Schoolcraft v. The City Of New York et al

Filing 551

PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS. Document filed by Adrian Schoolcraft. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Proposed Verdict Sheet)(Smith, Nathaniel)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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ADRIAN SCHOOLCRAFT,
)
)
Plaintiff,
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-against-)
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THE CITY OF NEW YORK, etal.,
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)
Defendants.
)
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10 Civ. 6005 (RWS)

PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Pursuant to Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court’s Individual
Practices, plaintiff requests that the Court give the following instructions to the jury, in addition
to any general instructions it intends to give.
I. SUBSTANTIVE LAW/PARTIES
The plaintiff in this case is Police Officer Adrian Schoolcraft. He is suing the defendants
under New York State law. The defendants in this action are Jamaica Hospital Medical Center,
Dr. Lilian Aldana-Bernier and Dr. Isak Isakov. I will refer to these defendants as the Medical
Defendants.
Officer Schoolcraft alleges that the Medical Defendant’s falsely imprisoned him at
Jamaica Hospital from October 31, 2009 until November 6, 2009 and that the decisions they
made to keep him in the hospital against his will deviated from generally accepted standards in
the medical community.
Although there are three defendants in this case, it does not follow from that fact alone
that if one or more defendant is liable, any other defendant is liable. Each defendant is entitled
to a fair consideration of the evidence relating to the plaintiff’s claims and that defendant’s own
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defense, and plaintiff and each defendant is not to be prejudiced by any finding you make for or
against plaintiff or any defendant. Unless otherwise stated, all the instructions I give to you
govern the case as to each of plaintiff’s claims, and each defendant’s defenses, separately.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT CLAIM AGAINST THE MEDICAL DEFENDANTS
Officer Schoolcraft brings a claim of false imprisonment against each of the Medical
Defendants. However, Officer Schoolcraft's claim is divided into two separate decisions to
involuntarily confine him at Jamaica Hospital. The first period of confinement was for three (3)
days beginning on October 31, 2009 and concluding on November 3, 2009. The parties agree
that only defendant Jamaica Hospital, its employees agents and staff were the only individuals
involved in making the decision to confine plaintiff for this three (3) day period. I therefore
instruct you that you are only to consider defendant Jamaica Hospital's liability for plaintiff's
false imprisonment claim relating to this period of confinement.
The second period of imprisonment/confinement was for an additional three (3) days
beginning on November 3, 2009 and concluding on November 6, 2009. It is up to you to decide
which defendant or defendants were involved in making this decision to continue to confine
plaintiff for this three (3) day period. I instruct you that you may find one, two or all of the
Medical defendants liable for this decision.
SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE FALSE IMPRISONMENT CLAIM
In order to succeed on his false imprisonment claim, Officer Schoolcraft must show that
the Medical Defendants intended to confine him at Jamaica Hospital, that Officer Schoolcraft
was conscious of his confinement, that he did not consent to his confinement. There is no
dispute in this case, that these elements have been established. I therefore instruct you that
Officer Schoolcraft has proven that defendants intended to confine him at Jamaica Hospital, he
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was conscious of his confinement and did not consent to being confined.
Nevertheless, defendants can still succeed on this claim if they can prove that his
confinement was otherwise privileged. DeMarco v. Sadiker, 952 F. Supp. 134, 141 (E.D.N.Y.
1996). I instruct you that defendants bear the burden of establishing this element.
In this case, Defendants contend that their decision to imprison/confine Officer
Schoolcraft in Jamaica Hospital for both three (3) day periods was privileged. Therefore, the
only element you need to decide is whether Officer Schoolcraft’s involuntary confinement at
Jamaica Hospital was privileged. I instruct you that the only way defendants can prove that
Officer Schoolcraft's confinement was privileged in this case, is if they establish that their
decision to confine plaintiff satisfied the requirements of Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39. I will
now instruct you on those requirements
REQUIREMENTS OF THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 9.39
In order to justifiably confine someone involuntarily under Mental Hygiene Law 9.39,
Medical Defendants must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the person has a mental
illness for which immediate observation, care, and treatment in a hospital is appropriate and that
the mental illness is likely to result in serious harm to himself or others.

(Authority: N.Y.

Mental Hygiene Law. § 9.39.)
The Mental Hygiene Law further defines “likelihood to result in serious harm” as
follows: “1. substantial risk of physical harm to himself as manifested by threats of or attempts at
suicide or serious bodily harm or other conduct demonstrating that he is dangerous to himself, or
2. a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by homicidal or other violent
behavior by which others are placed in reasonable fear of serious physical harm.” (Authority:
Id.). A person may only be admitted under 9.39 if a staff physician has personally examined
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patient and determined that these specific requirements have been met. In addition, even when
these findings have been made, the confinement is only privileged for a period of forty eight (48)
hours unless these findings are confirmed by another physician who is a member of the hospital
psychiatric staff and only after that second physician has also personally examined the
individual.
Thus, for the defendants to establish the privilege in this case,the Medical Defendants
must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) Officer Schoolcraft had a mental
illness; 2) that the mental illness was such that immediate observation, care and treatment in a
hospital was appropriate; and 3) that the mental illness was likely to result in serious harm,
meaning a substantial risk of physical harm to himself or others as shown by homicidal or other
violent behavior; and 4) an Officer Schoolcraft was in need of involuntary care and treatment
until the time of his discharge. (Authority: Boggs v New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 70
N.Y.2d 972, 973 (1988) (“The only legal issue presented is whether the City established by clear
and convincing evidence that petitioner [… has a mental illness and is a danger to herself or
others (Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39[a] ).”); Francis v. Stone, 221 F. 3d 100, 101 (2d Cir. 2000)
(“Involuntary civil commitment procedures mandate numerous protections, including a
requirement that the party proposing confinement must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the person is mentally ill and poses a danger to himself or others”). Further, in order to keep
plaintiff confined longer than forty eight (48) hours at the hospital, defendants must establish that
a second physician from the psychiatric staff confirmed those findings after they personally
examined plaintiff.
However, even if defendants are able to establish that they made the required findings
under Mental Hygiene Law 9.39, defendants confinement of plaintiff will not be privileged if
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those decisions finding plaintiff to pose a likelihood of serious harm to himself or others, were
made in a manner, or based on methods that deviated from accepted medical practice. In other
words, even if defendants had made such a finding, their confinement of plaintiff will not be
privileged if those decisions constituted medical malpractice. Anthony v. City of New York,
No. 00 CIV. 4688 (DLC), 2001 WL 741743, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2001) aff’d, 339 F.3d 129
(2d Cir. 2003);
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE10
A doctor who renders medical service to a patient is obligated to have that reasonable
degree of knowledge and skill that is expected of an average psychiatrist who performs
evaluations and treatment in the medical community in which the doctor practices. The doctor
must also comply with minimum national standards of care.

Malpractice is professional

negligence and medical malpractice is the negligence of a doctor. Negligence is the failure to
use reasonable care under the circumstances, doing something that a reasonably prudent doctor
would not do under the circumstances, or failing to do something that a reasonably prudent
doctor would do under the circumstances. It is a deviation or departure from accepted practice.
The law recognizes that there are differences in the abilities of doctors, just as there are
differences in the abilities of people engaged in other activities. To practice medicine a doctor is
not required to have the extraordinary knowledge and ability that belongs to a few doctors of
exceptional ability. However every doctor is required to keep reasonably informed of new
developments in his/her field and to practice medicine in accordance with approved methods and
means of treatment in general use. A doctor must also use his or her best judgment and whatever
superior knowledge and skill he/see possesses, even if the knowledge and skill exceeds that
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The instructions contained in this section are modeled on N.Y. Pattern Jury Instr.-Civil 2:150.
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possessed by the average psychiatrist, in the medical community where the doctor practices. By
undertaking to perform a medical service, a doctor does not guarantee a good result. The fact that
there was a bad result to the patient, by itself, does not make the doctor liable. The doctor is
liable only if he/she was negligent. Whether the doctor was negligent is to be decided on the
basis of the facts and conditions existing at the time of the claimed negligence.
If the doctor is negligent, that is, lacks the skill or knowledge required of him/her in
providing a medical service, or fails to use reasonable care in providing the service, or fails to
exercise his or her best judgment, and such failure is a substantial factor in causing harm to the
patient, then they have committed malpractice.
Thus, if the decision to confine plaintiff or the determination that plaintiff posed a
likelihood of serious harm to himself or others was based on decisions or actions that lacked the
skill or knowledge required of defendants, or they failed to use reasonable care in making such
decision or failed to exercise their best judgment in making those decisions, they would not be
privileged to confine/imprison plaintiff at Jamaica hospital.
In determining whether or not defendants decision to confine plaintiff or the decision
finding that plaintiff posed a likelihood of serious harm to himself or others was negligent and
thus constituted malpractice, I give you the following instructions:
I charge you that a doctor must conduct his or her own independent medical examination
of a patient before making a decision regarding the care and treatment of the patient. Bell v. New
York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 90 A.D. 2d 270, 280 (2d Dept. 1982) (doctor has duty to
rest a decision upon a careful and competent examination); Nestorwich v. Ricotta, 97 N.Y. 2d
393, 398 (2002) (doctors must employ their best judgment in treating patients after careful
examination0; Pigno v. Bunim, 43 A/D. 2d 718, 718-19 (2d Dept. 1973), aff’d, 35 N.Y. 2d 841
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(1974) (on opinion below) (error to grant motion for directed verdict for doctor where the facts
showed a jury issue on whether the doctor exercised professional judgment after careful
examination; where delay in performing test was not the result of careful analysis and evaluation,
lower court erred in directing verdict for defendant-doctor); Clark v. State of New York, 99 A.D.
2d 616 (3d Dept. 1984) (doctor’s failure to conduct careful examination of patient, the medical
record and the information available means that the doctor failed to exercise professional
judgment in releasing mental health patient).
Further, a decision that is made without proper medical foundation, that is, one that is not
the product of a carful examination, is not to be legally insulated as a professional medical
judgment, Bell, 90 A.D. 2d at 280-81, and you may find a doctor liable if you find that the
doctor’s judgment was not based on a careful examination and thus there was a failure to
exercise any professional judgment. Id.
I further charge you that a doctor would not have exercised professional judgment, or
adhered to minimum professional standards, if he or she relied upon only the
uncorroboratedstatements contained in the medical records to conclude that the patient posed a
danger to self or others. Rodriguez v City of New York, 72 F. 3d 1051, 1057 (2d Cir 1995)
(rejecting the suggestion “that a physician's mere making of a finding satisfies the requirements
of either [M.H.L. § 9.39] or due process”). A sufficient investigation must be done to verify the
information in the medical records and the threat of harm. Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 234 F. Supp. 2d 140. In other words, a doctor is required to contact available
persons with pertinent information and that without such additional information gathering, a
doctor’s finding that plaintiff was dangerous, constitutes a substantial departure from
professional judgment. If you find that the Medical Defendants failed to make reasonable efforts
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to gather such information to assess Officer Schoolcraft’s mental state, you must find for the
Plaintiff on this issue.
Therefore, if, after considering all of the evidence, you conclude that the Medical
Defendants have not established that plaintiff had the requisite mental illness and risk of danger
criteria required by Mental Hygiene Law 9.39 or that the determination of that criteria was
negligent according to medical malpractice standards, your verdict must be for Officer
Schoolcraft on this claim. On the other hand, if you conclude that the Medical Defendants have
proven by clear and convincing evidence the privilege to detain Officer Schoolcraft, then your
verdict must be for them.
AGENCY OF JHMC TREATING DOCTORS AND NURSES
Officer Schoolcraft also seeks to recover damages from JHMC on grounds that it is liable
for the negligence of its doctors, nurses, and other staff whose conduct is the subject of this
lawsuit. Because the medical personnel who treated Officer Schoolcraft at JHMC are employees
or agents of the hospital, JHMC is responsible for their acts. Defendants Bernier and Isacov are
also considered agents of Jamaica Hospital, therefore if you find either defendant Bernier and/or
Isacov is liable for any of plaintiff's claims, then you must find that defendant Jamaica Hospital
is liable as well.
II.

PROXIMATE CAUSE

In order to recover damages in this case, Officer Schoolcraft must show that the Medical
Defendants cause him harm. An act or omission is regarded as a cause of an injury if it was a
substantial factor in bringing about the injury, that is, if it had such an effect in producing the
injury that reasonable people would regard it as a cause of the injury. (Authority: N.Y. Pattern
Jury Instr.--Civil 2:70.)
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A substantial factor in causing harm is a factor that a reasonable person would consider to
have contributed to the harm. It must be more than a remote or trivial factor. It does not have to
be the only cause of the harm. There may be more than one cause of an injury. Where the
independent and negligent acts or omissions of two or more parties cause injury to another, each
of those negligent acts or omissions is regarded as a cause of that injury provided that it was a
substantial factor in bringing about that injury. (Authority: N.Y. Pattern Jury Instr.--Civil 2:71.)
You might find that more than one defendant is liable for a particular injury. If two or
more persons unite in an intentional act that violates another person’s right, then all of those
persons are jointly liable for the acts of each of them; the law does not require the injured party
to establish how much of the injury was done by each particular defendant that you find liable.
Thus, if you find that the defendants who you find to be liable acted jointly, then you may treat
them jointly for purposes of deciding damages. If you decide that two or more of the defendants
are jointly liable on a particular claim, then you may simply determine the overall amount of
damages for which they are liable, without breaking that figure down into individual
percentages. Keep in mind that a defendants' liability does not depend on how much damage he
has caused, his share of the damage or that other parties - even those who are not defendants caused more damage or were more at fault. The easiest way to conceptualized this concept is
that if you find that any defendant was responsible for even 1% of plaintiff's injury, you must
find that party liable and render a verdict against them in favor of plaintiff. See e.g., See
Manganiello v. Agostini, 2009 WL 151724, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)("If the tortfeasors are jointly
and severally liable, one tortfeasor is not relieved from liability simply because the other
tortfeasor also committed liability-causing actions…This principal of liability is not altered even
when one tortfeasor is immune from liability."); Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F.2d 185, 189 (6th Cir.
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1993)(“Unquestionably, the bulk of responsibility for damages falls on the security
personnel…However, applying the principles of joint and several liability…We must therefore
reverse the District Court's order insofar as it limits Defendant's liability to 10% of Plaintiff's
damages.”).
If you find that Officer Schoolcraft has established that either Dr. Isakov or Dr. Bernier
committed malpractice or were negligent, and that either or both of their negligence or
malpractice proximately caused Officer Schoolcraft injuries, then your verdict will be in his
favor and against Dr. Isakov and/or Dr. Bernier. On the other hand, if you find that Officer
Schoolcraft has not established that either Dr. Isakov or Dr. Bernier were negligent, or that their
negligence did not proximately cause Officer Schoolcraft injuries, then your verdict will be in
their favor and against Officer Schoolcraft on this claim.
CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE—JHMC
The corporate negligence doctrine is a doctrine under which a hospital owes a direct duty
to its patients to ensure their safety and well-being while at the hospital. The following are the
duties that a hospital must fulfill and that it cannot pass on to anyone else: (1) to use reasonable
care in the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and equipment; (2) to select and retain
only competent physicians; (3) to oversee as to patient care all persons who practice medicine
within its walls; and (4) to formulate, adopt, and enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure
quality care for its patients. (Authority: Thompson v. Nason Hospital, 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991).
These duties arise from the relationship existing between a hospital and its patients, which are
based on the vulnerability of physically or mentally ill persons and their inability to provide care
for themselves. Corporate negligence is a direct theory of liability against a hospital, which
contemplates some form of systemic negligence by hospital, and is not simply a vicarious theory
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of liability based on the negligence of its employees.
If you decide that JHMC violated any one of those duties, you must then decidewhether
JHMC knew or should have known of the breach of that duty, andthat the conduct was a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm or injury.
III. DAMAGES
If you find that Officer Schoolcraft has met his burden of proof with respect to his claims,
that is, that he has proven his claims by a preponderance of the evidence, then you must consider
the issue of damages. The fact that I am giving you instructions on damages, however, should
not be considered as an indication of any view of mine on what your verdict should be. Rather,
instructions on damages are given only so that you will have them in the event that you should
find in favor of Officer Schoolcraft on the question of liability.
There are two types of damages that you may consider: compensatory damages and
punitive damages. I will discuss each of these in turn.
A. Compensatory Damages
If you find for Officer Schoolcraft on the issue of liability, then you may award him
compensatory damages, that is, a sum of money that you believe will fairly and justly
compensate him for any injury you believe he actually sustained as a direct consequence of
defendants’ conduct.
You may award compensatory damages only for those injuries that you find that Officer
Schoolcraft has proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

Moreover, you may award

compensatory damages only for those injuries that you find Officer Schoolcraft has proven by a
preponderance of the evidence to have been the direct result of conduct by defendants. That is,
you may not simply award compensatory damages for any injury suffered by Officer Schoolcraft
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from any cause -- you may award compensatory damages only for those injuries that are a direct
result of actions by defendants.
Compensatory damages must not be based on speculation or sympathy. They must be
based on the evidence presented at trial, and only on that evidence. I cannot give you a yardstick
by which to measure the dollar value of pain or injury.

You heard Officer Schoolcraft’s

testimony and the testimony of his witnesses, including his expert witness, about the injuries he
sustained. If you award compensatory damages you will have to determine, based on your
common sense and experience, that amount of money that will fairly and reasonably make
Officer Schoolcraft whole or compensate him for his loss of income, and the injuries and pain
and suffering that he sustained, and may continue to sustain, as a consequence of any acts that
violated his rights.
Concerning Officer Schoolcraft’s claim of false imprisonment, from the fact of
confinement alone, you must award him monetary damages for the loss of freedom and
movement. In assessing compensatory damages, you must include an amount attributable to loss
of liberty and emotional distress resulting from his imprisonment and confinement that you
determine to be reasonable compensation in the light of all the evidence in this case.
Consequently, the law does not try to fix, nor does the law permit, a precise formula by which
loss of liberty and emotional damages as an element of compensatory damages may be measured
and reduced to dollars and cents.
If plaintiff wins, he is entitled to compensatory damages as a matter of law for his loss of
liberty resulting from his confinement. See Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93 (2d Cir.
2004) (recognizing that loss of liberty and emotional injuries are independent of each other and
that the torts of false arrest and malicious prosecution “‘[are] complete with even a brief restraint
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of the plaintiff's freedom’; ‘it is not necessary that any damage result from it other than the
confinement itself.’”)(emphasis added); see also Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir.
2013)(" a post-arraignment defendant who is ‘obligated to appear in court in connection with
[criminal] charges whenever his attendance [i]s required’ suffers a Fourth Amendment
deprivation of liberty")(citations omitted).
You must award compensatory damages for any loss of liberty suffered by the plaintiff
even if you determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory damages for physical,
emotional or monetary harm. See Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 123-25 (2d Cir.
2004)(recognizing that loss of liberty and emotional injuries are independent of each other and
that the torts of false arrest and “‘[are] complete with even a brief restraint of the plaintiff's
freedom’; ‘it is not necessary that any damage result from it other than the confinement
itself.’”)(emphasis added). This means that if you believe that plaintiff suffered a loss of his
liberty as a result of defendants’ conduct then you must award compensatory damages for the
amount of time and loss of dignity associated with plaintiff's deprivation of his liberty. See
Vilkhu v. City of New York, No. 06 Civ 2095 (CPS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16616, *2021 (E.D.N.Y. March 3, 2009)("especially, in cases where proof of the alleged constitutional
violation hinges on the jury's determinations of witness credibility -- a nominal damages
instruction affords the jury an opportunity to engage in improper compromise. In such cases, a
plaintiff should be allowed to determine whether to seek both nominal and compensatory
damages, or whether to remove the option of nominal damages from the jury's consideration and
instead seek an outcome in his case based on his showing of proximately caused actual
injury").11

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Plaintiff does not wish to have the jury consider a nominal damages charge. See Vilkhu
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You may also award damages for any physical or psychological injury, emotional
distress, mental suffering, or any physical consequences resulting from emotional distress, that
Officer Schoolcraft has suffered, and may continue to suffer, as a result of the wrongful conduct
of the defendants. Gardner v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 907 F.2d 1348, 1353 (2d
1990)(“Thus, the damages for deprivation of liberty redress the denial of free movement and the
violation done to Gardner’s dignity as a result of the unlawful detention, and not the physical and
mental injuries arising from the incident.”)(emphasis added); Robinson v. Holder, 2008 WL
2875291, *9 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)(“‘[t]he damages recoverable for the period spent in wrongful
confinement are separable from damages recoverable for such injuries as physical harm,
embarrassment, or emotional suffering.”)(emphasis added).
If Officer Schoolcraft persuades you by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence,
you may also include in your award fair and reasonable compensation for injury to reputation
from the detention, as well as the shame and humiliation of the detention.
If you decide that any defendant is liable, plaintiff is entitled to recover a sum of money
which will justly and fairly compensate him for any injury and pain and suffering to date caused
by defendants. (Authority: New York Pattern Jury Instruction – Civil, 2:280) In determining
the amount, if any, to be awarded plaintiff for pain and suffering, you may take into
consideration the effect that plaintiff’s injuries have had on plaintiff’s ability to enjoy life. Loss
of enjoyment of life involves the loss of the ability to perform daily tasks, to participate in the
activities which were a part of the person’s life before the injury, and to experience the pleasures
of life. If you find that plaintiff, as a result of his injuries, suffered some loss of the ability to
enjoy life, you may take that loss into consideration in determining the amount to be awarded to
v. City of New York, No. 06 Civ 2095 (CPS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16616, *20-21 (E.D.N.Y.
March 3, 2009)
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plaintiff for pain and suffering to date. (Authority: New York Pattern Jury Instruction – Civil,
2:280.1)
With respect to any of the plaintiff’s injuries or disabilities, the plaintiff is entitled to
recover for future pain, suffering and disability and the loss of his ability to enjoy life. In this
regard you should take into consideration the period of time that the injuries or disabilities are
expected to continue. If you find that the injuries or disabilities are permanent, you should take
into consideration the period of time that the plaintiff can be expected to live.
You may also award damages for the loss of income that you find Officer Schoolcraft has
experienced to date or will experience continue to experience as a result of the wrongful conduct
of the defendants.
Finally, the law provides that the stigma of an involuntary commitment results in a
variety of other future adverse social consequences. Addington at 426; Harris, at 279-80; Goetz v
Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir 1992). In making your determination, you may consider the
emotional as well as the financial consequenses suffered by Officer Schoolcraft. If you find that
the stigma of being involuntary commitment significant impacted Officer Schoolcraft you must
find in favor of plaintiff on this issue.
In determining the amount of any damages that you decide to award, you should be
guided by dispassionate common sense. You must use sound discretion in fixing an award of
damages, drawing reasonable inferences from the facts in evidence. In sum, your award of
compensatory damages should reasonably compensate Officer Schoolcraft for such injury and
damage as you find, from a preponderance of the evidence in the case, that he has sustained or is
reasonable likely to sustain in the future as a direct result of the defendants’ culpable conduct.
B. Punitive Damages.
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As I mentioned before, you may also make a separate and additional award of punitive
damages. The decision to award punitive damages rests solely in the jury’s discretion. If you
award Officer Schoolcraft compensatory damages, then you may, but are not required to, also
make a separate and additional award of punitive damages. The fact that I am giving you
instructions on punitive damages, however, should not be considered as an indication of any
view of mine on what your verdict should be. Rather, instructions on punitive damages are given
only so that you will have them in the event that you should find in favor of Officer Schoolcraft
on the question of liability.
You may award Officer Schoolcraft punitive damages against a defendant if you find that
the particular defendant’s actions were malicious or wanton and reckless, not merely
unreasonable, or if one or more of the defendants intentionally violated Officer Schoolcraft’s
rights. An act or failure to act is maliciously done if it is prompted by ill will or spite toward the
injured person. An act or failure to act is wanton if done in a reckless or callous disregard of, or
indifference to, the rights of the injured person. Officer Schoolcraft has the burden of proving,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that any of the defendants acted maliciously or wantonly
with regard to his rights. An act is wantonly and recklessly done if done in such a manner, and
under such circumstances, as to reflect utter disregard for the potential consequences of the act
on the safety and rights of others.
An award of punitive damages is discretionary; that is, if you find that the legal
requirements for punitive damages are satisfied, then you may decide to award punitive
damages, or you may decide not to award them. In making this decision, you should consider the
underlying purpose of punitive damages. The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate
Officer Schoolcraft. Punitive damages are awarded in the jury's discretion to punish a defendant
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for outrageous conduct, and to deter him or her, and others in the same position, from engaging
in similar conduct in the future.
DATED: October 28, 2015
LAW OFFICE OF NATHANIEL B. SMITH
100 Wall Street, 23rd Floor
New York, NY 10005
212 227 7062
212 346 4665 (fax)
By: Nathaniel B. Smith
John Lenoir
LAW OFFICES OF JON L. NORINSBERG
225 Broadway, Suite 2700
New York, New York 10007
[phone]
[phone] (fax)
COHEN & FITCH, LLP
225 Broadway, Suite 2700
New York, New York 10007
[phone]
[phone] (fax)
By: Gerald Cohen
Joshua Fitch

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