Schoolcraft v. The City Of New York et al

Filing 269

FILING ERROR - ELECTRONIC FILING OF NON-ECF DOCUMENT - LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference Motion to Compel Plaintiff's Expert Discovery addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Suzanna Publicker Mettham dated September 4, 2014. Document filed by Christopher Broschart(Tax Id. 915354 in his official capacity), Christopher Broschart(Tax Id. 915354 Individually), Timothy Caughey(Tax Id. 885374 Individually), Timothy Caughey(Tax Id. 885374 in his official capacity), Kurt Duncan(Shield No. 2483, Individually), Kurt Duncan(Shield No. 2483 in his official capacity), William Gough(Tax Id. 919124, Individually), William Gough(Tax Id. 919124, in his Official Capacity), Thomas Hanley(Tax Id. 879761, in his Official Capacity), Thomas Hanley(Tax Id. 879761, Individually), Elise Hanlon(in her official capacity as a lieutenant with the New York City Fire Department), Elise Hanlon(individually), Shantel James(Shield No. 3004 in his official capacity), Shantel James(Shield No. 3004 Individually), Theodore Lauterborn(Tax Id. 897840 in his official capacity), Theodore Lauterborn(Tax Id. 897840, Individually), Michael Marino, Michael Marino, Gerald Nelson(Assistant Chief Patrol Borough Brooklyn North, Tax Id. 912370 in his official capacity), Gerald Nelson(Assistant Chief Patrol Borough Brooklyn North, Tax Id. 912370, Individually), Robert W. O'Hare(Tax Id. 916960, Individually), Robert W. O'Hare(Tax Id. 916960, in his Official Capacity), Frederick Sawyer(Shield No. 2576 in his official capacity), Frederick Sawyer(Shield No. 2576, Individually), The City Of New York, Timothy Trainer(Tax Id. 899922, in his Official Capacity), Timothy Trainer(Tax Id. 899922, Individually), Richard Wall, Sondra Wilson(Shield No. 5172, in her Official Capacity), Sondra Wilson(Shield No. 5172, Individually). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Mettham, Suzanna) Modified on 9/5/2014 (db).

EXHIBIT E

Schoolcraft v. The City ofNew York, et al.
10 CV 6005 (RWS)

EXPERT REPORT OF ELI B. SILYERMAN, PH.D. & JOHN A. ETERNO, PH.D.

1

We, Eli B. Silverman, Ph. D. and John A. Etemo, Ph.D., have been retained by the law
office of N athanial B Smith to provide expert opinions in the case of Adrian Schoolcraft,
Plaintiffv. City ofNew York et al., Defendants. We have reviewed materials sent to us, a listing
of which is attached as Appendix B to this application.
We will be providing expert testimony on the management approach of the NYPD, the
blue wall of silence, basic police procedure, and how these bear upon the plaintiffs claims in this
case.

Compstat as a Performance Management System

Compstat (short for compare statistics) is the NYPD's central performance management
accountability device, introduced in 1994, whereby commanders are held responsible for crime
in their areas. Compstat features up-to-date computerized crime data, crime analysis and
advanced crime mapping as the basis for regularized interactive crime strategy meetings. As
originally designed, Compstat strategy meetings were also viewed as a mechanism to devolve
resources and authority to local commanders so they could craft crime strategies to particular
local conditions.
Since information is key to a police department's ability to manage crime, the department
made a concerted effort to overcome the lag of three to six months in its reporting of crime
statistics. This new updated data first appeared in a document known as the Compstat
(comparative statistics) book. This book, compiled on a city wide patrol borough and precinct
basis originally included current weekly, monthly and year to date statistics for criminal
complaints and arrests for major felony categories and violations. As the years progressed, the

2

range of information expanded widely to include summonses, stop and frisk encounters, quality
of life violations and numerous other activities. Decision makers were provided with more
reliable and timely data at their disposal through the streamlining and sharing of information
retrieval and crime mapping.
Although crime mapping was not new for the NYPD, the Compstat book and crime
strategy meetings supplanted previous pin mapping by integrating the use of sophisticated
computer technologies and software mapping capability with statistical analyses and deployment
data. The original 1994 twice weekly Compstat crime strategy meetings represented the first time
multiple sources of crime information were gathered for display before all key organizational
members at meetings devoted solely to fighting crime. Commanders are ranked and evaluated
based on their comparative crime statistics, anticrime plans, related law enforcement activities,
and the ability to articulate these at meetings. Commanders who do not measure up are often
reassigned to other positions.

Compstat Consequences

The bulk ofNew York City's crime reduction has taken place since 1994 when Compstat
and other police reforms were introduced. The NYPD repeatedly publicizes an astounding 80
percent drop in index crime since 1990. New York City's reported dramatic crime decline has
drawn widespread attention to the NYPD from professionals, criminologists, law enforcement,
politicians, the media, and the general public. The Compstat crime reduction system has been
frequently emulated in other cities where former NYPD officials took over as Chief. These
include, among others, the cities of Minneapolis, Newark, Chicago, New Orleans, Raleigh,

3

Miami, Baltimore and Philadelphia (Anderson, 2001: 4; Clines, 2001: 15; Weissenstein, 2003:
27).
Some scholars attribute New York and some other cities crime declines almost
exclusively to the practices of the police and in particular to Compstat (Bratton, 1998; Kelling &
Coles, 1998; Kelling & Sousa, 2001; Maple, 1999; Zimring, 2011). Other research
demonstrates less confidence in the police's role in the crime decline. (Bowling, 1999; Conklin,
2003; Greenberg, 2013; Harcourt, 2001; Karmen, 2000; Messner et al., 2007; Rosenfeld &
Forango, 2014; Rosenfeld, Forango, & Rengifo, 2007). Regardless of which explanation one
accepts, the mayor, police commissioner and other government officials' rhetoric has consistently
repeated the decrease in index crime. It became the focal point, the narrative, of both the
Giuliani and Bloomberg administrations.
Maintaining the narrative that crime will go down regardless of headcount (loss of
thousands of officers), budgetary restrictions, respecting Constitutional rights (see Floyd v. City
ofNew York), and respecting its own officers (including apparent reprisals against the plaintiff

and other whistleblowers) has become management's priority. There is considerable evidence
that the NYPD leadership, particularly from 2002 to 2012, has altered and misused Compstat.
Management has, especially through Compstat, placed enormous pressures on all ranks to write
summonses, conduct stop and frisks, make arrests and the like to be reflected in the Compstat
figures. The evidence of overwhelming pressures which lead to illegal quotas on summonses,
arrests, and forcible stops as well as downgrading crime reports is reflected in union statements,
media accounts, non NYPD data sources, accounts of whistleblowers, court cases (Floyd v. City
ofNew York) and our research.

4

Union Statements
There have been many statements by the unions regarding downgrading crime reports and
illegal quotas. One pertinent press release appeared on May 23, 2004. The Patrolmen's
Benevolent Association and the Sergeant's Benevolent Association (the NYPD's unions for
officers and sergeants respectively) issued a joint press release reporting widespread
downgrading of reports. It boldly states,
Our own members tell us that they have been conditioned to write crime
complaints to misdemeanors rather than felonies because of the abuse they
receive from superior officers worried about their careers. The case of the 101h
precinct where a 7% decrease became a 50% increase is a shocking example of
what is occurring throughout the city in many station houses. It is a truth that is
widely known by members of the department and now we have to see if the police
commissioner has the courage to face the truth and do what is right for the city.
(PBA/SBA Press Release, 2004).

A PBA article by then treasurer Robert Zink (2004, n.p.) elucidates:
... The department's middle managers will do anything to avoid being dragged
onto the carpet at the weekly Compstat meetings. They are, by nature, ambitious
people who lust for promotions, and rising crime rates won't help anybody's
career ... So how do you fake a crime decrease? It's pretty simple. Don't file
reports, misclassify crimes from felonies to misdemeanors, under-value the
property lost to crime so it's not a felony, and report a series of crimes as a single
event. A particularly insidious way to fudge the numbers is to make it difficult or
impossible for people to report crimes - in other words, make the victims feel
like criminals ...
On May 15, 2003 the PBA issued a press release in which PBA President Patrick Lynch
stated, "Today, as we launch our 'Don't Blame the Cop' campaign, we are sharing hard evidence

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that our police officers are being pressured to write high-priced summonses at the risk of
reassignment or other punitive action." The PBA has consistently referred to these pressures.

Media Accounts
These union observations were also echoed in periodicals and other media accounts.
Although reports of misclassification surfaced even earlier, 2004 marked a year in which
significant reporting first emerged. Ten years after Compstat was introduced in 1994, Newsday
offered a series of articles depicting alterations in crime reports. The first article, published on
March 21, 2004, examined a three year, twenty-six percent crime decline in the 50th precinct.

Some cops who worked in the 50th precinct, though, say numbers don't
tell the whole story. They say the dip, and subsequent 11 percent rise in
crime in the first 10 weeks after the precinct commander's departure
raises questions about the way crimes were reported under his command.
Many in the department, officers as well as supervisors, point to an
atmosphere of apprehension in the NYPD since the advent of Compstat,
the computerized system used to track crime trends. Although even the

most ardent critics agree Compstat has helped reduce serious crime to
levels not seen in four decades, some say that there is such pressure on
precinct commanders to keep crime down that some look for ways to
reclassify major crimes so rates appears lower. (Parascandola & Levitt,
2004, italics added)
The article recounts specific instances of questionable crime reporting. Several of the
cases refer to police refusing to take reports, constantly questioning complainants and
downgrading crimes. The former precinct commander was described by his subordinates as "an
aggressive commander whose scrutiny sometimes took the form of personally reviewing crime
complaints two and three times to determine whether they were felonies, or could be
downgraded" (Parascandola &Levitt, 2004). Our research has uncovered current occurrences of
similar practices.
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A 2004 New York Times article reporting on the 2003 FBI crime statistics for New York
City, noted the Mayor's and the police union's disagreement on the authenticity of the statistics.
The PBA has charged that precinct commanders feel such intense
pressure to drive down crime that they 'cook the books,' reducing the
severity of crimes on paper to avoid recording them among the seven
index crimes reported to the FBI. (Rashbaum, 2004)

Media reports regarding pressures imposed on officers also surfaced on local television.
ABC local news investigative reporter Jim Hoffer (2010, May 25) has offered several related
pieces. One piece portrays Commissioner Kelly's response,

Emails we received from current NYPD officers suggest quota pressures play a
role. One writes: "THEY CONSTANTLY WANT YOU TO VIOLATE
PEOPLES' RIGHTS AND MAKE FALSE STATEMENTS TO GET THE
ARREST." Another officer writes: "COMMANDS PUT OUT A LIST EVERY
MONTH OF THOSE WHO DON'T HAVE AN AREST, LABELING YOU A
ZERO." Commissioner Kelly is unapologetic. I'm proud of the record of the men
and women of the Department, because I know that we are saving lives," he said.
Crime in New York remains at record lows, but recent Justice Department
numbers show other cities are also experiencing record low levels of crime,
including cities that don't use quota driven police tactics.

Whistleblowers

Whistleblowers have provided audiotapes indicating that crime reports are manipulated.
Officers Adrian Schoolcraft (plaintiff), Adyl Polanco, Sergeant Robert Borrelli and others
produced ample evidence of manipulation. Indeed, Officer Schoolcraft's allegations have since
been confirmed by the departments own 'secret' internal investigation exposed by a reporter
(Rayman, 2012; Appendix B QAD Report). One example ofthe level of manipulation from
Schoolcraft's tapes is supervisors at roll calls instructing entire shifts of officers not to take
robbery reports if victims are not willing to return to the station house - clearly violating

7

department training and procedures. We note that all three of these whistleblowers were, in
some way, disciplined by the organization. Officers Schoolcraft and Polanco were suspended.
Sergeant Borrelli was transferred to the Bronx from a quiet precinct in the Rockaways where he
worked for many years directly after he made his allegations. We note that these whistleblowers
have had to contend with what is known as the "Blue Wall of Silence."

Blue Wall of Silence
The Blue Wall of Silence is a phrase that is used to describe a police culture that prizes
intense loyalty, unity and solidarity among police officers to the extent that any officer reporting
the wrongdoing of another officer would be in violation of the code and subject to retaliation.
This code of silence has been observed in studies and reports of many police departments
throughout the world.
In New York City, this issue has also repeatedly emerged. The 1972 Knapp Commission
Report exposed an organized system of payoffs from narcotics dealers and businessmen. The
Commission pointed to a "blue wall of silence" which failed to disclose this "widespread
corruption." Twenty years later, the 1994 Mollen Commission report pointed to the same blue
wall of silence: "The Code of Silence and other attitudes of police officers that existed at the time
of the Knapp Commission continue to nurture police corruption and impede ·efforts at corruption
control." (Mollen, 1994, p. 51) Although the Moll en and Knapp Commissions uncovered
different varieties of corruption, both gauged it similarly. They underscored the police culture of
silence, scandal-avoidance, mutual protection and a distant, often hostile, "us versus them"
mindset of the NYPD.
The Blue Wall is bolstered by the solidarity and closed ranks of police officers and their
dependence on one another for mutual safety and the perception of a distant, nonresponsive, nonappreciative headquarters and public. As the Mollen Commission noted, "The pervasiveness of
the code of silence is itself alarming." (p. 53) Consequently, those who violate the code are either
8

shunned, ostracized, retaliated against, punished or in some cases harmed. These are some of the
reasons why whistle-blowing is so difficult regardless of the issue --whether it be officer errors,
misconduct, acquisitive crimes, illegal brutality or filling out false records. In fact, the Mollen
Commission uncovered officers falsifying documents such as arrest reports, warrants and
evidence for an illegal arrest or search reports. To blow the whistle on unwarranted activities is
not easy. The blue wall of silence is a powerful deterrent.
Blue Wall and Forcible Hospitalization of Police Officer Schoolcraft

The "blue wall of silence" likely contributed to actions taken against Officer Schoolcraft.
Photographs ofhis locker indicate he was labeled as a "rat". This conduct, if true, is consistent
with uniformed member retaliation. The Unusual Report written by the NYPD duty captain on
the day that Officer Schoolcraft was forcibly hospitalized raises many questions. The report, for
example, is missing at least two key elements: how Officer Schoolcraft was specifically
determined to be emotionally disturbed and what happened to the tape recorder that was found
on him.
An emotionally disturbed person is defined as, "A person who appears to be mentally ill

or temporarily deranged and is conducting himself in a manner which a police officer reasonably
believes is likely to result in serious injury to himself or others." (see NYPD Patrol Guide 21605). Based on the audiotape, Officer Schoolcraft is clearly lucid and answering questions. His
weapons have already been taken from him. There is no indication that he is going to harm
himself or others. The Patrol Guide requires the NYPD to explain how they "reasonably
believe" Officer Schoolcraft is "mentally ill or temporarily deranged" such that his conduct "is
likely to result in serious injury to himself or others." In fact, we note that in the Unusual Report
Officer Schoolcraft's department assigned psychologist stated very explicitly that " ...Mr.

9

Schoolcraft was not a danger to himself or others ... " This is a very specific statement directly
on point that appears to have been ignored by the officers on the scene. We note that the report
indicates that, "His [Officer Schoolcraft's] actions were deemed that of a potentially emotionally
disturbed person by Lieutenant Hanlon of FDNY and she determined that he would not be
allowed to refuse medical attention due to his irrational behavior." Two issues with this are: 1.
The EMT only states he is "potentially" emotionally disturbed which is not emotionally
disturbed and, 2. According to police procedure a police officer, not an EMT, must reasonably

believe that the person being taken into forcible custody is mentally ill or temporarily deranged
and this behavior is likely to cause serious injury to himself or others. There was no indication
ofthis in the Unusual Report. The audiotape clearly indicates that Chief Marino orders Officer
Schoolcraft into custody but no reasonable basis for his decision is articulated. We also point out
that the writer of the Unusual Report determines it important to note that copies of complaint
reports are in Schoolcraft's apartment but fails to point out the running tape recorder found on
Officer Schoolcraft. Additionally, the duty captain refers the complaint reports to Internal
Affairs for follow-up (which is referred to Quality Assurance which, in turn, confirms Officer
Schoolcraft's allegations about the corrupt activity in the precinct). Again, there is no mention
of a tape recorder which was found on Officer Schoolcraft that recorded the incident. Proper
police procedure requires mention of this tape recorder in the apartment. The fact that this is not
mentioned would appear to be a glaring omission. Interestingly, another active recorder captured
the audio of this incident and this second recording device was recovered by lAB a week later.
The fact that lAB found this recorder critical and the other officers found the first recorder
meaningless is totally contradictory.

10

Lastly, we also question the initial entry into the apartment. What was the exigent
circumstance? If it was his health, once Officer Schoolcraft was seen in the apartment in good
condition, the emergency no longer existed and the officers should have immediately vacated. If
any actions appeared "emotionally disturbed" they occurred after they entered the apartment. In
fact, if they occurred, they apparently were the direct result ofthe actions ofNYPD. Having a
team of armed officers and EMT' s in your home, all refusing to leave, remaining in the
apartment without permission would likely upset any normal person. In fact, Officer
Schoolcraft's basic 4th Amendment rights appeared to have been violated in terms of protecting
his property (the tape recorder), armed officers and EMT's not leaving his apartment, and
forcibly removing him from his apartment without justification. We also note that the Unusual
Report does not indicate that the Legal Bureau was either consulted or notified at any point. The
Bureau has staff attorneys available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. In this very unusual situation
in which the police forcibly entered a uniformed member of the service's home and forcibly took
him into custody as an EDP, it would have been exceedingly prudent to contact the Legal Bureau
for advice as well as notify them directly.

Hospital Data

Hospital data, available through 2006, raises serious questions regarding crime report
manipulation particularly with respect to assaults, thusly providing additional reasons for
studying the phenomenon of crime reporting manipulation. New York City's Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene statistics indicate that in 1999 there were 25,181 visits to emergency
rooms throughout the City for assault. In 2006 there were 4 7, 779 visits. This represents a 90
percent increase in visits for assault while the NYPD reported a substantial decline. Even more a

11

concern is visits to emergency rooms for firearms assaults which skyrocketed as well. In 1999
there were 224 visits and in 2006 they count 514 visits- a 129 percent increase. (New York City
Health and Hospitals Corporation. 2011).

Lack of transparency

The NYPD's lack of transparency (i.e. openness to non-partisan research and requests
from outside the agency) makes value-neutral scientific study difficult yet at the same time more
urgent. NYPD has rebuffed scrutiny of its written crime reports even from official government
bodies. For example, Mark Pomerantz, a former federal prosecutor who chaired New York
City's Commission to Combat Corruption (a Mayoral agency) was denied permission by the
police department to view its crime reports (Rashbaum, 2005). His appeal to Mayor Bloomberg
was rebuffed resulting in Mr. Pomerantz's resignation.
Under mounting pressure from public disclosures of crime report manipulation, in
January 2011 Commissioner Raymond Kelly appointed three former federal prosecutors to
review NYPD's crime report auditing practices. The report (released 2 years later than its
promised date) does not examine written complaints but merely reviews the auditing system.
Even this report raised serious questions. For example, the report indicates " ... the persistence of
'egregious' errors in certain precincts despite the pre-finalization review of the complaint reports
by supervisors may be construed to support the conclusion that complaint reports are not
meaningfully or at least proficiently reviewed at the precinct level-or, in the worst light, that
the reviewing supervisors are complicit in the downgrading ... " (NYPD, 2013, p. 47)
A 2013 report by then Public Advocate Bill de Blasio described the NYPD as one of the
City agencies least responsive to FOIL requests. The Public Advocate designated the Department

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as one of only two agencies to receive a failing grade since "28% of the NYPD answered
requests took more than 60 days to process [and] 31% of requests received no response." (NYC
Public Advocate, 2013, 13)

Additional Information from Audiotapes from Officer Schoolcraft (plaintiff)
The roll call of October 12, 2009 is particularly revealing. At this roll call the supervisor
is heard stating, "You know we been popping up with those robberies, whatever. The best thing
I can say .. .ifthe complainant does not want to go back to the squad [detectives], then there is no
61 taken. That's it ... " (Schoolcraft, 2009). This clearly violates department guidelines.
The audiotapes reveal how headquarters number's focus has been interpreted by lower
level precinct supervisors and even precinct commanders. Compstat's extreme pressure is
translated into not taking reports, questioning the veracity of victims, downgrading reports,
haranguing officers about callbacks by supervisors, attempting to figure out what a district
attorney will do, and, in general, keeping the numbers of index crimes down in any way possible
- regardless of consequences.
As if this were not bizarre enough, the Quality Assurance Division's (QAD) report on
Schoolcraft's allegations of crime downgrading in the 81 st precinct remained hidden from the
public until reporter Graham Rayman discovered it in 2012. It was dated June 2010- the exact
time the police department was denying contradictory revelations. This QUAD report confirms
nearly all of Officer Schoolcraft's allegations and our findings.

Our Research

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In 2008 and 2012 we conducted studies ofNYPD using accepted social science methods
as evidenced by 2 peer reviewed journal articles and an academic book (Etemo & Silverman
2012; 2010a; 2010b). Our first study was conducted in 2008. We sent a survey to all retired
members of the Captain's Endowment Association which includes the ranks of Captain and
above. A very important feature of the survey is that it was anonymous. Social science research
suggests that anonymity leads to more truthful responses to sensitive questions (Babbie, 1989;
Bradburn, 1983; Dillman, Smyth, & Christianson, 2009; Neuman, 2000). We received a total of
491 completed questionnaires. We examined the data comparing those who worked after 1994
(the first year ofCompstat) and those who worked before.
A second study was conducted in 2012. This study replicated and confirmed the results
of our 2008 study using a different sample. We used anonymity in this study as well. The
sample is retired officers who are on the "active retiree database" maintained by NYPD. We had
1,962 responses of all ranks.
Tabular analyses of both surveys indicate that there was widespread pressure on officers.
The two surveys results are also very similar giving us confidence that what we are reporting is
an accurate representation of what occurred in the NYPD.

We present 4 crosstabs from our

2012 survey and 3 crosstabs from our 2008 survey. The first 3 from 2012 show markedly
increased pressure in the most recent category (2002 to 2012) to write summonses, make arrests,
and conduct forcible stops. These results are strong and statistically significant. Additionally,
the last crosstab for the 2012 survey indicates that as pressures increased regarding summonses,
arrests and stops, concurrently, pressure to obey Constitutional rights decreased- a questionable
combination, at best. Our 2008 survey with Captains and above shows similar results regarding
pressures to generate summonses, make arrests and conduct forcible stops. That study also

14
i·

shows stronger pressures in the Compstat period. Again the results are statistically significant
and strong.
We also note that both surveys indicate the manipulation of crime reports in recent times.
The 2012 survey shows approximately double the level of manipulation in 2002 to 2012
compared to the previous two eras. This result is statistically significant and strong. Our 2008
survey with a completely different sample shows report manipulation in the Compstat era. As
we write in our book, "Ofthe 160 respondents who were aware of any changes, over half(53.8
percent) indicated that the changes observed were highly unethical. An additional23.8 percent
indicated the changes were moderately unethical." (Etemo and Silverman, 2012, p.34)

15

2012 SURVEY FINDINGS- SUMMONS PRESSURE (1)

Crosstah- Year categ_orized *Summons l!..ressure categ_orized
l:ear categorized
before 1995 until 2002 until
2001
2012
Total
1995
93
283
Count
132
58
summons pressure low
categorized
16.2%
11.0% 16.3%
24.7%
% within year
categorized
124
233
560
203
medium Count
27.5% 32.2%
38.0%
34.6%
% within year
categorized
522
897
199
176
high
Count
61.6% 51.6%
% within year
37.3%
49.2%
categorized
534
848
1740
358
Count
Total
100.0%
100.0% 100.0%
% within year
100.0%
categorized
Gamma = .32 p< .000
Kendall's tau b =.203 p< .000

16

2012 SURVEY FINDINGS ARREST PRESSURE (2)

Crosstab - Year categorized hJ!.. arrest f!_ressure categorized
~ear

arrest pressure
categorized

Total

categorized
before 1995 until 2002 until
2001
2012
1995
77
111
191
21.2%
13.2%
36.2%

Count
% within year
categorized
medium Count
% within year
categorized
Count
high
% within year
categorized
Count
% within year
categorized
low

Total
379
21.9%

240
45.5%

128
35.3%

415
49.3%

528
100.0%

17

714
316
37.5% 41.2%

97
18.4%

Gamma= .422 p<.OOO
Kendall's tau b =.277 p< .000

158
43.5%

363
100.0°/o

640
36.9%

842
1733
100.0% 100.0%

2012 SURVEY FINDINGS STOP PRESSURE (3)

Crosstab -rear categ_orized * stoe.e.ressure categ_orized

stop pressure
categorized

Total

l:ear categorized
before 1995 until 2002 until
2001
2012
1995
127
205
297
24.4%
36.7%
57.8%

low

Count
% within year
categorized
medium Count
% within year
categorized
high
Count
% within year
categorized
Count
% within year
categorized

Total
629
37.0%

170
33.1%

664
39.0%

66
19.1%

295
35.1%

408
24.0%

514
100.0%

18

341
40.5%

47
9.1%

Gamma= .461 p<.OOO
Kendall's tau b =.302 p<.OOO

153
44.2%

346
100.0%

841
1701
100.0% 100.0%

2012 SURVEY FINDINGS RIGHTS PRESSURE (4)

Crosstab ,E- Year categorized* Pressure to Obe,E Constitutional rights categorized

obey constitutional
rights pressure
categorized

Total

low

Count
% within year
categorized
medium Count
% within year
categorized
high
Count
% within year
categorized
Count
% within year
categorized

Gamma= -.106 p<.002
Kendall's tau b = -.067 p< .000

19

l::ear categorized
1995
2002
before
until
until
1995
2001
2012
Total
109
63
187
359
17.2%
20.7%
22.1% 20.6%
183
34.7%

132
36.0%

357
672
42.2% 38.6%

235
44.6%

172
46.9%

302
35.7%

527
100.0%

367
100.0%

709
40.7%

846
1740
100.0% 100.0%

2008 SURVEY FINDINGS SUMMONS PRESSURE (1)

Crosstab- Year *Pressure to increase summonses
Did you serve on NYPD
after 1994
Total
Yes
No
Count
29
increase summonses low
68
39
categorized
27.7%
9.3% 15.0%
% within Did you serve
on NYPD after 1994
143
medium Count
209
66
45.7% 46.0%
% within Did you serve
46.8%
on NYPD after 1994
high
141
Count
177
36
45.0% 39.0%
% within Did you serve
25.5%
on NYPD after 1994
454
141
313
Total
Count
100.0% 100.0%
% within Did you serve
100.0%
on NYPD after 1994

Gamma=.431 p<.OOO
Kendall's tau c = .238 p< .000

20

2008 SURVEY FINDINGS ARREST PRESSURE (2)
Crosstah - Year *Pressure to increase arrests categorized

increase arrests
categorized

Total

Count
% within Did you serve
on NYPD after 1994
medium Count
% within Did you serve
on NYPD after 1994
high
Count
% within Did you serve
on NYPD after 1994
Count
% within Did you serve
on NYPD after 1994
low

Gamma=.571 p<.OOO
Kendall's tau c = .313 p<.OOO

21

Did you serve on NYPD
after 1994
No
Yes
43
26
30.9%
8.3%

Total
69
15.2%

73
52.5%

228
155
49.2% 50.2%

23
16.5%

134
157
42.5% 34.6%

139
100.0%

315
454
100.0% 100.0%

2008 SURVEY FINDINGS STOP PRESSURE (3)

Crosstab- Year* Pressure to increase stop and frisk

increase stops and
frisk categorized

Total

low

Count
% within Did you
serve on NYPD after
1994
medium Count
% within Did you
serve on NYPD after
1994
high
Count
% within Did you
serve on NYPD after
1994
Count
% within Did you
serve on NYPD after
1994

Gamma=.617 p<.OOO
Kendall's tau b =.347 p< .000

22

Did you serve on NYPD
after 1994
Yes
No
75
71
22.5%
54.7%

Total
146
32.3%

55
40.1%

155
49.2%

210
46.5%

7
5.1%

89
28.3%

96
21.2%

137
100.0%

315
452
100.0% 100.0%

2012 Survey - Knowledge of Crime Manipulation & Retirement Category
Period 1
1981-1993

Period 2
1994-2001

Period 3
2002-2012

327
(69.7%)

264
(65.5%)

383
(44.5%)

1-2 times
3-5 times
5+ times

15
55
72
(30.3%)

19
66
54
(34.5%)

44
188
245
(55.5%)

78
309
371

n
Missing
N

469
15
484

403
12
415

860

1732
38
1770

No

Yes

Statistics:
Gamma [ordinal by ordinal]
*** p< 0.001

0.337***

23

11

871

N
974

Impact on Police Officer Schoolcraft
Compstat began as a vital performance management system designed to address crime
and quality of life issues through up to date crime statistics, coupled with computer technology
crime mapping in an organizational environment designed to integrate and coordinate all relevant
NYPD units. Yet over time Compstat morphed into an instrument utilized by the NYPD
leadership to centralize decision making in order to record numbers that reflect lower index
crime and higher officer activity regarding arrests, summonses and stop and frisks. The
centralization of decision making and reduction of lower level flexibility, autonomy and
discretion parallels a national study of U.S. police departments (not including New York City)
which have adapted the Compstat system (Weisburd et al., 2001).
Since 2002, political and police pressure mounted to sustain the crime reduction
phenomenon of previous years. Up until2002, the first year of Mr. Bloomberg's administration,
crime was already down 60 percent. Leveling off was not considered an official option.
Demands to produce numbers have triggered the expansion ofNYPD activities that "work" but
without maintaining an eye on the structural health of the organization. The remedies are akin to
doubling a medication of 5 milligrams to 10 milligrams since the current prescription seemed to
work well. More of the same strategic medicine is introduced regardless of warnings about
possible side effects. Massive deployment to address quality-of-life crimes becomes favored over
more surgical strikes. Inadequate evaluation and tactical intensification has also been
accompanied by increased centralization. Special units, such as narcotics enforcement and
warrant enforcement became increasingly directed from above. In effect a centralization thrust
has been superimposed on decentralized reforms. But centralization now has a powerful weapon
in its arsenal--Compstat.
24

Compstat, in many senses, had been turned on its head. Instead of a tool to reevaluate
objectives and tactics and scan the environment for future trends, the information from
computer-generated comparative statistics became known for only its most visible aspects--crime
mapping and deployment activity. Greater information was used to bear down on the
management of many street operations. Numbers, sometimes any numbers, rule the day. This
ratcheted system, in the words of one participant is "wound up too tight." A 20-year veteran
Brooklyn detective put it this way, "Compstat is everything. People are tired of being harassed,
searched and frisked, and run off the streets. People are fed up; the cops are, too." (Marzulli &
O'Shaughnessy, 2000).
In a highly charged political atmosphere, the NYPD's ability to accomplish short-term
success has been amplified by Compstat. And what happens when painstaking and constant
lessons of implementation are neglected for the quick fix? The short-haul dominates. The NYPD,
preoccupied by the crisis dujour, has little time or inclination to reflect on its mission and
alternative strategies.
As it relates to this case, Officer Schoolcraft is a victim of the NYPD's Compstat
numbers game and the 'blue wall of silence.' Quotas, illegal stops, downgrading crime numbers
were endemic during his street time as a member of the NYPD. The Quality Assurance Division
memorandum confirms his allegations. The Floyd case adds further evidence. Our studies
provide additional confirmation. Beyond all this, photographs of his locker indicate that he was
labeled a "rat". The informal system based on the blue wall of silence led to the NYPD's abuse
of authority whereby Schoolcraft was forcibly detained for six days in a mental hospital without
an aided card or proper notification being filed- in flagrant violation of department policy (see

25

PG 216-01 & 216-03 ). The NYPD tried to hide evidence of what happened in his apartmentfailing to mention (in the Unusual Report) the first tape recorder found on Officer Schoolcraft.
As we have seen, other whistleblowers were punished as well (e.g., Sergeant Borelli's
transfer and Police Officer Adyl Polanco's suspension). There is a clear pattern of abuse and
retaliation by the NYPD. Officer Schoolcraft clearly tried in earnest to do the right thing- to
notify superiors who belatedly confirmed his allegations. In return, they forcibly transported him
to the hospital. Officer Schoolcraft is not an EDP but an honest, hard-working police officer
trying to expose misconduct.

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Signature

a 1J. JJ~aie:
Eli B. Silverman, Ph.D.

31