Chevron Corporation v. Donziger et al

Filing 1874

OPINION: Following trial, the Court finds that foreign judgment was procured by fraud and that defendants Steven Donziger, The Law Offices of Steven Donziger and Steven R. Donziger & Associates (collectively "Donziger") conducted and conspi red to conduct the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1962(d). Judgment will enter (1) imposing constructive trust for the benefit of plaintiff on assets of Donziger and defendants Camacho and Piaguaje that are traceable to the foreign Judgment, and (2) enjoining these defendants from seeking to enforce the foreign judgment in the United States or from undertaking any acts to monetize or profit from the Judgment. Defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing [DI 1860 and DI 1862] are denied. (Signed by Judge Lewis A. Kaplan on 3/4/2014) (Attachments: # 1 Appendix)(tro)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------------x
CHEVRON CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
-against-

11 Civ. 0691 (LAK)

STEVEN DONZIGER, et al.,
Defendants.
------------------------------------------x
OPINION
Appearances:
Randy M. Mastro
Andrea E. Neuman
Reed M. Brodsky
William E. Thompson
Anne Champion
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Richard H. Friedman
FRIEDMAN | RUBIN
Zoe Littlepage
Rainey C. Booth
LITTLEPAGE BOOTH
Steven Donziger

G. Robert Blakey
William J. and Dorothy K. O’Neill
Professor Emeritus
Notre Dame Law School
Amicus Curiae

Attorneys for Defendant Steven Donziger and
Steven R. Donziger & Associates LLP
Julio C. Gomez
JULIO C. GOMEZ, ATTORNEY AT LAW LLC
Attorney for Defendants Hugo Gerardo
Camacho Naranjo and Javier Piaguaje
Payaguaje

Table of Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
I.
The Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A.
Texaco’s Operations in Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
B.
Aguinda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.
The Principal Plaintiffs’ Lawyers in Aguinda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
a.
Cristobal Bonifaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
b.
Steven Donziger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
c.
Joseph Kohn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.
Key Events During Aguinda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
a.
Forum Non Conveniens – The Aguinda Plaintiffs Attack
Ecuadorian Courts as Corrupt While Texaco Defends Them
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
b.
The Start of the LAPs’ Alliance With the ROE – The LAPs
Agree Not to Sue PetroEcuador or the ROE . . . . . . . . . . 13
c.
The Aguinda Plaintiffs Seek to Recuse, and Attack, Judge
Rakoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
d.
The Environmental Management Act is Passed in Ecuador
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
e.
Texaco Merges with a Chevron Subsidiary and Survives the
Merger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
II.
The Lago Agrio Litigation Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.
Donziger’s Attitudes and Beliefs About the Ecuadorian Courts and the
Conduct of Lawyers in Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
B.
The Ecuadorian Judges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
C.
The LAPs’ Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.
The American Lawyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.
The ADF, Selva Viva, and Luis Yanza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.
The Ecuadorian Lawyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.
The Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
III.
The Beginnings of Donziger’s Pressure Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A.
Donziger’s Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
B.
Donziger’s Public Relations Team and NGO Allies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.
The Public Relations and Lobbying Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.
Amazon Watch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
C.
The Pressure Begins – The LAPs’ First Scientist and the $6 Billion “Drive
By” Damages Estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
D.
Donziger Touts Russell’s “SWAG” and Other Misleading Descriptions of
Conditions in the Orienté to Put Pressure on Chevron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
E.
False and Misleading Representations to Incite Governmental Action Against
Chevron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
F.
Donziger’s Attempt to Justify His Continued Use of Russell’s Disavowed
i

IV.

V.

VI.
VII.

Estimate is Unpersuasive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
The First Phase of the Lago Agrio Case – The Judicial Inspections . . . . . . . . . 50
A.
The Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
B.
The LAPs’ Judicial Inspection Experts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
C.
The Calmbacher Episode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
D.
The LAP Lawyers Halt Testing for BTEX and GRO Because it Is Yielding
Unhelpful Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
E.
Sacha-53 and the “Independent” Monitors – Donziger, in His Words, Goes
Over to the “Dark Side” and Makes a “Bargain With the Devil” . . . . . . 60
F.
The Termination of the LAPs’ Remaining Judicial Inspections and the
Genesis of the Global Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
1.
The LAPs Coerce the Judge to Cancel the LAPs’ Remaining Judicial
Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.
Donziger Chooses Cabrera to be the Global Expert . . . . . . . . . . 72
The Second Phase of the Lago Agrio Case – The Cabrera “Global Expert” Report
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
A.
The LAPs Secretly Plan the Cabrera Report – The March 3 and 4, 2007
Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
B.
Donziger, Fajardo, and Yanza Put Together an “Army,” Cabrera is Sworn in,
and the LAP Team Prepares His Work Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
C.
The Field Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
1.
The LAP Team Pays Cabrera to Ensure that He Would “Totally Play
Ball” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.
The LAP Team Provides Cabrera with Administrative “Support” and
Controls his Field Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
D.
Donziger Attempts to Deceive Judge Sand About Cabrera’s Independence
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
E.
Stratus Secretly Writes Most of the Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
F.
Stratus Criticizes its Own Report to Enhance the False Image of Cabrera’s
Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
G.
Donziger’s Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
The Pressure Campaign Continues – The LAP Team Turns Up the Heat By Pressing
for Indictment of Former Texaco Lawyers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
The Third Phase of the Lago Agrio Case – 2009-2010: Evidence of the Cabrera
Fraud Begins to Come Out, Kohn Leaves the Case, New Financing Is Found, and the
Case Proceeds in Lago Agrio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
A.
Donziger’s Assumption that What Happens in Ecuador, Stays in Ecuador
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
B.
The Release of Crude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
C.
The Section 1782 Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
1.
The Section 1782 Action Against Stratus – Denver Counsel
Withdraw and Donziger and Fajardo Seek to Obstruct Justice Before
the Federal Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
a.
Donziger Retains U.S. Counsel to Represent the LAPs in
Denver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
ii

b.

VIII.
IX.

Beltman Discloses the Truth to Shinder – Denver Counsel
Withdraw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
c.
Fajardo Submits a Misleading Affidavit in Denver and
Elsewhere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
2.
The New York 1782 Proceedings – Berlinger and Donziger . . 146
3.
The LAP Team Sought to Deceive This Court in the Berlinger 1782
Proceeding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
D.
Donziger Deceives Kohn, Refuses His Demand for an Investigation of the
Facts With Respect to Cabrera, and Precipitates a Final Break . . . . . . . 149
1.
Donziger Misrepresented to and Concealed From Kohn Important
Information Regarding Cabrera and Stratus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
2.
Donziger Deceives Kohn About the “Secret” Account . . . . . . . 152
3.
Donziger Refuses to Cooperate With Kohn’s Demand for an
Investigation Independent of Donziger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
4.
Kohn Cuts Off Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.
Defendants’ Response to Kohn’s Testimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
E.
The Search for New Funding – Patton Boggs, the Invictus Strategy, and
Burford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
1.
Patton Boggs Is Retained, Develops the Enforcement Strategy, and
Obtains Funding from Burford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
2.
The Invictus Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
F.
Fajardo Obtains a Broader Power of Attorney, and Donziger and Fajardo
Enter Into Their First Written Retention Agreements with the LAPs . . 172
G.
Burford Terminates the Funding Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
H.
Donziger and Patton Boggs Try to Fix the Cabrera Problem – the Cleansing
Experts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
The Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
A.
Its Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
B.
Chevron’s Ghostwriting and Bribery Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
The LAPs Wrote the Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
A.
Zambrano Was Not the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
1.
Zambrano Was Unfamiliar With Key Aspects of the Judgment He
Signed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
2.
Zambrano’s Account of the Preparation of the Judgment Was Self
Contradictory and Implausible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
3.
Zambrano’s Testimony as to the Computer on Which He Claimed the
Judgment Was Entered Was Inconsistent With the Evidence . . 193
4.
Zambrano’s Self Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
B.
Evidence that the LAPs Wrote the Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
1.
The LAPs’ “Fingerprints” Are All Over the Judgment . . . . . . . 200
a.
The Fusion Memo, the Draft Alegato, the Index Summaries,
the Clapp Report and the Fajardo Trust Email . . . . . . . 201
b.
The Moodie Memo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
c.
Selva Viva Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
iii

2.

X.

XI.

Defendants’ Failure to Provide any Explanation for the Overlap
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
3.
Evidence that the LAPs Began Preparing the Judgment as Early as
2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
C.
Ultimate Findings on this Point – The LAPs Wrote the Judgment . . . 218
How it All Began: Guerra Ghostwrote Orders for Zambrano and the LAPs Paid Him
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
A.
The Guerra-Zambrano-Donziger Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
B.
Preliminary Observations on Credibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
C.
Guerra’s Ghostwriting for Zambrano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
1.
The Guerra-Zambrano Ghostwriting Deal – Unrelated Civil Cases
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
2.
Zambrano’s First Tenure Presiding Over the Lago Agrio Case
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
a.
Guerra Reaches out to Chevron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
b.
Following Chevron’s Rejection, Guerra Makes a Deal With
the LAPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
c.
Guerra Drafted Zambrano’s Orders in the Chevron Case
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
d.
The LAP Team Paid Guerra for His Ghostwriting Services
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
D.
Ultimate Findings on This Point – Guerra Was Zambrano’s Paid Ghostwriter
in Civil Cases and Was Paid By Donziger and the LAPs To Write Some of
Zambrano’s Orders in the Chevron Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
The Story Ends: The LAPs Bribed Zambrano to Allow Them to Write the Judgment
and Issue It Under His Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
A.
Zambrano’s Second Tenure Presiding Over the Lago Agrio Chevron Case:
The Accounts of the Three Witnesses at Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
1.
Guerra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
a.
Guerra’s Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
b.
Assessing Guerra’s Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
2.
Zambrano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
3.
Donziger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
a.
Donziger’s Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
b.
Donziger’s Credibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
B.
Chevron’s Circumstantial Evidence Pertinent to the Alleged Bribery
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
C.
Other Circumstantial Evidence – The Fajardo December 2010-January 2011
Emails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
D.
The Defendants’ Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
1.
Donziger’s Testimony, Even If True, Would Not Negate the Alleged
Bribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
2.
Donziger’s Approval Was Necessary for the Alleged Deal With
Zambrano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
a.
Donziger Controlled the LAP Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
iv

b.

Donziger’s Approval Was Necessary, and Given, for the 2009
Ghostwriting Deal with Guerra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
E.
Ultimate Findings on this Point – Fajardo, with Donziger’s Approval,
Promised Zambrano $500,000 of the Judgment Proceeds to Decide the Case
for the LAPs and Sign a Judgment They Prepared . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
XII. The Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
A.
The First Level Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
1.
The LAPs Contend that Chevron Set Up its Ghostwriting Claim
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
2.
The Appellate Panel Affirms the Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
3.
The Appellate Clarification Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
B.
The National Court of Justice Affirms the Judgment in All But One Respect
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
XIII The Pressure Campaign Continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
A.
The Invictus Strategy Deployed – Attempts to Enforce the Lago Agrio
Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
B.
The Purpose of All of These Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Prior Proceedings in this Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
The Pleadings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
The Amended Complaint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
The Answers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
Discovery and Motion Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
Discovery and Discovery Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
The Partial Summary Judgment Motions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
Attempts to Recuse the Judge or Require Reassignment of the Case . . . . . . . . 302
The Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
Post-Trial Briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
Discussion and Additional Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
I.
This Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
A.
This Case Is Not Moot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
B.
This Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction When the Action Was Brought
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
C
The Court Would Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction Even on Defendants’
Erroneous Premise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
II.
The Non-Statutory Claims for Equitable Relief With Respect to the Judgment
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
A.
Equitable Relief With Respect to Fraudulent Judgments Generally . . . 318
B.
Fraud on the Court – Corruption and Coercion of Judges and Judicial Official
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
1.
The Bribery of Zambrano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
2.
The Coercion of Judge Yánez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
3.
The Corruption of Cabrera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
C.
Fraud – Ghostwriting and Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
1.
The LAPs’ Ghostwriting of All or Part of the Judgment and
Zambrano’s Adoption of Their Product Was Fraud Warranting
v

III.

IV.

Equitable Relief Even Absent Bribery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
2.
The Deception of the Lago Agrio Court By The Misrepresentations
that Cabrera Was Independent and Impartial and By the Passing Off
of the Ghostwritten Report as His Work Was Fraud Warranting
Equitable Relief Even Absent Bribery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
D.
The Other Requirements for Relief Have Been Satisfied . . . . . . . . . . . 334
E.
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
The RICO Statute Applies Here . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
A.
RICO Applies to Prohibited Conduct Regardless of Whether a Defendant Is
a Member of Organized Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
B.
Equitable Relief Is Available in Private RICO Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
The Section 1962(c) Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
A.
The Elements of a Section 1962(c) Violation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
B.
The Enterprise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
C.
Donziger Conducted and Participated in the Conduct of the Affairs of the
Enterprise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
D.
The Predicate Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
1.
Extortion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
a.
The Elements of Extortion and Their Application Here
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358
b.
Much of Donziger’s Conduct Was Not Protected . . . . . 360
i.
Donziger’s Entitlement Argument Is Without Merit
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
ii.
Donziger’s Conduct is Not Protected Petitioning
Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
c.
Donziger’s Extortionate Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
i.
Donziger’s Misconduct in the Litigation . . . . . . 366
ii.
Donziger Made Representations He Knew Were
Materially False in Order to Exert Pressure on
Chevron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
(A)
Donziger Repeatedly Used Damages
Estimates He Knew Were False or the Truth
of Which He Doubted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
(B)
Donziger Sought to Pressure Chevron by
Causing Third Parties to Act on His
Misrepresentations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
(C)
Donziger Pressed the Republic of Ecuador to
File Criminal Charges Against Chevron
Attorneys in Order to Pressure Chevron into
Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
d.
Application of the Hobbs Act to This Conduct Is Consistent
With Morrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
2.
Wire Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
a.
The Elements of Wire Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
b.
The Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
vi

3.
4.

V.
VI.
VII.

Money Laundering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382
Obstruction of Justice and Witness Tampering . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
a.
Obstruction of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
i.
The Elements of Obstruction of Justice . . . . . . . 387
ii.
Donziger Obstructed Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
b.
Witness Tampering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
i.
The Elements of Witness Tampering . . . . . . . . . 390
ii.
Donziger Tampered with the Testimony of Mark
Quarles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
5.
Violation of the Travel Act Through Furtherance of Violation of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
a.
The Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
b.
The Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
i.
Donziger Was a “Domestic Concern” . . . . . . . . 393
ii.
Donziger Used Instrumentalities of Interstate
Commerce in Furtherance of the Payments . . . . 394
iii.
Donziger’s Use of the Wires Was Corrupt and
Intended to Influence Official Action . . . . . . . . 395
iv.
The Offers, Promises, and Payments to Cabrera Were
of Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395
v.
Donziger Facilitated the Payments Knowing They
Would Be Given to Cabrera, a Foreign Official
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
vi.
The Payments Were for a Business Purpose . . . 398
E.
There Is A Related, Continuous and Domestic Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
F.
Chevron Was Injured by the Pattern of Racketeering Activity and, Absent
Equitable Relief, Will Continue to be Injured . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
Donziger Conspired to Conduct the Affairs of the Enterprise Through a Pattern of
Racketeering Activity in Violation of Section 1962(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406
Chevron’s Other State Law Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408
Neither the Judgment Nor the Appellate Decisions in Ecuador Foreclose Liability
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
A.
The Ecuadorian Decisions and Rulings Are Not Admissible for the Truth of
the Matters Asserted Therein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
B.
The Appellate Decisions in Ecuador Do Not Break the Chain of Causation
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
1.
The Intermediate Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
2.
National Court of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416
C.
In Any Case, the Ecuadorian Decisions May Not Be Afforded Comity or
Other Recognition Because They Were Rendered In a Judicial System That
Does Not Provide Impartial Tribunals or Procedures Compatible with Due
Process in Cases of this Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
1.
The 2004 and 2005 Judicial Purges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420
2.
The Election of President Correa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
3.
The 2011 Judicial “Reorganization” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
vii

4.
5.

U.S. Department of State Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
Donziger and His Colleagues Admitted the Weakness, Politicization,
and Corrupt Nature of the Ecuadorian Judiciary . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
6.
President Correa’s Influence in the Lago Agrio Litigation . . . . 431
VIII. This Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Over the LAP Representatives . . . . . . . . 434
A.
The Personal Jurisdiction Defense Has Been Stricken . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434
B.
In Any Case, This Court Would Have Personal Jurisdiction At Least Under
N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434
1.
Relevant Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
2.
Section 302 – Specific Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443
a.
Legal Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443
i.
Transacting Business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443
ii.
“Arising Out of” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446
b.
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448
i.
The LAP Representatives Transacted Business in
New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448
ii.
The Claims in This Suit Arise Out of the Transaction
of Business in New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451
3.
Due Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452
IX.
The Other Affirmative Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
A.
The Judicial Estoppel Defense is Without Merit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
B.
Defendants Have Abandoned All Other Pleaded Affirmative Defenses,
Which in Any Case Lacked Merit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461
1.
Rule 9(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462
2.
Unclean Hands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 464
X.
Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
A.
Chevron Has No Adequate Remedy at Law and is Threatened With
Irreparable Injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
1.
Further Proceedings in Ecuador, If Any Even Theoretically Were
Available, Would Offer No Adequate Remedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
2.
Defense of Multiple Enforcement Actions Would Not Provide An
Adequate Remedy at Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471
3.
Money Damages Are Not, and Could Not Have Been, an Adequate
Remedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473
B.
Chevron Is Entitled to Equitable Relief Preventing These Three Defendants
From Benefitting From the Fraud on the Court and Donziger From Profiting
From the RICO Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475
1.
Constructive Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475
2.
Other Equitable Relief to Prevent These Defendants From Benefitting
from the Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478
C.
Injunction Against Enforcement in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478
D.
This Relief Is Consistent with Naranjo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484
Appendices (in separately bound volume) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . App. 1
viii

ix

x

LEWIS A. KAPLAN, District Judge.
Introduction
Steven Donziger, a New York City lawyer, led a group of American and Ecuadorian
lawyers who brought an action in Ecuador (the “Lago Agrio” case) in the names of 47 plaintiffs (the
“Lago Agrio Plaintiffs” or “LAPs”), on behalf of thousands of indigenous peoples of the Orienté
region of Ecuador, against Chevron Corporation (“Chevron”). They claimed that Chevron was
responsible for extensive environmental damage caused by oil activities of Texaco, Inc. (“Texaco”),
that ended more than twenty years ago and long before Chevron acquired Texaco’s stock.
After years of pressuring Chevron to settle by a variety of both legitimate and
illegitimate means, Donziger and his clients obtained a multibillion dollar judgment (the
“Judgment”) in the Ecuadorian courts and now seek to enforce it around the world. Chevron then
brought this action, contending among other things that the Judgment was procured by fraud.
Following a full trial, it now seeks equitable relief against Donziger and the two of his Ecuadorian
clients who defended this case in order to prevent any of them from profiting from the alleged fraud
or from seeking to enforce the Judgment in the United States.
This case is extraordinary. The facts are many and sometimes complex. They
include things that normally come only out of Hollywood – coded emails among Donziger and his
colleagues describing their private interactions with and machinations directed at judges and a court
appointed expert, their payments to a supposedly neutral expert out of a secret account, a lawyer
who invited a film crew to innumerable private strategy meetings and even to ex parte meetings with
judges, an Ecuadorian judge who claims to have written the multibillion dollar decision but who was
so inexperienced and uncomfortable with civil cases that he had someone else (a former judge who
had been removed from the bench) draft some civil decisions for him, an 18-year old typist who

2
supposedly did Internet research in American, English, and French law for the same judge, who
knew only Spanish, and much more. The evidence is voluminous. The transnational elements of
the case make it sensitive and challenging. Nevertheless, the Court has had the benefit of a lengthy
trial. It has heard 31 witnesses in person and considered deposition and/or other sworn or, in one
instance, stipulated testimony of 37 others. It has considered thousands of exhibits. It has made its
findings, which of necessity are lengthy and detailed.
Upon consideration of all of the evidence, including the credibility of the witnesses
– though several of the most important declined to testify – the Court finds that Donziger began his
involvement in this controversy with a desire to improve conditions in the area in which his
Ecuadorian clients live. To be sure, he sought also to do well for himself while doing good for
others, but there was nothing wrong with that. In the end, however, he and the Ecuadorian lawyers
he led corrupted the Lago Agrio case. They submitted fraudulent evidence. They coerced one
judge, first to use a court-appointed, supposedly impartial, “global expert” to make an overall
damages assessment and, then, to appoint to that important role a man whom Donziger hand-picked
and paid to “totally play ball” with the LAPs. They then paid a Colorado consulting firm secretly
to write all or most of the global expert’s report, falsely presented the report as the work of the
court-appointed and supposedly impartial expert, and told half-truths or worse to U.S. courts in
attempts to prevent exposure of that and other wrongdoing. Ultimately, the LAP team wrote the
Lago Agrio court’s Judgment themselves and promised $500,000 to the Ecuadorian judge to rule
in their favor and sign their judgment. If ever there were a case warranting equitable relief with
respect to a judgment procured by fraud, this is it.
The defendants seek to avoid responsibility for their actions by emphasizing that the
Lago Agrio case took place in Ecuador and by invoking the principle of comity. But that warrants

3
no different conclusion.
Comity and respect for other nations are important. But comity does not command
blind acquiescence in injustice, least of all acquiescence within the bounds of our own nation.
Courts of equity long have granted relief against fraudulent judgments entered in other states and,
though less frequently, other countries. Moreover, the United States has important interests here.
The misconduct at issue was planned, supervised, financed and executed in important (but not all)
respects by Americans in the United States in order to extract money from a U.S. victim.
That said, considerations of comity and the avoidance of any misunderstanding have
shaped the relief sought here. Chevron no longer seeks, and this Court does not grant, an injunction
barring enforcement of the Lago Agrio Judgment anywhere in the world. What this Court does do
is to prevent Donziger and the two LAP Representatives, who are subject to this Court’s personal
jurisdiction, from profiting in any way from the egregious fraud that occurred here. That is quite
a different matter. Indeed, the LAP Representatives’ lawyer recently conceded before the Second
Circuit that the defendants “would not have a problem” with “the alternative relief that [Chevron]
would be seeking, such as enjoining the person who paid the bribe from benefitting from it,”
assuming that the judge was bribed.1 Defendants thus have acknowledged the propriety of equitable
relief to prevent individuals subject to the Court’s jurisdiction from benefitting from misdeeds for
which they are responsible. And while the Court does enjoin enforcement of the Judgment by these
defendants in the United States, that limited injunction raises no issues of comity or international
relations. It is the prerogative of American courts to determine whether foreign judgments may be

1

Tr., Sept. 26, 2013, at 25:3-15, Naranjo v. Chevron Corp., No. 13-772-cv (2d Cir.) [DI 14962].

4
enforced in this country.
Donziger is intelligent, resourceful, and a master of public and media relations. An
extensive public relations and media campaign has been part of his strategy from early days, and it
continues. Among its objectives has been to shift the focus from the fraud on Chevron and the Lago
Agrio court to the environmental harm that Donziger and the LAPs claim was done in the Orienté.
Indeed, that was a principal focus of defendants’ case at trial and of their post-trial briefing. But one
should not be distracted from the issues actually presented in this case.
The Court assumes that there is pollution in the Orienté. On that assumption, Texaco
and perhaps even Chevron – though it never drilled for oil in Ecuador – might bear some
responsibility. In any case, improvement of conditions for the residents of the Orienté appears to
be both desirable and overdue. But the defendants’ effort to change the subject to the Orienté,
understandable as it is as a tactic, misses the point of this case.
The issue here is not what happened in the Orienté more than twenty years ago and
who, if anyone, now is responsible for any wrongs then done. It instead is whether a court decision
was procured by corrupt means, regardless of whether the cause was just. An innocent defendant
is no more entitled to submit false evidence, to coopt and pay off a court-appointed expert, or to
coerce or bribe a judge or jury than a guilty one. So even if Donziger and his clients had a just cause
– and the Court expresses no opinion on that – they were not entitled to corrupt the process to
achieve their goal.
Justice is not served by inflicting injustice. The ends do not justify the means. There
is no “Robin Hood” defense to illegal and wrongful conduct. And the defendants’ “this-is-the-wayit-is-done-in-Ecuador” excuses – actually a remarkable insult to the people of Ecuador – do not help
them. The wrongful actions of Donziger and his Ecuadorian legal team would be offensive to the

5
laws of any nation that aspires to the rule of law, including Ecuador – and they knew it. Indeed, one
Ecuadorian legal team member, in a moment of panicky candor, admitted that if documents
exposing just part of what they had done were to come to light, “apart from destroying the
proceeding, all of us, your attorneys, might go to jail.”2 It is time to face the facts.

Facts
I.

The Background
The events at issue in this case took place in law offices in New York, Philadelphia,

and elsewhere in the United States, a consulting firm in Colorado, a public relations firm in
Washington, the Orienté, courthouses in Ecuador and all over the United States, the offices of a New
York documentary film maker, news media throughout the world, and government offices in
Ecuador and the United States, and other places. They involved an array of lawyers, financial
backers, scientists, judges, celebrities, media consultants, non-governmental organizations,
politicians, and law school interns. But despite the case’s complex history, reach and its large cast
of players, the events ultimately center on one man – Steven Donziger – and his team of Ecuadorian
lawyers and U.S. and European backers.
We begin with the backdrop against which these events took place.

A.

Texaco’s Operations in Ecuador
In 1964, the Republic of Ecuador (“ROE”) granted to a Gulf Oil subsidiary and to

2

PX 1279 (Mar. 30, 2010 Email from J. Prieto to S. Donziger, P. Fajardo, L. Yanza, and J.
Sáenz).

6
TexPet, an indirect subsidiary of Texaco, a concession to explore for and produce oil in the Orienté.3
The Gulf-TexPet joint venture, of which TexPet was the sole operator, became known as the
Consortium.4 In 1973, however, Ecuador’s state-owned oil company, now known as PetroEcuador,
acquired a 25 percent interest in the Consortium, 12.5 percent from each of TexPet and Gulf.5
Shortly thereafter, PetroEcuador acquired Gulf’s remaining equity and thus became the majority
owner of the Consortium. TexPet continued to hold a 37.5 percent interest.6
TexPet operated for the Consortium until June 1992, when the Concession expired.
TexPet’s 37.5 percent interest reverted to PetroEcuador, and TexPet began the process of winding
down its operations.7 In connection with the termination of TexPet’s Ecuadorian operations, TexPet
and Texaco in 1993 entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the ROE that provided that
TexPet would be released from any potential claim for environmental harm once TexPet performed
an agreed-upon remediation in the area in which it had operated.8 In the Spring of 1995, the parties

3

PX 210 (Napo Joint Operating Agreement); PX 3000 (Reis Veiga Direct) ¶ 14.
4

Id.
5

PX 211 (Agreement among the ROE, TexPet, and Gulf Oil); PX 3000 (Reis Veiga Direct)
¶ 14.
6

PX 212 (Agreement among the ROE, Ecuadorian Government Petroleum Corporation, and
Gulf Oil); PX 3000 (Reis Veiga Direct) ¶ 14.
7

PX 3000 (Reis Veiga Direct) ¶ 19.
8

PX 222 (Dec. 14, 1994 MOU among the ROE, PetroEcuador, and TexPet), at 3; PX 3000
(Reis Veiga Direct) ¶ 29.

7
executed a Settlement Agreement and Scope of Work agreement9 (the “Settlement Agreement”) that
laid out specific tasks TexPet was required to complete before its remediation and wind down were
complete, whereupon it would be entitled to a release.10 From 1995 through 1998, ROE inspectors
issued 52 actas in which they confirmed TexPet’s completion of each task.11 The final acta – the
52nd Certificate – was issued in September 1998 and stated that TexPet had complied with its
obligations under the Settlement Agreement. The final release was signed on September 30, 1998.12
It stated that TexPet had fully performed its obligations under the MOU and Settlement Agreement
and that TexPet was released from all potential claims by the ROE and PetroEcuador.13

B.

Aguinda
While TexPet was winding down its operations in Ecuador, a group of Ecuadorian

plaintiffs brought a class action against Texaco in the Southern District of New York (“Aguinda”)14
9

PX 3000 (Reis Veiga Direct) ¶ 26; PX 247 (Certificate # 052-RAT-98).
10

PX 223 (March 1995 Contract among TexPet, ROE, and PetroEcuador); PX 3000 (Reis
Veiga Direct) ¶ 30.
11

PX 3000 (Reis Veiga Direct) ¶ 33; see also e.g., PX 224, PX 225, PX 226, PX 237, PX 238,
PX 240, PX 242, PX 243, and PX 245 (actas).
12

PX 246 (Acta Final by and between the Government of the ROE, PetroEcuador,
Petroproduccion, and Texaco Petroleum Company).
13

Id.
14

Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (JSR) (filed Nov. 3, 1993) (hereinafter
“Aguinda”); see also Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 334,
341 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
The Court takes judicial notice of its own records. FED. R. EVID. 201(b); I. & I. Holding

8
seeking billions of dollars of damages for alleged injury to the environment and health of the
plaintiffs as well as certain equitable relief within Ecuador.15 The principal lawyers for the plaintiffs
were Cristobal Bonifaz, Joseph Kohn, and Steven Donziger.16 As all three figured in the story that
is at the heart of this case, we pause to identify them.

1.

The Principal Plaintiffs’ Lawyers in Aguinda
a.

Cristobal Bonifaz

Cristobal Bonifaz, grandson of a former Ecuadorian president, practiced law in
Amherst, Massachusetts in the early 1990s. His son attended law school with Steven Donziger.
In 1993, Bonifaz accepted an invitation to travel to Ecuador to meet with residents
of the Orienté concerning complaints about pollution in the region and the possibility of a lawsuit.17

Corp. v. Greenberg, 151 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945).
15

Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) vacated sub nom. Jota v.
Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
16

The defendants include not only Steven Donziger, but his law firm, variously referred to as
the Law Offices of Steven Donziger and Steven R. Donziger & Associates, PLLC. The
sole proprietorship is not a legal entity and is indistinguishable from Donziger personally
for all legal purposes. E.g., Holland v. Fahnestock & Co., 210 F.R.D. 487, 500 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); Anti-Hydro Co. v. Castiglia, 461 N.Y.S. 2d 87 (App. Div. 1983). It is undisputed
that Donziger’s professional company, Steven R. Donziger & Associates, PLLC, is liable
to the same extent as Donziger because Donziger was its agent and acted within the scope
of his employment by it. See In re Klenk, 612 N.Y.S. 2d 220, 220 (App. Div. 1994) (“The
attorney[’s] fraudulent scheme occurred while he was a partner acting in the ordinary course
of business of each law firm and therefore each law firm is liable for the attorney[’s]
misconduct to the same extent as he is.”). Accordingly, references to Donziger (unless
otherwise stated) include the sole proprietorship and the professional company for ease of
expression except if otherwise specifically stated.
17

Bonifaz Dec. 30, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 37:19-22.

9
He took a small group of lawyers, including Donziger, and others with him.18 In June of that year,
Bonifaz entered into a retention agreement with various individuals who soon became plaintiffs in
Aguinda.19

b.

Steven Donziger

Donziger’s interest in Latin America began when he worked as a journalist for the
United Press International in Nicaragua from 1984 to 198720 during which he covered events in
several Latin American countries.21 He also became fluent in Spanish.22
After his return from Nicaragua, Donziger23 graduated from Harvard Law School in
1991.24 He then worked as a public defender25 for two years before he accompanied Bonifaz on his

18

DX 1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶ 20.
19

PX 631 (June 27, 1993 Retention Agreement Between Bonifaz, Kohn, and plaintiffs in the
Aguinda Litigation).
20

DX 1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶ 2.
21

Id. ¶¶ 2-5.
22

Id. ¶ 2.
23

Unless otherwise stated, “Donziger” hereafter refers collectively not only to Donziger
himself, but also to defendants The Law Offices of Steven R. Donziger and Donziger &
Associates PLLC. As noted, the first is a sole proprietorship indistinguishable as a legal
matter from Donziger. The second is responsible for Donziger’s personal actions because
everything he did was done as its agent and within the scope of his authority.
24

Id. ¶ 1.
25

Id. ¶ 3.

10
trip to Ecuador.26 While on that trip, Donziger traveled widely in the Napo Concession area and met
Maria Aguinda, who later became the first-named plaintiff in Aguinda.27
Although Donziger’s name appears on the Aguinda complaint, he was not a lead
lawyer when it began. Nevertheless, he did much of the groundwork in Ecuador, took a “handful
of trips” to the area from 1993 to 2002 “to meet with clients in the Amazon rainforest, to attend
meetings of local community groups . . . , and to take care of lawsuit-related issues.”28 During those
trips and through case-related discovery from Texaco, Donziger made “significant headway on the
factual development of the case.”29

c.

Joseph Kohn

Bonifaz knew that he needed an experienced trial lawyer to assist him. He needed
money as well. He therefore got in touch with Joseph Kohn, a Philadelphia attorney and partner at
Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C. (the “Kohn firm” or “Kohn”).30 Kohn too was retained by the Aguinda
plaintiffs.31 Kohn and Bonifaz were co-lead counsel in Aguinda at its outset,32 and Kohn provided
26

Id. ¶ 21.
27

Id. ¶¶ 22, 25.
28

Id. ¶ 28.
29

Id. ¶ 29.
30

PX 2442 (Dec. 30, 2008 Email from K. Hinton to S. Cohen and H. Glaser attaching Dec.
30, 2008 Bloomberg article), at 10.
31

PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 1; see also PX 2350 (Dec. 21, 1994 Ltr. from Bonifaz to Kohn
reflecting fee sharing agreement in Aguinda and Ashanga v. Texaco; PX 631 (June 27, 1993

11
much of the funding.33

2.

Key Events During Aguinda

The details of Aguinda are largely unimportant at this stage but several points are
significant.

a.

Forum Non Conveniens – The Aguinda Plaintiffs Attack Ecuadorian
Courts as Corrupt While Texaco Defends Them

Texaco sought dismissal of Aguinda on the grounds inter alia of forum non
conveniens and the failure to join the ROE and PetroEcuador, which it argued were indispensable
because (1) the requested equitable relief within Ecuador could not otherwise be ordered, and (2)
PetroEcuador’s own actions would be at issue in the case.34 The Aguinda plaintiffs argued that New
York was the appropriate forum because Texaco was headquartered here. They contended also that
the case could not be brought in Ecuador because Ecuador did not permit class actions or pretrial
discovery.35

Retention Agreement Between Bonifaz, Kohn, and plaintiffs in the Aguinda Litigation).
32

PX 2350 (Dec. 21, 1994 Ltr. from Bonifaz to Kohn reflecting fee sharing agreement in
Aguinda and Ashanga v. Texaco), at 1.
33

PX 2350 (Dec. 21, 1994 Ltr. from Bonifaz to Kohn reflecting fee sharing agreement in
Aguinda and Ashanga v. Texaco, another case brought on behalf of residents of Peru), at 2-3.
34

Mot. to Dismiss, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 28,
1993) [DI 10], at 3.
35

Pls.’ Mem. of Law in Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ.
7527 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 10, 1994) [DI 23], at 3 n.2.

12
On November 12, 1996, Judge Rakoff – to whom that case was assigned – dismissed
the complaint on the grounds of forum non conveniens and international comity and because
PetroEcuador and the ROE had not been joined as plaintiffs.36 The plaintiffs appealed the ruling and
persuaded the ROE to move to intervene in the case, a motion that Judge Rakoff denied.37
In 1998, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of Aguinda on the ground that
the district court had failed to obtain a commitment by Texaco to submit to the jurisdiction of the
Ecuadorian courts.38 It remanded with instructions to require “Texaco’s consent to Ecuadoran
jurisdiction . . . [and to] independently reweigh the factors relevant to a forum non conveniens
dismissal.”39
Following remand, Texaco provided the missing commitment and then renewed its
motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. As part of its argument that the case belonged
in Ecuador and not the United States – and, as will be seen, a great irony – Texaco argued that
Ecuador would be an adequate alternative forum because it had an independent judiciary that
provided fair trials.40 With equal irony, the plaintiffs contended that Ecuador would not be an
36

Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated sub nom. Jota v.
Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
37

Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 50, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
38

Jota, 157 F.3d at 159.
39

Id.
40

E.g., Texaco Inc.’s Supp. Mem. of Law passim, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527
(JSR) (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 10, 2000) [DI 147].
As will appear, there is no necessary inconsistency between seeking a forum non conveniens
dismissal in order to proceed in a foreign country and later attacking a judgment rendered

13
adequate forum because the Ecuadorian judiciary was weak and corrupt and did not provide
impartial tribunals.41
Judge Rakoff granted the motion and was affirmed on appeal.42

b.

The Start of the LAPs’ Alliance With the ROE – The LAPs Agree Not
to Sue PetroEcuador or the ROE

A second point to be made about Aguinda is that it provided the impetus for an
arrangement whereby the LAPs in substance granted PetroEcuador and the ROE immunity from suit
in exchange for assistance in Aguinda, an alliance that has strengthened over time.
The Aguinda plaintiffs were concerned by Texaco’s argument that the ROE was an
indispensable party in view of the complaint’s prayer for an equitable decree requiring
environmental remediation in Ecuadorian territory. They obtained the ROE’s agreement to seek to
intervene in the case and to advise this Court that it consented to the “execution in its territory of any
environmental cleanup measures that the [Southern District] Court may order [Texaco] to
perform.”43 But there was a quid pro quo. The Aguinda plaintiffs gave the ROE and PetroEcuador
a judgment reduction agreement to protect them against any award of contribution that Texaco might
in that foreign country as fraudulent or on other permissible grounds. The standards
governing the availability of an alternate forum for forum non conveniens analysis and for
a collateral attack on a foreign judgment are quite different. See infra Discussion § IX.A.
41

E.g., Pls.’ Reply Mem. of law passim, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (JSR)
(S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 24, 2000) [DI 151].
42

Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) aff’d as modified, 303
F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
43

PX 684 (Waiver of Rights Between C. Bonifaz and J. Kohn in Aguinda v. Texaco, No. 93
Civ. 7527 (S.D.N.Y.)), at 1-2.

14
obtain against them.44
c.

The Aguinda Plaintiffs Seek to Recuse, and Attack, Judge Rakoff

Aguinda was marked also by a challenge to Judge Rakoff’s impartiality and an attack
on his integrity.
After the reversal of Judge Rakoff’s initial forum non conveniens dismissal, the
plaintiffs moved to recuse him, claiming that his attendance at a seminar on environmental issues
created an appearance of partiality because Texaco had contributed general funding to the
organization that sponsored the seminar.45 Judge Rakoff denied the motion. The Second Circuit
then denied the Aquinda plaintiffs’ mandamus petition, holding that no reasonable person
knowledgeable of the facts would doubt Judge Rakoff’s impartiality.46 Some time later, Donziger
– in a video recorded for possible use in a documentary film – attacked Judge Rakoff. He stated that
44

Bonifaz later testified that “this idea of an agreement not to sue arose following statements
by Judge Rakoff . . . that if the Government of Ecuador intervened in the Aguinda litigation,
that Texaco might bring counterclaims against it.” Bonifaz Mar. 1, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 14:1622. Bonifaz said that, at his suggestion, the ROE had agreed to intervene in the Aguinda
case, but that it wanted an assurance from Bonifaz that it would not be sued if it did so.
According to Bonifaz, “the Procurador [Attorney General]. . . said that he will be happy to
do whatever we wanted with respect to the case. Then, following that conversation,
whatever it was, I talked to a woman at his office . . . in which she said ‘Well, the Procurador
wants this document signed by you guys that you’re not going to sue Ecuador,’ because
Judge Rakoff raised the issue in court that ‘If you guys do that, you’re going to get sued.’
So they freaked out, and so then they wanted this document signed.” Bonifaz Mar. 1, 2011
Dep. Tr. at 16:8-21. (Defendants’ objection to this testimony is overruled. The evidence is
relevant to the development of the relationship among the ROE and the defendants, which
goes among other things to the likelihood that influence improperly was brought to bear on
the Lago Agrio court. The statements attributed to the ROE officials are not hearsay because
they are not received for the truth of the statements but to explain why the Aguinda plaintiffs,
most of whom are LAPs, waived claims against the ROE and PetroEcuador.)
45

In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 198 (2d Cir. 2001).
46

Id. at 198, 206.

15
Judge Rakoff “was corrupt too, brother. He was – totally biased against us.”47
As will appear, these events foreshadowed what became a pattern by the LAP team
of seeking to intimidate and threaten judges by pressure tactics including ad hominem attacks.48

d.

The Environmental Management Act is Passed in Ecuador

The pendency of Texaco’s dismissal motion and then the risk that the Court of
Appeals would affirm Judge Rakoff’s initial forum non conveniens dismissal prompted other actions
by the Aguinda plaintiffs’ lawyers. As Bonifaz later suggested, “his team” had “worked with
Ecuadorian legislators to draft a law similar to U.S. superfund law,” in preparation “for a possible
move from U.S. courts.”49

The legislation in question became Ecuador’s Environmental

Management Act of 1999 (the “EMA”),50 which among other things created a private right of action
for damages for the cost of remediation of environmental harms generally, as distinct from personal
injuries or property damages to specific plaintiffs.51

47

PX 10A (Mar. 30, 2006 Crude Clip).
48

See infra § Facts II.A, IV.F.1.
49

DI 29-10 (Hendricks Decl. 1), Ex. 83, at 2.
50

Act 99–37, Registro Oficial No. 245, July 30, 1999.
51

Id.; PX 2382 (Invictus Memo), at 29 (“Art. 43. Natural or legal persons or human groups,
linked by a common interest and directly affected by the harmful action or omission, may
file with the judge of competent jurisdiction actions for monetary damages and for
deterioration caused to health or the environment, including biodiversity and its constituent
elements.”) (citing EMA).
As noted, the issue whether Ecuador permitted class actions was hotly disputed in Aguinda.

16

e.

Texaco Merges with a Chevron Subsidiary and Survives the Merger

The final event of note that occurred during Aguinda was the merger of a wholly
owned subsidiary of Chevron with and into Texaco, with Texaco emerging as the surviving entity.
Chevron thereby became the indirect owner of all of Texaco’s common stock. Chevron, however,
did not acquire any of Texaco’s assets or assume any of its liabilities by operation of the merger.52

II.

The Lago Agrio Litigation Begins
In May 2003, about one year after the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of

Aguinda, the LAPs sued Chevron (but not Texaco) for damages and for remediation of
environmental harm said to have been caused by Texaco.53 The case was brought for the benefit of
some 30,000 indigenous residents of the Concession area. Significantly, however, the complaint
asked that any funds awarded to perform the requested remediation, plus an additional ten percent,
be delivered to the Frente de la Defensa de la Amazonia (the “ADF”) for use in performing any
remediation ordered by the court.54 Thus, the LAPs sought to have the ADF placed in complete
control of any and all sums recovered. As will appear, this is significant because Donziger and some
of his Ecuadorian associates controlled and still control the ADF.

52

Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 886 F. Supp. 2d 235, 243 & nn. 23-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
53

Id. The EMA is cited in the complaint as creating a right on the part of natural persons and
others to sue “for damage and loss and for health and environmental deterioration, including
biodiversity.” Id. at 29, 32.
54

Id. at 29-31; PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 4.

17
The case initially was assigned to Judge Alberto Guerra Bastidas (“Guerra”), who
then was the president of the Lago Agrio court55 and who became an important witness at trial.
Before turning to the events of the Lago Agrio proceedings, however, three subjects are important
to an understanding of what transpired later: (1) Donziger’s attitudes and beliefs concerning the
Ecuadorian courts, (2) the many Ecuadorian judges who were assigned to the case for varying
periods during the years of its existence, and (3) a brief description of the plaintiffs, their lawyers,
and the structure of the LAPs’ team. As someone once said, “you can’t tell the players without a
scorecard.”

A.

Donziger’s Attitudes and Beliefs About the Ecuadorian Courts and the Conduct of
Lawyers in Ecuador
Donziger’s attitudes and beliefs about the capability, fairness, and integrity of the

Ecuadorian legal system are no secret. During Aguinda, he argued strenuously that Ecuador was
not an adequate forum because the Ecuadorian judiciary was weak and corrupt and did not provide
impartial tribunals.56 After the Lago Agrio case began, he made repeated statements – many on
camera57 – in which he amplified this view. For example:
55

PX 4300X (Callejas Direct) ¶ 24.
56

E.g., Plaintiffs’ Reply Mem. of Law, passim, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527
(JSR) (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 24, 2000) [DI 151].
57

As will appear, these statements made on camera were recorded by a documentary film
maker whom Donziger recruited to make a film about the Lago Agrio case and for which he
procured millions in financing from a friend. The film was released with the title Crude.
In these film clips, Donziger frequently sought to justify improper or questionable actions
with respect to the Ecuadorian litigation by contending that such behavior was necessary in
under the circumstances. But there is no credible evidence to support Donziger’s claims of

18
•

“They’re all [i.e., the Ecuadorian judges] corrupt! It’s—it’s their birthright
to be corrupt.”58

•

“These judges are really not very bright – it is like a vocational job to them,
they deal with resolving disputes at a very basic level[;] there is little or no
intellectual component to the law.”59

•

“Uh, in a year from now, we’re not comin’ down here anymore. The case is
over. All we’re doin’ is writing reports and preparing for final submissions
of papers. And, really mobilizing the country, politically, so that no judge
can rule against us and feel like he can get away with it in terms of his
career.”60

•

“[T]his is not a legal case, this is a political battle that’s being played out
through a legal case and all the evidence is in. * * * So, what we need
to do is get the politics in order in a country that doesn’t favor people from
the rainforest.”61

•

“It’s incredible that a judge can – you can just walk in his office, with all the
media, and it’s obvious what we’re doing, and he doesn’t have the power to
say, ‘get the fuck out of my office,’ like at least to the press. I mean, I’ve
never seen such utter weakness. It’s the same kind of weakness that leads to
corruption. * * * These people [i.e., the judges] have no power. * * *
They don’t think they can do anything.”62

•

“You know, what . . . just happened with this judge, um, is sort of sad to me

necessity or justification, which often hinged on unsubstantiated suppositions of misconduct
by Chevron. The Court finds that Donziger’s attempts of self justification best are
understood as attempts to make himself look good notwithstanding his conduct. Those
attempts are not credible given the entire record of this case and the Court’s assessment of
Donziger.
58

PX 9A (Mar. 30, 2006 Crude Clip).
59

PX 179 (Donziger Notebook).
60

PX 3A (Mar. 9, 2006 Crude Clip), at CRS-032-00-CLIP-01.
61

PX 11A (Apr. 3, 2006 Crude Clip), at CRS060-00-CLIP-04.
62

PX 7A (Mar. 30, 2006 Crude Clip), at CRS-053-02-CLIP-04.

19
because it represents the fact that the judicial system here is so utterly weak
– like the only way you can secure a fair trial is if you do things like that, like
go in and confront the judge with media around, and fight and yell and
scream and make a scene, and, you know, that would never happen in the
United States. That would never happen in any judicial system that had
integrity. And it’s that very weakness that, you know, let people do that.
That is also– lets people corrupt the process.”63
•

[To a colleague]: “Please prepare a detailed plan with the necessary steps to
attack the judge through legal, institutional channels and through any other
channel you can think of. Send it to me today.”64

•

“[I]t’s a problem of institutional weakness in the judiciary, generally, and of
this court, in particular. We have concluded that we need to do more,
politically, to control the court, to pressure the court. We believe they make
decisions based on who they fear the most, not based on what the laws
should dictate. * * * [I]t’s a critically important moment, because we
want to send a message to the court that, ‘don’t fuck with us anymore – not
now, and not – not later, and never.’”65

•

“You can solve anything with politics as long as the judges are intelligent
enough to understand the politics. [T]hey don’t have to be intelligent enough
to understand the law, just as long as they understand the politics.”66

Though Donziger’s statements are remarkably disrespectful to the judicial system
he now so vehemently defends, it will be seen that they are not unlike President Correa’s views of
the Ecuadorian judiciary. The Crude outtakes depicted also Donziger’s beliefs on the role of
lawyers and evidence in litigation:
•

“I once worked for a lawyer who said something I’ve never forgotten. He
said, ‘Facts do not exist. Facts are created.’ And ever since that day, I

63

PX 8A (Mar. 30, 2006 Crude Clip).
64

PX 779 (June 14, 2006 Email from S. Donziger to A. Ponce re: “Need plan”).
65

PX 67A (June 6, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS-350-04-CLIP-01.
66

PX 81A (Undated Crude Clip), at CRS-129-00-CLIP-02.

20
realized how the law works.”67
•

“Science has to serve the law practice; the law practice doesn’t serve
science.”68

•

“[A]ll this bullshit about the law and facts but in the end of the day it is about
brute force . . .”69

•

“[A]t the end of the day, this [i.e., the lack of evidence on a key point] is all
for the Court just a bunch of smoke and mirrors and bullshit. It really is.”70

In considering these and other statements, not to mention Donziger’s conduct, it is
relevant to note that Donziger is a member of the New York Bar. His conduct, whether in the
United States or in Ecuador, was subject in every respect to the New York rules governing the
conduct of lawyers.71
Finally, it is relevant to note that Donziger and his Ecuadorian associates assumed
that it would be impossible to obtain evidence of their actions. This 2007 exchange with Atossa
Soltani, the head of Amazon Watch, a non-governmental organization (“NGO”) supporter of
Donziger and the LAPs, during a videotaped conversation about arguably questionable planned
activities in Ecuador, is revealing:
“SOLTANI:

Do you guys know if anybody can, uh, subpoena these
videos? That is a – how do you [unintelligible]

67

PX 47A (Mar. 4, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS 198-00-CLIP-07.
68

PX 24A (Jan. 16, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS 158-02-CLIP 9.
69

PX 77A (June 13, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS 361-11.
70

PX 43A (Mar. 4, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS-195-05-CLIP-01.
71

N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Rule 8.5(a) (effective Apr. 1, 2009); N.Y. CODE OF
PROF’L RESP., DR 1-105 (repealed effective Apr. 1, 2009).

21
“DONZIGER:
B.

We don’t have the power of subpoena in Ecuador.”72

The Ecuadorian Judges
A total of six judges presided over the Lago Agrio Chevron case from the time it was

filed in 2003 until the Judgment was issued in February 2011.73 In general, the president of the
Provincial Court of Nueva Loja – an election for which, it appears, was held every two years – was
to preside over the case. When a new president was selected, the case would be transferred either
to the newly-elected president, who would keep the case for two years or to another judge in the
court, who would keep it for four months.74 But the fact that six judges – two of whom presided
over the case more than once – presided over the Lago Agrio case in the eight years it was pending
reveals that the assignment system did not always work exactly as expected.
When the Lago Agrio case was filed in May 2003, Alberto Guerra was the president
of the court and so the case was assigned to him.75 Guerra’s term as president ended in January
2004, and the case was reassigned to the newly-elected president, Judge Efraín Novillo.76 Judge
Novillo presided over the case for two years. When his term was up in January 2006, the case was

72

PX 68A (June 6, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS-35-04-CLIP-02.
73

PX 2522 (List of Judges on the Lago Agrio Chevron Case).
74

Tr. (Zambrano) 1715:21-23; see also PX 4300X (Callejas Direct) ¶ 20.
75

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 4.
76

Id.; PX 2522 (List of Judges on the Lago Agrio Chevron Case).

22
transferred to Judge Germán Yánez.77 Judge Yánez’s term on the case lasted until October 2007,
when Judge Novillo took over again.78
In August 2008, Judge Juan Nuñez became president and the Lago Agrio case was
transferred to him.79 Nuñez’s term was cut short in September 2009, however, when he recused
himself.80 The case then fell to Nicolás Zambrano,81 who first had joined the Lago Agrio court on
July 30, 2008 directly from a career as a prosecutor82 and whose term was four months because he
was not the president of the court. The case then went to Judge Leonardo Ordóñez, who had just
been elected president, in February 2010.83 Although, as president, Judge Ordóñez was to have
presided over the case for two years,84 he was removed from the case when Chevron successfully
moved to recuse him in 2010.85

77

PX 2522 (List of Judges on the Lago Agrio Chevron Case).
78

Id.; PX 348 (Oct. 3, 2007 Lago Agrio Court Order).
79

PX 2522 (List of Judges on the Lago Agrio Chevron Case).
80

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 21; PX 4300X (Callejas Direct) ¶ 20.
81

Tr. (Zambrano) 1715:1-5; PX 2522 (List of Judges on the Lago Agrio Case).
82

PX 4124 (July 30, 2008 Personnel Action Appointing N. Zambrano as Second Judge of the
Superior Court of Nueva Loja); Tr. (Zambrano) 1629:19-1630:7.
83

Tr. (Zambrano) 1716:13-16.
84

Id. 1716:22-25.
85

Id. 1904:22-1905:2; DX 1561 (Oct. 1, 2010 Order).

23
Judge Zambrano took over again in October 201086 and issued the Judgment four
months later.

C.

The LAPs’ Team
1.

The American Lawyers

The lawyers for the Aguinda plaintiffs had laid groundwork for suing in Ecuador if
the New York case were dismissed by working toward the enactment in Ecuador of the EMA. At
the outset of the Ecuadorian case, the same three American lawyers – Bonifaz, Kohn, and Donziger
– played the key roles, using Ecuadorian counsel, the first of whom was Dr. Alberto Wray, to appear
of record. By the time the Lago Agrio case began, however, the respective roles of the American
lawyers had changed.
Kohn, who had a lead role in the United States in Aguinda, had no ties to Ecuador
and did not speak Spanish.87 While he provided most of the funding for the Lago Agrio case and
related public relations activities from its inception until 2009,88 he had little direct role in the

86

PX 2522 (List of Judges on the Lago Agrio Case).
87

PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 10.
88

Between May 2003 and November 2009, the Kohn firm “was the primary funder of the
litigation and related U.S. public relations and other activities. During those nearly seven
years, the firm paid over $6 million in litigation expenses. This included . . . $1.1 million
that [the Kohn firm] provided to Mr. Donziger for legal services and expenses, $1.1 million
that [the Kohn firm] paid to U.S. consultants, and $2.2 million that [the firm] transferred by
wire from bank accounts in the United States to bank accounts in Ecuador.” PX 5600 (Kohn
Direct) ¶ 9; see also Donziger Nov. 29, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 205:10-206:4. These payments
included a monthly stipend that the Kohn firm paid to Donziger. See Donziger Jan. 19, 2011
Dep. Tr. at 3547:23-3548:22.

24
litigation. He mainly stayed abreast of some developments through Bonifaz and Donziger,89
although, as discussed below, he sought unsuccessfully to become more involved when the case
began to run into difficulty in 2009.
Bonifaz’s role also changed. While he was involved in selecting and briefing the lead
Ecuadorian counsel,90 tensions subsequently arose between Bonifaz and Donziger. Bonifaz’s role
quickly faded, and he left the case in 2005 for reasons that are neither clear nor material.91
Although Bonifaz still was involved when the Ecuadorian lawsuit began, he no longer
was in charge. Donziger had taken over. In 2006, Donziger wrote that he had been the “lead
counsel on the [Lago Agrio] lawsuit for the last three years”92 – i.e., since it began. He explained
further that he was and had been:
“at the epicenter of the legal, political, and media activity surrounding the case both
in Ecuador and in the U.S. I have close ties with almost all of the important
characters in the story, including Amazon indigenous leaders, high-ranking
Ecuadorian government officials, the world’s leading scientists who deal with oil
remediation, environmental activists, and many of Chevron’s key players.”93
He stated that he was the individual who had put together and supervised the team that was pursing

89

PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 10.
90

Bonifaz Dec. 30, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 32:16-33:4.
91

Id. at 20:21-22; see also PX 761 (Feb. 10, 2006 Assembly Resolution Terminating C.
Bonifaz).
92

PX 806R (Donziger Book Proposal), at 5.
93

Id.

25
the case and related activities94 and that his role was “to be the lawyer and manage the Ecuadorian
legal team, while Kohn provide[d] overall guidance and money.”95 He described himself as the
“lead lawyer in the class-action trial.”96
There is no substantial doubt that Donziger was in charge of the important aspects
of the Ecuadorian case. He referred to the Ecuadorian lawyers as his “local counsel.”97 They often
referred to him as the “cabeza,” or head, of the team.98 From the time the case was filed in Lago

94

Id. at 3 (“I am the person primarily responsible for putting this team together and
supervising it.”).
95

Id. at 21.
96

Id. at 3.
97

Donziger July 19, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 4764:19-23 (“Q. When you say ‘local counsel,’ do you
mean Pablo Fajardo, Saenz, and Prieto? A. Yes.”); Tr. (Donziger) 2477:1-6; PX 7682 (Jan.
28, 2010 Draft Ltr. from S. Donziger to J. Tyrrell) (“It likely will involve regular travel to
Ecuador as well to work with local counsel.”); Tr. (Donziger) 2470:4-10 (“Q. Isn’t it a fact,
Mr. Donziger, that you would give directions to local counsel in Ecuador on what to do with
the litigation? A. On occasion I would express my opinion as to what they should do, and
I would do it in forceful terms.”).
98

DX 1306 (Donziger Notebook), at 23 (“Pablo . . . [s]till introduces me as the ‘cabeza’ of the
lawsuit which I don’t like but that is fixable.”).
Chevron offered selected portions of Donziger’s personal notebook as a series of individual
exhibits but the defendants offered all of it as DX 1306. The portions offered by Chevron
all were admissible, even over any hearsay objection, because Donziger’s statements in the
notebook are nonhearsay when offered by his opposing party, Chevron. FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(1). The situation is quite different when the entire notebook was offered by the
defendants. To the extent it was offered for the truth of the statements, it was hearsay. No
hearsay exception was established. Nor did defendants establish that the entire notebook
was admissible under the rule of completeness, FED. R. EVID. 106, which in any case would
not have overcome any hearsay objection, infra Discussion § VII.C, or that any specific part
was admissible for a nonhearsay purpose. Accordingly, DX 1306, except for those portions
specifically relied upon in this opinion, which are admissible for the truth of the matters
asserted under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1), is inadmissible and stricken.

26
Agrio until at least quite recently, and perhaps even until today, Donziger has supervised the
Ecuadorian legal team, set deadlines, was involved in setting the lawyers’ salaries,99 reviewed their
court filings, directed the legal strategy, and coordinated the work between the lawyers in Ecuador
and the scientists, experts, lawyers, litigation funders, politicians, and media consultants throughout
the world.100 In addition, he communicates extensively with the press, and he has made tactical and
99

Donziger Dep. July 19, 2011 Dep. Tr., at 4912:19-22 (“I think [Yanza’s] salary was set by
mutual consent between Mr. Kohn and myself on the one hand, and Mr. Yanza on the other,
when Mr. Kohn was involved in the case), id. at 4913:10-15 (“Q. Who determined whether
or not Mr. Yanza received a bonus? A. I think, again, it was done by mutual consent
between Mr. Yanza and myself after Mr. Kohn withdrew from the case.”); PX 2396R
(Donziger’s Responses and Objections to Chevron Corps.’ First Set of Requests for
Admission), at 21 (“REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit that YOU were involved
in setting Pablo Fajardo Mendoza’s bonuses for his work concerning the LAGO AGRIO
LITIGATION. RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: . . . Donziger admits
that he was aware of, and at times participated in, discussion concerning Pablo Fajardo
Mendoza’s compensation.”); id. at 22 (“REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Admit that
YOU were involved in setting Pablo Fajardo Mendoza’s bonuses for his work concerning
the LAGO AGRIO LITIGATION. RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5:
. . . Donziger admits that he was aware of, and at times participated in, discussion concerning
Pablo Fajardo Mendoza’s compensation.”); id. at 23 (“REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.
7: Admit that YOU were involved in setting Luis Yanza’s monthly salary for his work
concerning the LAGO AGRIO LITIGATION. RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR
ADMISSION NO. 7: . . . Donziger admits that he was aware of, and at times participated in,
discussion concerning Luis Yanza’s compensation.”); id. at 24-25 (same for Juan Pablo
Sáenz); id. at 26 (same for Julio Prieto); id. at 23-24 (“REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.
9: Admit that YOU were involved in setting Luis Yanza’s bonuses for work concerning the
LAGO AGRIO LITIGATION. RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9: . .
. Donziger admits that he was aware of, and at times participated in, discussion concerning
Luis Yanza’s compensation.”); id. at 25-27 (same for Juan Pablo Sáenz.); id. at 26 (same for
Julio Prieto).
100

E.g., PX 8057 (Mar. 7, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to L. Yanza, J. Sáenz, J. Prieto, L.
Garr, and A. Page), at 5 (“Friends, Today is Sunday but it’s urgent that we resolve the
following by Monday: 1) The local motion with the court – we need a draft right away with
the translation so we can review it here before submitting it in Lago Agrio. The sooner it can
be submitted the better; rush if possible friends . . . . Please friends, we are in a difficult
situation; I am asking you to work today.”); PX 1065 (Sept. 11, 2008 Email from S.
Donziger to J. Sáenz) (“‘No’ is not a sufficient answer. If you have too much work, find
somebody else to do it and pay them. I need this tonite – no bullshit, and trust me, it will
help our clients more than what you are currently doing, as important as what you are doing
is.”); PX 1038 (June 6, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to J. Sáenz, P. Fajardo, J. Prieto, L.

27
strategic decisions.101 He largely has controlled the money.102 Hence, the Court finds that it has
been Donziger who, from the very beginning of the Lago Agrio case, has called the important

Yanza, R. Garcia) (“Juampa Get this done and don’t fuck up please.”); PX 2376 (Apr. 19.
2007 Email from S. Donziger to M. Regalado and M. Garcés) (“Friends: I am very, very
disappointed that you had already left when I called at 5:20. I’m applying new rules for
office communication. . . . We’re paying too much to put up with this type of thing. I send
a corrected press release and instead of answering me, you left.”); PX 687 (Nov. 19, 2003
Memorandum from Donziger to Team Entitled “Strategic Planning Memo/Ecuador Case”);
PX 7670 (Jan. 21, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to J. Prieto, J. Sáenz, L. De Heredia, P.
Fajardo, A. Ponce) (“Julio, Juampa, and Pablo, and Alejandro: Please ask Lupita to give you
the legal document that I gave her on Friday. It is urgent that you take care of it.”); PX 7582
(July 22, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to P. Fajardo) (“Can you send me the summary that
I recently asked for? thanks.”); PX 7465 (Sept. 20, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to J. Sanez,
P. Fajardo, J. Prieto, L Yanza, V. Barham) (“Friends, Let’s talk tonight. Let’s not do
anything rash please. Let’s analyze it first as a group.”); PX 3040 (Apr. 3, 2008 Email from
S. Donziger to P. Fajardo, L. Yanza, M. Garces. M. Guadalupe de Heredia, J. Sáenz, J.
Prieto) (“PERSONALIZE THE REIS [VEIGA] MATTER BECAUSE USING HIM IS A
WEAKNESS OF CHEVRON. PLEASE TAKE ADVANTAGE”).
101

This of course is not to say that Donziger never consulted his Ecuadorian colleagues, both
lawyers and others, and that he did not take account of their views. But It was Donziger
who made the important final decisions, giving such weight to any views expressed by
others as he thought appropriate.
102

Although Mr. Kohn provided the money through 2009, Donziger largely controlled how and
when it was spent. Many of the payments Kohn made to the plaintiffs’ team in Ecuador,
scientists, consultants, PR strategists, and experts first flowed through Donziger and were
subject to his approval. Indeed, Donziger sometimes paid the Ecuadorian legal team from
his personal account, for which he later was reimbursed by Kohn. See, e.g., Donziger July
19, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 4925:5-14, 4927:2-4928:2. And while Kohn ultimately bore the cost of
the salaries and bonuses of Ecuadorian lawyers and agents during his time on the case,
Donziger was involved in setting the amount of each. E.g., id. at 4912:18-22 (Q: Who set
Mr. Yanza’s salary? A: I think it was set by mutual consent between Mr. Kohn and myself
on the one hand and Mr. Yanza on the other, while Mr. Kohn was involved in the case.); id.
at 4913:15-23 (“Q. Did Mr. Yanza receive any bonuses while Mr. Kohn was funding the
litigation? A. I believe he did, yes. Q. Did Kohn agree to those bonuses? A. He paid
them, so yeah, he agreed to them.”). Donziger testified also that he even purchased a home
for Yanza. Id. at 4917:3-10. While Donziger paid for the home from his personal checking
account, he was reimbursed for the payment by Kohn. Id. at 4918:12-18; see also PX 968
(Feb. 8, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to J. Kohn and K. Wilson) (“Please send your deposit
of 20,000 to the following account”).

28
shots.103 The main exception to this general conclusion for the period 2003-09, during which Kohn
was the principal financial backer, was that Donziger on occasion sought Kohn’s acquiescence with
respect to activities that required additional funds.104 As will appear, however, Donziger did not
always tell Kohn the whole truth about what he was doing.

2.

The ADF, Selva Viva, and Luis Yanza

Luis Yanza is Donziger’s closest friend in Ecuador.105 Although he is not a lawyer,
he has been and remains a central figure in the LAP team. He has long served as “the coordinator
of the case for the affected communities.”106 He has been paid throughout from funds raised to
finance the case. Donziger even purchased a residence for him out of personal funds, though this
expense ultimately was reimbursed to Donziger by the Kohn firm.107
Yanza has been involved in some of the legal team’s biggest strategic decisions,

103

Donziger and the other defendants disputed this, at least for the period early 2012 to date,
both on a sanctions motion and at trial. The Court previously rejected their argument on the
sanctions motion and now rejects it again after trial.
104

Infra Facts § VII.D.
In 2010, a new source of funding, Burford Capital, invested millions of dollars in the case,
at which point the law firm of Patton Boggs was given some authority, along with Donziger,
over the expenditure of the money. Infra Facts § VII.E.1.
105

PX 6872 (May 23, 2006 Ltr. from S. Donziger to D. Kuhn), at 7 (“[m]y closest friend in
Ecuador and the coordinator of the case for the affected communities [is] Luis Yanza”).
106

Id.
107

Donziger July 19, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 4912:11-21, 4914:4-24, 4917:3-10, 4918:12-18; see also
PX 968 (Feb. 8, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to J. Kohn and K. Wilson) (“Please send your
deposit of 20,000 to the following account.”).

29
including, according to Donziger, the decision to replace the first Ecuadorian lead lawyer, Alberto
Wray.108 He was copied on nearly every important email sent among the Ecuadorian lawyers and
Donziger, and has been the liaison between the lawyers and their clients. He serves also as a major
point of contact between the LAP team and various Ecuadorian government officials including
President Correa.109
Donziger and Yanza formed two entities that figure in the events that followed.
The first was the ADF, which was formed in 1993, shortly after the Aguinda
complaint was filed, to support the case.110 Yanza functions as its executive director and
representative with respect to the Lago Agrio case.111
The second was Selva Viva CIA, Ltda. (“Selva Viva”), “an entity created under . . .
the corporate law of Ecuador that served as a funding vehicle [in the Lago Agrio] case . . . to pay
people in Ecuador who worked on the case.”112 It was founded in 2004, also by Yanza and at the

108

Donziger Dec. 23, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 1763:18-23.
109

See infra Facts § VI.
110

DX 1900 (H. Piaguaje Direct) ¶ 22; Tr. (Kohn) 1493:10-19.
111

Id.; PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 3 (Yanza was the representative of the ADF with respect to
the Lago Agrio case from the outset); id. ¶ 17 (Yanza was the head of the ADF).
112

Tr. (Donziger) 2635:5-9; Donziger Dec. 23, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 1817:12-17 (“Q. Selva Viva
was an Ecuadorian corporation created and run by the representative of the plaintiffs; is that
right? A. It was created by Yanza as a mechanism to administer the case funds.”); PX 6906
(record of incorporation of Selva Viva, its entry into the Register of Companies, and the
designation of Donziger as president); PX 897 (Aug. 14, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to
K. Wilson, J. Kohn, and K. Kenny re: “critical money transfer”) (“The Frente [ADF] created
Selva Viva simply as a pass thru mechanism to administer funds for the litigation; the Frente
[ADF] controls Selva Viva.”).

30
direction of Donziger, who was and still may be its president. Yanza controls the Selva Viva bank
accounts,113 which have been used primarily as a “pass thr[ough] mechanism to administer the case
funds. . . .”114 For many years, when the Ecuadorian team needed money, Yanza contacted Donziger
and Donziger in turn requested the funds from Kohn. The Kohn firm then wired the money either
directly to Selva Viva or to Donziger, who then passed it on to Selva Viva. It is undisputed that the
ADF, which is controlled by Yanza and Donziger, controls Selva Viva.
The ADF, Yanza, and Selva Viva all are defaulted defendants in this case.115

3.

The Ecuadorian Lawyers

When the Lago Agrio litigation commenced, the American lawyers – who were not
licensed to practice law in Ecuador – hired Ecuadorian attorneys to represent the LAPs in court. The
composition and leadership of the Ecuadorian legal team changed through the years – although, as
will become evident, it always has been managed and overseen by Donziger.
Pablo Estenio Fajardo Mendoza (“Fajardo”) graduated from law school in 2000 and,
for a time, worked for the ADF helping residents of the Orienté bring claims against oil

113

E.g., Donziger July 19, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 4844:22-4845:14; PX 897 (Aug. 14, 2007 Email
from S. Donziger to K. Wilson, J. Kohn, and K. Kenny re: “Critical money transfer”)
(“Luis Yanza . . . runs the Selva Viva account.”).
114

PX 897 (Aug. 14, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to K. Wilson, J. Kohn, and K. Kenny re:
“critical money transfer”) (“The Frente [ADF] created Selva Viva simply as a pass thru
mechanism to administer funds for the litigation; the Frente [ADF] controls Selva Viva.”);
see also Donziger Dec. 23, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 1817:12-18 (“Q. Selva Viva was an
Ecuadorian corporation created and run by the representative of the plaintiffs; is that right?
A. It was created by Yanza as a mechanism to administer the case funds.”).
115

DI 1469.

31
companies.116 After the Lago Agrio complaint was filed in 2003, he became one of the junior
lawyers on the Ecuadorian team. His role was relatively minor until Donziger recommended that
he replace Dr. Wray,117 which occurred in 2005.118
From then on, Fajardo has been the procurador común – lead counsel before the
courts in Ecuador – for the LAPs.119 And, as will be seen, Fajardo has represented the plaintiffs in
court, filed briefs on their behalf, signed retention agreements with investment firms, and given
interviews with the international press as their representative.120 He has traveled to the United States
a number of times in connection with the Lago Agrio case.121
Fajardo is a defendant in this case and, as is discussed below, appeared pro se in its

116

PX 6872 (May 23, 2006 Ltr. from S. Donziger to D. Kuhn), at 7.
117

Tr. (Donziger) 2474:16-20, 2475:17-2476:6; PX 6872 (May 23, 2006 Ltr. from S. Donziger
to D. Kuhn), at 9 (“As we surveyed our options, we decided that Fajardo was the best bet
to replace Pareja even though he had never run a trial in his life and (as the graduate of an
extension school) was not considered a ‘real’ lawyer by Chevron’s legal team.”).
118

PX 323 (Special and Judicial Power of Attorney on Behalf of Pablo Estenio Fajardo
Mendoza).
119

Id.
120

E.g., DX 1500 (Hinton Direct) ¶ 34 (“Pablo Fajardo won the CNN Hero Award. . . .”).
121

E.g., PX 1107 (Feb. 24, 2009 Email from P. Fajardo to S. Donziger and L. Yanza) (“I’m in
Oregon [and] . . . . I’m supposed to give the opening address at a super important
conference in the environmental world. . . .”); PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 18 (“In 2006, Mr.
Donziger, Mr. Fajardo, Mr. Yanza, and Mr. Ponce met me in my offices to discuss the
case.”); Donziger Jan. 14, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 2795:11-20 (“Q. Where were you and Mr.
Fajardo meeting? A. It was in my apartment. Q. In New York? A. Yes. Q. What was
the purpose of Mr. Fajardo’s visit to New York in May of 2010? A. To deal with various
issues relating to the Lago case.”).

32
early days.122 He never answered the complaint, and a certificate of default has been entered against
him.123
A number of other Ecuadorian lawyers has been involved in the Lago Agrio case on
behalf of the LAPs. The most significant have been Alejandro Ponce Villacis (“Ponce”), Juan Pablo
Sáenz, and Julio Prieto.
Yanza recruited Ponce, a lawyer based in Quito, shortly after the Lago Agrio case
was filed to “provide advice on the strategy as well as draft pleadings” and consult on matters of
Ecuadorian law.124 Although Ponce was involved in “design[ing] the strategy of the case,”125 he left
the team in 2008 when he became a partner in his firm.126
Juan Pablo Sáenz and Julio Prieto report to Donziger and Fajardo, who often have
called upon them to research and answer questions of Ecuadorian law,127 translate documents (Sáenz

122

DI 128 (Feb. 23, 2011 Ltr. from P. Fajardo to Court).
123

DI 469 (Certificate of Default as to Fajardo, Yanza, the ADF, Selva Viva, and the 45
defaulting Lago Agrio Plaintiffs).
124

DX 1601 (Ponce Direct) ¶ 9.
125

Id. ¶ 12.
126

Id. ¶ 9.
127

E.g., PX 7735 (Apr. 10, 2007 Email From S. Donziger to J. Sáenz and A. Ponce) (“Need
some manner to make theory of unjust enrichment part of damages claim. Any ideas of
how under Ecuadorian law?”); PX 2493 (Aug. 26 2008 Memorandum from G. Erion and
J. Sáenz) (“Re: Chevron’s Liability for Texaco in Fact and Law.”).

33
is fluent in English),128 write briefs,129 and handle daily litigation tasks.

4.

The Assembly

In 2001, a grass roots organization called the Asamblea was formed in the Orienté.130
Humberto Piaguaje, the current leader, explained that associations were formed in each oil field.
Each association designated delegates to participate in a larger council, and leaders of each
indigenous group and one representative of settlers in each province formed an executive
committee.131 The executive committee has met approximately once a month, often with members
of the Ecuadorian plaintiffs’ legal team.132 Minutes of these meetings have been taken and kept
128

PX 8057 (Mar. 7 2010 Email from P. Fajardo to S. Donziger copying others) (“Juampa
[Sáenz] is translating the Callejas statement.”)
129

PX 8057 (Mar. 7 2010 Email from J. Prieto) (“I can start on the motion [to be submitted in
Denver]”); PX 7580 (Nov. 7, 2006 Email from S. Donziger to J. Sáenz, L. Schrero, and J.
Prieto); PX 7468 (Nov. 11, 2010 Email from J. Sáenz to P. Fajardo and S. Donziger)
(“Friends, here’s the most recent draft of the Alegato. It still needs some work.”); PX 435
(Nov. 15, 2007 Email from J. Sáenz to P. Fajardo, J. Prieto, S. Donziger, and A. Anchundia)
(“Colleagues, here’s the first version of the famous merger memo, for your review and
comments. At the last minute I thought it would be a good idea to add something about
piercing the corporate veil, which is still missing.”).
130

DX 1900 (H. Piaguaje Direct) ¶ 26; Tr. (Donziger) 2635:11-22 (“The asamblea, I would
describe it as a grassroots organization that was created by the affected communities that
exist in the Napo concession area, that is where Texaco used to operate. There is about 80
different communities, some indigenous, some farmer communities, that consider
themselves to be the class of people that would benefit from any cleanup of the
environmental damage. And they organized an assembly in recent years to meet on a
regular basis and to monitor the lawsuit and to work with the lawyers to make their views
known about how they thought the lawsuit should be litigated, or whatever issues that they
wanted to express themselves about they would.”).
131

DX 1900 (H. Piaguaje Direct) ¶ 36.
132

Id. ¶ 37.

34
since 2001.133
Although the Asamblea “existed informally as a de-facto organization” since 2001,
it changed its name in 2012 to the Union of the Assembly of those Affected by Texaco (“UDAPT”
or the “Assembly”).134 In each of its incarnations, it has worked closely with the ADF135 in
connection with the Lago Agrio case.

III.

The Beginnings of Donziger’s Pressure Campaign
A.

Donziger’s Strategy
Donziger’s assumption of control over the litigation resulted in a fundamental change

in approach. The new approach is a lens through which virtually everything that happened after the
Lago Agrio case began in 2003 must be viewed.
Donziger believed that the court of public opinion was as important as any other.136
Once he took control of the case, the effort became “a campaign with various fronts active

133

Id. ¶ 38.
134

Id. ¶ 26.
135

The ADF is referred to also as the “Amazon Defense Coalition.” See, e.g., DX 1600
(Moncayo Direct) ¶ 6.
136

Charles Calmbacher, one of the first experts Donziger hired to assist in the Lago Agrio
litigation, testified that “a big concern of Donziger’s was our public appearance. He was
convinced that he could win the case in the court of public opinion. . . . He felt, you know,
if we showed any contamination, he could basically bring that out as, you know, something
horrible to the people and to the Amazon and get public opinion on his side.” Calmbacher
Dep. Tr. at 26:1-14.

35
simultaneously,” including the media and the U.S. and Ecuadorian political spheres.137 He adopted
an aggressive media strategy.
The importance of Donziger’s media and public relations strategy is evident from the
manner in which Donziger spent the millions of dollars that were obtained from investors.138 He
outlined the campaign in a memorandum he wrote to his team in late 2003. He explained that the
team would initiate and/or utilize celebrities; non-governmental organization “pressure;” the
“Ecuador government – executive, and Congress;” national, international, and Ecuadorian press; a
“divestment campaign” in which the team would seek to convince institutional investors to sell
Chevron stock, and even a criminal case in Ecuador in its effort to obtain money from Chevron.139
137

PX 687 (Nov. 19, 2003 Memorandum from Donziger to Team re: “Strategic Planning
Memo/Ecuador Case”), at 1.
138

While the financial records are incomplete and do not permit a full and accurate accounting,
PX 4900R (Dahlberg Direct) ¶¶ 8, 31-32, Donziger spent, or had primary control over
spending by others from whom he raised money, at least several million dollars to make the
documentary film Crude, to hire public relations personnel and lobbyists, to pay a former
presidential speech writer to ghostwrite op-ed pieces for signature by others, and to fund
ostensibly independent NGOs that publicly supported the LAPs in various ways. Id. ¶¶ 7,
89-112; see also PX 607 (Invoices from S. Donziger to Kohn, Swift & Graf), at 58 (June 10,
2010 Invoice reflecting $7,500 fee for Paul Orzulak, West Wing Writers). The public
relations personnel and lobbying firms he hired included Karen Hinton, Ken Sunshine, Paul
Orzulak, Kerry Kennedy, Lou Dematteis, Mark Fabiani, Christopher Lehane, Ben Barnes
Group, and Downey McGrath Group. PX 4900R (Dahlberg Direct) ¶¶ 89, 107. Among the
NGOs with which he worked closely, and for which he raised substantial funds, were
Amazon Watch, the ADF, the Rainforest Action Network, and Selva Viva. Id. ¶¶ 101-06.
139

E.g., PX 1146 (July 2, 2009 Memorandum from “SRD” to “Kohn Team” re: “Activity
Going Forward”), at 1 (“The space is occupied by players in the worlds of law, science,
environmental activism, politics, the press, lobbying, diplomacy, celebrity, shareholders,
financial analysts, regulatory agencies, and many others in Ecuador – including high-level
officials in Ecuador’s government . . . . We . . . see this as not just a legal case, but a
political-style campaign driven by a legal case. The battle takes place on a daily basis, 24/7
per day, with no breaks for the normal rhythms of the typical legal practice.”).

In fact, many of Donziger’s former co-counsel on the case expressed grave concerns over

36
Just as important as the pressure campaign directed at Chevron was an analogous
campaign directed at the Ecuadorian courts. As we have seen already, Donziger viewed the
Ecuadorian courts as corrupt, weak and responsive to pressure – as institutions that, at best, “make
decisions based on who they fear the most, not based on what the laws should dictate.”140 In a
particularly revealing comment, made in his personal notebook, he wrote that “the only way the
court will respect us is if they fear us – and that the only way they will fear us is if they think we have
. . . control over their careers, their jobs, their reputations – that is to say, their ability to earn a
livelihood.”141 “[I]n the end of the day,” he said, “it is about brute force” rather than “all this bullshit
about the law and facts.”142 As we shall see, he and his associates directly coerced at least one judge
and mobilized demonstrations to intimidate others. And the object always included ratcheting the
pressure up on Chevron in order to extract money from it.
This focus on the media had at least one unintended effect. Hoping to promote the
LAPs’ cause in the court of public opinion, Donziger in 2005 recruited a film maker to follow him
and his team around in Ecuador and the United States, filming scenes for use in documentary. That
film eventually become the documentary Crude, which prompted extensive U.S. discovery efforts

his “obsession with public relations.” PX 1406 (Aug. 9, 2010 Ltr. from J. Kohn to P.
Fajardo, L. Yanza, H. Piaguaje, E. Chavez, H. Payaguaje, E. Criollo), at 4; see also PX
1157 (Sept. 5, 2009 Email from N. Glazer to S. Donziger) (“We have a team of experienced
attorneys who want to be fully integrated into and engaged with the matter . . . . And we .
. . learn of case developments not from co-counsel but from press releases . . . . I feel . . .
that it is extremely unprofessional, and that too much emphasis is placed on PR and not
enough on other aspects.”).
140

Supra Facts § II.A.
141

PX 184 (Donziger Notebook), at 2 of 5 (emphasis added).
142

PX 77A (Undated Crude Clip).

37
by Chevron that led to the disclosure of outtakes from the film. Many of Donziger’s statements on
camera made to the Crude film makers, some of which are quite revealing, are in evidence in this
case.

B.

Donziger’s Public Relations Team and NGO Allies
1.

The Public Relations and Lobbying Team

As Donziger viewed (and views) his efforts to force Chevron into settlement as “a
political-style campaign driven by a legal case,”143 it is not surprising that he spent a significant part
of the resources he raised for the Lago Agrio case on these efforts, and hired several public relations
professionals and lobbyists with extensive political experience to work on the LAPs’ behalf. He
involved also, and at times financially contributed to, NGOs to support his efforts. These
individuals and organizations often were mere mouthpieces, however. Donziger at all times
controlled the content and timing of the LAPs’ public relations.
Until quite recently, Karen Hinton was the public face of the litigation’s public
relations efforts. She was the “United States press coordinator” and handled media relations efforts
from May 2008 to March 2013.144 During that period, Hinton issued press releases and blog posts
to generate media interest in the case, selected materials to submit to public officials, responded to

143

PX 1146 (July 2, 2009 Memorandum from “SRD” to “Kohn Team” re “Activity Going
Forward”), at 1.
144

DX 1500 (Hinton Direct) ¶¶ 2, 4. In 2009, Donziger described Hinton to one of the case’s
investors as follows: “Former aid[e] to Andrew Cuomo (Clinton cabinet member and
currently [Attorney General] of New York). Responsible for 60 Minutes, Wash Post,
Bloomberg, AP, Wall Street Journal, and interest by Andrew Cuomo in investigating
Chevron for misleading shareholders.” PX 1123 (Apr. 14, 2009 Memorandum from S.
Donziger to R. DeLeon re “Estimated 15-month budget, Ecuador case”), at 1-2.

38
media inquiries,145 and, eventually, handled media requests related to the discovery proceedings
Chevron launched in the United States.146 As Hinton understood it at the time of her retention, the
objective of her communications efforts was to “facilitate the stated goal of pushing ChevronTexaco
to settle the lawsuit in the near future.”147 Hinton did not have ultimate control over the content of
her work, however. The substance of her press releases always was subject to Donziger’s
approval.148
Chris Lehane likewise worked to develop the LAPs’ media and public relations
strategy as an “advisor” to Donziger149 using “strategies and tactics . . . employed in political
campaigns . . . .”150 After first discussing Donziger’s objectives with him, Lehane proposed to

145

DX 1500 (Hinton Direct) ¶ 4; Tr. (Hinton) 2180:22-2181:2.
146

Tr. (Hinton) 2169:14-15.
147

PX 1034 (Apr. 28, 2008 Email from K. Hinton to S. Donziger re “Proposal from Hinton
Communications”), at 3.
148

E.g., PX 6817 (Mar. 11, 2009 Email Chain Between K. Hinton and S. Donziger) (Donziger
tells Hinton: “do not change headlines ever without telling me. . . . in the future blind copy
me on those emails to quito. . . I need to know what is going on for purposes of managing
my own staff there and knowing what journalists there have been sent . . . I think I asked
you that before”); PX 1133 (May 5, 2009 Email from K. Hinton to S. Donziger) (“There
are people in this world – other than yourself – who know how to get things done. I know
that’s hard for you to believe, given your own incredible fascination with yourself.”); PX
6814 (Dec. 3, 2009 Email chain Between K. Hinton and S. Donziger) (Donziger: “when I
send a final copy of a press release for posting, the issue of the headline is settled. never
change it at that point. tks.” Hinton: “I said I misunderstood. Why do u always feel the
need to rub a mistake in extra hard. . . To make sure your authority is respected and
acknowledged? It is. Ok!”).
149

Donziger June 28, 2013 Dep. Tr. at 845:21-23.
150

PX 728 (Apr. 27, 2005 Email from C. Lehane to S. Donziger and J. Kohn attaching
Ecuadorian Issues Outline), at 4.

39
Donziger a strategy to target shareholders, Congress, and “high level media” in order to “inflict[]
real economic pain on the company” and “bring[] Chevron Texaco to the negotiation table.”151 The
plan was to “fully leverage” events in Ecuador, with a view to “apply[ing] shareholder pressure on
Chevron.”152 Donziger hired him, and, in exchange for his work on the case, arranged for Lehane
to be given a percentage of any eventual monetary recovery.153

2.

Amazon Watch

Another central player in Donziger’s publicity campaign was Amazon Watch, an
NGO that declares a dedication to protecting the rainforest and the indigenous groups that inhabit
it.154 Amazon Watch and various of its staff – including Atossa Soltani, its founder and executive
director, and Mitchell Anderson, a “field consultant” – worked with Donziger and others on the LAP
team to support and publicize the lawsuit and to pressure Chevron. To that end, the organization
collaborated with the LAPs to lobby regulatory agencies and elected officials,155 sought support
151

Id. at 1 (emphasis omitted).
152

PX 734 (Oct. 1, 2005 Email from S. Donziger to J. Kohn re “Lehane’s first press plan”), at
2; see also PX 694 (Aug. 16, 2004 Email from C. Lehane to S. Donziger re: “Issues Outline
Document”), at 2 (“We must create an ongoing storyline that ChevronTexaco faces hidden
purposely concealed economic exposure because of its unresolved role in the Ecuador . .
. project. Ultimate success will depend on our ability to organize and focus our efforts on
impacting the company’s bottom line.”).
153

June 28, 2013 Donziger Dep. Tr. at 845:24-846:4; see also PX 560 (Feb. 2011 Advisory
Agreement between LAPs, CSL Strategies, and Mark Fabiani LLC).
154

See PX 571 (2005 Amazon Watch Annual Report), at 5.
155

PX 7426 (Feb. 9, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to M. Anderson, P. Paz y Mino, and K.
Koenig re: “For Pat Doherty”); PX 754 (Jan. 30, 2006 Amazon Watch Ltr. from A. Soltani

40
among Chevron shareholders for a settlement,156 and sought media attention through press
releases.157
Although Amazon Watch’s public materials did not bear Donziger’s name, Donziger
himself drafted many Amazon Watch materials related to the Lago Agrio litigation.158 Donziger not
only controlled the content of Amazon Watch press releases pertaining to the litigation,159 he drafted
also complaints that Amazon Watch submitted to the SEC160 and memoranda to be sent to elected
and S. Aird to C. Cox).
156

PX 7542 (May 25, 2009 Amazon Watch Letter to Shareholders), at 2.
157

See, e.g., PX 483R (Mar. 6, 2007 Amazon Watch press release) at 2 (“[An] independent
damage assessment, by the U.S. firm Global Environmental Operations, estimates clean-up
to cost at least $6.14 billion.”); PX 472R (Apr. 26, 2006 Amazon Watch press release), at
1 (“Two rainforest leaders sparked a dramatic showdown with Chevron CEO David
O’Reilly today over the oil major’s devastating $6 billion toxic contamination of their
ancestral lands . . . .”).
158

See, e.g., June 28, 2013 Donziger Dep. Tr. at 834:2-5 (acknowledging that “[o]n occasions
[Donziger] wrote press releases that [Amazon Watch] put out”); Jan. 18, 2011 Donziger Dep.
Tr. at 3177:10-13; 3178:10-20 (Q: “You drafted the [SEC] complaint letters for Amazon
Watch to send; did you not?” A: “I believe at times I did.”).
159

See, e.g., PX 1214 (Jan. 27, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to S. Tegel, A. Soltani, K. Koenig,
and M. Anderson re: “another thought”), at 1 (“Suggestions are welcome for any press
release we do; final editing authority is something we would never grant to any outsider –
especially somebody not in a position to understand the art and feel of this campaign and its
daily developments.”); PX 808 (Nov. 9, 2006 Email from S. Donziger to J. Ciplet and A.
Soltani re: “suggestion”), at 1 (“I also know the press releases on the Ecuador campaign are
not a terrible work burden to AW because I am writing most of them.”); PX 906 (Aug. 24,
2007 Email from S. Donziger to S. Tegel, M. Anderson, A. Soltani, and K. Koenig re:
“follow up on press releases”), at 1 (“[W]e are never going to outsource our editing
responsibility to anybody else or any NGO . . . .”).
160

See, e.g., PX 996 (Mar. 17, 2008 Email from S. Donziger, M. Anderson, S. Tegel, P. Paz y
Mino, and A. Soltani re: “Edited SEC letter/final”), at 1 (“The final SEC letter is attached
with all of AW’s edits sent to me on Friday plus some additional edits of my own . . . . I
think this letter will really put some heat on them. To submit this, this is what you need to
do . . . .”).

41
officials regarding Chevron.161 Despite Donziger’s authorship, the materials bore no outward
indication of his involvement – documents drafted in whole or in substantial part by Donziger were
sent on Amazon Watch letterhead and signed by Amazon Watch personnel.
In addition, in April 2005 Amazon Watch used funding from the LAPs162 to launch
a website that was a key conduit for Donziger’s campaign.163 Dubbed “ChevronToxico,” the website
posted information about the litigation as well as materials written by Donziger, Hinton, and others,
some of which included deliberately misleading statements.
Hinton, Lehane, Soltani, and others at Amazon Watch became important figures in
Donziger’s pressure campaign against Chevron, and their names appear throughout this case.
Among the campaign’s first real tasks, however, was the use of a flawed $6 billion figure to attempt
to convince Chevron that it was facing multibillion dollar exposure in Ecuador and that the time had
come to settle.

C.

The Pressure Begins – The LAPs’ First Scientist and the $6 Billion “Drive By”
Damages Estimate
Soon after the complaint was filed in Lago Agrio in 2003, Donziger hired David

Russell, an environmental engineer,164 to generate an initial cost estimate for remediation of the
161

See, e.g., PX 7426 (Feb. 9, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to M. Anderson re: “For Pat
Doherty”), at 1 (“Mitch, Attached is the memo you requested. I put it in your name.”).
162

Donziger June 28, 2013 Dep. Tr. at 841:19-22.
163

PX 571 (2005 Amazon Watch Annual Report), at 8; Tr. (Hinton) 2180:1-24.
164

PX 3200 (Russell Direct) ¶ 1. Prior to his involvement with the Lago Agrio case, Russell
worked on projects involving remediation and strategic planning related to oil operations in

42
Concession area.165 Among the purposes of the estimate was to subject Chevron to the threat of a
very large recovery.166
In the fall of 2003, at Donziger’s direction, Russell went to the Orienté to work on
his damages estimate.167 There are three notable points about this estimate.
First, Russell visited only about 45 of the hundreds of oil pits in the region, and based
his calculations on an extrapolation of what he observed at those sites.168 But he did not analyze
any soil or water samples at any of the sites he visited.169 And his visits to some of those sites, he
acknowledged at trial, were no more searching than driving past them at 40 or 50 miles per hour.170
Second, Russell testified, and the Court finds, that Donziger instructed him to make
certain assumptions in calculating costs.171 Among them was the assumption that Texaco was fully

the United States and Latin America. Id. ¶ 2.
165

Id.
166

E.g., Tr. (Russell) 388:14-18 (“I believe . . . that Mr. Donziger was intending to use this cost
estimate to get Chevron’s attention and to attempt to get them to settle the case.”).
167

PX 3200 (Russell Direct) ¶ 5; see also DX 1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶ 111; Tr. (Russell)
300:8-10 .
168

Tr. (Russell) 304:9-12.
169

PX 3200 (Russell Direct) ¶ 5. Donziger testified, however, that Russell was “provided with
and reviewed a considerable amount of data, including historical records and maps.” DX
1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶ 111.
170

Tr. (Russell) 309:4-8; PX 3200 (Russell Direct) ¶ 5.
171

DX 1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶ 111; PX 3200 (Russell Direct) ¶ 9.

43
liable for all of the contamination in the region, even that caused by PetroEcuador172 after it took
over operation of the Consortium properties when TexPet left in 1992.
Third, as the report itself made clear, Russell’s “cost projections [w]ere very
rough.”173 He testified that this was due to “the amount of unknowns and the lack of information
[he] had with regard to not only levels of contamination but the extent of those levels of
contamination.”174 And he informed Donziger and other members of the LAP team as early as
December 2004 that his estimates were “best guesses based upon a week of looking at the sites,
without any scientific data,” and encouraged the team not to “rush to judgment” based on a
“guesstimate.”175 He was entirely candid at trial on the consequences of this lack of data – the
quantities he used in generating the $6 billion figure were, he said, were “SWAG,” an acronym for
a “scientific wild ass guess.”176

D.

Donziger Touts Russell’s “SWAG” and Other Misleading Descriptions of Conditions
in the Orienté to Put Pressure on Chevron
Russell’s $6 billion SWAG figure quickly became a key weapon in Donziger’s effort

to exert pressure on Chevron and convince the company – and the world – that the damages in the

172

PX 3200 (Russell Direct) ¶ 6; see also DX 1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶ 111.
173

PX 2414 (Russell Damages Estimate), at 2.
174

Tr. (Russell) 339:4-7.
175

PX 3201 (Dec. 12, 2004 Email chain including D. Russell, C. Bonifaz, A. Wray, S.
Donziger, and M. Pareja).
176

Tr. (Russell) 339:10-11.

44
Orienté were substantial and the threat of an enormous judgment against it was real. As we shall
see, Donziger and his public relations operation avidly used Russell’s $6 billion figure in the media
to generate leverage despite the fact that they knew that it could not withstand serious analysis.
David Russell left the LAP team in early 2005 because, among other reasons, the
LAP team owed him money and refused to pay it.177 By that time he had made explicit to Donziger
that his cost estimate had been “wildly inaccurate and that it should not be used.”178 But that did not
stop Donziger and his public relations team from using the number, over Russell’s protests, to
pressure Chevron through the media.179

177

PX 3200 (Russell Direct) ¶ 38.
178

Id. ¶ 14.
179

Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 20; see generally PX 766 (Feb. 13, 2006 Email chain including D. Russell, L.
Salazar-Lopez, and S. Donziger re: “Cease and Desist!”); PX 764 (Feb. 14, 2006 Ltr. from
D. Russell to S. Donziger re “Cease and Desist”), at 1-2; PX 766 (Feb. 16, 2006 Email from
L. Salazar-Lopez to D. Russell re: “Cease and Desist!”) (stating that Amazon Watch
“respect[s] your request and have decided to take [the] report off of [the Amazon Watch]
website”); PX 466R (Mar. 17, 2006 ChevronToxico press release), at 2; PX 467R (Mar. 22,
2006 Amazon Defense Coalition press release), at 1 (“Chevron is resorting to increasingly
desperate measures to cover its tracks in the landmark environmental trial in Ecuador in
which the oil giant faces a $6 billion clean-up tab.”); PX 472R (Apr. 26, 2006 Amazon
Watch press release), at 1 (“Two rainforest leaders sparked a dramatic showdown with
Chevron CEO David O’Reilly today over the oil major’s devastating $6 billion toxic
contamination of their ancestral lands . . . .”); PX 480R (Oct. 30, 2006 Amazon Watch press
release), at 1-3 (referring to “landmark $6 billion pollution trial” and remediation cost
estimates of “at least $6 billion”); PX 18A (Undated Crude Clip), at CRS-138-02-CLIP-02;
PX 788 (Aug. 15, 2006 Email from S. Donziger to D. Russell re “I asked you once . . .”)
(“No problem, I will contact the Frente to have that removed . . . .”); PX 476R (Aug. 25,
2006 Amazon Watch press release), at 1 (“Clean-up is estimated at $6.1 billion.”); PX 494R
(Aug. 30, 2007 Amazon Defense Coalition press release), at 3 (“Global Environmental
Services, an Atlanta-based company that assessed the damage, called the area the
‘Rainforest Chernobyl’ and estimated clean-up would cost at least $6 billion.”).

45
E.

False and Misleading Representations to Incite Governmental Action Against
Chevron
The press was not the only intended audience for Russell’s disavowed $6 billion

figure and other false and misleading comparisons. Donziger and his public relations team
employed both in efforts to instigate action and put pressure on Chevron from federal and state
officials and agencies. One aim was to create the perception that the litigation threatened serious
harm to the company, was material to Chevron’s bottom line, and would result in a lower share price
and lower profits for Chevron shareholders. In Lehane’s words, “the Ecuadorian Amazon
ChevronTexaco project can be reduced, in the end, to a single strategic imperative: ‘Bringing
ChevronTexaco to the negotiation table by inflicting real economic pain on the company.’”180
To that end, Donziger in late 2005 drafted a letter181 that ultimately was sent by
Amazon Watch to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The letter “request[ed] that
[it] open an investigation into the Chevron Corporation (CVX) for violating SEC regulations
governing disclosure obligations. . . .”182 The letter promoted Russell’s SWAG remediation
estimate, stating that “[o]ne environmental remediation expert estimated that a basic clean-up would
cost at least $6 billion”183 despite the fact that Donziger knew when he wrote it that Russell had told

180

PX 728 (Apr. 27, 2005 Email from C. Lehane to S. Donziger and J. Kohn attaching
Ecuadorian Issues Outline) (emphasis omitted).
181

PX 736 (Nov. 1, 2005 Email from S. Donziger to C. Lehane and J. Kohn re: “SEC
ltr/other”).
182

PX 754 (Jan. 30, 2006 Amazon Watch Ltr. from A. Soltani and S. Aird to C. Cox).
183

Id.

46
him that it was wildly inaccurate.184 The letter asserted also that Chevron had “creat[ed] toxic
contamination over 30 times larger than the Exxon Valdez”185 and decried Chevron’s alleged failure
to disclose its “potential liability” to its shareholders.186 He used the same figure, despite subsequent
confirmation that it was exaggerated, in later testimony before a Congressional commission on
human rights, and in press releases.187
184

PX 3200 (Russell Direct) ¶ 14 (“I told Donziger on several occasions from late 2004
through early 2005 that my initial cost estimate was wildly inaccurate and that it should not
be used.”).
185

PX 754 (Jan. 30, 2006 Amazon Watch Ltr. from A. Soltani and S. Aird to C. Cox).
In 2007, Bill Powers, a member of the LAPs’ technical team, investigated the claim that the
contamination in the Orienté was 30 times larger than the contamination caused by the
Exxon Valdez. He concluded that it was vastly exaggerated and so informed Donziger and
Soltani of Amazon Watch. PX 861 (May 24, 2007 Email from A. Soltani to S. Donziger re:
“exxon valdez 30x”); PX 862 (May 24, 2007 Email from B. Powers to S. Donziger, A.
Soltani, S. Tegel, K. Koenig and J. Ciplet re: “FOE is on our team RE: exxon valdez 30x”).
Soltani responded that Amazon Watch – which had featured the Exxon Valdez comparison
in press releases – needed to “save face” and remove the references to the spill. PX 861
(May 24, 2007 Email from A. Soltani to S. Donziger re “exxon valdez 30x”). But Donziger
insisted that they stick to the claim. He warned that there would be “HUGE implications for
the legal case” if they disavowed the comparison to Exxon Valdez, and told Amazon Watch
that it “[w]ould terribly prejudice the people it is trying to help if it makes this change.” PX
860 (May 24, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to S. Tegel re: “private”). Despite Soltani’s
reservations, ChevronToxico continued to tout the claim. See, e.g., PX 492R (July 4, 2007
Amazon Watch press release), at 2; PX 2309R (Aug. 28, 2009 Amazon Defense Coalition
Press Release), at 2; PX 503 (May 21, 2008 Amazon Defense Coalition press release), at 2
(“30 times more pure crude than in the Exxon Valdez disaster”); PX 510 (Sept. 16, 2008
Amazon Defense Coalition press release), at 2 (“The Ecuadorians have accused Texaco . .
. of committing the worst oil-related disaster on the planet on their ancestral lands – one at
least 30 times worse than the Exxon Valdez spill.”); PX 513R (Oct. 15, 2008 ChevronToxico
press release), at 2 (“All told, the amount of oil dumped in Ecuador by Texaco is at least
thirty times greater than the amount spilled during the Exxon Valdez disaster, according to
the plaintiffs in the civil suit.”).
186

PX 754 (Jan. 30, 2006 Amazon Watch Ltr. from A. Soltani and S. Aird to C. Cox).
187

PX 1130R (Apr. 28, 2009 S. Donziger Testimony before Tom Lantos Human Rights
Comm’n, Hr’g on Ecuador, Nigeria, West Papua: Indigenous Communities, Environmental

47
The day after the SEC letter was sent, Donziger wrote to Soltani of Amazon Watch:
“[n]ow that the SEC ltr is filed, it is key we come up with a coherent strategy to build pressure for
the April shareholder’s [sic] meeting.”188 Donziger called on Amazon Watch and others – including
Chevron shareholders (whom Amazon Watch was to address at an upcoming shareholder meeting)
– to send letters to the SEC calling for investigation into Chevron’s conduct in Ecuador.189 Donziger
suggested that Amazon Watch “seek a meeting with [SEC chairman Christopher] Cox or one of his
deputies” in order “to press for them to open a real investigation.”190 He insisted that Amazon
Watch could “get a lot of legs out of this if it is exploited with a little follow-up” and emphasized
that the “key . . . to [the] strategy . . . is to keep this alive and active so it is hanging over their heads

Degradation, and International Human Rights Standards), at 60.
Douglas Beltman, another scientist then working for the LAPs, also challenged the accuracy
of the Exxon Valdez claim. He asked Donziger: “do you know where the 30 times number
comes from?” PX 1110 (Mar. 1, 2009 Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger re “Pls answer
questions”), at 1. Donziger replied: “My own calculations. If that doesn’t suffice then kiss
my butt.” Id. (emphasis added).
Shortly thereafter, Donziger recited the Exxon Valdez comparison in his testimony and
continued to use the statistic in press releases and blog posts throughout 2009 and 2010. PX
522R (Apr. 27, 2009 Amazon Defense Coalition press release), at 2; PX 527R (Oct. 22, 2009
Amazon Defense Coalition press release), at 2 (“Experts for the plaintiffs have concluded
the disaster is at least 30 times larger than the Exxon Valdez spill . . . .”); PX 529R (Dec. 30,
2009 Amazon Defense Coalition press release), at 2 (“Experts consider the disaster at least
30 times worse than the damage caused by the Exxon Valdez.”); PX 533R (The Chevron Pit
Blog Entry), at 3 (“Experts have concluded that the Chevron [sic] discharged at least 345
million gallons of pure crude oil directly into the rainforest ecosystem . . . and approximately
11 million gallons of pure crude was spilled during the Exxon Valdez disaster.”).
188

PX 756 (Jan. 31, 2006 Email from S. Donziger to A. Soltani and J. Ciplet re: “Plan for SEC
follow up”).
189

Id.
190

PX 759 (Feb. 1, 2006 Email to A. Soltani, S. Aird, J. Ciplet, L. Salazar Lopez, and S. Tegel
re: “imp follow up with SEC”).

48
as long as possible, and so it can be used to get other shareholders to write their own letters.”191
By the end of February 2006, Russell had sent his first cease and desist emails to
Donziger and Amazon Watch.192 Donziger emailed Soltani to suggest that they send “the SEC letter
in ASAP, making [the] slight change that another report will be coming with a multi-billion damage
figure, without disavowing or mentioning Russell’s report.”193
Donziger’s efforts to incite an SEC investigation did not amount to much. After
meeting with an SEC investigator, he wrote to his team that the investigator thought that “the
probability of a negative judgment [in the Lago Agrio litigation] was so attenuated that they [SEC
staff] did not think it [i.e., the possible $6 billion exposure] was material yet.”194 But while Donziger
admitted that he “sort of fe[lt] [that the investigation he sought was] bogus,” he insisted that he
would “ keep feeding them [the SEC] stuff” as long as the SEC was willing to continue talking with
them.195 This was not the only time Donziger and his public relations team would reach out to the
SEC in an effort to gain leverage over Chevron.196

191

Id.
192

PX 764 (Feb. 14, 2006 Ltr. from D. Russell to S. Donziger re “Cease and Desist”), at 1.
193

PX 768 (Feb. 23, 2006 Email from S. Donziger to A. Soltani, L. Salazar-Lopez, S. Tegel,
J. Ciplet re: “important – SEC ltr”).
194

PX 781 (July 12, 2006 Email from S. Donziger to A. Page and D. Fisher re: “SEC
investigation/Chevron”).
195

Id.
196

Amazon Watch wrote to SEC Chairman Cox again in March 2008 to request “that the SEC
impose sanctions on Chevron . . . for violations of its disclosure obligations” with respect
to its liability in the Lago Agrio litigation. In that letter, Amazon Watch stated that the case

49
F.

Donziger’s Attempt to Justify His Continued Use of Russell’s Disavowed Estimate
is Unpersuasive
Donziger attempted at trial to justify his continued use of Russell’s disavowed

estimate by explaining that he believed in its validity and, indeed, thought at the time that the actual
remediation figure was much higher than $6 billion. He testified that he had a “more detailed cost
assessment from [the] Ecuadorian technical team” that had calculated the remediation cost to be
over $15 billion as well as estimates by a “junior lawyer” that the “remediation proposal [would]
come in at about $20 billion.”197 That these estimates were so much higher than $6 billion, Donziger
claimed, satisfied him that it was acceptable to continue using Russell’s cost estimate
notwithstanding the fact that Russell demanded repeatedly that he stop doing so. But Donziger’s
claim is far fetched and the Court finds that Donziger in fact never believed it. The only estimates
of which there was any evidence were prepared under Donziger’s direction by junior lawyers who
worked for him.198 As Donziger acknowledged, their purpose was to “make media/court/CVX

was “[c]oming to a [c]lose” and touted “the appointment of an independent special master
to assess culpability and ascertain the monetary value of the damages caused.” See PX
497R (Mar. 18, 2008 Ltr. from A. Soltani to C. Cox), at 2. The letter stated also that
Chevron’s liability “appears to have increased substantially” such that the “materiality
threshold as understood by SEC guidance is reached.” Id. at 5. Donziger largely drafted
this letter for Amazon Watch as well. See PX 996 (Mar. 17, 2008 Email from S. Donziger,
M. Anderson, S. Tegel, P. Paz y Mino, and A. Soltani re: “Edited SEC letter/final”), at 1
(“The final SEC letter is attached . . . .”).
197

DX 1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶ 118.
198

They were prepared by Donziger’s associate, Aaron Marr Page, and his wife, Daria Fisher,
and were to be submitted under the name of Fausto Peñafiel. DX 731 (Apr. 14, 2006 Email
from A. Maest), at 4 (“Fausto can be the author of this if you’d like to submit it?”); DX 731
(Apr. 16, 2006 Email from S. Donziger to A. Page and D. Fisher re: “excellent work on
remediation/questions”); PX 8014 (Edits by S. Donziger, “The Cost of Remediating the
Former Texaco Concession: An Order of Magnitude Estimate,” signed by Fausto Miguel
Peñafiel Villareal). Mr. Peñafiel, one of the LAPs’ party-nominated experts, introduced
Donziger to Fernando Reyes, whose involvement in the case will be explained below. See

50
[Chevron] itself start thinking in terms of billions”199 and potentially to use the figure to pique the
SEC’s interest in the litigation.200 There is no evidence of any competent study during this time
period by any qualified person that supports Donziger’s claim.
*

*

*

We have touched here only on part of Donziger’s earliest efforts beyond the litigation
itself, which have continued unabated for years since. We shall touch on other examples later. But
we turn now to the Lago Agrio case itself, which already had begun.

IV.

The First Phase of the Lago Agrio Case – The Judicial Inspections
A.

The Process
Judge Guerra opened the evidentiary phase of the Lago Agrio litigation on October

21, 2003.201 It began with the parties submitting requests for the types and scope of evidence that

Reyes Dep. Tr. at 17:2-17. Page and Fisher are lawyers, not scientists. They worked on the
estimates under Donziger’s direction. PX 8014 (Edits by S. Donziger, “The Cost of
Remediating the Former Texaco Concession: An Order of Magnitude Estimate,” signed by
Fausto Miguel Peñafiel Villareal), at 3 (“Daria, a suggesti[o]n: [I] would put this at end in
a footnote or leave out altogether; texaco will see this and slam you . . . Remember that this
is not science, this is an active litigation and this needs to be written to protect fausto and this
part leaves him exposed. Always think how they will come back at us.”). Their sole
objective – in Page’s words – was “to exceed the $6 billion figure, while still passing the
laugh test.” DX 731 (Apr. 15, 2006 Email from D. Fisher to S. Donziger and A. Page, re:
“excellent work on remediation/questions”), at 3.
199

PX 3240 (Apr. 20, 2006 Email from A. Page to S. Donziger re: “DOJ ltr”).
200

DX 731 (Apr. 16, 2006 Email from S. Donziger to A. Page and D. Fisher re: “excellent
work on remediation/questions”), at 1 (“[W]ill releasing this now help with the SEC . . . ?”).
201

PX 4300X (Callejas Direct) ¶¶ 25, 26.

51
the Lago Agrio judge should consider. Adolfo Callejas – Chevron’s local counsel in Ecuador –
explained that:
“Under Ecuadorian civil procedure, the parties must submit all of their evidentiary
requests in a defined period; in the case of summary verbal proceedings, that period
is six days. While all of the evidence does not have to be provided within that time
frame, all requests for then-existent documents, witness testimony, expert
assessments, judicial inspections of a place or thing, and other proof must be
requested by both parties by the statutory deadline. . . . My legal team and I
submitted a number of evidentiary requests on Chevron’s behalf during the initial
six-day evidentiary period, as did the lawyers for the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs.
Although there were numerous requests for documents and for witness testimony
from both sides, the bulk of the requests were for judicial inspections of a total of
122 sites, including well sites and production stations, in the former Concession area
and nearby oilfields.”202
Guerra granted both sides’ evidentiary requests.203
Each side identified a technical expert to negotiate the procedures that would govern
the judicial inspection process. Sara McMillen, Chevron’s lead scientist on the Lago Agrio case,204
assumed this role for Chevron, while David Russell, who then still was working for Donziger, took
the lead on behalf of the LAPs.205 The parties ultimately agreed upon and submitted to the court a
sampling and analysis plan.206
“For most of the judicial inspections, experts were nominated by each side. At each
judicial inspection site, these nominated experts took samples under the supervision

202

Id. ¶¶ 28-29.
203

PX 317 (Oct. 29, 2003 Lago Agrio Court Order).
204

PX 3300 (McMillen Direct) ¶ 2.
205

PX 4300X (Callejas Direct) ¶ 31; PX 3300 (McMillen Direct) ¶ 14.
206

PX 4300X (Callejas Direct) ¶ 31.

52
of the judge at that site, sent their samples to a laboratory for testing and analysis,
and then each submitted a written report of his or her findings and conclusions to the
Ecuadorian Court. The Ecuadorian court also appointed a third set of experts, known
as the Settling Experts, who were to resolve any disputes between each sides’ experts
reports and findings. The Settling Experts attended the judicial inspections.”207
It is relevant to note that the Lago Agrio court formally appointed the party-nominated experts, but
each nominating party paid or provided the funds to pay the experts it nominated. The parties were
to share any compensation and expenses of settling experts, each side to submit its half to the court,
which then would pay it to the settling expert.208
At each judicial inspection, the party that requested the inspection was to present any
arguments it had concerning the site. The opposing party would rebut.209 Each side was to have the
right also to request that the court include relevant documentation or other evidence in the record.
Following each side’s oral presentation, the court itself inspected the site, “registering comments
and observations and allowing the parties and the experts to identify the areas where they intended
to take samples.”210 The court’s secretary was to transcribe the proceedings at the inspection sites,
and the transcript of the proceedings – including a list of all the documents presented at the
inspection – was to be finalized and signed by the parties.211 The finalized document was called an
acta, and was to be made part of the official court record. The documents within the record, which

207

PX 3300 (McMillen Direct) ¶ 11.
208

PX 4300X (Callejas Direct) ¶ 33.
209

Id.
210

Id.
211

Id.

53
of course included many papers in addition to the actas, were grouped into cuerpos, or books, each
of which contained about 100 pages of material.212
Following the inspections, each party’s experts were to submit their reports, to which
the opposing party’s expert would have an opportunity to respond.213 If the settling experts had been
called upon to resolve conflicting reports produced by the party-nominated experts, the settling
experts’ results would be included as well.214 The parties’ nominated experts’ reports, rebuttal
reports, and any reports by settling experts were to be submitted to the court and made part of the
record.
The first judicial inspection took place on August 18, 2004.215 As will appear, the
process of inspecting 122 sites moved very slowly and never ultimately was completed.

B.

The LAPs’ Judicial Inspection Experts
Russell was in charge of choosing the plaintiffs’ experts.216 He “created budgets for

the scientific investigation, purchased equipment, hired, trained, managed, and paid members of the
Ecuadorian plaintiffs’ field team, and hired and interfaced with the plaintiffs’ outside

212

Tr. (Zambrano) 1720:3-5.
213

PX 4300X (Callejas Direct) ¶ 34.
214

Id. ¶ 33.
215

Id. ¶ 31.
216

Russell himself could not serve as an expert because he did not speak Spanish. PX 3200
(Russell Direct) ¶ 7.

54
laboratories.”217

C.

The Calmbacher Episode
The first judicial inspection expert that Russell and Donziger hired, in the summer

of 2004, was Dr. Charles Calmbacher, an industrial hygienist who previously had worked with
Russell on other projects.218 Calmbacher was instructed to inspect and write the reports for the LAPs
with respect to the first four judicial inspection sites.219 He traveled to Ecuador four times to meet
with the plaintiffs’ team and participate in those inspections.220
Calmbacher became ill on his last trip and returned to the United States before he
completed his reports.221 Before he left, he gave the plaintiffs’ team his unfinished drafts, but
continued working on them from the United States.222 When Calmbacher was unable to finish the
drafts within the deadlines Donziger set, Donziger fired him.223 Even after he was fired, however,
Calmbacher insisted to Donziger that he would still be the one to “write the Perito [expert] reports”
217

Id. ¶ 24.
218

PX 3200 (Russell Direct) ¶ 26; Calmbacher Dep. Tr. at 13:23-14:1,18:10-14.
219

PX 3200 (Russell Direct) ¶ 26. These sites were Sacha-6, Sacha-21, Sacha-94, and
Shushufindi-48.
220

Calmbacher Dep. Tr. at 49:17-20
221

Id. at 61:9-16.
222

Id. at 61:19-23.
223

DX 1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶ 110; PX 2417 (Oct. 24, 2004 Email from C. Calmbacher to S.
Donziger and D. Russell).

55
because he needed to “comply with [his] obligation to the court and to maintain [his] professional
integrity with the Ecuadorian court.”224 He wrote to Donziger and Russell:
“It also has been stressed to me that it is highly unusual for a perito [expert] to allow
others to contribute to the writing of a report. Comments or review is acceptable, but
the perito’s opinion and findings are final. I therefore have and feel no obligation
to allow your team of textile engineers and associated cron[i]es to review or edit my
reports. I am assured, as perito of the court, that I am completely within my rights
to write and submit my report independent of whose who have nominated me for
appointment as perito. My sole obligation is to tell the truth, as I see it, to the court,
no matter the consequences for either party.”225
Calmbacher finished two of the reports and sent them to the LAP lawyers in
Ecuador.226 The reports were edited and reformatted by them and sent back to Calmbacher for his
signature.227 Calmbacher agreed with the conclusions reached by the reformatted and edited reports
and told the plaintiffs’ team that he “had no problem signing [them] because that’s what [he] felt.”228
But those reports were not the reports that the LAP team eventually filed.
Calmbacher testified that:
“[w]hat happened after that . . . was they asked me to initial some [blank] papers on
the corner so [the report] could be printed on that because it had to be initialed. I
said, no, I don’t think so. David [Russell] implored . . . me to do that, that it was
honest, it was fair, it was okay. So I did it. I think it was about 30 pages. And I
FedEx’d it down . . . I overnighted it. That was the last I’ve heard on the project.

224

PX 2417 (Oct. 24, 2004 Email from C. Calmbacher to S. Donziger and D. Russell).
225

Id.
226

Calmbacher Dep. Tr. at 62:5-10; PX 2417 (Oct. 24, 2004 Email from C. Calmbacher to S.
Donziger and D. Russell).
227

Calmbacher Dep. Tr. at 62:5-10.
228

Id. at 62:5-18.

56
I have not been contacted or anything else.”229
On February 14 and March 8, 2005, respectively, the LAP team submitted to the
Lago Agrio court what purported to be the reports of their nominated expert for the judicial
inspections of the Shushufindi 48 and Sacha 94 sites.230 They bore the signatures and initials of, and
purported to have been written by, Dr. Calmbacher.231 The reports found that “highly toxic
chemicals” contaminated the area and that TexPet’s remediation was “inadequate or insufficient.”232
When shown these reports at a deposition several years later, however, Dr. Calmbacher testified:
“I did not reach these conclusions and I did not write this report.”233 He never concluded that TexPet
had failed to remediate any site234 or that any site posed a health or environmental risk.235 Thus,
someone on the LAP team used the blank pages Calmbacher had initialed and his signature pages

229

Id. at 62:18-63:8. Evidence presented at trial suggests that it was more than Russell’s
imploring that convinced Calmbacher to initial the documents. Donziger was threatening
not to pay Calmbacher for the work he performed if he did not sign. Russell sent an email
to Donziger on March 1, 2005 that he had “communicated [Donziger’s] threat to
Calmbacher,” and that Russell had “also advised him that it was in his interest to comply by
signing the documents and sending them to [Donziger].” PX 721 (Mar. 1, 2005 Email from
D. Russell to S. Donziger).
230

PX 249 (Judicial Inspection Report for Sacha Well 93); PX 250 (Judicial Inspection Report
of the Shushufindi 48 Well).
231

Id.
232

PX 249 (Judicial Inspection Report for Sacha Well 93), at 32.
233

Calmbacher Dep. Tr. at 113:1-25, 114:22-116:18, 117:2-20.
234

Id. at 115:15-19.
235

Id. at 115:20-24.

57
to submit over his name two reports that contained conclusions he did not reach.
There clearly have been tensions between Calmbacher and Donziger. The reasons
for those tensions, and for the ultimate split between the two, are not clear, and their accounts differ.
Donziger contends that he fired Calmbacher because he missed deadlines for his two reports and
displayed “other [unspecified] unprofessional conduct.”236 Calmbacher admits that Donziger was
frustrated that his reports were late, but contends also that he at times disagreed with members of
the LAPs’ team on the format of the reports and that he voiced his concerns to the LAP team and
“probably ruffled feathers.”237 Nevertheless, the Court sees no sufficient basis to conclude that any
ill feeling that Calmbacher may have harbored colored his testimony with respect to reports filed
in his name on the Shushufindi 48 and Sacha 94 sites. It credits Dr. Calmbacher’s testimony that
those reports were not the reports he wrote and did not reflect his views. This means that someone
on the LAP Ecuadorian legal team revised his draft reports, printed them on the blank pages that Dr.
Calmbacher initialed, and filed them with knowledge of the falsity.
The judicial inspections continued despite Dr. Calmbacher’s departure, and the LAP
team hired other experts to take his place. But their troubles in this sphere did not end.

D.

The LAP Lawyers Halt Testing for BTEX and GRO Because it Is Yielding Unhelpful
Results
As noted previously, among the problems that faced the LAP team in the Lago Agrio

case is that PetroEcuador had operated in the Concession area from 1992, when TexPet left Ecuador,

236

DX 1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶ 110.
237

Calmbacher Dep. Tr. at 85:19-25.

58
forward and, in addition, had been a member of the Consortium earlier. The LAPs already had
entered into an agreement with the ROE and PetroEcuador pursuant to which they were obliged to
reduce the amount of any judgment they might obtain against Texaco by the amount of any
contribution judgment that Texaco might obtain against the ROE and PetroEcuador. Moreover, the
prospect of proof that PetroEcuador, an ROE owned entity, was responsible for substantial pollution
in the Orienté would not have been viewed favorably by the ROE. The LAPs therefore had an
interest in obtaining a judgment that Chevron was entirely responsible for any and all pollution
liability and remediation responsibility.
In late 2004, Russell met in New York with Donziger, Bonifaz, Wray, and perhaps
others to discuss the LAPs’ strategy for the remaining judicial inspections.238 Russell reported that
“the fact that [they were] finding BTEX, which is benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene; and
GRO, which is gasoline range organics,” in the samples they were testing from the Concession area
was “much more indicative of contamination from PetroEcuador rather than Texaco because these
compounds are volatile and degrade quickly in hot, wet, warm environment such as in the jungle.”239
As Texaco had not operated in the Concession area since 1992, it was highly unlikely that any
BTEX and GRO that ever had been attributable to Texaco’s operations still would have been
present.240 PetroEcuador’s continuing operations probably were the cause.

238

DX 1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶ 113; Tr. (Russell) 394:6-19.
239

Tr. (Russell) 394:22-395:2.
240

Tr. (Russell) 407:17-19 (“We found BTEX and GRO, and that was indicative of recent
contamination rather than contamination which would have been ten or perhaps 20 years
old from Texaco.”).

59
According to Russell, whom the Court found to be a credible witness, the “senior
lawyers” – Donziger, Bonifaz and Wray – requested that the LAP team stop testing for BTEX and
GRO because testing for these compounds “would be counterproductive to the case because it
argues for more recent contamination and that implies PetroEcuador rather than Texaco.”241
Accordingly, Russell and his team “stopped analyzing for those compounds [and] started instead
substituting a less reliable measure which was total petroleum hydrocarbons,” or TPH.242 The
methods the team used to test for TPH, however, were unable to distinguish between TPH
attributable to recent activity and activity that occurred a considerable period earlier.243 Moreover,
they were subject to a further problem, namely that “TPH methods currently in use can show up
naturally occurring compounds as an indication of petroleum, so give you a false positive.”244

241

PX 705 (Nov. 4, 2004 Email from D. Russell to E. Camino, S. Donziger, M. Pareja, and A.
Wray); see also Tr. (Russell) 407:21-408:9.
242

Tr. (Russell) 408:7-9. Donziger testified that “the conclusion of the conversation [in
Manhattan] was that if we were looking for a sample analysis that would more precisely
evidence the scope of Texaco’s contamination, testing for total TPH was the more
appropriate test to use. . . . Accordingly, we adopted a focus on sampling for TPH rather
than BTEX or GRO, although we kept a balanced portfolio of chemical analyses.” DX
1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶ 114.
The Court does not credit this testimony. It is contrary to Russell’s testimony on this
technical point, a point on which his testimony was not challenged. Donziger, for reasons
discussed below, is not a credible witness. Wray and Bonifaz both were deposed, but the
deposition testimony of these two witnesses that was submitted at trial is silent about this
meeting.
243

Tr. (Russell) 408:22-409:2.
244

Id. 408:10-14.

60
E.

Sacha-53 and the “Independent” Monitors – Donziger, in His Words, Goes Over to
the “Dark Side” and Makes a “Bargain With the Devil”
As mentioned, the court appointed several “settling experts” at the beginning of the

judicial inspection process, whose job it was to resolve any conflicts between the parties’ nominated
inspection experts’ reports. “The decision to request a settling report was solely in the Court’s
discretion,” and it ordered only one such report before the LAPs’ judicial inspections were
terminated – that of the Sacha-53 well site.245
The Sacha-53 site was important for the LAPs because, as Donziger explained to his
colleagues in a contemporaneous email, it was a “Texaco ‘remediated site’” – i.e., a site that Texaco
had remediated pursuant to its agreement with the ROE as a prerequisite to obtaining the release
discussed previously – “so[, in Donziger’s words, it would provide] the first definitive scientific
proof in the case to put the lie to their claim they remediated.”246 But Donziger soon learned that
the settling experts’ conclusions with respect to Sacha-53 would not be favorable to the LAPs. So
Donziger sought to provide an outwardly credible criticism of the anticipated settling expert report
in order to undermine its conclusions.
In late 2005, Donziger met Ramiro Fernando Reyes Cisneros (“Reyes”), a petroleum
and environmental engineer in Ecuador,247 at a cocktail party for the launch of a book Reyes had

245

PX 4300X (Callejas Direct) ¶ 39.
246

PX 708 (Nov. 11, 2004 Email from S. Donziger to C. Bonifaz, J. Kohn, J. Bonifaz, A Wray,
and M. Pallares).
247

DI 658-18 (Reyes Decl.) ¶ 3. The Reyes declaration is an exhibit to Reyes’ deposition,
where he attested to its accuracy. The declaration was designated by the plaintiff and
received in evidence. Defendants had the opportunity to cross-examine him concerning the
declaration at the deposition. It therefore is properly before the Court.

61
published on oil in the Amazon.248 Also present was Gustavo Pinto, the president of the Association
of Geological, Mining, Petroleum and Environmental Engineers (“CIGMYP”) of Ecuador.249 At
Donziger’s request, Reyes and Pinto met with Donziger and Fausto Peñafiel – then a consultant for
the LAP team – on the following day to discuss the Lago Agrio case.250
Donziger and Peñafiel outlined the judicial inspection and settling expert process for
Reyes and Pinto and told them that “[t]he settling experts were going to issue a report on the judicial
inspection of Sacha 53.”251 “Donziger proposed the idea of bringing in an ‘independent institution’
to monitor the work of the settling experts.”252 He wanted the independent monitors to make
“recommendations” concerning the inspections to the judge presiding over the Lago Agrio case.253
He inquired whether CIGMYP would perform that function.254 He informed Pinto and Reyes that
the LAP team would pay them for that work. His “initial wish was . . . to have the association’s
monitorship be oriented to show that the results that were being obtained were favorable . . . to the

248

Id. ¶ 10.
249

Id.
250

Id. The fact of the meeting is corroborated by Reyes’ notes from the meeting, PX 739
(Reyes annotations regarding Nov. 17, 2005 meeting), and Donziger’s own notebook, PX
174 (Donziger Notebook), at 1; see also Reyes Dep. Tr. at 18:15-22.
251

DI 658-18 (Reyes Decl.) ¶ 11.
252

Id.
253

Reyes Dep. Tr. at 21:10-16.
254

Id. at 19:2-9.

62
plaintiffs.”255
On November 18, 2006, Donziger reached a secret understanding with Pinto and
Reyes pursuant to which he would pay them to “monitor” the settling expert report on Sacha-53.
Donziger wrote about the meeting in his notebook:
“Deal with Gustavo Pinto – feel like I have gone over to the dark side. First meeting
like that I was not eaten alive. Made modest offer, plus bonus. Agreed to keep it
between us, no written agreement. Independent monitoring.”256
Lest there be any doubt, Donziger admitted at a deposition that the “modest offer” he made was of
money257 and that the reference to an agreement “to keep it between us” meant that the fact that
Pinto and Reyes would be working for the LAPs was to be kept confidential,258 including from the
judge.259 He conceded also that it was “possible” that the “modest offer” agreed upon was $50,000,
although he professed not to recall the amount.260
A week later, the same four men met again and finalized the deal. They agreed that
Pinto and Reyes would lead the “independent monitorship” and would be paid a fee plus a potential

255

Id. at 55:6-10, 20-22.
256

PX 174 (Donziger Notebook), at 1(emphasis added).
257

Donziger Dec. 29, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 2105:19-2106:17.
258

Id. at 2108:18-2019:9; Donziger Jan. 29, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 3846:6-17.
259

Donziger Jan. 29, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 3847:19-25.
260

Donziger Dec. 29, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 2109:24-2110:4, 2110:11-14, 2110:20-2111:13.

63
bonus if the plaintiffs won the case.261 “There never existed a formal contract between CIGMYP,
Pinto, [Reyes], Donziger, or Peñafiel, and all the participants in the meeting agreed that payment
by plaintiffs to CIGMYP, to Pinto and to [Reyes] for this monitorship would remain secret.”262
Secrecy was essential because Donziger and the LAP team knew that an appearance of
independence and neutrality was essential in order for the expected efforts of Pinto and Reyes to be
taken seriously by Chevron and the court.263
In fact, the agreement was for Reyes and Pinto to work covertly for the LAP team
and to keep their relationship with the LAPs secret from the judge.264 And Donziger well understood
that the arrangement was improper. He wrote in his notebook on February 6:
“Talked to Gustavo this morning about the [settling expert] report. I keep thinking
we pay them so little, and they know the court’s peritos [experts] make so much,
why will they want to keep doing this for us? This was my one bargain with the
devil, but we can’t win with the devil b/c they can always pay more. Really
frustrating, feel really boxed in.”265
Nonetheless, the deal and, as Donziger recorded, the secret payment were made. He
wrote in his notebook: “50 k came today – meet on roof to plan payment [to] [Pinto]. Luis [Yanza]

261

Id.; Reyes Dep. Tr. at 28:7-16. Reyes’s journal entry from that day states “Letter stating
Thursday 17 CIGMYP Board resolved to set up a scientific-technical monitorship (of)
remediation process of Texaco case. Invite them to a work meeting. Acknowledging his
appointment as settling expert, we express support of developments within bounds of
professional ethics and technical results.” DI 658-18 (Reyes Decl.) ¶ 12.
262

DI 658-18 (Reyes Decl.) ¶ 12.
263

Id. ¶ 15.
264

Supra notes 260-61.
265

PX 177 (Donziger Notebook) (emphasis added).

64
has his doubts; I explained we are not paying for time, but for value. Juan came later to collect the
[money].”266 Juan was a member of the LAP team (likely Juan Pablo Sáenz) and was used to deliver
the money to Pinto because Pinto “didn’t want to be paid directly.”267
Pinto and Reyes met with the settling experts a week after they made the deal with
Donziger.268 They “discussed the expert report on the inspection of Sacha 53, which the [settling
experts] had been working on, and . . . asked when the[] [settling experts] could provide the
monitors a draft of the report. They never did, at least not to [Reyes]. The meeting . . . was
basically to review the technical aspects of the report the settling experts were preparing on Sacha
53.”269 Although Reyes and Pinto never received an advance draft of the report, they knew from
these discussions what the report would conclude. And they conveyed that information to Donziger
and the LAP team.
In order for their “monitorship” to have the desired effect, Reyes and Pinto had to be
appointed by the court. They therefore wrote a letter to Judge Germán Yánez, then the judge
presiding over the Chevron case, detailing their credentials and their proposed role.270 They did not,
however, disclose that they were being paid by the LAPs’ team.271
266

PX 175 (Donziger Notebook).
267

Donziger Dec. 29, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 2120:2-11, 2120:25-2111:12.
268

DI 658-18 (Reyes Decl.) ¶ 13.
269

Id.; see also PX 741 (Reyes annotation regarding the Nov. 29, 2005 meeting).
270

DI 658-18 (Reyes Decl.) ¶ 14; PX 746 (Jan. 20, 2006 Ltr. from G. Pinto to Judge Yánez).
271

See PX 746 (Jan. 20, 2006 Ltr. from G. Pinto to Judge Yánez).

65
Judge Yánez did not respond to the letter, so Pinto and Reyes went to meet with him
in his office.272 Before doing so, they showed Donziger an advance copy of the comments on the
settling experts’ work that they intended to make to the judge.273 When they met with the judge,
they explained the need for the monitorship and expressed their desire to become involved in the
case. But the judge “did not express any interest in what [they] were telling him about the case.”274
To jump slightly ahead for a moment, the settling experts’ report was published in
February 2006.275 It concluded – consistent with the fears that led Donziger to the “independent
monitorship” scheme – that Texaco had fully remediated the Sacha-53 site. Donziger characterized
the report as “disastrous” for the LAPs’ team.276 He instructed Reyes and Pinto to prepare a report
that “established that the findings of the settling experts’ report on Sacha 53 were wrong, that they
lacked objectivity and were biased toward Chevron, and therefore the report should be
discounted.”277 The report that Pinto and Reyes drafted, however, did not reach those conclusions.
Instead, they concluded that, while the settling experts had “failed to strictly follow their judicial

272

DI 658-18 (Reyes Decl.) ¶ 17.
273

Donziger Jan. 29, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 3849:25-3850:8.
274

DI 658-18 (Reyes Decl.) ¶ 17.
275

PX 1530 (Jan. 17, 2006 Ltr. from G. Pinto and F. Reyes to Lago Agrio court) (referring to
“[t]he Report [which] was prepared by the Settling Experts Mr. Galo Albán, Eng., Dr. Luis
Albuja, Mr. Gerardo Barros, Eng., Mr. Jorge Jurado, Eng., Mr. Johnny Zambrano, Eng., and
is dated Feb. 1, 2006.”).
276

DX 1306 (Donziger Notebook), at 71 of 87.
277

DI 658-18 (Reyes Decl.) ¶ 20; Reyes Dep. Tr. at 51:2-11.

66
mandate” and that some of the data submitted by both parties had deficiencies, “the report contained
enough information for the Court to make its own ruling.”278 Donziger was extremely disappointed
in what he called Reyes’ and Pinto’s “tepid” response and instructed them not to file it with the
court.279
The Reyes–Pinto arrangement suggests that Donziger and his team were worried that
the evidence would not support their claim, at least to the extent they had hoped. The one settling
expert report that was in the process of completion concerned a site they expected would expose
what Donziger characterized as Texaco’s “lie,” but he learned it would reach the opposite
conclusion. When the likelihood that the report would reach that opposite conclusion became
known, Donziger – in his own words – went over “to the dark side”280 by recruiting and paying new
experts to pose as “independent monitors” and to criticize the settling experts’ conclusions to the
court without disclosing that the LAPs were paying them. Moreover, it must be noted that Donziger
did not address – much less offer any innocent explanation of – these events, either in his written
direct testimony or on the witness stand.
In the end, Donziger’s arrangement with Reyes and Pinto – his first “bargain with
the devil”281 – ultimately did not work out for him. The judge was not interested and the report
Reyes and Pinto wrote did not meet Donziger’s expectations. But it was not his last such bargain.

278

DI 658-18 (Reyes Decl.) ¶ 20; PX 1530 (Feb. 1, 2006 Draft of Reyes and Pinto Report).
279

DI 658-18 (Reyes Decl.) ¶ 20; Reyes Dep. Tr. at 53:19-54-7; PX 191 (Donziger Notebook).
280

PX 174 (Donziger Notebook), at 1.
281

PX 177 (Donziger Notebook).

67
By this time the LAPs were up to something new, which, if it succeeded, would reduce the risk of
unwanted results from the many uncompleted judicial inspections.

F.

The Termination of the LAPs’ Remaining Judicial Inspections and the Genesis of the
Global Assessment
Extensive evidence demonstrates that Donziger and the rest of his team concluded

that Dr. Wray had made a terrible mistake in committing to judicial inspections of so many sites.282
They were costly and took a great deal of time.283 Moreover, as the unfolding Sacha-53 crisis
demonstrated, they were risky – the party-nominated experts could disagree, and the settling experts
might agree with Chevron. For these reasons, the LAPs on January 27, 2006 – shortly before the
publication of the Sacha-53 settling expert report – moved to eliminate 26 of the remaining judicial
inspections that the LAPs had requested, ostensibly because they were unnecessary.284 The judge
then presiding swiftly denied the motion.285

282

E.g., PX 176 (Donziger Notebook), at 2 (“This goes back to Alberto’s errors: . . . asking for
too many inspections rather than controlling the process”); PX 195 (Donziger Notebook),
at 2 (“The problem is that Wray made some dumb-fuck agreement with Callejas at the first
inspection where they agreed the perito for the [global expert] would come from somebody
who had actuado en [acted in] the trial.”).
283

E.g., Tr. (Ponce) 2317:15-2318:8 (recommending LAPs seek to terminate inspections
because they were costly and the evidence was very favorable without the remaining
inspections) (The Court credits Ponce’s testimony as to cost. As the accuracy of his opinion
concerning the results of the inspections conducted thus far is not material here, the Court
makes no finding on that point either way); DX 1601 (Ponce Direct) ¶ 16 (same); PX 184
(Donziger Notebook), at 3 of 5.
284

PX 4300X (Callejas Direct) ¶ 40; PX 328 (July 21, 2006 Motion, quoting plaintiffs’ Jan.
27, 2006 motion), at 3-4.
285

PX 4300X (Callejas Direct) ¶ 41.

68
The LAPs responded by filing several motions challenging the court’s decision,
initiated a press campaign that questioned the judge’s handling of the case and accusing him of bias
in favor of Chevron, and began to organize several demonstrations outside the courthouse to protest
his rulings.286 The point of all of this, as Donziger wrote in his journal, was that the LAPs:
“need a massive protest on the court, and only after that should we talk to the judge
about what he needs to do. The judge needs to fear us for this to move how it needs
to move, and right now there is no fear, no price to pay for not making these key
decisions.”287
So the issue of reducing the LAPs’ judicial inspections continued to percolate through the spring of
2006. Moreover, a new ingredient entered the LAPs’ internal discussions of the issue – the idea not
only of dropping all of the remaining LAP judicial inspections, but of substituting a single,
supposedly impartial, global expert.
The idea of a global expert did not immediately persuade Donziger. On May 31,
2006, he wrote in his notebook:
“Yesterday we had a 5-hour [meeting] and it was extremely intense and frustrating.
Went through options on Global [Expert] – had Plans A through E, and I realized
how difficult this aspect of the case is going to be. Bottom line problem is we will
have no control over the [expert], who will be appointed by the judge. Pablo and
our legal team keep insisting that the solution is for the judge to appoint someone
who is favorable to us, but I don’t trust this approach so far.”288
In other words, he was concerned that he perhaps could not control a single global expert. He
worried that such an expert would not be “willing to do work that holds oil companies accountable.

286

Id.
287

PX 182 (Donziger Notebook), at 2 of 3.
288

PX 181 (Donziger Notebook), at 1 (emphasis added).

69
. . . Which gets back to my point that we need a foreigner as the expert for the global. No
Ec[uadorian] is going to come through and hold them accountable for billions – it is just not going
to happen. . . . Without that insurance, I just don’t see how we can go forward with the global
[expert].”289

1.

The LAPs Coerce the Judge to Cancel the LAPs’ Remaining Judicial
Inspections

The LAP team, in Donziger’s words, often “talk[ed] to the judge about what he needs
to do” in private.290
In July 2006, the LAPs filed another motion, this time seeking to relinquish all of
their remaining inspections, not just the 26 they in January had sought to eliminate.291 Donziger
wrote in his notebook that:
“Our issues first and foremost are whether the judge will accept the renuncia of the
inspections. If this happens – and Pablo thinks it will, but I and Aaron [Marr Page]
think he is overoptimistic – then we have to face the prospect of more of the
wasteful, time-consuming, and expensive inspections. [sic] If it doesn’t happen, then
we are in all-out war with the judge to get him removed.”292
But the “all-out war” to remove the judge proved unnecessary.
Donziger and the LAP team knew that Judge Yánez was in a weakened state. He
289

PX 182 (Donziger Notebook), at 2 of 3 (emphasis added).
290

PX 169R (Donziger Notebook), at 28.
291

PX 328 (July 21, 2006 Motion). The motion, filed by Fajardo, explained inter alia that
further judicial inspections were unnecessary because, it claimed, the evidence of
contamination was clear and abundant.
292

PX 184 (Donziger Notebook), at 3.

70
recently had been accused of “trading jobs for sex in the court”293 and was worried about his
reputation and perhaps career. They were determined to use that to their advantage. As Donziger
wrote in his notebook at the time, Fajardo informed Donziger that
“there is the feeling in the court that we are behind the [sexual harassment]
complaint[] against Yánez . . . , which we are not, even though we have much to
complain about, which is sort of ironic. I [i.e., Donziger] asked if this theory in the
court hurt or helped us, and both Pablo and Luis said it helped us. At which pt I
launched into my familiar lecture about how the only way the court will respect us
is if they fear us – and that the only way they will fear us is if they think we have . .
. control over their careers, their jobs, their reputations – that is to say, their ability
to earn a livelihood.”294
So the LAP team “wrote up a complaint against Yánez, but never filed it, while letting him know
we might file it if he does not adhere to the law and what we need.”295 Donziger explained in an
email to Kohn that Fajardo then met with the judge, who “said he is going to accept our request to
withdraw the rest of the inspections save the four we still want to do. . . . The judge also . . . wants

293

PX 785 (July 26, 2006 Email from S. Donziger to J. Kohn).
294

PX 184 (Donziger Notebook), at 2 (emphasis added).
295

PX 185 (Donziger Notebook), at 2. Donziger testified that he “never threatened Judge
Yánez or any other judge that we would file a complaint against that judge if he did not rule
in our favor.” DX 1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶ 122.
This testimony is inconsistent with Donziger’s contemporaneous writings in his notebook
and his July 26, 2006 email to Kohn. Moreover, while Donziger testified that he never
threatened the judge, he did not say that no one else on his team did or that he did not
authorize or approve such threats. The Court finds that Donziger knowingly was complicit
both in the preparation of a misconduct complaint against Judge Yánez and in threatening
the judge with the filing of the complaint unless the judge did what the LAPs’ wished him
to do. It was part of Donziger’s strategy to instill fear in that judge by convincing him that
“we [the LAPs] ha[d] . . . control over [his] career[], [his] job[], [his] reputation[] – that is
to say, [his] ability to earn a livelihood.” PX 184 (Donziger Notebook), at 2.

71
to forestall the filing of a complaint against him by us, which we have prepared but not yet filed.”296
Faced with this coercion,297 Judge Yánez granted the request to cancel the LAPs’
remaining judicial inspections. Donziger and Fajardo succeeded also in convincing the judge that
he should “fear” the LAP team.298 After Judge Yánez issued the order, Donziger on September 13,
2006, wrote that the judge “told Luis [Yanza] that we needed to back him now as he fights for
survival on the court. So instead of a strong judge who sees the validity of the case, we now might
have a weak judge who wants to rule correctly [i.e., for the LAPs] for all the wrong, personal
reasons. Need to get going on the inspections (looking for [expert]) and [global expert].”299
This last statement – that Donziger recognized his “[n]eed to get going on the
inspections (looking for [expert]) and [global expert]” – demonstrates that his earlier misgivings
about a global expert had been overcome and that Donziger was looking for an expert to appoint to
that pivotal role. The explanation for this change of heart is plain. Donziger’s “[b]ottom line
problem [about pursuing a global expert idea had been that] we will have no control over the
[expert], who will be appointed by the judge.”300 But the coercion of Judge Yánez eliminated that
“bottom line problem.” Donziger had found himself with “a weak judge who wants to rule correctly

296

PX 785 (July 26, 2006 Email from S. Donziger to J. Kohn).
297

A defense expert on Ecuadorian law testified, and the Court holds, that threatening a judge
to get him to appoint Cabrera or another court officer would be a crime under Ecuadorian
law. DI 1400-4 (Albán Dep.), Ex. D at 48:1-12.
298

PX 184 (Donziger Notebook), at 2.
299

PX 185 (Donziger Notebook).
300

PX 181 (Donziger Notebook).

72
for all the wrong, personal reasons,”301 among them the fear that the LAPs would file their judicial
misconduct complaint against him at a time when he least could withstand it. Donziger therefore
expected to be able to select and to control the global expert. That is exactly what then took place.

2.

Donziger Chooses Cabrera to be the Global Expert

With these pieces in place, Donziger and the LAP team moved on to finding a
compliant global expert. The idea was that the global expert – just like the “monitoring” experts,
Reyes and Pinto, who ultimately had not been appointed – in fact would work for the LAPs but
would appear to be independent and neutral. This required Donziger to find someone who, in
Donziger’s own words, would “totally play ball with” him.302
Donziger began quietly vetting candidates to fill the post.303 Initially, the lead
candidate for the job was Reyes,304 with whom Donziger already was acquainted from the Sacha-53
episode.
“[] Donziger, [] Fajardo, and [] Yanza together . . . explained to [Reyes] that having
a single expert to carry out a global assessment was important to the plaintiffs
because they acknowledged that the judicial inspection process had not yielded data
to support their claims of contamination. They also said they believed it would be

301

PX 185 (Donziger Notebook), at 2.
302

PX 191 (Donziger Notebook), at 4.
303

E.g., PX 2426 (Sept. 19, 2006 Email from S. Donziger to C. MacNeil Mitchell, R. Herrera,
and E. Bloom) (“Here is the info on the possible experts from Ecuador.”).
304

Id.; see Donziger Dec. 29, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 2130:18-23.

73
easier to manage a single expert than many.”305
Donziger met with Reyes in December 2006 “to do a hard vet.”306 Before settling
on Reyes as the global expert, Donziger was determined to ensure that Reyes would “totally play
ball with us and let us take the lead while projecting the image that he is working for the court.” 307
He needed also to persuade Reyes to take the assignment. So Donziger told Reyes “that if he did
this he likely would never work in the oil industry again in Ecuador, at least for an American
company, but that he could be a national hero and have a job the rest of his life being involved in
the clean-up.”308 And he reminded Reyes that, as the global expert, he would “need . . . to state that
Chevron was the only party responsible for environmental damages and the harm to the local
community.”309
Donziger’s statement to Reyes that he would “have a job the rest of his life being
involved in the clean-up” warrants emphasis. The Lago Agrio complaint identified the ADF, which
is controlled by Donziger and Yanza, as the entity to which the LAPs wanted any recovery money

305

DI 658-18 (Reyes Decl.) ¶ 22.
306

PX 191 (Donziger Notebook).
307

Id. (emphasis added).
308

Id. (emphasis added).
309

DI 658-18 (Reyes Decl.) ¶ 25. Reyes responded that in his book he had “advocated for joint
responsibility between the Ecuadoran government and Texaco environmental impacts, which
could be used against” him, but Donziger “dismissed these concerns and said none of them
would prevent [Reyes] from serving as an expert.” Id. ¶ 26.

74
paid.310 Thus, in promising Reyes that he would “have a job the rest of his life being involved in the
clean-up” if he took the assignment and gave the LAPs what they wanted, Donziger promised
something that he expected to be able to deliver – long-term, remunerative employment paid for by
the ADF.
While Donziger was vetting Reyes, Fajardo and Yanza met with Judge Yánez to get
him to appoint Reyes as the global expert. But Judge Yánez was troubled because he felt “bound
by an agreement Wray made with Callejas [Chevron’s local counsel] in the first inspection to use
[experts] already appointed by the court.”311 This would have excluded Reyes. In consequence,
the LAP team believed that the choice would be between José Echeverria and Richard Cabrera Stalin
Vega (“Cabrera”), both of whom previously had been designated as settling experts.312 Of the two,
Donziger’s choice was Cabrera. Donziger wrote:
“Richard [Cabrera] served in the last inspection, and he was found by Fernando
Reyes, who has turned out to be a good friend of the case. Richard showed some
surprising independence, telling the judge quietly that Texaco’s sampling was
bullshit. The question is, do we push for Reyes himself or Richard? At first, I
thought the idea Reyes would not be the [expert] was a case killer. I simply am
loathe to spend much more money on the case not knowing if we can get a damage
claim before the court, which essentially would prevent us from winning the case
before a decision can even be made. I trust Reyes; I don’t know Richard even
though he looks promising. So I met Richard with Reyes on Sat afternoon in the
Hotel Quito, one of my endless series of meetings. He is a humble man, not very
sophisticated, but he seemed smart and under-stated – maybe the perfect foil for

310

PX 316 (Lago Agrio Complaint), at 31.
311

PX 194 (Donziger Notebook), at 1; PX 195 (Donziger Notebook) (“The problem is that
Wray made some dumb-fuck agreement with Callejas at the first inspection where they
agreed the [expert] for the [global inspection] would come from somebody who had actuado
en the trial.”).
312

PX 195 (Donziger Notebook).

75
Chevron, but there is no way to know for sure so there is risk. Reyes thin[k]s we
should go with Richard, and we can help him.”313
Accordingly, Donziger, Cabrera, Reyes, and other LAP lawyers met to discuss the possibility of
Cabrera being appointed global expert.314
On February 27, 2007, Donziger, Yanza, and Fajardo met with Cabrera and Reyes
to do another “hard vet” of Cabrera and to give him the “hard sell.” Just as he had done with Reyes,
Donziger, again in his own words, “did the build up about the importance of the case, what it means
for history, how we can do something that we will always be remembered for, what it would mean
for the country and world, etc.”315 This sort of encouragement, Donziger noted “always works at
the opportune moment.”316 But that, the Court finds, is not all he said. The quoted entry from his
notebook summarized “the build up” he gave Cabrera in terms almost identical to the summary he
wrote of his “build up” to Reyes. It is logical to infer, and the Court finds, that Donziger made the
same implicit promise of lifetime work on the remediation to Cabrera that he had made previously
to Reyes. In any case, Cabrera agreed to the plan.
Meanwhile, the LAP team continued to meet ex parte with Judge Yánez317 to have
313

Id.; see also DI 658-18 (Reyes Decl.) ¶ 31 (“Donziger asked me to introduce him to
Cabrera, and I arranged a meeting which took place on Feb. 9 or 10, 2007, at Hotel Quito
. . . .”).
314

DI 658-18 (Reyes Decl.) ¶¶ 33-34.
315

PX 197 (Donziger Notebook), at 2.
316

Id.
317

E.g., PX 200 (Donziger Notebook) (“On Friday night, Pablo and Luis met with the judge
near the airport in his barrio in a restaurant. I was supposed to be there, but I couldn’t find
it[.] I was really pissed off at the news they reported – that the judge still did not want to

76
him appoint their new choice, Cabrera, as the global expert. By February, the LAPs were “100%
sure the judge would app[oin]t Richard [Cabrera] and not Echeverria.”318 On March 19, 2007, the
judge announced the appointment.319 But Donziger and the LAP team were so sure of Cabrera’s
appointment that they proceeded on the basis that Cabrera would be appointed even before the
appointment was announced and Cabrera sworn in.

V.

The Second Phase of the Lago Agrio Case – The Cabrera “Global Expert” Report
A.

The LAPs Secretly Plan the Cabrera Report – The March 3 and 4, 2007 Meetings
Donziger, Fajardo, and Yanza called the entire LAP team together for a meeting on

March 3, 2007.320 This included several American technical experts with whom Donziger had been

rule, he needed protection, that a magistrate from the Supreme Ct was coming on Thursday
to check him out given the denuncias, etc. The different pieces of the strategy to get us
home have to work in concert, and the one element out of sync at the moment is the fact we
don’t have the order to begin the [global inspection]. This is the one thing left; if we can
get thru this, we should be home free.”).
318

PX 197 (Donziger Notebook). And they were certain well before that that Judge Yánez
would grant their request to appoint a single global expert. In an email on January 9, 2007
to the LAPs’ legal team, Fajardo described a meeting he had had with the judge, to whom
he referred as “the Big Boss.” “I had a short meeting today with the Big Boss (you know
who I’m talking about); we discussed the start of the Global Assessment. The idea is to
perform a symbolic act at a well or station in Lago Agrio for the start of the Global
Assessment. The Expert will be sworn in at that act, and the judge will set the deadline for
the Expert to deliver his report to the Court.” PX 821 (Jan. 9, 2007 Email from P. Fajardo
to S. Donziger and others).
319

PX 335 (Mar. 19, 2007 Lago Agrio Court Order), at 2.
320

DI 658-18 (Reyes Decl.) ¶ 34. Ann Maest testified that she met Cabrera for the first time
in March 2006. Maest Dep. Tr. at 68:12-17; see also PX 636 (Screenshot from Crude Clip
of Mar. 3, 2007 Meeting including Cabrera, Yanza, and Fajardo). She clearly was mistaken
as to the year.

77
consulting – Charlie Champ, Dick Kamp, and Ann Maest,321 a scientist at E-Tech, an organization
that was working with the LAPs322 and who worked also for the Boulder, Colorado-based
environmental consulting firm, Stratus Consulting (“Stratus”).323 The purpose of the meeting, as
will appear in more detail, was to plan the global expert report. So sure were Donziger and Fajardo
of Cabrera’s appointment that the supposedly independent and impartial Cabrera, as well as
Fernando Reyes, were present.
Donziger explained the importance of the meeting to the Crude camera even before
the meeting began:
“Today is . . . a very important day ‘cause we’re meeting with . . . our team of
Ecuadorian technical people and our American consultants . . . to figure out how to
. . . pull all that information together for the final report we’re gonna submit to the
court, that is gonna ask for damages that’ll very likely be in the multiple billions of
dollars.”324
Thus, Donziger in an unguarded moment,325 acknowledged that the report ultimately submitted
would be the product of the LAPs and their “team of Ecuadorian technical people and . . . American

321

PX 201 (Donziger Notebook) (“March 7, 2007 . . . Sat had all-day Tech meeting in the
office . . . Richard and Fernando there, as was Ann, Dick, and Champ.”).
322

Maest Dep. Tr. at 42:17-34; see also PX 633 (Mar. 5, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to E.
Englert, M. Hoke, and J. McDermott) (“E-tech is a scientific consulting entity we worked
with before we hired Stratus. When Stratus came in the summer of 2007, we stopped
working with E-tech.”).
323

Maest Dep. Tr. at 50:5-7.
324

PX 33A[S] (Mar. 3, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS-187-01-01 (emphasis added).
325

As will appear, Mr. Donziger had obtained the financing for the film maker and had
influence over the content of the film. Infra Facts § VII.B. It thus is not too surprising that
he spoke as candidly as he often did when the camera was rolling.

78
consultants.”
Parts of the meeting were recorded by the film makers. Yanza began by introducing
the participants and setting out the general agenda.326 He introduced Cabrera to the full team for the
first time.327 Fajardo set forth the plan for the final phase of the evidentiary period, explaining that,
while Cabrera was likely to be appointed the global expert, “the work isn’t going to be the
expert[’]s. All of us bear the burden.”328 Maest then asked whether “the final report [was] going
to be prepared only by the expert?”329 Fajardo responded, “what the expert is going to do is state
his criteria, alright? And sign the report and review it. But all of us, all together, have to contribute
to the report.”330 Maest commented, “But . . not Chevron,” which provoked laughter.331 The video
clips of the meeting ended with Donziger commenting, they could “jack this thing up to $30 billion
in one day.”332
Reyes – who had been Mr. Donziger’s first choice for appointment as global expert
– testified that:
“At the meeting, Mr. Fajardo, Mr. Yanza and Mr. Donziger dropped any pretense
326

PX 35A (Mar. 3, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS-187-01-02.
327

Id.
328

PX 39A (Mar. 3, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS-191-00-CLIP-03.
329

Id.
330

Id.
331

Id.
332

PX 42A (Mar. 3, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS-193-00-CLIP-01.

79
that Mr. Cabrera would act independently in writing an expert report that would be
technically sound and executed according to professional standards. On the contrary,
it was obvious that the plaintiffs had already predetermined the findings of the global
assessment, that they themselves would write a report that would support their claim
for billions of dollars against Chevron and would simply put Mr. Cabrera’s name on
it. The purpose of the meeting was to establish all the conditions for controlling and
managing the expert’s work, in secret, in accordance to the plaintiffs’ interests.”333
The next day, Donziger met over lunch with some of his American experts to discuss
the work plan.334 The meeting, parts of which also were taped, confirmed that Donziger and the
LAPs would go far to control the process and conceal their involvement from Chevron and the court.
At one point, one of the experts commented, “I know we have to be totally transparent with
Chevron, and show them what we’re doing,” to which Donziger responded “[n]o, no. . . . they will
find out . . . [but] not in the moment. . . .”335 Maest replied, “Yeah, we don’t have to give them our
plan . . . . I don’t think, do we?” and Donziger answered “[w]ell, it’s a little unclear. . . . No one’s
ever done this before . . . . This is so crazy . . . . Our goal is that [Chevron] do[es]n’t know shit . . .
and that’s why they’re so panicked by this.”336 Another expert commented that “having [Cabrera]
there yesterday, in retrospect, was totally bizarre.”337 Donziger quickly told him not to talk about

333

DI 658-18 (Reyes Decl.) ¶ 35.
334

PX 43A (Mar. 4, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS-195-05-CLIP-01; PX 201 (Donziger
Notebook), at 1 of 2 (“On Sunday lunch, went to Mosaico (the four gringos, including me),
and spent four hours there talking things through.”).
335

PX 46A (Mar. 4, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS197-00-CLIP 3.
336

Id. (emphasis added).
337

Id.

80
that and told the film crew “that was off the record. . . .”338 Thus, right from the start, Donziger
evidenced his intent that the intimate relationship he had forged with Cabrera would not be allowed
to see the light of day.
The group discussed also the existing data. When Maest noted that “right now all
the reports are saying it’s just at the pits and the stations and nothing has spread anywhere at all,”
Donziger replied, “That’s not true. The reports are saying the ground water is contaminated because
we’ve taken samples from ground water.”339 Maest responded, “[t]hat’s just right under the pits,”
to which Donziger responded:
“Yeah, but, that is evidence. . . . Hold on a second, you know, this is Ecuador, okay
. . . You can say whatever you want and at the end of the day, there’s a thousand
people around the courthouse, you’re going to get what you want. Sorry, but it’s
true. . . . Okay. Therefore, if we take our existing evidence on groundwater
contamination which admittedly is right below the source . . . . And wanted to
extrapolate based on nothing other than, our, um, theory that it is, they all, we
average out to going 300 meters in a radius, depending on the . . . gradient. We can
do it. We can do it. And we can get money for it. . . . And if we had no more money
to do more work, we would do that. You know what I’m saying? . . . And it wouldn’t
really matter that much. . . . Because at the end of the day, this is all for the Court
just a bunch of smoke and mirrors and bullshit. It really is. We have enough, to get
money, to win.”340
Following the March 3-4 meetings, the LAPs wrote the work plan that supposedly
was to be done by Cabrera. On March 21, 2007, Fajardo sent the initial draft to Donziger for his

338

Id.
339

PX 43A (Mar. 4, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS-195-95-CLIP-01.
340

Id. (emphasis added). The Court makes no finding as to whether the groundwater
contamination was widespread or existed “just right under the pits.” As noted, the existence
or absence of contamination in the Orienté was not at issue in this trial.

81
approval.341 It laid out all of the required tasks including such things as the selection of sites to be
studied, field work, drafting of the report, and its submission to the court. It assigned responsibility
for each item, in most cases to members of the LAP team or their hired consultants. Cabrera was
allotted responsibility for relatively little. The drafting of the report was assigned to “[t]he Expert
with the support team,” the latter being a reference to the LAP personnel. Review of the initial draft
of the report was to be done by the “Legal team,” meaning the LAP lawyers. And following the
final item on the list, submission to the court, the LAPs wrote, “Everyone silent,” the point of course
being that no one was to disclose the control over and overwhelming participation in the process by
the LAP team. Indeed, Donziger admitted on cross-examination that he instructed all those
associated with the preparation of the Cabrera Report to keep their work highly confidential.342
Before Cabrera officially was sworn in, however, the LAP team faced another
possible hitch in its plan. Fajardo learned that Judge Yánez was considering appointing two global
experts – one for Chevron and one for the LAPs. The LAP team was very concerned – they had
worked hard to have the judge appoint the expert they had vetted and chosen and who would “totally
play ball” with them. Fajardo reported Judge Yánez’s plan to Donziger and others in an email titled
“Code Orange.” He wrote: “What is new is that in view of the other restaurant’s challenge, the cook
has the idea of putting in another waiter, to be on the other side. This is troublesome. I suggest we
341

PX 843 (Mar. 21, 2007 Email from P. Fajardo to S. Donziger and L. Yanza) (attaching draft
of work plan).
342

Tr. (Donziger) 2558:16-20.
Donziger at trial denied any knowledge of the fact that the March 21, 2007 work plan said
“everyone silent” following the entry for submission of the report to the court. Id. 2558:212559:1. That denial is patently incredible, however, as the work plan was submitted to
Donziger, who led the entire effort.

82
activate alarms, contacts, strategies, pressures in order to avoid this happening. It is necessary to do
it urgently.”343 Fajardo wrote that the “Lago Agrio messenger is waiting until this afternoon to meet
with the cook, to hear his position.”344 Donziger testified in a deposition that the LAP team used
code names “to prevent any reader of those documents from knowing exactly who it was [he] w[as]
talking about. . . .”345 He admitted at trial that the “cook” referred to the judge; the waiter referred
to Cabrera; and the “other restaurant” referred to Chevron.346
Not surprisingly in light of the position in which Donziger, Fajardo, and others had
put Judge Yánez, the “messenger” – most likely Fajardo – caused Judge Yánez to drop the idea of
appointing two experts. And they took additional steps to control his activities.
On April 17, 2007, Luis Yanza wrote to Donziger: “We have met with Richard
[Cabrera] and everything is under control. We gave him some money in advance.”347
Shortly thereafter, the LAP team set up a new, “secret” bank account through which
they surreptitiously could pay the supposedly independent expert.348 As Yanza once explained to
Donziger, the purpose of the secret account was for Donziger and Kohn to “send . . . money to the

343

PX 845 (Mar. 26, 2007 Email from P. Fajardo to S. Donziger and others).
344

Id.
345

Donziger Jan. 29, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 3817:13-23.
346

Tr. (Donziger) 2549:10-2550:12.
347

PX 850 (Apr. 17, 2007 Email from L. Yanza to S. Donziger).
348

PX 871 (June 12, 2007 Email string between L. Yanza and S. Donziger).

83
secret account to give it to the Wuao.”349 The “wuao” or “wao” was another code name the LAP
team created to refer to Cabrera.350 As we shall see, Donziger and Yanza later put that secret
account to considerable use.
Having secured Cabrera’s selection and his agreement to cooperate with them, the
LAP lawyers likely believed that they had paved their path to victory. But their problems were not
over.

B.

Donziger, Fajardo, and Yanza Put Together an “Army,” Cabrera is Sworn in, and
the LAP Team Prepares His Work Plan
Cabrera was selected in April 2007, but he had not been sworn in by June. The field

work had not yet begun. Donziger and his colleagues feared their plan was in danger.
Donziger and Fajardo visited Judge Yánez on June 4, 2007, to inquire why the
swearing in was taking so long and to encourage him to allow the expert to get to work in the field.
Remarkably, the audio of this ex parte meeting with the judge was recorded by the Crude camera
crew.351
Very early in the meeting, Donziger said to the judge: “Let’s speak frankly. What
do we do to start” the process with Cabrera?352 The judge replied that it “is already about to start,”
349

PX 913 (Sept. 12, 2007 Email from L. Yanza to S. Donziger and P. Fajardo).
350

Tr. (Donziger) 2550:13-19. As will be seen, the LAP team also used the term “huao” in
correspondence to refer to Cabrera.
351

The images indicate that the recording was done from the hallway outside the judge’s
chambers. PX 61 (June 4, 2007 Crude Clip).
352

PX 61A (June 4, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS354-02-CLIP-05.

84
but that Chevron had filed “two books” of “suggestions” and issues regarding the process by which
Cabrera’s field work was to be carried out, and the judge needed to rule on them.353 One such
“suggestion” was that Chevron lawyers be permitted to attend Cabrera’s inspections. Donziger
replied that “we are fine with that.”354 Judge Yánez responded: “Yes, but the only thing that must
be made clear is . . . the expert is appointed by the court.”355 There must be “parameters so that he
can – this is going to be done right, isn’t it? And the situation can’t be made too creative. Yes,
because, I know that tomorrow you’ll leave but I’ll still be here, right?”356 Donziger assured Judge
Yánez that he, Donziger, would not “desert” the judge, and stressed that the judge could not let
Chevron’s complaints about the expert or threats to appeal Judge Yánez’s ruling delay the swearing
in any further.357
Donziger and Fajardo left the meeting frustrated with the delay and worried that
Judge Yánez was slipping away from their control. They discussed the need to pressure the judge
to swear in Cabrera and get the process going. Donziger said: “To me, this is already a matter of
combat . . . I think we actually have to put an army together . . . .”358 Fajardo agreed: “We have to

353

Id.
354

Id.
355

Id.
356

Id.
357

Id.
358

PX 63A (June 4, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS346-00-CLIP-02.

85
have demonstrations, have protests. I think that has to be done right now. . . .”359 He continued: “the
idea is to teach a lesson to this judge and to the next one. I mean, teach the court a lesson. A
message to the court.”360
The next day, Donziger met with Yanza and Atossa Soltani of Amazon Watch and
explained the situation:
“I think that, analyzing the outlook of this case, we are losing strength with the court.
Uhm, this case has pretty much been asleep for five months. It’s weird. I mean, we
got – we were getting, like, everything, for a while, that we wanted. You know, we got
the cancellation of the inspections. You know, we we’re getting the peritaje global,
the final phase. But then, like, suddenly everything was in place and he won’t swear
in the perito, which is needed to start the hundred and-twenty day period. It’s been,
like, weeks and weeks and weeks of delays. You know, after sort of analyzing the
situation, we believe that the judge is trying to stall the case until the end of the year,
until the new guy comes in . . . So, you know – but it goes way beyond the problem
of any individual judge, ‘cause it’s possible the next person could come in and . . .
and not want to deal with it and do the same. You know, it’s a problem of
institutional weakness in the judiciary, generally, and of this court, in particular. We
have concluded that we need to do more, politically, to control the court, to pressure
the court. We believe they make decisions based on who they fear the most, not
based on what the laws should dictate. So, what we want to do is take over the court
with a massive protest that we haven’t done since the first day of the trial, back in
October of 2003.”361
He added that the protest would occur during the last week in June and emphasized that “it’s a
critically important moment, because we want to send a message to the court that, ‘don’t fuck with
us anymore – not now, and not – not later, and never. . . . [N]o one fears us right now. And, until

359

Id.
360

Id. (emphasis added).
361

PX 67A (June 6, 2007 Crude clip), at CRS-350-04-CLIP-01 (emphasis added).

86
they fear us, we’re not gonna win this case. I’m convinced.”362 Indeed, on June 13, 2007, he
suggested that Fajardo and Yanza “inform the judge now that we’re going to have the big march and
maybe ask for his recusal during that march so that he'll get scared now.”363
As it turned out, the June 4 visit to Judge Yánez by Donziger and Fajardo quickly had
its desired effect, and Donziger’s fears as to whether Cabrera would be sworn in and thus authorized
to begin his work as global expert proved short-lived. Cabrera was sworn in on June 13, 2007.364
At his swearing-in, Cabrera promised to execute his duties “faithfully and in accordance with
science, technology and the law and with complete impartiality and independence vis-a-vis the
parties.”365
Roughly two weeks later, Cabrera submitted what purported to be his work plan to
the court.366 While this was more abbreviated than the detailed March 21 plan initially prepared by
the LAP team, it too in fact had been written by the LAP team.367 It listed categories of experts who
362

Id. (emphasis added).
363

PX 872 (June 13, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to P. Fajardo and L. Yanza) (emphasis
added).
364

PX 342 (Cabrera Certificate of Swearing In).
Donziger obviously was unaware when he wrote his own June 13 email (PX 872) that
Cabrera had been or would be sworn in on that day. It is unclear whether the threat he had
suggested to Fajardo and Yanza was made before the swearing in took place.
365

PX 342 (Cabrera Certificate of Swearing In), at 3.
366

PX 277R (Cabrera Work Plan).
367

Donziger Jan. 31, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 4132:11-18 (“Q. Now, in the spring of 2007 it was the
plaintiffs’ team that drafted Mr. Cabrera’s work plan, correct? A. We drafted a work plan
that we gave to him. Q. That he then adopted, correct, sir? A. I believe he used most of

87
would assist in collecting samples in the field and analyzing data368 – all of whom secretly would
be named by the LAP team.369

C.

The Field Work
Shortly before Cabrera was sworn in, Donziger and Fajardo had discussed the need

to “scale up” the “battle” once that occurred by “organiz[ing] pressure demonstrations at the court
and [providing] vigilance” to “protect” the expert.370 They proceeded with the plan once Cabrera
was sworn in. They decided that a “pressure demonstration” would take place the day Cabrera was
set to begin “his” work in the field.
On June 26, 2007, Donziger emailed the producer and cameraman of the Crude
documentary to fill them in on the plan. He wrote that “Richard [Cabrera] the new expert [would
be] tak[ing] sampling [during the following week] for the first time in Lago, and a ton of people will
be there to protect him from the Chevron lawyers. . . .”371 He suggested that the crew “film us
getting ready for the big march. The march will be the biggest in the history of the [ADF] . . . [yo]u
can capture the main characters (me, Pablo, Luis) early in the morning Tuesday greeting the

it, if not all of it.”).
368

PX 277R (Cabrera Work Plan), at 11.
369

Donziger Jan. 31, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 4132:20-22.
370

PX 67A (June 6, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS-350-04-CLIP-01 (emphasis added).
371

PX 875 (June 26, 2007 Email chain between S. Donziger, M. Bonfiglio, and J. Berlinger).

88
communities as they travel to lago from the hinterlands. . . .”372 And he noted that “[t]he other thing
that would be good to capture is our private ‘army’ which has been very effective. Yesterday they
followed a Texaco lawyer into the judge’s chambers and had a confrontation. This is a critical part
of our strategy that is allowing the case to go forward . . .”373
The demonstration occurred on July 3, 2007, and culminated with a speech by
Yanza.374 Cabrera began his site inspections the following day, surrounded by Donziger’s “army.”375
Over the next three months, Cabrera visited sites and collected samples.376
Chevron was skeptical of Cabrera from the day he was named. It thought him
unqualified and that he lacked relevant experience, and it voiced its concerns to the court.377
Chevron’s lawyers became even more suspicious when Cabrera took samples at various sites
because they observed what seemed to them to be collaboration and familiarity between Cabrera –
the supposedly independent global expert – and the LAP team.378 In addition, “unlike the Lago
Agrio Plaintiffs’ representatives, Chevron lawyers and . . . technical team members were often

372

Id.
373

Id.
374

PX 78 (July 3, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS405; PX 79A (July 3, 2007 Crude clip).
375

PX 3300 (McMillen Direct) ¶ 27.
376

Id.
377

PX 4300X (Callejas Direct) ¶ 48.
378

PX 3300 (McMillen Direct) ¶¶ 27-28.

89
blocked from observing up close Cabrera’s inspections.”379 Thus, “[t]hroughout Mr. Cabrera’s
proposed appointment, swearing in, field work and the ultimate submission of his reports, Chevron
repeatedly petitioned the Court to address its concerns over Cabrera’s lack of impartiality and
independence and his suspected collusion with the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs’ representatives.”380 The
Lago Agrio court never intervened.381 It merely reminded Cabrera “that he is an auxiliary to the
Court for purposes of providing to the process and to the Court scientific elements for determining
the truth” and asserted that “[t]he transparency of the expert’s work will be ensured.”382
Chevron had reason to be suspicious of Cabrera’s field work, which was anything
but transparent. Among other things, Donziger later admitted that the LAP team “had [also] been
involved in Mr. Cabrera’s site selection” and his “sampling protocols.”383 Indeed, he conceded that
he could not recall a single site Cabrera sampled that the LAPs had not “recommended” to him.384
Nor was that all.

1.

The LAP Team Pays Cabrera to Ensure that He Would “Totally Play Ball”

The LAP team paid Cabrera. Some of the payments they made to him were official,
379

PX 4300X (Callejas Direct) ¶ 49.
380

Id. ¶ 52.
381

Id.
382

PX 348 (Oct. 3, 2007 Lago Agrio Court Order).
383

Donziger Dec. 29, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 2203:4-6; 2203:11-17; Tr. (Donziger) 2457:22-2548:4.
384

Tr. (Donziger) 2548:9-17; Donziger Jan. 29, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 3726:23-3727:4.

90
court-approved payments made through the court process, which worked like this: on several
occasions, Cabrera filed a letter with the court, requesting payment for work he performed or was
about to perform.385 The court approved the amount, and ordered the LAPs, who had requested the
global expert, to pay it. The LAP team then wrote Cabrera a check for that amount, which was filed
with the court and then given to Cabrera.386
But the court-approved payments were not the only ones the LAPs made to Cabrera.
They paid him also outside the court process. And they began paying him even before he had begun
to perform his duties.
After Cabrera was named as the global expert but before he was officially sworn in,
the LAPs agreed to set up a new, “secret” bank account through which they surreptitiously would
pay Cabrera.387 Yanza and Donziger began the process of opening the secret account in June 2007.

385

PX 4300X (Callejas Direct) ¶¶ 50-57. This process was consistent with Articles 9 and 14
of Ecuador’s Rules Governing the Activities and Fee Schedule of Experts in the Civil,
Criminal and Similar Areas of the Judiciary. See DI 1413-9, at 21.
386

For example, on June 25, 2007, Cabrera filed a request with the court for $59,349 “[t]o
complete the work I am to perform within the deadline Your honor has set . . . .” PX 277
(June 25, 2007 Ltr. from R. Cabrera to Lago Agrio court). The following day, the Lago
Agrio court approved the payment. PX 344 (June 28, 2007 Court Approved Payment of
$59,349 from LAPs to Cabrera), at 2 of 5. Two days later, the LAPs paid Cabrera $59,349.
Id. at 1.
On October 15, 2007, Cabrera wrote to the court asking it to order the LAPs to pay him
$97,000. PX 350 (Oct. 15, 2007 Ltr. from R. Cabrera to Lago Agrio court). The court
ordered the LAPs to pay Cabrera $97,000 a week later. PX 354 (Oct. 22, 2007 Lago Agrio
Court Order). The LAPs paid Cabrera the $97,000 in at least three installments. PX 356
(Nov. 22, 2007 Court Approved Payment of $30,000 from LAPs to Cabrera); PX 361 (Jan.
24, 2009 Court Approved Payment of $25,000 from LAPs to Cabrera); PX 367 (May 10,
2008 Court Approved Payment of $33,000 from LAPs to Cabrera).
387

PX 871 (June 12, 2007 Email string between L. Yanza and S. Donziger); PX 913 (Sept. 12,
2007 Email from L. Yanza to S. Donziger and P. Fajardo).

91
Yanza informed Donziger that “[t]o open the account we need at least 2 thousand dollars. Due to
the urgency, I suggest that amount (or more, 5 or 10 thousand) be sent to my personal account and
I will transfer it to the new secret account.”388 Donziger responded “I’m not sure it should be your
account. [A]re you sure?”389 Yanza assured Donziger that “the first transfer is just to open the other
account. Once we have the other account I’ll immediately transfer all the money to that account and
we start operating with that account.”390 He later made clear that he would open the secret account
in someone else’s name.391
The LAP team ultimately decided to repurpose a preexisting account the ADF held
at Banco Pichincha to serve as the secret account.392 Between August 2007 and February 2009,
Donziger had Kohn make three separate payments totaling $120,000 via wire transfer to the secret
account.393 A large portion of this money was paid to Cabrera via direct account-to-account transfers

388

PX 871 (June 12, 2007 Email string between L. Yanza and S. Donziger).
389

Id.
390

Id.
391

Id. He considered opening the account in the name of either “Lupe” or “Donald,” referring
to Lupeta de Heraldaia and Donald Moncayo, both of whom work for the LAPs through
Selva Viva. Woods Sept. 14, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 439:10-440:23; Tr. (Moncayo) 2058:23-24.
392

PX 578 (Banco Pichincha Account Statement for ADF) (account number 3921429800); PX
912 (Sept. 12 2007 Email from L. Yanza to P. Fajardo re: “Secret account”) (identifying
secret account as account number 3921429800).
393

PX 578 (Banco Pichincha Account Statement for ADF), at 6-7; PX 618 (Wire Transfers),
at 4-5; PX 897 (Aug. 14, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to K. Wilson and J. Kohn re “Critical
money transfer”) (“Pls transfer 50,000 to the following account in Ecuador.”).

92
at Banco Pichincha.394 For example, on August 9, 2007, Yanza sent Donziger an email in which he
included the account information for the secret account and wrote that “[Kohn] ha[s] to deposit 50k
[into the secret account] so we can pay the advances to the consultants so they will start their work
as soon as possible. I hope it is deposited by Wednesday at the latest. I’ll be in touch that day to
arrange all of this with Huao.”395 Six days later, Kohn transferred $50,000 into the secret account.396
Two days after that, $33,000 was transferred to Cabrera from the secret account.397 And on
September 12, 2007, Yanza emailed Donziger stating that he “need[ed] 50,000 more by Monday at
the latest.”398 He followed up on that request five days later, telling Donziger: “I hope you make that
deposit right away because I offered to give the Wao another advance tomorrow and I don’t want
to look bad.”399 That same day, Kohn transferred $49,998 into the secret account.400 And on
February 8, 2008, Yanza emailed Donziger and asked for a transfer to the secret account, stating
394

PX 578 (Banco Pichincha Account Statement for ADF), at 6; PX 590 (Aug. 17, 2007
Transfer Receipt) (showing transfer of $33,000 to Cabrera); PX 591 (Aug. 17, 2007 Ltr.
from J. Fajardo to Banco Pichincha Manager); PX 593 (Banco Pichincha Record of Cash
Transactions for the ADF).
395

PX 894 (Aug. 9, 2007 Email from L. Yanza to S. Donziger re: “bank information urgent”).
396

PX 2427 (Oct. 26, 2007 Email from K. Wilson to S. Donziger) (reflecting payment of
$50,000 to Frente de la Amazonia Aug. 15, 2007).
397

PX 578 (ADF Account Statement), at 6; PX 590 (Aug. 17, 2007 Transfer Receipt); PX 591
(Aug. 17, 2007 Ltr. from J. Fajardo to Banco Pichincha Manager); PX 593 (Banco
Pichincha Record of Cash Transactions for the ADF).
398

PX 912 (Sept. 12, 2007 Email from L. Yanza to S. Donziger).
399

PX 917 (Sept. 17, 2007 Email from L. Yanza to S. Donziger).
400

PX 578 (ADF Account Statement), at 6.

93
“[h]opefully, [Kohn] transfers 25.”401 Later that day, Donziger emailed Kohn, asking him to deposit
$20,000 into the Frente’s secret account.402 Kohn transferred the money to the secret account four
days later.403
Defendants have contended that the secret payments they made to Cabrera were
“advanced funds to cover expenses incurred for work performed so that his work would not stop.”404
And Donziger testified at trial that the secret account was “to pay [Cabrera] for work performed
outside of the court process due to the paralysis that existed in the court. . . .”405 He maintained also
that such payments were “appropriate” under Ecuadorian law.406
In fact, experts are prohibited under Ecuadorian law from “requir[ing] or receiv[ing]
anything of value, whether directly or indirectly, from the parties in the case . . . since their fees
must be established in advance by the competent judge.”407 The attempt to justify their payments
to Cabrera outside the court process – that is, without an application by Cabrera to the court

401

PX 967 (Feb. 8, 2008 Email from L. Yanza to S. Donziger).
402

PX 968 (Feb. 8, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to J. Kohn and K. Wilson).
403

PX 578 (ADF Account Statement), at 7; PX 618 (Banco Pichincha Account Statement for
ADF).
404

PX 2411 (Donziger Defs.’ Second Supplemental Responses to Chevron’s Interrogatories),
at 34.
405

Tr. (Donziger) 2550:20-25.
406

Tr. (Donziger) 2551:16-20.
407

DI 1413-9 (Art. 15 of Rules Governing the Activities and Fee Schedule of Experts in Civil,
Criminal and Similar Areas of the Judiciary), at 21.

94
followed by court approval followed by payment – as necessary “to keep the process going” is not
persuasive. While such advances might have been both understandable, if irregular, had they been
made openly and in response to proven delays by the court in acting on payment requests, there is
no persuasive evidence of either. Defendants’ expert, moreover, testified that secret payments to
Cabrera without the knowledge of the court to alter the result of the expert’s report would have been
crimes under Ecuadorian law.408 Indeed, the Ecuadorian Criminal Code provides that “[a]nyone who
bribes a[n] . . . expert . . . or who knowingly uses false . . . experts in a court proceeding . . . will be
punished as guilty of false testimony or perjury.”409
All of the circumstances – including the fact that a court-approved payment process
existed but that the LAP team secretly paid Cabrera outside of that process, used a secret account
to do so, worried in emails about whether any of the money should go through Yanza’s personal
account even temporarily, and used code names as they did it – indicate that the secret payments
were illegal or at least improper,410 that the LAP team knew that, and that they attempted to conceal
408

DI 1413-12 (Albán Dep. Tr.), at 31:25-32:2, 54:7-23.
409

DI 1413-4 (ECUADOR CRIM. CODE Art. 359), at 48-49.
410

The fact that at least some of the money the LAPs paid Cabrera changed hands before
Cabrera took the oath of office in June 2007 is not significant. They knew that he was to
act in an official capacity before any of the payments were made. The money was intended
to influence his official actions once he was sworn in. In those circumstances, the payments
were wrongful. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (the prohibition against bribing a public official
extends to a “person who has been selected to be a public official,” defined as “any person
who has been nominated or appointed to be a public official, or has been officially informed
that such person will be so nominated or appointed”); 18 U.S.C. § 201 (the prohibition
against government officials receiving compensation for representational services extends
to agreements to receive or acceptance of compensation before the term of employment
begins); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 163 (1990) (discussing the inclusion in
Sections 201 and 203 of pre-employment compensation or bribes); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
10.00(15), 200.10, 200.11, 200.12, 200.15 (proscribing the receipt of bribes by public

95
their payments. Whatever else these payments may have included, if anything, at least part of them
were made as part of even more extensive efforts to ensure that Cabrera “would totally play ball
with” the LAPs and with other U.S. consultants whom the LAPs had hired to draft the report Cabrera
would file under his name.

2.

The LAP Team Provides Cabrera with Administrative “Support” and
Controls his Field Work

The LAPs provided Cabrera more than payments from the secret account. Three days
before Cabrera began his field work, Fajardo sent an email to Donziger and Yanza, informing them
that Cabrera that morning had called him “about a little mistake in the contract, [and] he seemed a
bit upset. . . .”411 Fajardo suggested that Donziger get in touch with Cabrera
“to offer some Support, which . . . should be the following:
1. That we help him get an office, if he hasn’t yet, we shouldn’t let him go
through that hassle, it is our obligation to help him. Leaving him alone
would be irresponsible of us, we could give him someone to help him, he’ll
feel better.
2. I recommend that Julio [Prieto]’s girlfriend be his assistant, I think she’s
a really bright girl, and since she’s Julio’s girlfriend, there would be no
problems, she knows something about law and could help him in many
servants, defined to include those who have “been elected or designated to become a public
servant”); see also United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 153 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Although
defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights attached only upon indictment, the district court
properly considered pre-indictment state action that affected defendants post-indictment.
When the government acts prior to indictment so as to impair the suspect’s relationship with
counsel post-indictment, the pre-indictment actions ripen into cognizable Sixth Amendment
deprivations upon indictment.”); United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812, 813-16
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (Weinfeld, J.) (destruction prior to service of subpoena of evidence
material to known investigation constitutes obstruction of justice).
411

PX 877 (July 1, 2007 Email from P. Fajardo to L. Yanza and S. Donziger re:
“WORRIED”).

96
aspects, plus we’d have this situation more or less controlled. . . .
3. Even though it’s not our obligation, but I think it’s our duty to help him
get insurance. We must understand that he has no structure and we do. I
think that he now needs to get to the heart of his work. . . .”412
Donziger replied that he was “on it.”413
Donziger and Fajardo believed that supporting Cabrera in every way was necessary
to maintaining the “control” over him upon which Donziger insisted. So they entered into a contract
with Cabrera, provided him with a secretary (Prieto’s girlfriend), obtained life insurance for him,414
and provided other support. To ensure that Cabrera continued to cooperate with them, they needed
to make clear that they supported him. And their “support” was not limited only to administrative
matters. They also supported and controlled his work in the field.
Shortly after Cabrera began his inspections, he filed a letter with the Lago Agrio
court in which he complained that Chevron’s representatives had interfered with his first inspection
at the sampling site and were “insulting [Cabrera], trying to affect [his] reputation, dignity, and
impartiality.”415 He wrote that, in the future, “[i]f upon arriving at a site or well that [he] need[ed]
to sample [he] f[ou]nd alterations . . . [he] reserve[d] the right to replace that and all tampered sites
with other sites that have not been altered, without the new sites having to be on the list that was

412

Id. (emphasis added).
413

Id.
414

Id.; PX 881 (July 11, 2007 Email from J. Prieto to P. Fajardo and S. Donziger re: “insurance
for the wao”).
415

PX 279 (July 12, 2007 Ltr. from R. Cabrera to Lago Agrio court), at 2. This exhibit was
not offered or received for the truth of Cabrera’s statements.

97
provided in the work plan.”416
Read in concert with the LAP team’s internal correspondence, Cabrera’s letter to the
court – in which he “reserve[d] the right” to visit new sites and collect new data – was meant to lay
the groundwork for the LAP team’s maintenance of control over Cabrera’s field work. Indeed, on
July 17, 2007, Donziger sent an email to Yanza and Fajardo, the subject of which was “Ideas for
meeting with Richard [Cabrera].”417 He wrote:
“These are the [l]atest ideas:
1) That we think that Richard should suspend his work in the field and we should not
pay the team until after the recess. We just need to tell the team and Texaco that he’s
going to start all over after the recess so there is nothing strange, everything appears
normal.
2) When I get there, we’ll re analyze the work and budget with Richard. And we’ll
adjust with a much smaller team. My tendency is to stop Richard from working
much more in the field. . . or, if he continues doing it, he should continue under the
most strict control with an extremely limited number of samples . . . And we’ll
change the focus of the data at our offices.
3) It is key to have deadlines to receive drafts from all the consultants, such
as the biologists, the water man, and so on. Personally, I don’t want to wait for the
‘final’ product to determine if the work is useful or not, or we will be screwed
because they will ask for even more money to make the changes if we are not
properly informed of everything during the process.”418
Donziger’s email underscores the fact that the LAP team had chosen the sites which
Cabrera was to visit and, when the team’s funds began to run low, sought to limit the number of sites
even further. All the while, the LAPs knew that – for the samples he did collect – they could simply
416

Id.
417

PX 883 (July 17, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to L. Yanza and P. Fajardo).
418

Id. (emphasis added).

98
“change the focus of the data at [their] offices.”
The “team” to which Donziger referred included Stratus and other consultants and
scientists who were hired to perform technical work supposedly to have been done by Cabrera.419
One of those consultants was Uhl, Baron, Rana & Associates, Inc. (“UBR”), an environmental
consulting firm Kohn and Donziger had hired and paid to develop a potable water report.420 As will
be seen, the report UBR prepared ultimately became an appendix to the Cabrera Report.421 It was
attributed to Juan Villao Yepez, an employee of UBR, who was identified as a supposedly
independent expert on Cabrera’s supposedly independent technical team.422 The fact that the LAP
team had hired and was paying UBR was not disclosed to the Lago Agrio court.
The authorship of the Cabrera Report and its appendices will be discussed more fully
below. The importance of Donziger’s July 17, 2007 email for present purposes is that it shows that
the LAP team worried about how they could continue to pay the team of U.S. environmental
consultants they had assembled and hired to perform Cabrera’s work for him. And the team worried
also about maintaining control over the sites Cabrera inspected, the samples he took, and the data

419

See, e.g., PX 2481 (July 19, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to L. Yanza and P. Fajardo re:
“Very important”) (“If we use the American consultants here, it is [sic] necessary for Huales
to pay directly or can Kohn pay them? It might be a problem. Another option is for the
locals to adopt the work they do and are paid here, and the locals there.”).
420

See, e.g., PX 632 (July 18, 2007 Retention Agreement between J. Kohn and UBR); PX 2430
(July 24, 2007 Statement Reflecting $5,000 payment from J. Kohn to UBR).
421

PX 310 (Cabrera Report), at 4347 of 6124; Donziger Jan. 8, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 2537:12-17
(“Q. Now, the work that Uhl Baron did for yourself and Mr. Kohn ultimately became Annex
O-R of the Cabrera Report, correct? A. I believe so, either verbatim or something very
similar.”).
422

PX 310A (Cabrera Report), at 6085 of 6124.

99
the samples produced. So five days after Cabrera sent the letter to the court stating that he reserved
the right to visit new sites and collect new data,423 Donziger informed Fajardo that Cabrera should
collect an extremely limited number of samples and that (1) the focus of the data could be
“change[d] . . . at [the LAPs’] offices” and (2) the data ultimately would be analyzed and
summarized by the consultants the LAPs were paying to prepare Cabrera’s report.424 This twopronged attack enabled the LAP team to get what it wanted – fewer testing sites, lower costs, and
control over the samples and results they elicited – while allowing Cabrera to blame the need for
changes to his work plan on Chevron.
Donziger noted also in his July 17, 2007 email to Fajardo that the LAPs’ hired
consultants needed to be required to submit their drafts to the LAP team early on. Donziger wanted
control over the consultants’ reports from their inception. He did not want to risk waiting until their
work was “final” and ready to be included in the report to discover that it ultimately was not
“useful” to the LAPs.

423

PX 279 (July 12, 2007 Ltr. from R. Cabrera to Lago Agrio Court), at 2.
424

PX 883 (July 17, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to L. Yanza and P. Fajardo).

100
D.

Donziger Attempts to Deceive Judge Sand About Cabrera’s Independence
During this period, a case entitled Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp.425

was pending in this Court before Honorable Leonard B. Sand. The details of that case are not
particularly germane here. One, however, is significant because it provides further evidence of
Donziger’s (1) awareness that the LAPs’ control over Cabrera and their extensive participation in
the activities with which he was charged, as a supposedly independent expert, were wrongful, and
(2) determination to maintain the false appearance that Cabrera was independent when he most
certainly was not.
In mid-September 2007, the ROE and PetroEcuador were due to submit supplemental
papers in support of a motion to dismiss Chevron’s counterclaims and to renew their own motion
for summary judgment. Donziger had been given by the ROE’s lawyers a draft of a declaration
proposed for signature by Mark Quarles and submission to Judge Sand. Quarles was one of the
outside consultants hired by the LAPs to, among other things, work on the global expert report
supposedly done by Cabrera. Paragraph 5 subpart 3 of the draft read as follows:

425

No. 04 Civ. 8378 (LBS).
Chevron Corporation briefly changed its name to Chevron Texaco before rechanging it to
Chevron. See Chevron Corp. Annual Report 2000 (Form 10–K) (Mar. 28, 2001), available
a t
h t t p : / / w w w . s e c . g o v / A r c h i v e s /
edgar/data/93410/000009341001000015/0000093410-01-000015.txt; ChevronTexaco Corp.
Annual Report 2001 (Form 10–K) (Mar. 27, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/93410/000095014902000568/ f80065e10-k405.htm; Chevron Corp.,
Annual Report 2005 (Form 10–K) (Mar. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93410/000095014906000076/ f16935e10vk.htm.
the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Chevron, following the acquisition of the
shares of Texaco, was renamed Chevron-Texaco Corporation and then later changed its
name back to Chevron Corporation. Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 2007)
(explaining that courts may take judicial notice of “documents filed with the SEC . . . ‘to
determine what the documents stated’”).

101
“3.

In the event Chevron or the Plaintiffs had been allowed to participate in
developing Cabrera’s sampling strategy and selection of sites/methods, a
degree of biasness [sic] would have been introduced into the sampling plan.
Given that Chevron and the Plaintiff were not involved in the workplan
preparation, Cabrera’s plan should represent no bias.”426

On the evening of September 16, 2007, Donziger emailed the draft declaration to
Quarles with Donziger’s comments and requested Quarles to revise the declaration accordingly.427
Donziger’s proposal with respect to paragraph 5, subpart 3, was as follows (with the original draft
in normal type and Donziger’s comments and requested changes in boldface):
“3.

[I would delete para in favor of the following language, if true: Mr.
Cabrera has at all times acted independently from both the plaintiffs
and the defendant. At no time has Mr. Cabrera entertained suggestions
or even met with plaintiffs or their representatives regarding his current
work plan.
[In the event Chevron or the Plaintiffs had been allowed to participate in
developing Cabrera’s sampling strategy and selection of sites/methods, a
degree of biasness would have been introduced into the sampling plan.
Given that Chevron and the Plaintiff were not involved in the workplan
preparation, Cabrera’s plan should represent no bias. –would delete
para]”428

The foregoing demonstrates that Donziger did not want Quarles to say that
participation by either side in Cabrera’s sampling strategy or site or method selection would have
introduced bias into the process. So he suggested to Quarles that he assert, “if true,” that Cabrera
neither had entertained suggestions from nor even met with the LAPs regarding his work plan. But
Donziger by this time knew that the statements he proposed that Quarles make in his declaration

426

PX 915 (Sept. 16, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to M. Quarles re: Quarles Affidavit), at 6
of 9.
427

Id.
428

Id. at 5-6 of 9 (emphasis in original).

102
would have been false. Among other things, Donziger had been at the March 3, 2007 meeting with
Cabrera and others at which the LAPs laid out the plan they had prepared. Donziger knew also that
the LAPs controlled Cabrera’s site selections and that Cabrera in all other respects was “totally
playing ball” with the LAPs. His inclusion of the words “if true” were nothing more than a
misguided attempt to cover himself, should the blatant inaccuracy of the declaration itself ever be
discovered, by permitting him to assert that he had relied on Quarles and that the falsity of the
declaration had not been Donziger’s fault.
The subparagraph that Donziger wanted changed was altered before the Quarles
declaration was filed on the following day, September 17, 2007. The final version (which, with
renumbering of certain paragraphs, appeared as subparagraph 1 of paragraph 7) was this:
“1.

Mr. Cabrera and his team have acted independently from both the plaintiffs
and the defendant at the three (3) Phase II inspections that were witnessed on
September 6 - 7, 2007. In fact, armed guards were present to accompany
Cabrera and his team and to prevent plaintiff and defendant personnel from
interfering with the execution of the sampling plan.”429

Thus, Quarles was not prepared to go as far as Donziger wished, either because he knew that
Donziger’s assertions were false or because he knew that he lacked personal knowledge sufficient
to justify him in saying what Donziger proposed.
In any case, the Quarles declaration as filed was intended by Donziger to convey the
idea that Cabrera was working independently of the plaintiffs. It did so to some extent, though not
to the degree Donziger wished. Even its limited message was inaccurate, and Donziger knew it.
In fact, Quarles testified that if he had known that the LAPs had drafted Cabrera’s work plan and

429

PX 918, at 3-4 (emphasis in original); Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No.
04 Civ. 8378 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 17, 2007) [DI 225], at 3-4 of 6.

103
that Cabrera had worked directly with the plaintiffs, he would not have signed even the modified
declaration.430

E.

Stratus Secretly Writes Most of the Report
Ann Maest was a significant figure in the ensuing events. She first met Donziger and

the LAP team in 2006, and eventually suggested that Donziger speak to Stratus’ leadership to
discuss retaining the firm in connection with the Cabrera Report.431 Donziger then met with Stratus’
president, Josh Lipton, Maest, Stratus’ executive vice president and chief financial officer Douglas
Beltman, and other Stratus personnel in Boulder, Colorado in April 2007.432 Donziger explained the
history of the Lago Agrio litigation and the status of the evidentiary phase of the case.433 He

430

Quarles Sept. 1, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 115:20-116:04, 118:20-25, 121:21-122:05.
431

PX 848 (Apr. 10, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to J. Lipton and A. Maest) (“Josh – Ann
Maest suggested I write to reconnect about the Ecuador case against Chevron . . . . The case
is winding down fast, and we need to prepare a damages assessment . . . . I am interested
in a ‘global’ discussion of how Stratus might be able to take on some or all of this.”).
Donziger wrote in his notebook on April 12, 2007 “Need to see Stratus in Denver to get
help, but worried about the money. . . . Maest was down. Unclear if we can pull it all
together in the time frame allotted.” PX 204 (Donziger Notebook); see also PX 5200
(Lipton Direct) ¶ 13 (“On April 10, 2007 Donziger contacted me via email at Dr. Maest’s
suggestion and described his need for technical assistance on a damages assessment.”).
432

PX 5200 (Lipton Direct) ¶ 15 (“I met with Donziger on April 26, 2007 at Stratus’s office in
Boulder, Colorado.”); PX 851 (Apr. 23, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to J. Lipton and A.
Maest re: Meeting Thursday); PX 2466 (Apr. 22, 2007 Memorandum from S. Donziger to
J. Lipton re: Overall Ecuador Work Plan); PX 59A (Apr. 26, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS-26901-04 (April 2007 meeting with Stratus).
433

PX 5200 (Lipton Direct) ¶ 15.

104
explained also what he envisioned Stratus’ role would be.434 He said that he needed Stratus’ help
preparing the damages claim and explained that, while the LAP team had already done some testing
in the field and had produced a tentative remediation plan, it was “spotty” and needed “to be
significantly beefed up.”435
Stratus entered into a retention agreement with Kohn on August 20, 2007.436 The
agreement specified that Stratus would “provide regular updates on the progress of our work with
Mr. Steven Donziger via phone or email.”437 Doug Beltman was identified as the Stratus project
manager and officer-in-charge of the firm’s “Ecuador Project.”438
Throughout the rest of 2007 and early 2008, Beltman, Maest, and others at Stratus
consulted with Donziger and worked on preparing the damages assessment.439 Donziger and Stratus
personnel exchanged hundreds of emails regarding draft outlines of the Cabrera Report as well as

434

PX 59A (Apr. 26, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS-269-01-04 (April 2007 meeting with Stratus).
435

Id.
436

PX 633 (Mar. 5, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to E. Englert and M. Hoke), at 2-10.
437

Id. at 8.
438

PX 5200 (Lipton Direct) ¶ 19.
439

See, e.g., PX 942 (Dec. 10, 2007 A. Maest handwritten notes re: “Call with Steven and
Doug re Damages Assessment”); PX 945 (Dec. 20, 2007 A. Maest handwritten notes re
“Ecuador GW Sampling”); PX 951 (Dec. 27, 2008 A. Maest handwritten notes re “Call with
Steven and Doug - Ecuador”); PX 954 (Jan. 9, 2008 A. Maest handwritten notes re “Needed
for Trip”); PX 956 (Jan. 15, 2008 A. Maest handwritten notes re “Meeting in Quito”); see
also PX 957 (Jan. 16, 2008 Memorandum “Potential tasks for Stratus Consulting”).

105
schedules for the drafting, review, analysis, translation, and completion of the annexes.440 But it is
clear that Donziger had the final word on every annex and every piece of the report441 – even in
arriving at the actual damages figures.442
Based on data given to them by Donziger and the LAP team, their visits to Ecuador,
and their own analyses, Beltman, Maest and their team at Stratus wrote the bulk of the Cabrera
Report. As Donziger later admitted, much later, after Stratus had come clean about its involvement,
it was “the general idea” “that Stratus would draft the report in a form that it could be submitted
directly to the Ecuadorian court by Mr. Cabrera.”443 In January 2008, Beltman sent a first draft of

440

E.g., PX 985 (Mar. 5, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger re: “Annex tracking
table”) (attaching table tracking author, language, and status of review of each annex); PX
1521 (chart tracking translation of annexes); PX 8026 (Feb. 20, 2008 Email from D.
Beltman to A. Maest, J. Peers, and S. Donziger re: “annex on TexPet cleanup”); PX 8027
Mar. 10, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger and A. Maest re: “Another annex:
ecological risks”); PX 8028 (Mar. 5, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger re: “Draft
annex on historical data”) (“For your review. English and Spanish versions.”); PX 8029
(Mar. 4, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger re: “extrapolation annex without
maps”); PX 8030 (Mar. 13, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger and A. Maest re:
“Lost ecosystem value”) (“Steven: Attached is the Spanish version of our annex on the
value of the rainforest lost at wells and stations.”).
441

See id.; PX 985 (Mar. 5, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger re: Annex tracking
table) (attaching table tracking author, language, and status of review of each annex,
including column for “SD review”).
442

E.g., PX 936 (Nov. 17, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to D. Beltman re: “Unjust
Enrichment”) (“pls read our submission carefully and make sure you don’t say or even
suggest anything that backs away from the figures. Remember, we said in the submission
that the unjust enrichment would be on the order of billions of dollars (for everything, not
just dumping).”).
443

Donziger Dec. 29, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 2253:5-11.

106
an outline of the Cabrera Report to Donziger and Maest for their comments.444 In February 2008
– six weeks before Cabrera’s report was to be filed – Maest and Beltman traveled to Ecuador to meet
with Cabrera, Donziger, and other members of the LAPs’ team.445 Beltman wrote to the Stratus
team in Boulder that
“The project is at a key point right now. We have to write, over the next 2 to 3
weeks, probably the single most important technical document for the case. The
document will pull together all of the work over the last 15 or so years on the case
and make recommendations for the court to consider in making its judgment. We
(the case attorneys, the case team in Quito, and Stratus) have put together a very
ambitious outline for this report. The people in the Quito office are working on some
parts, and we’re working on others.”446
The report to which he referred, of course, was the one that Cabrera would submit
to the Lago Agrio court. At Donziger’s direction, Stratus wrote its portions in the first person as
though they were written by Cabrera.447 Beltman emailed that draft to Donziger on February 27,
2008,448 and continued to work on it through March.449 Other members of the Stratus team worked

444

PX 962 (Jan. 24, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger and A. Maest) (attaching draft
outline, named “Outline.v1.doc,” for the report); see also PX 2433 (Feb. 8, 2008 Email from
D. Beltman to S. Donziger, A. Maest, and others) (attaching updated draft outline “based on
what we talked about last Friday).
445

PX 1648 (Feb. 22, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to Stratus employees re:
“CONFIDENTIAL – Ecuador Project Update”) (“Greetings from Ecuador”).
446

Id.
447

Donziger Dec. 29, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 2253:5-11.
448

PX 978 (Feb. 27, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger re: “Start on report text;
human tox annex”).
449

E.g., PX 985 (Mar. 5, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger re: “Annex tracking
table”).

107
at Beltman’s direction and drafted portions of the annexes that would accompany Cabrera’s report,450
often collaborating with members of the LAPs’ Ecuadorian team in doing so.451 All of the portions
of the report that Stratus prepared were in English, were written in Cabrera’s voice, and later were
translated into Spanish for submission to the court.452
Beltman, Maest, and others at Stratus continued to provide comments on and material
for the Summary Report and the annexes to Donziger and the LAP team up to March 30, 2008, two
days before it was to be filed.453 On that day, Beltman provided comments to Donziger on a draft

450

E.g., PX 1649 (Mar. 1, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to M. Carney re: “eco risk annex”)
(“Hey Mike: Great job on the ecorisk annex. The link below has some edits and comments.
We are well on our way, but it’s going to take a bit more work.”); PX 981 (Mar. 4, 2008
Email from A. Maest to J. Peers re: “Yet another updated perito db”).
451

E.g., PX 2468 (Mar. 4, 2008 Email from J. Sáenz to D. Beltman); PX 1014 (Mar. 27, 2008
Email from J. Peers to L. Villacreces, P. Fajardo, and J. Prieto re: “corrected figures –
Exhibit Ecological Impact”).
452

PX 1050 (July 28, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to B. Lazar re: “english translations”); PX
2436 (Mar. 10 2008 Email From D. Beltman to A. Maest and J. Peers re: “Report help”)
(“Unfortunately, I’ve been too busy on annex stuff to work much on [the report], and it has
to go to the court in 2 weeks and get translated. . . . My goal is to have the entire report
drafted by COB Tuesday. Based on how things are going, our current translators will take
more than a week to turn it around, which puts us at next week Tuesday, if we’re lucky.”);
PX 980 (Feb. 29, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to [e-mail] and A.
Maest re: “Ecuador project”) (attaching two annexes for translation); PX 994 (Mar. 12, 2008
Email from [e-mail] to D. Beltman and A. Maest); PX 2437 (Mar. 12,
2008 Email from D. Beltman to [e-mail] re: “Big Report”).
453

See PX 1003 (Mar. 19, 2008 Email from B. Lazar to D. Beltman re: “eco loss”); PX 1005
(Mar. 20, 2008 Email from L. Gamboa to D. Beltman re: “Infomacion”); PX 1007 (Mar.
20, 2008 mail from L. Gamboa to D. Beltman re: “A modest change”); PX 1008 (Mar. 21,
2008 Email from A. Maest to J. Peers and D. Beltman re: “Most recent versions of report
and three annexes”); PX 1011 (Mar 22, 2008 Email from B. Powers to D. Beltman, S.
Donziger, and A. Maest re: “Status?”); PX 1653 (Mar. 22, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to
J. Peers, M. Carney, and A. Maest re: “TPH figures in pits, out of pits”); PX 1013 (Mar. 25,
2008 Email from D. Beltman to J. Sáenz and S. Donziger re: “new pieces”).

108
damages table to be used in the Summary Report.454 The table set the total estimated damages at
$16.3 billion.455
The last draft of the Cabrera Report was saved on the morning of March 30, 2008.456
Beltman, who was in Ecuador at the time, later recalled seeing the Report and annexes “boxed and
packed up in the offices of the plaintiffs’ lawyers in Ecuador . . . the day before the report was
filed.”457 On April 1, 2008, Donziger downloaded the final version of the report from a secret email
account Fajardo had created for him.458
Later that day, Cabrera – accompanied by the LAPs, their supporters, and members
of the press459 – walked into the Lago Agrio court and filed the report he claimed to have written.460
It consisted of an executive summary and 21 annexes and set the amount of damages at $16.3

454

PX 1018 (Mar. 30, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to D. Beltman re “what do u think of
this?”). The next day, Donziger emailed the chart to [e-mail]. PX 1020
(Mar. 31, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to [e-mail] re: “chart”).
455

PX 1018 (Mar. 30, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to D. Beltman re: “what do u think of
this?”).
456

PX 1017 (Apr. 1, 2008 Email from [e-mail] to S. Donziger re: “Informe
Final”); PX 4100 (Lynch Direct) ¶¶ 8, 15.
457

Tr. (Shinder) 1294:25-1295:9.
458

Tr. (Donziger) 2554:16-22; PX 1017 (Apr. 1, 2008 Email from gringograndote@gmail.
com to S. Donziger re: “Informe Final”).
459

PX 4300X (Callejas Direct) ¶ 56.
460

PX 310A (Cabrera Report).

109
billion.461 It stated that “[t]his report was prepared by the Expert Richard Stalin Cabrera Vega for
purposes of providing professional technical assistance to the Nueva Loja Superior Court of Justice
. . . .”462
We now know, and Donziger eventually admitted,463 that the Cabrera Report was not
written by Cabrera. It was written almost entirely by Stratus and others working at the direction of
Stratus and Donziger. Indeed, all of the damage amounts in the Cabrera Report came verbatim from
Stratus’ drafts.464 And the annexes drafted by Stratus or its subcontractors were falsely attributed
to experts on Cabrera’s purportedly independent team, who had been selected by Donziger and the
LAP team.465 But, while Donziger reviewed and commented on every aspect of the Cabrera Report
and its annexes before they were filed, there is no evidence that Cabrera himself ever did.

461

Id. at 7.
462

Id. at 1.
463

Donziger Jan. 8, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 2433:8-14 (Cabrera “adopted pretty much verbatim what
had been provided to him” by Stratus).
464

PX 1019 (Mar. 31, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to [e-mail]) (“Table of
Calculated Damages/Main Report”); Donziger Jan. 8, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 2507:24-2508:7 (“Q.
That was the damage table that was going to . . . appear in the Cabrera report, correct? A.
I believe so. Q. And that is something that you are working on drafting as of March 30th
of 2008, correct? Q. I believe so, yes.”); see also PX 976 (Feb. 26, 2008 Email from D.
Beltman to M. Carney, T. Hodgson, J. Peers, A. Maest, P. Sowell, E. English, D. Mills, C.
Rodgers and copying L. Cross re: “Ecuador annex schedule”) (discussing work plan to
complete Report and attaching chart listing who was responsible for each annex and to
whom each should be attributed).
465

PX 976 (Feb. 26, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to M. Carney, T. Jodgson, J. Peers, A.
Maest, P. Sowell, E. English, D. Mills, C. Rodgers and copying L. Cross re: “Ecuador annex
schedule”) (attaching chart listing who was responsible for each annex and to whom each
should be attributed).

110
Immediately after the Cabrera Report was filed, Donziger, Fajardo, and their team
began trumpeting it to the press as the work of an independent, court-appointed expert who had
conducted his work with the assistance of an independent team of scientists. The ADF issued a
press release on April 2 – which Donziger had prepared before the Cabrera Report was filed – titled
“Court Expert Smacks Chevron with Up To $16 billion in Damages for Polluting Indigenous Lands
in Amazon.”466 Another release stated that “an independent expert has proposed that Chevron pay
a minimum of $7 billion and up to $16 billion . . . . Cabrera, the court appointee who is a respected
geologist and environmental consultant, was assisted by a team of technical specialists.”467 And
another stated that the “expert report [] was prepared with the help of 15 scientists under the
supervision of [an] Ecuadorian environmental consultant.”468
Two weeks after the report was filed, Fajardo gave a press conference, with Donziger
at his side, in which he stated that “what scares Chevron the most, is that this independent, courtappointed expert, who doesn’t . . . respond to either side of the case has determined that to repair
this damage it will be between seven billion and sixteen billion dollars.”469 Donziger and the
plaintiffs’ team falsely stressed Cabrera’s “independen[ce]”470 to maximize the leverage on Chevron,
although they well knew that the claim of independence was a lie.
466

Compare PX 1023 (Apr. 1, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to J. Kohn re: “DRAFT ONLY
– DO NOT SHOW TO ANYBODY”), with PX 498R, 499R (Apr. 2, 2008 Press Release).
467

PX 498R (Apr. 2, 2008 Press Release) (emphasis added).
468

PX 501 (Apr. 14, 2008 Press Release).
469

PX 2237A (Crude Clip), at CRS 481 (emphasis added).
470

PX 502 (Apr. 16, 2008 Press Release).

111
F.

Stratus Criticizes its Own Report to Enhance the False Image of Cabrera’s
Independence
Stratus’ work was not complete the day the Cabrera Report was filed. Donziger and

his team knew that Chevron would respond to the Report and that they would need to defend it. So
the day after it was filed, Beltman emailed Donziger with a list of items that Stratus would be
working on moving forward. Among the items he listed was to “lin[e] up some experts to review
and defend the report,” to “prepare [the plaintiffs’] comments on Cabrera report to submit to the
court,” and to “write report on Cabrera’s report as response to Chevron’s anticipated report on
Cabrera’s report.”471 Thus, having written the bulk of the Cabrera Report, Stratus began preparing
to (1) respond to it on behalf of the LAPs as if the Cabrera Report actually had been written by
Cabrera,472 and (2) write a response for Cabrera to issue to anticipated Chevron criticisms of the
report that Stratus secretly had written. The plan was to maximize the deception.
The goal for the LAP team’s response was to create the impression that it was
dissatisfied with the Report and that Cabrera had not gone far enough in assessing damages –
notwithstanding the fact that the LAP team, including Stratus, itself had written it. Fajardo wrote
to the team the day after the Report was filed:
“Several international agencies have called me. I have told them the following,
among other things:
a. According to my cursory reading of the report: I think it is a good report,
but it is incomplete. For example, the cost of groundwater clean up is not
471

PX 1030 (Apr. 2, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger and A. Maest re: “List of
items for moving forward”).
472

See, e.g., PX 1040 (June 10, 2008 A. Maest Handwritten notes re: “Ecuador Meeting”); PX
1664 (Aug. 10, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to J. Peers, A. Maest, D. Mills, D. Chapman,
and J. Lipton re: “Status of Cabrera comment work”).

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economically quantified. It does not determine what Texaco should pay for
the [e]ffect on the culture of the indigenous peoples, it includes an item for
recovery, but there is no item for sanctions. It does not include an estimate
of the financial damage caused to the economy of rural residents, and it does
not say what should be done so rural residents can recover a decent life.
b. For these reasons, the plaintiffs are waiting for the judge to give us the
report, we will analyze it in depth, and we will ask the Expert to complete
this report, which does not meet our expectations…
c. The report is a step toward justice, but we are not happy because of what’s
missing.
. . . . I think it is good to maintain a uniform line, PLEASE, WE ARE NOT
HAPPY…”473
On September 15, 2008, Chevron responded to the Cabrera Report. It challenged its
findings, asked that the court strike the Report in its entirety and sought a hearing on errors the
Report allegedly contained.474 It questioned also Cabrera’s independence and accused Cabrera of
working improperly with the LAP team.
The LAPs filed their comments – which had been written by Stratus and other
members of the LAP team – on September 16, 2008, the day after Chevron’s response was filed.475
Although the comments largely endorsed Cabrera, they noted that he “did not consider more
documentary information in his report”476 and claimed that his “omissions” “broadly favor[ed] the

473

PX 1028 (Apr. 2, 2008 Email from P. Fajardo to LAP team re: “GOSSIP AND
SUGGESTIONS”).
474

PX 311 (Chevron Sept. 15, 2008 Motion); PX 4300X (Callejas Direct) ¶ 57.
475

PX 311 (Chevron Sept. 15, 2008 Motion).
476

PX 312 (LAPs’ Comments on Cabrera Report), at 17.

113
interest of [Chevron].”477
This appearance of dissatisfaction with the Cabrera Report was important because
it supported the false pretense that Cabrera had acted independently. It also provided a basis upon
which Cabrera later could admit errors in his initial report and increase his damages assessment.
Indeed, the LAP team already was preparing Cabrera’s supplemental filings.
On October 7, 2008, Cabrera wrote to the Court:
“President, I am an honest man with nothing to hide, and my conduct as an expert
in this case has been as professional, impartial and objective as possible, as can be
seen from my expert report. The fact that neither of the two parties is fully satisfied
with my report is clear evidence of my impartiality. I am therefore perfectly willing
to appear before the Superior Court of Justice and answer questions or provide
whatever is necessary to remove any doubts on the work carried out with a multidisciplinary and honest team. . . . I was appointed as expert by the President of the
Superior Court of Justice of Nueva Loja; I do not take orders from either of the
parties to the lawsuit. . . . This means, President, that I am not, nor will I be, subject
to the views or whims of either of the parties; I act in accordance with rulings by the
judge, with the law and with my principles.”478
This of course was blatantly false and misleading. Moreover, the assertion that “neither of the two
parties is fully satisfied with” the Report corroborates the conclusion that the response to the report
that Stratus wrote on the LAPs’ behalf – that is, Stratus’ criticism of its own work product that had
been submitted over Cabrera’s name – was intended to feed the false impression that Cabrera had
been independent. That was a key part of Donziger’s strategy.
In November 2008, Cabrera submitted a supplemental report, in which he purportedly
responded to the comments and questions submitted by the LAPs. The supplemental report
acknowledged certain omissions and added another $11 billion to the initial damages assessment
477

Id. at 2.
478

PX 299 (Oct. 8, 2008 Ltr. from R. Cabrera to Lago Agrio court), at 7-8.

114
in the Cabrera Report.479 This report, just like the one it was supplementing, had been written by
Stratus and the LAP team.480
Cabrera in February 2009 issued also a response to Chevron’s petition. He wrote:
“Your Honor, I don’t know how long I will have to keep responding to the same
requests from the parties. . . . [M]y opinion and my clarifications are clear; they are
based on field and bibliographic research, statistical analyses, laboratory analyses,
and scientific commentaries which are serious, objective, and deeply impartial. . . .
The entire expert investigation procedure was completed by me personally.”481
Again, Cabrera did not disclose Stratus’ and the LAP team’s role in drafting the Cabrera Report and
its supplement.482
479

PX 4300X (Callejas Direct) ¶ 59.
480

PX 1075 (Oct. 27, 2008 Email chain between D. Beltman, A. Maest, and J. Peers re:
“Ecuador, Doug- you should read this”) (“We received a request from Tania for an update
on where we are in responding to a set of the questions to the [Expert] assigned to us”); PX
1668 (Oct. 29, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to J. Peers and A. Maest re: “Plan for rough
estimate of groundwater damages”); PX 1078 (Oct. 31, 2008 Email from A. Maest to D.
Beltman and J. Peers re: “Reinjection and gas capture questions”); PX 1080 (Nov. 6, 2008
Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger re: “Clapp”).
481

PX 303 (Feb. 5, 2009 Ltr. from R. Cabrera to Lago Agrio court), at 1-2 (emphasis added).
482

There is another sidelight to the tale of the Cabrera Report.
In the course of preparing the Cabrera Report and ensuing documents, Stratus, Donziger, and
the LAP team dealt not only with new material prepared by Stratus, but with material that
the LAPs already had in hand from other experts they had employed. They divided some
of the available material among the Cabrera Report itself, the response that Stratus prepared
for Cabrera to make to the comments on the Cabrera Report submitted on behalf of the
LAPs, and perhaps other documents. With so many cooks in the kitchen, there was bound
to be confusion, and at least one now obvious mistake was made.
Donziger and Stratus hired Richard Clapp to prepare two reports. PX 1080 (Nov. 6, 2008
Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger re: “Clapp”) (“[Clapp] has done two reports that I
know of. A long while back, he wrote up a summary of the toxic effects of the chemicals
in crude oil and drilling fluids, and it was incorporated into the expert report as an annex
pretty much as is.”). One of Clapp’s reports was submitted “pretty much as is” as an annex
to the Cabrera Report, although it was attributed to someone else. Id. Beltman explained

115
In the last analysis, the facts concerning the Cabrera Report are crystal clear. The
remaining LAP judicial inspections were cancelled, the global expert proposal adopted, and Cabrera
appointed in consequence of the coercion of and pressure placed upon Judge Yánez. As Donziger
admitted in a Crude outtake, Judge Yánez “never would have done [that] had we not really pushed
him.”483
Cabrera was not even remotely independent. He was recruited by Donziger. He was
paid under the table out of a secret account above and beyond the legitimate court-approved
payments. He was promised work on the remediation for life if the LAPs won. The LAPs gave him
an office and life insurance, as well as a secretary who was a girlfriend of one of the LAP team
members. Stratus and, to some extent others, wrote the overwhelming bulk of his report and his
responses to Chevron’s objections, as well as to the deceitful comments Stratus had written on its
own report. And, in accordance with Donziger’s plan to ratchet up the pressure on Chevron with
a supposedly independent recommendation that Chevron be hit with a multibillion dollar judgment,
he repeatedly lied to the court concerning his independence and his supposed authorship of the
report.

to Donziger that Clapp had written also another piece, which Stratus had sent to the LAP
team in Ecuador, “but it did not appear in the [LAPs’] comments on the Cabrera report,
which means it will probably appear in the expert’s response to the comments.” Id. Beltman
and Donziger were adamant, however, that Clapp’s authorship of both reports remain secret.
Id. (“I don’t think we should hand out either one as Clapp’s thereby distributing proof.”).
Clapp informed Beltman and Donziger at one point that he was planning to use his initial
report in a piece Donziger asked him to write. PX 1082 (Nov. 18, 2008 Email from R. Clapp
to D. Beltman re: “Ecuador trip report and health summary”). Beltman immediately wrote
to Donziger: “We have to talk to Clapp about that [report] and how we have to limit its
distribution. It CANNOT go into the Congressional Record as being authored by him. You
want to talk to him, or me?” Id. The fact that Clapp had written the annex was not revealed
until years later, in discovery actions filed in the United States.
483

PX 2478A (June 13, 2007 Crude Clip).

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G.

Donziger’s Explanation
The foregoing facts were not seriously disputed at trial. None of Fajardo, Yanza, nor

Cabrera – all of whom were centrally involved – submitted to a deposition or testified at trial.
Donziger, however, over time has attempted to avoid responsibility in a variety of ways including
denial followed by various explanations, justifications and evasions in efforts to portray these events
in a benign light. None has merit.
As will be seen, Donziger initially attempted to keep his and his confederates’ role
in the Cabrera episode and Report secret – even from some of his co-counsel – and vehemently
denied any accusation that the LAPs had been involved in drafting the Cabrera Report. By late
2010, however, the truth of the Report’s authorship had been revealed to such a degree that Donziger
no longer could deny it. So he began to offer a new explanation: Stratus wrote the bulk of the report,
he acknowledged, but that was acceptable under Ecuadorian law. He testified at trial: “Although
I often have been confused about the issues involved,484 I now believe the process used to create the
executive summary of the Cabrera report was fundamentally consistent with Ecuador law, custom
and practice as it was occurring in the Aguinda case. Certainly, I never understood that any actions
I took or of which I was aware at the time were impermissible in Ecuador.”485
Donziger’s belated admission and explanation is incomplete and unpersuasive. It
does not square with the facts. He does not explain why, for example, he went to such great lengths
to keep the firm’s involvement secret if he believed Stratus’ drafting of the Cabrera Report was

484

The Court does not credit this claim of confusion. Donziger was the architect of all that
occurred with respect to the Cabrera Report and is intimately familiar with all the details.
485

DX 1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶ 91.

117
permissible. Nor does he (nor can he) square his statement that the “process used to create” the
report was consistent with Ecuadorian law, custom and practice with the fact that the Lago Agrio
court on multiple occasions instructed Cabrera to conduct his work impartially and independently
of the parties.486
Nor is Donziger’s explanation consistent with the fact that Cabrera himself – most
likely at the direction of the LAP team – wrote to the court several times to deny any coordination
with the LAPs. On July 23, 2007, in response to objections by Chevron, Cabrera wrote to the court:
“I should clarify that I do not have any relation or agreements with the plaintiff, and it seems to me
to be an insult against me that I should be linked with the attorneys of the plaintiffs.”487 In October
of that year, he wrote again: “I have performed my work with absolute impartiality, honesty,
transparency and professionalism. I reject the descriptions or attacks that have been leveled against
me alleging that I am biased toward one of the parties, and I also reject the unfounded accusations
that I am performing my work surreptitiously. That is completely untrue.”488 Later that month, he

486

On October 3, 2007, for example the court issued an order which stated that Cabrera “is
hereby reminded that he is an auxiliary to the Court for purposes of providing to the process
and to the Court scientific elements for determining the truth. . . . The Expert is responsible
for the opinions, for the conclusions made by the professionals making up his team and
assisting with the preparation of the report.” PX 348 (Oct. 3, 2007 Lago Agrio Court Order),
at 2. And on October 22, 2007, the court issued an order stating that “Richard Cabrera[] is
informed that he must personally prepare and work on the expert report, taking into account
the scientific, technical, and legal standards of both a universal nature and those in effect
here.” PX 352 (Oct. 22, 2007 Lago Agrio court Order), at 6-7.
487

PX 281 (July 23, 2007 Ltr. from R. Cabrera to Lago Agrio court).
488

PX 283 (Oct. 11, 2007 Ltr. from R. Cabrera to Lago Agrio court); see also PX 286 (Oct. 30,
2007 Ltr. from R. Cabrera to Lago Agrio court) (“I have fully and faithfully complied with
the instructions you gave in each order and at the meetings that were held during the sample
collection process.”).

118
wrote again: “I can only confirm my commitment to continue my work with absolute impartiality,
honesty and transparency.”489
Indeed, the LAPs’ lawyers themselves, in responding to Chevron’s objections in
Ecuador concerning Cabrera’s independence, wrote that the objections were “based completely on
the baseless concept of a ‘conspiracy’ of which there is no evidence, for this reason the [objection]
is completely unfounded and must be rejected as well as sanctioned given that it was lodged for the
sole purpose of damaging the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs’ case and tarnishing the good name of the
distinguished Superior Court of Nueva Loja.”490 Donziger does not explain why his legal team
dissembled to the court about their arrangement with Cabrera if there was nothing wrong with it.491
The Court rejects Donziger’s excuses entirely. He knew at all times that his actions
were wrongful and illegal.

489

PX 287 (Oct. 31, 2007 Ltr. from R. Cabrera to Lago Agrio court).
490

PX 354 (Oct. 29, 2007 Motion).
491

One of defendants’ Ecuadorian law experts testified as follows: “Q. So if I understood you,
if Cabrera received information from a U.S. firm called Stratus and the plaintiffs submitted
it and he adopted it, his obligation was to say in his report ‘This information came from
Stratus’? [colloquy omitted] A. . . . I’m being asked for an opinion that were not the subject
of my [written] opinion. But nonetheless, I reaffirm if the Court-appointed expert were to
incorporate information that is not his and did not expressly acknowledge that, the – the
expert would be lying. And if that is proved, he would be subject to a criminal – criminal
proceedings for providing false testimony.” DI 1413-12 (Albán Dep. Tr.), at 66:14-67:3.
Further: “Q. For example, when the expert passes off someone else’s work as his own
without attributing it to the person who submitted it? [objection omitted]. A. I answered
previously that the expert’s silence on the true source or origin of that information would
constitute false testimony.” Id. at 107:9-16.
The same expert testified that the passing off of Cabrera’s ghostwritten work plan was
inappropriate, DI 1400-4 (Albán Dep. Tr.), at 112:8-17, and that Cabrera’s attendance at the
March 3, 2007 meeting and the discussion about ghostwriting his report and keeping that
information from Chevron was “irregular, arbitrary and illegal.” Id. at 126:1-16.

119
VI.

The Pressure Campaign Continues – The LAP Team Turns Up the Heat By Pressing for
Indictment of Former Texaco Lawyers.
While all this was going on, political events in Ecuador took place that came to have

major implications for the Lago Agrio case. The background begins with the fact that the LAPs had
been concerned from the very outset of the Lago Agrio case with the possibility that the release
signed by the ROE in its final agreement with Texaco would wipe out or prejudice the LAPs’ claim.
So in 2003, the LAPs began pressing for a criminal prosecution of Texaco lawyers based on alleged
fraud in connection with the release and the conclusion of the Texaco-ROE relationship. Their
purpose was plain – to force Chevron to settle the lawsuit. As Donziger wrote in his personal
notebook on October 4, 2005:
“Idea to pressure the company, get major press in U.S. . . . and compel the Ec govt
to act against the company legally to nullify the remediation contract.”492
He emphasized two days later that:
“[t]he key issue is criminal case. Can we get that going? What does it mean? I really
want to consolidate control with contract before going down a road that I think could
force them to the table for a possible settlement.”493
The LAPs initially did not have much success. The Prosecutor General in 2006
issued a report requesting the dismissal of the charges of falsification of documents, stating that he
had found no evidence to support them.494 Around the same time, the prosecutor issued a report
finding no improper conduct on the part of Pallares and Reis Veiga, the Texaco lawyers, and

492

PX 170 (Donziger Notebook).
493

PX 172 (Donziger Notebook) (emphasis added).
494

PX 252 (Order by Dr. Cecilia Armas Erazo de Tobar in Preliminary Criminal Investigation).

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requested dismissal of the investigation.495 Despite the prosecutors’ requests, however, Ecuador’s
highest court did not terminate the investigations.496
The court’s action coincided with a political development in Ecuador – the 2006
election of Rafael Correa as president. President Correa’s influence over the judiciary is described
elsewhere. For present purposes, however, Donziger explained the fundamental change that the
election had worked. The LAPs had “gone basically from a situation where we couldn’t get in the
door to meet many of these people in these positions [in the government] to one where they’re
actually asking us to come and asking what they can do. . . .”497 The LAPs “ha[d] connections” with
the new administration, Donziger said. “[T]hey love us and they want to help us . . . .”498
In March 2007, President Correa met with Yanza, Ponce, and others and offered “all
the endorsement of the National Government to the Assembly of Affected by the oil company
Texaco.”499 The following day, the media agent for the LAP team who was present for the meeting
reported to Donziger that:
495

PX 256 (Submission by Dr. M. Vega Carrera in Preliminary Criminal Investigation No. 252004); PX 259 (Filing by W. Pesantez in Cause No. 25- 2004); PX 261(Prosecutor General’s
Ratification of Dismissal of Criminal Action).
496

PX 3000 (Reis Veiga Direct) ¶ 77; PX 258 (Filing by J. German in Preliminary Criminal
Investigation No. 146-2003).
497

PX 16A (Dec. 6, 2006 Crude Clip), at CRS138-01.
498

Id.; see also PX 192 (Donziger Notebook) (“Met interim [Attorney General] with Luis
[Yanza], APV [Ponce], Raul. ‘The door is always open’ he said to Luis – a far cry from the
days of the protests, fighting our way into the halls of power. Think of what has happened
in ten years – how we have gone from fighting on the outside of power, to being on the
inside.”).
499

PX 484R (Mar. 20, 2007 ROE Press Release), at 1 of 3.

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“THE PREZ WAS VERY UPSET AT TEXACO. HE ASKED THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL TO DO EVERYTHING NECESSARY TO WIN THE TRIAL AND
THE ARBITRATION IN THE U.S. . . . THIS SATURDAY HE WILL REPORT ON
THE MATTER ON NATIONAL TELEVISION, OFFICIALLY NOW. AT THAT
TIME HE WILL CLARIFY SEVERAL POINTS IN ORDER NOT TO HURT US
IN THE TRIAL.”500
In a further note, the LAPs’ media agent wrote that President Correa “GAVE US FABULOUS
SUPPORT. HE EVEN SAID THAT HE WOULD CALL THE JUDGE.”501 Fajardo and Prieto met
with ROE officials the following week and asked for assistance in providing President Correa with
a basis for reopening the “investigation for . . . the responsible parties.”502
A month later, President Correa boarded a helicopter with Yanza, Fajardo, and others
and toured the Lago Agrio oil fields.503 He issued a press release that same day calling upon the
“District Attorney of Ecuador to allow a criminal case to be heard against the Petroecuador officers
who approved the” Final Release.504 Donziger, who was in Colorado meeting with Stratus, noticed
that President Correa had not mentioned the Texaco lawyers in his statement and reflected that it
might be the right moment “to ask for the head of Pérez-Pallares [a Texaco lawyer who had been
involved in Texaco’s agreements with the ROE] – given what the President said.”505 He explained
500

PX 844 (Mar. 21, 2007 Email from M. Eugenia Yepez Relegado to S. Donziger re: “report”)
(emphasis in original); see Tr. (Ponce) 2303:20-2304:2.
501

Id. (capitals in original, other emphasis added).
502

PX 54A (Mar. 29, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS-221-02-CLIP-01.
503

PX 487R (Apr. 25, 2007 ROE Press Release).
504

PX 489R (Apr. 26, 2007 ROE Press Release).
505

PX 58A (Apr. 26, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS-268-000-CLIP-01.

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that the President was “basically calling for the heads of government officials that signed off on the
remediation, and he’s totally with us.”506
President Correa took to the radio on April 28, 2007, denouncing the “homelandselling” lawyers defending Chevron-Texaco, “who for a few dollars are capable of selling souls,
homeland, family, etc,” and calling for criminal prosecution of anyone who had signed the
“shameless” Final Release.507
Fajardo met with President Correa again in June 2007. He reported that the president
had informed him that “the current . . . Prosecutor General . . . is . . . a little nervous. Because, since
the political forces of the National Congress have changed . . . he is afraid of being removed. . . . So,
the President thinks that if we put in a little effort at the Public Prosecutors’ office, the Attorney
General will yield, and will re-open that investigation into the fraud of . . . the contract between
Texaco and the Ecuadorian Government.”508
Notwithstanding the pressure from the LAPs and President Correa, the Prosecutor
General refused to re-open the case. But his refusal cost him dearly. He immediately was removed
from office and replaced by Dr. Washington Pesántez – President Correa’s college roommate and
the district prosecutor who previously had recommended the dismissal of the criminal charges twice
before.509 Several months later, however, and following a meeting with Fajardo, Pesántez agreed
506

Id.
507

PX 853 (Apr. 28, 2007 Transcript of Correa Radio Address).
508

PX 75A (June 8, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS376-03-CLIP-01.
509

PX 358 (Nov. 29, 2007 Official Register of the Government of Ecuador: Mandate No. 1 of
the Constituent Assembly), at 3; PX 259 (Mar. 13, 2007 Filing by W. Pesantez in Cause No.

123
to reopen the criminal case.510 Fajardo reported to Donziger on March 11, 2008: “I have an
appointment with the Prosecutor tomorrow morning, we are insisting that he reopen the criminal
investigation against Texaco for the remediation.”511 And a few weeks after that, Fajardo wrote to
Donziger and members the Ecuadorian LAP team: “We received an email from Esperanza
[M]artinez, Alberto Acosta’s advisor . . . . [i]t says ‘on March 25, 2008, the investigation was
reopened, with the objective of gathering new and sufficient information, if applicable, filing a
criminal action.’ . . . . This is urgent . . . let’s get in all possible evidence . . . . If things work out, our
buddy Ricardo could go to jail . . . .”512
While the LAPs were the driving force behind the criminal case, Donziger instructed
his team to deny any involvement in it – and to tell the ROE officials to do the same. He wrote to
the LAP team in August 2008: “We [must] explain to all the ministers and to Correa that they
shouldn’t say ANYTHING publicly about the case except that the government has nothing to do
with it. That is key.”513 And a month later he instructed Fajardo that:
“The party line when the media or anyone else asks about the Prosecutor’s case
should be: ‘The criminal case against Chevron’s lawyers and against public officials
is not our battle. We are totally focused on winning the civil case, which has nothing

25-2004), at 10; PX 261 (Prosecutor General’s Ratification of Dismissal of Criminal Action),
at 12; PX 300 (Reis Veiga Direct) ¶ 96.
510

PX 992 (Mar. 11, 2008 Email from P. Fajardo to S. Donziger).
511

Id.
512

PX 1033 (Apr. 23, 2008 Email string between S. Donziger, P. Fajardo, A. Ponce, J. Sáenz,
J. Prieto, and L. Yanza re: “URGENTE”).
513

PX 1058 (Aug. 11, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to LAP team re: “Problem”)
(emphasis in original).

124
to do with what the Prosecutor does. . . .’ DON’T GET IN THE BATTLE – THIS
IS VERY IMPORTANT IF WE SAY THAT WE AGREE WITH THE
PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, IT COULD BE USED TO UNDERMINE THE
INTERESTS OF OUR CLIENTS IN THE US.”514
Donziger perhaps sought to keep the team’s involvement secret for an additional
reason as well – he realized it could harm him personally. He later wrote to his team in a different
context that “[i]n the US, threatening to file a criminal case to get an advantage in a civil case is
considered a violation of ethical rules of the profession.”515
Over the ensuing years, President Correa’s support for the LAP team grew more
vocal. And while we jump ahead of developments in the lawsuit itself, it is useful to complete the
tale of the attempted criminal prosecution of Texaco lawyers before returning to the civil litigation.
On July 4, 2009, President Correa stated in his weekly presidential radio address that
he “really loathe[d] the multinationals . . . . Chevron-Texaco would never dare do in the United
States what it did in Ecuador.”516 A few months later he stated in a radio broadcast: “Of course I
want our indigenous friends to win.”517
On April 29, 2010, the Prosecutor General’s office issued an opinion formally
accusing Reis Veiga and Pérez-Pallares of the crime of falsedad ideologica.518 The opinion cited,

514

PX 1069 (Sept. 19, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to P. Fajardo and others re: “important
suggestions about the media”) (emphasis in original).
515

PX 8058 (Jul. 18, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to J. Sáenz, J. Prieto, and P. Fajardo).
516

PX 1149 (July 4, 2009 Transcript of President Correa’s Weekly Radio Program).
517

PX 2494 (Sept. 12, 2009 Reuters Article).
518

PX 272 (Prosecutor’s Office Opinion in connection with Instruccion Fiscal No. 09-2008-

125
among other things, the Cabrera Report as evidence of Texaco’s contamination.519 Nevertheless,
on June 1, 2011, the First Criminal Division of the National Court of Justice in Ecuador formally
dismissed the charges.520
President Correa’s alliance with the LAPs and animosity toward Chevron did not go
away with the dismissal of the criminal charges. He since has publicly attacked Chevron in multiple
press releases, television and radio broadcasts, speeches, and presentations throughout the world.521
He has referred to Chevron’s attorneys as “homeland-selling lawyers.”522 He has labeled Chevron
an “enemy of the court.”523 After the Judgment was issued, he praised it has an “historic” ruling524
And, as will be seen, President Correa’s support for the LAP team has been used to benefit
defendants in this case as well.

519

DRR).

Id. at 95.
520

PX 407 (June 1, 2011 Opinion of National Court of Justice, First Criminal Division).
It is more likely than not that this occurred because the pendency of the criminal charges had
become disadvantageous to Donziger and the LAPs in U.S. litigation because it was a factor
in the success of Chevron and the former Texaco lawyers in obtaining discovery here that
the LAPs wished to prevent. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK),
2013 WL 646399, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2013) (describing circumstances).
521

E.g., PX 7511 (Aug. 17, 2013 Agence France-Presse Article); PX 7516 (Sept. 14, 2013 Tr.
of Pres. Correa Statement); PX 7518 (Sept. 16, 2013 El Telegrafo Article); PX 7519 (Sept.
17, 2013 El Telégrafo Article); PX 7520 (Sept. 21, 2013 Tr. of Pres. Correa Statement); PX
7526 (Sept. 28, 2013 Tr. of Pres. Correa Statement).
522

PX 853 (Apr. 28, 2007 Tr. of Pres. Correa’s Weekly Radio Program).
523

PX 7511 (Aug. 17, 2013 Agence France-Presse Article).
524

PX 2503 (Feb. 19, 2011 Ultimahora Article).

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VII.

The Third Phase of the Lago Agrio Case – 2009-2010: Evidence of the Cabrera Fraud
Begins to Come Out, Kohn Leaves the Case, New Financing Is Found, and the Case
Proceeds in Lago Agrio
Up to this point, this opinion has proceeded more or less chronologically. In 2009,

however, important sequences of events, each with its own relevant chronology, began taking place.
In order better to explain the facts, this section addresses the important sequences, each in its own
chronological order. But it is important to bear in mind that everything that went on during this
period – in Ecuador, the United States, and elsewhere – was interrelated.

A.

Donziger’s Assumption that What Happens in Ecuador, Stays in Ecuador
Relatively early in the Lago Agrio case, Donziger made a critical assumption. He

assumed that Chevron never would be able to obtain evidence of what transpired in Ecuador.
Evidence that he thought so appears in a June 2006 exchange he had with Atossa Soltani, head of
Amazon Watch, that was recorded by the Crude film makers.
On that occasion, Donziger and Yanza – with the cameras recording every word –
related to Soltani their plans for creating what they called a private army, ostensibly to protect the
court against corruption, a euphemism for surrounding the court with LAP supporters to pressure
it to do what they wished. For present purposes, however the important part of the conversation was
this exchange between Soltani and Donziger:
“SOLTANI:

Do you guys know if anybody can, uh, subpoena these
videos? That is a – how do you [unintelligible]

DONZIGER:

We don’t have the power of subpoena in Ecuador.

SOLTANI:

What about U.S.? These guys . . . [referring to the film
makers]

127
DONZIGER:

An army – it’s not an armed army– it’s a group of people to
watch over the court . . .

SOLTANI:

I just want you to know – I just want you to know that it’s –
it’s illegal to conspire to break the law.”

Following a round of laughter, Donziger responded that “[n]o law’s been conspired to be broken.”525
Donziger’s belief that Chevron would not be able to obtain discovery from Ecuador
has proved true to a large extent. Indeed, defendants repeatedly have refused to produce documents
from Ecuador, claiming that Ecuadorian law prevents them from doing so. And this in serious
respects has impeded Chevron’s efforts to litigate its case. But the assumption that what happens
in Ecuador, stays in Ecuador fails to the extent that one hires an American film crew to capture
many of his litigation-related moves over the course of three years in Ecuador and the United States.
And it did not account for the fact that certain of the important players in this case – most notably
the Crude film makers, Stratus, and Donziger himself – were U.S. residents and therefore subject
to U.S. rules of discovery.
Beginning in 2009, Chevron began obtaining subpoenas under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to
require production of documents and testimony from persons in the United States who had relevant
evidence. Thus, while defendants did not produce meaningful discovery from Ecuador, Chevron
obtained some evidence of what transpired there.

B.

The Release of Crude
The documentary film called Crude was made because Donziger in 2005 recruited

525

PX 68A (June 6, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS-350-04-CLIP-02.

128
film maker Joe Berlinger to portray the LAPs’ case against Chevron.526 The film featured Donziger
quite prominently. Donziger provided Berlinger, cameraman Mike Bonfiglio, and other crew
members expansive access to himself, his team and some of its activities for nearly the next three
years.527 The ultimate product, Crude, first was released in January 2009.528
The Crude team’s independence from Donziger and the LAPs’ lawyers – to the extent
there was any at all – was limited.529 For one thing, Donziger recruited the film’s main source of
funding: his former classmate Russell DeLeon.530 As Donziger wrote: “R[u]ss is funding the case.
Russ is funding the movie. And Russ wants to fund more cases and more movies.”531 Through his

526

Berlinger testified in a related proceeding that “During the summer of 2005, a charismatic
American environmental lawyer named Steven Donziger knocked on my Manhattan office
door. He was running a class-action lawsuit on behalf of 30,000 Ecuadorian inhabitants of
the Amazon rainforest and was looking for a filmmaker to tell his clients’ story.” Chevron
Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 302-03 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Application of
Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)) (emphasis omitted).
527

The video was shot in Ecuador and in the United States during the period approximately
January 2006 through September 2008. PX 1 (Crude Annotated Tape Log).
528

Tr. (Donziger) 2567:22-25.
529

Donziger often instructed Bonfiglio and Berlinger to stop filming when he did not like what
was being said. E.g., PX 46A (Mar. 4, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS197-00-CLIP 3. In the
months leading up to Crude’s release in January 2009, Donziger and Fajardo were in close
contact with Berlinger and Bonfiglio – to discuss budgeting, to coordinate press strategy, and
to ensure that the film makers and the LAP team were putting forth the same message.
Donziger wrote to Bonfiglio that “there will be certain questions asked of us that you might
want to advise us on how to position – such as funding sources, questions of bias, etc. [W]e
need to show independence from each other but we should be on the same page as to how
that will play out.” PX 1090 (Dec. 23, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to M. Bonfiglio).
530

PX 203 (Donziger Notebook).
531

Id.

129
creation and sole ownership of a production company called Crude Investment, Inc., DeLeon
contributed approximately 60 percent of the film’s total funding.532
Nonetheless, just as they had done with Cabrera, Donziger and his team attempted
to create the appearance that the film was independent, while they controlled or influenced its
content from behind the scenes. Ironically, this ultimately contributed to the “outing” of their true
role with respect to Cabrera.
In December 2008 –one month before Crude first was exhibited – Donziger received
a director’s cut of the film.533 One scene showed Dr. Carlos Beristain – a member of Cabrera’s
supposedly neutral staff – working directly with the LAPs and their lawyers, including Donziger.
Donziger requested that Berlinger delete the Beristain images and other material.534 Fajardo made
the same request to Bonfiglio, emphasizing that if the scene with Beristain were left in the film, “the
entire case will simply fall apart on us. . . . Those two guys [Beristain and Adolfo Maldonado,
another supposed neutral] must not appear in the documentary at all! Please, remove them from it.
It really isn’t much, but it can complicate the entire case for us.”535
Berlinger and Bonfiglio initially did not comply, and the film – with the Beristain

532

PX 4900 (Dahlberg Direct) ¶ 97.
533

Donziger Dec. 22, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 1569:16-19; PX 2465 (Dec. 13, 2008 Email from S.
Donziger to A. Woods re: “tell me what u think of this”). Donziger testified that he sent this
list also to Berlinger. Donziger Dec. 22, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 1570:21-1571:5.
534

Donziger Dec. 22, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 1571:6-1572:2. The list included also a note that the
film’s “scene of me [Donziger] telling Trudie [Styler] to only use Texaco is gratuitous and
not necessary.” PX 2465 (Dec. 13, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to A. Woods re: “tell me
what u think of this”).
535

PX 1091 (Dec. 25, 2008 Email from P. Fajardo to M. Bonfiglio).

130
scene – was shown at a film festival.536 But Fajardo persisted, again imploring Berlinger and
Bonfiglio to “remove the images” of Beristain “before the film is shown more widely, and before
it is sold to a distribution company.”537 He explained that the images were “so serious that we could
lose everything . . . . ”538 Berlinger ultimately removed the Beristain images from the scene, and
they were not included in the version released on DVD.539 They were left, however, in the version
of the film that streamed over Netflix. Someone at Chevron noticed.
The deleted images seemed to Chevron to confirm its suspicion that Cabrera had been
neither neutral nor independent. Parenthetically, the attempt to have them removed evidenced the
Donziger and Fajardo’s awareness that their relationship with Cabrera and his staff had been
improper and, indeed, could prove fatal to the Lago Agrio case. As Fajardo wrote, “we could lose
everything.”

536

PX 1097 (Jan. 22, 2009 Email from P. Fajardo to M. Bonfiglio).
537

Id.
538

Id.
539

PX 1097 (Jan. 22, 2009 Email from J. Berlinger to M. Bonfiglio and A. Spiegel).

131
C.

The Section 1782 Proceedings
1.

The Section 1782 Action Against Stratus – Denver Counsel Withdraw and
Donziger and Fajardo Seek to Obstruct Justice Before the Federal Court

In December 2009, Chevron brought a Section 1782 proceeding against Stratus and
related individuals in the District of Colorado.540 It argued that discovery was appropriate because
similarities between the Cabrera Report and documents published by people working with Stratus,
as well as documents produced by Stratus in a mediation proceeding, suggested that Stratus had
written all or at least part of the Cabrera Report.541 It contended that it was entitled to discovery to
determine the degree to which that in fact was so as well as the LAPs’ involvement in the process.542
Realizing that disclosure of Stratus’ documents would reveal the LAP team’s
relationship with Cabrera, the LAPs’ lawyers immediately sought to (1) prevent Chevron from
obtaining discovery from Stratus, and (2) minimize the effects of any discovery that it might obtain.

a.

Donziger Retains U.S. Counsel to Represent the LAPs in Denver

Shortly after Chevron filed the Colorado Section 1782 action against Stratus,
Donziger retained attorneys John McDermott of Denver firm Brownstein Hyatt Faber Schreck, LLP,
and Jeffrey Shinder of the New York City-based Constantine Cannon firm as counsel for the LAPs

540

Chevron v. Stratus Consulting, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 00047 (D. Colo.).
541

Id., DI 2 (Chevron Corp. Mem. in Support of § 1782 Application), at 8 & n.7.
542

Id.

132
to oppose the Section 1782 petition.543

Donziger assured them that Cabrera had been an

“independent” “court-appointed Special Master.”544 And Shinder, whom Donziger sought to interest
also in the much larger engagement of seeking to enforce the Ecuadorian judgment that the LAPs
already expected, testified that:
“the purported independence of the expert [Cabrera] was important in our [i.e., his
and Donziger’s] conversations. It was of obvious significance. It was of significance
to me in evaluating the possibility of being enforcement counsel that the process had
integrity and it was the kind of process that would withstand scrutiny should we take
that judgment and try to enforce it in an American court, and that the expert was
supposedly independent and had done a review of the evidence that had procedural
integrity was consequential and something we discussed.”545
So, before agreeing to represent the LAPs, Shinder wanted to know if anything Chevron had alleged
in its Section 1782 application was true. He met with Donziger in New York City in January 2010
to discuss the proceeding and his potential retention.
Shinder observed that Donziger was “worried, borderline sort of panicked over” the
1782 proceeding.546 Shinder asked him:
“[‘]Steven, what am I going to find?[’] I need access to the facts. [Donziger] denied
[Chevron’s] allegations. And the facts as he portrayed them to me were that
Chevron was trumping up this allegation that Stratus had essentially ghostwritten the
543

PX 1213 (Jan. 23, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to J. Shinder); PX 2356 (Feb. 26, 2010
Email from E. Engelhart to S. Donziger re: “Chevron petition”) (attaching draft engagement
letter); Donziger Dec. 29, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 2353:17-2354:21, 2381:15-18.
544

Tr. (Shinder) 1262:2-9; PX 7608 (Jan. 19, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to J. McDermott),
at 14; PX 1241 (Mar. 5, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to J. Shinder), at 2 of 4 (“selection
of Cabrera was made independently by the court,” “Cabrera conducted dozens of
independent site inspections and lab analyses”).
545

Tr. (Shinder) 1262:14-23.
546

Id. 1272:21-22.

133
Cabrera report by sort of drawing improper inferences from materials that had been
properly submitted to Mr. Cabrera through the process in Ecuador, that Cabrera had
independently taken in those materials, and independently chose to incorporate them
into his report. . . . I had been told that there was no, quote unquote, relationship
between Stratus and Mr. Cabrera. That to the extent there were any similarities
between the Cabrera report and work that Stratus had done, that that was the result
of Mr. Cabrera’s independent judgment . . . . ”547
A few weeks after their New York meeting, Donziger sent Shinder a list of
“responses to allegations that Chevron was making against the Lago Agrio plaintiffs and in,
particular, Cabrera and his report.”548 The list contained several purported responses to what
Donziger called Chevron’s “misrepresentations” about the Cabrera Report:549
“Fact: The Amazon Defense Coalition (ADC) [i.e., the ADF] has never made any
payments to Dr. Cabrera, or any other court official, beyond what has been required
by court under Ecuadorian procedural rules to satisfy the costs of the trial. . . .
Fact: The Cabrera report is an independent review and assessment of the
voluminous evidence in the case. Some small analyses provided by the parties
through regular court procedures were adopted by Cabrera after his own independent
assessment determined they were technically sound and consistent with the evidence.
This process is entirely proper, routine, and consistent with the practice of judges and
experts in the United States and other countries. . . .
Fact: Representatives of the ADC never conducted Dr. Cabrera’s field work or
prepared samples for him. During the course of Dr. Cabrera’s site assessments both
sides were allowed to observe his work and suggest places for his team to sample for
evidence of contamination. . . .”550

547

Id. 1268:17-1269:21.
548

Id. 1275:5-7; PX 1224 (Feb. 9, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to J. Shinder re: “interested
in your thoughts”).
549

PX 1224 (Feb. 9, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to J. Shinder re: “interested in your
thoughts”).
550

Id.

134
These assertions were false or misleading. The LAPs did pay Cabrera outside the
court process via the ADF secret account.551 Cabrera was not independent. And the LAP team,
through Stratus, performed all or much of “his” work. But Shinder did not know any of that at the
time. He relied on Donziger’s representations that Cabrera had been independent and neutral. He
did, however, ask Donziger about the “small analyses” that apparently had been provided to Cabrera
by the parties.552 Donziger told him that the LAPs had provided to Cabrera “approximately 3,000plus pages of documents . . . [c]onsistent with the process that had been set up, that the court had
approved, both parties had an opportunity to submit materials to Cabrera, and the plaintiffs had
properly availed themselves of that opportunity and sent 3,000-plus pages to Cabrera.”553 Shinder
requested that Donziger provide those materials to him. He never did.554

b.

Beltman Discloses the Truth to Shinder – Denver Counsel Withdraw

Nonetheless, relying on Donziger’s representations about Cabrera’s independence

551

Amazon Defense Coalition seems to have been used interchangeably with Amazon Defense
Front in references to the Frente de la Defensa de la Amazonia. E.g., PX 2389R (Hugo
Camacho Naranjo’s Objections and Responses to Chevron Corps’ First Set of Requests for
Prod. of Documents) ¶ 31; PX 700 Defin. 5; PX 1504 (included papers).
552

Tr. (Shinder) 1276:2-11.
553

Tr. (Shinder) 1276:4-10; see also PX 1244 (Mar. 8, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to J.
Shinder and L. Minnetto) (“With respect to the Stratus documents . . . we have determined
that a package of material (approx. 3,000 pages) was submitted by local counsel to the court
in early 2008 in response to a court order asking both parties to turn over any materials they
thought might assist Cabrera in carrying out his mandate. While we do not know (yet)
precisely what documents may have been submitted, all documents would only have been
submitted directly to Cabrera to assist him in preparation of his report . . . .”).
554

Tr. (Shinder) 1276:12-15.

135
and the propriety of the Report, Shinder entered into a retention agreement with Donziger and the
LAPs and set to work.555 He soon set up a day of meetings in Colorado with individual Stratus
personnel, the last of which was with Doug Beltman.556 Shinder testified that the interview with
Beltman was scheduled to last two hours, and he
“need[ed] every minute of the two hours to interview him. I had sort of accumulated
some sense during the day, although it was incomplete, and certainly paled in
comparison with what I heard from Mr. Beltman, that Stratus’s involvement in the
Cabrera report was much deeper and much more problematic than had been
characterized to me. I approached the interview in a way, I wanted to maintain a
kind of collegial, conversational tone so Mr. Beltman and I could develop a good
rapport, which I think was achieved. I asked him a lot of detailed follow-ups,
contextual follow-ups on things, a lot of questions about his time in Ecuador, how
he met Mr. Cabrera, Stratus’s work in terms of what they were doing on the case.
And over time and the climax, if you will, it was about an hour and 45 minutes in,
it became a very forthcoming interview, and about an hour and 45 minutes in he
essentially, quite explicitly . . . admitted to having written significant portions of the
Cabrera report.”557
And once “the truth came out . . . there were additional . . . lurid details that [Beltman] admitted to,
such as Stratus had essentially . . . ghostwritten the Cabrera report, then Stratus acting as experts for
the plaintiffs wrote comments to their own work, and then wrote the Cabrera report’s responses to
their own comments.”558 Beltman told Shinder that “everything he did was sort of under the

555

PX 1255 (Mar. 15, 2010 Email from A. Woods to L. Minnetto, J. Shinder, and S. Donziger)
(attaching retention agreement).
556

Tr. (Shinder) 1285:12-22.
557

Id. 1288:6-1292:7 (emphasis added).
558

Id. 1292:11-17.

136
instruction and supervision of Mr. Donziger and the lawyers who were handling the case.”559
The following day, Shinder spoke with his firm’s ethics counsel and one of the
managing partners. They “agreed that the firm could not continue to represent Mr. Donziger and
the Lago Agrio plaintiffs.”560 Shinder immediately called Donziger and informed him that the firm
had decided to withdraw.561 He told Donziger that he “thought that to the extent there was an
underlying case to be made regarding the environmental damage in Ecuador, that the conduct that
I learned had irretrievably wounded it, that it could not rely on the Cabrera report since it was not
independent, and I was not his lawyer anymore, so I wasn’t going to counsel him on what, if
anything, to do to try to fix the situation, but it bothered me, and it still bothers me, that we’ll never
know whether or not there was a case to be made against Chevron.”562
559

Id. 1295:25-1296:2.
The testimony of Shinder, Donziger, Stratus attorney Martin Beier, and Beltman conflicted
as to whether Donziger was present during this meeting. See DX 1750 (Donziger Direct)
¶ 104 (not present); Donziger Jan. 29, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 3639:4-8 (same); Beier Dep. Tr. at
83:1-4 (meeting included Beltman, Beier, Shinder, Page); id. at 90:7-11 (meeting included
“Jeff Shinder, Doug Beltman, Aaron Marr Page, Joe Silver. At the very beginning, possibly
before the meeting formally convened, Steven Donziger was there. But he left and was not
present during the interview”); Beltman Oct. 6, 2010 Dep. Tr. at 383:20-21 (Donziger
present).
The Court finds that he was not.
560

Tr. (Shinder) 1298:1-4.
561

Id. 1298:5-8.
562

Id. 1298:21-1299:4; PX 1262 (Mar. 19, 2010 Email from J. Shinder to S. Donziger re:
“Constantine Cannon Withdrawal”).
The Brownstein firm withdrew as well. After Shinder’s withdrawal, John McDermott of the
Brownstein firm asked to speak with him. Donziger gave Shinder permission to speak to
McDermott and told Shinder he could be fully forthcoming about reasons for his withdrawal.

137
Donziger fully understood the significance of Beltman’s revelations given the
falsehoods Donziger and his LAP team repeatedly had told about Cabrera and his report. The very
next day he wrote a second of his infrequent memos to “file” that purported to describe the recent
withdrawals of counsel.563 Indeed, a few weeks later, Donziger drafted a letter to “fellow counsel,”
which he apparently never sent, in which he acknowledged that:
“The traditional Ecuadorian law perspective (which will be asserted by Chevron)
would hold that the level of collaboration between one party and the expert is
problematic and improper in that all court-appointed experts in Ecuador should be
independent. By working so closely with our local counsel and Stratus, Cabrera
violated his duties to the court. Under this perspective, treating Cabrera like a U.S.-

PX 1264 (Mar. 19, 2010 Email chain Between J. Shinder and S. Donziger); Tr. (Shinder)
1301:15-25. Shinder spoke with McDermott two or three days later, and informed him of
what Shinder had learned during his interview with Beltman. Id. at 1302:10-1303:1. On
March 21, 2010, the Brownstein law firm withdrew as well. PX 1269 (Mar. 21, 2010 Email
from J. McDermott to S. Donziger re: “Chevron v. Stratus”). McDermott wrote to Donziger:
“Based upon what we have learned regarding Stratus and Cabrera, including the troubling
information we gathered in our call with you and Andrew [Woods] and conversations with
Jeff Shinder, and our as yet unresolved questions regarding Ecuadorian laws of privilege or
confidentiality of materials submitted to the court, we are in an untenable position.” Id.
563

PX 1270 (Mar. 22, 2010 S. Donziger memo to file re: “Denver action/ethical issues”).
He wrote that “[w]hile Shinder noted that it was not unusual for court experts to adopt
factual findings of the parties, he thought Beltman described a much broader role where
Stratus was preparing materials in conjunction with local Ecuadorian counsel to be used
and/or adopted by Cabrera in his report.” The memo went on to state that Shinder had
“made these conclusions without being aware of various court orders in Ecuador asking for
the parties to turn over materials to Cabrera to assist him in the preparation of his report, or
being aware generally that the parties in the Ecuador litigation . . . generally work very
closely with the parties.” Id. It claimed also that Donziger was “unclear whether the facts
a[s] described by Beltman would be considered acceptable or improper by an Ecuadorian
court. . . . [and] whether the role of Stratus was consistent with Ecuadorian rules and
procedures, per representations by local counsel.” Id. In fact, however, there were no such
uncertainties in Donziger’s mind. He had chosen Cabrera for the global expert position
because Cabrera would cooperate with the LAPs. He and Fajardo procured his appointment
by coercing Judge Yánez. They had caused Stratus to write all or most of his report and then
falsely passed that report off – both to the court and to the world press – as the independent
work of a neutral, court-selected expert. The Court finds that he had no illusions about the
impropriety of what he and his colleagues had done.

138
style expert as we did [and even that is questionable] will be seen as a violation of
local court rules. Whether the court will see these facts as no big deal, improper,
some sort of procedural defect that can be corrected, or (as the [Chevron] lawyers
will surely assert) a fraud is uncertain. Our side believes we can weather the storm
with good advocacy in both the court and the media, in Ecuador and in the U.S.
However, it was not lost on us that our local counsel seemed concerned about how
the information would land in Ecuador and what impact it would have on the case,
and to them personally. They fully expect that Chevron would refer the information
to the national prosecutor for action.”564
But he once again tried to justify his actions by referring to another perspective that allegedly had
been offered by unidentified “local counsel,” viz.:
“that given the customs and practices of the Aguinda case, nothing improper
happened. The information in the Cabrera report is sound, and is consistent with the
high quality of work that Stratus has done as a world class environmental
consultancy. As you know, all of the court appointed experts in the judicial
inspections have been working closely with the parties in one form or another for
several years with full knowledge of the court, and Cabrera was no different.
Chevron’s experts, including U.S. citizens appointed by the judge at Chevron’s
request were working with Chevron’s counsel. Even though Cabrera was not an
expert put forth by the parties, given that the plaintiffs unilaterally sought the global
expert report and are paying him, that Chevron boycotted the process, and that the
court ordered the parties to turn over materials to Cabrera and otherwise assist him
then the role of local counsel and Stratus was well within our rights and custom
under the rules and practices of the Aguinda case as they had evolved since its
inception almost seven years ago.”565
And this indeed was essentially the position that Donziger took at trial, where he argued that his
belief in the second “perspective” justified the LAP team’s actions with respect to Cabrera. He
contended also that, while he was unsure at the time, he now believes “the process used to create
the executive summary of the Cabrera report was fundamentally consistent with Ecuador law. . . .”566
564

PX 1291 (Donziger Memo to “Fellow Counsel”).
565

Id.
566

DX 1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶ 91.

139
Donziger’s attempt to cover himself in his memo by reference to “another
perspective,” and his comparable position at this trial, are fabrications and unpersuasive even in their
own terms. They are fabrications because he received no alternative perspective from local counsel,
identified or otherwise.567 They are fabrications because no “customs and practices of the Aguinda
case,” even if there had been any comparable practices, could have justified what was done with
Cabrera. If similar things were done with comparable experts, they all were wrongful; their
acceptability did not improve with the volume of misconduct. They are fabrications because there
were no comparable practices. Yes, lawyers work with their own experts, both here and probably
in Ecuador. That is accepted because everyone knows that party-nominated experts are selected and
paid by their clients. That built-in bias is above board and considered in evaluating the testimony
of party-paid experts.568 But Cabrera was a court-appointed expert, sworn to be independent and
impartial. And Donziger fully understood that Cabrera was neither independent nor impartial –

567

Fajardo understood that the collusion between the LAP team and Stratus on the one hand and
Cabrera on the other, not to mention the manner in which Cabrera was appointed and paid,
was improper. As we have seen, he implored Bonfiglio and Berlinger to remove the images
of Beristain and Maldonado from Crude precisely because the presence of those images
could lead to discovery of what really had happened. And he was under no illusion that
there was any benign explanation for that. He told Bonfiglio that if the images of Beristain
and Maldonado were left in the film, “the entire case will simply fall apart on us . . . . Those
two guys [Beristain and Adolfo Maldonado, another supposed neutral] must not appear in
the documentary at all!” PX 1091 (Dec. 25, 2008 Email from P. Fajardo to M. Bonfiglio).
He explained that the images were “so serious that we could lose everything. . . . ” PX 1097
(Jan. 22, 2009 Email from P. Fajardo to M. Bonfiglio).
As we will see momentarily, Prieto and other lawyers in the LAPs’ Ecuador office were even
more aware of the improprieties that had been committed.
568

There is only one respect in which Cabrera was even arguably comparable to a partynominated expert in either country. Although he was court-appointed, the LAPs were
responsible for providing the Court with funds to pay him through an open process described
above. The secret payments, however, were improper.

140
Donziger was personally responsible for making sure that he was neither and for having him paid
under the table, above and beyond the open, court-approved payments. Moreover, it was Donziger
who decided to ghostwrite the Cabrera Report using his own paid consultants and to hide and
misrepresent the facts concerning the Cabrera-Stratus-LAP relationship.
In sum, Donziger knew at every step that what he and the LAP team did with Cabrera
was wrong, deceptive, and illegal.

c.

Fajardo Submits a Misleading Affidavit in Denver and Elsewhere

The District of Colorado granted Chevron’s Section 1782 application for the issuance
of a subpoena on March 4, 2010.569 The LAP team, realizing that production by Stratus was
extremely likely in view of that ruling, was anxious to “minimize the effects” of the court-ordered
production of Stratus’ documents.570 In one of those blinding rays of candor that can occur even in
clouds of lies, Prieto, one of the LAPs’ lawyers in Ecuador, wrote to Donziger, Fajardo, and others
on March 30, 2010 as follows:
“Today Pablo [Fajardo] and Luis [Yanza] were kind enough to tell us what was
going on in Denver, and the fact that certainly ALL will be made public, including
correspondence . . . . Apparently this is normal in the U.S. and there is no risk there,
but the problem, my friend, is that the effects are potentially devastating in Ecuador
(apart from destroying the proceeding, all of us, your attorneys, might go to jail),
and we are not willing to minimize our concern and to sit to wait for whatever
happens. For us it is NOT acceptable for the correspondence, the e-mails, between

569

Chevron v. Stratus Consulting, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 00047 (D. Colo.), DI 22.
570

PX 1279 (Mar. 30, 2010 Email from J. Prieto to S. Donziger, P. Fajardo, L. Yanza, and J.
Sáenz).

141
Stratus and Juanpa [Sáenz] and myself to be divulged.”571
Thus, Prieto recognized that the disclosure of Stratus’ documents would reveal what actually had
gone on between Cabrera and the LAPs, that this disclosure would “destroy[] the [Lago Agrio]
proceeding,” and that “all of us, your attorneys, might go to jail.” Nor was he alone in this view –
Brian Parker, then an intern at the Selva Viva office, was told by other lawyers working on the case
that the Cabrera Report “would be worth zilch” and that Donziger “might get in trouble or lose his
license.”572 So Prieto implored Donziger and Fajardo to prevent the disclosure of the emails between
Stratus, Sáenz and himself.573
Prieto had reason to worry. Less than a month after the District of Colorado granted
Chevron’s Section 1782 application against Stratus, Chevron filed a 1782 application against
Berlinger (the “Crude 1782”), seeking the issuance of subpoenas for the outtakes from the Crude
film.574 More will be said on the Crude 1782 below. For present purposes it is important to note
only that, even with production from Stratus imminent, this filing created the added possibility that
Chevron would obtain footage of Cabrera and members of his team working directly with members
of the LAP team.
The LAP team quickly developed a plan to “cleanse” the Cabrera Report in Ecuador
– that is, to provide an alternative evidentiary basis for the Lago Agrio case against the possibility
571

Id. (emphasis added).
572

Parker Dep. Tr. at 136:1-5.
573

Donziger much later tried to put a very different spin on Prieto’s “go-to-jail” email. We
conclude below that his attempt was untruthful. Infra Facts § XI.A.3.b.iii.
574

In re Chevron Corp., 10 MC 1 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y.), DI 1 (filed Apr. 9, 2010).

142
that the Cabrera Report would be stricken or discredited or be relied upon as evidence of fraud in
a foreign court where the LAPs would seek enforcement of any favorable judgment. The idea was
to have a new expert or experts repackage, or cleanse, the Cabrera Report. But the LAPs needed
to delay the Section 1782 proceeding in Denver as long as possible in order to do that. So, a month
after the District of Colorado granted Chevron’s Section 1782 petition, the LAPs filed a motion for
a protective order with respect to the subpoena. They claimed that the subpoenaed documents and
testimony were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and work product
protection.575 The motion later was supported by a declaration of Pablo Fajardo (the “Fajardo
Declaration”).576
The Fajardo Declaration purported to explain to the Denver court what had happened
with the Cabrera Report and that it was acceptable under Ecuadorian law. The LAPs’ American
lawyers debated what the affidavit should reveal and whether Fajardo should be the one to sign it.
When a lawyer from Patton Boggs – a firm that had been brought on by the LAPs in early 2010 and
the involvement of which will be discussed more fully below – circulated a draft of the affidavit
to Donziger and other lawyers on May 3, 2010, one lawyer from Emery Celli Brinckerhoff &
Abady, LLC, which also represented the LAPs, responded:
“I don’t quite get the purpose of this affidavit. Pablo mentions one document
submission [to Cabrera] but not the other. If he’s submitting an affidavit about what
happened, why omit the most important part? It seems misleading at best. I just don’t
see how he can sign an aff. that documents his submissions to Cabrera without
mentioning that he sent documents that originated from Stratus which is the one
thing the judge is going to want to know . . . . [And] I wouldn’t emphasize too much
that Cabrera was independent and court-appointed. Once [Fajardo] says that in an
575

Chevron v. Stratus Consulting, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 00047 (D. Colo.), DI 68.
576

Id. DI 99 (filed May 5, 2010).

143
American court, we’ll never be able to back off from it.”577
Another LAP American lawyer expressed his concern that Fajardo might “be subject
to deposition[.] This is why we struggled with who would sign the declaration. If Steve [Donziger]
signs, he will most certainly be deposed. Same for any other counsel in the US. We figured that with
[Fajardo], they likely would not slow down the process by deposing him.”578
The Fajardo Declaration that ultimately was filed gave an anodyne description of the
process by which the judicial inspections had been terminated, the global expert proposal adopted,
and Cabrera in particular selected. It stated that “[i]n addition to the information collected from the
vast amount of field inspections he performed, Mr. Cabrera was also free to consider materials
submitted to him by the parties. Both plaintiffs and Chevron were asked to supply Mr. Cabrera with
documents.”579 It stated also that “to the extent that Mr. Cabrera put into his report any of the
information that [Fajardo] supplied to him, it would be viewable by Chevron or any other member
of the public that reviewed Mr. Cabrera’s Report.”580
The Fajardo Declaration was highly misleading. It failed to mention that Fajardo,
with Donziger’s approval, had threatened the judge with a misconduct complaint unless the judge
agreed to their demands to cancel the LAPs’ remaining judicial inspections. And while it

577

PX 1319 (May 3, 2010 Email from I. Maazel to others) (emphasis added).
578

PX 1316 (May 3, 2010 Email from E. Westenberger to others).
579

PX 1326 (Fajardo Decl.) ¶ 16.
580

Id. ¶ 19.

144
acknowledged that the LAPs had “delivered materials to Mr. Cabrera,”581 it did not mention the
March 3, 2007 meeting at which the LAPs laid out the plan for Cabrera’s Report and indicated, in
Cabrera’s presence, that the work would be done by them. Nor did it reveal that Stratus and the
LAPs’ counsel in fact had written most of the Cabrera Report. In other words, it omitted what the
Emery Celli lawyer said was “the most important part”—that Fajardo “sent documents that
originated from Stratus.”582 The declaration similarly neglected to report that the LAPS “chang[ed]
the focus of [Cabrera’s] data at [their] offices.”583 And it, of course, failed to disclose that the LAPs
had made secret payments to Cabrera outside the court process.
Notwithstanding the Fajardo Declaration, the District of Colorado denied the LAPs’
motion for a protective order and ordered Stratus to turn over its documents.584 Following the ruling,
however, the LAP team – including Donziger – brainstormed ways to delay further the production
of Stratus’ documents and, realizing that production was inevitable, to mitigate its effects. One of
the LAPs’ American lawyers sent an email to the LAP team emphasizing that “Stratus will be under
a court order to produce all materials it gave Cabrera. Stratus will not risk a contempt motion, it will
comply. Unless we want the Stratus/Cabrera revelation to come out in CO, which seems like the

581

Id. ¶ 18.
582

PX 1319 (May 3, 2010 Email from I. Maazel to S. Donziger, E. Westenberger, A. Wilson,
E. Yennock, J. Abady, E. Daleo, and J. Rockwell re: “Draft Affidavit”).
583

PX 883 (July 17, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to L. Yanza and P. Fajardo).
584

See Chevron Corp. v. Stratus Consulting, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 0047, DI 154 (filed May 25,
2010).

145
worst possible place, we need to make our submission in Ecuador and fast.”585 Another lawyer
responded, “[w]hat about the following? Appeal; move for stay; if we win with [the District of
Colorado] great; if we lose, we produce whatever we want (narrow read); [Gibson Dunn] complains
and then we move for clarification. If we lose again, we think about another appeal.”586 In other
words, delay.
The “submission in Ecuador” to which the lawyer referred was a petition the
American legal team had been drafting and planned to file –in Fajardo’s name –in the Lago Agrio
court (the “Fajardo Petition”).587 The Fajardo Petition, which Donziger characterized as a “very
general and admittedly less than adequate statement,”588 was filed with the Lago Agrio court on June
21, 2010.589 It informed the court that the LAPs had made submissions to Cabrera but did not
“confess to having authored specific portions of the report.”590 It conceded, however, that the LAPs
had given Cabrera “proposed factual findings and economic valuations of the environmental and

585

PX 1363 (May 27, 2010 Email chain Between S. Donziger and Patton Boggs Attorneys re:
“Mini-revelation”).
586

Id.
587

PX 384 (Fajardo Petition).
588

PX 1382 (June 20, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to U.S. lawyers re: “important update on
Ecuador submission”), at 2-3.
589

PX 384 (Fajardo Petition).
590

PX 1371 (June 14, 2010 Email from J. Abady to U.S. lawyers re: “Current Thinking on
Ecuadorian Submission”).

146
other damages Texpet’s practices and contamination caused.”591
It thus went farther than the Fajardo Declaration filed in Denver. But that too was
deceptive. There was no disclosure of the fact that Cabrera was handpicked by Donziger because
he would cooperate with the LAPs, that the report was planned and written by the LAPs and Stratus,
and that Cabrera “play[ed] ball” by simply affixing his name to it, acting all the while under the false
pretense – fostered by the LAPs – that the report was Cabrera’s independent work.
Nonetheless, the LAPs later told U.S. courts that, in filing the Fajardo Petition, they
had “fully disclosed” their relationship with Cabrera. The LAPs filed the Petition twice in this Court
and once in the Second Circuit.592

2.

The New York 1782 Proceedings – Berlinger and Donziger

Following the start of the Stratus 1782 proceeding, Chevron brought two more
Section 1782 actions in New York.
The first was against Berlinger. It sought, among other things, production of the out
takes – the video shot in connection with the making of Crude that was not included in the film.593
That discovery was ordered and the decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals.594 The record here

591

PX 384 (Fajardo Petition), at 6-7.
592

PX 2514 (filing in Second Circuit); PX 2515 (filing in 10-MC-00001); PX 2516 (filing in
10-MC-00002).
593

See In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011).
594

Id.

147
contains important evidence from those out takes, which were contemporary recordings of the words
and deeds of Donziger and his allies both in Ecuador and in the United States.
The other Section 1782 proceeding brought in New York was against Donziger. It
sought to compel production of documentary evidence and testimony. Although Donziger and the
LAPs resisted fiercely, this Court ordered the requested discovery, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.595 Donziger was obliged to produce a trove of documents and emails relating to the Lago
Agrio case and to give a deposition. Much of the evidence in this case was obtained in that
proceeding.

3.

The LAP Team Sought to Deceive This Court in the Berlinger 1782
Proceeding

The LAPs filed the misleading Fajardo Declaration in fifteen Section 1782
proceedings in courts across the United States, including this one.596 But perhaps their first act of
deception in this Court occurred in April 2010, when Chevron sought discovery from Berlinger.
As noted, Chevron filed the Crude 1782 petition on April 9, 2010. Five days later,
Donziger prepared his draft letter to “fellow counsel,” in which he admitted that the LAP team’s
contacts with Cabrera violated the “traditional Ecuadorian law perspective.”597 Despite this
admission by Donziger, his co-counsel offered a completely different explanation to this Court.

595

In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Lago Agrio
Plaintiffs v. Chevron Corp., 409 F. App’x 393 (2d Cir. 2010).
596

See PX 1326-1340, 2479 (Fajardo Decls.).
597

PX 1291 (Donziger Draft Letter to “Fellow Counsel”).

148
On April 23, 2010, the LAP team filed its opposition to the Crude 1782, describing
the Beristain meeting with Donziger as an “innocuous meeting, which is of no relevance to anything.
. . .”598 This, of course, was untrue. As discussed, Fajardo had emailed Berlinger and Bonfiglio
shortly after the film first was exhibited, explaining that the presence of the images of Beristain and
Maldonado were “so serious that we can lose everything”599 and that Beristain “must not appear in
the documentary at all” or “the entire case will simply fall apart on us.”600 But at a hearing on April
30, 2010, counsel for the LAPs repeated this falsehood. He told the Court that Chevron’s
application for production of the out takes was “frivolous” because the meeting with Beristain was
“unimportant,” akin to a group of New York lawyers attending a party together.601
Notwithstanding the LAPs’ misrepresentations, the Court granted Chevron’s
application for discovery from Berlinger on May 6, 2010 and was affirmed on appeal. Berlinger
produced 600 hours of raw footage to Chevron. The out takes included footage of the LAP team’s
March 3 meeting with Cabrera, scenes of the LAPs’ representatives – including Donziger – meeting
ex parte with Ecuadorian judges602 and lengthy statements by Donziger in which he expressed his
highly critical view of the Ecuadorian judicial system. Some of these scenes have been discussed

598

In re Chevron Corp., 10 MC 00001 (LAK), DI 24 (filed May 13, 2010), at 8.
599

PX 2454 (Aug. 3, 2010 Email between S. Donziger and J. Berlinger re: “GRACIAS”).
600

PX 1090 (Dec. 25, 2008 Email from P. Fajardo to M. Bonfiglio).
601

In re Chevron Corp., 10 MC 00001 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2010), Hr’g Tr. 39:16-20;
40:20-23.
602

See PX 1 (Crude Annotated Tape Log).

149
already and some will be mentioned below. It is important to note here, however, that the revelation
of these scenes came at around the same time Stratus began producing documents to Chevron.
Donziger and his co-counsel knew by then that they could no longer deny what had happened with
Cabrera, and they knew they had to figure out a way to salvage their case.
But before we get to that, there is another story that must be told. The full extent of
the LAPs’ contacts with Cabrera threatened to surface even before the Section 1782 applications
were filed. And Chevron’s allegations were causing serious strife within the LAP team between
those who always were aware of the truth underlying the Cabrera Report (Donziger, Fajardo, Yanza,
and others) and those who intentionally were kept in the dark, most significantly, Joseph Kohn.

D.

Donziger Deceives Kohn, Refuses His Demand for an Investigation of the Facts With
Respect to Cabrera, and Precipitates a Final Break
As far as Donziger was concerned, Kohn’s role in the Lago Agrio case was to pay

for it. Kohn largely acquiesced for years; he was not involved in the day-to-day decisions and
actions and relied on Donziger to keep him apprised of important events. Donziger, however, was
selective with what he told Kohn and when he told him, and he actively misled him in important
respects. This led to a break in relations and is important for several reasons.
First, Donziger misled Kohn, his financial backer and supposed co-counsel,
concerning the Cabrera Report and related matters. This demonstrates his full awareness that what
transpired between and among Donziger, the LAP Ecuadorian lawyers, Cabrera and Stratus had been
highly improper. It is further evidence that Donziger’s claim that he believed otherwise is untrue.
Second, the manner in which Donziger dealt with Kohn further confirms that
Donziger was in entire control of the Lago Agrio case and all related activities.

150
Third, the break in relations between Donziger and Kohn resulted in the loss of
Donziger’s principal financial backer and led to the search for another. That search in turn quite
possibly resulted in still further deception of a financing source and led to the appearance on the
scene of Patton Boggs LLP.

1.

Donziger Misrepresented to and Concealed From Kohn Important
Information Regarding Cabrera and Stratus

As discussed previously, Donziger and Kohn formally retained Stratus in the spring
of 2007.603 Kohn, in accordance with the Stratus contract, understood “that materials prepared by
Stratus on behalf of the Ecuadoran plaintiffs would be ‘for submittal to the court,’ on the record, and
that the global damages expert would then review and consider whether to accept, or reject, or rely
upon in some way any or all of Stratus’s findings in his own report.”604 But he was kept in the dark
about most of what was important regarding Cabrera – the LAPs’ role in selecting him, securing his
appointment, and ensuring that he would cooperate with them – and about Stratus’ true role.
Kohn and Donziger did agree in the spring of 2006 that “it would be best to limit or
end the judicial inspections and move onto the second evidence-gathering phase of the litigation:
the global damages expert report and final submissions.”605 But Donziger did not tell Kohn that
Donziger and “his Ecuadoran co-counsel vetted candidates to be the global damages expert prior to
the court ordering the end of judicial inspections and the beginning of the court expert phase of trial.
603

PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 29; PX 633 (Aug. 20, 2007 Stratus Contract), at 1-9.
604

PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 29 (quoting PX 633 (Aug. 20, 2007 Stratus Contract)).
605

Id. ¶ 27.

151
[Kohn] was not aware that Fernando Reyes was one of the candidates Mr. Donziger and his
Ecuadoran co-counsel vetted. [He] was not aware that Fernando Reyes suggested to Mr. Donziger
that he choose Mr. Cabrera to be the court expert.”606
Nor did Donziger inform Kohn that Donziger, the Ecuadorian LAP lawyers, and their
U.S. technical consultants met with Cabrera on March 3, 2007 to plan out Cabrera’s “work.”607 He
was not told that Stratus actually was writing the report to be submitted under Cabrera’s name.608
Indeed, Kohn believed – based on statements by Donziger – that “at all times, the Ecuadoran
plaintiffs’ consultants’ materials were being submitted publicly to the Ecuadoran court through a
proper, legal process consistent with Ecuadoran law.”609
Kohn did learn that, “[e]ven before the Cabrera Report was filed in 2008, Chevron
representatives began suggesting that Mr. Cabrera was not an independent expert. [Kohn] raised
these allegations with Mr. Donziger on several occasions. [But] Mr. Donziger consistently denied
[that] there was anything improper in connection with Mr. Cabrera, or that there was any basis for
Chevron’s allegations that Mr. Cabrera was not independent.”610
After the Cabrera Report was filed, Donziger continued to deceive Kohn regarding
606

Id. ¶ 73.
607

Id. ¶ 74.
608

Id. ¶ 31 (Kohn “did not review drafts of Stratus’ work being submitted in Ecuador. [He did]
not recall reviewing any draft documents beginning with ‘I, Richard Cabrera.’ [He] was not
involved in any discussions about Stratus’s work being attributed to Mr. Cabrera or
otherwise being used in a non-transparent manner.”).
609

Id.
610

Id. ¶ 50.

152
Stratus’ role and the propriety of the LAP team’s collaboration with Cabrera. In the days following
the issuance of the Report, Donziger sent to Kohn several press releases, some in draft form, all of
which referred to Cabrera as an “independent” expert.”611 And while Kohn was aware that Cabrera
filed a second, supplemental report that increased his damages estimate by $11 billion, Donziger did
not disclose to Kohn that Stratus had written the supplemental report.612

2.

Donziger Deceives Kohn About the “Secret” Account

While he was misleading Kohn about the Cabrera operation, Donziger and other
members of the LAP team continued to pump him for money. “[B]etween June 2005 and November
2009, KSG [the Kohn firm] made approximately 51 separate wire transfers from [its] U.S. bank
account to [Selva Viva’s primary account at] Banco Pichincha . . . in amounts ranging from $10,000
to $100,000.”613 In 2007, however, Donziger began referring in emails to Kohn to a second account
at Banco Pichincha.614 He asked Kohn to transfer money into this second account on three occasions
in 2007 and 2008.615 When Kohn’s assistant asked Donziger why he wanted the money transferred
to a new account, Donziger explained that it was because the payments involved “separate case-

611

PX 1023 (Apr. 1, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to J. Kohn); PX 1032 (Apr. 4, 2008 Email from
S. Donziger to J. Kohn).
612

PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 33.
613

Id. ¶ 37.
614

Id. ¶ 38; PX 897, 917, 965, 968, 984 (Emails to Kohn Referring to Second Selva Viva
Account).
615

PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 38.

153
related piece[s] of work that [are] being run by the Frente [i.e., the ADF] . . . . This separate account
will be used for [the] same purpose under the same control of the Frente and Yanza, and will be
accounted for the same way with receipts.”616
We now know that this second account had a special purpose. It was the “secret”
account the LAPs set up in order surreptitiously to pay Cabrera outside the court process.617 But
Donziger did not tell Kohn that – in fact, he led Kohn to believe that Cabrera was being “paid
directly by the court . . . as is customary and required in Ecuador.”618 Thus, “[i]n accordance with
. . . instructions from Mr. Donziger, [Kohn] wire transferred $120,000 total from its U.S. bank
account to this second account in Ecuador on August 15, 2007 ($50,000), September 17, 2007
($50,000), and February 12, 2008 ($20,000).”619 As noted, $33,000 of that money was transferred
directly from the secret account into Cabrera’s account without Kohn’s knowledge just before
Cabrera formally was named.620

616

PX 897 (Aug. 14, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to J. Kohn, K. Wilson, K. Kenny re:
“Critical money transfer”).
Kohn testified that he understood that the “second account was simply an administrative or
ministerial matter, no different from any business or firm having more than one bank
account.” PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 39.
617

The record is silent as to what other covert purposes, if any, it served.
618

PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 30.
619

Id. ¶ 38.
620

See supra Facts § V.C.1.

154
3.

Donziger Refuses to Cooperate With Kohn’s Demand for an Investigation Independent of
Donziger
By late 2008, Kohn was worried about the likelihood of obtaining a judgment in the

plaintiffs’ favor and of enforcing such a judgment if it were obtained. Chevron’s allegations
concerning the Cabrera Report were surfacing.621 As will be detailed below, Chevron had begun to
allege that the judge presiding over the Lago Agrio case had been caught on video accepting a
bribe.622 And, despite prior assurances from Donziger that a judgment would issue in Ecuador by
2006 or 2007,623 the case seemed to “be dragging on indefinitely.”624 Kohn attempted to take a more
active role.625
Donziger “rebuffed these efforts.”626 He “refused to provide [Kohn] with copies of
his files, including all the court filings [Kohn] had requested; he cancelled or postponed meetings
at the last minute; and generally he refused to substantively engage with [the Kohn firm].”627 He
repeatedly attempted to “prevent [Kohn lawyers] from meeting with members of the Ecuadoran
legal team by first delaying or rescheduling meetings, and then ultimately stating [that Kohn

621

PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶¶ 20, 50.
622

Infra Discussion § IX.B.2.
623

PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 20.
624

Id.
625

Id.
626

Id.
627

Id. ¶ 54.

155
lawyers] were not allowed to speak directly with the Ecuadoran legal team.”628 When Kohn in early
2009 suggested a meeting with the Ecuadorian legal team to discuss the final brief the LAPs would
submit to the Lago Agrio court, Donziger “kept putting it off and even became irate when a lawyer
in [the Kohn] firm . . . communicated with Mr. Sáenz directly.”629 Sáenz “appeared to acquiesce to
this control, telling” the Kohn firm “Steven is our point of contact, so please coordinate with him
about the best way to proceed.” 630 And in a memorandum to Kohn and others at his firm, Donziger
made clear that he was the boss and that the Kohn firm would not be allowed to step on his toes:
“It is critical that you understand the larger context of how this effort is being
managed and thereby understand how [the Kohn firm] can best add value. The legal
and political ‘space’ around this case in both Ecuador and the U.S. has been
intricately constructed over the last several years by those involved on a fulltime
basis. The process is managed by myself, Pablo Fajardo, and Luis Yanza. All of us
work on this on a full-time basis and we speak among ourselves frequently. We also
manage [t]he client relationships and in my case I have raised significant funds for
both the case in chief and ancillary activities. All activities from [the Kohn firm]
must be coordinated through this process, which in practice means coordinated
through me.
*

*

*

Given this context, the ‘value added’ of the [Kohn] team needs to be focused on
discrete tasks within the existing structure, not overall management of this complex,
delicate, intricate and multi-cultural process. The learning curve at this point is way
too great to even start down that road. . . .That said, your input and thoughts are
valued and I have no doubt your contributions can be immense if you are willing to
work within this structure and complete tasks (such as legal research, draft reports)
by specific deadlines and be real about what you can and cannot do. But be clear: I
am not going to consult with each of you on each and every aspect of this effort,
unless you want to come work out of my office on a fulltime basis, which I am sure
628

Id.
629

Id. ¶ 55.
630

PX 1185 (Nov. 13, 2009 Email from J. Sáenz to L. Yanza, P. Fajardo, and J. Kohn).

156
you would rather not do. . . .”631
Kohn and other lawyers at his firm repeatedly expressed their frustration among
themselves and to Donziger at his refusal to provide them with information about what was going
on in Ecuador, or to allow them to be meaningful participants in the decision-making process. This
frustration eventually led to Kohn’s withdrawal from the case. But there was another event in
particular that precipitated the withdrawal.
Kohn was becoming aware of Chevron’s allegations concerning the LAPs’ contacts
with Cabrera.632 Fearing that their case was in jeopardy, Kohn proposed to Donziger that they retain
an American lawyer to conduct an investigation, on behalf of the LAPs but independent of Donziger
and the LAPs’ Ecuadorian team, into “Chevron’s allegations of misconduct by the Ecuadoran
plaintiffs’ team,” including the Cabrera Report.633 He suggested Kenneth Trujillo – a Spanishspeaking former Assistant United States Attorney and former City Solicitor of Philadelphia,634 to
“make inquiries into what knowledge members of the [LAP] legal team . . . may have of
improprieties involving the judge and/or government or ruling party officials, as well as with respect
to allegations leveled by Chevron Corporation, the defendant in that litigation, of improper contacts

631

PX 1146 (July 2, 2009 Memo from S. Donziger to Kohn team re: “Activity Going
Forward”) (emphasis added).
632

PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶¶ 50-52. Kohn testified that he participated in two mediation
sessions with Donziger and attorneys for Chevron in late 2007 and early 2009. At both of
those sessions, Chevron’s attorneys “asserted that the Ecuadoran plaintiffs’ team had
improper contacts with Mr. Cabrera.” Id. ¶ 52.
633

Id. ¶ 22.
634

Id.; PX 1155 (draft retention agreement with K. Trujillo).

157
between members of Aguinda legal team and various Ecuadorian judges, court-appointed experts,
or government officials.”635
Kohn testified that Donziger initially appeared receptive to the idea of hiring an
independent investigator and that he, Donziger, and Trujillo participated in at least one conference
call to discuss Trujillo’s possible engagement.636 A few days later, however, Donziger emailed
Kohn to say that he did not think going forward with an investigation was a good idea.637 Donziger
wrote:
“I talked to Pablo and Luis about your idea of hiring the former prosecutor for the
purposes you described. There is a consensus such a move would be adverse to the
client’s interests and unwise for a host of reasons. Neither I, nor the legal team in
Quito, will cooperate with such an investigation nor continue working with a firm
that insists on doing such an investigation. I can explain details when we talk. If
you go forward with retaining somebody for this purpose, please notify me
immediately so I can notify the clients.”638
Kohn did not go forward with retaining Trujillo because he knew that an investigation would be
ineffective without Donziger and the Ecuadorian legal team’s cooperation.639
Squabbles occur among co-counsel for all sorts of reasons and that they rarely are
subjects of interest or concern to courts. This one, however, was different. Donziger blocked

635

PX 1155 (draft retention agreement with K. Trujillo).
636

PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 22.
637

Id.; PX 1156 (Sept. 4, 2009 Email from S. Donziger to J. Kohn re: “idea to retain a
lawyer”).
638

PX 1156 (Sept. 4, 2009 Email from S. Donziger to J. Kohn re: “idea to retain a lawyer”)
(emphasis added).
639

PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 22.

158
Kohn’s efforts to become more involved, and especially blocked the suggestion that a lawyer
independent of Donziger and the LAP Ecuadorian lawyers look into what really had happened with
Cabrera and other alleged improprieties, in order to conceal to the extent possible the truth about
what had taken place. The Court finds these events probative of Donziger’s consciousness of guilt.

4.

Kohn Cuts Off Funding

Two months after Donziger rejected Kohn’s proposal for the Trujillo investigation,
Kohn informed Donziger that he no longer would pay Donziger’s monthly expenses for his work
on the Lago Agrio case.640 Donziger responded that Kohn had no role on the case other than to pay
for it.641 Kohn replied that, although he previously had
“requested you to adjust your requested monthly figure several times since the work
in Ecuador was reduced and more time was spent here . . . you did not. Since then
you have continued to send us expenses for all travel, meals, staff and anything else
without any thought. In terms of the legal work on the case, you have consistently
tried to exclude us from discussions, meetings etc, including preventing meetings

640

PX 1181 (Nov. 9, 2009 Email Chain Between J. Kohn and S. Donziger).
Donziger and Kohn had a fee sharing arrangement, and Kohn was under no obligation to
pay Donziger’s expenses. Id.
641

Id.
Donziger wrote: “As a general matter, your firm’s primary obligation is to finance the case;
my firm’s primary obligation is to run the case on a day to day basis, maintain relations with
the clients, handle press and political aspects in both Ecuador and the U.S., and make sure
we are set up for an enforcement action and financing going forward. In other words, I am
doing a substantial portion of the actual work. If you break it down by time and value, I think
I am doing the overwhelming amount of work on this case. I am not going to keep doing a
substantial portion of the work AND take over your responsibility for financing while
maintaining our same equity arrangement.” Id.

159
with the lawyers in Ecuador we have been requesting for many months.”642
Kohn stated also that he had “consistently said [he was] willing to discuss proposals for other
funding.”643 He had even identified and spoken with firms that were willing to come in and help on
a “lawyerly and businesslike basis.”644 But Donziger repeatedly declined to respond to Kohn’s offer.
Kohn wrote: “I conclude you are not interested in doing so because you perceive them as our friends
who you could not control, or would not simply take orders from you.”645
On November 10, 2009, Kohn wrote to Fajardo and Yanza regarding the possibility
of further settlement negotiations with Chevron.646 He argued that settlement discussions were
advisable and that a settlement of $700 million would “provide for virtually 100% clean-up” of the
Orienté, as well as funds for other projects.647 Fajardo and Yanza replied that they did not wish to
engage in settlement discussions at that time. They stated that “all budget and strategy decisions
must be made by Mr. Donziger.”648 They also “raised certain issues about slowness in [Kohn’s]
payment of certain bills over time, or that [Kohn] had not funded certain things or met certain

642

Id.
643

Id.
644

Id.
645

Id.
646

PX 1184 (Nov. 10, 2009 Ltr. from J. Kohn to L. Yanza and P. Fajardo).
647

Id.
648

PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 60 (citing PX 1187 (Nov. 19, 2009 Ltr. from J. Kohn to L. Yanza
and P. Fajardo)).

160
commitments.”649
Kohn responded on November 19, 2009, that “[t]he working relationship between
[him] and . . . Steven ha[d] steadily deteriorated over the past years” and that Kohn had “paid all
necessary litigation expenses, as well as many wasteful and unnecessary expenses incurred due to
Steven’s extravagance and decisions.”650 He explained that:
“[B]y far, the largest single component of the ‘budget’ is Steven’s demand for fees
and expenses, and there, in my opinion, lies the root of the current problem, and the
reason why this current crisis arises . . . . At the same time as we have spent
enormous sums of money on the case, Steven has denied us access to documents,
information and the legal team, despite our repeated requests. He has made it
impossible for us to effectively discharge our duty as attorneys and has interfered
with the attorney-client relationship.”651
Kohn concluded by stating that “unless or until such agreements are reached, [Kohn] considers that
due to Steven’s influence and interference, there is no longer an attorney-client relationship with our
firm and we will withdraw from any further representation related to the case and notify the vendors
and other appropriate entities of that fact.”652
Several months later, Kohn spoke with Jeffrey Shinder by telephone. Shinder
explained to Kohn that he had withdrawn from representing the LAPs in the Denver Section 1782
proceeding against Stratus and his reasons for doing so.653 Shortly thereafter, Kohn met with

649

Tr. (Kohn) 1463:18-1464:18.
650

PX 1187 (Nov. 19, 2009 Ltr. from J. Kohn to L. Yanza and P. Fajardo).
651

Id.
652

Id.
653

PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 63.

161
Donziger – at Donziger’s request – in New York.654 Donziger asked Kohn if he was “interested in
joining a [new] committee of lawyers representing the Ecuadoran plaintiffs.”655 Kohn replied that
he had spoken with Shinder about the LAPs’ contacts with Cabrera and that he “would not discuss
anything with [Donziger] unless he – and anyone of the Ecuadoran team that had contact with Mr.
Cabrera – ‘came clean’ about what happened with Mr. Cabrera.”656 Donziger admitted to Kohn that
“someone on the Ecuadoran team ‘may’ have provided ‘some’ documentation to Mr. Cabrera, and
if it came out, it could be embarrassing for the Ecuadoran plaintiffs’ team.”657
On April 13, 2010, Kohn wrote to Fajardo and Sáenz, informing them that he had
become aware of “very disturbing recent events related to the case taking place in the U.S.”658
Because “Steven stopped providing [Kohn] with information, consulting with [Kohn], or following
any of [Kohn’s] advice,” he was reaching out to the Ecuadorian lawyers directly.659 Kohn noted,
among other things, that:
“Steven . . . hired other firms to deal with the depositions of Stratus. He informed
me last week, without providing any details or facts, that the information Stratus may
provide will be damaging to the case and highly embarrassing. We have no
knowledge of what he is talking about except what Steven has now reluctantly told
us: that it involves communications with Cabrer[]a, something that surprised us and
654

Id. ¶ 64.
655

Id.
656

Id.
657

Id.
658

PX 1290 (Apr. 13, 2010 Ltr. from J. Kohn to P. Fajardo, J. Sáenz, and L. Yanza).
659

Id.

162
that we find quite disturbing if true. This conduct - the contacts with Cabrer[]a (if
they took place), and the failure to properly oppose or prepare for these depositions,
has and will cause severe damage to the case.”660
Accordingly, Kohn informed the lawyers that Donziger and possibly others needed to withdraw in
order to salvage the case.661 Moreover, the LAPs’ Ecuadorian legal team, he asserted, needed to
open their files to the Kohn firm and allow themselves to be interviewed by an independent
attorney.662
Later in April 2010 – and after the Colorado district court had granted Chevron’s
Section 1782 application with respect to the Stratus documents, but before any documents had been
produced – Kohn met in Philadelphia with Fajardo, Yanza, and Humberto Piaguaje at the
Ecuadorians’ request.663 Kohn asked them about their interactions with Cabrera. Fajardo responded
that they had provided documents to Cabrera in accordance with a court order and that Chevron’s
allegations were false.664 A few days later, on May 3, 2010, Kohn received an unsolicited email
from Fajardo, in which he clarified that he “did not mention [one] detail” regarding “the information
[the LAPs] shared regarding the process in Ecuador.”665 Fajardo wrote that “[b]ased on the same
order of the judge, by which we submitted information to Expert Cabrera, we proceeded to submit
660

Id. at 2.
661

Id.
662

Id.
663

PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 66.
664

Id.
665

PX 1312 (May 3, 2010 Email from P. Fajardo to J. Kohn).

163
a packet of information, mainly the input of Stratus, around the middle of March 2008.”666 Fajardo
assured Kohn that “there is no illegality in the process of delivering information.”667 This email,
quite interestingly, preceded the filing of Fajardo’s misleading declaration in the Stratus litigation
in Denver by only two days.668
On July 29, 2010, Kohn received a letter from representatives of the LAPs purporting
to terminate their attorney-client relationship with the Kohn firm.669
After evidence of the Cabrera fraud and other events began to emerge from Section
1782 proceedings, Kohn “disavowed any financial interest in the Ecuadoran judgment.”670 Kohn
testified at trial: “I relied on Mr. Donziger to tell me the truth about what was going on in the
Ecuadoran litigation . . . and I now know that Mr. Donziger did not tell me the truth. It is now clear
to me that Mr. Donziger deceived and defrauded me, and that, as a result, we continued to pay
millions of dollars to that litigation that we never would have paid had we known the truth.”671

666

Id.
667

Id.
668

Chevron Corp. v. Stratus Consulting, Inc., 10 Civ. 0047, DI 99 (D. Colo. filed May 5,
2010).
669

PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 68.
670

Id. ¶ 25.
671

Id. ¶ 81.

164
5.

Defendants’ Response to Kohn’s Testimony

Donziger for the most part failed to respond to Kohn’s testimony. He did not offer
any explanation for why he had not provided Kohn with accurate information concerning Cabrera,
Stratus, himself, and the Ecuadorian LAP lawyers. His questions to Kohn at trial suggested that
Kohn could and should have taken steps to obtain information concerning Ecuadorian law from
sources other than Donziger, such as hiring an Ecuadorian law expert to investigate the Cabrera
Report.672 Thus, Donziger appeared to argue that Kohn’s failure to learn the truth of what happened
in Ecuador and whether it was proper under Ecuadorian law was his own fault.
That of course is understandable in view of the fact that litigation by Kohn to recover
the money he advanced to Donziger is quite possible.673 And it is not this Court’s function to decide
the merits of any such claim here. But it is its duty to find the facts to the extent they are material
to this case. And it finds that Donziger’s arguments, to the extent they are material here, are not
persuasive.
Kohn had proposed hiring such an expert in 2009, Kenneth Trujillo, but Donziger
and the Ecuadorian lawyers were unwilling to allow him to conduct a meaningful investigation.674
Moreover, whether or not Kohn sought independently to verify the limited information he received
from Donziger does not change the fact that Donziger misrepresented to him vital facts about the

672

Tr. (Kohn) 1448:19-21.
673

Kohn testified that he has “preserved through tolling agreements [his] firm’s right to pursue
litigation to recover amounts paid [to Donziger and Stratus] in connection with the
Ecuadoran litigation.” PX 5600 (Kohn Direct) ¶ 25.
674

Tr. (Kohn) 1449:10-19.

165
case in Ecuador. And when Kohn did try to find out what had gone on, Donziger prevented him
from doing so because, the Court finds, Donziger understood full well that what he and his
associates had done was wrong.
The LAPs called one witness whose testimony differed slightly from Kohn’s on
certain points. Humberto Piaguaje, the “executive coordinator of the asamblea,”675 testified that
Fajardo, Yanza, and Piaguaje, during their April 2010 Philadelphia meeting with Kohn, asserted that
there were “decisions that [Kohn] made that were above the interests of the members of the
assembly for the struggle that they were involved in.”676 According to Piaguaje, the Assembly
subsequently decided to terminate Kohn “[b]ecause he did not abide by some of the things that had
been suggested at the meeting.”677
Thus, through Piaguaje’s testimony, defendants appear to suggest that Kohn was fired
because he was taking actions that the LAPs had not ratified and because he would not abide by his
clients’ wishes. But they fail to mention a single action Kohn took of which they did not approve
(besides his decision to stop funding the case). And they fail to explain how what they describe as
their decision to fire him changes the fact that Kohn repeatedly was lied to about Cabrera and other
important events. Accordingly, the Court does not credit Piaguaje’s claim.

675

Tr. (H. Piaguaje) 2678:10-13.
676

Id. 2698:11-16.
677

Id. 2699:20-24.

166
E.

The Search for New Funding – Patton Boggs, the Invictus Strategy, and Burford
By the end of 2009, Kohn no longer was supporting the lawsuit and the LAPs were

in financial difficulty. Although Donziger had secured a $500,000 investment from Russell DeLeon
in June 2009,678 he knew that much more would be needed to keep the case going. Moreover, the
LAP team’s internal emails make clear that they expected to obtain a large judgment soon – a
timetable that proved inaccurate – and Donziger knew he would need substantial U.S. legal help to
mount a credible enforcement threat. The story of how he found it is important. It led to the
refinement of the enforcement strategy that the LAP team planned to follow to collect the Judgment.

1.

Patton Boggs Is Retained, Develops the Enforcement Strategy, and Obtains
Funding from Burford

As of late 2009, Donziger’s plan for enforcement of the judgment he expected shortly
to obtain was simple – to seek enforcement in the United States. That is what he then told Jeffrey
Shinder, whom he considered hiring to run the enforcement effort.679 But around the same time, he
began working with H5, a litigation services firm in New York, to secure financing.680 In November
678

PX 543 (Jun. 30, 2009 Investment Agreement between R. DeLeon, S. Donziger, and J.
Kohn) § 7.2.
679

Shinder testified as follows with respect to a late 2009 conversation with Donziger: “Q. Did
you come to speak to Mr. Donziger in the fall of 2009? A. Yes, I did. Q. Generally, do
you recall what legal services Mr. Donziger was looking for? A. I do. He was looking for
enforcement counsel, lawyers in the United States who were going to take a judgment that
he anticipated getting from the court in Ecuador and getting it enforced in the United States
against Chevron, and that was the role we were auditioning for. Q. Did you say enforcing
in the United States? A. Yes. Q. Did Mr. Donziger say that to you? A. Yes.” Tr.
(Shinder) 1253:6-18.
680

PX 3100 (Bogart Direct) ¶ 5; PX 541 (Nov. 1, 2009 Ltr. from N. Economou to S. Donziger
and L. Yanza).

167
2009 – the same month in which Kohn officially informed Donziger he no longer would finance the
Lago Agrio case – Nicolas Economou of H5681 reached out to Burford Capital LLC (“Burford”) “to
solicit investment capital for international judgment enforcement activities in connection with the
Lago Agrio litigation.”682 Economou introduced Burford to Donziger, who “described himself [to
Burford] as the lead U.S. lawyer for the LAPs and also the overall strategist behind the
Litigation.”683 Burford “rapidly made it clear that [the Lago Agrio case] was outside its usual
investment parameters and that Burford could only even consider the matter if highly regarded US
litigation counsel were involved.”684
So Donziger – with the assistance of Economou and Burford – expanded the search
for “highly regarded US litigation counsel.” In January 2010, Economou and Burford chief
executive Christopher Bogart had a meeting with Donziger, James Tyrrell, a senior partner of Patton
Boggs, and Eric Westenberger, another partner at the firm.685 In early February, Patton Boggs
proposed to Donziger a “multi-jurisdictional strategy” for “expeditiously delivering the Aguinda
Plaintiffs [LAPs] their due recovery.”686 The proposal called for attacking Chevron “on multiple
fronts – in the United States and abroad.” And the point of the multi-front strategy was explicit:
681

PX 541 (Nov. 1, 2009 Ltr. from N. Economou to S. Donziger and L. Yanza).
682

PX 3100 (Bogart Direct) ¶ 5.
683

Id.
684

Id.
685

Tyrrell Dep. Tr. at 81:13-23.
686

PX 1389 (Response to Request for Information), at 7 of 88.

168
“[S]wift recovery is of paramount importance . . . A thoughtfully crafted, multi-front
approach, not only increases the odds of obtaining expedient and significant
recovery, it also serves the related purpose of keeping Chevron on its heels.”687
The point of the multi-front strategy thus was to leverage the expense, risks, and burden to Chevron
of defending itself in multiple jurisdictions to achieve a swift recovery, most likely by precipitating
a settlement.
Before the month of February was out, Patton Boggs “had secured a leading role in
the [l]itigation, with Jim Tyrrell as the lead partner.”688 “Burford thus began more significant
diligence and commenced commercial negotiations over investment terms.”689
Patton Boggs quickly became heavily involved in the Lago Agrio litigation, both in
the United States and in Ecuador. By July 2010, it had “assist[ed] Ecuadorian counsel in sustaining
and prosecuting plaintiffs’ claims against [Chevron] in Ecuador, and defend[ed] multiple ancillary
28 U.S.C. § 1782 actions across six U.S. jurisdictions.”690 It also had “drafted . . . briefs filed in both
U.S. Courts and the Lago Agrio Court, performed a sizeable document review in connection with
the Colorado § 1782 proceedings [against Stratus]” (although PB did not appear formally in that
action), and led efforts to retain Ecuadorian law experts.691
In conducting its due diligence, Burford largely relied on Patton Boggs to keep it
687

Id.
688

PX 3100 (Bogart Direct) ¶ 6; PX 1391R (July 12, 2010 Ltr. from J. Tyrrell to S. Donziger)
(“PB’s work on behalf of the plaintiffs . . . first commenced in February 2010”).
689

PX 3100 (Bogart Direct) ¶ 7.
690

PX 1391R (July 12, 2010 Ltr. from J. Tyrrell to S. Donziger).
691

Id.

169
apprised of events in the litigation, to assess the merits of the LAPs’ case, and to come up with a
coherent enforcement strategy that would be undertaken once the LAPs received a judgment in their
favor. Moreover, “it was agreed [with Burford during its due diligence] that Patton Boggs would
provide its analysis on . . . [a] judgment enforcement strategy to Burford, and that Burford would
not try independently to perform that work, although Burford remained in close and active contact
with Tyrrell and . . . Westenberger about their work.”692
The enforcement strategy was key to inducing Burford to invest in the case. So
Patton Boggs prepared a document setting forth the LAPs’ plan, a document that was entitled
“Invictus” and that has become known as the “Invictus Memo.”693 The Invictus Memo found favor
with Burford, which was not surprising in light of the fact that Burford had “a special relationship
with and respect for Jim [Tyrrell] and Patton Boggs. . . .”694 In September 2010, Burford’s
investment committee approved the investment and a funding agreement was signed,695 pursuant to
which Burford was to invest a total of $15 million in three separate tranches – $4 million on
November 1, 2010,696 and two subsequent tranches each of $5.5 million. In return, Burford was

692

PX 3100 (Bogart Direct) ¶ 4.
693

PX 2382 (Invictus Memo).
694

PX 2382 (Sept. 5, 2010 Memo from C. Bogart to Burford Investment Comm.), at 3.
695

PX 3100 (Bogart Direct) ¶ 8.
696

Id. ¶ 25; PX 2456 (Nov. 2, 2010 Email from C. Bogart to S. Donziger, N. Economou, and
W. Carmody) (“I confirm that we have funded Patton Boggs’ London account.”).

170
given a 5.545 percent interest the Judgment, less certain costs and expenses.697

2.

The Invictus Strategy

The Invictus strategy is significant not only because Burford relied on it in approving
the investment, but because the LAP team has been carrying it out since the Judgment was rendered
in 2011.
Invictus built on the LAPs’ previous intention to seek to enforce the anticipated
favorable judgment in the United States and the Patton Boggs proposal to Donziger. It set out a plan
to enforce it “quickly, if not immediately, on multiple enforcement fronts—in the United States and
abroad.”698 It noted that “[o]btaining recognition of an Ecuadorian judgment in the United States
is undoubtedly the most desirable outcome.”699 But Invictus recognized also that enforcement in the
United States could prove difficult. It emphasized that “Patton Boggs’ current and former
representation of numerous, geographically diverse foreign governments means that barriers to
judgment recognition in a given country may not necessarily preclude enforcement there.”700 It
further elaborated that “Patton Boggs [would] use its political connections and strategic alliances
to ascertain which nations’ governments are not beholden to Chevron, so as to minimize the prospect

697

PX 552 (Burford Funding Agreement).
698

PX 2382 (Invictus Memo), at 15.
699

Id. at 22.
700

Id.

171
of adverse governmental interference in the enforcement process.”701 And it touted the benefits of
what it called a “keystone” strategy. It explained that:
“proceeding as an initial matter in a jurisdiction housing the highest concentration
of Chevron’s domestic assets would offer certain obvious advantages, including
efficiency. Nonetheless, it is more important for Plaintiffs to proceed initially in a
jurisdiction that promises the most favorable law and practical circumstances. To
that end, Plaintiffs’ Team will identify and potentially target certain ‘keystone’
nations - that is, nations that enjoy reciprocity, or, better yet, are part of a judgment
recognition treaty - with nations that serve as the locus for greater Chevron assets.
For instance, while enforcing western judgments in the Middle East is notoriously
challenging, certain countries in that region have entered into relevant treaties with
European nations. If the Aguinda Plaintiffs are able to obtain conversion of the
judgment in one of those European nations, this may open the door to enforcement
in the Middle Eastern target nation.”702
Invictus noted also that the LAPs would identify Chevron-related entities – such as subsidiaries and
joint ventures – and “target” them with enforcement actions also.703
The Invictus Memo made clear that the LAPs’ enforcement strategy contemplated
an initial multi-pronged attack on Chevron, its assets, and subsidiaries in multiple jurisdictions
outside the United States followed by proceedings here. Although Burford was enticed by the
Invictus strategy, however, it did not stick around long enough to see it implemented.

701

Id.
702

Id. at 21 (emphasis in original).
703

Id. at 26.

172
F.

Fajardo Obtains a Broader Power of Attorney, and Donziger and Fajardo Enter Into
Their First Written Retention Agreements with the LAPs
There is a final point to be made about the Burford story: it led to a broadening of

Fajardo’s power of attorney from the LAPs and the execution of a formal retention agreement
between Donziger and the LAPs. Both are relevant.
On November 5, 2010, four days after he signed the Burford Funding Agreement on
the LAPs’ behalf, Fajardo obtained a new power of attorney (“POA”) from the LAPs.704 The reason,
among others, for the broadened POA was that Donziger had secured funding by promising
investors a share in the LAPs’ recovery from a judgment. The Funding Agreement with Burford
made clear that Burford’s return on its investment would be paid from the LAPs’ share of any
recovery on a judgment net of the portion allocated to the attorneys’ fees.705 Moreover, Donziger
recently had agreed to amend his March 2010 funding agreement with Russell DeLeon by “deleting
the[]reference [of DeLeon’s recovery] to percentage of Attorney Fees” and changing it to “1.75%
of Net Plaintiff recovery.”706 It was unclear, however, whether Fajardo had had the authority under
his previous POA to sign such agreements on the LAPs’ behalf. Indeed, DeLeon had raised that

704

PX 392 (Fajardo Nov. 2010 Power of Attorney), at 1-2.
The new POA was “a broadening or extension of the power of attorney that was previously
granted to [Fajardo], for which reason the [LAPs] ratif[y] and approve[] each and every one
of the actions performed by the attorney Pablo Fajardo Mendoza . . . in . . . legal actions in
. . . court of law, national or foreign, financial or administrative actions and that have been
performed directly or through other persons legally authorized by him for the defense of
his/her interests.” Id.
705

Donziger Jan. 31, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 4075:10-16.
706

PX 1402 (July 27, 2010 Email from R. DeLeon to S. Donziger re: “Amendment to
Agreement”).

173
question with Donziger.707 Nor was that the only such problem.708 In order to address these
concerns and to ensure that the funding agreements with Burford and DeLeon would be enforceable,
the LAP team drafted a broader POA for Fajardo. It drew up also a retention agreement between
Donziger and the LAPs, which was signed in January 2011.709 The retention agreement explicitly
vested in Donziger the responsibility of “coordinating the overall legal strategy of the Plaintiffs to
pursue and defend all aspects of the Litigation.”710
More will be said on this agreement below in connection with other matters. But for
now it suffices to note only this. Although Fajardo, as a matter of form and convenience, signed
Donziger’s agreement in his capacity as attorney-in-fact for the LAPs, the Court finds that no change
in the substance of the relationship was intended or occurred, at least in any time period relevant to
this case. Donziger remained firmly in charge. The paperwork done in early 2011 was undertaken
principally to ensure that the new investors, who were to receive portions of any recovery net of
attorney fees, had a written paper trail that led back to the LAPs individually. While those
concerned with the documentation were at it, Donziger and Fajardo, who both had contingent fee
arrangements, obtained written agreements of their own.

707

Id. (“Does Pablo have authority to sign for [the LAPs]? If so, how can this be clarified?”).
708

Donziger and Fajardo had signed also retention agreements with various U.S. law firms on
the LAPs’ behalf. Donziger Jan. 18, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 3207:1-22.
709

PX 558 (Donziger Jan. 2011 Retention Agreement).
710

Id. at 2.

174
G.

Burford Terminates the Funding Agreement
Burford funded the $4 million first tranche under the Funding Agreement in

November 2010. It never funded the others. On September 23, 2011, Burford informed the LAPs
that it was terminating the Funding Agreement.711 It claimed it had been misled, by Patton Boggs
and Donziger, principally regarding Cabrera.712 There is evidence that Patton Boggs in turn pointed
the finger at Donziger.713
During its due diligence, Burford specifically had asked Donziger and Patton Boggs
whether Chevron’s allegations about the LAPs’ relationship with Cabrera were a cause for
concern.714 Donziger and Patton Boggs assured Burford that they were not. They told Bogart that
the LAPs’ contacts with Cabrera had been “limited” and were “lawful under Ecuadorian law.”715
But subsequent events – including testimony given by Donziger in the Section 1782 proceeding in
this Court – “flatly contradict[ed]” those representations.716 Had Burford known the truth about the
711

PX 1490 (Sept. 29, 2011 Ltr. from Burford to P. Fajardo, El Frente de Defensa de la
Amazonia, S. Donziger, Purrington Moody Weil LLP, and L. Yanza).
712

Id.
713

Tyrrell of Patton Boggs informed Bogart shortly after Donziger’s depositions in January
2011 that Donziger had not “told the truth” to Patton Boggs about the LAPs “voluminous”
contacts with Cabrera when he retained the firm. PX 1473 (Bogart Notes of Jan. 27, 2011
Call with J. Tyrrell). (The notes are received as evidence of Tyrrell’s state of mind but not
for the truth of the matters stated.)
714

PX 3100 (Bogart Direct) ¶ 18.
715

Id. ¶ 38; PX 1490 (Sept. 29, 2011 Ltr. from Burford to P. Fajardo, El Frente de Defensa de
la Amazonia, S. Donziger, Purrington Moody Weil LLP, and L. Yanza).
716

PX 1490 (Sept. 29, 2011 Ltr. from Burford to P. Fajardo, El Frente de Defensa de la
Amazonia, S. Donziger, Purrington Moody Weil LLP, and L. Yanza).

175
Cabrera Report, it asserted, it would not have invested in the Lago Agrio case. Indeed, as Bogart
testified at trial, it “would have walked away immediately.”717 The failure to disclose the truth about
Cabrera, Burford stated, “[i]n addition to breaching the Funding Agreement . . . amount[ed] to
fraud.”718
The question whether Patton Boggs misled Burford concerning the Cabrera episode
one day may be important to a Chevron claim against Patton Boggs in a related action or in any
litigation that may arise between Burford and Patton Boggs. But those cases are not now before the
Court, and the answer to that question is not material to the resolution of this one. Two things are
plain here, however. First, the romancing of Burford led to the development of the Invictus strategy
of proceeding on multiple fronts, especially in foreign courts, rather than bringing a single
enforcement against Chevron in the United States. Second, there is not much doubt that Donziger
misled Burford – either by misstating or failing to disclose material facts – in his determination to
raise money to pay for the litigation.

H.

Donziger and Patton Boggs Try to Fix the Cabrera Problem – the Cleansing Experts
As noted, after the Denver court granted the Section 1782 application against Stratus,

the LAP lawyers knew they no longer could ignore the LAP team’s involvement in drafting the
Cabrera Report, as the truth soon was to be exposed. So they planned to hire a new expert to address
Cabrera’s findings in the hope of providing alternative grounds for the damages evaluation. One

717

PX 3100 (Bogart Direct) ¶ 18.
718

Id. ¶ 36 (quoting PX 1490 (Sept. 29, 2011 Ltr. from Burford to P. Fajardo, El Frente de
Defensa de la Amazonia, S. Donziger, Purrington Moody Weil LLP, and L. Yanza)).

176
of the LAPs’ lawyers explained that:
“The path for an Ecuadorian decision will be simple. We would hope the judge
would say/rule: There has been much controversy surrounding the Cabrera report,
and objections to it. [Perhaps: The court did not anticipate that there was the degree
of collaboration between plaintiffs’ counsel and Cabrera, that there may have been.
Given these issues, the court is not relying on Cabrera for its ruling.] However, the
Court now has additional submissions from the parties . . . The court finds the new
report (demonstrating damages of $—billion) to be persuasive, reliable and accurate
and therefore rules . . . .”719
He stated also:
“Simply put, our local team is convinced that a court ruling – relying solely on
Cabrera – is potentially imminent if we don’t get something on file immediately. .
. . If we cop to having written portions of the report, the details of exactly how that
might have been accomplished will be for another day, when and if the relevant
people are deposed as part of the 1782s, but hopefully by that time, the process of
having both sides cure this with new submissions will be under way and render the
details of the Cabrera report a thing of the past. We will have already admitted that
we authored portions of the report; the details of how that was accomplished might
be inter[]esting for Chevron, but u[lt]imately irrelevant because of our admission and
alternative grounds for a damage evaluation.”720
But the LAP team knew that it had to move quickly. It needed to submit the Fajardo
Petition721 – and convince the court to grant it – before the Lago Agrio court issued a ruling relying
solely on the Cabrera Report. On June 14, 2010, Donziger emailed Tyrrell and Westenberger of
Patton Boggs:
“The Ecuador team is getting nervous that there is an increasing risk that our
‘cleansing’ process is going to be outrun by the judge and we will end up with a

719

PX 1371 (June 14, 2010 Email from J. Abady to E. Yennock, E. Westenberger, E. Daleo,
J. Tyrrell, I. Moll, S. Donziger, B. Narwold, I. Maazel, A. Wilson, A. Celli, N. Economou,
J. Brickell re: “Current Thinking on Ecuadorian Submission”) (brackets in original).
720

Id.
721

PX 384R (Fajardo Petition).

177
decision based entirely on Cabrera. Absent our intervention ASAP, they believe the
judge could issue autos para sentencia in about 3-4 weeks, which would in effect bar
our remedy to the Cabrera problem.”722
The Fajardo Petition was filed one week later.723 It asked the Lago Agrio court to
allow the parties to submit “supplementary information to aid th[e] Court in the process of assessing
the global damages.”724 The court granted the LAPs’ request on August 2, 2010.725 Shortly
thereafter, the American LAP team began “brainstorming” whom they would retain to draft the
supplemental submissions.726 As one Patton Boggs lawyer explained in an email to Donziger and
others, “our new expert will most likely rely on some of the same data as Cabrera (and come to the
same conclusions as Cabrera). . . .”727
Patton Boggs ultimately hired the Weinberg Group to manage the cleansing
process.728 Donziger and Patton Boggs lawyers told the Weinberg Group that “the defendants in the
case had made allegations of veracity of the [Cabrera] report and involvement by another consulting
firm in connection with the independent expert, and that because of these questions of veracity that
722

PX 1370 (Jun. 14, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to J. Tyrrell, E. Westenberger, and E.
Daleo).
723

PX 384R (Fajardo Petition).
724

Id. at 2.
725

PX 387 (Aug. 2, 2010 Lago Agrio Court Order).
726

PX 1410 (Aug. 18, 2010 Email from A. Small to S. Donziger, E. Westenberger and J.
Abady re: “Brainstorming on Expert Issues”).
727

Id.
728

Dunkelberger Dep. Tr. at 10:9-15.

178
they wanted to supplement or have an outside third party look at some of the same data and prepare
a report.”729 Westenberger of Patton Boggs and Donziger told employees of the Weinberg Group
that Cabrera “wrote the report and was an independent expert. . . .”730 The Weinberg Group was not
told that Cabrera had met with the LAPs’ representatives without the Lago Agrio court’s
knowledge.731 And it was not told that Stratus had worked with the LAPs’ lawyers to write the
Report under Cabrera’s name.732
The Weinberg Group recruited a team of experts to work on drafting the cleansing
reports.733 It coordinated the preparation of seven reports, all of which were submitted to the Lago
Agrio court on September 16, 2010,734 and at least some of which were reviewed and commented
upon by Donziger.735 Although the reports purported to “supplement” the Cabrera Report, some of
them relied upon it directly.736 One of the cleansing experts later testified that he was given the
Cabrera Report, which he “accepted . . . at face value and used as a starting point to do [his] own

729

Id. at 51:6-14.
730

Id. at 60:19-61:11.
731

Id. at 250:2-24.
732

Id. at 81:24-82:7.
733

Id. at 91:16-22.
734

Donziger Jan. 30, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 4065:16-22.
735

Donziger Jan. 31, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 4067:11-21.
736

Tr. (Donziger) 2577:4-11.

179
evaluation.”737 Another testified that, based on statements by employees at the Weinberg Group,
it “was [his] baseline understanding” that the Cabrera Report had been prepared by a “neutral”
expert,738 that he relied on the cost and data information provided in the Report, and that his “results
depend, in part, on the accuracy of [the Cabrera Report’s] data series and his cost figures.739 Indeed,
as one Patton Boggs attorney wrote to Donziger, the cleansing should “address Cabrera’s findings
in such a subtle way that someone reading the new expert report (the Court in Lago or an
enforcement court elsewhere) might feel comfortable concluding that certain parts of Cabrera are
a valid basis for damages.”740

VIII.

The Judgment
A.

Its Contents
With the cleansing reports in the Lago Agrio record, the 188-page single spaced

Judgment was issued on February 14, 2011 by then-Judge Zambrano.741 It found Chevron liable for
at least seven categories of harm to the environment and human health. It awarded $8.646 billion
plus another $8.646 billion to be paid unless Chevron issued a public apology within 15 days.

737

Allen Dep. Tr. at 90:4-10.
738

Shefftz Dep. Tr. at 68:14-24.
739

Id. at 63:18-64:9.
740

PX 1410 (Aug. 18, 2010 Email from A. Small to S. Donziger, E. Westenberger, and J.
Abady re: “Brainstorming on Expert Issues”).
741

PX 400 (Lago Agrio Judgment).

180
The Judgment professed to disclaim reliance on the Cabrera Report.742 It stated also
that the author or authors had “not considered the conclusions presented by the experts in their
reports, because they contradict each other despite the fact that they refer to the same reality. . . .”743
The Judgment mentioned some of Chevron’s charges of misconduct by Donziger,
many of which were based on his statements recorded in Crude out takes.744 It characterized his
statements regarding the Ecuadorian judiciary as “disrespectful.” It went on, however, to state that
there was “no record in the case file of any power of attorney granted to him by the plaintiffs . . . .
Therefore, insofar as concerns the merits of his statements, they [a reference to Chevron’s
arguments] are rejected . . . and the Court does not recognize anything that Mr. Donziger might say
or do when he is in front of the cameras or in any other act.”745 Thus, it purported to disregard as
irrelevant all of Donziger’s alleged misconduct, without considering what actually occurred, because
he did not hold a formal power of attorney from his clients.
Finally, the Judgment ordered that the LAPs establish a trust for the benefit of the
ADF “or the person or persons that it designates ” and that Chevron pay the damages awarded to that
trust.746 It directed that the trust’s board of directors be made up of the “representatives of the
Defense Front,” i.e., the ADF, and provided that the board would choose the contractors who would

742

Id. at 49-51.
743

Id. at 94.
744

Id. at 50-52.
745

Id. at 51.
746

Id. at 186.

181
perform the remediation.747 Thus, the Judgment did exactly what the complaint had asked – it put
the ADF in complete control of any proceeds of the Judgment.
Chevron issued no apology. Instead, it filed a motion for clarification and expansion
of the Judgment three days after it was issued.748 It requested further explanation of several of the
Judgment’s conclusions, including the conclusion that Chevron and Texaco had merged and that
Chevron was liable as Texaco’s successor.749 It questioned also the Judgment’s award of punitive
damages, “which are not defined in the Ecuadorian legal system,” and were “completely identical
to the items indicated in the Cabrera Report,” which the Judgment purported to exclude from its
consideration.750
The Lago Agrio court issued a clarification order on March 4, 2011.751 It held inter
alia that “the occurrence of the merger has been proved beyond any reasonable doubt by the public
statements and actions of the representatives of the merged companies”752 and reiterated that “the
Court decided to refrain entirely from relying on Expert Cabrera’s report when rendering judgment
. . . . [T]he report had NO bearing on the decision. So even if there was fraud, it could not cause any

747

Id. at 187.
748

PX 2502 (Chevron Motion for Clarification and Expansion of the Lago Agrio Judgment).
749

Id. at 2-3.
750

Id. at 23.
751

PX 429 (Mar. 4, 2011 Judgment Clarification Order).
752

Id. at 3.

182
harm to” Chevron.753 The clarification order stated that the punitive damage award was based on
Chevron “misconduct during these proceedings” and that it was “in accordance with Article 18 of
the Civil Code” and the “universal principles of law to sanction someone who well deserved it, to
set an example.”754

B.

Chevron’s Ghostwriting and Bribery Claims
Chevron contends that Zambrano did not write the Judgment, that the LAPs prepared

it, and that the LAPs bribed Zambrano to decide the case in their favor and to sign the judgment they
had prepared. The evidence concerning those contentions and its analysis are extensive. The Court
here summarizes its findings before proceeding to the detailed discussion of how it reached them.
The first major point is that the Court finds that Zambrano did not write the
Judgment, at least in any material part. The LAP team wrote it, and Zambrano signed it. The
following sections explain the Court’s bases for that conclusion.
In Part IX.A, the Court examines Zambrano’s trial testimony and finds that it was not
credible. Zambrano neither could recall nor explain key aspects of the 188 page opinion despite his
claim that he alone wrote it. He was a new judge with very little civil experience, so much so that
he admittedly had another former judge ghostwrite orders for him in civil cases. He was unfamiliar
with – and on occasion bewildered by – certain of the most important concepts and evidence with
which the opinion dealt. His testimony was internally inconsistent and at odds with other evidence
in the record. He was an evasive witness. Finally, Zambrano had economic and other motives to
753

Id. at 8-9.
754

Id. at 9.

183
testify as he did. His livelihood, what remains of his reputation after having been removed from the
bench, and perhaps even his personal safety hinged on his protecting the legitimacy of the $18
billion Judgment by claiming authorship.
Having concluded that Zambrano did not write the Judgment, the Court turns in Part
IX.B to the question who did. It examines the overwhelming and unrefuted evidence establishing
that portions of at least eight of the LAP team’s internal work product documents appear verbatim
or in substance in the Judgment. These documents never were filed with the Lago Agrio court or
made part of the official case record. Defendants utterly failed to explain how or why their internal
work product – their “fingerprints” – show up in the Judgment. As will be seen, the most logical
conclusion is that members of the LAP team wrote at least material portions of the Judgment, and
probably substantially all of it, and that they copied from their own internal files in doing so. And
direct evidence from the LAPs’ internal emails – dealt with in Part XI.B.3 – suggests that the LAP
team had been preparing since at least 2009 to write a draft judgment to pass to the judge, this
despite the fact that one of their own Ecuadorian law experts testified that the submission of
proposed judgments to an Ecuadorian judge is improper.
The next question is how it came to pass that Zambrano decided the case for the
LAPs and signed a judgment they prepared for him. The Court in Parts X and XI examines
Chevron’s contention that the Judgment was the result of a corrupt scheme in which the LAPs
promised to pay Zambrano $500,000 from the proceeds of the Judgment in exchange for his
deciding the case their way and permitting them to write the Judgment. In doing so, it details each
of the witnesses’ accounts of what happened in Lago Agrio in the years and months leading to the
Judgment, considers the evidence corroborating or conflicting with each account, and assesses the

184
credibility of each witness. Having concluded based entirely on direct and uncontroverted evidence
that the LAPs wrote the Judgment, the Court credits Guerra’s explanation that they got Zambrano
to sign it by bribing him. Although Guerra’s credibility is not impeccable, that portion of his
account was corroborated extensively by independent evidence. Donziger and Zambrano provided
no credible evidence to support their versions of what transpired.

IX.

The LAPs Wrote the Judgment
A.

Zambrano Was Not the Author
Zambrano testified at trial. He claimed that he “was the one who exclusively drafted”

the Lago Agrio Judgment, that “no one . . . helped [him] to write the judgment,” and that he did all
the research for the Judgment.755 He flatly denied that he considered anything that was not in the
official court record.
The Court rejects Zambrano’s claim of authorship, let alone sole authorship, as
unpersuasive for a host of reasons.

1.

Zambrano Was Unfamiliar With Key Aspects of the Judgment He Signed

Even at the most general level – that is, without considering the inconsistencies
between Zambrano’s deposition (taken days before his trial testimony) and his trial testimony, the
internal inconsistencies in his trial testimony, and the inconsistencies between his testimony and
other evidence – Zambrano was a remarkably unpersuasive witness.
As an initial matter, Zambrano was unable to answer basic questions about the
755

Tr. (Zambrano) 1608:12-16.

185
Judgment that he ostensibly wrote and that he came to New York to defend.
The Judgment states that “benzene . . . is the most powerful carcinogenic agent
considered in this decision.”756 But when Zambrano was asked “what substance the judgment says
is, quote, the most powerful carcinogenic agent considered,” he could not recall.757 Instead, he said
that “[t]he hexavalente is one of the chemicals that if it is exceeded in its limits, it becomes cancer
causing, carcinogenic.”758
Zambrano was asked also which report the Judgment stated is “statistical data of
highest importance to delivering this ruling.”759 He responded “[t]he report by the expert Barros.”760
But the Judgment stated that the “Relative Risk established in” the study entitled Cáncer en la
Amazonía Ecuadoriana “is statistical data of highest importance to delivering this ruling . . . .”761
Zambrano was unable also to recall the theory of causation on which the Judgment

756

PX 400 (Lago Agrio Judgment), at 107.
757

Tr. (Zambrano) 1611:15-18 .
758

He perhaps meant to refer, incorrectly in response to this question, to hexavalant chromium,
which is a different known carcinogen. See id. 1610:21-23.
759

Id. 1613:1-16 (quoting PX 400 (Lago Agrio Judgment), at 134).
760

Id.
761

PX 400 (Lago Agrio Judgment), at 134.
The Judgment does not identify by name the author of the study Cáncer en la Amazonía
Ecuadoriana. Defendants nowhere suggest that Barros was the author this study.

186
relied.762 And, although the English word “workover” appears twice in the Judgment,763 Zambrano
testified that he does not speak English,764 did not know what “workover” means,765 and could not
explain why the word was in the Judgment.766
TPH – which stands for total petroleum hydrocarbons – appears over 35 times in the
Judgment.767 Indeed, the Judgment awards plaintiffs over $5 billion for TPH cleanup.768 But when
Zambrano was asked at his deposition what TPH stands for, he testified that “it pertains to
hydrocarbons, but I don’t recall exactly.”769
Zambrano’s inability to recall every detail of a 188-page decision of course would
not itself prove that he had not written it. But the aspects of the Judgment he was unable to recall
were not insignificant details – they included the identification of a substance for the presence of
which the Judgment awarded $5 billion, the identity of a substance that the Judgment described as
the most powerful carcinogenic agent it considered, and the source of the most important statistical

762

Tr. (Zambrano) 1614:7-10; PX 400 (Lago Agrio Judgment), at 88.
763

PX 399 (Lago Agrio Judgment (Spanish)), at 20-21.
764

Tr. (Zambrano) 1614:11-12.
765

Id. 1712:12-13.
766

Id. 1713:8-11.
767

See, e.g., PX 400 (Lago Agrio Judgment), at 100, 101, 102, 104.
768

Id. at 181.
769

Tr. (Zambrano) 1615:1-10.

187
data. It is extremely unlikely that a judge who claims to have spent many months reviewing the
record770 and to have written this lengthy and detailed decision would not recall such important
aspects – especially when, as will be seen, that Judgment was hailed by the president of Ecuador as
the most important decision in the country’s history. When this is taken together with the evidence
discussed below, it is significant.

2.

Zambrano’s Account of the Preparation of the Judgment Was Self
Contradictory and Implausible

In a declaration submitted to this Court in March 2013, Zambrano stated: “I confirm
that I am the only author of the judgment that I issued on February 14, 2011 . . . . I did not receive
support or assistance from Dr. Alberto Guerra or from any other person . . . .”771 He made the same
statement in a declaration to Ecuadorian prosecutors.772 At trial, however, he testified that he
actually had received assistance from someone else – a Ms. Calva who, he claimed, typed almost
every word of the Judgment as he dictated to her.773 He paid her $15 per day for her transcription
770

Zambrano testified that he set to work on the Judgment right after he began his second tenure
on the case with the benefit of the notes he had made during his brief prior tenure. He
claimed that he read the entire court record in order to render his decision and that he
finished doing so “[w]ay before January 2011 . . . [and] [b]y that time . . . [he] w[as] already
polishing the draft of the judgment.” Id. 1736:21-1737:2
771

PX 6330 (Zambrano Mar. 28, 2013 Decl.) ¶ 14 (emphasis added).
772

PX 6391 (Zambrano Sept. 2013 Decl. to Ecuadorian Prosecutors), at 1 (“I am the only
author of the decision issued on February 14, 2011, that I have not had any help from any
person. . . .”).
773

Zambrano testified: “I would begin dictating by taking a document from here, another one
from over there. So you have an idea as to what the office was set up . . . the cuerpos of the
trial were laid out. On some of them I had the corresponding annotations. On some
occasions I would sit on the piece of furniture that was next to her desk. I would dictate.

188
services.774 Moreover, as his testimony proceeded, he claimed that Ms. Calva did even more.
In fact, Calva’s existence first was disclosed by Guerra. Other aspects of Guerra’s
testimony will be explored more fully below. For present purposes, it suffices to note that Guerra
testified that the daughter of an attorney friend of Zambrano, Arturo Calva, retyped drafts of orders
in the Chevron case into Zambrano’s computer at Zambrano’s office.775 Several days after Mr.
Guerra testified, defendants moved for leave to add Ms. Calva as a witness.776
At that point, Zambrano changed his story. He mentioned Ms. Calva during the
following week, both at his deposition and at trial, claiming for the first time that he had dictated
the entire Judgment to Calva.
In addition to Zambrano’s failure to mention Calva in his declaration and statement,
Zambrano’s testimony at trial regarding her role was internally inconsistent. For example,
Zambrano first testified that “nobody helped [him] do the research [he] needed to do to write and

Other times I would stand up because I would reach for a document or refer to a cuerpo or
some other writing. I wold refer to notes that I had made and in my mind I was developing
the idea I wanted to state so she would type it accurately.” Tr. (Zambrano) 1661:161662:10.
774

Calva was not a court employee. Her father was a lawyer in Lago Agrio who often appeared
before then-Judge Zambrano. Tr.(Zambrano) 1659:23-1660:13. Zambrano hired her at his
personal expense in mid-November 2010, id. 1664:12-15, to help him with the Judgment in
the Chevron case because, he said, “it was a very voluminous trial. [Calva] was an excellent
typist; she was very good at typing. She also know very much about the computing system.
She had just graduated . . . and her mother asked me if she could help me in some kind of
situation, and precisely I needed help. That’s why I made the proposal to her that I could
give her $15 per day, and the mother accepted willingly.” Id. 1818:8-15.
775

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 46.
776

DI 1642 (Oct. 30, 2013 LAPs Mot. to Amend Witness List).

189
author the judgment.”777 But when he later was asked how he had found French, British, Australian,
and American authorities that were cited in the Judgment, Zambrano explained that Ms. Calva, an
18-year old whom he paid $15 per day, was “the one who would go onto the internet. She would
look for a specific subject . . . she would print them out so that I would read them later.”778 In any
case, however, there was no credible explanation of how Calva, as Zambrano claimed, found French,
British, Australian, and American legal authorities on the Internet given that there is no evidence
that she had any legal training or spoke French or English. Nor was there any reasonable
explanation of how Zambrano could “read . . . later,” much less deal intelligently with, any such
French or English language authorities in light of the fact that he reads neither French nor English,
has no legal training in the common law, and even had very little experience with civil matters in
Ecuador.779
Finally, Zambrano was adamant that Calva typed only what he dictated orally to her.

777

Tr. (Zambrano) 1608:14-16.
778

Id. 1616:23-1617:4; see also id. 1619:4-6, 1620:1-4.
Zambrano later testified that he never performed internet searches himself. Id. 1684:7-10
779

Defendants contend that Zambrano did not have to read the French sources cited in the
Judgment because he “copied [them] from [an] Ecuadorian Supreme Court case which went
through and discussed Colombian, Argentinean, and French law.” Tr. (summation) 2902:711. But Zambrano’s testimony at trial suggested that he never actually had read that case.
He was unable to recall its name, the names of the parties, or what it was about – even after
being shown a copy of the decision by defense counsel. Tr. (Zambrano) 1885:1-20,
1887:10-23. And even if the supreme court case could have explained the French language
authorities that are cited in the Judgment, it does not explain the American, English, or
Australian ones. PX 1141 (June 18, 2009 Email from P. Fajardo to J. Prieto, J. Sáenz, and
S. Donziger attaching Torres de Concha v. Petroecuador). It nowhere cites or discusses
cases or law from those countries. Id.

190
He “never show[ed] Ms. Calva any document for her to type from.”780 But the 188-page Judgment
contains many complicated words, citations, and numerical sequences. The sampling data cited in
the Judgment consists of strings of alphanumeric sequences with dashes, periods, underscores, odd
spacing, and parentheses in them. For example:
“con resultados como 3142 y 466 en Auca 1 en AU01-PIT1-SD2-SU2-R(220-240
cm)_sv y AU01-A1-SD1-SU1-R(60-100cm)_sv; 2450 y 876 en Cononaco 6 en
CON6-A2-SE1_sv y CON6-PIT1-SD1-DU1-R(160-260cm)_sv;
154.152,73.6325,70.4021 en Shushufindi 18, en SSF18-A1-SU2- R(O.Om)_sv,
SSF18-PIT2-SD1-SU1-R(1.5-2.0m)_sv; y SSF18-A1- SU1-R (0.0 m)_sv).”781
It is not credible that Zambrano dictated these sequences to Calva orally and that
Calva then typed them exactly into the draft without looking at any underlying document.
Moreover, as will appear, the Judgment contains portions of eight documents from the LAPs’
internal files, many of them in haec verba. Even assuming that Zambrano actually prepared the
Judgment, as he claims, he certainly would not have dictated these pre-existing documents to Ms.
Calva rather than giving them to her with markings indicating exactly what he wanted her to copy.
Of course, Ms. Calva readily could have confirmed or denied Zambrano’s account.
When her name surfaced, the Court granted defendants’ motion to add her as a witness.782
Defendants advised the Court that she had obtained a visa to come to the United States for that
purpose.783 But defendants failed to call her or to explain her absence. While the Court does not

780

Tr. (Zambrano) 1879:23-25.
781

PX 399 (Lago Agrio Judgment (Spanish)), at 109.
782

DI 1681 (Nov. 5, 2013 Lago Agrio Court Order).
783

Tr. 2333:16-2335:10.

191
draw any inference as to the substance of the testimony she would have given, her absence is worthy
of note.
There is still another consideration. Judge Ordóñez began presiding over the Lago
Agrio case on March 12, 2010 and was expected to continue for two years. Chevron moved to
recuse him on August 2010. He opposed the motion, and he was not recused until October 1,
2010.784 Zambrano did not assume jurisdiction of the case as the presiding judge until October 11,
2010.785 Moreover, he did not issue autos para sentencia – the order closing the evidentiary phase
of the case, inviting final argument, and declaring the case ready for decision786 – until December
17, 2010.787 Thus, the intervals between the issuance of the Judgment on February 14, 2011 and (1)
autos para sentencia, (2) Zambrano’s assumption of jurisdiction as the presiding judge, and (3) the
initial recusal were (1) less than two months, (2) about four months, and (3) about six months,
respectively.
The Lago Agrio court record at the point at which the case was decided contained
over 200,000 pages. While the 200,000 page figure no doubt overstates in some measure the part
of the record that remained relevant to a decision on the merits,788 the reasonable conclusion is that
784

PX 6374 (Oct. 1, 2010 Lago Agrio Court Order).
785

PX 2546 (Oct. 11, 2010 Lago Agrio Court Order).
786

Tr. (Zambrano) 1911:2-5.
787

PX 397 (Dec. 17, 2010 Lago Agrio Court Order).
788

Zambrano testified that he read every page of the Lago Agrio record to render the decision
and that this was required by Ecuadorian law. Tr. (Zambrano) 1719:24-1720:16. Even
assuming that reading every page would have been required as a formal matter of
Ecuadorian law, the Court does not find it credible that Zambrano, or many other judges,

192
the relevant part was quite large.789 Moreover, the Judgment is a 188 page, single spaced document
of considerable complexity that purports to rely on innumerable pieces of evidence, many of them
lengthy documents themselves. The preparation of the Judgment in the time available, even
assuming that the author or authors began as soon as Chevron moved to recuse Judge Ordóñez,
would have been a Herculean task for anyone. To have done so without any assistance save an 18year old typist, as Zambrano claimed, would have rendered its accomplishment in the relevant time
period even less likely. And to have done so by dictating orally virtually every word, without the
typist copying anything at all from other documents, as Zambrano claimed, would have made it still
less probable.790 The likelihood that Zambrano would have been capable of doing what he said he
did, much less capable of doing it in the way he said he did it, is quite small.

would have read portions of the record that were not relevant to the decision of the case in
the course of preparing a decision. It implies no criticism of any such omission, which is
a different matter from Zambrano’s apparent lack of candor in claiming that he actually had
done that. Accordingly, the Court finds Chevron’s argument that Zambrano could not even
have read every page of the record during the total time over which he was assigned to the
case (see PX 4200 (Rayner Direct) passim), though quite probably correct, immaterial on
the authorship issue.
789

One of Donziger’s former associates wrote to Sáenz that the Lago Agrio record in January
2010 – more than a year before the case was decided – contained “more than 200,000 pages
of trial evidence, 62,000 scientific analyses produced by independent laboratories
contracted by both parties, testimony from dozens of witnesses, and 101 judicial field
inspections . . . .” PX 1211 (Jan. 7, 2010 Email From L. Garr to J. Sáenz).
790

Zambrano’s contention that he was aided by notes and materials he had collected during his
first tenure on the case, i.e., in the roughly four month period starting in September 2009,
is undermined by the fact he claimed to have destroyed those notes and materials. While
that was understandable in light of Zambrano’s removal from the bench, as he could not
have any further use for them, there remains a lack of anything to corroborate that part of
his story.

193
3.

Zambrano’s Testimony as to the Computer on Which He Claimed the
Judgment Was Entered Was Inconsistent With the Evidence

Zambrano’s testimony as to his alleged authorship of the Judgment was contradicted
persuasively on yet another point by other evidence.
Zambrano testified that the only computer on which he and Calva wrote the Judgment
was the new computer in his office at the Lago Agrio court.791 But this is contradicted by objective
evidence.
On October 24, 2013, a week into trial, defendants moved for leave to call Milton
Efrain Jaque Tarco, a witness not previously identified.792 They explained that Tarco is a police
expert in computer forensics793 and then submitted a declaration signed by Tarco in support of their
motion (the “Tarco Declaration”).794 Tarco there stated that he had been asked to examine and
791

Tr. (Zambrano) 1679:5-7, 1680:3-6; PX 6371 (Tarco Decl.).
792

DI 1601 (Oct. 24, 2013 LAPs Mot. for Leave to Amend the Witness List).
793

PX 6371 (Tarco Decl.) ¶ 1.
794

Id. This statement was admissible against defendants as an adoptive admission by virtue
of their submission of his declaration in support of their motion for leave to call him as a
witness. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B); see also 2 Kenneth S. Broun, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 261 (7th ed.) (“When a party offers in evidence a deposition or an affidavit to
prove the matters stated therein, the party knows or should know the contents of the writing
so offered and presumably desires that all of the contents be considered on its behalf since
only the portion desired could be offered. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that the
writing so introduced may be used against the party as an adoptive admission in another
suit.”); see, e.g., Attorney Gen. of U.S. v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 530 F. Supp. 241, 252
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) aff’d, 668 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding letters written to defendant that
defendant had specifically adopted or incorporated by reference in its reply to the summary
judgment motion admissible under F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(B)); Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 120
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) aff’d, 522 U.S. 801 (1997) and aff’d sub nom. Acosta v. Diaz, 522 U.S. 801
(1997) and aff’d sub nom. Lau v. Diaz, 522 U.S. 801 (1997) (referee’s report admissible
under 801(d)(2)(B) where state legislature submitted it to the Department of Justice in
seeking preclearance under the Voting Rights Act).

194
analyze the “computer equipment . . . that Dr. Nicolas Augusto Zambrano Lozada allegedly used”
to write the Lago Agrio Judgment.795
Tarco explained in his declaration – which, to jump ahead, ultimately was received
in evidence only as to two narrow points796 – that he had been provided with both computers that
had been in Zambrano’s office during the time in which Zambrano claimed he had written the Lago
Agrio Judgment, which Tarco called PC-01 and PC-02.797 He created forensic copies of each of the
computers and analyzed their contents.798 Because “relevant information for [the Judgment] was
found [only] in computer PC-02,” Tarco limited his discussion to that computer.799
Although the Court granted defendants’ motion for leave to add Tarco to their
witness list, defendants ultimately did not call him at trial. There appears to be at least one reason
why they did not.
Tarco’s declaration was received to establish the serial numbers of each of the
computers that had been in Zambrano’s office – PC-01 and PC-02.800 Chevron expert Spencer

795

PX 6371 (Tarco Decl.) ¶ 2.
796

Tr. 2781:20-2789:1.
797

PX 6371 (Tarco Decl.) ¶ 5.
798

Id. A“forensic copy” is “the exact image that is created of all of the data and information
from the hard drives in a computer at a certain moment.” Id.
799

Id. ¶ 6.
800

Id. ¶ 5.

195
Lynch testified, using records obtained from the Lago Agrio court801 and from Hewlett-Packard,802
testified that the computer that the Tarco Declaration identified as the one that contained data
relevant for the Judgment (PC-02) – a file called PROVIDENCIAS – was the older of the two
computers.803 PC-01 – which Tarco stated did not contain any documents relating to the Lago Agrio
case – was the new computer.804 Thus, the Tarco Declaration, insofar as it was received in evidence,
contradicted Zambrano’s testimony that “[i]t was on this new computer that the whole writing of
the judgment was done.”805

801

See PX 4108 (Lago Agrio Court Delivery Record of Furniture and/or Office Equipment); PX
4110 (same); PX 4109 (Lago Agrio Court Department of Fixed Assets Control of Fixed
Assets for N. Zambrano); PX 4110 (Lago Agrio Court Record of Delivery of Furniture
and/or Office of Equipment).
802

See PX 4122 (HP Shipment Detail).
803

Tr. (Lynch) 2808:9-11, 2813:4-13.
804

Lynch determined that the “old” computer was manufactured by HP in October 2006 (PX
4119 (Serial Number & Subassembly Tracking)), and given to Zambrano two years later.
PX 4110 (Lago Agrio Court Record of Delivery of Furniture and/or Office of Equipment);
Tr. (Lynch) 2812:22-2813:3. The new computer – on which Zambrano testified the
Judgment was typed in full – was manufactured by HP in September 2010. PX 4121 (Serial
Number and Subassembly Tracking). The Judicial Council of the Lago Agrio court
purchased the new computer on November 26, 2011. PX 7772 (Ltr. No. AF-001-2013 from
A. Jimenez).
Moreover, the new computer had not even been shipped by HP by October 10, 2010 – the
date on which the Tarco declaration stated that the PROVIDENCIAS file was created. Tr.
(Lynch) 2819:25-2820:5. It was not received by the Ecuadorian Judicial Council until
November 26, 2010, PX 7772 (Ltr. No. AF-001-2013 from A. Jimenez), almost two months
after Zambrano was reassigned to the Chevron case.
805

Tr. (Zambrano) 1679:5-7; see also id. 1658:14-1659:6.

196
4.

Zambrano’s Self Interest

It is relevant to understand also the nature and extent of Zambrano’s personal motives
to support the LAPs and to deny Chevron’s accusations. They are economic and political, and the
two are interrelated.
One personal motive is quite simple – employment. Zambrano had been in
government service almost his entire adult life, first in the Air Force, then as a prosecutor from 1994
until he was appointed a judge in 2008.806 In February 2012, he was removed from the bench for
misconduct.807 In May 2012, the Judiciary Council again found Zambrano guilty of judicial
misconduct in another incident and imposed the further sanction of removal from office to be
“recorded in his personnel file since he [then wa]s no longer part of the judicial branch.”808
Following his removal, he was unemployed.809 Moreover, we infer that Zambrano’s employment
prospects in the legal field were quite limited and that the likelihood that he would be hired by the
government after the Judiciary Council removed him from office as a judge for two incidents of
misconduct was nil.
On January 28, 2013, Chevron filed a motion in this case to which it attached a
declaration by Guerra that set forth his contention that Zambrano had been bribed. On March 13,
806

Id. 1894:25-1902:4; PX 4124 (July 30, 2008 Zambrano Judicial Appointment).
807

PX 411 (Feb. 29, 2012 Order). The Plenary Judicial Council found that Zambrano and
Judge Ordóñez, previously mentioned, overturned a detention order and released from
custody a defendant who had been apprehended in a truck containing 557 kilograms of
cocaine. Id.
808

PX 6321 (May 22, 2012 Order), at 8.
809

Tr. (Zambrano) 1801:23-25.

197
2013, Zambrano provided the defendants with a declaration contesting Guerra’s allegations.810 In
April, Zambrano started a new job as a legal adviser at the Refinery of the Pacific, a venture that is
majority owned by PetroEcuador, the Ecuadorian national oil company.811
This sequence of events gives rise to a strong inference that Zambrano’s employment
was – and remains – directly related to his testimony. Zambrano’s attempt to deny any such
connection only made the connection more likely because of the clumsy way in which he
dissembled about it.812
The likelihood of such a connection is enhanced by the importance of the Lago Agrio
case to the president and government of the ROE. It has been open and notorious in Ecuador for
years that President Correa and the government support the LAPs in the case against Chevron. The
government itself is litigating closely related issues against Chevron in an arbitration.813 On the very
day that Zambrano issued the Judgment, he appeared at a press conference with then-president of

810

PX 6330 (Zambrano Decl.) ¶¶ 1, 14.
811

Tr. (Zambrano) 1792:4-21, 1802:9-1803:7.
812

Zambrano testified that he had never visited the website of the Refinery of the Pacific,
despite that he had been working there for six months. Tr. (Zambrano) 1794:15-19. He was
unaware that he had an email address with the company. Id. 1795:15-17. And he claimed
not to know whether Petroecuador was a majority shareholder of RFP, even though he
admitted that Ecuadorian law requires that Petroecuador must own more than a majority
share. Id. 1793:13-21, 1793:3-8.
813

See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, __ F. Supp. 2d ___, 12 Civ. 1247 (JEB),
2013 WL 5797334 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 2103); Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 949 F.
Supp. 2d 57 (D. D.C. 2013); Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 886 F. Supp. 2d 235, 248
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).

198
the Judiciary Council, Benjamin Cevallos.814 Cevallos praised Zambrano, calling him “a brave
judge, a determined judge, a judge who knows how to fulfill his obligations . . . .”815 And he
congratulated Zambrano for a decision that he described as “a touch of happiness . . . that has been
shared with all of you. This is happiness for all citizens, especially for the indigenous communities
of the Ecuadorian Amazon.”816 A week later, President Correa told reporters that Zambrano’s ruling
was “historic.”817 Yet Zambrano claimed not to recall what had been said at the press conference818
and to have been entirely unaware, even at trial, “that President Correa supported the Lago Agrio
plaintiffs’ case before [Zambrano] issued the Lago Agrio Chevron judgment.”819 But that testimony
is not at all credible.
For one thing, Zambrano was at the press conference, which was a media event at
which a high official of the judiciary lauded him publicly. People understandably forget minor
details of such events, but Zambrano’s claims to lack recollection of an event that likely was a high
point of his career are implausible.
The claim of unawareness of the president’s and the government’s position on the

814

Tr. (Zambrano) 1800:6-10; PX 2500 (Tr. of Feb. 14, 2011 Press Conference).
815

PX 2500 (Tr. of Feb. 14, 2011 Press Conference), at 3.
816

Id. at 4.
817

PX 2503 (Correa says the judgment against Chevron in Ecuador must be respected,
Ultimahora, Feb. 19, 2011).
818

Tr. (Zambrano) 1800:3-1801:4.
819

Id. 1959:18-21.

199
lawsuit is even worse. Chevron’s alegato – its final written argument before Zambrano rendered
the Judgment – argued extensively that the case had been prejudicially influenced by the
government. It made abundantly clear that the government generally and President Correa in
particular supported the LAPs’ case.820 Zambrano swore that he had read this document before he
issued the Judgment.821 Zambrano, contrary to his testimony, was well aware that the Judgment he
issued was just what the president of Ecuador wanted.
The Court finds that Zambrano’s disavowals of memory and of knowledge were
false. The motive for this lack of candor was to attempt to defeat any inference that there was, or
that Zambrano thought there was, a connection between his testimony and his job. But the attempts
fail. The Court finds that Zambrano at least thought that his job would be in jeopardy if he did not
testify favorably to the plaintiffs, and his desire to keep his job strongly motivated his testimony.822
In sum, the Court finds that Zambrano did not write the Judgment issued under his
name. He was astonishingly unfamiliar with important aspects of its contents. His testimony at trial
was evasive and internally inconsistent. He repeatedly contradicted himself when attempting to
explain how he wrote the Judgment, whether he received any assistance, and what materials he
relied upon in doing so. The testimony he gave at trial was markedly different from that which he
820

PX 6405 (Chevron alegato), § 3.8, at 150-163 of 604.
821

Tr. (Zambrano) 1961:4-6.
822

Given this finding, it is unnecessary to determine whether the job actually was given to him
to buy his testimony or, in the vernacular, to “keep him sweet.” The Court does not,
however, credit Zambrano’s claim that he got the job over the Internet. Tr. (Zambrano)
1935: 13-25. He made quite clear at trial that he had limited if any computer skills. If he
is to be believed, he had an 18-year old typist do legal research for him on the computer.
Tr. (Zambrano) 1684:3-11. He did not even know the email address assigned to him at
Refinery of the Pacific. Tr. (Zambrano) 1796:12-14.

200
gave at his deposition just days before. And his responses and explanations at trial varied from one
minute to the next. Not only was his version of events internally inconsistent, it was, as we shall
see, in large respects thoroughly contradicted by evidence that was unrebutted and unexplained by
the defendants. So we turn to the question of who did write it.

B.

Evidence that the LAPs Wrote the Judgment
1.

The LAPs’ “Fingerprints” Are All Over the Judgment

We explain in Appendix I, § I, that the record in the Lago Agrio case consists of the
documents duly filed with the clerk and added to the cuerpos, booklets each containing about 100
pages. Consideration of any other materials, including any materials provided to a judge or court
official informally or ex parte, would have been improper under Ecuadorian law.823
Zambrano stated that he decided the Lago Agrio case824 “[a]ccording to the evidence
that is part of the record. . . .”825 He added that, while documents related to the case that were not
incorporated into the court record occasionally were left at the door of his office in the court,826 he
“always matched [those documents] up with what already existed in the [record of the] case.”827 If
823

Infra App’x I Pages 1-5.
824

That of course is a hotly contested issue and the Court does not credit Zambrano’s claim of
authorship. But Zambrano’s testimony as to what materials properly could have been
considered in deciding the case nonetheless has value, particularly as the thrust of his
testimony was that everything was done with utter propriety.
825

Tr. (Zambrano) 1608:21-22.
826

Id. 1691:3-14.
827

Id. 1692:25-1693:3.

201
the documents were different from those in the record, he discarded them because they were not
“useful” to him.828 Thus, according to Zambrano, he considered only documents that were in the
court record – that is, officially filed by the parties and added by the clerk to the cuerpos.
Chevron exhaustively compared documents produced by defendants in discovery in
this case and in the Section 1782 proceedings, on the one hand, with, on the other hand, the Lago
Agrio court record – the record that Zambrano claimed was the sole source of evidence used in
writing the Judgment. That comparison establishes that portions of eight documents produced by
defendants in discovery – internal work product – appear in haec verba or in substance in the
Judgment that Zambrano claims to have written himself.829 These documents appear nowhere in the
Lago Agrio court record.830
a.

The Fusion Memo, the Draft Alegato, the Index Summaries, the
Clapp Report and the Fajardo Trust Email

The first six of the eight documents – known as the Fusion Memo,831 the Draft
Alegato,832 the January and June Index Summaries,833 the Clapp Report,834 and the Fajardo Trust
828

Id. 1694:15-22.
829

Infra App’x I.
830

Id.
831

PX 435 (Fusion Memo).
832

PX 438 (Draft Alegato).
833

PX 433-34 (Index Summaries).
834

PX 928 (Clapp Report).

202
Email835 – were considered by Chevron Expert Dr. Robert Leonard, who concluded that parts of
them appear verbatim or in substance on 30 pages of the Judgment.836 Some of these inclusions and
commonalities were on important issues, including the question whether Chevron could be held
liable for alleged pre-acquisition torts of Texaco. Even more important, however, they are, as
Chevron’s counsel aptly called them, like “fingerprints.” There is no plausible explanation for their
presence in the Judgment except that whoever wrote the Judgment copied parts of them. This
becomes even clearer when one examines the commonalities between these six LAP internal work
product documents and the Judgment. Examples of these are summarized in exhibits to Dr.
Leonard’s testimony,837 PX 2164 through 2169838 and PX 2170, which “contain[] side-by-side
comparisons highlighting text from the Ecuadorian Plaintiffs’ unfiled work product in the above five
exhibits that appears verbatim or nearly verbatim in the Ecuadorian Judgment.” PX 2164, which
gives “39 examples of plagiarized text from the[se six pieces of the] Ecuadorian plaintiffs’ unfiled
work product that appear[] in the Ecuadorian Judgment,”839 is attached as Appendix II. It and the
video accompanying it are especially helpful in understanding the expert testimony, which the Court
fully credits.

835

PX 437 (Fajardo Trust Email).
836

PX 3700 (Leonard Direct) ¶ 80.
837

Id. ¶¶ 39-79.
838

Id. ¶ 39.
839

Id.

203
Two other internal LAP documents that are not in the record840 but that show up in
the Judgment are referred to as the Moodie Memo and the Selva Viva Database and warrant brief
separate treatment.

b.

The Moodie Memo

On February 2, 2009, a former intern for the LAP team, Nick Moodie, prepared a
memorandum for Prieto and Sáenz regarding “[t]he standard of proof in US common-law toxic tort
negligence claims” (the “Moodie Memo”).841 The purpose of the Moodie Memo was to “provide[]
examples of the plaintiff’s [sic] burden of proof taken from common-law jurisdictions.”842 Both
the Moodie Memo and the corresponding part of the Judgment cite, among other things, American
and Australian tort law in their causation analyses.
There are three striking similarities in both documents’ discussion of and citation to
U.S. law on causation:
•

First, the Moodie Memo discusses the “substantial factor” test, which it
explains was taken from “Californian case law” and requires a plaintiff to
prove that there is a “[r]easonable medical probability that D’s conduct was
a substantial factor in contributing to the aggregate dose of toxic substance
and hence the risk of developing the disease.”843 The Judgment states also

840

The fact that neither is in the Lago Agrio record is established by the testimony of Dr. Juola,
PX 3800 ¶¶ 3, 27 (Selva Viva Database), and Mr. Hernandez (PX 3900) ¶¶ 3, 17-19, 35-36,
39) (Moodie Memo). The Court credits that testimony.
841

PX 1101 (Moodie Memo).
842

Id.
843

Id. at 2.

204
that “substantial factor” is an appropriate test for legal causation.844
•

Second, the Moodie Memo cites the California case, Rutherford v. OwensIllinois, Inc.,845 as reflective of U.S. law on causation in toxic substance cases
and as requiring proof that “D’s conduct was a substantial factor in
contributing to the aggregate dose of toxic substance and hence the risk of
developing the disease.”846 The Judgment, citing Rutherford, also states that
substantial factor requires “that the conduct of the defendant was a factor that
contributed substantially to increasing the dose of harmful substances and
ultimately the risk of developing illnesses.”847

•

Third, the Moodie Memo states that the substantial factor test does not
require that “it was toxic chemical’s [sic] from D’s conduct that actually
produced the malignant growth (due to the ‘irreducible uncertainty of which
particular fibre or fibres actually cause the cancer to begin forming’).”848 The
Judgment states that the substantial factor test means that agents “must be
considered without the need to investigate which of them was precisely the
cause of harm, due to the irrefutable lack of scientific uncertainty about
which of the elements used by the defendant caused the harm.”849

Chevron expert Michael Green, a law professor from Wake Forest University School
of Law “with substantial expertise in the area of causation in toxic tort lawsuits,”850 analyzed the

844

PX 400 (Lago Agrio Judgment), at 89-90 (“Finally, we refer to two theories that have been
developed by Anglo-Saxon case law which refer to causation in harm to human health: the
theory of the substantial factor and that of the most probable cause, which are legal theories
of causation developed in the USA, Australia and England. . . .”).
845

941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997).
846

PX 1101 (Moodie Memo), at 2.
847

PX 400 (Lago Agrio Judgment), at 89.
848

PX 1101 (Moodie Memo), at 2 (emphasis in original).
849

PX 400 (Lago Agrio Judgment), at 89-90.
850

PX 5100 (Green Direct) ¶ 1.

205
Judgment and the Moodie Memo. He expressed the view that it was odd that a court in Ecuador –
a civil law country – would cite to and rely upon U.S. (and other common law countries’) law on
causation without any explanation for doing so.851 He found it difficult to understand also why the
Judgment relied on the “substantial factor” theory set forth in Rutherford, as the theory is outdated
and generally applied only in asbestos cases.852 The reason, he concluded, is that this section of the
Judgment was largely copied from the Moodie Memo. This Court agrees.
The documents’ citation to and discussion of Australian law also indicate that the
Moodie Memo and the Judgment were written by the same author. Both documents cite to
Australian law regarding its “process of inference” rule for causation. Both documents contain
identical strings of words:
The Moodie Memo: “Australia: causation can be established by a process of
inference which combines primary facts even if each piece of evidence alone does not
rise above the level of possibility. . . .”853
The Judgment: “Australian case law tells us that causation can be established by
a process of inference which combines concrete facts even if the actual causation
cannot be attributed to anyone of them by itself. . . .”854
This part of the Judgment, at least, was copied from the Moodie Memo. There is

851

Id. ¶¶ 16-18.
852

Id. ¶ 20A-C.
853

PX 1101 (Moodie Memo), at 3 (emphasis added).
854

PX 400 (Lago Agrio Judgment), at 90 (emphasis added).

206
evidence also of additional copying from the Moodie Memo into the Judgment. Both documents
refer to the Australian case law for the “process of inference” discussion.855 The Moodie Memo
cites specifically to Seltsam v. McGuiness.856 But Honorable James Spigelman, the former Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales857 and author of the Seltsam opinion, testified at
trial that the citation to his opinion, or to Australian law, for this proposition is anomalous. “Besides
the similarity of the language,” he said, “it is striking that both the Ecuadorian Judgment and the
Moodie Memo attribute this approach to Australian law, whereas it is a well-established proposition
throughout the common law world. It is usually attributed, as [former Chief Justice Spigelman] did
in Seltsam v. McGuinness, to the American text, Wigmore on Evidence 3rd Edition, paragraph 2497.
To describe it as an Australian legal approach is inaccurate.”858
Both Professor Green and former Chief Justice Spigelman identified other mistakes
of U.S. and Australian law that are common to both the Moodie Memo and the Judgment.859 It is
unnecessary to list them all here. The fundamental point, however, is not that the Judgment came
855

Id. at 89-90; PX 1101 (Moodie Memo), at 3.
856

(2000) 49 NSWLR 262, PP 91, 98.
857

PX 5000 (Spigelman Direct) ¶ 1.
858

Id. ¶ 18. Counsel for the Donziger defendants pointed at trial to what appears to be an
Australian journal article, which cites the Seltsam case for this proposition and does not
mention Wigmore on Evidence or any other American source. Tr. (Spigelman) 902:11903:13; DX 1203 (K. Mengersen, S.A. Moynihan, and R.L. Tweedie, Causality and
Association: The Statistical and Legal Approaches, STATISTICAL SCIENCE, 2007), at 240.
But the fact that Australian authors in an Australian publication cite exclusively to an
Australian case in no way establishes that that case – or Australian law in general – is
commonly cited in jurisdictions outside Australia, such as Ecuador.
859

See PX 5100 (Green Direct) ¶¶ 21B-E; PX 5000 (Spigelman Direct) ¶ 17.

207
to mistaken or odd conclusions about the law of the United States or Australia. It instead is that both
the Moodie Memo and the Judgment made the same mistakes in characterizing them. Nothing in
the Moodie Memo appears anywhere in the Lago Agrio Record.860 Thus, the likelihood that the
Judgment independently would contain exactly the same errors in characterizations as appear in the
Moodie Memo is almost zero. The Court finds that parts of the Moodie Memo were copied into and
paraphrased in the Judgment.

c.

Selva Viva Database

Spencer Lynch of Stroz Friedberg, LLC, compared the environmental sample names
and testing results contained in the Judgment with those contained in the lab results filed with the
judicial inspection reports in the Lago Agrio case (the “Filed Lab Results”). He compared them also
with those contained in a series of spreadsheets that were produced to Chevron in discovery, but not
filed with the Lago Agrio court (the “Selva Viva Database”).861 While the Filed Lab Results “were
similar in many ways to the” Selva Viva Database, Lynch found that there were “several notable
differences [which] revealed that the [Selva Viva Database] was more likely the source of the
information cited within the Ecuadorian Judgment” than the Filed Lab Results.862 He found also that
“reliance on the [Selva Viva Database] introduced several numerical errors into the Ecuadorian

860

PX 3900 (Hernandez Direct) ¶ 35 (“The Moodie Memo was not located in the Reviewed
Record . . . . No complete excerpt from the Moodie Memo was located in the Reviewed
Record . . . .”).
861

PX 439-441 (Selva Viva Database).
862

PX 4100 (Lynch Direct) ¶ 81.

208
Judgment, indicating that the data was copied from this source.”863
First. Many of the Judgment’s citations to sample results, each of which consisted
of a series of letters and numbers, ended with the suffix “_sv” or “_tx.”864 Not one of the Filed Lab
Results contained an “_sv” or “_tx” suffix but the Selva Viva Database did.865 In addition, both the
Selva Viva Database and the Judgment used a naming convention “ending with numeric ranges and
an ‘m’ or ‘cm’ enclosed within parentheses . . . [but] the Filed Lab Results used a naming
convention that ended with numeric ranges in parentheses, followed by an ‘m’ or ‘cm’ outside of
the parentheses.”866 Further, in discussing the results of benzene testing, the Judgment referred to
the sample result “SA_13-JI_AM1_0.1M,”867 which matches the format used in the Selva Viva
Database.868 However, the sample names in the Filed Lab Results contained no underscores, but
used dashes instead.869
Second. There are two striking discrepancies between numerical values in the Filed
Lab Results and the Judgment that must have resulted from copying from the Selva Viva Database.
863

Id.; see also PX 2175 (Portion of Judgment Showing Errors Common to Selva Viva
Database).
864

PX 4100 (Lynch Direct) ¶ 82.
865

Id.; PX 349-441 (Selva Viva Database).
866

PX 4100 (Lynch Direct) ¶ 83.
867

PX 399, 400 (Lago Agrio Judgment), at 108.
868

PX 4100 (Lynch Direct) ¶ 84.
869

Id.; see PX 2175 (Summary of Overlap and Common Errors in Judgment, Selva Viva
Database, and Stratus Compilation).

209
The first relates to reporting of concentrations of mercury. The sensitivity of testing
to determine the presence or absence and, in the former case, concentration of a substance in a
sample varies depending upon the capabilities of the equipment or testing method used. Where a
test does not reveal the presence of the subject substance, the result often is reported as a less-than
sign (“<”) followed by a number that indicates the minimum concentration of the subject substance
that can be detected by the particular equipment and testing method used.870
The Judgment contained the following passage (which, though it is extraneous to the
present point, was relevant to liability and damages in Ecuador):
“Mercury has been considered as a possible human carcinogenic agent by the EPA
and there are multiple studies showing the effects of mercury exposure, the most
serious being permanent brain and kidney damage, which alerts this Court that
alarming levels of mercury have been found in the Sacha, Shushufindi and Lago
Agrio fields, where we found several samples reaching 7 mg /kg. taken by the experts
José Robalino in the judicial inspection at Sacha Central (see samples -ESTSl_sv and
SAC-PITl-Sl-l_sv); and SAC-PIT-l-Sl-2 sv) and Xavier Grades at Shushufindi 8 and
Lago Agrio Norte (see samples SSF08-PIT1-Sl_sv, SSF08-PIT1-S2_sv, SSF08PIT1-S3 _sv, SSF08-PIT2-Sll_ sv, SSF08-PIT2-S3_SV, SSF08-PIT2-S4-l_sv,
SSF08-PIT2-S5_sv, SSF08-Pl T2-S6_sv, and also LAN-ESTA-B_sv, LAN-ESTABl_sv, LAN-ESTA-B2_sv, LAN-ESTA-C_sv, LAN- ESTBASUEl_sv, LAN-ESTBASUE2_sv, LAN-ESTB-Dl_sv, LAN- ESTB-D2_sv, LAN-ESTB-El_sv). In light
of these results, showing evidence of the presence of mercury in elevated levels in
soil samples collected during the judicial inspections, there is evidence of a worrying
presence of this element in the soil of the ecosystem of the concession.”871
In fact, however, the Filed Lab Results did not report that mercury levels reached 7 mg/kg in these

870

PX 4100 (Lynch Direct) ¶ 87; see also, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 439.1(j) (“Non-detect (ND) means
a concentration value below the minimum level that can be reliably measured by the
analytical method”); DENNIS R. HELSEL, NONDETECTS AND DATA ANALYSIS 9
(“[m]easurements whose values are known only to be above or below a threshold . . . [are
c]alled ‘less thans’ or ‘nondetects’”); id. at 6 (illustrating tabular presentation of nondetects
using less than (“<”) symbol).
871

PX 400 (Lago Agrio Judgment), at 109 (all emphasis added).

210
samples. They reported levels of “<7” – i.e., no detectable mercury – for every one of them.872
The source of this anomaly is apparent. The Selva Viva Database separated the “<”
sign from the following value by placing each in its own column. The column containing the “<”
sign was labeled “flag.” The author or authors of the Judgment thus used the Selva Viva Database
rather than the Filed Lab Results, ignored or did not understand the “flag” column, and wrongly
reported each of these test results as showing a concentration of mercury of 7 mg/kg.873
The next “tell” is quite similar. The Judgment reported the concentration of a
substance allegedly found at some specific sites in milligrams per kilogram.874 – i.e., one onethousandth of a gram per 1,000 grams (2.2 pounds) of sample. Page 109 of the Judgment contains
the following passage:
“and 3142 mg/kg., in the samples taken by the plaintiffs’ experts, since the
defendant’s experts did not analyze this compound. On the other hand, the expert
Luis Villacreces, in samples taken during the inspections of the Auca 1 well,
Cononaco 6, the Sacha 51 well and wells 18, 4 and 7 at Shushufindi has provided
results that exceed any standard of reasonable tolerance, with results such as 3,142
and 466 at Auca 1 in AU01-PIT1-SD2-SU2-R(220-240 cm)_sv and AU01-Al-SD1SU1-R(60-100cm)_sv; 2450 and 876 at Cononaco 6 in CON6-A2-SEl_sv and”875
In fact, the Filed Lab Results for these samples reported their findings in micrograms

872

PX 4100 (Lynch Direct) ¶ 87.
873

This is illustrated by Figure 26 in PX 4100 (Lynch Direct) ¶ 89; see also id. ¶¶ 87-88.
874

A milligram is one-thousandth of a gram. A concentration of one milligram is one onethousandth of a gram per 1,000 grams of sample.
875

PX 400 (Lago Agrio Judgment), at 109 (emphasis added).
Of course, the original Judgment (PX 399) was in Spanish; this is the stipulated English
translation. But the phrase “3142 mg/kg” is identical in both.

211
per kilogram (µg/kg) – that is, in millionths of a gram per kilogram.876 Thus, the Judgment could
not have obtained the results it reported from the Filed Lab Results. It had to have copied them from
the Selva Viva Database which, unlike the Filed Lab Results, reported at least some of its test results
in milligrams per kilograms.877
Finally. Both the Judgment and the Selva Viva Database incorrectly identified one
of Chevron’s experts, John Connor, as the submitter of a specific sample result.878 But the judicial
inspection report filed with the Lago Agrio court shows that Fernando Morales was Chevron’s
expert for that inspection, not John Connor.879
The foregoing analysis, it should be understood, does not reflect any review by this
Court of the substantive merits of the Judgment. The point is that these particular characteristics of
the Judgment are inconsistent with the evidence in the Lago Agrio record upon which the Judgment
purportedly relied, but appear in the Selva Viva Database, which is not in that record. This goes
directly to the question of the authorship of the Judgment. At least in these respects, the Judgment
was copied from LAP material outside the record, and Zambrano’s testimony was untrue.

876

PX 4100 (Lynch Direct) ¶ 90 & Fig. 27.
877

Id. & Fig. 28
It perhaps bears mention, though the point is extraneous for the present purpose of
identifying copying in the Judgment from non-Record sources, that the use of milligrams
per kilogram exaggerated the concentration of the subject substances in these samples by
a factor of 1,000, assuming that the Filed Lab Results were accurate to begin with.
878

Id. ¶ 85.
879

Id. ¶ 85 & Fig. 21.

212
2.

Defendants’ Failure to Provide any Explanation for the Overlap

Defendants had remarkably little to say regarding the evidence of the extensive
overlap between the Judgment and their internal work product. They did not explain how the LAPs’
internal work product ended up verbatim or in substance in the Judgment, despite that it appears
nowhere in the record. Donziger testified that he had “a variety of explanations” for how it had
occurred, but failed to provide a single one.880 Ponce testified that documents were provided to the
judge at some judicial inspections and that certain actas from those judicial inspections (which were
incorporated into the record) did not reflect all of the documents submitted by the parties.881 But he
failed to identify a single occasion when that actually had happened, much less any given document
that was submitted on such an occasion. Moreover, Ponce had left the LAP team before most of the
LAP internal work product documents that appear in the Judgment even were created,882 so his
testimony explained nothing.
Zambrano testified that documents related to the case that were not parts of the court
record occasionally were left at the door of his office in the court.883 Defendants thus appear to
suggest that the overlap between the Judgment and the LAPs’ internal documents is explained by
the possibility that the documents were left at Zambrano’s doorstep and that Zambrano copied from

880

Tr. (Donziger) 2600:6-9.
881

DX 1601 (Ponce Direct) ¶ 11.
882

Tr. (Ponce) 2272:22-2273:1, 2273:4-8.
883

Tr. (Zambrano) 1691:10-14.

213
them. But Zambrano could not recall any of the specific documents that were left at his door.884
Moreover, he was clear that he did not use any material that was left at his door. When documents
were left for him, he explained, he “always matched it up with what already existed in the [cuerpos
of the] case.”885 If a document differed from what was in the cuerpos, he discarded it “because it
wasn’t useful” to him.886
More fundamentally, any contention that the eight internal LAP documents that
appear verbatim or in substance in the Judgment were provided to the judge during the judicial
inspections or were left at Zambrano’s doorstep cannot be taken seriously. Not only would any such
ex parte submission have contravened Ecuadorian law, but defendants utterly failed to prove that
any such thing actually occurred. Had a member of the LAP team provided a document ex parte
to Zambrano or any other judge, that person could and should have been brought to court or deposed
to explain what the document was and when it was provided to the judge. But no such witness was
produced. Defendants’ failure to provide any evidence corroborating their explanation makes clear
that it is nothing more than a post-hoc attempt to explain away the inexplicable.

884

Id. 1691:20-23.
885

Id. 1692:24-1693:3.
886

Tr. (Zambrano) 1694:15-21. When asked at trial whether he discarded documents that did
not match those that were already in the cuerpos, Zambrano answered in the negative. Id.
1694:7-12. However, at his deposition two days earlier, Zambrano had testified that when
documents were different from those in the cuerpos, he discarded them. Zambrano Dep.
Tr. at 282:11-20. He testified at trial that his deposition testimony on this point was true.
Tr. (Zambrano) 1694:23-25.
Again, the point is not that Zambrano wrote the Judgment. The Court finds that he did not.
Rather, it is that this testimony confirms that he felt constrained to say that he relied only
on material in the record.

214
Finally, it bears mention that Chevron has adduced evidence of only eight LAP
documents that were copied into the Judgment. One may wonder why even more of the Judgment
was not traced to the LAPs’ internal work product. It is entirely conceivable, however, that Chevron
would have done just that if it had been given complete access to the LAPs’ documents. But
documents from Ecuador were not produced in response to discovery requests and orders by this
Court. Only through discovery from Donziger and others in the United States was Chevron able to
obtain even the eight documents discussed above. Those eight documents firmly establish that the
LAPs wrote at least material portions of the Judgment. In all the circumstances, the Court infers that
the LAPs wrote all or most of it, particularly in light of evidence that they had been preparing for
some time to write the whole Judgment.

3.

Evidence that the LAPs Began Preparing the Judgment as Early as 2009

As one of the defendants’ Ecuadorian law experts testified,887 it is unlawful under
Ecuadorian law for parties to submit proposed judgments to a court.888 Nevertheless, despite the
lack of any meaningful discovery from the LAP team in Ecuador or testimony by any of its
members, there is more than a hint in emails that Donziger produced under court order that the LAPs

887

The testimony, which in this respect was uncontroverted, was given in a deposition and
submitted under FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 to facilitate the Court’s decision on certain matters of
Ecuadorian law.
888

DI 1751-5 (Rosero Dep. Tr.), at 124:12-125:19.
This is not unique to Ecuador. The same is true in Mexico. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.
Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 470 F. Supp. 2d 917, 926 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (“Under Mexican
judicial procedures, it is improper to submit any proposed order to a Mexican state court.”)
The parties have made no submissions on the point as to the law of other countries.

215
did prepare a form of judgment and, indeed, had begun that task in mid-2009, if not before.
In late May or early June 2009, an intern named Brian Parker began working at the
Selva Viva office. On June 5, 2009, Fajardo asked Donziger for “suggestions as to what he could
do during these first few days.”889 Donziger offered no printable ideas. But Fajardo responded to
Donziger that he would give Parker “a research assignment for our legal alegato and the judgment,
but without him knowing what he is doing . . .”890 Then, on June 18, 2009, Fajardo sent Donziger
a copy of a new court decision. He added that “[t]he arguments by the magistrates are very
interesting, I think they serve us well for our alegato and . . .”891
These emails are suggestive. The distinction drawn between the alegato – i.e., the
written closing argument in an Ecuadorian litigation892 – and the judgment in the email about Parker
indicates that Fajardo’s reference to “the judgment” meant exactly what it said. Parker was to do
research for preparation of a judgment, but was not to be told the purpose of the assignment.
Moreover, defendants have advanced no reason why it was important to keep Parker in the dark,
save for the logical inference that he really was working on a judgment that could not properly have
been submitted to the Lago Agrio court. Likewise, the strategically placed ellipsis at the end of the
quoted sentence from the June 18 email implies that Fajardo knew that Donziger would know from
889

PX 1137 (June 5, 2009 Email from P. Fajardo to S. Donziger re: “BRYAN” [sic]).
890

Id. (emphasis added); see also Donziger July 19, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 4763:24-4764:23,
4765:20-4766-17.
891

PX 1141 (June 18, 2009 Email from P. Fajardo to S. Donziger, J. Prieto, and J. Sáenz re:
“THIS IS THE MOST COMPLETE ONE”) (ellipsis in original).
892

Tr. (Zambrano) 1960:12-14 (“[The alegato] is a statement of position by one of the parties
regarding a specific point that is in dispute in that litigation.”).

216
the June 5 email that the ellipsis referred to the judgment.
These emails, in and of themselves, of course do not prove that the LAP team began
work in 2009 on a proposed judgment. But there is more as well that suggests that they did so, at
least by some time in 2010.
Donziger’s distrust of the competence and integrity of the Ecuadorian judiciary is
clear. Moreover, Donziger and the LAPs had strong reasons to want to control the contents of, and
therefore to write, the Judgment, assuming that they could obtain the judge’s signature on it. They
were deeply concerned by early to mid-2010 that the Lago Agrio court, even assuming it ruled in
their favor, might rely on the Cabrera Report if left to its own devices.893 Prieto’s “go to jail” email
was written in late March 2010, and this June 2010 email was written in the face of the imminent
disclosure of “the Stratus materials” in the Colorado 1782 proceeding. Thus, there was an
immediate threat that the Cabrera Report would be discredited as the work of the LAPs’ consultants,
Stratus. Reliance on it by the Ecuadorian court would have threatened to discredit even a judgment
favorable to the LAPs – unless such a judgment were written in a particular way, as it ultimately
was, with the disclaimer of reliance already noted. In fact, on the day that Donziger wrote the email
just quoted, one of the LAPs’ other U.S. lawyers spelled out the hope that the cleansing expert
would provide an alternate basis for a decision and that the judge would decline to rely on the

893

PX 1370 (June 14, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to J. Tyrrell, E. Westenberger, and E. Daleo
re: “important update/Ecuador”) (““The Ecuador team is getting nervous that there is an
increasing risk that our ‘cleansing’ process is going to be outrun by the judge and we will
end up with a decision based entirely on Cabrera. Absent our intervention ASAP, they
believe the judge could issue autos para sentencia in about 3-4 weeks, which would in effect
bar our remedy to the Cabrera problem. Abady’s firm is re-editing the submission in light
of the recent complications with the Stratus materials . . .”).

217
Cabrera Report and rely instead on the cleansing expert.894 There could have been no better way to
ensure that the Lago Agrio court would not rely on the Cabrera Report than for the LAPs to draft
the decision themselves.
The probability that the LAPs drafted the judgment draws strength also from the
following deposition testimony by Donziger:
“Q.
Did the Lago Agrio plaintiff team at any time develop a proposed judgment
for the Lago Agrio case? A. I don’t believe so. I don’t know. It is possible.”895
Donziger, almost in the same breath, testified that he (1) believed that the LAPs had not prepared
a proposed judgment, (2) did not know whether they had prepared a proposed judgment, and (3)
thought it possible that they had prepared a proposed judgment. But this deposition took place only
five months after the Judgment was issued. Chevron already had suggested that the Judgment, like
the Cabrera Report, had been ghostwritten by the LAPs, or at least that the judge received “secret
assistance” from the plaintiffs’ team in writing it.896 So Chevron’s suggestion that the LAPs had
ghostwritten the Judgment, the Court finds, was in Donziger’s mind when this deposition was taken.
Given his lead role in the litigation and the emails discussed above, it is most unlikely that he did
not know whether the LAPs had prepared a proposed judgment. If they had not, the easy and
truthful answer would have been that they had not done so. Period. Indeed, the fact that Donziger
obfuscated – that he quickly changed his answer to this very simple question from “I don’t believe
so” to “I don’t know” to “[i]t is possible” – suggests that Donziger knew quite a bit more than he
894

PX 1371 (June 14, 2010 Email from J. Abady to S. Donziger and others).
895

Donziger July 19, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 4814:22-4815:2.
896

Infra Facts § XII.A.1.

218
was willing to say and that he did not say what he knew because it would have been damaging.

C.

Ultimate Findings on this Point – The LAPs Wrote the Judgment
As we have noted, there is direct evidence that the LAPs began preparing a draft

judgment as early as 2009. Donziger evaded the question whether they prepared a proposed
judgment, notwithstanding that the submission of proposed judgments would have been improper
in Ecuador. The Judgment copied extensively from eight LAP internal work product documents –
documents which were not in the record, which Zambrano denied having used, and the presence of
which in the Judgment defendants could not explain. There is extensive evidence of substantive ex
parte contact by LAP lawyers,897 including Donziger, with various Ecuadorian judges throughout
the Lago Agrio case. There is the LAPs’ previous ghostwriting of the Cabrera Report and their
submission of a report supposedly written by Calmbacher but in fact written by the LAPs.
In addition, we have referred to the LAPs’ strong motive to control the specific
content of the Judgment insofar as it related to the Cabrera Report. Moreover, the LAPs’ Cabrera
Report problem had grown even more acute by later in 2010, when the Judgment must have been
in preparation. By then, the Denver lawyers had withdrawn as counsel upon their discovery of what
had transpired among Donziger, Stratus, and the LAPs. The LAPs’ last-ditch effort to stop the
production of the Stratus documents had failed.898 The Second Circuit had directed Berlinger to
produce substantially all of the Crude out takes, so that material either had been or was about to be
897

E.g., Donziger Jan. 29, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 3711:9-12 (LAP Ecuadorian lawyers “up to a
certain point” “spoke regularly to the judge ex parte”); Infra Discussion § II.B.2, supra
Facts § IV.F.1.
898

Supra Facts § VII.C.1

219
produced.899 This Court had directed Donziger to produce extensive material and to submit to a
deposition in a Section 1782 proceeding.900 Other Section 1782 proceedings had been or were being
filed around the country. Hopes of suppressing the facts that Cabrera had been neither impartial nor
independent and that Stratus had written all or much of his report had been dashed.
In the circumstances, the Court finds that the LAPs wrote the Judgment in its entirety
or in major part and that Zambrano made little or no contribution apart from his signature and
perhaps some light editing designed to make it read more like other decisions he had signed in this
and other cases. The Court would have made these findings without regard to the facts that Fajardo
and the other Ecuadorian lawyers – those who naturally would have drafted or been involved
intimately with the drafting of the judgment by the LAPs – (1) did not testify, and (2) did not
produce documents pursuant to Chevron’s request and the Court’s order. But the inference from the
absence of these witnesses strongly confirms these findings.

X.

How it All Began: Guerra Ghostwrote Orders for Zambrano and the LAPs Paid Him
The LAPs wrote the Judgment. Zambrano did not. And yet the Judgment was issued

by the Lago Agrio court under Zambrano’s signature. How was this accomplished?
Chevron contends that the LAPs bribed Zambrano to allow them to write the
Judgment and that this bribe was facilitated by Alberto Guerra. As will be seen, the Court finds that
Chevron has so proved. To understand how this deal ultimately came to pass, however, we must
899

Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 305-06 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting July 15, 2010
order to produce).
900

In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Lago Agrio
Plaintiffs v. Donziger, 409 F. App’x 310 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order).

220
turn back to mid-2009, when Zambrano first presided over the Lago Agrio case and the Judgment
still was two years away.

A.

The Guerra-Zambrano-Donziger Conflict
Alberto Guerra was the judge who presided over the Lago Agrio case from its filing

until it was reassigned to another judge in 2004. But his involvement did not end then. Nor did it
end when he was removed from the bench in May 2008.901
Chevron – in reliance on Guerra’s testimony – claims that Guerra was a party to three
distinct corrupt bargains with Zambrano before Zambrano too was removed from the bench:
•

The first corrupt bargain, solely between Guerra and Zambrano, allegedly
began after Guerra was removed from the bench. Zambrano, whose previous
experience had been almost entirely as a prosecutor, was new to the bench
and inexperienced in civil cases. He made an arrangement with Guerra
pursuant to which Guerra drafted court decisions in civil cases over which
Zambrano presided. Zambrano paid him for his ghostwriting services. There
is no suggestion that Donziger or the LAPs were involved in this
arrangement at its outset.

•

The second was an outgrowth of the first. It came into existence when
Zambrano was assigned in mid-2009 to preside over the Chevron case for the
first of two occasions. Zambrano allegedly reached an unspecified
arrangement with the LAPs to move the case along quickly and generally in
the LAPs’ favor. At Zambrano’s suggestion, Guerra then made a deal with
Donziger, Fajardo, and Yanza. The substance was that the LAPs paid Guerra
roughly $1,000 per month to ghostwrite orders for Zambrano in the Chevron
case that would give effect to the Zambrano-LAP deal, expediting the case
in a way favorable to the LAPs.

•

The third corrupt arrangement is said to have taken place in connection with
Zambrano’s second and decisive period of presiding over the Lago Agrio
case, which began in mid- to late 2010. At Zambrano’s request, Guerra
allegedly facilitated a deal among Zambrano, Donziger, and Fajardo pursuant

901

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 7.

221
to which the LAPs promised to pay Zambrano $500,000 in exchange for
Zambrano permitting the LAPs to write the decision. Fajardo then is said to
have provided Zambrano and Guerra with a draft of the judgment to which
Guerra made minor editorial changes. Zambrano allegedly signed and filed
it.
Zambrano admitted at trial that he had Guerra draft decisions for him in civil cases
but he denied that he paid Guerra to do so and denied that he had Guerra draft anything for him in
the Lago Agrio Chevron case. He denied also the second and third alleged corrupt bargains and
claimed that he dictated every word of the 188-page Judgment without any help from anyone except
the typist.
Donziger admitted that Guerra proposed to him and Fajardo that Zambrano would
throw the case and let the LAPs write the decision in exchange for a $500,000 bribe. He claimed,
however, that he rejected the deal. Fajardo and Yanza declined to testify.
There are substantial credibility issues with respect to the testimony of Guerra,
Zambrano, and Donziger. The resolution of these issues draws on the history of relationships among
the five key actors, all of which span close to ten and in some cases more years. Moreover, it
requires careful consideration of an enormous amount of testimony and documentary evidence,
some important portions of which were ignored by both sides. Determinations of credibility depend
also upon assessments of intangible factors such as the courtroom demeanor, tone, and manner of
witnesses as well as other considerations and evidence.902 Before turning to what happened among
902

“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, must not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s
opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.” FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). “[W]hen findings
are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, Rule 52(a) demands even
greater deference to the trial court’s findings; for only the trial judge can be aware of the
variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding
of and belief in what is said.” Metzen v. United States, 19 F.3d 795, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1994)
(citation omitted).

222
Zambrano, Donziger, and Guerra in the years leading up to the Judgment, the Court makes some
preliminary observations on the credibility of each witness.

B.

Preliminary Observations on Credibility
Each of Guerra, Zambrano, and Donziger was a deeply flawed witness. The parties’

opposing arguments naturally reflect that.
This is a civil case. Nevertheless, the defendants – in the classic manner of
defendants attacking accomplice witnesses who “turn state’s evidence” by testifying for the
prosecution in exchange for what they trust will be reduced sentences for their own crimes –
understandably train their guns on Guerra. They point out that Guerra admitted that he had been a
corrupt judge, a crook just like many government accomplice witnesses in criminal cases. He later
sought to profit from his proximity to these events, and he has succeeded in doing so. He is the
beneficiary of what amounts to a private witness protection program created for him by Chevron,
which facilitated his relocation from Ecuador to the United States and has been supporting and
assisting him since his arrival here. The defendants therefore are quite right in the sense that a key
witness against them, Guerra, is self interested. The Court recognizes that his testimony, in the
words of the standard instruction given to juries with respect to such witnesses, “should be
scrutinized with great care and viewed with particular caution. . . .”903
903

1 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS Instr. 7-5 (Matthew
Bender & Co. 2013).
We bear in mind also another relevant portion of this standard instruction:
“The government argues, as it is permitted to do, that it must take the witnesses as it finds
them. It argues that only people who themselves take part in criminal activity have the
knowledge required to show criminal behavior by others.

223
Chevron, in the classic response, argues that conspiracies of the sort alleged here
usually are proved only by the testimony of accomplices who often are scurrilous characters, that
Guerra’s testimony like that of many accomplice witnesses is corroborated by other evidence, and
that the defendants’ witnesses – Donziger and Zambrano – are at least equally flawed. We will deal
below with the allegedly corroborating evidence, which requires extensive analysis. But it is well
to recognize at the outset that Chevron too is quite right as to the matter of self interest.
Donziger of course stands to recover a contingent fee of more than $600 million if
the Judgment is collected, a vast multiple of Guerra’s economic interest. Nor, as already mentioned
and as will be further detailed below, is his self interest purely economic.
Zambrano too is self interested. If indeed he was promised $500,000 from the
proceeds of the Judgment, his chances of ever seeing a penny would be reduced by a finding that
he was bribed to throw the case. $500,000 is a considerable fortune to someone in his position. His
economic self interest in denying that corrupt bargain is obvious. And, as detailed previously, his
self interest goes beyond that.
In sum, as the Court begins its analysis of what really happened in the final phase of
the Lago Agrio case, it keeps in mind that all three of the these witnesses testified in ways that, if
believed, would advance their own interests, economic and personal. Guerra’s admitted corrupt
behavior and the consequent attack on his character, which is entirely appropriate, should not
obscure the fact that there are no saints here. Donziger and Zambrano are quite open to comparable

For those very reasons, the law allows the use of accomplice testimony. Indeed, it is the law
in federal courts that the testimony of accomplices may be enough in itself for conviction,
if the jury finds that the testimony establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
A fortiori the same is true in civil cases, in which the standard of proof is less than beyond
a reasonable doubt.

224
attacks. The Court will return below to the credibility of the witnesses as it pertains to specific
testimony and findings of fact. It turns first, however, to its discussion of the events that led up to
the ultimate bribe deal.

C.

Guerra’s Ghostwriting for Zambrano
1.

The Guerra-Zambrano Ghostwriting Deal – Unrelated Civil Cases

Guerra first met Zambrano when Guerra was a judge on the Provincial Court in Lago
Agrio, where Zambrano was a prosecutor.904 Guerra was elected presiding judge in January 2002905
and presided over the Lago Agrio case from May 2003 through January 2004.906 He was dismissed
from the bench in May 2008.907 Following his dismissal, however, he maintained contact with
Zambrano who, as noted, joined the court in July 2008.908
Guerra testified that “[a]s a former prosecutor,[] Zambrano had ample knowledge of

904

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 8; Tr. (Zambrano) 1629:19-1630:4.
905

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 4.
906

Id.
907

Id. ¶ 7.
Guerra said that “[a]ccording to the Judiciary Council, the reason for my dismissal was that
I made statements that the Chevron case should be declared null, at a time when I no longer
presided over the Chevron case. In reality, I believe I was dismissed because I confronted
Judges Novillo and Yánez, who succeeded me as judges in this case, regarding several
dubious and illegal rulings they had issued in the proceedings, and regarding their practice
of asking the experts for 25 percent of their fees in consideration for having appointed them
as such.” Id.
908

See Tr. (Zambrano) 1811:6-1812:2.

225
criminal law and procedure, but very limited knowledge of civil law rules, substantively and
especially procedurally.”909 So when Zambrano became a judge, he was much more comfortable
handling his criminal cases than his civil ones. He and Guerra entered into an agreement by which
Zambrano paid Guerra $1,000 per month to assist Zambrano in drafting his “writs and rulings” in
civil cases.910 Guerra explained that he was facing financial hardships at that time as a result of his
removal from the bench and came to rely on his arrangement with Zambrano as a main source of
income.
According to Guerra, he worked on the rulings in Zambrano’s civil cases mainly on
weekends at Guerra’s home in Quito.911 Zambrano lived in Manta and worked in Lago Agrio, and
he sometimes met Guerra in the Quito airport on his flights home from Lago Agrio.912 On such
occasions, Zambrano sometimes gave Guerra court files and Guerra spent the weekend working on
the orders.913 Zambrano then met Guerra at the Quito airport on his return trip to Lago Agrio to
collect from Guerra flash drives containing the draft rulings Guerra had written.914 On other
occasions, Guerra and Zambrano shipped the materials to each other in freight packages via the

909

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 11.
910

Id. ¶ 11.
911

Id. ¶ 13.
912

Id.
913

Id.
914

Id.

226
Ecuadorian TAME airline.915
Guerra testified that Zambrano generally paid Guerra for his ghostwriting services
in cash when they met in the Quito airport.916 On various occasions, however, Zambrano deposited
the money directly into Guerra’s account at Banco Pichincha in Quito.917
That Guerra ghostwrote orders for Zambrano in cases other than Chevron is
corroborated by independent evidence Chevron produced at trial.
First, as will be seen, Guerra in 2012 provided Chevron with full access to the hard
drive of his personal computer.918 That hard drive contained drafts of 105 rulings issued by the Lago
Agrio court in cases unrelated to the Chevron case from December 22, 2010 through November 28,
2011.919 At least 101 of the 105 draft rulings were issued by then-judge Zambrano or in cases
assigned to him.920
915

Id. ¶¶ 13-15.
Guerra testified that he generally shipped the documents to Zambrano directly. At times,
however, he shipped them to other individuals in Lago Agrio, who would then deliver them
to Zambrano. Id. ¶ 16.
916

Id. ¶ 17.
917

Id.
918

Infra Facts § XI.A.1.a.iii.
919

PX 375, PX 1468, PX 1773-PX 1875; PX 4100 (Lynch Direct) ¶ 3e; PX 2177 (Summary
Chart of non-Chevron draft rulings on Guerra’s computer).
920

PX 4100 (Lynch Direct) ¶¶ 54-68. Chevron expert Spencer Lynch, the Director of Digital
Forensics at Stroz Friedberg, LLC (id. ¶ 1) compared the drafts orders found on Guerra’s
computer to court rulings published on the Ecuadorian court website,
http://www.funcionjudicial-sucubios.gob.ec/index.php/consulta-de-causas, in cases assigned
to Zambrano. Id. His analysis revealed that text “appear[ed] verbatim, or nearly verbatim

227
Second, the fact that Guerra and Zambrano at times shipped documents between them
is corroborated by TAME’s certified shipping records.921 The records reveal that, between
November 18, 2009, and February 28, 2012, Guerra and Zambrano shipped 16 packages between
them.922 The description of these packages generally was either “documents” or “package with
documents.”923
Zambrano admitted that he and Guerra had a close relationship924 that continued after
Guerra was removed from the court and after Zambrano became a judge.925 He admitted also that
“Guerra helped [him] with the drafting of orders in [Zambrano’s] cases,” though he said that the
arrangement did not include the Chevron case.926 Thus, there is no doubt that Guerra ghostwrote
orders for Zambrano for some time.
Zambrano at one point did deny that he paid Guerra for doing so although his

in 105 rulings issued by the Ecuadorian court [and] . . . [a]t least 101 of the 105 rulings were
issued by then-judge Zambrano or in cases assigned to then-judge Zambrano.” Id ¶ 68b-c.
921

PX 1682 (TAME Shipment Records For Alberto Guerra Between Nov. 19, 2009 and Feb.
28, 2012).
922

Id.
923

Id.
924

Tr. (Zambrano) 1629:25-1630:4.
925

Id. 1811:6-1812:2.
926

Id. 1630:22-24.

228
testimony on the point was inconsistent.927 But Guerra produced his day planners covering the
period July 14, 2011 through July 12, 2012,928 which corroborate his testimony, at least for the
period they cover.929
The Court sees no persuasive reason why Guerra would have done this work for
Zambrano without compensation, especially given that Guerra had been removed from the bench
even before Zambrano became a judge and was in financial difficulty. Indeed, while Zambrano at
one point denied such payments, his testimony on this point actually was internally contradictory
and his claim that Guerra worked for nothing was not credible. And while it is true, as defendants
argue, that the available day planners do not begin until 2011, the logic of the situation also supports
Guerra’s version.
The Court finds that Zambrano compensated Guerra for drafting orders on his civil
cases and that the arrangement began in late 2008 or early 2009 and in any case before there was
any immediate prospect of Zambrano being assigned the Chevron case. Zambrano’s testimony that
he did not pay Guerra and that the arrangement began in 2010 is not credible.
927

As Chevron pointed out, Zambrano “stated that Guerra assisted him with drafting court
orders because, at the time, Guerra ‘was facing a great financial need.’ Tr. (Zambrano)
1630:22-1631:3; see also id. 1814:4-11 (Guerra ‘was facing a very delicate financial
situation’). But, despite having permitted Guerra to assist him by drafting orders because
of Guerra’s financial desperation, Zambrano denied having paid Guerra for ghostwriting his
orders – implausibly implying that Guerra’s financial need had resulted in his working for
nothing. Tr. (Zambrano) 1630:22-1631:6.” DI 1847 (Chevron Corp. Post-trial Mem. of
Law), at 101.
928

PX 1733 (Guerra Daily Planner); PX 1734 (Guerra Daily Planner).
He testified that he had lost the prior day planners. Tr. (Guerra) 1025:1-17.
929

PX 1735 (Guerra Daily Planner), at 1, 180; PX 1685 (Guerra Daily Planner Entry for Feb.
24, 2012).

229
2.

Zambrano’s First Tenure Presiding Over the Lago Agrio Case
a.

Guerra Reaches out to Chevron

In August 2009, Judge Nuñez was presiding over the Lago Agrio case. A scandal
allegedly involving his conduct and the Chevron case broke in consequence of which he left the case
and Zambrano became the presiding judge. According to Guerra, Zambrano instructed Guerra to
reach out to the attorneys for Chevron “in order to negotiate an agreement by which the company
would pay Zambrano and [Guerra] for issuing the final judgment in Chevron’s favor.”930 Zambrano,
Guerra said, believed that “Chevron would have much more money than the Plaintiffs for this
agreement, and therefore [he] could get a better deal and greater benefits” from the company.931
Pursuant to Zambrano’s instruction, Guerra called Alberto Racines, an attorney at
the law firm of Adolfo Callejas, Chevron’s Ecuadorian counsel, some time in the August to October
2009 period.932 The two met, and Guerra informed Racines that he “could establish a direct
connection with Judge Zambrano so they could discuss and negotiate important and decisive issues
in the case, including the judgment.”933 After the meeting, Guerra continued to contact Racines and
pressed him to “do the deal,” but Racines ultimately rejected Guerra’s proposal.934
930

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 22.
931

Id.
932

Id. ¶ 22; Tr. (Guerra) 916:3-3.
933

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 22; Tr. (Guerra) 916:3:917-4.
Guerra did not tell Racines that he was ghostwriting orders for Zambrano. Tr. (Guerra)
917:5-7.
934

Tr. (Guerra) 917:8-20.

230
Guerra claims that he reported Racines’ rejection to Zambrano, who then decided to
explore the possibility of a deal with the plaintiffs.935 Zambrano explained that he already had
reached an agreement with the LAPs’ representatives to “move the case along in their favor” and
told Guerra that he should “work out a financial agreement directly with Fajardo for payment of
[Guerra’s] ghostwriting services.”936

b.

Following Chevron’s Rejection, Guerra Makes a Deal With the LAPs

Guerra said that he first met with Fajardo in Quito to discuss the matter.937 They
agreed that: (1) Guerra would “move the case quickly,” (2) “Chevron’s procedural options would
be limited by not granting [its] motions on alleged essential errors in rulings [Guerra] was to write,”
and (3) the LAPs’ “representatives would pay [Guerra] approximately USD $1,000 per month for
writing the court rulings [] Zambrano was supposed to write.”938 But Fajardo told Guerra that
Guerra should meet with Donziger promptly so that Donziger could hear the deal from Guerra’s
mouth. This was necessary, Fajardo said, because Donziger “was the boss of the attorneys – of the
legal team” and “all important matters should be brought to [his] attention.”939
At Fajardo’s request, according to Guerra, Guerra several days later allegedly met

935

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 23.
936

Id.
937

Id.; Tr. (Guerra) 919:6-14.
938

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 23; Tr. (Guerra) 920:2-7.
939

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 23; Tr. (Guerra) 921:6-20.

231
with Donziger, Fajardo, and Yanza at the Honey & Honey Restaurant in Quito.940 Fajardo
summarized for Donziger the three aspects of the agreement he had reached with Guerra.941
Donziger, said Guerra, “thanked [Guerra] for [his] work as Zambrano’s ghostwriter in th[e] case and
for helping steer the case in favor of the Plaintiffs.”942

c.

Guerra Drafted Zambrano’s Orders in the Chevron Case

During Zambrano’s first tenure on the Chevron case Guerra wrote many of
Zambrano’s rulings in that case as well as others.943 He drafted most – but not all – in the LAPs’
favor.944 He continued to deliver the rulings to Zambrano by hand at the Quito airport or shipped
them via TAME.945 He testified that he occasionally met or spoke on the phone with Fajardo “to
discuss matters that were to be included in the court orders in the case. . . .”946
940

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 25; Tr. (Guerra) 921:5-25.
941

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 27.
942

Id.; Tr. (Guerra) 925:6-14.
943

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 31; Tr. (Guerra) 930:7.
944

Tr. (Guerra) 930:14-16.
He occasionally drafted orders, or portions of orders, to favor Chevron because, he
explained, “it could seem too obvious if every single portion of every single court order that
[Guerra] drafted[.] [I]t could seem as though all of the orders were being issued for the
benefit of the plaintiffs. That would have looked suspicious and the idea was to not have it
look suspicious.” Id. 930:20-24.
945

PX 4800 (Guerra) ¶ 31.
946

Tr. (Guerra) 931:8-11.

232
In addition to 105 drafts of orders in Zambrano’s other cases,947 Guerra’s computer
contained nine drafts of orders that Zambrano issued in the Lago Agrio Chevron case between
October 21, 2009 and February 17, 2010.948 Forensic analysis demonstrated that eight of those nine
draft orders last were saved to Guerra’s computer prior to the date on which Zambrano issued the
corresponding order,949 generally by only a few days.950 The Court finds that the Zambrano orders
were prepared from the Guerra drafts. The Guerra draft orders corroborate his testimony that he was
ghostwriting orders for the Chevron case, although not the claim of an arrangement between
Zambrano and the LAPs.

947

Supra note 920.
948

PX 1172, 1173, 1186, 1190-1193, 1197, 1209, 1220, 1243 (Guerra Draft Chevron Orders);
PX 4100 (Lynch Direct) ¶ 34.
949

PX 4100 (Lynch Direct) ¶ 48.
950

Id. ¶ 45 & Table 10.
Although the last-saved date for the ninth order postdated Zambrano’s issuance of it, it is
much more likely it actually was created by Guerra before Zambrano issued its counterpart.
Chevron’s forensic expert testified that the metadata of the order – which is 72 pages long
– reflects that the order was edited for a total of only two minutes before it was last saved.
Because it is impossible to draft a 72-page document in two minutes, and because the order
is nearly identical to the order that was issued by Zambrano, it is much more likely, and the
Court finds, that the ninth draft order was written by Guerra, issued by Zambrano, and for
some reason later last-saved on Guerra’s computer. Id.

The Court notes also that the fact that these draft Chevron orders all had a file system create
date of July 23, 2010 does not suggest that all were created then or that they were not
prepared by Guerra when he said he prepared them. Forensic analysis of his computer
showed that he installed Windows XP on July 23, 2010 and then transferred these draft
orders, as part of a larger transfer of data on the same date, from an external hard drive. The
obvious inference is that Guerra backed up his computer to the external hard drive before
installing Windows XP and then restored his files from the external hard drive to the
computer. PX 4100 (Lynch Direct) ¶¶ 34-37; see Tr. (Lynch) 557:1-558:10.

233
d.

The LAP Team Paid Guerra for His Ghostwriting Services

According to Guerra, the LAP team paid Guerra for his ghostwriting work directly,
either in cash or by deposit into his bank account.951 Fajardo sometimes paid him in cash on the
street in Quito.952 On other occasions, members of the LAP team deposited money into Guerra’s
account at Banco Pichincha.953
Records of Guerra’s bank account at Banco Pichincha954 establish also that Guerra
was paid by the LAPs’ lawyers.
Guerra’s account statements and deposit slips confirm that in each of October,
November, and December 2009, and February 2010, $1,000 was deposited into Guerra’s account
at Banco Pichincha.955 The deposits for December 2009 and February 2010 both were made by
Ximena Centeno, who Donziger confirmed was an employee of Selva Viva at the time each deposit

951

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 31; Tr. (Guerra) 931:21-22.
952

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 32; Tr. (Guerra) 932:10-11 (“[Fajardo] would hand me a blank
white envelope and inside the envelope were [$]20 and $50 bills.”).
953

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 33.
954

The Court has concluded, for reasons set out in Appendix III, that the records are admissible
and it finds them persuasive.
955

PX 1713 (Guerra Banco Pichincha Deposit Slips); PX 1689, 1706-1708 (Guerra Banco
Pichincha Account Statements).

234
was made.956 Those two deposit slips957 bear signatures and a national identity number that match
Centeno’s signature and national identity number as shown on her national identity card.958 The
authenticity of both of those deposit slips, moreover, was confirmed entirely independently of
Guerra.959 And all four deposits tie in to defendants’ own emails, which remove any doubt as to
whether the LAPs in fact made these deposits to Guerra’s account.
Beginning in mid-2009, Fajardo began an email chain that involved Donziger and
others and that referred to the PUPPET and the PUPPETEER. The text and context of the emails
demonstrate these terms were code names, and that PUPPETEER referred to Guerra and PUPPET
referred to Zambrano.960 These emails confirm Guerra’s testimony about the ghostwriting deal he
made with the LAPs during Zambrano’s first term on the case.

956

PX 1719 (Dec. 23, 2009 Deposit Slip); PX 1718 (Feb. 5, 2010 Deposit Slip); Tr. (Donziger)
2596:1-4 (“Q. Ximena Centeno [wa]s an employee of Selva Viva [in December 2009],
correct, sir? A. My understanding was that she worked for Selva Viva at that time, yes.”).
957

PX 1718 (Feb. 2010 Guerra Banco Pichincha Deposit Slip); PX 1713 (same), at 8; PX 1719
(Dec. 2009 Guerra Banco Pichincha Deposit Slip); PX 1713 (same), at 1.
958

PX 1741 (X. Centeno national identity card). The admissibility of this exhibit is dealt with
in Appendix V.I.
959

DI 1671 (Owen Decl.) passim. The declaration was filed in opposition to defendants’
motion (DI 1660) to strike, among other things, bank records offered through Guerra.
Defendants neither objected to consideration of the declaration nor, for that matter, replied
to Chevron’s opposition to their motion. In any case, the Court is not bound by the rules of
evidence in deciding preliminary questions of admissibility. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
960

Donziger and Fajardo often used code names in internal emails. As Donziger admitted in
a deposition, he did so “to prevent any reader of those documents from knowing exactly who
it was [he] w[as] talking about. . . .” Donziger Jan. 29, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 3817:13-18. One
admitted example is Fajardo’s 2007 cook-waiter-restaurant email, discussed above, in which
Donziger admitted that “cook” meant Judge Yánez, “waiter” meant Cabrera, and
“restaurant” meant Chevron.

235
The chain began on September 15, 2009 – shortly after Judge Nuñez had recused
himself and at about the same time at which (1) Zambrano had begun acting on the Chevron case,
and (2) Guerra said he struck the ghostwriting deal with Fajardo and Donziger – with an email from
Fajardo to Donziger, Sáenz, Prieto, and Yanza. The subject was “PUPPETEER.” Fajardo wrote:
“I think that everything is quiet … The puppeteer is pulling the string and the puppet
is returning the package… By now it’s pretty safe that there won’t be anything to
worry about… The puppet will finish off the entire matter tomorrow… I hope they
don’t fail me …”961
As we have seen, Zambrano formally took over and issued his first two orders in the
Lago Agrio case on October 21, 2009.962 On the same day, Fajardo emailed his colleagues to assure
them that “things here are under control.”963 Then, on October 27, 2009, Fajardo emailed Donziger
and Yanza that “[t]he puppeteer won’t move his puppet unless the audience pays him something.”964
Two days later, $1,000 was withdrawn from Selva Viva’s account at Banco Pichincha.965 That same
day, $1,000 in cash was deposited into Guerra’s account.966
On November 26, 2009, another $1,000 in cash was withdrawn from the Selva Viva
961

PX 1753 (Sept. 15, 2009 Email from P. Fajardo to S. Donziger, J. Prieto, J. Sáenz, L.
Yanza, and [e-mail] re: “PUPPETEER”) (ellipses in original).
962

He had issued some orders in it earlier. E.g., PX 348 (Oct. 3, 2009 Lago Agrio Court
Order).
963

PX 1176 (Oct. 21, 2009 Email from P. Fajardo to S. Donziger, J. Sáenz, J. Prieto, L. Yanza,
and R. Garcia re: “ONWARD”).
964

PX 1751 (Oct. 27, 2009 Email from P. Fajardo to S. Donziger and L. Yanza re: “NEWS”).
965

PX 583 (Banco Pichincha Account Summary for Selva Viva), at 51.
966

PX 1713 (Guerra Deposit Slips), at 10.

236
account.967 On November 27,$1,000 in cash was deposited into Guerra’s bank account.968 On the
same day, Yanza emailed Donziger and explained that “the budget is higher in relation to the
previous months, since we are paying the puppeteer. . . .”969
On December 22, 2009, $1,000 was withdrawn from the Selva Viva bank account.970
The next day, Selva Viva employee Ximena Centeno deposited $1,000 into Guerra’s account.971
On February 4, 2010, $1,000 was withdrawn from the Selva Viva bank account.972
The next day, Ximena Centeno deposited $1,000 into Guerra’s account.973
The alleged arrangement among the LAPs, Guerra, and Zambrano continued until
Zambrano was replaced on the Lago Agrio case by Judge Leonardo Ordóñez in February 2010.974
Although he no longer was working for the LAPs, Guerra subsequently continued to ghostwrite
orders in Zambrano’s civil cases.975

967

PX 583 (Banco Pichincha Account Summary for Selva Viva), at 51.
968

PX 1713 (Guerra Deposit Slips), at 5, 11.
969

PX 1746 (Nov. 27, 2009 Email from L. Yanza to S. Donziger).
970

PX 583 (Banco Pichincha Account Summary for Selva Viva), at 52.
971

PX 1713 (Guerra Deposit Slips), at 7; PX 1719 (same), at 1.
972

PX 583 (Banco Pichincha Account Summary for Selva Viva), at 53.
973

PX 1713 (Guerra Deposit Slips), at 8; PX 1718 (same), at 1.
974

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 35; PX 2522 (Timeline of Judges in the Lago Agrio Litigation).
975

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 35.

237
D.

Ultimate Findings on This Point – Guerra Was Zambrano’s Paid Ghostwriter in
Civil Cases and Was Paid By Donziger and the LAPs To Write Some of Zambrano’s
Orders in the Chevron Case
The Court finds that during Zambrano’s first term on the Chevron case, Guerra was

ghostwriting orders for him in civil cases generally and, to some extent, on the Chevron case in
particular. He was paid for those services, at least as to the cases other than Chevron, by Zambrano.
The bank records prove that he was paid for his services on the Lago Agrio Chevron case by the
LAPs as well, which they did with Donziger’s authorization and agreement.976 This is confirmed
by the PUPPETEER emails, in which PUPPETEER referred to Guerra and PUPPET to Zambrano.
Indeed, the events of October 26-29, 2009, and of November 26-27, 2009, make that conclusion
virtually inescapable.
Defendants offered no evidence or testimony that rebuts or explains these emails or
the payments. Fajardo and Yanza, the authors of the emails, declined to testify. Donziger at his
deposition denied knowledge of the identities of the PUPPETEER and the PUPPET and claimed
neither to have known to what Fajardo had been referring nor to have discussed the matter with
him.977
Donziger attempted at trial to pass off the code names as jokes or nicknames.978 But
that attempt is unpersuasive, particularly in light of the fact that he admitted in a deposition that the
LAP team used code names in emails “to prevent any reader of those documents from knowing

976

Infra Facts § XI.D.2.
977

Donziger June 24, 2013 Dep. Tr. at 285:14-286:22; Donziger June 25, 2013 Dep. Tr. at
389:23-390:2.
978

Tr. (Donziger) 2592:12-15, 2592:24-2593:4.

238
exactly who it was [he] w[as] talking about.”979 So too is his contention that he does not know who
the PUPPET and the PUPPETEER were but that they were not Zambrano and Guerra.980
But there remains an important qualification. Guerra asserted at trial that Zambrano,
during his first tenure on the case (late 2009 into early 2010), told him that he, Zambrano, had made
an agreement with the LAPs to move the case along in their favor and told Guerra to work out a deal
with Fajardo to obtain payment from the LAPs for Guerra’s ghostwriting services. Guerra claimed
that he then met – first with Fajardo and later with Fajardo, Donziger, and Yanza – and worked out
a deal to move the case in the LAPs’ favor, limit Chevron’s procedural options by denying its
motions claiming essential errors, and to receive $1,000 per month from the LAPs for doing those
orders for Zambrano.
Guerra first began telling his story to Chevron representatives in June 2012. He had
a series of discussions with Chevron’s lawyers in Ecuador, at least some of which were recorded and
transcribed. In the June 25, 2012 interview, Guerra told a slightly different story about his
ghostwriting role with respect to the Chevron Lago Agrio case during Zambrano’s first tenure.
Although he said that he was ghostwriting for Zambrano on the Chevron case and others, he never
mentioned that Zambrano had reached any arrangement with the LAPs to issue orders in their favor.
To the contrary, he suggested that Zambrano’s motives for wanting to move the case were vanity
and the hope that, if the case proceeded quickly, Zambrano later might be in a position to decide it

979

Donziger Jan. 29, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 3817:13-18.
980

Id. 2593:5-23.

239
and then to extract a lucrative payment from someone.981 Indeed, Guerra told an anecdote, that he
attributed to Fajardo, in which Fajardo claimed that he had approached Zambrano during this period
(i.e., Zambrano’s first tenure on the case) to try to have the case expedited, but that Zambrano had
thrown him out of his office.982
This inconsistency was not explored at trial by either side. Nevertheless, it is not
easily reconciled with the truth of Guerra’s later testimony that Zambrano had told him that
Zambrano already had reached an unspecified arrangement with the LAPs to move the case quickly
as opposed to wishing to do so for his own reasons. There is no other evidence that this arrangement
took place. The Court therefore declines to find that the alleged arrangement between Zambrano
and the LAPs during Zambrano’s first tenure on the Lago Agrio case existed or to credit Guerra’s
testimony with respect to the alleged 2009 Honey & Honey restaurant meeting.983
We proceed now to Zambrano’s second tenure in the Lago Agrio Chevron case, the

981

DX 1360 (June 25, 2012 Interview Transcript), at 42-45 (during period in which Guerra
wrote orders for Zambrano, Zambrano told him not to “give Chevron room for anything” out
of vanity and avoidance of delay because he wanted to issue the judgment), 65 (“[d]on’t give
Chevron any room” “to reach such a point as to say: ‘Well, right now . . . , now we’re in a
situation to talk, see. Cut the bull. Do you want to talk to me?”).
982

Id. at 69-70.
983

Donziger argued that Guerra must have lied concerning the alleged fall 2009 meeting at the
Honey & Honey restaurant because Donziger was not then in Ecuador. While the Court does
not credit Guerra’s testimony with respect to that meeting, it finds Donziger’s argument that
he was not in Ecuador when it allegedly took place unpersuasive. Ecuadorian records
establish that Donziger was in Ecuador from October 6 until some time on October 9, 2009.
PX 1509 (Donziger Immigration Records). Donziger’s contention that the alleged meeting
must have taken place at a different time rests on assumptions that the Court regards as
unfounded. Nevertheless, the point is academic in view of the Court’s finding on this point,
which to reiterate is that the LAPs, with Donziger’s authorization, paid Guerra during this
period to ghostwrite Zambrano’s orders on the Chevron case and to do so to their advantage.

240
bribe, and the Judgment.
XI.

The Story Ends: The LAPs Bribed Zambrano to Allow Them to Write the Judgment and
Issue It Under His Name
As noted, Zambrano returned to preside over the Lago Agrio Chevron case in late

2010 when the case had progressed to the point at which a judgment was near. Chevron contends
that the LAPs reached a deal with Zambrano by which they agreed to pay him $500,000 to allow
them to write the Judgment in their favor, which he would sign and issue as his own. Guerra was
instrumental in facilitating this plan. The Court in this section assesses Chevron’s allegations. It
first details each witness’ account of what transpired among Guerra, Zambrano, and the LAPs during
Zambrano’s second tenure on the Lago Agrio Chevron case. It then discusses the pertinent
credibility problems of each witness and examines the evidence corroborating or conflicting with
each account. Finally, it explains why – given the history of the litigation, the weight of the
evidence, and the credibility of the witnesses – the bribery claim is the explanation that makes sense
and is persuasive.

241
A.

Zambrano’s Second Tenure Presiding Over the Lago Agrio Chevron Case: The
Accounts of the Three Witnesses at Trial
1.

Guerra
a.

Guerra’s Account
i.

More Ghostwriting, The Bribe, and The Judgment

In August 2010, Chevron moved to recuse Judge Ordóñez.984 According to Guerra,
Zambrano “saw this as an opportunity to once again take control of the Chevron case, and asked
[Guerra] to help him write the court ruling sustaining Judge Ordóñez’s disqualification from the
case.”985 Zambrano saw this also as a chance to reach out to Chevron’s attorneys once again in the
hopes of striking a deal. Zambrano instructed Guerra to make another overture to the Callejas
firm.986
At more or less the same time, Guerra, who had maintained contact with the LAP
team, on September 5, 2010, emailed Donziger to ask for legal advice on an immigration issue
relating to Guerra’s daughter.987 But he closed with the statement that he would “support the matter
of Pablo Fajardo so it will come out soon and well.”988 Guerra testified that the only business Guerra
then had with Fajardo was the Lago Agrio case and that he and Zambrano knew by this date that
984

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 36.
985

Id.; Tr. (Guerra) 975:15-977:3.
986

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 36; Tr. (Guerra) 987:1-21.
987

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 37; Tr. (Guerra) 1033:24-1034:20. Guerra testified also that he
discussed with Donziger an immigration issue concerning his son at the Honey & Honey
Restaurant. Tr. (Guerra) 925:17-926:1.
988

PX 1745 (Sept. 5, 2010 Email from A. Guerra to S. Donziger re: “Greetings from Quito”).

242
Zambrano would return to the case.989 Thus, his message was an assurance to Donziger that he
would continue to assist the LAPs with respect to the case so that it would “come out soon and
well.”990 Donziger did not reply to Guerra directly, but Fajardo later told Guerra that Donziger had
received the email and was looking into the matter.991
Guerra pursued the prospect of a deal with Chevron. He testified that “[g]iven that
[his] previous attempts to approach Chevron through Mr. Racines had been unsuccessful, on this
occasion [Guerra] asked an intermediary to propose to Chevron’s attorneys that Chevron write the
final judgment in the case in exchange for a payment to Mr. Zambrano and” to Guerra.992 The
intermediary informed Guerra that he or she had reached out to attorneys at the Callejas firm and
that the attorneys had rejected the overture.993
Guerra allegedly reported this to Zambrano, who then suggested that Guerra approach
the LAPs’ representative with essentially the same proposition – “that they could obtain a verdict
in their favor, in exchange for a payment of at least USD $500,000 to Mr. Zambrano; and for

989

Tr. (Guerra) 1035:13-20.
990

Id. (“By this date, Judge Zambrano and I knew that later on Judge Zambrano would rehear
the case. In these circumstances and through this message, specifically regarding the issue
that I will support the matter of Pablo Fajardo so it will come out soon and well, this subject
was related only with the Chevron case.”).
991

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 37.
992

Id. ¶ 39; Tr. (Guerra) 987:5-21.
993

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 40; Tr. (Guerra) 990:9-18.

243
whatever amount [Guerra] could negotiate or agree to for [him]self.”994 Guerra then took the offer
to Fajardo, who allegedly was enthusiastic but said that he had to discuss it with Donziger.995 Days
later, Guerra said, he received a call from Fajardo, who asked him to a meeting with himself,
Donziger, and Yanza.996
The meeting took place at the Honey & Honey restaurant in Quito. Guerra
summarized the proposal. Donziger had several questions for Guerra, including how he could be
sure that Zambrano actually would rule in the LAPs’ favor if the payment were made.997 Guerra
assured Donziger that he could trust Zambrano. Although he appeared interested in the deal,
Donziger ultimately replied that they, the LAPs, did not then have that sum of money.998
Some time later, Zambrano informed Guerra that he had been in direct contact with
Fajardo and that “the Plaintiffs’ representatives had agreed to pay him USD $500,000 from whatever
money they were to collect from the judgment, in exchange for allowing them to write the judgment
in the Plaintiffs’ favor.”999 Zambrano told Guerra that he would share some of the money with

994

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 41; Tr. (Guerra) 990:9-23.
995

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 41; Tr. (Guerra) 991:20-993:22.
996

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 42; Tr. (Guerra) 995:5-22.
997

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 42; Tr. (Guerra) 995:23-997:9.
998

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 42; Tr. (Guerra) 996:12-16.
999

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 43; Tr. (Guerra) 999:24-1001:12.

244
Guerra once it was paid to him.1000
Guerra then resumed his role as Judge Zambrano’s ghostwriter, albeit in a manner
different from before.1001 Zambrano “advised [Guerra] that [they] had to be more careful because
the attorneys for Chevron would be very attentive to any irregularities. Because of that, there were
times when [Guerra] traveled to Lago Agrio to work on the court rulings for the Chevron case” and
he shipped documents via TAME less frequently.1002
When Guerra was in Lago Agrio, he said, he worked on the Chevron rulings in
Zambrano’s apartment.1003 He drafted them on a laptop Fajardo had given him during Zambrano’s
first tenure on the Chevron case.1004 When he completed a ruling, he left the laptop for Zambrano,
who did not have a printer, and Zambrano took it elsewhere to print the document.1005 Zambrano
then had the orders re-typed on his personal work computer in his office at the courthouse by
Calva.1006 Zambrano apparently did this because “he did not want to upload the draft order onto his

1000

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 43; Tr. (Guerra) 1002:2-7.
There were objections to this testimony, which the Court ultimately received for the reasons
set forth in Appendix V.II.
1001

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 44; Tr. (Guerra) 1002:8-19.
1002

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 44; Tr. (Guerra) 1000:24-1001:2, 1002:8-1003:11.
1003

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 46; Tr. (Guerra) 1003:17-1004:7.
1004

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 46; Tr. (Guerra) 1003:7-16.
1005

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 46; Tr. (Guerra) 1002:15-19.
1006

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 46; Tr. (Guerra) 1002:15-1003:3.

245
work computer from a flash drive, as he understood that computer technicians could detect when
that happens and he did not want it to become known that the orders had not been drafted on his
work computer.”1007
About two weeks before the Judgment was issued in February 2011, Guerra went to
Zambrano’s apartment where he said he met with Fajardo and Zambrano. “Zambrano gave [Guerra]
a draft of the judgment so that [Guerra] could revise it.”1008 He told Guerra that the LAPs’ attorneys
had written the judgment and delivered it to him, and it was then Guerra’s job to “work on the
document to fine-tune and polish it so it would have a more legal framework.”1009 Fajardo told
Guerra to call him if Guerra needed any further assistance.1010
Guerra worked on the draft judgment in Zambrano’s apartment for several hours over
the course of two days.1011 At some point, he called Fajardo to ask him about two sections of the
draft that confused him, and Fajardo told him he would provide him with a “memory aid” to clarify
Guerra’s concerns.1012 Fajardo brought it over to Zambrano’s apartment later that day.1013

1007

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 46.
1008

Id. ¶ 47; Tr. (Guerra) 1009:6-1010:6.
1009

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 47; Tr. (Guerra) 1009:6-1010:6.
1010

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 47; Tr. (Guerra) 1010:21-1011:7.
1011

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 48; Tr. (Guerra) 1010:18-20.
1012

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 49; Tr. (Guerra) 1011:8-23.
1013

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 49; Tr. (Guerra) 1011:24-1012:12.

246
Guerra’s edits were minor, involving mainly spelling and punctuation.1014 When he
was through, he returned the document to Zambrano on the laptop.1015 The document was “not too
different from the one that the Plaintiffs lawyers had given to Mr. Zambrano.”1016 Zambrano later
told Guerra that “the Ecuadorian Plaintiffs’ attorneys made changes to the judgment up to the very
last minute before it was signed and issued by Judge Zambrano” on February 14, 2011.1017
Three days after it was issued, Chevron filed a request for expansion and clarification
of the Judgment.1018 Guerra testified that he assisted Zambrano over the phone as he prepared the
supplemental and clarification order,1019 which was issued on March 4, 2011.1020

ii.

Guerra’s Last Meeting with the LAP Team

Guerra continued assisting Zambrano with orders in his civil cases until Zambrano
was dismissed from the court.1021 He had no further contact with the LAP team save a meeting in

1014

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 49.
1015

Id.; Tr. (Guerra) 1017:23-1018:7.
1016

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 49; Tr. (Guerra) 1020:3-5.
1017

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 51; Tr. (Guerra) 1018:18-25.
1018

PX 2502 (Chevron Request for Clarification of Judgment).
1019

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 52; Tr. (Guerra) 1020:6-9.
1020

PX 429 (Mar. 4, 2011 Judgment Clarification Order).
1021

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 54; Tr. (Guerra) 1020:19-22.

247
May or June 2011 with Fajardo and one of the LAP Representatives’ U.S. lawyers at which Fajardo
and the U.S. lawyer asked Guerra to “testify [in this case] about the suitability of the Ecuadorian
legal system.”1022

iii.

Guerra Contacts Chevron

Guerra testified that in April 2012, Zambrano, who by then recently had been
dismissed from the court, authorized Guerra to “begin talks with Chevron’s representatives to reveal
the truth regarding the drafting of the judgment in the Chevron case.”1023 Guerra explained that “[i]n
[his] initial discussions with Chevron’s representatives . . . [he] attempted to negotiate a large
payment for [himself], as [he] believed that, with the substantial $18 billion judgment issued by Mr.
Zambrano, Chevron would be willing to pay [Guerra] a substantial amount for evidence and
testimony that the judgment was illegal and obtained by fraud.”1024
Zambrano “ultimately had a change of heart” and told Guerra “that he was not willing
to provide information to Chevron or to reveal the truth.”1025 Guerra continued cooperating with
Chevron’s representatives nonetheless.

He informed them that he had ghostwritten for

1022

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 55.
Fajardo offered to pay for Guerra $5,000 for his testimony and to cover his airfare and
expenses. Guerra did not disclose to the U.S. lawyer that he had served as Zambrano’s
ghostwriter or that Zambrano had agreed to $500,000 from the LAP team. Id. After the
meeting, Fajardo never followed up with Guerra and the subject was dropped.
1023

Id. ¶ 58.
1024

Id.
1025

Id. ¶ 60.

248
Zambrano.1026 He disclosed that the LAP team agreed to pay Zambrano $500,000 from any proceeds
collected on the Judgment in order to be able to ghostwrite it.1027 And he told them he had physical
evidence to back up his story. Guerra agreed also to make himself available to testify in this case,1028
although Chevron’s attorneys “told [him] repeatedly that Chevron absolutely would not pay [him]
for testimony.”1029
In July 2012, Guerra began to turn over physical evidence to Chevron’s
representatives. He gave them his personal computer, on which he had typed many of the orders
in Zambrano’s cases,1030 two cellular telephones,1031 his daily planners,

1032

TAME shipping

records,1033 his cellular telephone records,1034 bank records, and credit card statements.1035 And he

1026

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 61; PX 1671 (Guerra Jan. 27, 2013 Signed Agreement with
Chevron) ¶ 2; Tr. (Guerra) 1152:12-22.
1027

PX 1671 (Guerra Jan. 27, 2013 Signed Agreement with Chevron) ¶ 3.
1028

Id. ¶ 7.
1029

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 59.
1030

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 61; PX 1736#; Tr. (Guerra) 1118:13-16.
1031

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 61; PX 1738 #.
1032

PX 1733, 1734 (Guerra Daily Planners); Tr. (Guerra) 1125:7-9.
1033

PX 1682 (TAME Shipping Records).
1034

PX 1727, 1728 (Guerra telephone records).
1035

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 61; see Tr. (Guerra) 1160:22-1161:3.

249
provided Chevron’s investigators access to two of his email accounts.1036 Chevron paid Guerra a
total of $48,000 for the physical evidence.1037
After two meetings with Chevron attorneys in Ecuador, and after he had turned over
the bulk of his physical evidence,1038 Chevron in November 2012 flew Guerra to Chicago to meet
with Chevron representatives and attorneys.1039 Guerra there signed a declaration that was filed in
this case in January 2013 in which he described his relationship with Zambrano and the drafting of
the Lago Agrio Judgment.1040
Fearing retaliation from the ROE, Guerra and his family (including his wife, his son,
and his son’s family) relocated to the United States.1041 Chevron representatives paid for the
move1042 and, as his visa status does not allow him to work while he is in this country, Chevron pays
him $10,000 per month for his living expenses, pays for health insurance coverage for Guerra and
his family, leases a car for him, and pays for an attorney to represent him in any dealings with
federal or state government investigative authorities or any civil litigation, and for an immigration

1036

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 61.
1037

Id.; PX 1671, 1672 (Guerra Agreements with Chevron); Tr. (Guerra) 1043:6-15.
1038

Tr. (Guerra) 1070:1-1075:4.
1039

Id. 1075:6-19.
1040

DX 1363 (Guerra Nov. 17, 2013 Decl.); Tr. (Guerra) 1084:13-1085:1.
1041

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 64.
1042

PX 1671 (Guerra Jan. 27, 2013 Signed Agreement with Chevron).

250
attorney to deal with his resident status.1043
Shortly after Guerra left Ecuador, the LAP team filed a criminal complaint against
him there.1044

b.

Assessing Guerra’s Account
i.

Guerra’s Credibility

From the standpoint of demeanor, Guerra was an impressive witness. He testified
clearly, directly, and responsively, regardless of which side questioned him. He rarely hesitated.
On the other hand, it is appropriate to recognize that he was very extensively prepared for his
testimony by Chevron.1045 While there is nothing wrong with extensive preparation of a witness,
it may bear on the weight of the testimony. But there is more to assessing Guerra’s credibility than
the fact that he came across well on the stand.
The first consideration is Guerra’s self interest – including the fact that Chevron, to
summarize briefly, is supporting him and has assisted his relocation from Ecuador to the United
States.
Second, Guerra admitted that he often has been dishonest.1046 His professional
history includes multiple instances in which he has accepted bribes, lied, and facilitated illegal

1043

Id.; Tr. (Guerra) 1052:24-1064:9.
1044

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 64.
1045

Tr. (Guerra) 1049:9-1052:7.
1046

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 55.

251
relationships between parties and judges. For example, Guerra testified that he:
•

Issued rulings in Zambrano’s favor when Guerra was a judge and Zambrano
a prosecutor in Lago Agrio. Although Guerra was “careful to issue these
rulings with some legal grounds,” he claimed to have known “that the party
benefitting from [his] decision was paying Mr. Zambrano bribes for
arranging to have the case ruled in that party’s favor, and Mr. Zambrano,
from time to time, shared with [Guerra] a portion of those bribes.”1047

•

As a practicing attorney, Guerra “on occasion bribed judges, including judges
on the nation’s highest courts, to rule in [his] clients’ favor or assist [Guerra]
in obtaining favorable ruling.”1048

•

As a judge, Guerra “occasionally accepted bribes from litigants in exchange
for issuing favorable rulings.”1049

•

Ghostwrote orders for Zambrano in return for payments from both Zambrano
and the LAP team.

•

Attempted to solicit bribes from both the LAP team and, on at least two
occasions, from Chevron.

•

Solicited a $500,000 bribe to be paid by the LAP team to Zambrano in
exchange for a ruling in the LAPs’ favor.

•

Was removed from the court apparently for making statements that the
“Chevron case should be declared null, at a time when [he] no longer
presided over the . . . case.”1050

•

Admittedly lied to the Chevron investigators in claiming that the LAPs had
offered him $300,000, a lie that he explained at trial by saying that he had

1047

Id. ¶ 8.
1048

Id. ¶ 9.
1049

Id.
1050

Id. ¶ 7.

252
been trying to exaggerate his own importance.1051
The details of some of these admissions are important to this story and indeed form
the basis for much of Chevron’s theory of how the Judgment came about. They will be dealt with
more fully below. For present purposes, the Court notes only that Guerra’s willingness to accept
and solicit bribes, and his lie to Chevron about the supposed offer by the LAPs of $300,000, and
other considerations, put his credibility in serious doubt, particularly in light of the benefits he has
obtained from Chevron. Indeed, Guerra admitted that he came forward because he believed he
would be “rewarded handsomely.”1052 In addition, there are some inconsistencies in his story.

ii.

Inconsistencies in Guerra’s Account

As discussed, it appears that Guerra first began to tell his story to Chevron
representatives in June 2012.1053 There were three interviews in June and July 2012, two entirely
and one partly recorded.1054 He told his story again when he met with Chevron lawyers in Chicago
and signed the declaration that later was filed in this case. And he told it again at trial. Each
recounting yielded variations in some of the details. The Court begins with the following
concerning Guerra’s participation in the drafting of the Judgment as they were matters upon which
1051

Tr. 1197:3-16; DX 1360 (June 25, 2012 Interview Tr.), at 10, 29, 48, 83, 87.
1052

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 58.
1053

Rivero Apr. 24, 2013 Dep. Tr. at 90:12-91:4.
1054

Id. at 91:13-92:5; see DX 1360 (Transcript of July 13, 2012 Conversation between A.
Guerra, Yohir Akerman, and A. Rivero); DX 1361 (Transcript of July 13, 2012
Conversation between A. Guerra and A. Rivero); DX 1362 (Transcript of July 31, 2012
Conversation between A. Guerra, Investigator 5, and A. Rivero).

253
the defendants have focused.
First, Guerra’s testimony regarding how he allegedly received the draft of the
Judgment to begin his work on it changed.
As noted, Guerra testified at trial that Zambrano gave him a draft on Fajardo’s laptop
approximately two weeks before the Judgment was issued so that Guerra could revise it.1055 Guerra
then spent two days working on the document in Zambrano’s apartment in Lago Agrio using
Fajardo’s computer.1056 But when he spoke with Chevron’s representatives earlier, he said that
Zambrano had given him a draft of the Judgment on a flash drive at the Quito airport.1057
Second, Guerra’s testimony regarding his receipt of the “memory aid” from Fajardo
while he was working on the Judgment changed as well.
At trial, he said that he called Fajardo to ask him about two sections of the draft that
confused him at some point while he was working in Zambrano’s apartment.1058 Fajardo then
brought him the memory aid to clarify Guerra’s concerns.1059 When Guerra met with the
investigators in July 2012, however, he said that Fajardo had emailed the memory aid to him,1060 and

1055

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 47.
1056

Id. ¶¶ 47-48.
1057

Id. ¶ 47.
1058

Id. ¶ 49.
1059

Id.
1060

DX 1361 (Tr., July 13, 2012 Conversation between A. Guerra and A. Rivero), at 48.

254
he repeated that in his November 2012 declaration.1061
Guerra explained at trial that “[a]t the beginning, [he] was certain that [he] had
received that memory aid via e-mail, but then [he] later recalled that [Fajardo] personally handed
[Guerra] the document in the nighttime hours of the first day of [his] review of” the Judgment.1062
He said further that “[w]hen [he] first summarized these events in a sworn declaration in November
2012, [he] stated that [he] recalled receiving this ‘memory aid’ from Fajardo . . . but [he] could not
locate the document itself.”1063 However, while later searching for documents responsive to
defendants’ requests in this action, Guerra located the memory aid and provided it to Chevron.1064
Defendants contend that Guerra initially told Chevron that he had received the
Judgment and the memory aid on a flash drive and by email because Guerra wanted to convince
Chevron that he had hard evidence to back up his story. He then gave Chevron representatives his
computer, access to his email accounts, and a number of flash drives in exchange for payment,
promising them that they would find the memory aid and a draft of the Judgment on his media. But
when Chevron’s experts searched his email and flash drives, they found no memory aid and no
Judgment. So, defendants argue, Guerra changed his story to explain his alleged receipt of the
memory aid and the draft judgment in ways consistent with the absence of those documents on
Guerra’s computer. But there is at least one problem with defendants’ theory that these changes

1061

DX 1363 (Guerra Nov. 2012 Decl.) ¶ 26.
1062

Tr. (Guerra) 1012:9-12.
1063

PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶ 50.
1064

Id.; Tr. (Guerra) 1016:3-9.

255
reflected a careful conforming by Guerra of the details of the story to new evidence as it emerged.
Guerra explicitly told Chevron’s representatives in his July 2012 meetings that he
had not found the memory aid or the draft of the Judgment on his computer or the flash drives.1065
What he said were on his computer hard drive were copies of drafts of orders he had written for
Zambrano,1066 and that was accurate. It is entirely possible that Guerra told Chevron that he received
the draft of the Judgment from Zambrano on a flash drive because that is how he normally received
drafts of orders from Zambrano, that he so believed at the time, and that his memory subsequently
was refreshed.
Third, there is another possibly troublesome question concerning the memory aid
testimony. The memory aid itself, though it purports to contain a chronology of the Lago Agrio
case, does not refer to anything that occurred after 2009 although it allegedly was provided to
Guerra in late 2010 or early 2011.1067 Thus, one might expect that any chronology given to Guerra
in late 2010 or early 2011 would have included events after 2009. Nevertheless, there is no
necessary inconsistency in this, as Guerra stated that the memory aid responded to specific questions
he had asked,1068 which may explain the date cutoff. Likewise, it is entirely possible that Fajardo
responded to Guerra’s request with a preexisting document that, though old, was adequate to the
purpose.

1065

DX 1361 (Tr., July 13, 2012 Conversation between A. Guerra and A. Rivero), at 61.
1066

Id.
1067

PX 1703 (memory aid); Tr. (Guerra) 1012:13-23.
1068

Id. (Guerra) 1013:5-12.

256
2.

Zambrano

We have discussed Zambrano’s account of how he claimed to have prepared the
Judgment. He claimed that he was the sole author of the Judgment. He never asked Guerra to make
revisions to it before it was issued on February 14.1069 He never asked Guerra to travel to Lago
Agrio to work on the Judgment.1070 Indeed, according to Zambrano, Guerra never worked on the
Lago Agrio Judgment at any time before it was issued.1071 But for reasons previously explained,
Zambrano was not a credible witness.1072 No more need be said on that point. We turn now to
Donziger.

1069

Tr. (Zambrano) 1810:1-4.
1070

Id. 1810:11-18.
1071

Id. 1811:3-5.
1072

It is worth noting that Chevron unsuccessfully sought a favorable statement from Zambrano
in this action. Zambrano testified that Guerra, in approximately August 2012, informed
him that he had been speaking to Chevron representatives, and “that Chevron was willing
to give [Zambrano] a minimum of $1 million or whatever he wanted” in exchange for his
cooperation. Id. 1914:24-1915:2. Guerra met him at the Quito airport and gave Zambrano
documents, including the business card of a Chevron attorney who wished to speak with
him. Id. 1915:7-13; DX 92 (Zambrano Decl.; Rivero Business Card), at 138 of 250.
Guerra called Zambrano several times after their airport meeting to reiterate the proposal.
Tr. (Zambrano) 1929:22-1930:9. In January 2013, Zambrano received a phone call from
Rivero himself requesting that Zambrano meet with him in person. Id. 1930:10-25; DX 84
(Transcript of Recorded Call Between Zambrano and Rivero). Zambrano told Rivero that
he would not speak with him until he confirmed that Rivero worked for Chevron and found
out exactly what Guerra had told him. Zambrano secretly recorded the conversation. Tr.
(Zambrano) 1931:5-15; DX 84 (Transcript of Recorded Call Between Zambrano and
Rivero).
Zambrano did not follow up with Rivero. In March 2013, he signed a declaration that
defendants filed in this action. PX 6330 (Zambrano Mar. 28, 2013 Decl.).

257
3.

Donziger
a.

Donziger’s Account

Donziger’s direct testimony on these subjects was brief. He stated:
“I did not write the judgment in the [Lago Agrio] case in Ecuador. I have no
knowledge that anybody on the legal team of the plaintiffs wrote the judgment in this
case, or wrote any part of the judgment.
I have never met Judge Nicolás Zambrano, nor have I communicated with him.
Other than his live testimony during this trial, I have never seen Judge Nicolás
Zambrano.
I did not bribe Judge Zambrano. The allegations by former Judge Alberto Guerra
that I was involved in a meeting where I ‘approved’ a plan arranged by Pablo
Fajardo to pay Zambrano $500,000 is false.”1073
With respect to Guerra, Donziger testified that he “did not agree or express any
support for a plan to pay any amount of money so that the plaintiffs would be able to draft the final
judgment.”1074 Donziger did admit that he had had a relationship with Guerra, although he described
it in minimal terms.
Donziger stated that he “occasionally chatted about non-substantive matters” with
Guerra when Guerra was the presiding judge on the Lago Agrio Chevron case, i.e., from May 2003
until January 2004.1075 He acknowledged that Guerra had Donziger’s phone number in 2008.1076
They each had the other’s email address, and Donziger admitted having received emails from

1073

DX 1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶¶ 71-73.
1074

Id. ¶ 75.
1075

Id. ¶ 77.
1076

Tr. (Donziger) 2588:20-25.

258
Guerra, which he claimed he thought were spam and ignored.1077 But he conceded also that he had
received a March 1, 2008 email from Guerra in which Guerra sought a favor for a friend, and that
he forwarded it to Fajardo for advice.1078
Donziger said that “[t]he one meeting with Guerra that stands apart vividly in [his]
memory was the one in Quito” with Guerra and Fajardo1079 at which, he acknowledged, the topic of
a bribe was discussed.1080 But he said that he agreed to attend only “with the idea that [he] would
pick up useful tidbits of ‘courthouse gossip.’”1081
The meeting took place in late 2010 at “a restaurant in Quito” and lasted
approximately 45 minutes.1082 Toward the end of the meeting, Donziger acknowledged, Guerra said
that he could ensure that the judgment would come out in the LAPs’ favor for $500,000 – that “he
could get it done for a payment.”1083 But Donziger, in contrast to Guerra, testified that he

1077

Id. 2589:1-13.
1078

PX 2469 (Mar. 1, 2008 Email from A. Guerra to S. Donziger re: “Request for Investivation”
[sic]); PX 1749 (Mar. 2, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to P. Fajardo re: “What should I
do?”); Tr. (Donziger) 2589:14-20.
1079

He did not deny that he had other meetings with Guerra, with or without Fajardo.
1080

DX 1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶ 78.
1081

Id.
1082

Tr. (Donziger) 2597:8-24.
1083

Id. 2598:2-16.

259
“immediately and unequivocally refused” Guerra’s request.1084 He added that “I would never do that
. . . . Whatever money we had we would not – it would not be used to bribe a judge . . . .”1085
Donziger admitted that neither he nor anyone else on the LAP team reported Guerra’s
bribe solicitation.1086 He said there were “various reasons”1087 for that, but the only one he gave was
that he “felt like [Guerra’s] offer didn’t have a lot of credibility. And [Donziger] was very
concerned that doing anything at that point to turn [Guerra] in would give Chevron an excuse to
further use it against the court or against the process such that the trial could be derailed.”1088

b.

Donziger’s Credibility
i.

Self Interest

That Donziger is deeply self interested – both on the ghostwriting questions and, in
addition, with respect to the outcome of this case generally – is obvious. We have noted already that
Donziger personally stands to gain a contingent fee in excess of $600 million1089 and, it appears,
control of or influence over the billions that would go to the ADF were the Judgment collected.1090
1084

DX 1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶ 78.
1085

Tr. (Donziger) 2598:24-2599:7.
1086

Id. 2600:24-2601:4.
1087

Id.
1088

Id. 2650:17-2651:2.
1089

PX 558 (Donziger Jan. 2011 Retention Agreement), at 3.
1090

Supra Facts § II.

260
The money is important to him. Just one indicator, of many, came from his own lips in an exchange
with the Crude camera crew:
“DONZIGER: You can never underestimate the power of personal relationships in
this business. You know?
CAMERAMAN: What business is that?
DONZIGER: The business of getting press coverage as part of a legal strategy.
CAMERAMAN: Hey, uh. Can we, Can we all fit in your – ?
DONZIGER: The business of plaintiffs’ law. To make fucking money.”1091
And Donziger’s self interest extends beyond money. As he confided to his personal
notebook on April 4, 2007:
“I had an incredible email with Russ this morning. He read the VF [Vanity Fair]
story.
R[u]ss is funding the case. Russ is funding the movie. And Russ wants to fund more
cases and more movies.
I sit back and dream. I cannot believe what we have accomplished. Important
people interested in us. A new paradigm of not only a case, but how to do a case.
Chevron wanting to settle. Billions of dollars on the table. A movie, a possible book.
I cannot keep up with it all.”1092
Thus, Donziger wants money, but he wants more as well. These desires have been important
motivating factors.

1091

PX 57A[9] (Apr. 24, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS-258-00-CLIP-01.
1092

PX 203 (Donziger Notebook) (emphasis added).

261
ii.

Deceit

Donziger has deceived when deception served his interests.1093 Many such incidents
have been discussed already, including these:
•

Donziger recruited Reyes and Pinto, ostensibly to act as independent
monitors but in reality to work for the LAPs, to undermine an anticipated
negative report from the court’s settling experts. He made an under the table
payment to induce them to do so. Contrary to the facts, he arranged with
them to conceal their relationship with the LAPs to the court and to pose as
independents. Donziger admitted in the privacy of his notebook that this was
a “bargain with the devil”in which he had gone “over to the dark side.”

•

Donziger recruited Cabrera and then ensured that Cabrera “would totally play
ball” with the LAPs. He and his Ecuadorian colleagues secretly prepared the
work plan, a version of which Cabrera, in accordance with the scheme,
passed off on the court as his own. Donziger then hired and worked
extensively with Stratus to have Stratus write most of the Cabrera Report that
was supposed to be Cabrera’s independent, impartial product. In order to
conceal the roles of Stratus and the LAPs vis-a-vis Cabrera, he instructed
Stratus’ Beltman and Maest to keep their involvement secret. Once the
report was filed, complete with Cabrera’s repeated false protestations to the
court of his independence, Donziger knowingly promoted the fiction of
Cabrera’s impartiality and independence, drafting or assisting in the drafting
of numerous press releases touting the work of the “independent expert.”

•

Donziger long hid the truth about Cabrera from Karen Hinton and others on
the public relations team, whom he repeatedly had issue press releases
emphasizing Cabrera’s independence and lambasting Chevron’s allegations
to the contrary.1094

•

Donziger concealed Stratus’ real role from Kohn despite that Kohn at the
time was funding the LAPs. Donziger hid from Kohn the fact that some of
the funds Kohn provided were shuttled covertly to Cabrera through a “secret
account.” And Donziger prevented Kohn from commissioning an
independent investigation of the Cabrera episode when allegations of

1093

The Court considers the evidence of Donziger’s prior deceit on the issue of his credibility
and not to prove character for the purpose of showing that he acted in accordance with that
character on other specific occasions.
1094

Tr. (Hinton) 2189:5-2190:3.

262
misconduct began to surface.
•

Donziger concealed the truth about the Cabrera Report from certain, though
not all, members of the LAP team. He did not inform the Weinberg Group
or the cleansing experts that Cabrera had not been independent. Nor did he
reveal that fact to his co-counsel in the United States, many of whom were
working directly on the Cabrera fallout.

•

Donziger convinced Shinder and McDermott to represent the LAPs in the
Stratus Section 1782 proceeding by assuring them that Chevron’s allegations
concerning the LAPs’ collusion with Cabrera were untrue. It was not until
they learned the truth directly from Beltman that Donziger confessed that the
LAPs’ involvement in the preparation of the report were more extensive than
he initially had indicated.

•

Once the details of the Cabrera episode began to leak out, Donziger
encouraged the American lawyers not to reveal in their court filings any more
than they absolutely had to. He specifically warned them of the “negative
fallout” that could occur if the Fajardo Declaration and Petition disclosed too
much. As we know, the misleading Fajardo Declaration was filed in the
Denver court and at least sixteen others in the United States, including this
one.

iii.

Misrepresentation to this Court

As noted, Prieto on March 30, 2010, sent an email to Donziger, Fajardo, and others
expressing Prieto’s concern that “the proceeding,” i.e., the Lago Agrio case, would be destroyed and
“all of us, your attorneys, might go to jail” if Stratus’ documents were produced in the Colorado
Section 1782 proceeding.1095 Donziger has testified twice about that email. His two accounts were
very different.
In a January 2011 deposition, Donziger admitted that Prieto’s email expressed
“concern[] that all of the local Ecuadorian lawyers for the Lago Agrio plaintiffs might end up in jail
1095

PX 1279 (Mar. 30, 2010 Email from J. Prieto to S. Donziger, J. Sáenz, L. Yanza, and P.
Fajardo re: “Protection Action”).

263
because of. . . [t]he role they played related to Stratus, Mr. Cabrera. . . .”1096 But when he was
questioned about the same email at a sanctions hearing before this Court in April 2013, Donziger
said that Prieto had not been concerned with the substance of the Stratus documents that would be
disclosed – that is, with the fact that the truth about the relationship among the LAP lawyers, Stratus
and Cabrera would come out. He was concerned instead, Donziger claimed, with “his fear that by
turning over documents in the United States via the Stratus 1782, that it would violate their
Ecuadoran law obligations in Ecuador among local counsel”1097 – in other words, a professional
obligation of confidentiality.
The hearing at which Donziger offered this new explanation for the email dealt with
Chevron’s motion to sanction Donziger and the LAPs for their failure to produce documents from
Ecuador. Defendants had refused to produce the documents because, among other reasons, they
claimed it would have been illegal under Ecuadorian law. Donziger’s testimony at the sanctions
hearing thus offered a convenient explanation for the very damaging email – with the added benefit
that the new explanation was in line with defendants’ newly-minted argument that Ecuadorian law
prevented disclosure of Stratus’ documents. But it was contradicted directly by his prior sworn
testimony on the matter. The Court finds that this testimony by Donziger at the sanctions hearing
deliberately was false.1098
1096

Donziger Jan. 19, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 3381:14-20 (emphasis added).
1097

Sanctions Hr’g (Donziger), at 113:9-18.
1098

Donziger sought to mislead this Court in another way, albeit perhaps not so blatantly.
On May 3, 2013, former counsel for Donziger sought and later obtained leave to withdraw
as counsel on the ground of non-payment of fees. DI 1104 (LAPs Mem.); DI 1105
(Donziger Mem.). Following the withdrawal, Donziger repeatedly moved to adjourn

264
iv.

Evasiveness and Demeanor

In November 2011, Donziger prepared a memorandum for himself in advance of his
deposition in the Section 1782 case in this Court.1099 The memorandum began as follows:
“Read: RICO, Borja, Cabrera report, Tropical Rainforest EP, Cancer-San Seb,
Guanta, Genocide, Wray testimony (3rd day), Chevron’s own test results; define SRD
role; 2nd circuit brief; basis for belief people were dying.
Comments: ‘It’s possible but I don’t think so’; ‘I guess it’s possible, but to best of
my recollection I didn’t.’ ”1100
He testified, “I wrote it [the italicized language] in response to specific questions that might come

deadlines or stay this case, always claiming that he had “limited resources” with which to
secure new counsel and defend himself. DI 1212 (Donziger Aff.) ¶ 14; see also DI 1211
(Mot. to Stay) (“A stay is absolutely necessary if I am to have a realistic chance to obtain the
funds for, and to retain, substitute counsel”); DI 1214 (May 23, 2013 Tr.), at 3:25-4:4; DI
1318 (July 18, 2013 Tr), at 11:13-18 (“my prior counsel already spent thousands of hours
dealing with their previous motions . . . which essentially drove my counsel off of this case
. . . because I couldn’t afford to pay their fees anymore because they were all wasted on these
previous motions for summary judgment”); DI 1369 (Mot. for Order to Show Cause); DI
1435 (Mot. for Extension of Time); DI 1459 (LAPs Mem.).
Although the Court largely granted Donziger’s requested relief, it made clear time and again
that it would be willing to consider further extensions or delays if Donziger provided
competent evidence or sworn testimony substantiating his claim that he was constrained by
a lack of resources. E.g., DI 1214 (May 23, 2013 Tr.), at 13:25-14:6; DI 1185 (Order), at
3 (“The Court . . . is willing to consider [Mr. Donziger’s] issues in the event a well supported
motion is filed.”); DI 1302 (Order Denying Mot. for Stay); DI 1407 (Order Denying Stay).
Donziger never did so. At trial, however, Donziger admitted that, notwithstanding his claims
of lack of resources, he actually had secured additional funding of $2.5 million in March
2013 – two months before his counsel withdrew – from a British investor. See Tr.
(Donziger) 2528:9-2529:11. He admitted also that he personally had received $600,000 in
liquid assets and over one million in real estate over the preceding year and a half from
probate actions he initiated against family members in Florida. Id. 2537:6-2539:2.
1099

PX 2457 (Donziger Deposition Memo).
1100

Id. (emphasis added).

265
up that that would be an appropriate response to.”1101
Donziger graduated from Harvard Law School. He tried cases as a public defender
in Washington before getting involved with Aguinda. He did not need a written reminder to respond
to a question by saying, if such an answer would be true, that he did not remember or even that his
best recollection was that something had or had not happened.
Donziger was evasive repeatedly at his deposition in the Section 1782 action against
him, his deposition in this case, and again at trial. In his June 2013 deposition in this case, Donziger
replied “I don’t know” or “I don’t recall” to more than 180 questions, nearly every substantive
question posed to him.1102 And during his cross-examination at trial, Donziger so responded over
one hundred times.
The likelihood that Donziger’s memory was as bad as these answers suggested is very
small.
* * *
In sum, the Court declines to credit Zambrano’s and Donziger’s testimony with
respect to the bribe scheme. As to Guerra, the Court has examined his credibility carefully,
considered his past dishonesty, and examined the inconsistencies in his testimony. Guerra on many
occasions has acted deceitfully and broken the law. Some details of his story of what transpired in
the Lago Agrio case have changed. But that does not necessarily mean that it should be disregarded
wholesale.
The Court next considers the circumstantial evidence relevant to the bribe scheme,
1101

Tr. (Donziger) 2464:4-10.
1102

Donziger June 24, 25, 28 2013 Dep. Tr., passim.

266
and the defendants’ evidence at trial. It concludes that this evidence leads to one conclusion: Guerra
told the truth regarding the bribe and the essential fact as to who wrote the Judgment. The Court
is convinced that the LAPs bribed Zambrano and wrote the Judgment in their favor.

B.

Chevron’s Circumstantial Evidence Pertinent to the Alleged Bribery
Certain facts probative of the validity of Chevron’s contention that the LAPs bribed

Zambrano are undisputed or already have been determined.
First, Guerra and Zambrano had a long standing and close relationship. No one
disputes that Guerra drafted orders for Zambrano, at least in some civil cases other than Chevron.
The Court has concluded that the arrangement between them was improper under Ecuadorian law
and found, in addition, that Zambrano paid Guerra for his drafting services.
Second, Guerra drafted orders for Zambrano on the Chevron case, as well as others,
during Zambrano’s first tenure. The LAPs paid him $1,000 a month for his services with respect
to Chevron.
Third, Guerra and Donziger both testified that Fajardo arranged a meeting in late
2010 at the restaurant in Quito at which Guerra proposed to fix the case with the judge (then
Zambrano) for a $500,000 bribe. Donziger did not deny that Guerra proposed that the quid pro quo
would include not only a decision in favor of the LAPs, but allowing the LAPs to write the
Judgment. Nor did he deny Guerra’s testimony that Fajardo was at the meeting.
Fourth, the Court has found that Zambrano did not write much, if any, of the
Judgment.
Fifth, the Judgment includes substantial passages and references that do not appear

267
anywhere in the Lago Agrio Record, but that do appear verbatim or in substance in a number of
documents from the LAPs’ files. Whoever wrote the Judgment copied those materials from the
LAPs’ unfiled work product. Moreover, a complete review of the LAPs’ files never took place
because the files located in Ecuador were not produced.
Sixth, neither Donziger nor the LAP team reported Guerra’s bribe solicitation to
authorities.1103 Indeed, the LAPs considered hiring Guerra as an expert witness on the fairness of
the Ecuadorian judicial system for use in the United States long after Guerra had solicited a bribe
from them to fix the Lago Agrio case.
Seventh, Fajardo – who is the LAPs’ counsel of record in Ecuador and the holder of
a power of attorney on behalf of all of the LAPs – and their other Ecuadorian lawyers declined to
testify.
In addition to the foregoing, there is additional circumstantial evidence independent
of Guerra’s testimony.

1103

While Donziger tried to explain this away, the fact that he did not report the bribe solicitation
is undisputed. Moreover, the explanation is not persuasive. Donziger claimed that there
were “various reasons” why no report was made, but the only reasons he mentioned were
that he claimed that he did not regard Guerra as having had much credibility and that he was
“very concerned that doing anything at that point to turn [Guerra] in would give Chevron an
excuse to further use it against the court or against the process such that the trial could be
derailed.” Tr. (Donziger) 2650:17-2651:2. Given the facts that (a) Donziger frequently
claimed that he was afraid that Chevron would corrupt the process and buy a favorable
outcome; (b) Donziger had made complaints against other judges, id. 2601:5-17; and (c) the
Ecuadorian government, up to and including the president, was openly and fully supportive
of Donziger and the LAPs, those explanations are of limited value. The failure of Donziger
and the LAPs to report Guerra’s bribe solicitation, moreover, certainly was not comparable
to Chevron’s failures in light of the hostility of the Ecuadorian government to Chevron.
Supra Facts § IX.A.4, infra Discussion § VII.C.6.

268
First, Zambrano needed the money.1104
Second, Donziger and the LAPs had huge financial and other incentives to want to
win.
Third, Donziger and the LAPs had at least two important reasons for wishing to
control precise aspects of the decision, quite apart from winning in general.
The first already has been discussed – Donziger and the LAPs had strong incentives
to ensure that the decision not rely on the Cabrera Report.1105 But he was unwilling to abandon
reliance publicly on the Cabrera Report because doing so would have discredited the case and
impugned the LAPs’ integrity in vital respects.1106 So the LAPs continued to rely on the Cabrera
Report in their final alegato1107 but they needed to ensure that the decision did not do so.

1104

Zambrano’s personal financial statement, filed in November 2010 although dated in July
2008, PX 393 (ROE Judiciary Council personnel action dated Nov. 16, 2010 attaching
Zambrano’s sworn assets statement dated July 31, 2008), showed that he had cash on hand
of under $2,500, not even enough to pay his outstanding Diners Club balance. He owed
banks nearly $8,000. Apart from two used vehicles, one of which was pledged, the only
other material asset shown was $27,500 of real estate owned by his wife. Zambrano made
no effort to explain these data, to show that his financial circumstances had improved, or to
deny any economic motive to participate in the bribe arrangement. Nor is it likely that there
was any improvement in Zambrano’s financial situation between July 2008 and the issuance
of the Judgment.
1105

See supra Facts §§ 5.E.-G.
1106

That Donziger’s mind ran in this direction is shown by his reaction much earlier to Soltani’s
suggestion that Amazon Watch stop comparing the pollution in the Orienté to the Exxon
Valdez spill. Rather than retreat, Donziger insisted that they stick to the claim. He warned
that there would be “HUGE implications for the legal case” if they disavowed the
comparison to Exxon Valdez, and told Amazon Watch that it “could terribly prejudice the
people it is trying to help if it makes this change.” PX 860 (May 24, 2007 Email from S.
Donziger to S. Tegel re: “private”).
1107

DX 1482 (LAPs’ Final Alegato), passim.

269
The Court has not yet discussed the second, and it is this. The LAPs were concerned
about an ambiguity in the EMA in connection with their attempts to raise new financing in 2010
after Kohn withdrew his support. As Patton Boggs spelled out in 2010 in the Invictus Memo, which
was prepared in the effort to obtain a new investment from Burford, Article 43 of the EMA provides
that the judge in an action such as the Lago Agrio case is to order payment of damages “to the
community directly affected and to repair the harm and damage . . . [and] also order the responsible
party to pay to the moving party ten percent (10%) of the value of damages.”1108 Thus, “Art. 43
present[ed] some measure of risk that a substantial portion of the judgment could be awarded to a
presently uninvolved-and therefore unforeseen-agency or public authority” with only ten percent
going to the LAPs.1109 Although Patton Boggs said it thought the possibility of such an outcome
was low, it recognized that such an outcome would dramatically reduce the money available for
investors and the fees payable to the attorneys, both of which depended on the LAPs winning. This
was of sufficient concern that the Invictus Memo contemplated that “the Plaintiff group [might] .
. . arrang[e] for receipt of any funds recovered against the judgment through payment agents in the
United States and thereafter dividing those funds outside the Republic of Ecuador.”1110

1108

PX 1407 (Invictus Memo), at 27 (quoting EMA) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1109

Id.
1110

Id. at 27-28.
The defendants in May 2012 did create a Gibralter company, Amazonia Recovery Limited
(“Amazonia”) for receipt and distribution of any funds in consequence of the Judgment.
See PX 657 (Amazonia Memorandum of Association); Donziger June 25, 2013 Dep. Tr. at
626:18-20, 627:12-24, 629:12-17, 631:3-6, 632:4-9, 633:22-634:2, 634:13-635:15; PX 1520
(diagram of Newco (i.e., Amazonia) structure and fund flows). Amazonia, however, was
not created until more than a year after the Judgment was rendered.

270
Writing the decision precisely as they wished and securing Zambrano’s signature on
it would have solved or, at least gone far toward solving, both the Cabrera Report and Article 43
problems. The disclaimer of reliance on the Cabrera Report offered the best hope for the first.
Obtaining a judgment providing that all of the damages would be payable to the ADF, as the
Judgment ultimately did, would have eliminated the EMA Article 43 concern.
Finally, there was no lack of opportunity. The LAPs previously had availed
themselves of Guerra’s ghostwriting efforts when Zambrano was on the case for the first time.
These facts circumstantially support Chevron’s contention.

C.

Other Circumstantial Evidence – The Fajardo December 2010-January 2011 Emails
That said, and despite the fact that the defendants have not argued the point, there are

two exhibits that at first blush would be in some tension with Chevron’s claim that the defendants
bribed Zambrano with respect to the outcome and the Judgment, if they were admissible and fully
candid. They are emails by Fajardo dated December 31, 2010 and January 8, 2011.1111
The December 31, 2010 email was addressed to Eric Westenberger of Patton Boggs,
Donziger, and Sáenz. The subject was “ABOUT THE ALEGATO,” i.e., the final written argument
to be submitted to the Lago Agrio court. Fajardo pointed out that the LAPs’ final submission would

1111

DX 899 (Dec. 31, 2010 Email from P. Fajardo to E. Westenberger, S. Donziger and J. Sáenz
re: “ABOUT THE ALEGATO”); DX 900 (Jan. 8, 2011 Emails from P. Fajardo to J. Sáenz,
J. Prieto, S. Donziger, A. Carrasco, E. Westenberger, L. Yanza, and V. Barham; second
email to J. Prieto, J. Sáenz, S. Donziger, toxico, A. Carrasco, E Westenberger, and V.
Barham re: “CHEVRON’S ALEGATO”).

271
have to be filed in the next week, that its preparation was being coordinated by Westenberger1112 and
Sáenz, that Fajardo already had hoped to have received it for translation into Spanish, but that “it
ha[d] not arrived, at least not yet.” He went on to say that “[n]obody knows when the Judge may
issue the judgment . . . but if the judge issues the judgment soon, we will end up with the document
[i.e., the alegato] in hand and it will be useless to us.” The email closed by stating that “we are
behind schedule with this memorandum of law, which could have serious consequences for the
case.”1113
The January 8, 2011 emails1114 went to a broader audience, including also Prieto,
Yanza,1115 Anne Carrasco, and Vanessa Barham, the former of whom worked at Patton Boggs and
the latter of whom was among the LAPs’ lawyers working in Ecuador.1116 The first of Fajardo’s two
emails of that date reported that Chevron had filed its alegato on January 6. Prieto responded that
1112

Patton Boggs in general and Westenberger in particular did a great deal of work in
preparing the LAPs’ alegato. E.g., Tyrrell Dep. Tr. at 315:4-13, 319:6-320:5; see also PX
7468 (Nov. 11, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to E. Westenberger and A. Small re: “this is
latest draft of alegato”); PX 1470 (Jan. 12, 2011 Email Chain Between Patton Boggs
lawyers re: review of final Alegato).
1113

DX 899 (Dec. 31, 2010 Email from P. Fajardo to E. Westenberger, S. Donziger and J. Sáenz
re: “ABOUT THE ALEGATO”).
1114

DX 900 (Jan. 8, 2011 Emails from P. Fajardo to J. Sáenz, J. Prieto, S. Donziger, A.
Carrasco, E. Westenberger, L. Yanza, and V. Barham; second email to J. Prieto, J. Sáenz,
S. Donziger, toxico, A. Carrasco, E Westerberger, and V. Barham re: “CHEVRON’S
ALEGATO”).
1115

One of the addressees of the second Fajardo email of that date (that of 16:23:47) was
<[e-mail]> which, as the 15:49:22 email of that date reveals, is (or is among)
Yanza’s email addresses.
1116

Tyrrell Dep. Tr. at 260:12-17; Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11-1264, DI 92-3, at 87-88
(2d Cir. filed July 5, 2011).

272
he could not “believe they beat us!” to which Fajardo in turn replied that “[t]he one who strikes first
has greater success or causes greater impact. . . They want to influence the judge with their theory.
It is a mistake on our part to have fallen asleep for so long on the alegato.”1117
These emails, if admissible and taken literally, would be consistent with a belief on
Fajardo’s part in late December and early January 2011 that the result of the Lago Agrio case then
was in doubt. If Fajardo in fact so believed, that fact would undercut Chevron’s argument that the
case had been fixed by then with the promise of $500,000 out of the judgment proceeds in exchange
for Zambrano’s promise to decide the case for the LAPs and to sign a judgment they prepared.1118
But the Court would not construe these emails in such a manner even if they were admissible, which
they are not.
The key consideration is that the only individuals on the LAP side who necessarily
would have known if a bribery deal had been struck would have been Fajardo and Donziger. That
is so of Fajardo because he is said to have agreed to it. It is true of Donziger because his approval
would have been essential for reasons discussed in the following section. Given the relationships
on the LAP side of the case, it is not unreasonable to think that Yanza also perhaps would have
known. But all of these emails went to other people as well, including Patton Boggs’ Westenberger

1117

DX 900 (Jan. 8, 2011 Emails from P. Fajardo to J. Sáenz, J. Prieto, S. Donziger, A.
Carrasco, E. Westenberger, L. Yanza, and V. Barham; second email to J. Prieto, J. Sáenz,
S. Donziger, toxico, A. Carrasco, E Westenberger, and V. Barham re: “CHEVRON’S
ALEGATO”).
1118

The emails, even if taken literally, would not utterly defeat the idea that Zambrano had been
bribed. Even if the corrupt bargain had been struck, Fajardo may have been concerned that
Zambrano would double cross the LAPs. Given the LAP team’s views of Chevron, the risk
of being outbid, whether real or the product of fevered speculation, may have been in his
mind.

273
in the case of the December 31 email and Patton Boggs’ Carrasco and Westenberger, as well as
junior lawyers in Ecuador, in the case of the January 8 communications.
There is no reason to believe that any of the core three on the LAP side of the case
– Fajardo, Donziger, and Yanza, if Yanza was knowledgeable about this – would have confided the
fact that they had bribed Zambrano to any of the other recipients of the emails. Their goal was to
urge the email recipients to finish the work on the alegato, which already was late, even if only to
keep up the pretense that the Lago Agrio litigation was in real dispute and the end result in doubt.
They could not successfully have done that if they had told those working on the alegato that “the
fix was in” and that the alegato would be no more than window dressing. Equally important, this
trio had a long record of keeping knowledge of questionable behavior as close to their personal vests
as possible. That was the case with concealment from Kohn and Donziger’s principal public
relations person, Karen Hinton, of the true facts with respect to the Cabrera Report and the LAPs’
relation to it. It is reflected in the edict in the Cabrera work plan, addressed to those who were in
on the LAPs’ role in the Cabrera Report, that everyone was to be “silent.” And there are other
examples. The bottom line here is that there is no reasonable likelihood that Donziger, Fajardo, or
Yanza would have disclosed a bribery arrangement, assuming it existed, to the other recipients of
these two emails. The risks were too great.1119
Accordingly, these emails would not bear the weight that might have been placed

1119

That is especially true with respect to Eric Westenberger and Anne Carrasco of Patton
Boggs, who were recipients. As Donziger, Fajardo, and Yanza must have known, they had
no reason to suppose that these lawyers, who were subject to compulsory process in the
United States, would have allowed themselves to be swept into a conspiracy to bribe a judge.
Indeed, earlier in 2010, Donziger, Fajardo, and Yanza had seen the LAPs’ Denver lawyers
withdraw in the Stratus 1782 proceeding as soon as they learned the truth about the Cabrera
Report.

274
upon them even if they were admissible in evidence.1120 Moreover, in the only important respects
they are not admissible.1121

D.

The Defendants’ Evidence Regarding Zambrano’s Alleged Agreement to Fix the Case
The defendants offered no evidence with respect to Guerra’s contention that the LAPs

bribed Zambrano save for Zambrano’s denial and Donziger’s testimony.
As noted, Zambrano was not credible. We are left then with Donziger’s testimony.

1.

Donziger’s Testimony, Even If True, Would Not Negate the Alleged Bribe

It should be recalled at the outset that Donziger’s testimony on this point was narrow.
He essentially said no more than that Donziger himself “did not bribe Judge Zambrano,” that
“allegations by former Judge Alberto Guerra that I [Donziger] was involved in a meeting where I
‘approved’ a plan arranged by Pablo Fajardo to pay Zambrano $500,000 is false,” and that he “did
not agree or express any support for a plan to pay any amount of money so that the plaintiffs would
1120

Chevron objected to the emails on, inter alia, hearsay grounds.
1121

As the text shows, the critical point for which the emails might be used would be to support
assertions by Fajardo, explicit and implicit, that the outcome of the case was in doubt and
that the submissions of which he was urging prompt completion could matter. This in turn
could imply that the case had not been fixed. But the emails are inadmissible hearsay for any
such purpose.
FED. R. EVID. 802 renders “hearsay” inadmissible. Rule 801(c) defines “hearsay” as an out
of court “statement” offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Rule
801(a) defines “statement” as “a person’s oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal
conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.” Fajardo’s statements in these emails, to
the extent they are offered for the purpose of proving that the outcome of the Lago Agrio
case was in doubt and thus that the case had not been fixed, were assertions and therefore
classic hearsay. Nor would they be admissible under the state of mind exception to the
extent they contain statements of belief. FED. R. EVID. 803(3).

275
be able to draft the final judgment.”1122
This testimony, assuming its truth, would be of only limited value. Among other
things, Guerra never said he was present when Donziger agreed to the alleged bribe or that anyone
told him that had occurred. He attributed the corrupt promise to Fajardo. Fajardo, on behalf of the
LAPs, is alleged to have promised a bribe to Zambrano after the 2010 meeting at the Honey &
Honey Restaurant and outside Donziger’s presence. So Donziger’s testimony would not necessarily
have been inconsistent with a finding that Fajardo did precisely that. But this raises an additional
issue that warrants serious consideration – whether Donziger authorized or approved any such deal,
assuming it was made.

2.

Donziger’s Approval Was Necessary for the Alleged Deal With Zambrano
a.

Donziger Controlled the LAP Team

Donziger once wrote that he was “at the epicenter of the legal, political, and media
activity surrounding the case both in Ecuador and in the U.S.”1123 He has described himself as the
“lead lawyer” in the Lago Agrio litigation and the “person primarily responsible for putting [the
LAP] team together and supervising it.”1124 In a November 2009 email, Donziger wrote that his
“primary obligation” was to “run the case on a day to day basis.”1125 His January 2011 retention

1122

See supra Discussion § XI.A.3.a.
1123

PX 806R (Donziger Book Proposal), at 5.
1124

Id. at 3.
1125

PX 1181 (Nov. 9, 2009 Email from S. Donziger to J. Kohn re: Trip to Ecuador), at 2.

276
agreement with the LAPs – signed just a few months after the alleged bribery of Zambrano – bears
this out, describing him as the LAPs’ U.S. Representative and his duties as being “to exercise overall
responsibility for the strategic direction of the Litigation and the day-to-day management of the
Litigation.”1126
As the “cabeza” – or head – of the LAP team, Donziger supervised the Ecuadorian
legal team, set deadlines, paid the lawyers’ salaries, including Fajardo’s,1127 reviewed at least their
important court filings in Ecuador, and coordinated the work among the lawyers in Ecuador and the
scientists, experts, lawyers, litigation funders, politicians, and media consultants in the United States
and elsewhere.1128 He visited his local counsel monthly since the case began.1129 He controlled the
LAP team’s media strategy, communicated with the press, and recruited Berlinger to film Crude.
In addition, Donziger largely has controlled the money used for purposes of the Lago
Agrio case, public relations, and related litigation. He was the intermediary between the Ecuadorian
lawyers and Kohn when Kohn was funding the case. He recruited Russell DeLeon, his law school
classmate, to fund Crude and other aspects of the LAPs’ efforts. He secured funding from Burford,
and, together with H5, brought on Patton Boggs. He occasionally paid even some of the LAP team’s
expenses and lawyers’ salaries out of his personal funds.
Donziger has been intimately involved with the LAP team’s legal strategy in the U.S.

1126

PX 558 (Donziger Jan. 2011 Retention Agreement), at 2.
1127

See PX 4900R (Dahlberg Direct) ¶ 75.
1128

See supra Facts § II.C.1.
1129

PX 1509 (Donziger Ecuador Migration Record).

277
and in Ecuador. He hired David Russell to come up with the first damages estimate. With Russell,
he hired the LAPs’ first nominated expert, Calmbacher, and then rode herd over the completion of
his reports. He repeatedly met with Ecuadorian judges presiding over the Lago Agrio case.1130 He
recruited Reyes and Pinto, supposedly to serve as independent monitors but in reality to challenge
the settling experts’ conclusions concerning two site inspections, and agreed to make the under the
table payments in the “bargain with the devil” referred to above. He (at Reyes’ suggestion) selected
and vetted Cabrera to be the global expert and made sure Cabrera was under the LAP team’s control.
He met with Cabrera and the LAP team on March 3, 2007 to plan Cabrera’s work, and then he met
with the American experts the following day to discuss their involvement in it. He recruited, hired,
and worked directly with Stratus in drafting much of the Cabrera Report. And when the truth about
Cabrera began to leak out, Donziger controlled the LAPs’ efforts to minimize, contain, and spin it.
He recruited and hired lawyers to assist the LAPs in the Stratus 1782 proceeding. And he personally
was involved in determining what information the Fajardo Declaration and Petition would – and
would not – reveal.
Donziger’s role is reflected in the fact that he stands to receive more money from the
Lago Agrio case than any other lawyer – or law firm – who has worked on the case. His January
2011 retention agreement with the LAPs – signed just shortly after the LAP team allegedly struck
the deal with Zambrano and shortly before the Judgment was issued – entitles him to 31.5 percent
of all attorneys fees (which will be 20 percent of anything collected on the Judgment, net of certain
preferred payments).1131
1130

PX 207, 200, 192, 169R (Donziger Notebook), at 20.
1131

PX 558 (Donziger Jan. 2011 Retention Agreement), at 3.

278
b.

Donziger’s Approval Was Necessary, and Given, for the 2009
Ghostwriting Deal with Guerra

Guerra’s testimony that the LAPs paid him for ghostwriting Zambrano’s orders
during Zambrano’s first term as the Lago Agrio Chevron judge was extensively corroborated by
independent evidence: the Guerra bank deposit slips (including those bearing the signature and
cedula number of the LAPs’ Ximena Centeno) and Guerra bank statements, the Selva Viva bank
statements, and the PUPPETEER emails.1132 The PUPPETEER emails corroborate Donziger’s
approval of these payments to Guerra.1133 And Donziger has admitted the significance of that
finding with respect to the question whether Donziger was complicit in a later scheme to bribe
Zambrano:
“The importance of this story to Chevron’s case is simple: If the plaintiffs’ lawyers
in fact entered into a deal with Guerra in 2009 to influence the case, then that shows
their willingness to act corruptly, making it far more likely that they bribed Judge
Zambrano a year later.”1134
*

*

*

In sum, Donziger was the boss of the LAP team; Fajardo was his “local counsel.”
If Fajardo promised consideration to Zambrano to fix the case, he would have done so only with
Donziger’s authorization.

1132

Supra Facts § X.C.2.d.
1133

Id.
1134

DI 1850 (Donziger Defs.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 38.

279
E.

Ultimate Findings on this Point – Fajardo, with Donziger’s Approval, Promised
Zambrano $500,000 of the Judgment Proceeds to Decide the Case for the LAPs and
Sign a Judgment They Prepared
As we have seen, (1) Zambrano, a new judge inexperienced in civil matters, had his

close friend and associate, Guerra, who had been removed from the bench for misconduct, drafting
orders for him in civil cases which Zambrano signed and filed as his own; (2) Zambrano had
motives to solicit a bribe in the Chevron case; (3) his friend and ghostwriter, Guerra, was a ready
means of doing so; (4) Guerra concededly solicited the bribe from Donziger, Fajardo, and Yanza;
(5) Donziger, Fajardo, and Yanza had motives and the opportunity to promise the bribe and, at least
as long as the money was paid out of judgment proceeds and probably otherwise, the means to pay
it; and (6) the Judgment that Zambrano ultimately signed copied from LAP internal work product
that was not in the court record. In short, there is a classic circumstantial case – independent of
Guerra’s testimony – that the LAPs bribed Zambrano to rule in their favor and sign a judgment they
wrote for him. To this must be added (1) the Court’s finding that Zambrano could not and did not
write the Judgment himself, least of all in the manner in which he claimed he did so, and (2) neither
the files of the LAPs’ Ecuadorian counsel nor their testimony was made available.
The defendants, to the extent they produced evidence, sought to deny the charge. But
neither Zambrano nor Donziger was a credible witness, at least on this point. And the other
witnesses associated with the defendants – Fajardo and Yanza – declined to testify. That said, this
Court recognizes that “disbelief of a . . . denial of a fact which the [adverse party] has the burden
of proving is not sufficient to sustain [the adverse party’s] burden.”1135 So the question comes down
1135

Wantanabe Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 375, 393 n.110 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); accord Venzie Corp. v. U.S. Mineral Prods. Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1313 (3d Cir. 1975)
(“While the jury was free to disregard the defendants’ testimony that no agreement of any

280
to whether the circumstantial evidence, either alone or in conjunction with Guerra’s testimony,
carries Chevron’s burden.
This Court already has made clear its skepticism concerning Guerra’s testimony,
character, and motives. Among other things, it has concluded that Guerra’s testimony to the effect
that Zambrano had cut a deal with the LAPs during his first tenure on the Lago Agrio case was not
sufficiently persuasive in view of prior statements he made to Chevron investigators. But, in
language specifically approved by our Circuit:
“There never has been any positive rule of law which excluded evidence from
careful consideration entirely, on account of the wilful falsehood of a witness as to
some portions of his testimony. Such disregard of his oath is enough to justify the
belief that the witness is capable of any amount of falsification, and to make it no
more than prudent to regard all that he says with strong suspicion, and to place no
reliance on his mere statements. But when the testimony is once before the jury, the
weight and credibility of every portion of it is for them . . . .”1136
In other words, a jury is entitled to believe part or even most of the testimony even of one who, it
concludes, deliberately has lied under oath as to other particulars. Substantially the same is true of
a judge sitting, as in this case, as the trier of the facts.
In this particular instance, Guerra told the Chevron investigators very early on that
(1) Zambrano told Guerra to go to the LAPs and “have them give me [Zambrano] around 500 and
see how much they give you, . . . have them bring the judgment, we dress it up here and we issue
it,” (2) Guerra’s attempt to do so was unsuccessful, (3) Zambrano later told Guerra that he “[made]

kind was formulated during the course of these contacts, mere disbelief could not rise to the
level of positive proof of agreement to sustain plaintiffs’ burden of proving conspiracy.”);
Ortho Diag. Systs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(same).
1136

United States v. Weinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 713-14 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, C.J.) (quoting
Knowles v. People, 15 Mich. 408, 412 (1867)).

281
contact with the other side . . . [and] ultimately, he sets it up . . . with Fajardo,” and (4) and “they
offered him . . . half a million dollars . . . [b]ut to be paid later.”1137 He never wavered from that
account.1138
In view of the entire record – including but not limited to the circumstantial evidence
that predominantly supports Chevron’s contention and the Court’s evaluation of all of the pertinent
testimony – this Court finds that (a) Zambrano agreed with Fajardo to fix the case for a payment of
$500,000 paid out of any judgment proceeds, (b) Fajardo did so with Donziger’s express
authorization, (c) the LAPs drafted all or most of the Judgment, and (d) Zambrano signed their draft
without consequential modification as part of the quid pro quo for the promise of $500,000.

XII.

The Appeals
A next logical point in the story of the Lago Agrio case is the appeals. In order to

appreciate one aspect of that story, however, it is necessary first to describe briefly an event that
occurred in this action only days after this case began.
Chevron filed its complaint in this case on February 1, 2011.1139 It sought inter alia
a preliminary injunction barring the enforcement of the then imminently expected Judgment.1140 The
Judgment was rendered thirteen days later, on February 14. On February 15, Chevron filed its reply

1137

DX 1360 (June 25, 2012 Tr.), at 49, 51, 81.
1138

DX 1363 (Guerra Nov. 17, 2013 Decl.) ¶ 23; PX 4800 (Guerra Direct) ¶¶ 41-43.
1139

DI 1 (Complaint).
1140

Id. at 147.

282
memorandum in support of the preliminary injunction motion in this Court.1141 In a footnote, it
wrote that it “suspected” that Judge Zambrano had “received secret ‘assistance’ drafting the
judgment. . . .”1142 It based this allegation primarily on the fact that Zambrano had stated to the press
only weeks before the Judgment was issued that he had reviewed only three quarters of the
approximately 200,000-page record.1143 Chevron pointed out that it would have been impossible for
the judge to have reviewed 50,000 pages and write a 188-page judgment in that period of time, and
noted that it anticipated “requesting discovery on this issue shortly.”1144
With that fact in mind, we turn to the appeals.

A.

The First Level Appeal
Both Chevron and the LAPs appealed the Judgment.1145 The LAPs argued that the

lower court had failed to account for three types of harm in its damage award and sought an increase
in damages.1146 Chevron argued that the Judgment should be reversed on multiple grounds,

1141

DI 91 (Chevron Reply Mem.).
1142

Id. at 6, n.1.
1143

Id. at 6.
Zambrano testified at trial that he lied to the reporter on this point. Tr. (Zambrano) 1738:912.
1144

Id. at 6, n.1.
1145

PX 430 (Appellate Judgment), at 1.
1146

Id.

283
including ghostwriting.1147 It attached to its appellate brief among other things an affidavit of an
expert in which the expert identified overlap between the LAPs’ internal Selva Viva database and
the Judgment.1148 Chevron contended that the overlap indicated that the LAPs secretly had assisted
Judge Zambrano in writing the Judgment.

1.

The LAPs Contend that Chevron Set Up its Ghostwriting Claim

Shortly after the parties filed their appellate briefs, the Judicial Council of the
Sucumbíos Court selected three judges from the trial court to hear the appeal.1149 Several months
after the panel was chosen, the LAPs filed a motion requesting that the panel “take into account and
analyze Chevron’s [judgment fraud] allegations when deciding this appeal to prevent Chevron from
taking advantage of this Division’s possible silence and so continue its worldwide smear campaign
against the Ecuadorian judicial system.”1150
Although the LAPs admitted in the motion that they “ha[d] been unable to determine
with certainty how it was that overlapping of information identified by Chevron occurred,” they
suggested that “maybe it was the company [Chevron] itself that established the conditions for Judge

1147

Id.
1148

PX 2548 (LAPs’ July 8, 2011 Filing with Appellate Court), at 4, 8-10.
1149

PX 403 (Certificate of Lottery Drawing to Form the Sole Division of the Provincial Court
of Justice of Sucumbios, No. 106-2011). Chevron contends that Judge Zambrano improperly
and secretly influenced the selection of the panel, which, it claims, should have been done
publicly by random lottery. It has failed, however, to provide evidence or foreign law
materials explaining the procedure for selection of appellate judges under Ecuadorian law.
1150

PX 2548 (LAPs’ July 8, 2011 Filing with Appellate Court), at 12.

284
Zambrano to be able to use the contested material[s] as a basis.”1151 The LAPs noted that Chevron
first alleged that Zambrano had received secret assistance in its reply brief to this Court on February
15. They contended that “[t]he fact that Chevron has identified similarities and differences between
the judgment of February 14, 2011, and some documents obtained from plaintiffs through collateral
procedures initiated in the U.S., all in only one day, [wa]s categorical evidence that Chevron was
ready to make these accusations before the judgment was rendered.”1152 Thus, the LAPs continued,
“Chevron might know perfectly well how these materials were taken into account by Judge
Zambrano. . . . Logic compels us to conclude that Chevron knew where to look for it because
Chevron itself put it there from the beginning.”1153
Chevron responded two weeks later. It denied the allegation that it had provided the
LAPs’ unfiled work product to Zambrano.1154 It noted that its February 15, 2011 filing with this
Court said that it suspected fraud in the authorship based on “Judge Zambrano’s admission only
weeks before February 14, 2011, that he still had a quarter of the approximately 200,000-page record
left to review.”1155 It was not until Chevron obtained further discovery from the LAPs’ U.S. counsel
1151

Id. at 5.
1152

Id. at 8-9 (emphasis in original).
1153

Id. at 5, 10.
1154

PX 2549 (Chevron Response to LAPs’ July 8, 2011 Appellate Filing), at 1.
1155

Id. at 5.
In fact, the footnote in Chevron’s February 15, 2011 reply memorandum in this Court
referred also to unspecified “indications in the Judgment itself.” DI 91, at 6 n.1. But it did
not explain what “indications” it had in mind. The Court notes, however, that at least one
such indication was obvious on the face of the Judgment – the presence of the _sv and _tx

285
and then compared the documents it received in discovery to the Judgment that it presented evidence
of the overlap to the Ecuadorian appellate court in May 2011.1156 Thus, the LAPs’ assertion that
Chevron had located the portions of the Judgment that matched the LAPs’ internal files in “only one
day” was false. Moreover, Chevron noted that, despite the LAPs’ accusations and bluster,
“[n]owhere do Plaintiffs deny that they secretly provided Judge Zambrano with the content of their
internal documents so that it could be incorporated into the text of the lower court judgment.”1157
Chevron appended to its response additional evidence of overlap, based in part on
discovery it had obtained from Section 1782 proceedings in the U.S. Nonetheless, Chevron
requested – based on the overlap evidence and the LAPs’ failure to explain it or deny their
involvement in writing the Judgment – that the Judgment be declared null and void.1158

2.

The Appellate Panel Affirms the Judgment

The three-judge appellate panel affirmed the Judgment on January 3, 2012, rejecting
the arguments made by both parties.1159 Although it claimed to have resolved the appeal “on the
suffixes in the Judgment’s designations of samples. As previously discussed, those suffixes
were not used in the Filed Lab Results in the Record, the ostensible source of the
Judgment’s references. Supra Facts § IX.B.1.C. “SV,” moreover, were the initials of Selva
Viva, the LAPs’ administrative entity.
1156

PX 2549 (Chevron Response to LAPs’ July 8, 2011 Appellate Filing), at 5.
1157

Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
1158

Id.
1159

PX 430 (Appellate Judgment).
As discussed below, the appellate judgment was not received for the truth of the matters
stated therein and has no legal effect here.

286
merits,”1160 the panel stated that it would not “refer at all” to Chevron’s specific allegations“of fraud
and corruption of plaintiffs, counsel and representatives . . . except to let it be emphasized that the
same accusations are pending resolution before authorities of the United States of America due to
a complaint that has been filed by . . . Chevron, under what is known as the RICO act, and this
[court] has no competence to rule on the conduct of counsel, experts or other officials . . . . .” 1161
Indeed, the appellate court declined almost entirely to address Chevron’s allegations
concerning overlap between the Judgment and the LAPs’ unfiled work product. While Chevron had
not yet obtained Guerra’s evidence by the time the appeal was decided, it did present to the appellate
court some other evidence that it presented at trial in this case – for example, that portions of the
unfiled Selva Viva Database, the Fajardo Trust Email, and the Fusion Memo – were copied either
verbatim or in substance into the Judgment. But the appellate court by and large disregarded it. The
court failed entirely to address the overlap between the Judgment and the Fusion Memo, the Index
Summaries, and the Fajardo Trust Email.1162 And, while the appellate court stated that it “ha[d] been
able to confirm first hand that the record include[d]” certain “information” in the Judgment that
appeared also in the unfiled Selva Viva Database,1163 it did not identify the specific “information”
to which it referred, where it had found it within the record, or why it differed from the LAPs’ filed

1160

Id. at 1.
1161

Id. at 10.
1162

PX 430 (Appellate Judgment).
1163

Id. at 11.

287
sampling data.1164 The appellate court thus declined to address the fundamental implication of the
overlap between the Judgment and the LAPs’ unfiled work product – that the LAPs had written, or
assisted Zambrano in writing, the Judgment.
Moreover, to the extent the appellate court acknowledged that the Judgment
incorrectly had reported some of the data samples – for example, its incorrect reporting of mercury
and PAH levels as much higher than the Filed Lab Results reported them to be – it concluded that
the errors were immaterial to the Judgment’s damages award.1165 The panel did not attempt to recalculate the damages based on the correct figures. It concluded simply that the judge had
considered all of the evidence – not each piece individually – to arrive at the total damages
award.1166 But that of course missed at least one major point – Chevron pointed to the overlap in
1164

Moreover, for reasons previously stated, the appellate court decision may not be considered
for the truth of the matters asserted, as it is hearsay if and to the extent it is offered for that
purpose. Infra note 1563. The Court concludes below that it does not have issue preclusive
effect on this or any other factual point. Infra Discussion § IX.A
1165

For example, the appellate court noted that, in listing some of the sample results, the
Judgment omitted decimals – notwithstanding that the sampling results reported the decimals
– and instead reported the next whole number. PX 430 (Appellate Judgment), at 11. This
was particularly true for at least one sample of benzene. But the court concluded that “[t]his
gaffe, no doubt involuntary, does not affect the merits of the judgment being examined,
since, regardless, it refers to an alarming quantity of benzene in the environment.” Id. The
appellate panel addressed also the fact that the Judgment reported certain results for PAHs
in milligrams rather than micrograms but concluded only that “the assessment of the quantity
of contamination based on these samples should be reduced considerably.” Id. And the
panel noted that the Judgment omitted the “less than” symbol in reporting the results for
mercury, and “[f]or this reason, emphasi[z]ed . . .that the reference to the presence of ‘high
levels’ of mercury . . . does not match the facts. . . .” Id. at 12. Nonetheless, the court
“consider[ed] that this error in the assessment of the laboratory results regarding a
contaminating element d[id] not invalidate the remaining findings or reasoning regarding
others which are in fact characterized as contaminating elements.” Id.
1166

“[T]he . . . errors would not be capable of slanting [the Judgment’s] reasoning, or inducing
it to error . . . because the judge in his judgment has not assessed each sample and its results
separately, as if they described isolated facts, but instead it is the collection of information

288
general and to the errors and other idiosyncracies common to the Judgment and the unfiled LAP
documents as evidence that the LAPs had written or secretly had a hand in writing the Judgment,
which raised an entirely different issue from whether there simply had been factual errors.
Consistent with its statement that it would not “refer at all” to Chevron’s specific
allegations “of fraud and corruption of plaintiffs, counsel and representatives,” the intermediate
appellate court failed largely to address the question whether these commonalities supported
Chevron’s claim of misconduct.

3.

The Appellate Clarification Order

The LAPs sought clarification of the appellate court’s decision.1167 They referred to
the appellate court’s statement that it “ha[d] no competence to rule on” Chevron’s fraud allegations
that were “pending resolution before” this Court1168 and asked that “the [appellate] Division clarify
and state that in fact it ha[d] analyzed Chevron’s accusations, and that it ha[d] not found any fraud
in the activities of the plaintiffs or their attorneys.”1169
The appellate court issued its clarification order on January 13, 2012.1170 It stated

coming from various sources that undoubtedly has created in the trial judge the conviction
of the existence of damage.” Id.
1167

PX 2551 (LAPs’ Appellate Clarification Request); PX 2552 (Chevron Response to LAPs’
Appellate Clarification Request); PX 431 (Appellate Clarification Order).
1168

PX 2551 (LAPs’ Appellate Clarification Request), at 4; PX 2552 (Chevron Response to
LAPs’ Appellate Clarification Request), at 9 (citing PX 430 (Appellate Judgment), at 10).
1169

PX 2551 (LAPs’ Appellate Clarification Request), at 5 (emphasis added).
1170

PX 431 (Appellate Clarification Order).

289
that, while it did “not find evidence of ‘fraud,’” it was “stay[ing] out of these [fraud] accusations,
preserving the parties’ rights to present formal complaint to the Ecuadorian criminal authorities or
to continue the course of the actions that have been filed in the United States of America.”1171 It
noted that “[t]his was a determining factor for the [Appellate] Division’s considerations in the
judgment that is being clarified, since it is obvious that it was not its responsibility to hear and
resolve proceedings that correspond to another jurisdiction. . . .”1172
Nonetheless, the court stated conclusorily that “all of the samples, documents,
reports, testimonies, interviews, transcripts and minutes, referred to in the judgment, are found in
the record without the defendant identifying any that is not – the defendant’s motions simply show
disagreement with the reasoning, the interpretation and the value given to the evidence, but they do
not identify correctly legal evidence that is in the record.”1173 But the clarification order – like the
underlying appellate order – did not address any of Chevron’s specific ghostwriting claims. Nor did
it identify where in the record it had located the documents it claimed were there and – as noted
previously – its statements concerning what it allegedly found in the record may not be considered
for their truth. It posited instead that “[i]f there had been any ‘secret assistance,’ the presumed
concordance between the plaintiffs’ internal documentation, and the text of the judgment would not
be limited to a fairly simple interpretation of evidence that is contained in the record.”1174

1171

Id. at 4.
1172

Id.
1173

Id. at 3.
1174

Id. at 4.

290
B.

The National Court of Justice Affirms the Judgment in All But One Respect
Chevron sought review in the Ecuadorian National Court of Justice on January 20,

2012.1175 The National Court of Justice is a court of cassation. It reviews only the legal arguments
and does not re-examine the facts.
Despite its limited scope of review, Chevron made a plethora of arguments – both
legal and factual – to the National Court. Most relevant, however, were its contentions that the trial
court proceedings should have been “nullified” because, inter alia, the LAPs had submitted
fraudulent reports by Dr. Calmbacher, Cabrera had been appointed illegally and had illegally carried
out his duties, and the LAPs had ghostwritten the Judgment.1176
The National Court issued its opinion affirming in large part the appellate court’s
decision on November 12, 2013, while trial in this case was underway.1177 It noted that “the
cassation appeal is an extraordinary appeal granted to the losing party so that the Cassation Court
may annul not every unfair judgment, but only those in which their own specific unfairness has been
proved to have been founded on a wrongful interpretation of the law.”1178
With respect to Chevron’s allegations concerning Calmbacher and Cabrera, the
National Court noted that Chevron had not “mentioned which legal rule ha[d] been supposedly
infringed” or “which procedural rules have rendered the proceeding absolutely null” and stated that

1175

DX 1022 (Chevron Cassation Appeal).
1176

Id.
1177

PX 8095 (Opinion of Ecuadorian National Court of Justice).
1178

Id. at 96.

291
it had concluded that the cassation court therefore was unable to pass on them.1179 It accepted the
trial court’s statement that it had not relied on the Cabrera Report.1180 The National Court
“concluded that . . . [t]he court of appeals ha[d] adequately addressed the requests of the defendant
with respect to the report of Mr. Cabrera and has properly weighed the evidence in accordance with
the rules of the sound judgment, within which it has considered that the aforementioned report was
not taken in consideration by the trial judge. . . .”1181 The National Court therefore “discard[ed] the
[Cabrera] allegation inasmuch as it is shown that there has been a correct weighing of the evidence
in accordance with legal standards . . .”1182 It pointed out, however, that it had not reviewed the
record before the trial court as “one cannot attempt to re-evaluate the evidence through a cassation
appeal. . . .”1183
The National Court stated also that Chevron’s ghostwriting allegations were
inappropriate for cassation review.1184 The court wrote:
“appellant has alleged that the judgment rendered by the trial judge was drafted by
the plaintiffs, and making reference even to the commission of a procedural
violation, which would result in the nullity of the trial court’s judgment. The nullity
of any judgment, according to the Code of Civil Procedure, arises for reasons
1179

Id.; see also id. at 97-98.
1180

Id. at 156-57 (citing PX 400 (Lago Agrio Judgment), at 50-51).
1181

Id. at 157.
1182

Id.
1183

Id.
1184

The National Court did not consider Chevron’s allegations concerning Guerra or the bribe
scheme. Chevron did not raise them in its cassation petition, as Guerra had not yet
approached Chevron by the time the petition was filed.

292
expressly provided for in the law itself, which is something different from the
grounds for nullity of a proceeding, as we discussed herein, therefore allegations
such as those involving the perpetration of a crime are not sufficient legal foundation
to lodge a cassation appeal and allege the nullity of a judicial proceeding, since the
record also does not show any judicial determination on the commission of a
crime.”1185
The National Court affirmed the appellate court in all but one respect. It “quashed”
the punitive damages award “since punitive damages are not contemplated under Ecuadorian law
and public apologies are not admissible nor, therefore, is any award for that concept.”1186 It therefore
cut the LAPs’ damages award to $8.646 billion.

XIII

The Pressure Campaign Continues
A.

The Invictus Strategy Deployed – Attempts to Enforce the Lago Agrio Judgment
As noted, the Invictus Memo set out a plan to enforce the Judgment “quickly, if not

immediately, on multiple enforcement fronts – in the United States and abroad.”1187 It laid out also
a so-called “keystone nation” strategy:
“As with the domestic enforcement analysis, proceeding as an initial matter in a
jurisdiction housing the highest concentration of Chevron’s domestic assets would
offer certain obvious advantages, including efficiency. Nonetheless, it is more
important for Plaintiffs to proceed initially in a jurisdiction that promises the most
favorable law and practical circumstances. To that end, Plaintiffs’ Team will identify
and potentially target certain ‘keystone’ nations - that is, nations that enjoy
reciprocity, or, better yet, are part of a judgment recognition treaty - with nations that

1185

Id. at 99 (footnotes omitted).
1186

Id. at 222.
1187

PX 2382 (Invictus Memo), at 29.

293
serve as the locus for greater Chevron assets.”1188
In pursuit of this strategy, the LAPs currently are seeking enforcement of the
Judgment against subsidiaries of Chevron in Argentina,1189 Brazil,1190 and Canada.1191 The Court
finds that they intend to do so in the United States when they conclude that it is tactically
advantageous to do so.1192
1188

Id. at 35 (emphasis in original).
1189

PX 2461 (Order Issued by the National Civil Trial Court No. 61 of Argentina in Aguinda
Salazar Maria v. Chevron Corp.).
In the Argentine case, the LAPs successfully convinced a trial court to embargo Chevron’s
Argentine subsidiary’s assets, dividends, and future bank deposits. Id. at 2-4. The decision
ultimately was reversed by the Argentine Supreme Court, which held that Chevron
Argentina – the defendant in the Argentine case – was separate from Chevron Corporation
– the defendant in the Lago Agrio case – and that the LAPs had failed to pierce the corporate
veil. PX 273 (Order Issued by the Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina in Aguinda
Salazar Maria v. Chevron Corp).
1190

PX 2306 (Filing in the Superior Court of Justice of Brazil).
The Brazilian action, see Tr. (J. Piaguaje) 2398:7-2399:3, so far as the record discloses still
is in its initial stages.
1191

PX 1004 (Amended Statement of Claim, filed in Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corp., Court File No.
CV-12-454778, Ontario Superior Court of Justice).
An Ontario court stayed the LAPs’ enforcement action against Chevron’s Canadian
subsidiary, holding that the LAPs had failed to pierce the corporate veil. The court held that
the case could not proceed unless and until the LAPs located assets of Chevron Corporation
in Canada. PX 660 (Order, Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corp., File No. CV-12-9808-00CL,
Ontario, Canada). The stay of proceedings later was vacated by the Ontario Court of Appeal,
http://cdn5.lettersblogatory.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/C57019.rere_.pdf, which then
stayed its decision pending Chevron’s motion for leave to the Supreme Court of Canada,
http://cdn5.lettersblogatory.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/2014ONCA0040.pdf.
1192

As noted, attempts to enforce the Judgment in the United States always have been part of
the plan. Indeed, even when the defendants sought to defeat the preliminary injunction in
this case by disclaiming any then present intention to seek enforcement in New York, they
conspicuously did not disclaim any such intention elsewhere in the United States.

294
The LAPs are enforcing the Judgment in Ecuador despite that Chevron never has
operated in the country and has no subsidiaries there. As noted, Invictus foreshadowed the LAPs’
plan of seeking “attachment of Chevron’s assets prior to successful recognition of the Ecuadorian
judgment.”1193 It noted that “attachment would undoubtedly compound the pressure already placed
on Chevron vis a vis an international enforcement campaign, and force Chevron to focus its
resources on the proceedings initiated by the Plaintiffs, rather than its sideshows.”1194 The LAPs
recently have attempted to employ this strategy in Ecuador.
A few months after the intermediate appellate court affirmed the Judgment, the
Provincial Court of Sucumbíos issued orders attaching Chevron’s assets and the assets of its

Moreover, the reasons for their failure to seek enforcement to date in the United States are
fairly obvious.
As an initial matter, the defendants’ repeated efforts to have this case assigned to a different
judge make clear their preference for almost any other forum. Any attempt, however, to
enforce the Judgment in the United States while this action remains pending would carry
a substantial risk that the enforcement proceeding would be litigated here for two reasons.
First, as long as this action remains pending, any suit in a federal court by any of the LAPs
(other than the two LAP Representatives who defended this case at trial) to enforce the
judgment likely would be a compulsory counterclaim in this case, as the defaulting LAPs
are defendants here and have not answered the complaint in this case. FED. R. CIV. P.
13(a)(1).
Second, there in any event would be a substantial chance that any enforcement action
brought in a federal court other than this one would be transferred to this Court under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 1407, as occurred with Patton Boggs’ related lawsuit in the District of
New Jersey. Patton Boggs LLP v. Chevron Corp., No. 12 Civ. 9176 (LAK), DI 42 (filed
Dec. 14, 2012). Moreover, as the LAPs all are aliens, any enforcement action brought in
a state court, other than those of the two states of which Chevron is a citizen (California and
Delaware), could and quite likely would be removed by Chevron to federal court and then
likely transferred to this Court.
1193

PX 2382 (Invictus Memo), at 31.
1194

Id.

295
subsidiaries worldwide. In furtherance of enforcement of the Judgment, it attached Chevron’s
intellectual property rights in Ecuador, funds going into or leaving Ecuador to Chevron’s bank
accounts abroad, and a $96 million arbitration award issued against the Republic of Ecuador
(“Embargo Order”).1195 More will be said on this below, but it suffices now to note only that it is
another important aspect of the LAPs’ multi-pronged enforcement plan.

B.

The Purpose of All of These Efforts
Donziger’s and the LAPs’ purposes in pursuing the expansive media campaign

previously discussed, in their attempts to instigate the criminal prosecution of Chevron lawyers, in
their efforts to precipitate disinvestments in Chevron stock, and in their overtures to government
officials and agencies to investigate Chevron and in related activities, always have included driving
Chevron to the settlement table.
On October 6, 2007, Donziger confided to his personal notebook the following:
“The key issue is criminal case. Can we get that going? What does it mean? I really
want to consolidate control with contract before going down a road that I think could
force them to the table for a possible settlement.”1196
Later that month, Donziger, on the eve of a mediation with settlement, wrote confidentially to
another of his hired PR people that “[w]e need to get more press and increase the pressure b/w now

1195

PX 432 (Oct. 15, 2012 Order issued in Summary Proceeding No. 21100-2003-0002), at 4
(attaching intellectual property, cash, and other assets in Ecuador, along with a $96,355,369
arbitration award issued against the ROE); PX 418 (Oct. 25, 2012 Order issued in Summary
Proceeding No. 21100-2003-0002) (expanding attachment order); PX 7087 at 4 et seq.
(Oct. 3, 2013 Official Letter of Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Inst. informed Lago Agrio
court of notations of attachment of Chevron trademark registrations pursuant to attachment).
1196

PX 169R (Donziger Notebook), at 6.

296
and then, to get the price up.”1197
In August 2009, Donziger sent a new prospective PR firm a memorandum outlining
his ideas for their efforts. It began by stating that the “primary objective is to pressure Chevron such
that they will have to settle the case at a level that would allow for a comprehensive environmental
clean-up” and then discussed generating pressure from shareholders, disinvestment, pressure from
governmental investigators, diplomatic pressure, celebrity endorsements, and pressure from
Congress and NGOs.1198
To be sure, Donziger’s long-time head PR person, Karen Hinton, testified at trial that
Donziger’s interest was only in taking the case to verdict and not in settling it:
“I had numerous conversations with Mr. Donziger about resolving the case. Mr.
Donziger repeatedly told me that in the settlement talks Chevron refused to agree to
pay for a full and complete remediation of the concession area. As a result, Mr.
Donziger made it clear during this time that his clients did not want to settle the case.
As Mr. Donziger repeatedly told me, settlement meant, by definition, compromise
and his clients deserve a full recovery, not a compromised recovery. Since the
sample data overwhelmingly proved contamination, Mr. Donziger and his clients
wanted a full trial and verdict so the Amazon would get completely cleaned up (and
not just partially). He also wanted Chevron to provide medical facilities and clean
drinking water. Throughout the time I worked on the case, the team prepared the case
for trial, not settlement.”1199
1197

PX 931 (Oct. 29, 2007 Memo from S. Donziger to C. Lehane); see also PX 728 (Apr. 27,
2005 email from C. Lehane to S. Donziger and J. Kohn), at 2 (“As we have discussed, the
Ecuadorian Amazon ChevronTexaco project can be reduced, in the end, to a single strategic
imperative: Bringing ChevronTexaco to the negotiation table by inflicting real
economic pain on the company.”) (bold in original).
1198

PX 7450 (Aug. 2009 Memo from S. Donziger to New Partners re “Idea for Campaign”).
1199

DX 1500 (Hinton Direct) ¶ 11.
The Court does not credit her assertions that Donziger told her that the sample data
overwhelmingly proved contamination or that he would not compromise the case in any
way meaningful to Chevron for that reason. Nor does it credit her testimony that

297
But she quickly admitted on cross-examination that Donziger wanted to get more press attention to
get the settlement price higher.1200 The Court finds disingenuous Hinton’s efforts to deny or to
equivocate about Donziger’s objective to use media and other outside attention of various sorts to
force Chevron to the settlement table and to induce it to offer more in settlement than it otherwise
would have done. Moreover, trying the case to judgment (and even through appeals) and achieving
a favorable settlement are not mutually exclusive goals. There are indications that Donziger and the
LAPs concluded long ago that trying the case to a decision could provide the best chance for a
significant settlement.1201
This Court finds that Donziger and the LAPs were very much interested from the
outset in settling the Lago Agrio case. Logic dictates the finding also that they are, and will remain,
at least as interested in doing so now and in the future. The objects of all of Donziger’s media and

“[t]hroughout the time [she] worked on the case, the team prepared the case for trial,
not settlement.” Id.
1200

She testified on cross examination as follows:
“Q. And at any time did Mr. Donziger tell you that his goal was to get more press, increase
the pressure in order to get that settlement price higher? A. Are you speaking about a
particular time frame?
Q. At any time, Ms. Hinton. A. Repeat it again.
Q. At any time, ma’am, did Mr. Donziger tell you that his goal was to increase press so
that he could increase the pressure in order to get the settlement price higher? A. Yes.
Q. At any point in time, Ms. Hinton, did Mr. Donziger tell you that he wanted to force
Chevron to the table for possible settlement? [Objection and ruling omitted] A. Not in
those words.” Tr. (Hinton) 2159:3-18 (emphasis added).
1201

See PX 1184 (Nov. 10, 2009 Ltr. from J. Kohn to P. Fajardo and L. Yanza re: “EcuadorTexaco Case”), at 2; PX 1187 (Nov. 19, 2009 Ltr. from J. Kohn to P. Fajardo and L. Yanza
re: “Ecuador-Texaco Case”), at 2 (noting reported “decision to not raise settlement before
[they] ‘win’ the trial”).

298
outside pressure efforts, including his attempt to have Chevron lawyers prosecuted criminally in
Ecuador, prominently included increasing the pressure on Chevron to make it more willing to
compromise, and at a higher amount, than otherwise would have been the case. The questions
whether and to what extent those efforts were actionable, which is not quite as simple as the
defendants would have them, are dealt with below.

Prior Proceedings in this Litigation
The Pleadings
This action was filed on February 1, 2011 against the LAPs, Donziger, Fajardo,
Yanza, the ADF, Selva Viva, and a number of other individuals and entities.1202 All defendants were
duly served. Fajardo, on behalf of himself, the LAPs, and all of the other Ecuadorian defendants,
sought and obtained an extension of time within which to move or answer.1203 Two of the LAPs –
Hugo Gerardo Camacho Naranjo and Javier Piaguaje Payaguaje (the “LAP Representatives”)
answered and have defended the action. None of the other Ecuadorian defendants answered or
moved with respect to the complaint. A certificate of default has been entered against them.1204

The Amended Complaint
The amended complaint contained nine causes of action. As the Court has granted
1202

Among these were the Stratus Defendants – Stratus Consulting, Inc., the consulting firm
that allegedly ghost-wrote all or most of the Cabrera Report, and two of its personnel,
Douglas Beltman and Ann Maest. The Stratus Defendants ultimately settled with Chevron.
1203

DI 128 (Letter from P. Fajardo to Court, Feb. 23, 2011); DI 127 (Order extending time).
1204

DI 205.

299
defendants’ dismissal motions as to some,1205 only five remain – (1) counts 1 and 2, which assert
substantive and conspiracy claims against Donziger under RICO, (2) Counts 3 and 7, which assert,
respectively, fraud and civil conspiracy claims against all defendants, and (3) Count 8, which asserts
that Donziger violated Section 487 of the New York Judiciary Law.1206
Count 9 sought a declaration that the Judgment was unenforceable and
unrecognizable “on, among others, grounds of fraud, failure [by Ecuador] to afford procedures
compatible with due process, lack of impartial [Ecuadorian] tribunals, lack of personal jurisdiction,
[and] contravention of public policy.”1207 As discussed below, Count 9 has been disposed of as well.

The Answers
Two aspects of the defendants’ answers1208 are relevant here.
First, Donziger’s seventh affirmative defense asserts that “Chevron’s claims are
barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and/or res judicata.”1209 Likewise,
the LAP Representatives’ thirty-third affirmative defense asserts that “[t]he claims asserted in the
Complaint and any relief sought thereunder are barred, in whole or in part, under the doctrines of

1205

Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK), 871 F. Supp. 2d 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(Donziger); DI 634 (LAP Representatives).
1206

Id. ¶¶ 420-26.
1207

Id. ¶ 430.
1208

DI 307 (Donziger answer); DI 350 (LAP Representatives’ answer).
1209

DI 307 (Donziger answer), at 71.

300
res judicata and/or collateral estoppel.”1210
Second, both assert unclean hands and in pari delicto affirmative defenses.1211
Moreover, the LAP Representatives’ pleading explicitly and significantly relies, in this respect, on
findings by the Lago Agrio court of misconduct by Chevron in the defense of the Lago Agrio
case.1212

1210

DI 350 (LAP Representatives’ answer), at 106.
1211

Id. at 91-105; DI 307 (Donziger answer), at 71.
1212

Indeed, they allege that:
“As observed by the Ecuadorian Court in its final judgment, Chevron also engaged in the
following procedural misconduct: raising at the eleventh hour ‘unresolved issues’ previously
abandoned by Chevron in an effort to delay resolution of the case; obstructing the evidence
gathering process by launching frivolous attacks upon each and every expert report not
submitted by a Chevron-affiliate, which the Court found to be designed to ‘impede the
normal advance of the evidence gathering process, or even prolong it indefinitely;’ and
frontally attacking the court in a display of shocking disrespect for the judicial process.
Further, In [sic] summation of Chevron’s behavior throughout the course of the litigation,
the Court observed that ‘the following constitutes a display of procedural bad faith on the
defendant’s part: failure to . . . [produce] . . . documents ordered coupled with a failure to
submit an excuse on the date indicated; attempting to abuse the merger between Chevron
Corp. and Texaco Inc. as a mechanism to evade liability; abuse of the rights granted under
procedural law, such as the right to submit the motions that the law allows for [. . .]; repeated
motions on issues already ruled upon, and motions that by operation of law are inadmissible
within summary verbal proceedings, and that have all warranted admonishments and fines
against defense counsel defendant from the various Judges who have presided over this
Court; [and] delays provoked through conduct that in principle is legitimate, but . . . [which
have] . . . unfair consequences for the proceedings . . . such as refusing and creating obstacles
for payment of the experts who took office, thus preventing them from being able to
commence their work . . . .’” Id. at 103-04 (emphasis added). See also DI 350 (LAP
Representatives’ answer), at 101-04.

301
Discovery and Motion Practice
Discovery and Discovery Sanctions
During discovery, the defendants refused to comply with Chevron’s request for
production of documents insofar as it sought documents located in Ecuador that were not in the
personal physical possession of Donziger or the LAP Representatives – in principal part documents
physically in the hands of Fajardo and the Ecuadorian LAP lawyers as well as Yanza, the ADF, and
Selva Viva.
The Court granted Chevron’s motion to compel production and, when the defendants
did not comply, its motion for sanctions.1213 As will be discussed below, the only sanction ultimately
imposed was the striking of the LAP Representatives’ personal jurisdiction defense.1214

The Partial Summary Judgment Motions
Chevron made four motions for partial summary judgment on various aspects of the

1213

Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, --- F.R.D. ---, 2013 WL 5575833 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2013).
1214

Id. at *40 (striking defense unless documents relevant to personal jurisdiction were
produced by Oct. 24, 2013, which they were not).
The Court concluded also that defendants’ failure to comply with the order compelling
production warrants (a) the inference that the documents requested but not produced would
have been unfavorable to defendants, and (b) exclusion at trial of documents ordered but not
produced. But it reserved for trial the questions whether to draw that inference and to
exclude such documents. Id. at *40-43. In any event, the Court drew no such inference from
the defendants’ failure to comply and excluded no documents on that ground. In some
instances, it drew inferences from the failure of the Ecuadorian lawyers to testify. As noted
however, it would have made the same findings in the absence of such inferences.

302
case. Three motions were denied in their entirety and the fourth in all but one small respect.1215

Attempts to Recuse the Judge or Require Reassignment of the Case
From the very outset of this case, the defendants made repeated efforts to get rid of
the judge, who previously had ruled against them and been affirmed in both the Berlinger and
Donziger Section 1782 proceedings.1216 The several early efforts, which began within a week of the
filing of this action, are recounted in the Court’s ruling denying the first formal recusal motion.1217
Defendants then unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandamus or an order reassigning the case to a
different judge. The Court of Appeals summarily denied both requests. In denying mandamus, it
stated that “[B]ias cannot be inferred from a mere pattern of rulings by a judicial officer, but requires
evidence that the officer had it in for the party for reasons unrelated to the officer’s view of the

1215

Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK), 2013 WL 4482691 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
22, 2013) (denying motion in the exercise of discretion without consideration of the merits);
DI 1063 (Order, Apr. 24, 2013) (denying motion for partial summary judgment dismissing
collateral estoppel affirmative defense); DI 878 (Order, Mar. 4, 2013) (denying motion for
partial summary judgment on Count 8); Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 886 F. Supp.2d 235
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (substantially denying motion for partial summary judgment dismissing
former adjudication affirmative defenses). (The first of the cited decisions mistakenly
spoke of three rather than four motions for partial summary judgment.)
1216

Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 305-06 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting July 15, 2010
order to produce); In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d
sub nom. Lago Agrio Plaintiffs v. Donziger, 409 F. App’x 310 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary
order).
1217

Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 783 F. Supp. 2d 713, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

303
law[.]”1218 It rejected the reassignment request without comment.1219
Undaunted, Donziger within days of the Court of Appeals’ decision, made another
motion for recusal,1220 which this Court denied summarily.1221 Still undaunted, defendants later filed
yet another mandamus petition, that one ostensibly to challenge a number of interlocutory rulings
by this Court, but in which they again asked the Court of Appeals to reassign the case to another
judge.1222 Those applications too were denied summarily.1223

The Trial
Chevron waived all claims for damages and sought only equitable relief. The case
was tried without a jury1224 from October 15 through November 26, 2013. In conformity with
common practice in this district in non-jury cases, the direct testimony of most witnesses was taken
in the form of written statements, the truth of which was affirmed on the witness stand. The
1218

Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11-2259-op, 2011 WL 4375022 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2011)
(quoting McLaughlin v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 869 F.2d 1039, 1047 (7th Cir. 1989)).
1219

Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 239 n.11 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
423 (2012).
1220

DI 391 (Feb. 17, 2012 Mot. for Recusal).
1221

DI 392 (Feb. 24, 2012 Memo. Endorsement).
1222

Petition for writ of mandamus, Naranjo v. Chevron Corp., No. 13-772 (2d Cir. filed Mar.
5, 2013), at 31-40.
1223

Naranjo v. Chevron Corp., No. 13-772, DI 182 (2d Cir. filed Sept. 26, 2013).
1224

See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 691 (LAK), 2013 WL 5526287 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
7, 2013) (no right to jury trial in this case).

304
witnesses so testifying then were tendered for cross-examination, redirect, and any subsequent
questioning as usual. Some exhibits were offered through witnesses in the usual way. Many were
offered and received in bulk, subject to the filing and, where appropriate, rulings on objections to
exhibits so offered.
Chevron called 25 witnesses live and offered deposition testimony of 22 additional
witnesses. The defendants called only six witnesses live – Donziger, Hinton, Ponce, Javier Piaguaje,
Selva Viva employee Donald Moncayo, and Assembly leader Humberto Piaguaje. They did not call
Fajardo, Yanza, Sáenz, Prieto, or Cabrera, none of whom was deposed. The record thus lacks any
testimony from them.
The trial was conspicuous for the fact that the defendants sought to offer extensive
evidence of environmental conditions in the Orienté and of Texaco’s alleged responsibility for them
notwithstanding the Court’s numerous pretrial rulings that those questions were not at issue in this
case.

Post-Trial Briefing
The post-trial briefing in this matter was notable for the fact that the defendants made
little effort to address the evidence presented at trial or to argue the facts. They confined
themselves, for the most part, to rearguing the contentions they made in Ecuador with respect to
alleged environmental pollution in the Orienté and to legal arguments that, they contend, require
dismissal even if the facts are as Chevron contends.1225

1225

See DI 1850 (Donziger Defs.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law); DI 1857 (Donziger Defs.’ Post-trial
Reply); DI 1851 (LAPs Reps.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law); DI 1858 (LAPs Reps.’ Post-trial
Reply).

305
One consequence of this approach is that the defendants – who offered only a handful
of their proposed exhibits through witnesses in open court1226 – made little effort to show the
relevance or significance of most of the more than 1,000 exhibits they tendered in a mass submission
on the last day of the trial. The Court therefore does not have the benefit of much reasoned
discussion by defendants as to what defendants think they proved or disproved even assuming their
exhibits are admissible, which many quite obviously are not. Nevertheless, the Court has considered
the evidence on both sides and, to the extent it is admissible, given it such weight as it deserves.1227

1226

That is true also, albeit not to the same extent, of Chevron. Chevron, however, has
explained its case extensively both in summation and in extensive post-trial submissions.
1227

As frequently occurs in bench trials, most of the exhibits on both sides were received
subject to subsequent rulings on (1) motions to strike, where such motions were made, and
(2) objections, which in the case of Chevron’s objections are set forth in an extensive
spreadsheet listing each exhibit, Chevron’s objections, and defendants’ responses. A
similar practice was employed with respect to the parties’ designations of deposition
testimony.
Some of these motions and objections were ruled upon during or after the trial. Others are
dealt with in this opinion, including in Appendix III. Beyond that, little purpose would be
served by the making of specific rulings as to the admissibility of hundreds or possibly
thousands of exhibits and many pages of deposition testimony that do not figure in the
outcome. Suffice it to say that the Court has received in evidence any exhibit or testimony
upon which it relies in this opinion.

306
Discussion and Additional Findings
Chevron’s principal remaining claims seek equitable relief with respect to the
Judgment both on non-statutory grounds and under RICO.

These two claims are entirely

independent of each other1228 although, of course, they rely to a great but not complete extent on the

1228

There is a basis of subject matter jurisdiction over these and other non-federal claims
completely independent of the RICO claims, namely 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See generally DI
283 (Am. Compl.), ¶¶ 8-17, 20, 23.
At the outset of the action, there was one uncertainty as to the existence of complete
diversity, viz. the allegation that defendant Selva Viva Selviva CIA, LTDA (actually Selva
Viva CIA, LTDA, subsequently referred to as “Selva Viva”) is an Ecuadorian limited
liability company. Id. ¶ 14. Had that been true, it would have been a citizen of every state
or nation of which any of its members was a citizen. E.g., Handlesman v. Bedford Vill.
Green Assocs. L.P., 213 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2000). There is no allegation as to the identity
or citizenship of its members. Accordingly, if paragraph 13 of the complaint (paragraph 14
of the amended complaint) had been accurate, plaintiff’s failure to have alleged that none of
Selva Viva’s members was a citizen of Delaware or California, the states in which Chevron
is organized and in which it has its principal place of business, respectively, would have been
fatal to diversity or alienage jurisdiction. But that pleading flaw has been rendered
immaterial by the proof at trial.
The Court finds that Selva Viva is, and from its inception always has been, an Ecuadorian
corporation with its principal place of business in Ecuador. Tr. (Donziger) 2635:4-6 (Selva
Viva is an entity created under corporate law of Ecuador); Donziger June 24, 2013 Dep. Tr.
at 103:6-16 (acknowledging incorporation of Selva Viva and Donziger’s designation as
president); Tr. (H. Piaguaje) 2677:12-2678:3 (stating that witness is a 40 percent shareholder
of Selva Viva); PX 6906 (record of incorporation of Selva Viva, its entry into the Register
of Companies, and the designation of Donziger as president); PX 426 (Ecuadorian court
record reflecting Fajardo’s description of Selva Viva as a corporation); Tr. (Kohn) 1420:1120 (Selva Viva headquartered in Quito, Ecuador); Tr. (Donziger) 10:6-17 (Selva Viva’s
office is in office of LAPs’ Ecuadorian counsel); Donziger June 26, 2013 Dep. Tr. at 737:714 (Selva Viva office is in Ecuador); DX 226T-227T (same). It therefore is a citizen of
Ecuador. Thus, plaintiff Chevron is a citizen of California and Delaware, and defendants all
are citizens of Ecuador or of states other than California and Delaware. The matter in
controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, obviously exceeds the sum of $75,000. Subject
matter jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) and (c). For the sake of good order, the
complaint and the amended complaint are deemed amended to conform to the proof that
Selva Viva is an Ecuadorian corporation with its principal place of business in Ecuador. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1653. Accordingly, even a pretrial dismissal of the
RICO claims would not have permitted dismissal of the non-RICO claims for want of subject
matter jurisdiction.

307
same facts. Chevron asserts in addition certain other claims.
The Court begins by disposing of Donziger’s claim, raised only after trial, that the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Chevron lacks Article III standing. It then turns to
the merits of Chevron’s claims, the affirmative defenses, and then to relief. The appendices to this
opinion, filed separately for convenience, are an integral part of it and contain additional findings
of fact and conclusions of law.

I.

This Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Following the completion of the trial and all post-trial briefing, defendants moved to

dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. They argue that Chevron lacks Article III
standing by virtue of its recent withdrawal of its damage claim and its decision to limit the geographic
scope of injunction against enforcement of the Judgment to the United States. Defendants claim that
these recent changes in the relief sought eliminated any “case or controversy” between them and
Chevron. Parenthetically, that is a proposition that defies common sense given the bitter adversity
of the parties on the central issue between them, whether the Lago Agrio Judgment was procured by
fraud. But putting that aside, their argument is completely baseless.

First, subject matter jurisdiction – including standing1229 – is determined as of the
time the action is brought.1230 But defendants do not suggest that Chevron lacked standing when the
1229

15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 101.32 (3d ed. 2013) (“Standing is determined as of the
time suit is filed.”).
1230

See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 184 (2000)
(rejecting challenge to plaintiffs’ standing because “unlawful conduct . . . was occurring at
the time the complaint was filed”); Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567,
570-71 (2004) (footnote omitted) (“It has long been the case that ‘the jurisdiction of the court

308
action was brought. The basis for their present motion – Chevron’s limitation of the relief it seeks
– occurred only recently. So they have posed the wrong question. The right question is whether these
recent changes have mooted the case.1231 The answer to that question quite plainly is “no.”
Second, even were the Court to engage defendants’ standing argument – thereby
ignoring the horn book law that subject matter jurisdiction and its standing component are determined
as of the time the action is brought – it would reject it. Defendants’ arguments ignore the factual
record in this case. Given the record and this Court’s findings, there would be standing here even if
the matter were determined as of this moment.
In sum, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction.

A.

This Case Is Not Moot

Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power of the United States – and thus
the jurisdiction of federal courts – in relevant part to “Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution [and] the Laws of the United States” and “to Controversies between . . . Citizens of

depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought.’ Mollan v. Torrance, 9
Wheat. 537, 539, 6 L.Ed. 154 (1824). This time-of-filing rule is hornbook law (quite
literally) taught to first-year law students in any basic course on federal civil procedure.”).
Accord, e.g., Utah Ass’n of Counties v. Bush, 455 F.3d 1094, 1099 (10th Cir. 2006); Focus
on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Trans. Auth., 244 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003).
1231

Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990); U.S. Parole Comm’n v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) (“One commentator has defined mootness as ‘the
doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the
commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence
(mootness).”) (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and
When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973)).

309
different States”1232 – or, as it often is stated more broadly, to “cases and controversies.”1233
Assuming the existence of a case or controversy at the time an action is brought – and defendants’
motion, not to mention their behavior in litigating this case over the past three years so assumes – the
federal court continues to have subject matter jurisdiction unless and until “a suit becomes moot,” i.e.,
until “‘the issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome.’”1234 But, as the Supreme Court held just months ago, “a case ‘becomes moot only when
it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.’”1235 “As long
as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not
moot.”1236
First, the litigants here plainly retain a “concrete interest” in the resolution of this case.
Chevron insists that it has been a victim of defendants’ fraud and racketeering activity. It alleges that
it is threatened with additional injury. It seeks equitable relief both to rectify past injuries and prevent
further injury. Donziger and the LAP Representatives argue in response that Chevron’s claims are
spurious, that this Court lacks jurisdiction to provide Chevron with any effective relief, and that
comity in any event demands respect for the Lago Agrio Judgment and the various enforcement

1232

U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.
1233

See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
1234

Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S.Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 621, 726 (2013)).
1235

Id. (quoting Knox v. Serv. Empls, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012) (emphasis added)).
1236

Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2287 (quoting Ellis v. Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 442 (1984)) (emphasis
added).

310
courts. Nevertheless, “there is not the slightest doubt that there continues to exist between the parties
‘that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues.’”1237
Second, Chevron’s withdrawal of its damage claim and its limitation of the geographic
scope of the anti-enforcement injunction it seeks did not make it “impossible for [this] court to grant
any effectual relief whatever.”1238 This Court can and, as will appear below, does impose a
constructive trust on the proceeds of the Judgment to these defendants, including the proceeds of
intellectual property and royalties already seized from Chevron in Ecuador in Judgment enforcement
proceedings and a $96 million arbitration award in favor of Chevron against the ROE, in order to
prevent these defendants from profiting unjustly at Chevron’s expense. It can and, as will be appear
below, does enjoin these defendants from pursuing any proceedings in the United States to enforce
the Judgment, once again to prevent them from profiting from the fraud. Regardless of whether those
and any other remedies granted would afford Chevron all the relief it could hope for with respect to
the fraud and racketeering of which it complains, Chevron certainly has “a concrete interest, [even
if others might characterize it as] small,” in obtaining them. The fact that the Court can afford
Chevron such relief means this case is not moot.1239

1237

Id. at 1024; see also Cabala v. Crowley, 736 F.3d 226, 229 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Because the
parties continued to dispute the form and extent of the relief to which [plaintiff] was entitled,
the case never became moot.”).
1238

Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1023.
1239

Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1026 (“[T]he availability of a partial remedy is sufficient to prevent
[a] case from being moot.”) (quoting Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996) (per
curiam)); Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (“Even
though it is now too late to prevent, or to provide a fully satisfactory remedy for [plaintiff’s
injury], . . . the availability of [any] possible remedy is sufficient to prevent this case from
being moot.”).

311
B.

This Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction When the Action Was Brought
Defendants have not questioned the existence of subject matter jurisdiction generally,

or Chevron’s standing in particular, as of the time this action was brought. But subject matter
jurisdiction goes to the Court’s power to hear a case, and the Court therefore is obliged to raise the
issue of its own motion whenever a question appears. Accordingly, the Court does so now.

One element of a “case” or “controversy,” the existence of which is essential to the
jurisdiction of a federal court, is that the plaintiff have standing to sue. The determination, as the
Court has shown, is made “on the basis of what was known at the time a suit was initially filed.”1240
“[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements:” (1)
“the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ – an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical,” that is (2) “‘fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,’” and (3)
“likely” to “be redressed by a favorable decision.”1241 Although an “injury-in-fact” exists when a
defendant has inflicted a “present harm” on a plaintiff, the “Supreme Court has recognized that a
plaintiff in some circumstances may have standing to sue even when the plaintiff shows only an
imminent threat of future harm or a present harm incurred in consequence of such a threat.”1242

1240

Hargrave v. Vermont, 340 F.3d 27, 34 n.7 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Davis v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (although the “proof required to establish standing
increases as the suit proceeds, the standing inquiry remains focused on whether the party
invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed”
(emphasis added) (internal citation omitted)).
1241

Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
1242

Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2013).

312
The complaint in this case alleged that the defendants (1) corrupted the judicial
process in Ecuador, (2) colluded with the Ecuadorian government, (3) improperly procured the
appointment of Cabrera and secretly ghostwrote his report, (4) improperly induced the Ecuadorian
government to prosecute two former Texaco lawyers, and (5) mounted a public relations blitz, aimed
at Chevron and based in part on knowing misrepresentations, all to extort a payment from Chevron,
and that they also had obstructed justice and tampered with witnesses in U.S. discovery proceedings
to prevent proof of their misconduct.1243 Chevron asserted that it already had suffered substantial
damages, that the entry of a large judgment against it was imminent as a result of the alleged
corruption, that the defendants would move promptly to seek to enforce that judgment, and that it
was threatened with irreparable injury absent equitable intervention.1244 Chevron sought damages
as well as an injunction barring the defendants from seeking to enforce the imminent judgment
anywhere in the world.1245
Those allegations satisfied Article III’s standing requirements. And while a plaintiff
ultimately bears the burden of proving, not merely alleging, facts sufficient to satisfy the standing
requirements as of the date an action is begun, Chevron did so. The findings in this opinion
demonstrate that Chevron proved the substantial truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. Finally,
the remedy it initially sought – damages and a global injunction prohibiting the LAPs and both their

1243

See DI 1 (Feb. 1, 2011 Compl.).
1244

The Judgment was entered thirteen days following the filing of the original complaint in this
case, thus demonstrating that Chevron’s claim that this event was imminent was well
founded. See Hargrave, 340 F.3d at 34. In any case, Chevron alleged other, already
consummated, injuries.
1245

See, e.g., DI 1 (Feb. 1, 2011 Compl.) Prayer for Relief.

313
Ecuadorian and U.S. counsel from enforcing or profiting in any way from the Judgment – would
obviously redress Chevron’s injuries by compensating it for injuries already incurred and by
preventing future injuries stemming from both the Judgment and attempts to enforce it.1246
Chevron had standing, and the Court had subject matter jurisdiction, as of the
commencement of this action.

C.

The Court Would Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction Even on Defendants’
Erroneous Premise

Even were this Court to accept defendants’ erroneous premise that the standing
requirements that apply at the commencement of a lawsuit persist through the twists and turns that
litigation can take – in other words, their invitation to ignore (1) the foundational principle that
standing is determined at the time the complaint is filed, (2) the fact that Chevron both pleaded and
proved that it had standing at the outset, and (3) the fact that this action is far from moot – the Court
still would conclude that Chevron has standing here.
First, defendants’ enforcement of the Judgment in Ecuador already has resulted in the
loss by Chevron of Ecuadorian trademarks and related revenue streams, which are being applied to

1246

Defendants argue that even a global anti-enforcement injunction could not have redressed
Chevron’s injuries “because foreign courts would first have to decide to give it effect.” See
DI 1861 (Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction), at 6 n.4.
That argument ignores the fact that even the possibility that foreign enforcement might
enforce the Judgment is a threat directly caused by the fraudulent procurement of the
judgment in the first place. It ignores also the facts that “[c]ourts often adjudicate disputes
where the practical impact of any decision is not assured” and that “[c]ourts also decide
cases against foreign nations, whose choices to respect final rulings are not guaranteed.”
Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1025-26. Such potentialities have no bearing on jurisdiction.

314
the satisfaction of the Judgment.1247 The value of those trademarks is between $15,703,986 and
$23,195,020, and the value of lost future royalties amounts to $5,138,596.1248 And it has lost its $96
million arbitration award against the ROE to the extent that the award otherwise would have been
enforceable in Ecuador.1249 As the attachment orders say, all of that property is applicable to the
satisfaction of the Judgment under Article 2367 of the Ecuadorian Civil Code.1250 The application of
that property to the satisfaction of the Judgment – that is, to the benefit of the Judgment creditors and,
through his contingent fee arrangement, Donziger – is a concrete, particular, and direct consequence
of the fraudulent Judgment, not merely “fairly traceable” to it.1251

1247

See DI 1847 (Chevron Corp.’s Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 197-98; DI 1848 (Chevron
Corp.’s Proposed Findings of Fact) ¶ 127.
1248

PX 6000 (Anson Direct) ¶¶ 48-49.
1249

PX 432 (Oct. 15, 2012 Order issued in Summary Proceeding No. 21100-2003-0002), at 4
(attaching $96,355,369 arbitration award issued against the ROE).
1250

See, e.g., PX 432 (“Therefore, in strict compliance with Article 2367 of the Civil Code,
which states that, ‘every personal obligation gives the creditor the right to satisfy it with all
real property or personal property of the debtor, whether present or future, only excepting
those that cannot be attached . . .’, since none of the assets for which attachment is being
requested is covered under this exception, and since it is necessary to comply with that
ordered in the judgment being executed, against the defendant in this proceeding, Chevron
Corp., it is ordered that the execution of this judgment be applicable to the entirety of the
assets of Chevron Corporation, until such time as the entire obligation has been satisfied.”).
1251

Defendants’ argument that subsequent appellate proceedings constitute an intervening cause
ignores the fact that “the ‘fairly traceable’ standard is lower than that of proximate cause.”
Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2013). Defendants’ actions need not be “the
very last step in the chain of causation” in order to establish causation for the purposes of
Article III. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168-69 (1997). It ignores also this Court’s
conclusion, infra, that the subsequent appellate rulings are not entitled to any recognition
in consequence of the systemic deficiencies of the Ecuadorian legal system.

315
Those injuries are redressable by the constructive trust the Court today imposes on,
and the related relief it grants with respect to, Donziger’s right to share in those proceeds and any
benefits accruing to the other defendants and the LAP Representatives. The constructive trust with
respect to the any royalties and other income generated by the trademarks will deprive Donziger and
these other defendants of any benefit from the Judgment and restore that value to its rightful owner,
Chevron.1252
Second, Chevron has established that it is threatened with additional, imminent injury
as a direct result of defendants’ continued efforts to enforce the Judgment. It currently is incurring
substantial legal fees and other expenses to defend enforcement proceedings,1253 all concrete and direct
consequences of the fraud perpetrated by these defendants. In addition, it is threatened with the risk
of further disruptive pre-judgment attachment in foreign countries, as occurred in Argentina,1254 and
with the risk that some foreign country will enforce the Judgment. All of these threatened injuries
are direct consequences of the Judgment.
Defendants nevertheless argue that the risk of further attachments and of foreign
enforcement are not certain to be realized and, even were they certain, would be products of the

1252

Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A constructive trust is
properly imposed in this situation in order to make [a plaintiff] whole for its loss of the
value of the Property . . . .”).
1253

See, e.g., PX 3000 (Veiga Direct), ¶ 132.
1254

PX 2461 (Order, National Civil Trial Court No. 61, Argentina, in Aguinda Salazar Maria
v. Chevron Corporation).
The Argentine attachment ultimately was vacated by Argentina’s highest court. See PX 273
(Order, Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina, in Aguinda Salazar, Maria v. Chevron
Corporation).

316
actions of other courts and thus not “fairly traceable” to defendants. But these arguments are not
persuasive.
The suggestion that the risks of attachments or a foreign decision enforcing the
Ecuadorian Judgment are merely speculative is disingenuous. Defendants’ own written enforcement
strategy lays out the plan to use prejudgment attachment wherever possible,1255 and they have pursued
that course in Argentina already. If the possibility of a foreign judgment enforcing the Judgment
entered in Ecuador were as speculative as defendants argue, they would not be pursuing such
judgments in Argentina, Brazil, and Canada, spending large sums doing so, and obtaining investors
willing to fund those (and doubtless other) efforts in exchange for percentages of the result.1256
Finally, the attempt to lay any outcome adverse to Chevron at the doorstep of whatever foreign court
might render a decision adverse to it, and thus to disconnect defendants’ fraud from the threatened
harm, does not withstand analysis. Defendants’ fraud produced the Judgment. Their enforcement
efforts present the foreign tribunals with the opportunities to enforce that Judgment. If any does so,
it would be in consequence of defendants’ actions and arguments. Thus, there is a substantial risk that
the harm Chevron apprehends will come to pass and, should that occur, it would have come to pass

1255

PX 2382 (Invictus Memo), at 17 (“Consistent with its aggressive approach, Plaintiffs’ Team
will look for ways to proceed against Chevron on a pre-judgment basis, largely as a means
of attaining a favorable settlement at an early stage.”).
1256

See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 184 (plaintiffs’ evidence of direct effects of
defendants’ conduct could not “be equated with the speculative ‘some day’ intentions” upon
which plaintiffs relied in Lujan) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564).

317
as a direct result of defendants’ actions. That would suffice to give Chevron standing to seek relief
even if the existence of standing now matter, which for reasons already discussed it does not.1257
Finally, the fact that the relief sought in this case would not remedy all of the past
harms nor prevent all of the threatened harms of which Chevron is at substantial risk would not
deprive it of standing even if standing were viewed as of the present rather than as of the
commencement of the action. The requirement of redressability is satisfied if the relief would “relieve
a discrete injury.”1258 A plaintiff “need not show that a favorable decision will relieve his every

1257

Defendants’ reliance on Clapper for the proposition that the harm must be certain and that
plaintiffs may not rely on “speculation about the unfettered choices made by independent
actors not before the court,” 133 S.Ct. 1150 n.5 (quotation marks and citation omitted), is
misplaced. Clapper acknowledged that the “substantial risk” and “clearly impending”
standards may be coextensive and, even if they are not, did not abandon the former. See id.
There is no proper comparison to be made between the chain of speculation that the Clapper
Court condemned as too attenuated and the far more direct relationship between defendants’
fraud in this case and any foreign judgment enforcing the Ecuadorian Judgment.
Even more basic, Clapper must be read in the context in which it was written – an attempt
to use the courts to cabin the actions of the executive branch. The Court made clear that its
“standing inquiry has been especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute
would force us to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the
Federal Government was unconstitutional.” Id. at 1146-47 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521
U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This purely private dispute implicates none of the separation of powers concerns that inform
the standing doctrine, particularly in cases like Clapper. It therefore would be entirely
wrong to apply literally some of the language used in Clapper, assuming that the language
was meant to impose standards higher than usual in the first place, to purely private
litigation. Such application could alter dramatically, to cite but one example, the law
governing preliminary injunctions in trade secret cases by transforming the requirement of
impending dissemination into a jurisdictional question, rather than a question on the merits.
See Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that
plaintiff had standing, but vacating preliminary injunction for lack of irreparable harm
where plaintiff failed to show imminent disclosure of trade secrets).
1258

Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 n.15 (1982) (emphasis added).

318
injury.”1259 Because Chevron “would benefit in a tangible way from the [C]ourt’s intervention,”1260
it has standing here.

II.

The Non-Statutory Claims for Equitable Relief With Respect to the Judgment
Chevron asserts that the Judgment was procured by bribery and coercion of

Ecuadorian judges and, even if that were not so, that it nevertheless was procured by fraud in other
respects. It nevertheless does not seek to set aside the Judgment in the Ecuadorian court – an
institution of a sovereign nation – or even to enjoin its enforcement outside the United States.
Rather, it seeks equitable relief “that will strip Defendants of any profits they are able to procure as
a result of their corrupt judgment”1261 and to enjoin enforcement of the Judgment in the United
States.1262

A.

Equitable Relief With Respect to Fraudulent Judgments Generally
Three basic principles underlie Chevron’s non-statutory claim for relief from the

Judgment.
First, independent equitable actions long have afforded relief from judgments
obtained by fraud, whether by enjoining their enforcement, preventing those responsible from

1259

Id.
1260

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103 n.5 (1998).
1261

DI 1847 (Chevron Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 326.
1262

Id. at 347-49.

319
benefitting from their fraudulent actions, or otherwise.1263 The willingness of equity to “enjoin a
judgment obtained by fraud” has existed at least since the seventeenth century. 1264 While the merger
of law and equity altered the procedural context in which such actions are pursued and other changes
in the legal environment have reduced the frequency with they are brought, all relief traditionally
granted in equity remains available.1265

1263

E.g., 4 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1364, at 984
(Symons 5th ed. 1941) (“POMEROY”) (“where the legal judgment was obtained or entered
through fraud, . . . then a court of equity will interfere . . . and restrain proceedings on the
judgment which cannot be conscientiously enforced”); Note, Injunctions – Foreign
Judgment – Enforcement Abroad Restrained, 38 YALE L.J. 261 (1928). FED. R. CIV. P.
60(b) indeed provides that “the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be
by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.” See id. Comm. Note
2007 Amdt. (emphasis added).
1264

See, e.g., HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, MCCLINTOCK ON EQUITY (“MCCLINTOCK”) § 4, at 11,
459 (1948); see also id. § 171, at 459 (“Since [the seventeenth century] . . . there has been
no serious question as to the power [of equity] to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment
obtained by fraud . . . .”).
1265

Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 382 n.26 (1949) (“Notwithstanding the
fusion of law and equity by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the substantive principles of
Courts of Chancery remain unaffected.”); Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 139 F.2d
542, 544 (2d Cir. 1944) (“Under the present practice there is no longer a law side and an
equity side of the court, but only a civil action in which all relief must be obtained that
could formerly be secured either at law or in equity.”); 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1043, at 177 (3d ed. 2002) (“[T]he merger of law
and equity and . . . abolition of . . . forms of action furnish a single uniform procedure by
which a litigant may present his claim in an orderly manner to a court empowered to award
whatever relief is appropriate and just; the substantive and remedial principles that applied
prior to the advent of the federal rules are not changed.”); see also, e.g., Grupo Mexicano
de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318-19 (1999) (“[T]he
substantive prerequisites for obtaining an equitable remedy as well as the general
availability of injunctive relief are not altered by [Rule 65] and depend on traditional
principles of equity jurisdiction.”) (quoting 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2941, at 31 (2d ed.
1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)).

320
Second, equity acts in personam – it acts on the person subject to its jurisdiction and,
in this context, not on the challenged judgment, whether foreign or domestic.1266 It therefore “may
command persons properly before it to cease or perform acts outside its territorial jurisdiction.”1267
Since the time of Lord Coke, this principle has resulted, in proper cases, in equitable decrees
“enjoin[ing] parties from enforcing judgments obtained by them at law when it was unconscionable
for them to do so” even “leav[ing] the judgment in peace.”1268 Moreover, the principle that equity
1266

E.g., 2 POMEROY § 428; MCCLINTOCK § 34, at 85; see also, e.g., Hart v. Sansom, 110 U.S.
151, 155 (1884) (“[A] court of equity acts in personam, by compelling a deed to be executed
or canceled by or on behalf of the party. It has no inherent power, by the mere force of its
decree, to annul a deed or to establish a title.”); Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148, 158
(1810) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[T]he principles of equity give a court jurisdiction wherever the
person may be found, and the circumstance, that a question of title may be involved in the
inquiry, and may even constitute the essential point on which the case depends, does not
seem sufficient to arrest that jurisdiction.”).
1267

Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 289 (1952) (affirming injunction prohibiting use
of trademark in Mexico); accord, e.g., Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 111 (1890)
(affirming Massachusetts decree restraining Massachusetts citizens from prosecuting
attachment actions in New York); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d
246, 263 (2d Cir. 2012) (federal court sitting in equity having personal jurisdiction over
party may “enjoin him from committing acts elsewhere” (quoting Bano v. Union Carbide
Corp., 361 F.3d 696, 716 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted))); City of
Jamestown v. Pennsylvania Gas Co., 1 F.2d 871, 878 (2d Cir. 1924) (“Where the necessary
parties are before a court of equity, it is immaterial that the res of the controversy, whether
it be real or personal property, is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the tribunal. It has the
power to compel the defendant to do all things necessary, according to the lex loci rei sitae,
which he could do voluntarily, to give full effect to the decree against him.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); Storm LLC v. Telenor Mobile Commc’ns AS, No. 06
Civ. 13157 (GEL), 2006 WL 3735657, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2006) (Lynch, J.)
(enjoining initiation of lawsuits in Ukraine that would disrupt or delay New York arbitration
proceedings); Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sen. 444, 447-48, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132, 1134-35
(Ch.) (1750) (Lord Chancellor entertained in England bill seeking specific performance of
contract to determine boundary between provinces of Maryland and Pennsylvania).
1268

MCCLINTOCK § 34, at 85; accord, 73 N.Y. JUR. 2D, Judgments § 226 (2011) (“The equitable
remedy against a judgment is not a proceeding in rem but is a proceeding in personam
against a party to the judgment seeking to deprive him or her of the benefit of the judgment
by enjoining the enforcement of it. The remedy in equity does not assail the court in which
the judgment was rendered . . . but may be employed to secure relief against the judgment

321
acts in personam means that a court of equity having jurisdiction over individual parties may enjoin
those parties from enforcing, or afford other equitable relief with respect to, a judgment of another
state or another nation.1269 Thus, the fact that equity acts in personam affords ample scope for
equitable relief short of voiding or setting aside a fraudulent judgment.

on the ground that the rights acquired cannot be retained in good conscience.”); 73 N.Y
JUR. 2D, Judgments § 234 (“By a decree operating in personam or upon parties personally
subject to its jurisdiction, a court of equity may grant relief from a judgment rendered in a
foreign state even though the court that rendered the judgment had jurisdiction.”) (footnote
omitted).
This principle underlies also the rule that “[w]hen . . . both parties to a suit in a foreign
country[] are resident within the territorial limits of another country [or subject to its in
personam jurisdiction], the courts of equity in the latter may act in personam upon those
parties, and direct them, by injunction, to proceed no further in such suit.” JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 899 (1st Eng. ed. Grigsby ed. 1884).
1269

Gray v. Richmond Bicycle Co., 167 N.Y. 348, 358-59 (1901) (“a court of one state may,
where it has jurisdiction of the parties, determine the question whether a judgment between
them, rendered in another state, was obtained by fraud, and, if so, may enjoin the
enforcement of it, although its subject-matter is situated in such other state”) (quoting Davis
v. Cornue, 151 N.Y. 172, 179 (1896) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Venizelos v.
Venizelos, 293 N.Y.S.2d 20 (App. Div. 1968) (affirming injunction barring, inter alia,
enforcement of a Greek court decree); Browning v. Navarro, 826 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1987)
(instructing district court to consider whether state court judgment was procured by fraud
and may be set aside); Ellerman Lines, Ltd. v. Read, [1928] 2 K.B. 144 (C.A. 1928)
(English plaintiff entitled to injunction barring enforcement of Turkish judgment that was
procured by fraud); Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Cal. Dev. Co., 152 P. 542, 550-51, 553, 55758 (Cal. 1915) (affirming injunction barring enforcement in Mexico of Mexican judgment
obtained by fraud); Ochsenbein v. Papelier, (1873) L.R. 8 Ch. (Eng.) 695 (English equity
court had jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of French judgment procured by fraud but
declined to grant relief in light of adequacy of legal remedy); Bowles v. Orr, (1835) 1
Younge & Collyer, 464, 160 Eng. Rep. 189 (1835) (enjoining action to enforce in England
a French judgment allegedly obtained by fraud); Injunction Against Enforcement of
Judgment Rendered in Foreign Country or Other State, 64 A.L.R. 1136 (1930); see also
Tamimi v. Tamimi, 328 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1972) (declaring void a Thai divorce
decree on the ground that the decree had been procured by fraud).

322
Third, fraud in its procurement is an ancient basis for enjoining enforcement of or
granting other equitable relief with respect to a judgment where other requisites of the exercise of
equitable power are present.1270
With this background, the Court proceeds to the claim that the Judgment was
procured by fraud.

B.

Fraud on the Court – Corruption and Coercion of Judges and Judicial Official
There is a good deal of learning concerning the kinds of fraud that support an

independent action for relief from a judgment.1271 But there is uniform agreement on the
proposition that “a judgment may be avoided . . . if the judgment . . . [r]esulted from corruption of
or duress upon the court . . .”1272 “Where . . . the situation is clear cut, as where a judge accepts a
1270

E.g., supra note 1263; 12 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.81.
1271

Fraud in the context of independent actions or other applications for relief from a judgment
generally falls into two or three categories. “Relief is always possible for ‘extrinsic’ fraud”
and for “fraud on the court,” which often is confused with or treated as a subset of extrinsic
fraud. 12 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.81[1][b]. Relief for so-called “intrinsic fraud”
often has been available less frequently. Id. § 60.81[1][b][ii]. There is more recent
discussion as to whether the supposed distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud is or
should be meaningful. Id. § 60.81[1][b][iv]; see Gleason v. Jandrucko, 860 F.2d 556, 560
(2d Cir. 1988) (“Relief from a judgment by way of an independent action need not be
premised on a showing of extrinsic as opposed to intrinsic fraud.”) (citations and emphasis
omitted).
1272

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70(1)(a) & cmt b (1982); see 11 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2870 (“Fraud on the
court” most commonly has been invoked in cases involving “‘the most egregious conduct
involving a corruption of the judicial process itself.’ The concept clearly includes bribery
of a judge . . . .”); accord, RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 124 (1942); United States v.
Buck, 281 F.3d 1336, 1342 (10th Cir. 2002) (bribery of judge or juror is fraud on court and
ground for relief from judgment) (internal quotations omitted); Wilkin v. Sunbeam Corp.,
466 F.2d 714, 717 (10th Cir. 1972) (corruption of judicial officers is fraud on the court);
Root Ref. Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 169 F.2d 514, 517, 541 (3d Cir. 1948) (vacating

323
bribe . . . , the person injured thereby is entitled to equitable relief.”1273 The position is equally clear
with respect to the coercion of judicial officers. “[E]quitable relief will be given from a valid
judgment to a party . . . injured thereby because of . . . duress upon the court . . . by the other party
or a third person” if the judge “submits to duress.”1274 Indeed, defendants do not contend otherwise.
This record establishes both of these types of fraud on the Lago Agrio court.

1.

The Bribery of Zambrano

This Court has found by clear and convincing evidence that Zambrano was corrupted
by Donziger and the LAPs. Fajardo – with Donziger’s approval – agreed to pay Zambrano $500,000
out of proceeds of the Judgment in exchange for Zambrano deciding the Lago Agrio case in the
LAPs’ favor and signing a decision provided by the LAPs. The principle that such a bribe warrants

judgments obtained by bribery of Third Circuit judge), cert. denied sub nom. Universal Oil
Products Co. v. William Whitman Co., 335 U.S. 912 (1949); In re Ibanez, 834 N.W.2d 306,
312 (S.D. 2013) (same); Pizzuto v. Ramirez, No. 1:92–cv–00241–BLW, 2013 WL 1222560,
at *8 (D. Ida. Mar. 22, 2013) (bribery of judge or juror is fraud on court and ground for
equitable relief against judgment); Ellett v. Ellett, 35 Va. App. 97, 101, 542 S.E.2d 816, 818
(2001) (“[e]xtrinsic fraud includes such circumstances as bribery of a judge or juror”); In
re Miller, 902 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Mont. 1995) (“[e]xtrinsic fraud includes such
circumstances as bribery of a judge or juror”).
For the sake of completeness, the defendants have not asserted that the question whether the
bribery of Zambrano and the coercion of Judge Yánez were lawful under Ecuadorian law
should be decided under Ecuadorian law. In the absence of a party’s demonstration of a
conflict of laws, the law of the forum, here New York, applies. 19A N.Y. JUR. 2D, Conflict
of Laws § 2 (2014). Citations are unnecessary to establish the proposition that bribing a
judge is unlawful here. Moreover, an Ecuadorian law expert for defendants testified, and
this Court holds, that the law in Ecuador is the same. DI 1413-12 (Albán Dep. Tr.), at
31:21-32:2; DI 1400-4 (Ex. D), at 48:1-12.24.
1273

RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 124 cmt. a.
1274

Id.

324
equitable relief is so well established that counsel for the LAP Representatives recently conceded
before the Second Circuit that they “would not have a problem” with “the alternative relief that
[Chevron] would be seeking, such as enjoining the person who paid the bribe from benefitting from
it,” assuming that the judge was bribed.1275 Thus, the bribery of Zambrano establishes a clear basis
for relief provided that other equitable considerations are satisfied.

2.

The Coercion of Judge Yánez

The Court has found, also by clear and convincing evidence, that Fajardo and
Donziger coerced Judge Yánez to allow the LAPs to terminate their remaining judicial inspections,
to appoint a global expert, and to designate their hand-picked choice, Richard Cabrera, for that
position. They did so by threatening him with the filing of a misconduct complaint at a time when
he was especially vulnerable, and by other pressure as well.
Defendants do not dispute that the coercion of Judge Yánez would be fraud on the
court and afford a basis for equitable relief if it were material to the outcome. Rather, they argue
that the coercion of Judge Yánez was immaterial because the Cabrera Report played no role in the
ultimate decision. But they are mistaken.
The only basis for the contention that the Cabrera Report played no role in the
ultimate decision is the statement in the Judgment that the Lago Agrio court did not rely on it.1276
But that disclaimer does not carry the day for the defendants on this point for at least two reasons.
1275

DI 1496-2 (Tr., Sept. 26, 2013), at 25:3:15, Naranjo v. Chevron Corp., No. 13-772-cv (2d
Cir.).
1276

The National Court of Justice accepted that statement and therefore disregarded the
allegations regarding Cabrera. Supra Facts § XII.B.

325
First, the disclaimer is inadmissible hearsay – it is nothing more than an out-of-court
statement by the author or authors of the Judgment, and it is offered for its truth. It therefore is
inadmissible hearsay, and it would be so even if Zambrano were the author.1277
Second, even if the disclaimer were admissible for its truth, it would be only some
evidence on the question. But this Court has found, on the basis of other evidence, that the Cabrera
Report in fact was relied upon by the author or authors of the Judgment and that it played an
important role in holding Chevron liable to the extent of more than $8 billion. The most material
respect in which that was true was the reliance on the Cabrera Report for the count of 880 pits,
which was an essential predicate to more than $5 billion of the damage award.1278
Accordingly, the coercion of Judge Yánez, coupled with the important reliance on
the Cabrera Report by the author or authors of the Judgment, is a second material fraud on the Lago
Agrio court, and it is entirely independent of the bribery of Zambrano.

3.

The Corruption of Cabrera

In late February and early March 2007, Donziger and Fajardo, having concluded that
Cabrera would cooperate them, were giving him the “hard sell” to accept the global expert
appointment. They promised him a lifetime of work on the remediation if the LAPs won the case.
Even before he was sworn in as the global expert on June 13, 2007, Donziger and the LAPs began

1277

Infra Discussion VII.A.
1278

Infra App’x III.I.

326
covertly paying him through the secret account in addition to paying him via the public and
established court process. They provided him also with a secretary and life insurance.
The Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that at least some of these
payments and benefits, actual and promised, were bribes given to influence Cabrera’s actions as the
court-appointed global expert. The quid pro quo were Cabrera’s repeated representations to the
Lago Agrio court and others that he was impartial and independent, his putting of his name to the
Report largely prepared by Stratus and it subcontractors and claiming that Report as his own
product, and his filing as his own purported response (actually written mostly by Stratus and the
LAPs) to the LAPs’ and Chevron’s comments on the Cabrera Report.
Cabrera took an oath administered by and was an officer of the court. When
Donziger and the LAPs covertly paid him and provided him with other benefits under the table to
make sure he “totally play[ed] ball” with them, they bribed or corrupted a judicial official.1279 The
same principles that apply to the bribery of Zambrano apply to this behavior.1280 In light of the
reliance by the author(s) of the Judgment on the Cabrera Report, this corruption of Cabrera is highly
material.

1279

As discussed, experts are prohibited under Ecuadorian law from accepting “anything of
value” from parties, as the fees are established by the judge, and it is illegal to bribe a courtappointed expert. Supra Facts § V.C.1; see also DI 1413-4 (ECUADOR CRIM. CODE Arts.
355, 359), at 48, 49; DI 1413-7 (ECUADOR CODE OF CIV. P. Arts. 251, 252, 839), at 56; DI
1413-9 (Rules Governing the Activities and Fee Schedule of Experts in the Civil Criminal
and Similar Areas of the Judiciary, Arts. 9, 14, 15), at 21; DI 1413-12 (Albán Dep. Tr.), at
31:25-32:2, 54:7-23.
1280

See Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1938) (addressed below).

327
C.

Fraud – Ghostwriting and Deception
Donziger and the LAPs committed fraud on the court and/or extrinsic fraud by means

independent of the bribery of Zambrano, the corruption of Cabrera, and the coercion of Judge
Yánez.
1.

The LAPs’ Ghostwriting of All or Part of the Judgment and Zambrano’s
Adoption of Their Product Was Fraud Warranting Equitable Relief Even
Absent Bribery

This Court has found that the LAPs wrote the Judgment, in whole or in major part,
that they gave the draft to Zambrano, and that Zambrano (whether with or without Guerra’s
participation) made little or no contribution apart from his signature and perhaps some light editing.
Even if Zambrano had not been bribed to take these actions, his actions and those of the LAPs would
have been fraud on the court and/or extrinsic fraud, the choice being only a matter of one’s verbal
preference.
In Morgan v. United States, 1281 upon which Chevron relies, the plaintiffs challenged
rates fixed by the Secretary of Agriculture on the ground that the Secretary signed findings
submitted to him ex parte by department staff without notice to the unsuccessful litigant and without
hearing or considering the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs. In holding the order invalid, the
Supreme Court reasoned that the Secretary’s action would have been improper in a court of law and
that no lesser standard applied to the rate making proceeding before it:
“If in an equity cause, a special master or the trial judge permitted the plaintiff’s
attorney to formulate the findings upon the evidence, conferred ex parte with the
plaintiff’s attorney regarding them, and then adopted his proposals without affording

1281

304 U.S. 1.

328
an opportunity to his opponent to know their contents and present objections, there
would be no hesitation in setting aside the report or decree as having been made
without a fair hearing. The requirements of fairness are not exhausted in the taking
or consideration of evidence, but extend to the concluding parts of the procedure as
well as to the beginning and intermediate steps.”1282
Even more pointed, in present circumstances, is In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.
Tires Products Liability Litigation,1283 the misconduct in which shares some elements with that in
this case. In Bridgestone/Firestone, the Mexican plaintiffs in a U.S. wrongful death action sought
to avoid a forum non conveniens dismissal of their U.S. case on the ground that Mexican courts were
not an adequate and available alternative forum. They pointed to the fact that they had sued in
Mexico but that the Mexican court had dismissed their action. Upon inquiry into the circumstances
of that dismissal, however, it turned out that (1) the plaintiffs’ had sought the dismissal of their own
Mexican case in order to bolster their opposition to the forum non conveniens motion in the United
States, (2) the plaintiffs’ Mexican lawyers had been given $20,000 “for expenses” plus 10 percent
of plaintiffs’ gross recovery (in the U.S.) if they obtained the dismissal of the Mexican action, (3)
the Mexican lawyers manipulated the proceedings in Mexico to have the case assigned to a
particular judge and to a secretaria de acuerdos – essentially a permanent law clerk whose job was
“to draft all orders issued in a case prior to the final judgment and present those orders to the judge
for final approval” – who was a sister of one of the plaintiffs’ Mexican lawyers, (4) the plaintiffs’
Mexican lawyers improperly submitted to the judge a proposed order dismissing the Mexican case,
and (5) the judge signed the order thus provided. Moreover, as has been the case here with Fajardo,

1282

Id. at 20.
1283

470 F. Supp. 2d 917 (S.D. Ind. 2006).

329
Yanza, Prieto, and Sáenz, the Mexican lawyers in Bridgestone/Firestone refused to testify in the
U.S. proceeding. The U.S. court held that the Mexican dismissal had been obtained by fraud.
Neither Morgan nor Bridgestone/Firestone was an independent action for relief from
an allegedly fraudulent judgment. They nevertheless illustrate the fact that the Judgment here was
obtained by fraud regardless of whether Zambrano was bribed and even without regard to whether
Yánez was coerced or Cabrera corrupted. Judges and a judicial officer, at the behest of the LAPs,
abandoned their sworn responsibilities of fairness and impartiality. Even without that misconduct,
the actions of the LAPs and Zambrano – the secret submission of a form of judgment desired and
written by the LAPs and Zambrano’s adoption of that form of judgment in whole or in part,
respectively – would have deprived Chevron of a fair determination of the Lago Agrio case. Those
actions constituted fraud on the court because they involved misconduct by both court officials and
a litigant that went directly to the integrity of the process. In any case, they satisfied the classic
definition of extrinsic fraud – “by reason of something done by the successful party to a suit, there
was in fact no adversary trial or decision of the issue in the case . . . . [T]he unsuccessful party
[Chevron w]as . . . prevented from exhibiting fully [its] case, by fraud or deception practised on [it]
by [its] opponent.”1284

1284

United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65 (1878).

330
2.

The Deception of the Lago Agrio Court By The Misrepresentations that
Cabrera Was Independent and Impartial and By the Passing Off of the
Ghostwritten Report as His Work Was Fraud Warranting Equitable Relief
Even Absent Bribery

The facts concerning the Cabrera Report and Cabrera’s response to the LAPs’
Stratus-authored critique, as well as Chevron’s critique, of the Cabrera Report, are not disputed, at
least seriously. These two documents were presented to the Lago Agrio court on the basis that the
documents had been prepared by Cabrera and that Cabrera himself was impartial and independent.
The representations and pretenses that Cabrera was impartial, that he wrote the documents and, in
this Court’s view, that he was independent all were inaccurate.1285 These false pretenses and
representations to the Lago Agrio court – engaged in by Cabrera as a court official at the instance
of Donziger and the LAPs – constituted fraud warranting equitable relief.
Particularly relevant here is the Supreme Court’s decision in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co.
v. Hartford-Empire Co.,1286 also heavily relied upon by Chevron, in which the Court reversed a
ruling that had denied equitable relief against a previous judgment and, indeed, in which the Court

1285

The Court recognizes that the parties referred to their respective nominated judicial
inspection experts and others they hired as “independent” in certain public statements
notwithstanding that those individuals had been selected and paid by those who selected
them and sometimes interacted with the lawyers who engaged them. See, e.g., Tr. (Reis
Veiga) 107:4-109:8, Tr. (McMillen) 428:1-429:6; DX 1416 (Filing of A. Callejas). Those
situations, however, were quite different from that of Cabrera, who was (1) court-appointed
to be a single global expert rather than someone openly nominated by and working with one
side or the other, (2) sworn to be independent and impartial, (3) to be paid only through an
open court process. The representations and pretenses that Cabrera was “independent”
therefore are not properly comparable to the manner in which the parties treated experts
whom they openly had hired and who would have been regarded by any reasonable observer
as partisan or, at least, beholden to the hiring party.
1286

322 U.S. 238 (1944).

331
directed that the prior judgment be vacated. Attention to the facts is useful, as they parallel those
of this case in important respects.
The first suit had been for patent infringement. Hartford, the eventual patentee, had
met with resistance from the Patent Office during prosecution of its patent application. In order to
overcome that resistance, it ghostwrote and procured publication of an article, signed by a
supposedly disinterested expert whom Hartford procured, that described the alleged invention as “a
remarkable advance in the art.” It brought the article to the attention of the Patent Office, and the
patent issued.
Hartford then sued Hazel-Atlas for infringement. The ghostwritten article played no
role in the trial, and the district court dismissed the case on the ground that the accused device did
not infringe. Hartford appealed and drew the appellate court’s attention to the ghostwritten article.
The court of appeals reversed and reinstated the infringement suit, which then was settled on terms
favorable to Hartford.
Over time, the facts concerning the article, some small part of which had been known
to Hazel-Atlas at the time of trial, came out, many after the court of appeals’ ruling in favor of the
patentee. Hazel-Atlas then commenced a new action in the court of appeals seeking relief from the
prior judgment.1287 The court of appeals ruled against it, but the Supreme Court reversed and
directed that the prior judgment be vacated.
The basis for the Supreme Court’s ruling was that Hartford’s actions constituted fraud
on the court. As the Court put it:
1287

The procedure, now unfamiliar, involved the filing in the court of appeals of a petition for
leave to file a bill of review in the district court to set aside the decree that had been entered
in the district court following the issuance of the court of appeals’ mandate in the first case.
322 U.S. at 239.

332
“Every element of the fraud here disclosed demands the exercise of the historic
power of equity to set aside fraudulently begotten judgments. This is not simply a
case of a judgment obtained with the aid of a witness who, on the basis of afterdiscovered evidence, is believed possibly to have been guilty of perjury. Here, even
if we consider nothing but Hartford’s sworn admissions, we find a deliberately
planned and carefully executed scheme to defraud not only the Patent Office but the
Circuit Court of Appeals. Cf. Marshall v. Holmes, supra. Proof of the scheme, and
of its complete success up to date, is conclusive. Cf. United States v. Throckmorton,
supra.
*

*

*

We have, then, a case in which undisputed evidence filed with the Circuit Court of
Appeals in a bill of review proceeding reveals such fraud on that Court as demands,
under settled equitable principles, the interposition of equity to devitalize the 1932
judgment despite the expiration of the term at which that judgment was finally
entered.1288
*

*

*

Hartford’s fraud, hidden for years but now admitted, had its genesis in the plan to
publish an article for the deliberate purpose of deceiving the Patent Office. The plan
was executed, and the article was put to fraudulent use in the Patent Office, contrary
to law. [citations omitted] From there the trail of fraud continued without break
through the District Court and up to the Circuit Court of Appeals. Had the District
Court learned of the fraud on the Patent Office at the original infringement trial, it
would have been warranted in dismissing Hartford’s case. * * * So, also, could
the Circuit Court of Appeals have dismissed the appeal had it been aware of
Hartford’s corrupt activities in suppressing the truth concerning the authorship of the
article. The total effect of all this fraud, practiced both on the Patent Office and the
courts, calls for nothing less than a complete denial of relief to Hartford for the
claimed infringement of the patent thereby procured and enforced.1289
The Court went on to direct that the earlier judgment of the court of appeals be set aside, that the
mandate be recalled, that Hartford’s original appeal be dismissed, and that the district court be

1288

Id. at 245-47.
1289

Id. at 250.

333
directed to dismiss the infringement suit in addition to “tak[ing] such additional action as may be
necessary and appropriate.”1290
The situation here, even without regard to the fact that Cabrera was paid covertly by
Donziger and the LAPs, is at least as egregious. That is so notwithstanding that, in retrospect, the
Lago Agrio court was aware of what might appear to have been a few drops in what in fact was a
heavy downpour:
•

The Lago Agrio court knew that Cabrera was the LAPs’ ultimate choice
because Fajardo and Donziger had lobbied and coerced it ex parte for his
appointment. Moreover, Cabrera in February 2007 had written the court to
ask that Chevron be ordered to pay him certain fees he claimed with respect
to alleged prior services as a settling expert and, in the course of doing so,
said he had made an arrangement with the LAPs, who already had paid him
their share of the fees allegedly due for settling expert work.1291

•

The Lago Agrio court knew also that Chevron had suspicions about
Cabrera’s neutrality and independence, as Chevron brought them to its
attention more than once.1292

But those inklings were a far cry from a full and fair disclosure. Neither the Lago Agrio court nor
Chevron knew anything approaching the whole story of the overall Cabrera fraud – the thoroughgoing deception that Cabrera was impartial and independent, that he did his own work with his own
independent helpers, that he wrote the Report and other documents that he purported to have written,
and that he was compensated only through the court process. Indeed, the first important evidence
did not leak out until March 2010, after the Netflix release of Crude, and the production of the

1290

Id. at 251.
1291

PX 4300X (Callejas Direct) ¶ 50.
1292

Id. ¶¶ 47-60.

334
Stratus documents later that year in the Denver Section 1782 proceeding. Confirmation came still
later.1293
Nor may Hazel-Atlas be distinguished successfully on the basis of the statement in
the Lago Agrio Judgment that the Lago Agrio court did not rely on the Cabrera Report. As we hold
below, that statement is not even admissible in evidence for its truth. In any event, the evidence
persuasively establishes that the Judgment rests in material respects on the Cabrera Report.

D.

The Other Requirements for Relief Have Been Satisfied
In considering whether a litigant is entitled to relief from a prior judgment on the

ground of fraud, courts frequently consider whether (1) the fraud (whether intrinsic or extrinsic)
prevented a full and fair presentation or determination of the litigant’s claim or defense in the prior
action or otherwise would render it unconscionable to give effect to the prior judgment, (2) the party
seeking relief was diligent in discovering the fraud and attacking the judgment, and (3) evidence of

1293

See PX 3300 (McMillan Direct) ¶¶ 5-6, 33-60.

335
the fraud is clear and convincing.1294 For present purposes, only the first of these considerations
warrants discussion.1295
When courts are asked to grant relief from or to decline to recognize a prior judgment
on the ground of fraud, a central question is whether such an outcome is appropriate to “protect the
fairness and integrity of litigation.”1296 In cases in which the tribunal has been corrupted, “no
worthwhile interest is served in protecting the judgment.”1297 The point is analogous to that made
by the Second Circuit in the infamous Manton case, a criminal prosecution of a Court of Appeals
judge where the Circuit rejected a contention that there had been no obstruction of justice by a judge

1294

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 cmt. d (1982); see also Toledo Scale Co.
v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 421 (1923) (“[I]t must appear that the fraud charged
really prevented the party complaining from making a full and fair defense”); Marshall, 141
U.S. at 596; Lundborg v. Phoenix Leasing, Inc., 91 F.3d 265, 271 (1st Cir. 1996) (due
diligence; clear and convincing evidence); Diaz v. Methodist Hosp., 46 F.3d 492, 497 (5th
Cir. 1995) (full and fair opportunity to present case); Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922
F.2d 60, 71 (2d Cir. 1990) (due diligence and lack of fault on part of party attacking
judgment); Green v. Foley, 856 F.2d 660, 665 (4th Cir. 1988) (fully and fairly presenting
case), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989).
The same considerations are pertinent in determining whether a judgment should be
recognized or enforced, either offensively or by means of an affirmative defense, under the
Uniform Act, which in New York is CPLR Article 53.
1295

The Court finds both the fraud and that Chevron has been diligent in discovering the fraud
and attacking the Judgment by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, the defendants do not
suggest any lack of diligence by Chevron.
1296

12 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.43[1][d] (3d ed. 2012) (quoting Lonsdorf v. Seefeldt,
47 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1995)).
1297

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70, cmt. b (1982).

336
because the cases would have been decided the same way in any case.1298 The Circuit’s view in that
case has equal bearing here.
Even in cases of extrinsic fraud short of judicial corruption, a plaintiff need not prove
that the outcome of the prior case would have been different absent the fraud.1299 It ordinarily must
show only that the fraud “prevented the losing party from fully and fairly presenting his case or
defense” or otherwise significantly tainted the process.1300 Implicit in this latter criterion is a

1298

The Circuit wrote:
“We cannot doubt that the other judges who sat in the various cases acted honestly and with
pure motives in joining in the decisions. No breath of suspicion has been directed against
any of them and justly none could be. And for aught that now appears we may assume for
present purposes that all of the cases in which Manton’s action is alleged to have been
corruptly secured were in fact rightly decided. But the unlawfulness of the conspiracy here
in question is in no degree dependent upon the indefensibility of the decisions which were
rendered in consummating it. Judicial action, whether just or unjust, right or wrong, is not
for sale; and if the rule shall ever be accepted that the correctness of judicial action taken
for a price removes the stain of corruption and exonerates the judge, the event will mark
the first step toward the abandonment of that imperative requisite of even-handed justice
proclaimed by Chief Justice Marshall more than a century ago; that the judge must be
‘perfectly and completely independent with nothing to influence or control him but God and
his conscience.’” United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 846 (2d Cir. 1939) (emphasis
added).
1299

E.g., Ty Inc. v. Softbelly’s Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 536-37 (7th Cir. 2003); Schultz v. Butcher,
24 F.3d 626, 631 (4th Cir. 1994); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 924 n.10 (1st
Cir. 1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70, cmt c, d (1983) (party seeking
relief must show either corruption of court or that fraud goes to a material matter and that
party seeking relief had “a substantial case to present”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
JUDGMENTS § 124, cmt. d (1942) (“It is of the essence of a fair trial that a judicial tribunal
should have an uncorrupted mind and if it does not the trial is not fair even though it may
be shown that the tribunal would have reached the same result had there been no corruption
or duress. Thus where a party, although believing that he can prove his case, nevertheless
out of excess of caution bribes a tribunal, equitable relief will be given against him even
though, on the facts presented, the tribunal would have reached the same decision.”).
1300

Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1339 (5th Cir. 1978); see Ty Inc., 353 F.3d at
536-37.

337
requirement of materiality, as judgments will not be set aside or denied recognition where the only
impact of the misconduct or other taint is to prevent a litigant from presenting cumulative evidence,
to deceive as to a peripheral issue, or the like.1301
Zambrano’s exchange of a favorable decision and his signature on the LAPs’
proposed judgment for a promise of $500,000 of the judgment proceeds was corruption that went
to the integrity of the judicial process and requires relief from that judgment. Its materiality is
beyond question.
The same would be true of Zambrano’s signature on a judgment ghostwritten by the
LAPs and submitted to him ex parte, even absent the promise of the $500,000. That alone would
have been a classic case of fraud on the court. As the Supreme Court recognized in Morgan, “there
would be no hesitation in setting aside” such a decision “as having been made without a fair
hearing.”1302 The actions of Zambrano and the LAPs would have deprived Chevron of a full
opportunity to makes its defense.1303

1301

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 cmt. d (1982); see Greiner v. City of
Champlin, 152 F.3d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 1998) (denying relief on ground of fraud consisting
of alleged withholding of report that would have been cumulative); see also Robinson v.
Volkswagenwerk AG, 56 F.3d 1268, 1274 n.5 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[C]oncealment of material
information by a party may justify a refusal to give preclusive effect to a judgment.”)
(emphasis added); Standard Chlorine of Del., Inc. v. Sinibaldi, 821 F. Supp. 232, 253 (D.
Del. 1992).
1302

Morgan, 304 U.S. at 20.
1303

This is especially obvious with respect to one of Chevron’s most significant defenses, viz.
that it was not liable because it never had operated in Ecuador and that there was no basis
for holding it liable for any actions of Texaco – not a defendant in the Lago Agrio case –
because Chevron did not succeed to Texaco liabilities by virtue of its indirect acquisition
of its shares years after the events in question. Much of the portion of the Judgment
rejecting Chevron’s position was copied directly out of the Fusion Memo, part of the LAPs’
unfiled work product. Supra Facts § IX.B. But it would have been true in any case because

338
The coercion of Judge Yánez, the corruption of Cabrera, the ghostwriting of the
Cabrera Report and associated documents, and the misrepresentations to the Lago Agrio court of
Cabrera’s impartiality and independence stand somewhat differently, as the significance of these
events, assuming they stood alone, would depend upon whether the Cabrera Report ultimately
mattered in any significant way. The Court, however, already has found that the Ecuadorian court
relied significantly on the Cabrera Report despite the disclaimer of reliance. These fraudulent
elements therefore were material to the outcome.1304

Chevron never was afforded any opportunity to respond directly to anything that was given
to Zambrano ex parte.
1304

Camacho and Piaguaje, the LAP Representatives, are liable for the actions of Donziger,
Fajardo, and the other Ecuadorian and U.S. lawyers for the LAPs, and Stratus and the other
LAP experts, consultants, and advisers. Under New York law, a principal is liable for the
acts of its agents, committed within the scope of their employment or actual or apparent
authority. E.g., American Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556,
566 (1982); Standard Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Plantsville Nat’l Bank, 158 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.1946),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 812 (1947); Gen. Overseas Films, Ltd. v. Robin Int’l, Inc., 542 F.
Supp. 684, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d 718 F.2d 1085 (2d Cir. 1983).
These defendants dispute their liability for the acts of their agents only under New York law
and only on the theory that their awareness of Chevron’s complaint and other claims of
misconduct was insufficient to constitute ratification. DI 1858 (LAP Reps.’ Post-trial Mem.
of Law), at 15-17. There are two fundamental problems with the argument.
First, a principal is liable for the torts of an agent under New York law as long as the agent
acted within the scope of the agent’s actual or apparent authority. Ratification is immaterial
except in the absence of actual or apparent authority. E.g., Dover, Ltd. v. A.B. Watley, Inc.,
423 F. Supp. 2d 303, 318-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (mag. op.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY §§ 7.03(1)(a), 7.04 (principal liable for torts of agent committed with actual
authority or ratified by principal), 7.03(2)(b), 7.08 (principal liable for torts of agent
committed with apparent authority). Moreover, an Ecuadorian law expert for Chevron
explained, and this Court holds, that the law in Ecuador is the same. DI 1413-11 (Apr. 5,
2013 Velazquez Decl.), Ex. 92, Ann. B. (“According to rules of contractual and tort liability,
the client is held liable for the actions of his agent, even when the client does not become
aware of the agent’s conduct until after it has occurred, if he takes no action to reject it or,
failing that, to withdraw the agency authorization and, even more so, if he benefits from such
conduct.”).
Second, the Court finds that these defendants knowingly ratified the misconduct,

339
E.

Conclusion
All of the elements required for equitable relief from the Judgment as against all

defendants have been satisfied in this case subject only to the resolution of two remaining questions
– whether (1) the Ecuadorian appellate decisions alter this conclusion, and (2) the sine qua non for
the exercise of equitable jurisdiction, the inadequacy of legal remedies, is present here. The first
of these issues implicates the import of and the effect, if any, of the appellate decisions, which is
dealt with in Point VII below. The second is common to the non-statutory claim for equitable relief
and to Chevron’s RICO and other claims. The Court defers discussion of it to the section of this
opinion dealing with relief.

III.

The RICO Statute Applies Here
Chevron asserts that Donziger, though not the LAP Representatives, has violated two

sections of the RICO statute.1305 The first, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) makes it unlawful “for any person
employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” The second, Section 1962(d),
prohibits “any person” from “conspir[ing] to violate” the preceding section. The Court begins by
disposing of certain arguments common to both claims.

substantially for the reasons set forth by Chevron. DI 1847 (Chevron Corp. Post-trial Mem.
of Law), at 254-56.
1305

The amended complaint states RICO claims also against Fajardo, Yanza, the ADF, Selva
Viva, Stratus Consulting, Inc., Ann Maest, and Doug Beltman. See DI 283 (Am. Compl.)
¶ 1. Each of these other defendants either has settled or defaulted. Accordingly, this
opinion deals with the RICO liability only of Donziger.

340
A.

RICO Applies to Prohibited Conduct Regardless of Whether a Defendant Is a
Member of Organized Crime
RICO was drafted as a weapon in the fight against organized crime. Some therefore

argue that the statute is limited to mobsters of the sort portrayed in The Godfather, Goodfellas, or
The Sopranos. That argument is misconceived.
“Congress drafted RICO broadly to encompass a wide range of criminal activity,
taking many different forms and likely to attract a broad array of perpetrators operating in many
different ways.”1306 Thus, while the statute’s legislative history focused on “the predations of
mobsters,” it “shows [also] that Congress knew what it was doing when it adopted commodious
language capable of extending beyond organized crime.”1307 Hence, the Supreme Court has made
it clear that RICO applies “not just [to] mobsters” but to “any person” who violates its provisions.1308
The statute, moreover, is intended “to be read broadly,” in accordance with “Congress’ selfconsciously expansive language and overall approach,” as “an aggressive initiative to supplement
old remedies and develop new methods for fighting crime,” regardless of whether the defendant is
associated with organized crime or a “respected business.”1309
1306

H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248-49 (1989).
1307

Id. at 245-46.
1308

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985) (“Section 1962 . . . makes it
unlawful for ‘any person’ – not just mobsters – to use money derived from a pattern of
racketeering activity to invest in an enterprise, to acquire control of an enterprise through
a pattern of racketeering activity, or to conduct an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity.”) (emphasis added); see also H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 247 (quoting 116
CONG. REC. 35204 (1970)).
1309

Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497-99 (“The fact that § 1964(c) is used against respected businesses
allegedly engaged in a pattern of specifically identified criminal conduct is hardly a
sufficient reason for assuming that the provision is being misconstrued.”).

341
Against this clear background, the RICO claims against Donziger are entirely
appropriate despite the fact that he is a Harvard-educated lawyer. The RICO question in this and
all other such cases is whether all of the statutory requirements are satisfied with respect to each
defendant, not whether the defendant fits a particular popular stereotype. Nevertheless, it bears
mention also that this is a civil RICO case in which the plaintiff’s burden is to prove its case by a
preponderance of the evidence – that is, that “its version of the facts is more probable than its
adversary’s”1310 – rather than beyond a reasonable doubt, as would be the case in a criminal
prosecution.1311

B.

Equitable Relief Is Available in Private RICO Actions
Two circuits have ruled definitively on whether equitable relief is available to private

plaintiffs under RICO. They are divided.1312 The question is open in our own.1313 Unsurprisingly,
1310

M.O.C.H.A. Soc’y Inc. v. City of Buffalo, 689 F.3d 263, 277-78 (2d Cir. 2012).
1311

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985); Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d
6989, 731 (2d Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds, Agency Holding Co. v. Malley-Duff
& Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
The Court has found certain facts that are common to the RICO and non-statutory claims
by clear and convincing evidence. Nevertheless, the Court wishes to be clear that it makes
no findings based on the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.
1312

Compare Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1980-89 (9th Cir. 1986)
(reading legislative history of RICO statute as foreclosing injunctions for private plaintiffs),
with Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 695-98 (7th Cir. 2001)
(hereinafter “NOW”) (ruling that RICO statute’s text expressly provides for private
injunctive relief), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women,
Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003).
Circuits to have addressed the question in dicta likewise are divided. Compare Johnson v.
Collins Entm’t. Co., 199 F.3d 710, 726 (4th Cir.1999), In re Fredeman Litig., 843 F.2d 821,
828–30 (5th Cir. 1988) (suggesting injunctive relief unavailable), with Bennett v. Berg, 710

342
Chevron asserts that the statute affords such relief to private litigants where otherwise appropriate
while defendants argue for the opposite conclusion. This Court thus far has not passed on the issue
though pressed by both sides to do so. The case now has been tried and the facts determined. The
time for a decision on this point is at hand.
Judge Diane Wood’s opinion for the Seventh Circuit in National Organization for
Women v. Scheidler,1314 which held that equitable relief is available under the statute to prevailing
civil RICO plaintiffs, is the most persuasive analysis of the issue thus far. In this Court’s view, the
conclusion reached by the Seventh Circuit is demanded by the plain language of the statute1315 and
draws added support from the context in which the statute was enacted.
RICO’s civil remedies provision contains three parts. The first, Section 1964(a),
grants district courts jurisdiction to “prevent and restrain” RICO violations.1316 It does not limit the
breadth of that jurisdictional grant.

F.2d 1361, 1366 (8th Cir. 1983) (McMillan, J., concurring) (suggesting injunctive relief is
available); see also Lincoln House, Inc. v. Dupre, 903 F.2d 845, 848 (1st Cir. 1990);
Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Elec. Motor & Supply, Inc., 262 F.3d 260, 267 n.4 (4th Cir.
1989) (noting controversy but expressing no opinion).
1313

See, e.g., Trane Co. v. O’Connor Sec., 718 F.2d 26, 28–29 (2d Cir.1983) (expressing doubt
in dicta about availability of injunctive relief for private plaintiffs).
1314

267 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2001).
1315

See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 462 (2002) (“[C]ourts must presume that
a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When
the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial
inquiry is complete.’”) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54
(1992)).
1316

18 U.S.C. § 1964(a).

343
The second part of the remedies provision is Section 1964(b),1317 which states that
the Attorney General may institute proceedings under Section 1964(d) and authorizes the court to
enter restraining orders, prohibitions, or take such other actions as it deems proper.
The third and final part, Section 1964(c),1318 provides that any person injured in his
business or property by a violation of the statute may sue in a district court and shall recover, inter
alia, treble damages and attorneys’ fees.1319
Read together, as they must be, Sections 1964(b) and (c) plainly provide remedies
in addition to, and not in place of, the remedies provided for in Section 1964(a). Section 1964(a)
empowers district courts to “prevent and restrain” RICO violations, thus authorizing injunctive
relief. It does so generally rather than limiting the jurisdiction conferred only to cases brought by
the Attorney General or some other public actor. Section 1964(b) specifically authorizes suits by
the Attorney General and confers additional powers on the district courts in such actions – the
issuance of restraining orders, prohibitions, or other relief they deem appropriate. Finally, Section
1964(c) creates a private right of action for treble damages.
“[T]his reading of the statute gives the words their natural meaning and gives effect
to every provision in the statute.”1320 It is consistent also with Congress’s intent “not merely to
compensate victims but to turn them into prosecutors, ‘private attorneys general,’ dedicated to

1317

Id. § 1964(b).
1318

Id. § 1964(c).
1319

See id. § 1964(a), (b), (c).
1320

NOW, 267 F.3d at 696.

344
eliminating racketeering activity.”1321 The Supreme Court repeatedly has rejected efforts to curtail
the scope of civil RICO actions where courts ignore Congress’s insistence that the statute be
“liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”1322

“Indeed, if Congress’ liberal-

construction mandate is to be applied anywhere, it is in § 1964, where RICO’s remedial purposes
are most evident.”1323
This reading is supported also by the context in which RICO was enacted, a context
of which Congress is deemed to have been aware.1324 Article III of the Constitution provides that
the judicial power of the United States extends “to all Cases, in Law and Equity.”1325 Congress
implemented Article III in 1789 by conferring “jurisdiction over ‘all suits . . . in equity.’”1326 The
Supreme Court has rejected efforts to curtail the equitable powers of district courts in cases in which

1321

Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000) (Congressional intent was to “encourag[e] civil
litigation to supplement Government efforts to deter and penalize the . . . prohibited
practices”); see also NOW, 267 F.3d at 698 (quoting Rotella and noting that “this role for
civil RICO litigation” is “fully consistent” with the view that “the statute gives private
citizens the ability to seek injunctive relief as well as damages”).
1322

Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
1323

Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491 n.10.
1324

S. New England Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs, 624 F.3d 123, 135 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Because we
presume that ‘Congress legislates against the backdrop of existing jurisdictional rules that
apply unless Congress specifies otherwise, a clear statement from Congress is required
before we conclude that a statute withdraws the original jurisdiction of the district courts
. . . .” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
1325

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
1326

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999)
(quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 78).

345
they otherwise have subject matter jurisdiction unless “a statute in so many words, or by a necessary
and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in equity.”1327
RICO does not “in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference,”
foreclose equitable relief in actions brought by private plaintiffs. Accordingly, this Court agrees
with Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan that “[i]t would be extraordinary indeed if Congress, in enacting
a statute that Congress expressly specified was to be ‘liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes,’ intended, without expressly so stating, to deprive the district courts of utilizing this
classic remedial power in private civil actions brought under the act.”1328 Absent just such an
express Congressional deprivation, the Court declines to divest itself of equitable powers that the
Framers intended district courts to have and that they have possessed since 1789.
This Court holds that RICO empowers a district court to grant such equitable relief
as may be warranted in cases in which the court finds a violation of the statute and that the principles
of equity support relief sought. It respectfully shares Judge Rakoff’s view that the contrary reading
of the statute in Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim1329 is unpersuasive.

1327

Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (stating that the
“comprehensiveness” of a court’s “equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the
absence of a clear and valid legislative command”); see also Mitchell v. Robert DeMario
Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291 (1960) (holding that, where the statute provided that “the
[d]istrict [c]ourts are given jurisdiction . . . ‘for cause shown, to restrain violations’” of a
statute, district courts have full equitable powers).
1328

202 F. Supp. 2d 239, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
1329

796 F.2d 1076.

346
C.

Morrison v. National Australia Bank Does Not Require Dismissal
Donziger argues that Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.,1330 requires dismissal

of Chevron’s RICO claims on the ground that application of the statute here would be extraterritorial
and therefore improper.
As the Court noted in denying in part defendants’ motion to dismiss,1331 the Supreme
Court in Morrison reiterated the longstanding principle “that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.”1332 “This principle,” the Supreme Court said, “represents . . . a presumption about a statute’s
meaning.”1333 “When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has
none.”1334 Accordingly, the analysis of statute-based claims that involve foreign aspects involves
two steps. The first is to determine whether Congress has given sufficient indication of an intention
that the statute apply outside the United States. If it has not, the second step is to determine whether
the proposed application of the statute in fact would be extraterritorial. This, the Court said, turns
on “the ‘focus’ of congressional concern” or the activity “that the statute seeks to ‘regulate.’”1335 The

1330

561 U.S. 247, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
1331

See Chevron v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 239.
1332

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991)).
1333

Id.
1334

Id. at 2878.
1335

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.

347
determination is informed by the “objects of the statute’s solicitude” and “th[e] transactions that the
statute seeks to regulate.”1336
The first step in the analysis is not open to significant discussion. Our court of
appeals has ruled that RICO does not apply extraterritorially.1337 The second step, however, is
another matter entirely, as it requires determination of the focus of congressional concern, a matter
not yet addressed by the Second Circuit.
The decisions to have considered the matter have taken essentially one of two
approaches to determining whether application of RICO to situations involving conduct both in the
United States and abroad would be extraterritorial. Some have taken the view that RICO’s focus
is on the enterprise, an approach that would make the domestic or foreign character of the enterprise,

1336

Id. (citation omitted).
1337

Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2010).
Although the Court adheres to Norex, it respectfully questions whether RICO’s “silence”
as to extraterritorial application, the basis for the Norex holding, correctly resolves the
question whether Congress intended that RICO apply outside the territorial limits of the
United States. As the Supreme Court observed in Morrison, its reliance on the presumption
against extraterritorial application was not intended to impose a “clear statement”
requirement, “if by that is meant a requirement that a statute say ‘this law applies abroad,’”
before it could be so applied. See 130 S. Ct. at 2883. “Assuredly, context can be consulted
as well” in pursuit of statutory meaning and Congressional intent. Id.
Given RICO’s heritage as a weapon of choice in prosecuting the Sicilian Mafia, see, e.g.,
United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989), and the more recent application
of racketeering statutes to transnational drug and terrorism networks, e.g., United States v.
Leija-Sanchez, 602 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2010) (reversing dismissal of indictment charging
murder of Mexican citizen under 18 U.S.C. § 1959 in Mexico where defendant paid for and
arranged murder in United States); United States v. Guzman Loera, No. 3:12-cr-006849FM-1, Indictment [DI 1] ¶¶ 10-11 (W.D. Tex. filed Apr. 11, 2012), it seems likely that
Congress intended it to have extraterritorial application. See Gideon Mark, RICO’s
Extraterritoriality, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 543, 573-85 (2013) (hereinafter “RICO’s
Extraterritoriality”).

348
however that is to be determined, dispositive of whether the alleged conduct falls within RICO.1338
Others, including this Court, have rejected that analysis. They have concluded that the focus of
RICO is on the alleged pattern of racketeering activity.1339 Chevron maintains that application of
RICO to the conduct in question here would not be extraterritorial under either approach.
This Court adheres to its determination that the focus of RICO for Morrison purposes
cannot properly rest on the domestic or foreign character of the enterprise for the reasons this Court
previously has expressed, which have been amplified by the Ninth Circuit in Chao Fan Xu.1340
“RICO’s focus is on the pattern of racketeering activity for purposes of analyzing the extraterritorial

1338

See United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 975-79 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing the
different approaches and holding that the proper focus is on the pattern of activity); see also
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 933, 938-40 (N.D.
Cal. 2012) (focusing on the enterprise); Cedeño v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471,
473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 457 F. App’x 35 (2d Cir. 2012).
1339

Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 975-79; Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 245;
Hourani v. Mirtchev, 943 F. Supp. 2d 159, 165-66 (D.D.C. 2013); Borich v. BP, P.L.C., 904
F. Supp. 2d 855, 862 (N.D. Ill. 2012); CGC Holding Co. v. Hutchens, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1193,
1209 (D. Colo. 2011).
1340

Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 977-78; Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 245-46;
see also RICO’s Extraterritoriality, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. at 595-603.

349
application of the statute.”1341 The next question, then, is how a court should look at the alleged
pattern of racketeering activity.
This much is clear. RICO defines “racketeering activity” as an act “chargeable” or
“indictable” under enumerated state and federal statutes.1342 Thus, we first must direct our attention
to acts “chargeable” or “indictable” under state or federal law, giving due regard in each case to
Morrison, as only such acts are eligible for inclusion in a pattern of racketeering activity. If no
pattern of racketeering activity, as that term is defined in the statute, has occurred, no substantive
violation of RICO has taken place. But what more is required, if anything, is not evident.
Donziger contends that the answer is found in Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access
Industries, Inc.,1343 which, he contends, requires dismissal of the RICO claims as improper
extraterritorial applications of the statute. As this Court concluded in denying his motion to dismiss
1341

Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 977-78; accord Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d at
245-46.
Recognizing that a reviewing court might disagree and focus instead on the character of the
enterprise, this Court finds that the character of the enterprise here at issue was
predominantly domestic by any reasonable standard. The enterprise, as will appear, was
essentially the LAP team, including Donziger and the LAPs’ other lawyers (both U.S. and
Ecuadorian), and its host of consultants, PR people, financiers, and advisors including
Stratus, Beltman, Maest, Hinton, Lehane, Russell, Calmbacher, H5, and many others. With
the exception of the handful of Ecuadorian lawyers, Yanza, and the two entities that he and
Donziger controlled, virtually every member of the enterprise – and there were a great many
– were American. The nerve center of the entire operation, see Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at
976-77, was in New York City, where Donziger was based and, despite roughly monthly
visits to Ecuador, spent most of his time. In any case, it was in the United States. This is
where almost all of the important decisions were made, the location from which the
Ecuadorian lawyers were supervised (except when Donziger actually was in Ecuador), and
the place from which the pressure campaign with all of its many different aspects was
organized, supervised, and run.
1342

18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
1343

631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Cedeño v. Castillo, 457 F. App’x 35 (2d Cir. 2012).

350
the amended complaint, however, he is mistaken.1344 It suffices for present purposes to quote the
discussion from that opinion:
“In Norex, a Canadian plaintiff alleged that the defendants had engaged in a
racketeering scheme, using Russian companies, to take over control of another
Russian company in which the plaintiff was a minority shareholder, leaving the
Canadian plaintiff as ‘a powerless minority shareholder.’ {631 F.3d at 31.} The
district court dismissed the complaint under the pre- Morrison conduct-and-effects
test. The Second Circuit affirmed. Insofar as the brief opinion addressed the
question now before this Court, it said only that ‘simply alleging that some domestic
conduct occurred cannot support a claim of domestic application. “[I]t is a rare case
of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all contact with the territory of the
United States.” [Morrison, 130 S.Ct.] at 2884 (emphasis in original). The slim
contacts with the United States alleged by Norex are insufficient to support
extraterritorial application of the RICO statute.’ {Id. at 33.}
The allegations of the amended complaint here are entirely different. Unlike
the Norex complaint, the scheme alleged here was conceived and orchestrated in the
United States to injure a U.S. plaintiff, involved a predominately U.S. enterprise, and
was carried out in material respects, though by no means entirely, here. Norex
therefore does not control. Indeed, as the Circuit in Norex found it unnecessary to
articulate an approach to deciding whether application of RICO in a given situation
is extraterritorial, beyond drawing a conclusion with respect to the particular
complaint before it, that case sheds no light on the pivotal question before this Court.
{See Note, Life After Morrison: Extraterritoriality and RICO, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1385, 1402 (2011) (Norex did not ‘offer [ ] much guidance as to
what might constitute domestic application.’).}”1345
So Norex does not answer the question before the Court. Nor is this the only Court to reach that
conclusion on analogous facts.1346
1344

Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229, 240-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
1345

Id. at 240-41 (footnotes included in curly brackets).
1346

Id. at 244 (quoting CGC Holding Co. v. Hutchens, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1209-10 (D. Colo.
2011) (distinguishing Norex on the basis of pattern of racketeering activity in that case that
occurred largely in the United States and was directed at U.S. victim)); Aluminum Bahrain
B.S.C. v. Alcoa Inc., Civ. Action No. 8–299, 2012 WL 2093997, at *2-4 (W.D. Pa. June 11,
2012) (distinguishing Norex on similar grounds).

351
Chao Fan Xu1347 is relevant also. The RICO conspiracy indictment in that case
charged “a scheme to steal funds from the Bank of China” in China and to escape prosecution and
retain the proceeds by transferring proceeds to the United States and fleeing here by, among other
things, passport and visa fraud.1348 The only predicate acts charged, however, were violations of
U.S. criminal statutes.1349
On appeal from convictions, the Ninth Circuit first held that RICO’s focus is on the
pattern of racketeering activity.1350 It then stated that it would “look at the pattern of Defendants’
racketeering activity taken as a whole” in order “to determine whether Defendants’ count one [i.e.,
RICO] convictions are within RICO’s ambit.”1351 It next observed that the first part of the alleged
scheme “center[ed] on the Bank of China fraud and, to that extent it was predicated on
extraterritorial activity [and therefore] beyond the reach of RICO.”1352 But it went on to note that

1347

706 F.3d 965.
1348

706 F.3d at 972-74; United States v. Xu Chaofan, No. 2:02-cr-00674-PMP-LRL, Second
Superseding Indictment [DI 151] ¶¶ 1-13 (D. Nev. filed Jan. 31, 2006).
1349

Xu Chaofan, No. 2:02-cr-00674-PMP-LRL [DI 151] ¶ 11.
1350

Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 975-78.
1351

Id. at 978.
This formulation conflates “pattern of racketeering activity,” which is defined by statute as
a pattern of acts indictable or chargeable under U.S. or state law, see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1),
and thus domestic in nature, with all of the defendants’ alleged misconduct, whether
domestic or foreign. Referring to the latter as “Defendants’ pattern racketeering activity
taken as a whole,” while perfectly normal in ordinary conversation, can be confusing in this
context.
1352

Id.

352
the “second part [of the scheme] involved racketeering activities conducted within the United
States,” that those racketeering activities were within RICO’s focus, and affirmed the RICO
conspiracy conviction on the ground that they fell “within the ambit of the statute.”1353 It reached
that conclusion, despite its view that the pattern of racketeering activity “may have been conceived
and planned overseas,” because “it was executed and perpetuated in the United States.”1354
Chao Fan Xu thus seems to cut in two directions. At one point it suggested that the
presence of a domestic pattern of activity is sufficient even where it is bound up with extensive
foreign conduct. At another it indicated that it looked at the defendants’ actions as a whole. In
either case, however, it concluded that the conception and planning of the scheme overseas and the
embezzlement in China as an integral part of the overall scheme did not foreclose application of
RICO to the domestic pattern of racketeering activity.
In the last analysis, these cases yield no clear, authoritative principle for determining
whether a given application of RICO is or is not extraterritorial. Quite understandably given the
difficulty of the issue, they bring to mind Justice Stewart’s famous observation with respect to hardcore pornography – “I know it when I see it.”1355
In this case, the evidence at trial established that Donziger, a New York lawyer and
resident, here formulated and conducted a scheme to victimize a U.S. company through a pattern
of racketeering. That pattern included substantial conduct in the United States – e.g., the bulk of
Donziger’s overall supervision of the entire operation; much of Donziger’s fund raising activity; the
1353

Id. at 978-79.
1354

Id. at 979.
1355

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion).

353
ghostwriting of the Cabrera Report, which occurred mainly in Boulder, Colorado, and was
supervised by Donziger from New York; much of the pressure and lobbying campaign designed to
injure Chevron’s reputation and impact its bottom line and its stock price, a campaign
micromanaged by Donziger that employed many U.S. public relations advisors and lobbyists; the
making of Crude by a New York-based and recruited film maker; and the improper efforts to ward
off discovery through U.S. courts of what really had taken place with Cabrera, Stratus, and the
LAPs. Much of the funding came principally from Kohn in Philadelphia and Burford, which
operated at least partly in the United States. Absent the U.S. activity, there would have been no
scheme. Even had there been one, it would have been doomed to failure, without that activity.
Unlike Norex, this is not a case “simply [involving] some domestic conduct.”1356
As we demonstrate below, all of the elements of the RICO claims, including the
existence of a domestic pattern of racketeering activity, have been proved. It therefore suffices for
purposes of this case to hold that the application of RICO to that domestic pattern of racketeering
activity would not be extraterritorial.

IV.

The Section 1962(c) Claim
The first RICO claim is that Donziger and others who did not appear at trial

conducted, and continue to conduct, the affairs of an enterprise – essentially, the LAP team –
through a pattern of racketeering activity that includes extortion, wire fraud, money laundering,
obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and violation of the Travel Act through violation of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).

1356

Norex, 631 F.3d at 33.

354
The Court begins the analysis by setting out the elements of a Section 1962(c)
violation, knowledge of which is indispensable to all that follows. It then conducts a detailed
analysis of whether there has been a Section 1962(c) violation and whether further violations are
likely.

A.

The Elements of a Section 1962(c) Violation
“A violation of § 1962(c) . . . requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a

pattern (4) of racketeering activity.”1357 Here, the alleged enterprise in substance is the LAP team
and its associated persons – an enterprise over which Donziger long has presided. The alleged
pattern of racketeering activity by which Donziger and others conducted the affairs of that enterprise
includes many of the wrongful, improper, and illegal actions discussed above.

B.

The Enterprise
Section 1961(4) defines “enterprise” to “include[] . . . any union or group of

individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” An enterprise may consist of “a group
of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct,” the
existence of which is proven “by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by

1357

Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496.
In a suit for damages for such a violation, the plaintiff would be obliged to prove “injury
to [its] business or property . . . caused by the violation of Section 1962.” Chevron v.
Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Spool v. World Child Int’l
Adoption Agency, 520 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2008)). Chevron at this point, however, seeks
only equitable relief. The Court deals below with the proof required to entitle it to such
relief, assuming proof of a violation of the statute.

355
evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.”1358 It “need not have a
hierarchical structure or a ‘chain of command,’” and “decisions may be made on an ad hoc basis and
by any number of methods.”1359
A RICO enterprise “is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in
which it engages” and must be proved separately.1360 Importantly, an enterprise need not be
illegitimate or illegal, and the enterprise itself (or the members of an associated-in-fact enterprise)
need not commit any of the racketeering acts at all.1361 Indeed, the enterprise frequently is itself a
victim of the racketeering activity perpetrated by its participants.
In this case, the LAP team and its affiliates were a group of persons associated in fact
for the common purpose of pursuing the recovery of money from Chevron via the Lago Agrio
litigation, whether by settlement or by enforceable judgment, coupled with the exertion of pressure
on Chevron to pay. The group included (1) Donziger, (2) the U.S. and Ecuadorian lawyers,
including Kohn, Patton Boggs, and others, (3) Yanza, the ADF, and Selva Viva, (4) the investors
who gave money to finance the operation, usually in exchange for shares of any recovery, (5) the
LAPs’ public relations, media, and lobbying arms, (6) the LAPs’ technical people, including Stratus,
1358

United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
1359

Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 948 (2009).
1360

Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
1361

Id. (“The enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together
for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. The pattern of racketeering
activity is, on the other hand, a series of criminal acts as defined by the statute. The former
is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that
the various associates function as a continuing unit. The latter is proved by evidence of the
requisite number of acts of racketeering committed by the participants in the enterprise.”)
(citation omitted).

356
Beltman, Maest, Russell, Calmbacher, Champ, Quarles, E-Tech, UBR, and 3TM, and (7) others.
In accordance with the authorities just cited, the Court emphasizes that it does not imply that each
and every member of the enterprise committed acts of racketeering activity or, for that matter, acted
improperly in any respect, although some did. The findings are that all of these persons and entities
were associated in fact for the purposes stated and that they constituted an enterprise within the
meaning of the RICO statute.

C.

Donziger Conducted and Participated in the Conduct of the Affairs of the Enterprise
Liability under Section 1962(c) does not attach unless an individual “employed by

or associated with any enterprise . . . conduct[s] or participate[s], directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of [the] enterprise’s affairs.” In sum, a defendant must have “participated in the operation
or management of the enterprise” in order to be liable under Section 1962(c).1362 Section 1962(c)
liability, however, is not confined “to those with primary responsibility for the enterprise’s affairs,”
or to “those with a formal position in the enterprise.”1363 In the Second Circuit, “discretionary
authority in carrying out the instructions of the [enterprise’s] principals” is sufficient to satisfy the
“operation or management” requirement.1364

1362

Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 179, 183-84 (1993) (“An enterprise is ‘operated’ not
just by upper management but also by lower rung participants in the enterprise who are
under the direction of upper management.”).
1363

Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
1364

Baisch v. Gallina, 346 F.3d 366, 376 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Diaz, 176
F.3d 52, 93 (2d Cir. 1999)).

357
For reasons amply detailed above, the Court finds that Donziger was in ultimate
command and, in any case, certainly conducted, and participated in the conduct of, the affairs of the
enterprise at all relevant times.

D.

The Predicate Acts
1.

Extortion

Hobbs Act extortion, which is a RICO predicate act, requires “obtaining of property
from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right” and attempts to do so.1365 As Chevron has not paid the
Judgment and nor settled the case, we are concerned here with attempted extortion.
One of Donziger’s principal objectives from the early days of the Lago Agrio case
was to subject Chevron to pressure sufficient to produce a generous settlement prior to judgment.
Failing that, his aim was to obtain the largest possible judgment in the hope that the threat of

1365

18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). The New York Penal Law, upon which Chevron relies also for
predicate act purposes, is to the same effect. N.Y. PENAL L. §§ 155.05(2)(e), 105.17, 110.00
(McKinney 2013).
The Hobbs Act makes it unlawful to attempt “in any way or degree,” to “obstruct[], delay[],
or affect[] commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by . . .
extortion.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) “[I]t is well established that the burden of proving . . . a
nexus [with interstate or foreign commerce] is ‘de minimis.’” United States v. Arena, 180
F.3d 380, 389 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Farrish, 122 F.3d 146, 148 (2d Cir.
1997)). “[A]ny interference with or effect upon interstate [or foreign] commerce, whether
slight, subtle or even potential . . . is sufficient to uphold a prosecution under the Hobbs
Act,” Jund v. Town of Hempstead, 941 F.2d 1271, 1285 (2d Cir. 1991), and proof of the
defendants’ intent to affect commerce is unnecessary where the interference is a natural
consequence of the offense, see United State v. Daley, 564 F.2d 645, 649 (2d Cir. 1977). The
nexus with interstate and foreign commerce in this case is plain: the potential of a payment
by Chevron to the LAPs. The commerce requirement is satisfied here, and the defendants
do not claim otherwise.

358
enforcement would bring Chevron to the table or, if that did not occur, that the judgment actually
could be collected.
These objectives, of course, are shared by every plaintiff in every lawsuit. As long
as a lawsuit is pursued by lawful and proper means, it is not extortion, in the criminal sense, because
the means are not wrongful.1366 Indeed, some courts have held that even the filing of a meritless
lawsuit is not extortionate lest every unsuccessful lawsuit lead to an extortion claim and thus chill
resort to the courts.1367 As we will see, however, this case is far more complicated than this simple
proposition because it was not pursued by lawful methods alone.

a.

The Elements of Extortion and Their Application Here

The Hobbs Act’s principal elements are two: “wrongful means and wrongful
objective.”1368 The “means” – in other words, the threat – “can be wrongful because it causes the
victim to fear a harm that is itself wrongful, such as physical injury, or because the means is
wrongful, such as violence.”1369 Moreover, there is no need for a threat of violence. “[T]he Hobbs
Act may . . . be violated by a threat that causes the victim to fear only an economic loss.”1370

1366

Deck v. Engineered Laminates, 349 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Vemco, Inc.
v. Camardella, 23 F.3d 129, 134 (6th Cir. 1994) (“A threat of litigation if a party fails to
fulfill even a fraudulent contract . . . does not constitute extortion.”).
1367

Deck, 349 F.3d at 1258.
1368

Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. Icahn, 747 F. Supp. 205, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
1369

United States v. Jackson, 180 F.3d 55, 70, on reh’g, 196 F.3d 383 (2d Cir. 1999).
1370

Id., 180 F.3d at 69-70.

359
In this case, the allegedly extortionate behavior included Donziger’s efforts to
pressure Chevron to settle without exhausting the legal process – in other words, to pay before the
marshal literally came to its door and took away its property to satisfy a final, enforceable judgment.
Donziger wrote, for example, that the LAPs’ “key leverage point . . . is our ability to threaten
Chevron’s cash position - i.e., to get their money without going through a lengthy appeals process that
drags this out for years.”1371 On another such occasion, he said that, at “the end of the day[,] it is

about brute force; who can apply the pressure and who can withstand the pressure. And can you get
them to the breaking point.”1372 And he engaged in two categories of conduct to apply that pressure.
Both were wrongful.
The first category was the corrupt and fraudulent behavior in and relating to the Lago
Agrio litigation itself. It included the coercion of Judge Yánez to appoint a global expert and to
select Cabrera, the secret payments to Cabrera and other means used to ensure that he would
cooperate with the LAPs, the covert use of Stratus and others to write most of the Cabrera Report,
the passing off of the Stratus-LAP product as that of a supposedly impartial and independent neutral
expert, the payments to Guerra to influence the content of Zambrano’s decisions during Zambrano’s
first tenure on the case, the ghostwriting of the Judgment, and the bribery of Zambrano.

1371

PX 1146 (July 2, 2009 Memorandum from “SRD” to “Kohn Team” re: “Activity Going
Forward”), at 2 (emphasis added).
1372

PX 77A (June 13, 2007 Crude Clip). Donziger’s comments in full:
“We have to keep pushing on all fronts at all times. That simple. All fronts at all times;
push, push, push. It’s just a matter of force. It’s pure force. Who can put the most pressure
and who can resist. It’s just like . . . You know, all this bullshit about the law and facts, . .
. yeah, that factors into it, ‘cause that affects the level of force. But in the end of the day it
is about brute force; who can apply the pressure and who can withstand the pressure. And
can you get them to the breaking point.”

360
The connection between Donziger’s wrongdoing in the Lago Agrio case itself and
his objective “to get [Chevron’s] money without going through a lengthy appeals process that drags
out for years” was straightforward. The bribery of Cabrera and Stratus’s secret preparation of the
report were intended to ensure that the court-appointed, supposedly impartial and independent expert
– whose appointment Donziger and the LAP team engineered – would recommend damages “in the
multiple billions of dollars.”1373 Inflating Chevron’s potential exposure by means of that ostensibly
neutral expert was a means to “threaten Chevron’s cash position.” So too with the ghostwriting of
the Judgment, the corruption of Zambrano, and the LAPs’ efforts to enforce that Judgment. The
object all along was to maximize Chevron’s possible exposure and to increase both the risk that the
Ecuadorian court in fact would rule for the LAPs and the additional risk that any such judgment
would be enforceable outside Ecuador, all in order to bring Chevron to its knees.
The other category of activities designed to pressure Chevron to pay was the use of
the media, NGOs, the disinvestment campaign, celebrity advocacy, lobbying, incitement of official
investigations and inquiries, and the attempt to incite criminal prosecution of former Texaco lawyers
in order to pressure Chevron to settle. As will appear, by no means all of this activity was wrongful,
but some certainly was.

b.

Much of Donziger’s Conduct Was Not Protected

Chevron contends that every act in furtherance of this plan was an act of racketeering
activity because it was indictable under the Hobbs Act. Donziger makes essentially two rejoinders.
The net of this clash is that both sides overreach, but that some of Donziger’s means were wrongful.

1373

PX 33A[S] (Mar. 3, 2007 Crude Clip), CRS-187-01-01.

361
First, Donziger contends that the LAPs were entitled to the recovery that was
obtained in Ecuador, that Donziger so believed, and that a threat of economic harm is not
extortionate, i.e., wrongful, “unless (1) the defendant is not legally entitled to the property that he
or she seeks and (2) does not hold a good-faith belief in that entitlement.”1374
Second, he asserts that he did nothing more than conduct a lawsuit. Lawsuits, he
correctly notes, all inherently instill fear of adverse results, and most settle for that reason. But the
bringing of a lawsuit, he argues, is not extortion, at least not in the criminal sense, notwithstanding
that it always exerts some pressure on the defendant to part with something of value in exchange for
peace. Indeed, he understandably invokes the First Amendment in his defense.
Ultimately, the parties’ respective arguments are not completely persuasive as to
either categorical position.

i.

Donziger’s Entitlement Argument Is Without Merit

The first of Donziger’s arguments rests on the uncontroversial proposition, derived
from United States v. Jackson1375 and its predecessors, that some perfectly lawful activities instill
fear of economic harm and thus are not wrongful. The distinction between legitimate and wrongful
(i.e., extortionate) threats of economic harm turns, he argues, upon whether the threatener in good
faith believes it is entitled, and in fact has a plausible claim, to the property it seeks. But that is
where Donziger’s argument goes off the tracks.

1374

DI 1850 (Donziger Defs.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 71 (emphasis added).
1375

180 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1999).

362
The Jackson panel did not hold that no threat of economic harm to obtain property
is extortionate as long as the threatener, with the benefit of hindsight, could be said to have been
entitled to the property demanded. Rather, it said that “Congress meant to adopt the traditional
concept of extortion, which includes an element of wrongfulness.”1376 The element of wrongfulness
may be supplied by (1) the lack of a plausible claim of entitlement to the property demanded, or (2)
the lack of a good faith belief of entitlement, or (3) the lack of a nexus between the threat and the
claim of right. It may be supplied also, in this Court’s view, by inherently wrongful conduct. The
existence of this element of wrongfulness is a question of fact for the fact finder.1377 Finally, neither
the plausibility of a claim of right nor the threatener’s good faith belief is established merely by
proof that the threatener in fact thought that the threatener, in some cosmic, moralistic or personal
ethical sense, was entitled to the property.
One may assume, without deciding, that there was a plausible basis for bringing the
Lago Agrio case in the first place and that Donziger at its inception had a good faith belief that his
clients were entitled to recover something. One may assume further that the mere bringing of the
lawsuit, though it of course carried with it some threat of economic harm to Chevron, was not
wrongful. This does not get Donziger where he wishes to go.
It would be fundamentally wrong to view the threat of economic harm in this case
in static terms. It was Donziger’s purpose to magnify the pressure on Chevron by increasing both
the perceived magnitude of its potential exposure and the perceived likelihood that the exposure in
the end would culminate in huge liability. He repeatedly did so by manifestly wrongful means,

1376

Id. at 70.
1377

Id. at 70-71.

363
which included corruption of the litigation and a pressure campaign premised on misrepresentations.
Within the litigation, he coerced Judge Yánez to allow the LAPs to drop their remaining judicial
inspections and to appoint their hand-picked global expert, coordinated the ghostwriting of the
Cabrera Report to threaten Chevron for the first time with more than $16 billion of exposure;
coopted Cabrera to put his name to it; supervised the ghostwriting for Cabrera’s signature on the
response to the LAP and Chevron comments on the Cabrera Report, which raised the ante to more
than $22 billion; and bribed Zambrano to allow the LAP team to ghostwrite the multibillion
Judgment. His pressure campaign relied upon his repeated dissemination of estimates of Chevron’s
damages exposure and the magnitude of the harm allegedly created by Texaco that he knew to be
false.
Each of these tactics increased the perceived threat of harm to Chevron, either by
increasing the dollar exposure, by increasing the probability of a judgment that could be enforced
outside Ecuador, or by both. They were inherently wrongful by any definition. Chevron “had a
preexisting right to be free from the threats invoked” by the illegitimate means employed.1378
Viewing them in terms of the Jackson formulation, they destroyed the nexus between the original
plausible claim and the fear of a catastrophic adverse result on that claim because the fear of such
a result was a product not solely of the original plausible claim, but of the illegitimate means used
to increase the exposure on that claim, the likelihood that Chevron would be found liable, and the
likelihood that any such finding ultimately would prove enforceable. In other words, the illegitimate
means that Donziger and his confederates used provided them with “leverage to force the payment
of money” that arose uniquely from the illegitimate means. Moreover, the “actual disclosure” of

1378

United States v. Tobin, 155 F.3d 636, 640 (3d Cir. 1988) (Alito, J.).

364
those illegitimate means would have been, and even today would be, “counterproductive.”1379 Put
still another way, one engaged in litigation either accepts the risk of an adverse result reached by
fair and honest methods or settles, and that is fine. But a litigant who magnifies the risks to its
adversary by corrupting the litigation in order to “get the price up” creates leverage purely
attributable to the corruption, which is inherently wrongful, which bears no proper nexus to any
plausible claim that may have been asserted in the first place, and from which the victim has a right
to be free.

ii.

Donziger’s Conduct is Not Protected Petitioning Activity

Implicit in what has been said already, this Court accepts that litigation is a
constitutionally protected right in the United States and assumes it should be afforded ample scope
even when conducted abroad. It serves the important purpose of permitting resolution of disputes
by means more desirable than otherwise might be employed. Accordingly, while the authorities
already referred to do not compel a conclusion so broad, it assumes without deciding that even
“meritless litigation is not extortion” under the Hobbs Act.1380 But we are dealing here with
something else entirely.
Chevron’s claim with respect to the Lago Agrio case itself, insofar as it pertains to
the predicate acts of attempted extortion, is not that the case was entirely baseless. Rather, it is that
Donziger and others corrupted the case by bribing the judge and by other corrupt and fraudulent

1379

Jackson, 180 F.3d at 70-71.
1380

Deck v. Engineered Laminates, 349 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases and
holding that “meritless litigation is not extortion” under Hobbs Act); United States v.
Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1205 (11th Cir. 2002).

365
means and that they did so, among other reasons, to instill fear in Chevron of a catastrophic result
sufficient “to get [Chevron’s] money without” litigating the case to judgment, without “going
through a lengthy appeals process that drags this out for years,” and without the need for time
consuming and expensive judgment enforcement proceedings.1381 It is clear from cases in the NoerrPennington area1382 that corruption of an adjudicative process removes any shield that the First
Amendment otherwise would provide.1383 That is so because “bribes (in any context) and
misrepresentation (in the adjudicatory process), are not normal and legitimate exercises of the right

1381

See PX 1146 (July 2, 2009 Memo), at 2; PX 33A[S] (Mar. 3, 2007 Crude Clip), CRS187-01-01.
1382

That doctrine sharply restricted, on the basis of First Amendment considerations, antitrust
liability based on litigation, lobby and petitioning of public agencies for allegedly
anticompetitive purposes. See generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST
LAW DEVELOPMENTS (SIXTH) 292-94 (2007). Nevertheless, antitrust liability may be
imposed for (1) “filing of baseless lawsuits or administrative actions not in order to prevail
. . . but to impede a competitor’s ability to compete,” (2) litigation “brought pursuant to a
policy of starting legal proceedings without regard to the merits and for the purpose of
injuring a market rival,” and (3) “intentional misrepresentations made to a judicial or
administrative body” for anticompetitive purposes. Id. at 293-94. Accordingly, “activities
of this sort have been held beyond the protection of Noerr.” Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v.
Am. Pharm. Ass’n, 663 F.2d 253, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (collecting cases); see also Clipper
Exxpress v. Rocky Mtn. Motor Tariff Bur., Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1261 (9th Cir. 1982) (“In the
adjudicatory sphere, . . . information supplied by the parties is relied on as accurate for
decision making and dispute resolving. The supplying of fraudulent information thus
threatens the fair and impartial functioning of these agencies and does not deserve
immunity” from liability).
1383

Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972) (there are “many
. . . forms of illegal and reprehensible practice which may corrupt the administrative or
judicial processes and which may result in antitrust violations” because
“[m]isrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when used in the
adjudicatory process”); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 420 (1992)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (while “the First Amendment broadly protects ‘speech,’ it does not
protect the right to ‘fix prices, breach contracts, make false warranties, place bets with
bookies, threaten, [or] extort.’”(quoting Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A
Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 270 (1981)) (brackets in original)).

366
to petition.”1384 Accordingly, the actions in the Lago Agrio case itself, which are said to have been
corrupt, to the extent proved, were wrongful means for Hobbs Act and RICO purposes.

c.

Donziger’s Extortionate Conduct
i.

Donziger’s Misconduct in the Litigation

As amply detailed above, Donziger’s actions in increasing the pressure on Chevron
by dishonest and corrupt steps in the litigation – coercion, bribery, ghostwriting, and so on – were
intended to communicate threats to Chevron. Their purpose was to instill fear of a catastrophic
outcome in order to increase the amount Chevron would pay to avoid the worst.
The Hobbs Act requires only obtaining, or attempting to obtain, “property from
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of . . . fear.”1385 No verbal or explicit threat is
required.1386 Thus, subject to the constraints of Morrison, which are discussed below, Donziger’s
misconduct in the litigation that was undertaken for the purpose of instilling fear of economic harm
in order to induce payment by Chevron were indictable under the Hobbs Act, chargeable under the
New York extortion statute, and therefore acts of racketeering activity.

1384

Fed. Prescription Serv., 663 F.2d at 263.
1385

18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2).
1386

See, e.g., United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220, 241 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Hobbs Act
‘leaves open the cause of the fear’ inducing a party to consent to part with property and does
not require that such fear be ‘created by implicit or explicit threats.’”) (quoting United
States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 333 (2d Cir. 2006)).

367
ii.

Donziger Made Representations He Knew Were Materially
False in Order to Exert Pressure on Chevron

Donziger’s misconduct outside the courthouse went hand in hand with his
misconduct within it. Both were parts of an offensive to produce a multi-billion dollar payout.
Donziger’s “brute force” campaign depended largely on his ability to threaten Chevron by
portraying the litigation as a likely source of huge liability for the company.1387
As an initial matter, although the existing case law perhaps does not go so far, the
Court assumes for purposes of this decision that advocacy through public statements and lobbying
activities for the purpose of inflicting economic harm, except to the extent it rests on knowingly
false statements or statements as to the truth of which the speaker in fact entertains serious doubt,
is not extortionate. But Donziger in some instances relied upon estimates and comparisons that he
knew were false or the truth of which he seriously doubted. These included Russell’s $6 billion
SWAG, claims that contamination in the Orienté exceeded that of the Exxon Valdez by a factor of
thirty, and assertions of Cabrera’s impartiality and independence. Accordingly, these are proper
subjects of the extortion predicate act claim.
As we have seen, Donziger exercised virtually total control over the specific content
and timing of the press campaign.1388 He rebuffed repeatedly Hinton’s and Amazon Watch’s efforts
to exercise discretion over the substance or wording of particular materials.1389

Donziger

1387

PX 1146 (July 2, 2009 Memorandum from “SRD” to “Kohn Team” re: “Activity Going
Forward”), at 2.
1388

See supra Facts § III.B.1-2.
1389

See, e.g., PX 6817 (Mar. 11, 2009 Email from S. Donziger to K. Hinton) (“do not change
headlines ever without telling me”); PX 6814 (Dec. 3, 2009 Email from S. Donziger to K.
Hinton) (“[w]hen I send a final copy of a press release for posting, the issue of the headline

368
accordingly made or caused these assertions to be made in press releases and sought to have them
repeated by prominent figures to create “pressure . . . to get the price up”1390 and induce Chevron to
settle.

(A)

Donziger Repeatedly Used Damages Estimates He
Knew Were False or the Truth of Which He Doubted

The LAPs’ former chief scientist, David Russell, disavowed his initial damages
assessment and repeatedly requested that the LAPs and Amazon Watch cease using his $6 billion
figure.1391 Russell warned that the estimate “was prepared in a very short time, with only a week of
review . . ., and [was] heavily influenced by [Donziger] in the writing.”1392 He said the number
“[was] too high by a substantial margin, perhaps by a factor of ten, or more.”1393 As a result, he
warned, the “2003 cost estimate is a ticking time bomb which will come back to bite you, and very
badly if anyone attempts due diligence on it.”1394
is settled. never change it at that point. tks.”); PX 1214 (Jan. 27, 2010 Email from S.
Donziger to S. Tegel, A. Soltani, K. Koenig, M. Anderson re: “another thought”), at 1
(“Suggestions are welcome for any press release we do; final editing authority is something
we would never grant to any outsider – especially somebody not in a position to understand
the art and feel of this campaign and its daily developments.”).
1390

PX 931 (Oct. 29, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to C. Lehane re: “let’s talk”) (“Totally
confidential, but Chevron is hurting and they have asked to go to mediation at end of
November. We need to get more press and increase the pressure b/w now and then, to get
the price up.”).
1391

See supra Facts § III.C-D.
1392

PX 764 (Feb. 14, 2006 Ltr. from D. Russell to S. Donziger re “Cease and Desist”), at 1.
1393

Id.
1394

Id. at 2.

369
Donziger and Amazon Watch both promised to stop citing Russell’s estimate in their
press releases and statements to the public. But these promises were broken. The ADF1395 and
Amazon Watch – at Donziger’s direction – continued to tout the $6 billion figure1396 and continued
to attribute it to Russell’s firm.1397 Donziger knew that Russell had disavowed his cost estimate and
had revealed that it was wildly inaccurate. His continued reliance on the figure thus was deliberately
deceitful or, at best, highly misleading.
Donziger now claims that his team had prepared a new, higher estimate, which
satisfied him that it was acceptable to continue using Russell’s cost estimate despite Russell’s
repeated demands that he stop doing so.1398 But the Court does not credit that claim. The
“replacement” estimates were prepared under Donziger’s direction by junior lawyers who worked

1395

As noted above, the ADF uses the name the Amazon Defense Coalition. Although its press
releases are issued under the latter name, we continue to use ADF to prevent confusion.
1396

See, e.g., PX 477R (Sept. 13, 2006 Amazon Watch press release), at 1, 2, 3 (“[a]n
independent expert has estimated a clean-up would cost $6.1 billion”); PX 480R (Oct. 30,
2006 Amazon Watch press release) at 2 (alleged contamination “would cost at least $6
billion to remediate”); PX 481R (Nov. 8, 2006 Amazon Watch press release) at 2
(Chevron’s “Ecuador liability” was “estimated at $6 billion”); PX 482R (Nov. 15, 2006
Amazon Defense Coalition press release) at 1-2 (“Clean-up is estimated at $6 billion.”).
1397

See, e.g., PX 494R (Aug. 30, 2007 Amazon Defense Coalition press release) at 3 (“Global
Environmental Services, an Atlanta-based company that assessed the damage, called the
area the ‘Rainforest Chernobyl’ and estimated clean-up would cost at least $6 billion.”); PX
483R (Mar. 6, 2007 Amazon Watch press release), at 2 (referencing an “independent
damage assessment, by the U.S. firm Global Environmental Operations” that “estimates
clean-up to cost at least $6.14 billion”); PX 485R (Mar. 20, 2007 Amazon Watch press
release) at 2 (stating that an “independent damage assessment, by the U.S. firm Global
Environmental Operations puts clean-up costs at $6.14 billion”).
1398

See supra Facts § III.C-E.

370
for him.1399 They were intended to “make media/court/CVX [Chevron] itself start thinking in terms
of billions,”1400 and potentially to be used to pique the SEC’s interest in the litigation.1401 To the
extent they ever were publicly quoted or relied upon, they too were weapons in Donziger’s scheme
to ratchet up the pressure on Chevron to settle.
Evocation of the Exxon Valdez disaster was another such weapon. Donziger’s
allegiance to the hyperbolic and highly misleading comparison between the contamination in the
Orienté and the oil spilled by the Exxon Valdez further demonstrates Donziger’s willingness to
disregard the truth in order to inflate Chevron’s perceived exposure. Despite repeated warnings
from the LAPs’ own scientific experts about the inaccuracy of the comparison,1402 ADF press
releases and other materials continued to maintain that “[e]xperts for the plaintiffs have concluded
the disaster is at least 30 times larger than the Exxon Valdez spill.”1403 And they did so at

1399

They were prepared by Donziger’s associate, Aaron Marr Page, and his wife, Daria Fisher.
See DX 731 (Apr. 16, 2006 Email from S. Donziger to A. Page, D. Fisher re: “excellent
work on remediation/questions”); see also supra Facts § III.F.
1400

PX 3240 (Apr. 20, 2006 Email from A. Page to S. Donziger re: “DOJ ltr”).
1401

DX 731 (Apr. 16, 2006 Email from S. Donziger to A. Page, D. Fisher re: “excellent work
on remediation/questions”), at 1 (“[W]ill releasing this now help with the SEC . . . ?”).
1402

See supra Facts § III.E.
1403

PX 527R (Oct. 22, 2009 Amazon Defense Coalition press release), at 2; see PX 533R (June
2, 2010 post, “The Chevron Pit”), at 3 (“Experts have concluded that the Chevron [sic]
discharged at least 345 million gallons of pure crude oil directly into the rainforest
ecosystem . . . . and approximately 11 million gallons of pure crude was spilled during the
Exxon Valdez disaster.”); PX 513R (Oct. 15, 2008 ChevronToxico post), at 2 (“All told, the
amount of oil dumped in Ecuador by Texaco is at least thirty times greater than the amount
spilled during the Exxon Valdez disaster, according to the plaintiffs in the civil suit.”); see
also PX 4400 (Kim Direct), at Attachments C & D (chart and timeline of “Donziger and/or
Co-Conspirators’ Use of ‘30 times Exxon Valdez’ Claim”).

371
Donziger’s direction. Indeed, when the director of Amazon Watch suggested removing references
to the spill from its website,1404 Donziger insisted that it stick to the claim. He warned that there
would be “HUGE implications for the legal case” if they disavowed the comparison to Exxon
Valdez, and told Amazon Watch that it “[w]ould terribly prejudice the people it is trying to help if
it makes this change.”1405
It is no accident that the substance of the misrepresentation pertained to the scale of
the disaster and, consequently, the supposed scope of Chevron’s exposure. In dogged pursuit of
headlines and, ultimately, support for a number likely to “get the price up,”1406 Donziger ignored
warnings that those claims were “off by [a] factor of ten” or more.1407

1404

PX 861 (May 24, 2007 Email from A. Soltani to S. Donziger re: “exxon valdez 30x”).
1405

PX 860 (May 24, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to S. Tegel re: “private”).
1406

PX 931 (Oct. 29, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to C. Lehane re: “let’s talk”) (“Totally
confidential, but Chevron is hurting and they have asked to go to mediation at end of
November. We need to get more press and increase the pressure b/w now and then, to get
the price up.”).
1407

PX 861 (May 24, 2007 Email from A. Soltani to S. Donziger re: “exxon valdez 30x”); PX
764 (Feb. 14, 2006 Ltr. from D. Russell to S. Donziger re: “Cease and Desist”), at 1 (stating
that the estimate was “too high by a substantial margin, perhaps by a factor of ten, or more”).

372
(B)

Donziger Sought to Pressure Chevron by Causing
Third Parties to Act on His Misrepresentations

Donziger devoted particular attention to promulgating the misrepresentations related
to Cabrera, the Russell SWAG, and the Exxon Valdez to elected officials, the SEC,1408 and Chevron
investors in the hope of inducing them to pressure Chevron themselves.
Donziger targeted then-New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo and New York
State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli, the latter of whom is “the sole Trustee of the Common
Retirement Fund . . . whose portfolio includes more than 7.5 million shares of Chevron Corporation
. . . valued at approximately $556 million.”1409 In response to lobbying efforts by Donziger’s
team,1410 Cuomo and DiNapoli wrote to Chevron chief executive officer, David O’Reilly, repeating

1408

See PX 754 (Jan. 30, 2006 Amazon Watch Ltr. from A. Soltani and S. Aird to C. Cox); PX
497R (Mar. 18, 2008 Amazon Watch Ltr. from A. Soltani to C. Cox).
1409

PX 5801 (Nov. 17, 2008 Letter from T. DiNapoli to D. O’Reilly), at 1 (“It appears that
Chevron’s strategy remains that of denying responsibility for the contamination and,
instead, protracting the legal proceedings. I question whether that strategy best serves the
company and its shareholders.”).
1410

This team included Hinton, Amazon Watch staffer Mitch Anderson, and LAP lobbyist Ben
Barnes. PX 1048 (July 11, 2008 Email from K. Hinton to S. Donziger re: “Cuomo”) (“I
spoke with Andrew Cuomo this morning and told him about the lawsuit and the
comptroller’s office, etc. He said he would be helpful, if we gave him a good idea about
how to do that. You should discuss with Patrick Doherty about how we might leverage
Cuomo.”); PX 7441 (Apr. 2, 2009 Email chain from S. Donziger to S. Martin, S. Moorhead,
K. Caperton, M. Anderson, K. Koenig, and A. Soltani re: “draft ltr for Cuomo”); PX 1106
(Feb. 13, 2009 Email from S. Donziger to B. Barnes, S. Moorhead, P. Thomasson, and K.
Hinton re: “DeNapoli info/instructions for Ben”) (“Instructions: (1) That DiNapoli call
Andrew Cuomo’s office, or write a letter, requesting assistance on the Chevron disclosure
matter to enable Cuomo to write a letter to Chevron seeking more information. The person
to call is Steve Cohen, Cuomo’s chief of staff.”); PX 7426 (Feb. 9, 2008 Email from S.
Donziger to M. Anderson, P. Paz y Mino, and K. Koenig re: “For Pat Doherty”), at 2
(touting $6 billion damages estimate and claiming that “[t]he amount of pure crude dumped
is more than 30 times greater than that spilled during the Exxon Valdez disaster”); PX 7422
(Mar. 23, 2007 Email from K. Koenig to S. Alpern, J. Gresham, A. O’Meara, M. Rosenthal,
P. Doherty, I. Lowe, T. Symonds, G. Wong, and S. Donziger re: “Ecuador Court Speeds Up

373
what they were told and doubtless believed – that an independent, court-appointed expert (Cabrera)
had recommended billions in damages against Chevron.1411 Comptroller DiNapoli repeatedly urged
the company to settle.1412 He even wrote a Huffington Post piece recounting his request that
“Chevron’s board of directors settle this marathon litigation and spare the company’s battered
reputation any further damage.”1413 Both Amazon Watch and the ADF (i.e., Donziger) then
publicized Cuomo and DiNapoli’s positions.1414

Chevron’s $6 Billion Amazon Trial Over Rainforest Contamination”) (including press
release referring to “only independent damage assessment” of $6 billion and discussing
coordination for Chevron annual meeting).
1411

PX 5801 (Nov. 17, 2008 Letter from T. DiNapoli to D. O’Reilly), at 1; PX 1131 (May 4,
2009 letter from A. Cuomo to D. O’Reilly) (referring to Cabrera as “a technical expert
[who] has estimated that . . . damages assessed against Chevron may be as high as $27
billion”).
1412

E.g., PX 7480 (May 2011 Investor Statement on Chevron and Aguinda v. Texaco), at 1
(“We also call upon the Company to reevaluate whether endless litigation in the Aguinda
case is the best strategy for the Company and its shareholders, or whether a more productive
approach, such as reaching an equitable negotiated settlement, could be employed to protect
shareholder investments and prevent any further reputational harm due to protracted
litigation.”); PX 5803 (May 25, 2011 press release, “DiNapoli to Chevron: Resolve Amazon
Lawsuit, Standoff on Poor Ecological Record Bad for Business”); PX 7498 (May 25, 2012
press release, “NYS Pension Fund Renews Call for Chevron to Resolve Ecuador Lawsuit”).
1413

PX 7490 (Sept. 26, 2011 Email from E. Sumberg, S. Thompson, P. Grannis, C. Calhoun,
N. Groenwegen, B. Anastassiou, E. Evans re: “Huffington Post: What Chevron Owes the
People of Lago Agrio”).
1414

PX 7542 (May 25, 2009 Amazon Watch Ltr. to Shareholders), at 2; PX 5804 (May 26, 2011
Amazon Defense Coalition press release), at 1 (“New York State Comptroller Thomas
DiNapoli, who manages $780 million in Chevron stock called on the company ‘to face
reality’ and resolve the lawsuit, which is currently under appeal by both parties in Ecuador.
‘The entire case is looming like a hammer over shareholders’ heads. Investors don’t derive
any benefit from this never-ending courtroom drama.’”).

374
Donziger fed DiNapoli and Cuomo the same misrepresentations he was feeding the
press.1415 And he sought to use their influence, both as public officials and in the case of the
Comptroller as a major Chevron stockholder, to “increase the leverage and increase the cost [to]
Chevron,” including “the cost of all the hassle [it has] to put up with from the environmental groups”
and “the cost of their sullied reputation . . . .”1416 That leverage was intended to convince Chevron
to settle with Donziger and the LAPs.

(C)

Donziger Pressed the Republic of Ecuador to File
Criminal Charges Against Chevron Attorneys in
Order to Pressure Chevron into Settlement

We have discussed already Donziger’s efforts to incite the ROE to prosecute two
Chevron lawyers – Reis Veiga and Pérez-Pallares – criminally. Donziger viewed a “criminal case”
against the two lawyers, premised on alleged fraud in connection with the release signed with the
ROE, as “a road that . . . could force [Chevron] to the table for a possible settlement.”1417 Donziger
was convinced that such a prosecution would be a potential source of “major press in [the] U.S.”
and a way to “really raise the cost to CVX.”1418

1415

Tobin, 155 F.3d 636 (finding extortionate campaign of harassment consisting, among other
things, of threats to report the victim to Internal Revenue Service and threats to interfere
with business by maligning reputation).
1416

PX 7537 (Crude Transcript, Theatrical Version), at 52.
1417

PX 172 (Donziger Notebook).
1418

PX 2373R (May 11, 2005 Email from S. Donziger to A. Wray, C. Bonifaz, J. Kohn, J.
Bonifaz re: “sked conference call Monday at 10 a.m.”), at 1-2; PX 170 (Donziger
Notebook).

375
To that end, he asked Chris Lehane to prepare a plan to “fully leverage the criminal
investigation of . . . Chevron executives.”1419 The priority of the plan was “to apply shareholder
pressure on Chevron, including” letters to Chevron board members, “elected officials who head
major pension funds,” and “major investors” such as “public and university funds . . . .”1420 The plan
called also for “Meetings with State Pension Fund Elected Officials” (to persuade them “to publicly
demand a meeting with Chevron to discuss the matter”), an “Analyst Road Show,” a “Google ad that
[would] put[] out some provocative information for anyone who types in a search for Chevron,” and
“SEC letters calling for an investigation of Chevron” in the “days and weeks” following the release
of a story about the criminal investigation in order “to keep imposing tremendous pressure on
Chevron.”1421
Although the LAPs’ efforts to stimulate such a prosecution initially met resistance,
the tide turned following President Correa’s election in 2007. After a series of meetings with
Donziger and the LAP team, the president announced his support for the prosecution.1422 On April
1419

PX 734 (Oct. 3, 2005 Email from S. Donziger to J. Kohn re: “Lehane’s first press plan”),
at 2.
1420

Id. at 2-3.
1421

Id. at 3-4.
1422

See discussion supra Facts § VI; see also PX 7537 (Crude Transcript, Theatrical Version),
at 43 (Donziger: “Correa just said that anyone in the Ecuadorian government who approved
the so-called remediation is now going to be subject to litigation in Ecuador. Those guys
are shitting in their pants right now.”).
Fajardo and Donziger lobbied the Prosecutor General’s office as intently as they did the
Office of the President. See, e.g., PX 75A (June 8, 2007 Crude clip), at CRS376-03-CLIP01 (noting Correa’s suggestion that “if we put in a little effort at the Public Prosecutors’
office, the Attorney General will yield, and will re-open that investigation into the fraud of
. . . the contract between Texaco and the Ecuadorian Government”); PX 992 (Mar. 11, 2008

376
29, 2010, the Prosecutor General’s office issued an opinion citing the Cabrera Report and formally
accusing Reis Veiga and Pérez-Pallares of the crime of falsedad ideologica.
Donziger knew that, “[i]n the US, threatening to file a criminal case to get an
advantage in a civil case is considered a violation of ethical rules of the profession.”1423 He
nevertheless used the criminal prosecutions in an attempt to “keep the hammer over [Chevron’s]
head”1424 and to “force [Chevron] to the table.”1425 His action in doing so, moreover, was wrongful
irrespective of whether there was a plausible claim of wrongdoing by the lawyers and of any belief
by Donziger in the merit of the claim of such wrongdoing. In terms of Jackson’s formulation, there
was no nexus between the property Donziger sought to obtain by threatening the Chevron lawyers
with criminal prosecution and any plausible claim that the lawyers had violated Ecuadorian law in
connection with the release of Texaco years earlier. Moreover, Donziger and the LAP lawyers were
well aware of the wrongful nature of their actions. They “resort[ed] to very sophisticated means”

Email from P. Fajardo to S. Donziger re: “urgent that we speak about next week”), at 1 (“I
have an appointment with the Prosecutor tomorrow morning, we are insisting that he reopen
the criminal investigation against Texaco for the remediation.”); PX 1067 (Sept. 18, 2008
Email from P. Fajardo to J. Saenz, J. Prieto, S. Donziger, and others re: “Prosecutor’s
Case”) (“the bread is almost ready to be taken out of the oven, but that’s a good time to get
burned . . . Let’s all do our best to make sure this action moves forward. I wonder if it’s
possible to put on more pressure at Court Monday or Tuesday”).
1423

PX 8058 (July 18, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to J. Saenz, J. Prieto, and P. Fajardo).
1424

PX 169R (Donziger Notebook), at 41.
1425

PX 172 (Donziger Notebook), at 2.

377
to prevent being “tied to the matter.”1426 Their efforts to distance themselves is probative of their
awareness of the wrongful nature of their attempts to procure these prosecutions.

d.

Application of the Hobbs Act to This Conduct Is Consistent With
Morrison

Donziger’s media, lobbying, and public relations campaign, as well as the Cabrera
scheme, took place largely in the United States. Much of it was directed by Donziger in major part
from his New York City apartment. As a result, Morrison has no bearing on the bulk of Donziger’s
conduct. Among Chevron’s allegations of extortion, however, are various actions that took place,
in whole or in part, in Ecuador or abroad, including the bribery of Zambrano, efforts to persuade the
ROE to criminally charge Chevron attorneys, efforts to enforce the judgment abroad, and quite
possibly the ghostwriting of the Judgment. The Court therefore must determine whether the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to the Hobbs Act.
The Hobbs Act has two basic components – (1) the wrongful use of fear, in this case,
of economic or reputational harm (2) in order to obtain the property of another – neither of which
evinces a Congressional intent that the statute be applied to extraterritorial conduct. To determine
which of defendants’ conduct properly is considered part of the domestic pattern, the Court therefore
must discern the focus of the statute or the “object[] of the statute’s solicitude.”1427

1426

PX 1103 (Feb. 4, 2009 Email from J. Saenz to S. Donziger, M. Garces, P. Fajardo, and
others re: “Nuevo Boletin/importante”), at 3 (“The problem is that in Ecuador, our discourse
has been that we haven’t had ANYTHING to do with the process at the prosecutor general’s
office . . . . So, to publically [sic] say that the discovery comes from one of our collaborators
ties us in some way to the prosecutorial investigation. And we all agree that we don’t want
that to happen.”).
1427

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.

378
The defining element of extortion is the pursuit of “something of value from the
victim that can be exercised, transferred, or sold.”1428 By the statute’s very terms, the conduct
prohibited is to, “in any way or degree,” “obstruct[], delay[], or affect[]commerce or the movement
of any article or commodity in commerce, by . . . extortion. . . .”1429 In Scheidler v. National
Organization for Women, Inc.,1430 the Supreme Court explained that, “[a]t common law, extortion
was a property offense”1431 and demonstrated the significance of the defendant’s objective to the
definition of extortion by examining the claim alongside the crime of coercion. Coercion, the Court
explained, targeted those who “employed threats and acts of force and violence to dictate and restrict
the actions and decisions of businesses,” but stopped short of seeking and acquiring property, which
the crime of extortion requires.1432 Thus, it is the defendants’ desire “ultimately to enrich
themselves” at the target’s expense that transforms merely coercive tactics into extortion.1433
As a result, the fact that certain of Donziger’s wrongful efforts to force Chevron to
pay took place in Ecuador is of no moment. While Donziger’s activities in Ecuador were important,
they in many respects were merely tools. Regardless of where the conduct creating the threat took
1428

Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720, 2726 (2013).
1429

18 U.S.C. 1951(a).
1430

537 U.S. 393 (2003).
1431

537 U.S. at 402.
1432

Id. at 405-06; see also United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 323 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We . . .
read Scheidler II as . . . simply clarifying that before liability can attach, the defendant must
truly have obtained (or, in the case of attempted extortion, sought to obtain) the property
right in question.”).
1433

Gotti, 459 F.3d at 324.

379
place, the plan was hatched and run from the United States and its object was a multi-billion dollar
payment from Chevron, a U.S. based company. The application of the Hobbs Act to the extortionate
behavior therefore would not be extraterritorial.

2.

Wire Fraud

Donziger engaged in multiple acts that are indictable under the wire fraud statute and
that therefore are acts of racketeering activity.

a.

The Elements of Wire Fraud

The wire fraud statute prohibits the use of the wires “for the purpose of executing”
a “scheme or artifice to defraud.”1434 A “scheme or artifice to defraud” is a plan to deprive a person
of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching. “[A]ny ‘mailing that is incident to
an essential part of the scheme satisfies the mailing element,’ even if the mailing itself contain[s]
no false information.”1435 Nor need the defendant personally communicate by wire – he or she need
only cause the wires to be or initiate a series of events which foreseeably would result in their
use.1436 The scheme need not even be successful in order for liability to obtain under the statute.1437

1434

18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343.
1435

Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 647 (2008) (quoting Schmuck v.
United States, 489 U.S. 705, 712, 715 (1989) (alteration in original)); United States v. Maze,
414 U.S. 395, 400 (1974) (mails need only be “for the purpose of executing” the scheme)
(quoting Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 94 (1944)).
1436

See, e.g., United States v. Bortnovsky, 879 F.2d 30, 39 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that
“defendant need not actually intend, agree to or even know of a specific mailing to ‘cause’
mail to be sent as long as he or she ‘does an act with knowledge that the use of mails will
follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such can reasonably be foreseen’”

380
Fraudulent intent is established by proof of intentional fraud or by demonstrating
“reckless indifference to the truth.”1438 Intentional fraud is established by “a ‘conscious knowing
intent to defraud . . . [and] that the defendant contemplated or intended some harm to the property
rights of the victim.”1439
The statute requires also that the plaintiff prove the defendants used materially false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises in the scheme.1440 The materiality element is
satisfied if the false pretense or representation has “some independent value” or “bear[s] on the
ultimate value of the transaction.”1441
Finally, although many of the wires at issue were interstate, a number of them were
sent to or from the United States. In any event, “the wire fraud statute punishes frauds executed ‘in

(internal citations omitted)).
1437

United States v. Walker, 191 F.3d 326, 335 (2d Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Pierce,
224 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The wire fraud statute punishes the scheme, not its
success.”) (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
1438

O’Malley v. New York City Transit Auth., 896 F.2d 704, 706 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations
omitted).
1439

Autuori, 212 F.3d at 116 (quoting United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir.
1999)).
1440

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999) (holding materiality is an element of a
“scheme or artifice to defraud” under the mail and wire fraud statutes).
1441

Autuori, 212 F.3d at 118 (quoting United States v. Mittelstaedt, 31 F.3d 1208, 1217 (2d Cir.
1994)); id. (“[U]nder the mail fraud statute, it is just as unlawful to speak ‘half truths’ or to
omit to state facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

381
interstate or foreign commerce,’ so this is surely not a statute in which Congress had only ‘domestic
concerns in mind.’”1442

b.

The Conduct

Donziger’s overriding goal was to extract a large payment from Chevron in exchange
for peace. In pursuit of that objective, however, he engaged, as we have seen, in a number of
deceitful schemes, each of which was intended to play its part in achieving that end and each of
which was furthered by use of the wires. These included, but were not limited to: (1) the
ghostwriting of the Cabrera Report by Stratus and the LAPs and the passing off of the report as the
work of Cabrera, together with the misrepresentations of his supposed impartiality and
independence; (2) the false portrayal of Cabrera as neutral and impartial, (3) the concealment of the
true relationship among Cabrera, Stratus and the LAPs, including concealment of the secret
payments to Cabrera; (4) the ghostwriting by Stratus of the response to Chevron’s objections to the
Cabrera Report, which too were passed off as Cabrera’s work; (5) the attempts to deceive Chevron
and courts in the Section 1782 proceedings concerning what actually had transpired among Cabrera,
Stratus, and the LAPs; (6) the ghostwriting of all or much of the Judgment and Zambrano’s false
claim of authorship; and (7) the false statements to the media and to public officials that were made
to increase the pressure on Chevron.
In each of these schemes, Donziger specifically intended to mislead Chevron by
falsely portraying the extent of its potential exposure and the likelihood of an adverse result, both
material matters designed to induce it to settle the case and to do so at a higher figure than otherwise

1442

Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371-72 (2005) (citations omitted).

382
might have been available. He sought also to portray those same matters falsely to others in a
position to exert pressure on Chevron toward the same end. Thus, he acted with scienter, and the
schemes involved deception as to material matters. The jurisdictional means requirement was
satisfied by the extensive use of the wires by Donziger, Fajardo, and Yanza, among others, to
transmit messages – chiefly emails – both within the United States and between the United States
and Ecuador in furtherance of the schemes.1443
3.
Money Laundering

1443

Numerous emails were sent in furtherance of these schemes.
For example, the ghostwriting of the Cabrera Report by Stratus was coordinated through
wire communications. See, e.g., PX 2433 (Feb. 8, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to S.
Donziger, A. Maest, P. Fajardo, J. Peers, B. Lazar), supervised by Donziger, PX 979 (Feb.
27, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to D. Beltman re: “Start on report text; human tox
annex”), translated into Spanish, PX 980 (Feb. 29, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to
[e-mail], and A. Maest re: “Ecuador Project”), sent to Ecuador, PX
1019 (Mar. 31, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to [e-mail] re: “table”), and
revised by Donziger, PX 1018 (Mar. 30, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger re:
“what do u think of this?”). So too were the attempts to conceal it. See, e.g., PX 1315 (May
3, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to E. Westenberger, and others re: “Fajardo edits”); PX
1321 (May 4, 2010 Email from A. Wilson to S. Donziger, and others re: “Fajardo
Declaration”); PX 2452 (May 5, 2010 Email from S. Donziger, and others re “aguinda
litigation”).
Other examples are the communications regarding the ghostwriting by Guerra of Zambrano
orders and the early preparation by the LAP team for preparing the judgment. Fajardo kept
Donziger apprised of the team’s arrangements during Zambrano’s first tenure on the case,
PX 1751 (Oct. 27, 2009 Email from P. Fajardo to L. Yanza, S. Donziger re “News”),
Donziger and Fajardo coordinated research assignments for the judgment, PX 1137 (June
5, 2009 Email from P. Fajardo to S. Donziger re: “BRYAN”), and the two discussed case
law and proposed arguments, PX 1141 (June 18, 2009 Email from P. Fajardo to S. Donziger
and others re: “THIS IS THE MOST COMPLETE ONE”).
“Each of these [wires] was an ‘act which is indictable’ as [wire] fraud. . . .” Bridge, 553
U.S. at 648. They are not, moreover, a complete list of the wire communications in
furtherance of these schemes. The record in this case is replete with other emails in
furtherance of the schemes, including many cited elsewhere in this opinion. Still others are
included in Appendix 1 to Chevron’s Proposed Findings of Fact, although the exhibit is
somewhat overinclusive. See DI 1848 (Chevron Corp. Proposed Findings of Fact), App’x
1.

383
Money laundering, a violation of Section 1956 of the Criminal Code,1444 is a RICO
predicate act.1445 Section 1956 in pertinent part states that:
“Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers . . . funds [1] from a place in the United
States to or through a place outside the United States or [2] to a place in the United
States from or through a place outside the United States –
“(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity
. . .”
thereby commits a felony.1446 “[S]pecified unlawful activity” includes, with an exception irrelevant
to this case, “any act or activity constituting an offense listed in section 1961(1) of this title . . . .”1447
“[S]pecified unlawful activity” thus includes any act of racketeering activity, including Hobbs Act
and state law extortion, wire fraud, obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and violation of the
Travel Act. Section 2(b) of the Criminal Code, moreover, provides that “[w]hoever willfully causes
an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the
United States is punishable as a principal.”1448 Thus, whoever transfers, or willfully causes another
to transfer, funds into the United States from abroad, or from the United States to another country,
“with the intent to promote the carrying on of” a RICO predicate offense violates the money
laundering statute.

1444

18 U.S.C. § 1956.
1445

Id. § 1961(1).
1446

Id. § 1956(a)(2).
1447

Id. § 1956(b)(7)(A).
1448

Id. § 2(b).

384
As the “cabeza” of the Lago Agrio litigation for the LAPs, Donziger’s responsibilities
included: (1) obtaining money to fund the litigation and related activities, including public relations
and media, and (2) disbursing, or causing the disbursement of, the funds thus raised to vendors and
to recipients in Ecuador, most notably Selva Viva, which managed most of the money sent there.
To whatever extent he (1) obtained money from outside the United States or (2) sent or caused
money to be sent from the United States to another country, in each case with the requisite intent
and to promote the carrying on of a RICO predicate offense, he committed money laundering.
The record in this case contains persuasive evidence of a number of such offenses
by Donziger.1449 The following are illustrative.
Donziger on March 23, 2007 received in his Chase attorney account in New York
$1.75 million from a Gibraltar account controlled by Russell DeLeon, a law school friend Donziger
recruited to help fund the case.1450 He promptly transferred $1 million of that money to the Kohn
firm in Philadelphia, where it was controlled by Donziger and Kohn pending its use for case-related

1449

In Appendix 2 of its Proposed Findings of Fact, Chevron lists a number of wire transfers
it asserts were money laundering. See DI 1848 (Chevron Corp. Proposed Findings of Fact),
App’x 2. The Court need not find that each of these transfers constituted money laundering.
1450

PX 586 (Collection of Chase Bank statements for accounts referred to as “Law Firm
Account” and “Ecuador Case Account”), at 3 (reflecting deposit of $1.75 million on March
23, 2007 from Gibraltar-based account); Donziger Jan. 18, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 3212:20-23
(acknowledging that “Russ DeLeon is someone [he] introduced to the Lago Agrio case as
a source of financing”).

385
expenditures.1451 Donziger then caused that money to be transmitted to entities in the United States
and Ecuador.1452
In the United States, that money paid in part for the production of the Cabrera Report:
both Stratus and Cristobal Villao, an author of one of the Report’s annexes, through his American
employer, Uhl, Baron, Rana and Associates, received payments from Kohn, the money for which
came from DeLeon’s contribution to the case.1453
Some of the funds were used in Ecuador to pay Cabrera through both the Lago Agrio
court and the secret account the LAPs established to pay Cabrera outside the court process. For
example, on August 14, 2007, after receiving a request from Yanza,1454 Donziger asked Kohn to send
1451

PX 846 (Mar. 29, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to R. DeLeon re: “Update memo”), at 1
(discussing deposit of DeLeon’s funds); PX 586 (Collection of Chase Bank statements for
accounts referred to as “Law Firm Account” and “Ecuador Case Account”), at 3 (reflecting
deposit of $1.75 million on March 23, 2007 from Gibraltar-based account and subsequent
transfer to Kohn Swift & Graf).
1452

PX 585 (Summary of 2005-2013 Transfers to Selva Viva Acct. Ending 5004 from S.
Donziger, Kohn Swift & Graf, and Foreign Entities), at 1, 2 (listing wire transfers from
Kohn Swift & Graf to Selva Viva); PX 641 (June 12, 2009 Texaco-Ecuador Kohn Swift &
Graf Expenses 1993 to May 31, 2009), at 2.
Kohn Swift & Graf identified the expenses for which DeLeon’s funds were used in its
record keeping. See PX 641 (June 12, 2009 Texaco-Ecuador Kohn Swift & Graf Expenses
1993 to May 31, 2009), at 2 (identifying “Investor’s Expenses”). There is no evidence of
any other investor during that period of the case.
1453

See PX 641 (June 12, 2009 Texaco-Ecuador Kohn Swift & Graf Expenses 1993 to May 31,
2009), at 2 (reflecting payments to Stratus and UBR between March 30, 2007 and
November 30, 2007); PX 2430 (July 24, 2007 Ltr. From J. Kohn to V. Uhl reflecting
payment to Uhl, Baron, Rana & Assocs.); PX 596 (Sept. 6, 2007 Ltr. From J. Kohn to V.
Uhl reflecting payment to Uhl, Baron, Rana & Assocs.); PX 635 (Oct. 18, 2007 Ltr. From
J. Kohn to V. Uhl reflecting payment to Uhl, Baron, Rana & Assocs.); PX 4900R (Dahlberg
Direct) ¶ 122 (regarding payments to UBR and Villao).
1454

PX 894 (Aug. 9, 2007 Email from L. Yanza to S. Donziger re: “bank information urgent”)
(“[Kohn] ha[s] to deposit 50k so we can pay the advances to the consultants so they will

386
$50,000 to the secret account in Ecuador.1455 The Kohn firm did so on the following day.1456 On
August 17, 2007, $33,000 was transferred from that account to Cabrera.1457 That process was
repeated in the following month: Yanza emailed Donziger to request disbursement of an additional
$50,000 for Cabrera,1458 Donziger directed that Kohn deposit the money into the secret account,1459
and the transfer was subsequently made to the secret account.1460

start their work as soon as possible. I hope it is deposited by Wednesday at the latest. I’ll
be in touch that day to arrange all of this with Huao.”)
1455

PX 897 (Aug. 14, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to K. Wilson and J. Kohn re: “Critical
money transfer”), at 3.
1456

PX 578 (Banco Pichincha Statement), at 6 (reflecting Aug. 15, 2007 transfer of $49,998
from Kohn Swift & Graf); PX 2427 (Oct. 26, 2007 Email from K. Wilson to S. Donziger
and J. Kohn), at 3 (reflecting payment of $50,000 to ADF on Aug. 15, 2007).
1457

PX 578 (ADF Account Statement), at 6 (reflecting transfer to “Cabrera Vega, RichardStalin” on Aug. 17, 2007); PX 590 (Aug. 17, 2007 Account-to-Account Transfer Receipt
between ADF and Cabrera Vega); PX 591 (Aug. 17, 2007 Ltr. from J. Fajardo to Banco
Pichincha Manager); PX 593 (Banco Pichincha Record of Cash Transactions for the
Frente).
1458

PX 913 (Sept. 12, 2007 Email from L. Yanza to S. Donziger re: “Let’s not give Texaco the
pleasure of stopping the PG”) (“I think we should think ahead and not give those Texaco
sons of bitches the pleasure, using the same mechanism as weeks ago, meaning, for you to
send us money to the secret account to give it to the Wuao . . . .”); PX 967 (Feb. 8, 2008
Email from L. Yanza to S. Donziger); PX 917 (Sept. 17, 2007 Email from L. Yanza to S.
Donziger) (“I hope you make a deposit right away because I offered to give the Wao
another advance tomorrow and I don’t want to look bad.”).
1459

PX 916 (Sept. 16, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to K. Wilson re: “quito account”) (“The
50,000 to the Frente goes to the second account . . . not the primary account to which we
usually transfer funds.”).
1460

PX 578 (ADF Account Statement), at 6 (reflecting Sept. 17, 2007 transfer from Kohn Swift
& Graf).

387
In sum, Donziger received money from overseas and caused it to be used in this
instance in at least these two ways: (1) to fund in part the ghostwriting of the Cabrera Report, which
was used in an attempt to extort Chevron; and (2) to pay Cabrera in violation of the Travel Act. In
so doing, Donziger committed acts indictable for money laundering.

4.

Obstruction of Justice and Witness Tampering
a.

Obstruction of Justice
i.

The Elements of Obstruction of Justice

Criminal Code Section 15031461 provides that “[w]hoever . . . corruptly or by threats
or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice” is guilty of an
obstruction of justice.

“[T]he [plaintiff] must establish (1) that there is a pending judicial . . .

proceeding constituting the administration of justice, (2) that the defendant knew or had notice of
the proceeding, and (3) that the defendant acted with the wrongful intent or improper purpose to
influence the judicial . . . proceeding, whether or not the defendant is successful in doing so.”1462
“[A] defendant does not need to know with certainty that his conduct would affect judicial
proceedings . . . [i]nstead, the defendant’s conduct must only have the natural and probable effect
of interfering with the due administration of justice.”1463 Section 1503 requires also proof of “a
1461

18 U.S.C. § 1503.
1462

United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 170 (2d Cir. 2006).
1463

United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 620-21 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that courts afford
Section 1503 “a generally non-restrictive reading”) (internal quotations omitted); see also
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598 (1995) (noting that “the ‘Omnibus Clause’

388
connection between the defendant’s intentional acts and the likelihood of potentially affecting the
administration of justice.”1464 That is, “‘the act must have a relationship in time, causation, or logic
with the judicial proceedings.’”1465 Obstruction of justice is a predicate act under RICO in cases
where, as here, a defendant’s efforts were “designed to prevent detection and prosecution of the
organization’s illegal activities [and] were part of a consistent pattern that was likely to continue for
the indefinite future, absent outside intervention.”1466

ii.

Donziger Obstructed Justice

As thoroughly recounted above, Donziger and the LAPs’ U.S. counsel submitted the
deliberately misleading Fajardo Declaration first to the court in Denver and then to many other
courts throughout the country, including this one.1467 The LAPs’ American lawyers – including
Donziger – were involved in drafting the declaration.1468 They debated extensively the extent to
which it would reveal the truth about the LAPs’ “contacts” with Cabrera.1469 And they decided that

serves as a catchall, prohibiting persons from endeavoring to influence, obstruct, or impede
the due administration of justice”).
1464

Quattrone, 441 F.3d at 170.
1465

Id. (quoting Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599).
1466

United States v. Coiro, 922 F.2d 1008, 1017 (2d Cir. 1991).
1467

See supra Facts § VII.C.1.c.
1468

E.g., PX 1319 (May 3, 2010 Email from E. Yennock to LAPs’ U.S. Counsel, including
Donziger).
1469

See id. Ed Yennock of Patton Boggs instructed Donziger to “confirm[] that [the declaration]
[wa]s accurate.”

389
Fajardo rather than Donziger should sign it for fear that Donziger, a U.S. resident and thus subject
to compulsory process, would be deposed.1470 Finally, the declaration, as discussed earlier,1471 was
misleading at best.
Donziger’s conduct with respect to the Fajardo Declaration was obstruction of justice,
plain and simple.1472 The declaration was drafted while the Stratus Section 1782 proceeding was
pending, as Donziger was acutely aware.1473 Its purpose – in Donziger’s words – was to “prevent
Stratus’ role relative to the Cabrera report from coming out.”1474 Donziger was involved in the
communications as to what it would and would not say. He knew that it was false or misleading.
His conduct was intended to “impede . . . the due administration of justice,” and it fell squarely
within the federal obstruction of justice statute.1475

1470

PX 1316 (May 3, 2010 Email from E. Westenberger to others) (“This is why we struggled
with who would sign the declaration. If Steve [Donziger] signs, he will most certainly be
deposed. Same for any other counsel in the US. We figured that with [Fajardo], they likely
would not slow down the process by deposing him.”) .
1471

See supra Facts § VII.C.1.c.
1472

The Court makes no finding as to whether Patton Boggs, Emery Celli, or any of their
attorneys committed obstruction of justice. It suffices to find, as the Court does, that
Donziger knowingly caused the Fajardo Declaration to be false and misleading and to be
filed. He is liable as a principal in those circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 2(b).
1473

Quattrone, 441 F.3d at 170; see, e.g., Tr. (Donziger) 2569:1-7 (“My role at the time was to
try to organize legal representation for those involved [in the Stratus Section 1782
proceeding], and I hired different counsel at different times at that time for the Lago Agrio
communities.”).
1474

Donziger Jan. 19, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 3363:18-20.
1475

18 U.S.C. § 1503; see also United States v. Ruggiero, 934 F.2d 440, 445 (2d Cir. 1991).

390
b.

Witness Tampering
i.

The Elements of Witness Tampering

The federal witness tampering statute1476 prohibits knowing attempts to inter alia
“hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a . . . judge of the United States information relating
to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense.”1477 “The section was written
broadly to encompass non-coercive efforts to tamper with a witness.”1478 Thus, one violates Section
1512 if one is “motivated by an improper purpose.”1479 Improper purposes include causing a witness
to withhold relevant facts about a defendant’s wrongful acts1480 or to provide false testimony to the
court.1481

ii.

Donziger Tampered with the Testimony of Mark Quarles

1476

18 U.S.C. § 1512.
1477

Id. § 1512(b)(3).
1478

United States v. Amato, 86 F. App’x 447, 450 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding evidence sufficient
to support conviction for witness tampering where defendant, “[c]oncerned [witness] would
testify against him . . . directed intermediaries . . . to reach out to [witness] and deliver a
message” despite absence of evidence of intent behind or effect of message).
1479

United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996).
1480

United States v. Price, 443 F. App’x 576, 582 (2d Cir. 2011).
1481

Thompson, 76 F.3d at 453.

391
Donziger attempted to have Mark Quarles alter materially the declaration he
submitted to Judge Sand in an earlier proceeding in this district between Chevron and the ROE.1482
As discussed previously, Donziger urged Quarles to assert that Cabrera neither had entertained
suggestions from nor even met with the LAPs regarding his work plan, both of which Donziger
knew were false.
Although Donziger knew that the statements he sought to have Quarles make were
false, he urged Quarles to adopt them to prevent exposure of the truth regarding Cabrera and to
mislead the court.

Donziger’s effort to influence Quarles’s testimony constitutes witness

tampering.1483

5.

Violation of the Travel Act Through Furtherance of Violation of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act

The Travel Act,1484 an enumerated RICO predicate,1485 prohibits the use of “any
facility of interstate or foreign commerce” in furtherance of, or with the intent to promote unlawful
activity.1486 “Unlawful activity” is defined in Criminal Code Section 1952(b)(2)1487 as, inter alia,

1482

See supra Facts § V.D.
1483

United States v. Rodolitz, 786 F.2d 77, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The most obvious example
of a section 1512 violation” is “the situation where a defendant tells a potential witness a
false story as if the story were true, intending that the witness believe the story and testify
to it . . . .”).
1484

18 U.S.C. § 1952.
1485

18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(C).
1486

18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (elements of Travel Act violation include: (1) use of the “mail or
any facility in interstate or foreign commerce,” (2) with the intent to “promote, manage,

392
“bribery . . . in violation of the laws . . . of the United States.” Chevron asserts that Donziger
violated the Travel Act through the use of facilities of interstate or foreign commerce with the intent
to facilitate violations of the anti-bribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).
He did so by using email and by causing money to be wired to Ecuador to further the payment of
money to Cabrera, a court appointee.1488

a.

The Elements

The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions apply where: (1) a “domestic concern,” such as
a U.S. resident or a resident’s agent, (2) uses the “mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce” (3) “corruptly” (4) “in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or
authorization” to pay money or “anything of value” to any person, (5) “knowing that all or a portion
of” the payment would be “offered, given, or promised” to a “foreign official” (6) in order to
influence any official act or decision, induce an action or an omission to act in violation of a lawful

establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on,
of any unlawful activity,” followed by (3) performance of or an attempt to perform an act
of promotion, management, establishment, carrying on, or facilitation of the enumerated
unlawful activity).
1487

Id.
1488

See United States v. Kozeny, 664 F. Supp. 2d 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (declining defendant’s
motion for entry of judgment of acquittal or new trial following conviction for conspiring
to violate the FCPA and Travel Act in furtherance of FCPA violation); Dooley v. United
Techs. Corp., No. 91 Civ. 2499, 1992 WL 167053, at *9 (D. D.C. June 16, 1992) (holding
that violations of the Travel Act based on conduct allegedly violating the FCPA sufficiently
stated a RICO predicate act); United States v. Young & Rubicam, 741 F. Supp. 334 (D.
Conn. 1990) (denying motion to dismiss RICO count premised on violation of Travel Act
through bribery prohibited by FCPA); see also Envtl. Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc.,
847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding allegations that company bribed foreign government
officials over period of time to procure military contract sufficient to allege pattern of
racketeering activity premised on FCPA violations).

393
duty, or to secure any improper advantage, and (7) the making of the payment or offer to assist in
obtaining or retaining business for any person or company or directing business to any person or
company.1489 Because all of the conduct material to elements of the Travel Act occurred within the
United States,1490 the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply.

b.

The Conduct
i.

Donziger Was a “Domestic Concern”

“The term ‘domestic concern’ means . . . any individual who is a citizen, national,
or resident of the United States” and “any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company,
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of
business in the United States . . . .”1491 Donziger is a U.S. citizen, a member of the New York Bar,
and maintains his office here.1492

1489

See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(3); see also Stichting Ter Behartiging Van De Belangen Van
Oudaandeelhouders in Het Kapitaal Van Saybolt Int’l B.V. v. S.E. Schreiber, 327 F.3d 173,
179-80 (2d Cir. 2003) (listing factors).
The FCPA includes an “[e]xception for routine governmental action” where the payment
is intended “to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action by
a foreign official . . . .” See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b). That exception plainly does not apply
here, where the payments were intended to permit Stratus to write the Cabrera Report.
1490

Cf. United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011, WL 7416975, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
2011) (holding that presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply because “[a]ll the
elements under the Travel Act were allegedly satisfied in California, even if the target of
Defendants’ commercial bribery scheme was overseas”).
1491

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(A)-(B).
1492

See PX 1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶ II.1.

394
ii.

Donziger Used Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce in
Furtherance of the Payments

Under both the Travel Act and the FCPA, a domestic concern must “make use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce” in furtherance of the payments.
Donziger’s “use of the Internet to send emails in furtherance of [the Cabrera] bribery
scheme [was] sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce requirement of the FCPA”1493 and Travel
Act, as was his transfer of funds to a bank account.1494 Specifically, Donziger used email to cause
Kohn to transfer funds to the secret account in order to pay Cabrera from that account.1495 Kohn
complied with Donziger’s requests and wired the money.1496 Donziger, Fajardo, Yanza, and others
discussed the details of the scheme via email.1497

1493

S.E.C. v. Straub, No. 11 Civ. 9645 (RJS), 2013 WL 4399042, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5,
2013).
1494

See Information at 18-19, United States v. Brown, No. H-060cr0316 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 11,
2006) (alleging that transfer of funds to bank account for use as improper payments for
PetroEcuador officials satisfied interstate commerce element).
1495

See, e.g., PX 895 (Aug. 14, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to K. Wilson and J. Kohn re:
“Critical money transfer”) (“Pls transfer 50,000 to the following account in Ecuador.”).
1496

See PX 578 (Account Statement, ADF) at 6 (reflecting $50,000 wire from Kohn Swift &
Graf); PX 901 (Aug. 15, 2007 Email from K. Wilson to S. Donziger, J. Kohn, K. Kenney
re: “Frente Wire”) (“The wire transaction for Frente has been completed.”).
1497

See, e.g., PX 850 (Apr. 17, 2007 Email from L. Yanza to S. Donziger re: “A couple of
things”) (“We have met with Richard and everything is under control. We gave him some
money in advance.”); PX 888 (July 26, 2007 Email from L. Yanza to S. Donziger re:
“pissed off”) (“Tonight I have to coordinate the new request for money with the huao . . .
. [T]he huo is asking for other technical field implements.”); PX 894 (Aug. 9, 2007 Email
from L. Yanza to S. Donziger re: “bank information urgent”).

395
iii.

Donziger’s Use of the Wires Was Corrupt and Intended to
Influence Official Action

“Corruptly” means to act “knowingly and dishonestly, with the specific intent to
achieve an unlawful result by influencing a foreign public official’s action in one’s own favor.”1498
As this Court has found,1499 Cabrera often was referred to by a code name. Donziger
was instrumental in arranging for him to be paid, over and above the payments that went through
the normal court process, from a secret account. The Court has found that Donziger intended that
at least part of the payments via the secret account would ensure that Cabrera did what Donziger and
his confederates wanted him to do as is confirmed by the multi-year effort to conceal the truth
concerning the relationship among Cabrera, Stratus and the LAPs.1500 Indeed, Donziger would not
go along with the suggestion to pursue the possibility of using a global expert until he was satisfied
that he and the LAPs would control the expert. The report Cabrera signed was written for him by
Stratus and the LAPs. Donziger’s actions were corrupt and intended to influence official action.

iv.

The Offers, Promises, and Payments to Cabrera Were of
Value

The FCPA prohibits corrupt payments of “money” and corrupt “offer[s], gift[s],
promise[s] to give, or authorization[s] of the giving of anything of value.”1501 The term “anything

1498

United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 449 (5th Cir. 2007).
1499

See supra Facts § V.A.
1500

E.g., PX 1279 (Mar. 30, 2010 Email from J. Prieto to S. Donziger, L. Yanza, and P. Fajardo
re: “Protection Action”).
1501

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a).

396
of value” is construed broadly to include such benefits as employment offers,1502 travel expenses,1503
and charitable contributions.1504 Cabrera received tens of thousands of dollars directly from the
secret account.1505

v.

Donziger Facilitated the Payments Knowing They Would Be
Given to Cabrera, a Foreign Official

The FCPA prohibits domestic concerns from using email or wire transfers “in
furtherance of . . . [a] payment . . . or authorization of the payment of any money . . . to” “any
person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money . . . will be offered, given, or promised,
directly or indirectly, to any foreign official . . . .”1506 For the purposes of the FCPA, a “foreign
official” is defined as:

1502

See Rotec Indus. Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1278-79 (D. Or. 2001).
1503

United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1310-11 (8th Cir. 1991); see also Complaint, SEC
v. UTStarcom, Inc., No. 09-cv-6094 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2009).
1504

Complaint, SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 04-cv-945, (D.D.C. June 9, 2004).
1505

See, e.g., PX 901 (Aug. 15, 2007 Email from K. Wilson to S. Donziger, J. Kohn, K. Kenney
re: “Frente Wire”) (“The wire transaction for Frente has been completed.”); PX 913 (Sept.
12, 2007 Email from L. Yanza to S. Donziger and P. Fajardo re: “Let’s not give Texaco the
pleasure of stopping the PG”) (“send . . . money to the secret account to give it to the
Wuao”).
Donziger likewise provided Cabrera with an office, an assistant, and life insurance. PX 877
(July 1, 2007 Email from Fajardo to S. Donziger and L. Yanza re: “Worried”) (advocating
that the team provide Cabrera with an office and an assistant, to which Donziger replied that
he was “on it.”); see also Jan. 29, 2011 Donziger Dep. Tr. 3808:14-3808:16 (reviewing
email and stating “it looks to me like insurance for Cabrera was purchased”).
1506

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(3).

397
“any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, or . . . any person acting in an official capacity for or on
behalf of any such government or department, agency or instrumentality, or for or
on behalf of any such public international organization.”1507
The statute provides further that “[a] person’s state of mind is ‘knowing’ with respect to conduct,
a circumstance, or a result” where the “person is aware that . . . such circumstance exists, or that
such result is substantially certain to occur.”1508
The Court’s findings make clear that Donziger caused the use of the secret account
for the purpose of paying Cabrera,1509 that he asked Kohn to wire money to that account,1510 and that
he knew the money was intended to pay Cabrera.1511 It has found further that the money in fact was
used to pay Cabrera.1512 The Court therefore finds that Donziger was “aware” that it was
“substantially certain” that Cabrera would be paid from the funds he wired to the secret account.

1507

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(f)(2)(A).
1508

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(A).
1509

See supra Facts § V.A; see also PX 871 (June 12, 2007 Email string between L. Yanza and
S. Donziger); PX 913 (Sept. 12, 2007 Email from L. Yanza to S. Donziger and P. Fajardo).
1510

PX 895 (Aug. 14, 2007 Email from S. Donziger to K. Wilson and J. Kohn re: “Critical
money transfer”) (“Pls transfer 50,000 to the following account in Ecuador.”).
1511

PX 894 (Aug. 9, 2007 Email from L. Yanza to S. Donziger re: “bank information urgent”)
(“[Kohn] ha[s] to deposit 50k so we can pay the advances to the consultants so they will
start their work as soon as possible. I hope it is deposited by Wednesday at the latest. I’ll
be in touch that day to arrange all of this with Huao.”).
1512

PX 578 (ADF Account Statement), at 6 (reflecting transfer to “Cabrera Vega, Richard
Stalin” on Aug. 17, 2007); PX 590 (Aug. 17, 2007 Account-to-Account Transfer Receipt
between ADF and Cabrera Vega); PX 591 (Aug. 17, 2007 Ltr. from J. Fajardo to Banco
Pichincha Manager); PX 593 (Banco Pichincha Record of Cash Transactions for the ADF).

398
Furthermore, as an expert appointed by the Lago Agrio court, Cabrera was an officer or official of
the Ecuadorian court.1513

vi.

The Payments Were for a Business Purpose

“Congress intended for the FCPA to apply broadly to payments intended to assist the
payor, either directly or indirectly, in obtaining or retaining business for some person . . . .”1514 The
SEC and the Department of Justice interpret the FCPA to prohibit payments to court officials and
regularly find that such payments satisfy the business purpose test.1515 This Court agrees.
Here, the payments increased the likelihood that Donziger’s business – that of
contingency litigation – would benefit from a favorable judgment. Roughly 30 percent of the 20
percent contingency fee owed to the litigation team accrues to Donziger. He stood to benefit
directly from any judgment and, accordingly, from any act that improved the likelihood that such
a judgment would issue and its amount. The improper payments to Cabrera were intended to do,
and did, exactly that.

1513

PX 348 (“The Expert [Cabrera] is hereby reminded that he is an auxiliary to the Court for
purposes of providing to the process and to the Court scientific elements for determining
the truth.”).
1514

United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 755 (5th Cir. 2004).
1515

See, e.g., DI 1849, Ex. I (Information at 6-9, 14, United States v. Pride Forasol S.A.S., No.
4:10-cr-771 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010)) (alleging that bribery of Indian court official in order
to obtain favorable judgment constituted effort to obtain or retain business); Ex. J (Plea
Agreement at 12, United States v. Brown, No. H-06-cr-316 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2006))
(noting bribes to court officials provided business advantage to subsidiaries).

399
E.

There Is A Related, Continuous and Domestic Pattern
The pattern requirement is well defined. The racketeering activity must include “at

least two [predicate] acts” within a ten-year period.1516 The predicate acts must be “related,” and
they must “amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.”1517 The predicate acts cannot
be “isolated events” – instead, they must “have the same or similar purposes, results, participants,
victims, or methods of commission.”1518 In addition, “‘a plaintiff in a RICO action must allege
either an open-ended pattern of racketeering activity (i.e., past criminal conduct coupled with a
threat of future criminal conduct) or a closed-ended pattern of racketeering activity (i.e., past
criminal conduct extending over a substantial period of time).’”1519 Open-ended continuity requires
the “threat of continuing criminal activity beyond the period during which the predicate acts were
performed.”1520 Closed-ended continuity requires “predicate acts extend[ed] over a substantial
period of time,” with two years generally considered the minimum duration necessary.1521
The pattern at issue in this case comprises, at the very least, a five-year effort to
extort and defraud Chevron through the series of predicate acts described above. These acts of
racketeering satisfy the pattern requirement whether viewed as an open- or closed-end pattern. The
1516

18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
1517

H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
1518

Id. at 240.
1519

First Capital Asset Mgmt. v. Satinwood, Inc., 385 F.3d 159, 181 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting
GICC Capital Corp. v. Tech. Fin. Grp., Inc., 67 F.3d 463, 466 (2d Cir.1995)).
1520

Cofacredit S.A. v. Windsor Plumbing Supply Co., 187 F.3d 229, 242 (2d Cir. 1999).
1521

First Capital Asset Mgmt., 385 F.3d at 181.

400
number and variety of predicate acts, the duration of the period over which they have been
committed, the fact that they all targeted Chevron and its money, and the fact that the overall scheme
continues all demonstrate criminal activity over a substantial period of time and a threat that it will
continue into the future. That threat is particularly acute in view of the defendants’ failure thus far
to achieve their goal.
This pattern of racketeering is domestic and satisfies the analysis required under
Morrison. Each of the predicate acts described above is indictable and/or chargeable under statutes
enumerated in Section 1961(1).1522 In some instances, conduct that occurred abroad was indictable,
notwithstanding the general presumption against extraterritorial application, because the
presumption was overcome by the underlying statute (for example, money laundering, which by its
terms applies to money sent to and from the United States). In others, the presumption against
extraterritorial application applies to the underlying statute, but the focus or “the object of the
statute’s solicitude” is in the United States (for example, the attempts to extort money from Chevron,
a U.S. company, by fears generated as part of a scheme conceived, run, and financed principally
from the United States).
Although certain of defendants’ actions took place abroad, this is a case in which “the
conduct of the [affairs of the] enterprise within the United States was key to its success.”1523 Further,
many of the enterprise’s participants, whose actions were quite material to the execution of the

1522

18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
1523

CGC Holding, Co. LLC v. Hutchens, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1210 (D. Colo. 2011); see also
United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding a domestic
pattern where, in the absence of the domestic conduct, the conduct abroad and the scheme
itself “would have been a dangerous failure”).

401
pattern of racketeering, live and work in the United States. Donziger, the head of the enterprise and
the center of its decision-making power, resides and mostly operates within the United States (with
the exception of a few trips each month to Ecuador). Its principal funders – Kohn and then Burford
– operated entirely or in relevant part in the United States. Hinton, Lehane, and Amazon Watch –
important actors in the pressure campaign – operated from Washington, D.C., and California.
Donziger employed Colorado-based Stratus and other U.S.-based scientists to produce the fraudulent
Cabrera Report and then used American law firms to attempt to prevent the disclosure of the truth
regarding the Cabrera episode. Unlike the situation in Norex, these were not incidental, sporadic,
or immaterial contacts with the United States.1524 They have been sustained and significant. As a
result, the Court finds that Morrison is satisfied.

F.

Chevron Was Injured by the Pattern of Racketeering Activity and, Absent Equitable
Relief, Will Continue to be Injured
Chevron now seeks, as against these three defendants, only equitable relief designed

to prevent them from benefitting in any way from the Judgment. It seeks that relief both on nonstatutory state law grounds and under RICO. In order to obtain that relief on its RICO claims, it
must establish that the RICO violations it has proved, actual and threatened, bear an appropriate
causal connection to the relief sought. And though Chevron no longer seeks damages against these
defendants, RICO’s explicit provision for civil damages actions is a useful starting point in seeking
to address the nature of the required causal connection.

1524

Cf. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010).

402
RICO explicitly provides a cause of action for “[a]ny person injured in his business
or property by reason of a violation of” the RICO statute.1525 Damages therefore are available only
“to those persons injured by reason of the defendant’s predicate acts.”1526 The predicate acts must
be both the factual and the proximate cause of the injury.1527 Equitable relief under RICO is
constrained by the same causation requirements.
“When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question
it must ask is whether the . . . violation led directly to the plaintiff’s injuries.”1528 A “plaintiff must
prove only . . . an injury directly resulting from some or all of the activities comprising the
violation,” however, and need not prove that every predicate act constituting the pattern injured the
plaintiff in some way.1529
Among the predicate acts that Chevron has proved are (1) multiple extortionate acts
including, among others, (a) the ghostwriting of the Judgment and the promise of $500,000 to
Zambrano for signing it, and (b) the ghostwriting of the Cabrera Report upon which the author(s)
of the Judgment relied for the pit count that underlies more than $5 billion of the damages award,
as well as the false portrayal of Cabrera as a neutral, impartial and independent expert, and the

1525

18 U.S.C. 1964(c).
1526

First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 769 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
1527

Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 2003).
1528

Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 461 (2006).
1529

Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Terminate
Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335, 1347 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that Marshall
“appears to be a correct reading of § 1964(c)” but not so holding).

403
payments and other inducements to Cabrera to ensure that he “played ball,” (2) multiple acts of wire
fraud in furtherance of fraudulent schemes with respect to all of the foregoing, (3) money laundering
to promote racketeering acts, including with respect to the ghostwriting of the Cabrera Report by
Stratus and payments to Cabrera, and (4) violations of the Travel Act to facilitate violations of the
anti-bribery provision of the FCPA by payments to Cabrera.
Defendants contend that Chevron has not demonstrated that its injuries “flow” from
the Judgment and that the Judgment’s enforcement breaks the chain of causation because it is the
result of an independent actor’s discretion.1530 Defendants’ efforts to attenuate the chain of causation
leading to Chevron’s harm fail.
“The mere recitation of the chain of causation alleged by [Chevron] is perhaps the
best explanation” of why that injury satisfies RICO’s direct causation mandate.1531 The attachment
of Chevron’s property, including the arbitration award, in Ecuador,1532 was a product of the predicate
acts just described.

The threat of enforcement of the Judgment elsewhere is as well.

Notwithstanding defendants’ assertions to the contrary, the appellate decisions and the orders
attaching Chevron’s assets were not truly the “independent actions of third . . . parties,”1533 for the

1530

DI 1861 (Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction), at 16.
1531

Cf. Lerner, 318 F.3d at 123 (“The mere recitation of the chain of causation alleged by the
plaintiffs is perhaps the best explanation of why they do not have standing in this case.”)
(quoting Newton v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 207 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 2000)).
1532

See supra Facts § XIII.A, Discussion § I.A.
1533

Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 15 (2010).

404
reasons discussed below.1534 Significantly, Chevron’s injuries are not attributable to a cause
independent of defendants’ ghostwriting, bribery and other misconduct.1535 As the most “directly
injured victim[],” there is no party better situated “to vindicate the law as private attorney[]
general.”1536 Finally, Chevron’s injuries are not indirect, incidental, or unintended – they were the
very result Donziger sought by his predicate acts.
Not only are Chevron’s injuries proximate consequences of the racketeering acts, but
Donziger has realized gains from them at Chevron’s expense and threatens to realize more.
Donziger’s retainer agreement1537 with the LAPs and the ADF, which is governed by New York
law,1538 provides that Donziger is entitled to be paid (a) 6.3 percent of all amounts collected in
respect of the Lago Agrio litigation,1539 plus (b) any arrearages in his monthly retainer, 1540 plus (c)

1534

See infra Discussion § VII.B.
1535

Cf. Anza, 547 U.S. at 459; see also Holmes v. Sec. Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258,
272-73 (1992).
1536

Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70.
1537

PX 558 (Jan. 5, 2011 retainer agreement).
1538

The retainer agreement contains New York governing law clauses, PX 558 ¶¶ (10)(a), 11,
which control under N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. L. § 5-1401(1).
1539

PX 558 (Jan. 5, 2011 retainer agreement) ¶ (3)(a) (the 6.3 percent is the product of 31.5
percent of the Total Contingency Fee Payment, which is 20 percent of all funds collected).
It is conceivable that the percentage of any Judgment proceeds to which Donziger is entitled
has been slightly diluted subsequently in order to accommodate giving equity to new
investors, but this neither matters nor is persuasively shown on the record.
1540

See id. ¶ (3)(b).

405
reimbursement for expenses.1541 Donziger’s contingent fee is payable only out of “Plaintiff
Collection Monies,” which the retainer agreement defines as “amounts paid . . . whether from
Chevron Corporation. . . , any other party listed as a defendant in respect of the Litigation . . . or any
other party added or joined to the Litigation as a defendant. . . .”1542 Thus, the Judgment directly
resulting from Donziger’s fraud is the indispensable predicate of his right to collect a contingent fee
with respect to the Lago Agrio case. This is true also with respect to other property already seized
from Chevron. Its intellectual property rights in Ecuador, which are worth between $15 and $30
million, are being held pending sale preparatory to the distribution of the cash proceeds to the
Judgment creditors and their investors, subject to Donziger’s right to his share of the recovery.1543
All of the property that Donziger now has and which he hereafter may receive as a
result of the Judgment are and will be the products of the Judgment obtained in consequence of his
predicate acts of racketeering. To the extent he has been enriched by property taken from Chevron,
Chevron has lost that property as a proximate consequence of those predicate acts. Moreover, to
the extent the Judgment is enforced in the future, Donziger will be enriched further at Chevron’s
expense to the extent of 6.3 percent of the property thus obtained.

1541

Id. ¶ (3)(d).
1542

Id. ¶ (3)(a).
1543

See supra Facts § XIII.A.

406
V.

Donziger Conspired to Conduct the Affairs of the Enterprise Through a Pattern of
Racketeering Activity in Violation of Section 1962(d)
RICO Section 1962(d) makes it unlawful “for any person to conspire to violate any

of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of [§ 1962].” Chevron asserts that Donziger conspired
to violate Section 1962(c).
1.

The Elements

The elements of a Section 1962(d) violation are plain:
“The ‘straightforward language of § 1962(d) provides: “It shall be unlawful for any
person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this
section.”’ Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)). A RICO conspiracy charge ‘is proven
if the defendant “embraced the objective of the alleged conspiracy,” and agreed to
commit . . . predicate acts in furtherance thereof.” Id. (quoting United States v.
Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.1986)). Assuming that a RICO enterprise
exists, the government must prove only “‘that the defendant[s] . . . know the general
nature of the conspiracy and that the conspiracy extends beyond [their] individual
role[s].’ United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir.1989). In applying this
analysis, we need inquire only whether an alleged conspirator knew what the other
conspirators ‘were up to’ or whether the situation would logically lead an alleged
conspirator ‘to suspect he was part of a larger enterprise.’ Viola, 35 F.3d at 44–45;
see also Salinas, 118 S. Ct. at 478 (upholding conviction under Section 1962(d)
where defendant ‘knew about and agreed to facilitate the scheme’).”1544
Thus, “[t]he RICO conspiracy provision . . . is even more comprehensive than the general
conspiracy offense” in that it does not require an overt act “to effect the object of the conspiracy.”1545
Indeed, one may be convicted of conspiracy to violate RICO without agreeing “to commit the two

1544

United States v. Zichittello, 202 F.3d 72, 99 (2d Cir. 2000).
1545

Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997); see also 18 U.S.C. § 371.

407
or more predicate acts requisite to the underlying offense.”1546

2.

The Conduct

Chevron’s amended complaint names ten “RICO Defendants” and twenty-one nonparties as participants in the alleged RICO conspiracy. The RICO Defendants include Donziger,
Fajardo, Yanza, Selva Viva, and the ADF.1547 The non-parties include Stratus, Beltman, Maest and
others. With the Stratus defendants having settled and all of the RICO Defendants other than
Donziger having defaulted, the only alleged RICO conspirator who went to trial was Donziger.
The Court finds that at least Donziger, Fajardo, and Yanza conspired to violate RICO
by conducting the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering. Donziger was aware
of far more than the “general contours” of the conspiracy – he was its primary architect and key to
its viability.1548

1546

Salinas, 522 U.S. at 66.
1547

DI 283 (Am. Compl.) ¶¶ 8-18.
1548

See supra Facts § II.C.1.

408
VI.

Chevron’s Other State Law Claims
Chevron makes two other state law claims, viz. that defendants defrauded persons

other than Chevron with consequent injuries to Chevron and that Donziger violated Section 487 of
the New York Judiciary Law.1549
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, Donziger’s pressure campaign included a
plethora of false and misleading representations to persons and entities – including among others
members of the media, the New York Attorney General, the SEC, the New York State Comptroller,
and Chevron shareholders – often in efforts to pressure Chevron into settlement. Likewise,
Donziger, a member of the New York Bar, attempted to deceive the judges of this Court. Among
other things, he suggested that Mark Quarles include statements that Donziger knew to be false in
a declaration before the Honorable Leonard Sand to deceive the court into believing that Cabrera
was an independent expert.1550 In attempting to explain away the Prieto email, he offered a
deliberately false explanation to this Court that contradicted his prior sworn testimony in an obvious
attempt to avoid sanctions for failing to produce documents from Ecuador.1551 But these claims have
been transformed radically by events.
Chevron has waived its claim for damages and seeks only injunctive relief. With
respect to its claims premised on reliance by third parties (other than the Ecuadorian courts) on false
or misleading statements, it seeks only an injunction against “[c]ommitting, aiding, abetting,
1549

N.Y. JUD. L. § 487. The statute provides for treble damages and criminal sanctions against
“[a]n attorney or counselor who . . . [i]s guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any
deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party.”
1550

Supra Facts § V.D.
1551

Supra Facts § XI.A.3.b.iii.

409
inducing, or directing any acts of fraud.”1552 With respect to Section 487, it seeks only an injunction
barring Donziger “from engaging in any deceit or collusion, or consenting to any deceit or collusion,
with intent to deceive any court within the state of New York” and requiring him to attach a copy
of the order to any initial appearance in any state or federal action in this state.1553
It is debatable whether the injunctive relief sought by Chevron with respect to these
claims would be sufficiently specific to satisfy Rule 65(d)(1).1554 It is debatable also whether it
makes practical sense to subject every future public statement by these defendants, or every future
action by Donziger in connection with litigation in courts in New York, to the possibility of
contempt proceedings for violating an injunction barring “acts of fraud” and any “deceit or
collusion.” Moreover, the professional consequences of Donziger’s behavior, past and future, may
be addressed quite adequately by other bodies. Accordingly, the Court, in the exercise of discretion,
declines to grant equitable relief on Chevron’s claims of third party fraud and violation of Judiciary
Law Section 487.

VII.

Neither the Judgment Nor the Appellate Decisions in Ecuador Foreclose Liability
At the outset of the case, defendants pleaded the Ecuadorian Judgment as collateral

estoppel. They subsequently conceded that the recognizability and enforceability of the Judgment
under the Uniform Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments Act, codified in New York

1552

DI 1847 (Chevron Corp. Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 347-48.
1553

Id. at 352.
1554

See, e.g., City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 142-45 (2d Cir.
2011); Peregrine Myanmar Ltd. v. Segal, 89 F.3d 41, 50-52 (2d Cir. 1996).

410
as Article 53 of the CPLR, is an essential element of their collateral estoppel defense.1555 So, in an
effort to avoid a determination of that issue, they now purport to disavow reliance on the collateral
estoppel defense.1556
This disavowal is disingenuous. Defendants now argue that (1) the Court effectively
is bound by statements or assertions contained in the Judgment and in the appellate decisions in
Ecuador or, at least, that these statements and assertions have evidentiary significance; (2) the
appellate decisions break the chain of causation between the bribery, ghostwriting, and other fraud
in the Lago Agrio court and the injuries suffered by and threatened to Chevron; and (3) the Court
should extend comity to the Ecuadorian decisions.1557 Thus, defendants seek to breathe conclusive
or, at least, substantial legal effect into these Ecuadorian court decisions without calling their
arguments what in substance they are: a collateral estoppel defense or an effort to gain legal
recognition of these decisions. Their arguments all are entirely without merit.

A.

The Ecuadorian Decisions and Rulings Are Not Admissible for the Truth of the
Matters Asserted Therein
To start at the most basic level, the statements and conclusions set forth in the

Ecuadorian decisions lack evidentiary significance in this case. The Judgments, the decisions of the
Ecuadorian appellate courts, and a few other rulings were received in evidence but only for the fact
1555

Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 886 F. Supp. 2d 235, 264-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
1556

DI 1857 (Donziger Defs.’ Post-trial Reply Mem. of Law), at 34-35.
1557

E.g., DI 1850 (Donziger Defs.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 23-28, 48-51, 52-53; Tr.
(Donziger closing) 2883:6-18; Tr. (Donziger opening) 31:10-24; DI 1600 (Defs.’ Trial Brief
Requesting Judicial Notice of Four Ecuadorian Court Decisions).

411
that they were rendered and contain the statements that they contain. In no case was any received
for the truth of the matters stated. Thus, none properly may be relied upon for the truth of its
statements. The defendants nevertheless relied in their post-trial submissions upon one or more of
these documents as evidence of facts or conclusions they stated.1558 It therefore is important to be
clear as to their evidentiary status and the basis for the Court’s rulings.
The principal decisions and rulings that are in evidence are the (1) Judgment (PX 399
(Spanish), PX 400 (English)), (2) trial level clarification order (PX 429), (3) intermediate appellate
court decision (PX 430), (4) intermediate appellate court clarification order (PX 431), and (5)
National Court of Justice decision (DX 8095). In each case, however, the exhibit was received only
for purposes other than the truth of the matters they asserted.1559 Although defendants made a few
allusions to an intention to offer one or more of these documents at a subsequent time for the truth
of the matters asserted, no such offer ever was made.
In these circumstances, any contention that these decisions and rulings should have
been received for the truth of the matters asserted has been waived. But even if it had not been
waived, the documents would not have been admissible for their truth.
The statements and conclusions contained in these decisions and rulings were out of
court statements. Thus, if offered to prove their truth, they would have been inadmissible absent the
existence of an applicable exception.1560 Defendants never identified any allegedly applicable
1558

See, e.g., DI 1850 (Donziger Defs.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 23-28.
1559

Tr. 195:16-198:25 (PX 399, PX 400), 456:14-456:24 (PX 429), 457:17-459:8 (PX 430),
459:16-25 (PX 431), 2958:12-2959:11 (DX 8095).
1560

FED. R. EVID. 801(c).

412
hearsay exception.

The only one that seems even remotely relevant is the public records

exception.1561 But that exception does not apply to judicial findings.1562

Statements and conclusions in court rulings and documents are inadmissible hearsay absent
a relevant exception. E.g., United States v. Sine, 493 F.3d 1021, 1036 (9th Cir 2007);
Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Jones, 29
F.3d 1549, 1554 (11th Cir. 1994). Were they not, FED. R. EVID. 803(22), which creates a
hearsay exception for evidence of a judgment of final conviction, would have been
superfluous. See Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 925 F. Supp. 2d 414, 447 (E.D.N.Y.
2013) (judgment of conviction admissible pursuant to exception to hearsay rule).
1561

FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
1562

Herrick, 298 F.3d at 1192; Jones, 29 F.3d at 1554; Nipper v. Snipes, 7 F.3d 415, 417 (4th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Nelson, 365 F. Supp. 2d 381, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); L-3
Commc’ns Corp. v. OSI Sys., Inc., 02 Civ. 9144 (PAC), 2006 WL 988143, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 13, 2006); 5 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.10[1], at 5-803 (2d ed. 2002).
For the sake of completeness, we note that defendants at one point requested that the Court
take judicial notice of the Ecuadorian decisions enumerated above (other than the National
Court of Justice decision), arguing that the decisions if so noticed would become “prima
facie evidence of the facts and opinions stated therein.” DI 1600 (Defs.’ Trial Brief
Requesting Judicial Notice of Four Ecuadorian Court Decisions). The Court declined to do
so in a memorandum decision filed November 5, 2013. DI 1683 (Nov. 5, 2013 Order).

413
B.

The Appellate Decisions in Ecuador Do Not Break the Chain of Causation
Defendants assert that the Judgment was affirmed by two appellate courts and that

there is no evidence “that every one of these [appellate] judges . . . are [sic] corrupt or
unqualified.”1563 This, they say, cleansed the case of the fraud perpetrated in Lago Agrio – in their
words, they say it broke “the chain of causation” between the bribery, ghostwriting, and other fraud
in the Lago Agrio court and Chevron’s injuries.1564 They are mistaken.

1.

The Intermediate Decision

The sine qua non of defendants’ argument that the intermediate appellate court’s
decision broke “the chain of causation” is that it undertook a de novo review of the Judgment,
affording no deference to the findings and conclusions below. Defendants, however, offered no
evidence to support that proposition. Moreover, it is abundantly clear that the Ecuadorian appellate
court did not conduct a review of that nature. The intermediate appellate decision and clarification
order thus did not cleanse the Lago Agrio Judgment of its impropriety for at least two reasons.
First, the appellate court expressly declined to examine Chevron’s allegations of
fraud and corruption. The appellate panel stated that it “should not refer at all” to these allegations
“except to let it be emphasized that the same accusations are pending resolution before authorities
of the United States of America . . . and this [court] has no competence to rule on the conduct of

1563

DI 1850 (Donziger Defs.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 3.
1564

See id. at 48-51.

414
counsel, experts or other officials . . . if that were the case.”1565 In its clarification order, the
appellate court stated again that it was “stay[ing] out of these [fraud] accusations, preserving the
parties’ rights to present formal complaint to the Ecuadorian criminal authorities or to continue the
course of the actions that have been filed in the United States of America.”1566 Moreover, the
appellate court could not have evaluated Chevron’s bribery claim or any of its allegations related
to or supported by Guerra, as Guerra had not yet disclosed what he knew to Chevron before the
appellate decision was rendered.
Second, contrary to defendants’ assertion, the appellate court did not review the
record de novo. Under Ecuadorian law, the appellate court was required to “rule on the merit of the
record.”1567 Defendants contend that this required (and resulted in) a de novo review of the
Judgment.1568 But a review of the intermediate appellate decision makes clear that is not what
transpired. Apart from the fact that the appellate court explicitly stated that it would not pass on
Chevron’s fraud allegations, it declined also to analyze the evidence of overlap between the
1565

PX 430 (Appellate Judgment), at 10. The Court notes also that, although not discussed by
the parties, the National Court of Justice stated that “it is not within its scope of [the
appellate] court to have jurisdiction to hear collusive action cases . . . or procedural fraud.”
DX 8095 (Opinion of Ecuadorian National Court of Justice), at 95.
1566

PX 431 (Appellate Clarification Order), at 4.
1567

ECUADOR CODE OF CIV. P. Art. 838; DI 1413-8, at 52.
1568

DI 1850 (Donziger Defs.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 26. Although the Court, relying on
the declarations submitted on the preliminary injunction motion, indicated its then
understanding that the intermediate appellate court would review the facts and law de novo,
the additional evidence presented at trial reveals that this conclusion was premature.
Moreover, as the appeal in this case later proceeded, that understanding proved incorrect.
See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Further, the
Patton Boggs Invictus Memo stated its understanding that “the standard of review is not de
novo.” PX 2382 (Invictus memo), at 24.

415
Judgment and the LAPs’ internal files. The court failed entirely to address the overlap between the
Judgment and the Fusion Memo, the Index Summaries, and the Fajardo Trust Email.1569 And while
the appellate court stated that it had “been able to confirm first hand that the record include[d]”
certain “information” in the Judgment that appeared also in the unfiled Selva Viva Database,1570 it
did not identify the specific “information” to which it referred, where it had found it within the
record, or why the Judgment differed from the Filed Lab Results but matched the Selva Viva
Database. Further, the appellate court failed to address the fact that the errors it identified in the
Judgment – inaccurate reporting of mercury and PAH levels – were present also in the LAPs’
unfiled internal work product but nowhere in the Lago Agrio record.1571 The appellate court thus
declined to address the fundamental implication of the overlap between the Judgment and the LAPs’
unfiled work product – that the LAPs had written, or at least assisted Zambrano in writing, the
Judgment.
It bears mention also that it would have been impossible for any court to have
conducted a de novo review of the 188-page Judgment and the trial record in the time the appellate
court rendered its decision. The record included more than 200,000 pages of trial evidence, 62,000
scientific laboratory analyses, testimony from dozens of witnesses, and more than 100 judicial fields
inspections.1572 Nevertheless, on January 3, 2012 – only five weeks after the three member appellate

1569

PX 430 (Appellate Judgment).
1570

Id. at 11.
1571

Supra Facts § XII.A.2.
1572

PX 1211 (Jan. 7, 2010 Email from L. Garr to J. Sáenz), at 1.

416
panel was selected1573 – the appellate court affirmed the Judgment.1574 Even assuming that the judges
began working on the decision as soon as they were selected, they could not have conducted a de
novo review of this case– at least not in any meaningful sense of the term – in such a short time.1575
This Court finds that it did not do so.

2.

National Court of Justice

Nor did the opinion of the National Court of Justice “break[] the chain of causation.”
The National Court of Justice is a cassation court, i.e., it reviews legal arguments
only.1576 It dismissed Chevron’s claim that the proceedings should have been nullified due to the
underlying fraud because “it is not possible to seek the cassation of a judgment by making these
kinds of allegations” where the “appeal does not indicate which law has been violated” or “which

The appellate court itself noted “that at this stage alone there were almost two hundred
record binders (about twenty thousand pages), not counting the more than two hundred
thousand papers in the first instance case.” PX 430 (Appellate Judgment), at 2. The parties
did not indicate whether the appellate court’s review “on the merit of the record” consisted
of: (1) the record binders only (preventing it from reviewing and evaluating the 200,000
pages of trial evidence), or (2) the 20,000 pages in record binders and the 200,000 pages of
trial evidence (which it could not have reviewed in five weeks). The appellate court’s
review was not de novo in either case.
1573

PX 410 (Nov. 29, 2011 Certificate of Lottery Assignment on Appellate Panel).
1574

PX 430 (Appellate Judgment).
1575

Cf. PX 4200 (Rayner Direct) ¶ 3(b) (stating that it would have been impossible for Judge
Zambrano to have read the approximately 236,000 pages of Lago Agrio case record in eight
weeks).
1576

Supra Facts § XII.B.

417
legal rules have been infringed.”1577 It refused to “re-evaluate the evidence through a cassation
appeal, because to do so would be to diminish the independence of trial judges,”1578 even though a
vital part of Chevron’s appeal was the destruction of Judge Zambrano’s independence by permitting
the LAPs to draft his judgment.1579

C.

In Any Case, the Ecuadorian Decisions May Not Be Afforded Comity or Other
Recognition Because They Were Rendered In a Judicial System That Does Not
Provide Impartial Tribunals or Procedures Compatible with Due Process in Cases
of this Nature
United States courts may not give comity to or recognize the judgment of a foreign

state if “the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide impartial tribunals
or procedures compatible with due process of law.”1580 As the Ninth Circuit succinctly stated: “We
are aware of no deviation from that principle.”1581 In determining whether a foreign legal system

1577

DX 8095 (Opinion of Ecuadorian National Court of Justice), at 95, 97-98.
1578

Id. at 157.
1579

As with Chevron’s appeal to the intermediate appellate court, the National Court of Justice
could not have evaluated Chevron’s bribery claim or any of its allegations concerning
Guerra, as Guerra had not yet come forward when Chevron filed its appeal.
1580

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 482(1)(a); see also N.Y. CPLR § 5304(a)(1) (“A foreign country judgment is not
conclusive if the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law.”); cf. Hilton
v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895) (holding that if the foreign court provided a full and
fair trial, “under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of
justice . . . and there is nothing to show either prejudice . . . or fraud in procuring the
judgment,” it should not be “tried afresh”).
1581

Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir.) (declining to recognize or enforce
Iranian judgment), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 989 (1995).

418
“provide[s] impartial tribunals [and] procedures compatible with due process of law,” a court
considers not only the structure and design of the judicial system at issue, but also “its practice
during the period in question.”1582 Courts essentially are tasked with one question: whether the
foreign procedures are “fundamentally fair” and “do not offend against basic fairness.”1583
Moreover, they are not confined by the rules of evidence in answering that question.1584
The Court is far from eager to pass judgment as to the fairness of the judicial system
of another country, but it of course is obliged to do so.1585 Vladimiro Álvarez Grau1586 testified
1582

Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s
refusal to recognize a 1993 Liberian judgment because the Liberian judicial system then did
not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due
process).
1583

Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
1584

Id. at 477 (in evaluating the law of a foreign nation, courts are “not limited to the
consideration of evidence that would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence;
any relevant material or source may be consulted”).
1585

Courts are obliged to do so in other circumstances as well including the determination
whether the enforce a foreign judgment that is presented for enforcement and the
determination of the availability of a foreign forum for purposes of a forum non conveniens
motion. (The latter is determined under a different standard that is far more forgiving of
problems with foreign legal systems.)
1586

Álvarez is an impressively credentialed expert who has practiced law in Ecuador for 43 years
and has held numerous elected and appointed public offices and legal academic positions in
that country. PX 6200 (Álvarez Direct) ¶¶ 8-23. In addition, he has been a weekly
columnist for 19 years, covering legal and political issues for two major newspapers in
Ecuador.

In Naranjo, the Second Circuit characterized Álvarez as “an avowed political opponent of
the country’s current President, Rafael Correa.” Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232,
238 (2d. Cir. 2012). The evidence presented at trial demonstrates that he and Correa never
were political opponents. Álvarez ran for president of Ecuador in 1992 for the Christian
Democratic Party at a time when President Correa was not publicly known and his political
party did not exist. Tr. (Álvarez) 2032:14-25. Further, when asked about his position

419
credibly at trial regarding Ecuador’s political, governmental, and legal situation in recent years, the
undue influence of the executive branch over the judiciary, and his conclusion that the Ecuadorian
judiciary “does not operate impartially, with integrity and fairness in the application of the law and
the administration of justice.”1587 Defendants offered no evidence to rebut Álvarez’s testimony.
Donziger and Ponce themselves stated in a Crude out take that all Ecuadorian judges are corrupt,
doubtless an exaggeration but nonetheless probative. According to Donziger, the judicial system
is “utterly weak” and lacks integrity. The State Department’s Human Rights Reports indicate also
that Ecuadorian judges sometimes decide cases based on substantial outside pressures, especially
in cases of interest to the government. There is abundant evidence that, at the time the Ecuadorian
courts’ decisions in the Lago Agrio case were rendered, the judicial system was not fair or impartial
and did not comport with the requirements of due process. The Ecuadorian decisions therefore are
not entitled to recognition here.

regarding President Correa, Álvarez “acknowledge[d] the positive actions or undertakings
that [President Correa] has carried out on behalf of Ecuador,” but explained that, “as an
Ecuadorian citizen, as an attorney, and as a university professor, as a father and grandfather
in my family, I cannot hold back from analyzing and criticizing President Correa’s actions,
which constitute violations of the rule of law that lead to a lack of independence in the
branches or powers of the state and interference in the functioning of the Ecuadorian
judiciary.” Id. at 2033:1-14.

It was mentioned also that the Court drew “significant support” from Álvarez in granting
the preliminary injunction. Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 238 n.9. Defendants had ample
opportunity at trial to submit evidence on this point, but elected not to do so. The Court
now has evaluated Álvarez’s demeanor among other things and finds that he is a credible
witness. And although the Court continues to draw support from Álvarez’s testimony, it
draws significant support also from the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports and the
statements of Donziger and his colleagues. See generally Bridgeway, 201 F.3d 143
(upholding district court’s reliance on such reports in concluding that Liberian judicial
system was not fair and impartial and did not comport with the requirements of due
process).
1587

PX 6200 (Álvarez Direct) ¶ 122.

420
The Ecuadorian judiciary has been in a state of severe institutional crisis for some
time. Matters have deteriorated in recent years. From 1979 to 1998, judges of the Supreme Court
of Justice, the highest court in Ecuador at that time, were appointed by the National Congress for
six-year terms and therefore were susceptible to political influence.1588 Ecuador’s Nineteenth
Constitution, in effect from 1998 until October 2008, overhauled the appointment system, providing
that Supreme Court justices would serve life terms and that the Supreme Court en banc would
appoint new justices.1589 A brief period of stability and judicial independence followed these
reforms.1590

1.

The 2004 and 2005 Judicial Purges

This changed dramatically when the Ecuadorian Congress in 2004, just after the Lago
Agrio litigation was filed, purged the three highest judicial tribunals in Ecuador.1591 In December
2004, the Congress, at the instigation of then-President Gutierrez, unconstitutionally replaced 27 of
the 31 justices of the Supreme Court with new justices elected by Congress.1592 Just five months
later, President Gutierrez declared a state of emergency and removed all of the Supreme Court

1588

Id. ¶ 25.
1589

Id. ¶ 26.
1590

Id. ¶ 27.
1591

Id.
1592

Id. ¶ 28.

421
justices, including those then recently elected.1593 As a result, Ecuador was left without a Supreme
Court for most of a year during which the Lago Agrio case was pending.1594
Ecuador’s judiciary never has recovered from these events. In November 2005,
following President Gutierrez’s downfall, new justices selected by a new qualification committee
established by Congress were appointed.1595 In May 2006, that new Supreme Court purported to
limit lower-court judges to four-year terms and arrogated to itself the power to appoint and reappoint lower court judges.1596 In consequence, Supreme Court justices serve at the will of
Congress, and lower court judges’ futures depend on whether their rulings coincide with the
positions of the higher-court judges.

2.

The Election of President Correa

Rafael Correa was elected president of Ecuador in 2006. At his inauguration, he
refused to swear to respect and submit to the Constitution of the Republic.1597 President Correa’s
stated view was that “the Judicial Branch depends on the Executive Branch. If I don’t give it money
it has no means to act . . . .”1598

1593

Id. ¶ 29.
1594

Id.
1595

Id. ¶¶ 30-31.
1596

Id. ¶ 31.
1597

Id. ¶ 32.
1598

Id. ¶ 33.

422
Shortly after assuming office, President Correa commanded the Supreme Electoral
Tribunal, with threats of violence, to set a date for a referendum to create a Constituent Assembly
to draft a new Constitution.1599

When the Tribunal obeyed, 57 of the 100 congressional

representatives challenged the constitutionality of the Tribunal’s proceedings and voted to remove
the president of the Tribunal.1600 The Tribunal, by then subservient to the President, dismissed these
57 representatives – all of whom had been elected – and called on 57 alternate representatives loyal
to the president to fill their seats.1601 The representatives who had been dismissed brought suit in
the Constitutional Tribunal, which ruled in their favor and ordered that they be reinstated. President
Correa immediately condemned that decision and sent the National Police to block the
representatives from returning to the Congress building.1602 That very day, the newly appointed
congressional majority unconstitutionally removed all of the judges of the Constitutional Tribunal
and appointed new judges.1603 The new Constitutional Tribunal reversed its previous decision with
respect to the 57 original representatives and from that day forward consistently has backed the
administration’s decisions.1604

1599

Id. ¶ 35.
1600

Id. ¶ 36.
1601

Id. ¶¶ 36-37.
1602

Id. ¶ 38.
1603

Id. ¶ 39 (“In addition, threats of criminal prosecution were made against both the members
of the Constitutional Tribunal and the original 57 representatives.”).
1604

Id.

423
In April 2007, Ecuador voted to draft a new constitution, and a Constituent Assembly
was formed. It issued “Mandate No. 1,” which among other things proclaimed that it enjoyed full
powers, threatened removal and criminal sanctions to any judge who ruled contrary to its decisions,
and eliminated Congress.1605 When this was challenged before the Constitutional Tribunal, that body
ruled that no judge could contravene the Constituent Assembly.1606
The new October 2008 constitution further concentrated power in the hands of
President Correa. It extended the term of the president and, though it provided for a Congress, it
granted him the authority to dissolve it and hold new elections.1607 It subjects certain decisions of
the Supreme Court (renamed the National Court of Justice) to review by the Constitutional Tribunal
(renamed the Constitutional Court).1608 In addition, it terminated the appointments of 31 Supreme
Court justices and subjected them to a lottery from which 21 randomly would be selected to serve
on the National Court of Justice. Most of the 31 justices refused to submit to the lottery and
resigned in protest, causing a gap of several months before the government was able to appoint
interim justices.1609 Moreover, the Constitutional Court is subject to the de facto control of the
political branches,1610 most notably the LAPs’ stalwart supporter, President Correa.

1605

Id. ¶ 43.
1606

Id. ¶ 44
1607

Id. ¶ 46.
1608

Id. ¶ 48.
1609

Id. ¶ 50.
1610

Id. ¶¶ 39-51, 119.

424
Since his initial re-election in November 2008, President Correa has continued to
interfere in judicial matters of interest to the Ecuadorian government.1611 In a number of recent
cases, judges have been threatened with violence, removed, and/or prosecuted when they ruled
against the government’s interests.1612 The Correa administration has targeted large foreign
companies in particular.1613 In 2009, Ecuador withdrew from the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes, and President Correa soon thereafter requested that Congress terminate 13
bilateral investment treaties that prescribed fair treatment toward foreign companies.1614
The president of the Civil and Criminal Commission of the National Assembly stated
in 2009 that “[w]e have a justice administration system that has entirely collapsed.”1615 And in June
2010, the Judicial Council publicly declared that “the Judicial Branch is not independent,” and
noted “serious risks” “that affect the ability to dispense justice.”1616 Among those risks, the Judicial
Council raised “the threat of impeachment,”, the lack of “economic and financial autonomy,” and
outside “influence in matters that are the exclusive domain of the purveyors of justice.”1617

1611

Id. ¶¶ 52-61.
1612

Id. ¶¶ 52-56, 66, 74.
1613

Id. ¶¶ 58-61; see also id. ¶ 60 (“President Correa has stated that ‘I really, really hate the big
multi-national companies . . . .’”).
1614

Id. ¶ 60.
1615

Id. ¶ 66.
1616

Id. ¶ 67 (quoting From the Judiciary Council to the Nation, Resolution No. 043-2010, June
22, 2010).
1617

Id.

425
3.

The 2011 Judicial “Reorganization”

In January 2011, President Correa asserted the need to hold a referendum “to get my
hands on the justice system.”1618 The referendum, which passed by a majority vote, resulted in,
among other things, the dissolution of the nine-member Judicial Council, creation of a three-member
Transitional Judicial Council to be appointed by government branches under President Correa’s
influence, and the restructuring of the entire judiciary by the Transitional Judicial Council.1619
Shortly after its creation, the Transitional Judicial Council began evaluating judges and subjecting
each to a psychological examination, which provided an opportunity to exclude judicial officers who
did not support the interests of the government.1620 Hundreds of judges were fired and many
resigned.1621 On September 5, 2011, President Correa declared a state of emergency and permitted
the Transitional Judicial Council not only to remove judges and justices, but also to designate their
replacements.1622

Many of the Council removals were of judges who had criticized the

reorganization process, including judges who were involved in cases in which the administration
or President Correa had an interest.1623 An International Oversight Committee – appointed in 2011
by President Correa and the Transitional Judicial Council – acknowledged that “suspension[s] of

1618

Id. ¶ 77.
1619

Id. ¶¶ 78, 80.
1620

Id. ¶¶ 83-85.
1621

Id. ¶¶ 83, 85, 107.
1622

Id. ¶ 86.
1623

Id. ¶ 92.

426
judges . . . sometimes[] become strictly discretional, especially when they originate from the
administrative review of a jurisdictional decision.”1624
On January 18, 2012, the Transitional Judicial Council appointed the 21 judges of
the National Court of Justice.1625 Legal scholars reported that the candidates who were awarded the
highest scores in their final evaluation interviews were those closest to the Correa administration.1626
Members of the National Judicial Council were appointed on January 9, 2013, for a term of six
years.1627 The Council, headed by President Correa’s former secretary, appoints and evaluates
judges and substitute judges of the National Court of Justice and the provincial courts.1628
While there are many examples of President Correa’s influence over the Ecuadorian
judiciary, Álvarez’s description of the lawsuit against the Ecuadorian newspaper, El Universo, bears
mention in greater detail. President Correa filed impairment and defamation charges in 2011 against
El Universo, its columnist, and certain of its directors regarding an editorial piece on the president’s
alleged lies.1629 Five different judges temporarily presided in that proceeding.1630 Within two days

1624

PX 1500 (Report of International Oversight Committee), at 43; see also PX 6200 (Álvarez
Direct) ¶ 115.
1625

PX 6200 (Álvarez Direct) ¶ 109.
1626

Id. ¶¶ 110-111.
1627

Id. ¶ 117.
1628

Id. ¶ 118.
1629

Id. ¶¶ 93-94.
1630

Id. ¶ 95.

427
of Judge Paredes’ appointment, he entered a 156-page judgment against the defendants.1631 Each
defendant was ordered to serve a three-year prison sentence and they collectively were to pay $30
million to President Correa as compensation, plus attorneys’ fees.1632 President Correa appealed the
judgment on the grounds that he had not been awarded the full $80 million he had requested.1633
Computer experts repeatedly confirmed the accusation that Judge Paredes had not written the
judgment.1634

Notwithstanding that information, the intermediate appellate court rejected

defendants’ appeals.1635 The day prior to defendants’ hearing before the National Court of Justice,
Judge Encalada – who had served temporarily on the trial court – came forward with the following
information: (1) Judge Paredes told her that President Correa’s lawyer had written the judgment, and
(2) Judge Paredes offered Judge Encalada 25 percent of the attorneys’ fees awarded to President
Correa if she presided over the trial and signed the judgment.1636 Nonetheless, the newly-appointed
National Court of Justice unanimously affirmed the judgment.1637 It was only after national and

1631

Id.
1632

Id. ¶ 96.
1633

Id. ¶ 97.
1634

Id. ¶ 98; see also id. (“The judicial officers who arranged for and allowed this analysis were
sanctioned by the Transitional Judicial Council, while Judge Paredes was not.”).
1635

Id. ¶ 99.
1636

Id. ¶ 101. It is worth noting that Judge Encalada left Ecuador and sought asylum in
Colombia shortly after making her statement. Id.
1637

Id. ¶ 102.

428
international criticism that President Correa publicly pardoned El Universo, its directors, and the
columnist.1638
All this has led numerous independent commentators, identified by Álvarez, to
conclude that the rule of law is not respected in Ecuador in cases that have become politicized.1639
Álvarez himself concludes that “the Judiciary can no longer act impartially and with integrity where
the matter or dispute to be decided involves important political, social, or economic issues, and is
instead subjected to constant pressure and threats that influence its decisions.

4.

U.S. Department of State Reports

Álvarez’s portrayal of the Ecuadorian judiciary is consistent also with the U.S.
Department of State’s Country Reports in recent years. According to the 2010 and 2011 Investment
Climate Statements, “[c]orruption is a serious problem in Ecuador,” and there were concerns that

1638

Id. ¶ 104.
1639

See, e.g., id. ¶ 70 (a former President of the Supreme Court said in January 2010 that “judges
are obeying certain government influences. . . . There are judges who have been instructed,
who because of their position or for other reasons, do improper things, and that is the way
justice is administered in general, and that’s why the country is not progressing, nor will it
make much progress as long as it has no independent judiciary system”); id. (another former
Supreme Court justice wrote that “[s]ince 2008, the administration of justice has entered an
institutional crisis. . . . [T]here is a marked trend whereby the Executive Branch is taking
over all sorts of duties, and the Judiciary has not been able to escape this trend”); id. (the
Chairman of the special committee that selected the justices of the Supreme Court in 2005
declared recently that “[t]he great disgrace of the court system is that political interests can’t
resign themselves to not interfere with the courts. . . . The current constitution has minimized
the power of the Court; that is evident in its rulings. Political influences have turned out to
be ruinous”); id.¶ 57 (an attorney and academic wrote in June 2009 that “what we are
experiencing on a daily basis, those of us who are involved in judicial activity, cannot be
worse. With few exceptions, we find corruption at every step, delays all around; alarming
incompetence, undue pressure and interference, and on and on, to the point that at this time
justice in Ecuador is just one more item up for sale”).

429
the Ecuadorian courts were “susceptible to outside pressure” and were “corrupt, ineffective, and
protective of those in power.”1640 Those same reports indicated that neither legislative oversight
“nor internal judicial branch mechanisms have shown a consistent capacity to investigate effectively
and discipline allegedly corrupt judges.”1641
Likewise, the Human Rights Reports for Ecuador recognized that the judiciary was
“susceptible to outside pressure and corruption,” particularly in cases of interest to the
government.1642 In fact, the 2008 Human Rights Report described “the susceptibility of the judiciary
to bribes for favorable decisions and resolution of legal cases and on judges parceling out cases to
outside lawyers who wrote judicial sentences on cases before the court and sent them back to the
presiding judge for signature.”1643

1640

PX 1234 (2010 Investment Climate Statement), at 4, 8; PX 1478 (2011 Investment Climate
Statement), at 4, 7.
1641

PX 1234 (2010 Investment Climate Statement), at 4; PX 1478 (2011 Investment Climate
Statement), at 4.
1642

PX 1108 (2008 Human Rights Report), at 3; PX 1252 (2009 Human Rights Report), at 4;
(“While the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, in practice the judiciary was
at times susceptible to outside pressure and corruption. The media reported on the
susceptibility of the judiciary to bribes for favorable decisions and resolution of legal cases
. . . . Judges occasionally reached decisions based on media influence or political and
economic pressures.”).
1643

PX 1108 (2008 Human Rights Report), at 3; PX 1252 (2009 Human Rights Report), at 4.

430
5.

Donziger and His Colleagues Admitted the Weakness, Politicization, and
Corrupt Nature of the Ecuadorian Judiciary

The outspoken opinions of Donziger and his colleagues are in line with those held
by Álvarez. Ponce, one of the Ecuadorian lawyers for the LAPs, had the following conversation
with Donziger in a Crude outtake:
“DONZIGER:

Where’s the judge? They’re all weak.

“PONCE:

All the judges here are corrupt. Even . . .

“DONZIGER:

They’re all corrupt!
corrupt.”1644

It’s – it’s their birthright to be

According to Donziger, the only way to secure a fair trial in Ecuador is by causing disruption
because the judicial system is plagued by “utter weakness” and lacks “integrity.”1645 Donziger’s
understanding of the Ecuadorian judiciary was that judges “make decisions based on who they fear
the most, not based on what the laws should dictate.”1646 He viewed the Lago Agrio litigation “not
[as] a legal case,” but rather “a political battle that’s being played out through a legal case.”1647 In
discussing the Lago Agrio case with Ponce and others, Donziger said: “You can solve anything with
politics as long as the judges are intelligent enough to understand the politics. . . . [T]hey don’t have
to be intelligent enough to understand the law, just as long as they understand the politics.”1648
1644

PX 9A (Mar. 30, 2006 Crude Clip).
1645

PX 7A (Mar. 30, 2006 Crude Clip), at CRS-053-02-CLIP-04; PX 8A (Mar. 30, 2006 Crude
Clip).
1646

PX 67A (Jun. 6, 2007 Crude Clip), at CRS-350-04-CLIP-01.
1647

PX 11A (Apr. 3, 2006 Crude Clip), at CRS-060-00-CLIP-04.
1648

PX 81A (Undated Crude Clip), at CRS-129-00-CLIP-02.

431
Accordingly, Donziger and his colleagues repeatedly have pressured the Ecuadorian
judges “to let [them] know what time it is,” to send a message that they cannot “fuck with us
anymore – not now, and not – not later, and never.”1649 When one individual suggested to Donziger
and Ponce that the judge would be “killed” for ruling against the LAPs, Donziger responded that the
judge “might not be [killed], but he’ll think – he thinks he will be . . . [w]hich is just as good.”1650
Donziger and his colleagues’s statements – all of which were captured on video – evidence their
acknowledgment that the Ecuadorian judiciary does not provide impartial tribunals.

6.

President Correa’s Influence in the Lago Agrio Litigation

The “political battle” in Ecuador was made possible by President Correa who
consistently has expressed strong feelings about, and demonstrated great interest in, the LAPs’ suit
against Chevron. President Correa pledged his full support to the LAPs in a 2007 meeting with
Yanza, Ponce, and others.1651 The LAPs’ media agent reported to Donziger the following day that
President Correa “GAVE US FABULOUS SUPPORT. HE EVEN SAID THAT HE WOULD CALL
THE JUDGE.”1652

1649

PX 5A (Mar. 30, 2006 Crude Clip), at CRS-052-00-CLIP-6; PX 67A (Undated Crude Clip),
at CRS-350-04-CLIP-01.
1650

PX 81A (Undated Crude Clip), at CRS-129-00-CLIP-02.
1651

PX 853 (Apr. 28, 2007 ROE Press Release), at 1.
1652

PX 844 (Mar. 21, 2007 Email from M. Eugenia Yepez Relegado to S. Donziger re: “report”)
(capitals in original, italics added); see Tr. (Ponce) 2303:20-2304:2.

432
A month later, after meeting again with members of the LAP team, President Correa
broadcast a call for the criminal prosecution of the “Chevron-Texaco . . . homeland-selling lawyers”
in addition to the prosecution of PetroEcuador officials.1653 In a Crude outtake, Donziger states:
“This is incredible. . . . Correa, the President of Ecuador, just said that anyone in the Ecuadorian
government who approved the so-called remediation is now going to be subject to litigation in
Ecuador. Those guys are shittin’ in their pants right now.”1654 When the Prosecutor General found
no basis to support criminal charges, he was removed from office and replaced by President Correa’s
former college roommate who – unsurprisingly – agreed several months later that the criminal case
should be reopened.
President Correa’s public support for the LAP team in the Lago Agrio litigation grew
even stronger over the next few years. In separate radio broadcasts in 2009, President Correa
announced that he “really loathed the multinationals,” and “he want[ed] our indigenous friends to
win.”1655 When the Judgment issued in 2011, President Correa praised it as an “historic” ruling.1656
In press releases, speeches, and other public forums, President Correa has continued to attack
Chevron.1657 And a month after Zambrano provided the defendants with a declaration contesting the
1653

PX 487R (Apr. 27, 2007 ROE Press Release); PX 853 (Transcript of Correa Radio
Address).
1654

PX 2477A (Apr. 26, 2007 Crude Clip).
1655

Supra Facts § VI.
1656

PX 2503 (Correa says the judgment against Chevron in Ecuador must be respected,
ULTIMAHORA, Feb. 19, 2011).
1657

See, e.g., PX 7511 (Ecuador’s president denounces Chevron as ‘enemy of our country,’ THE
RAW STORY, Aug. 17, 2008); PX 7516 (Tr., Excerpt from Cadena Presidencial, Pres.

433
bribery and ghostwriting allegations, he started a new job as a legal adviser that is majority owned
by PetroEcuador, the Ecuadorian national oil company.1658

*

*

*

In sum, this Court finds that Ecuador, at no time relevant to this case, provided
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of law.1659 The decisions of its courts
in the Lago Agrio case are not entitled to recognition in courts in the United States. The defendants’
reliance on them, as well as their collateral estoppel defense, therefore fail.1660

Correa, Sept. 14, 2013); PX 7518 (Chevron tried to approach Correa, negotiating with the
White House, EL TELÉGRAFO, Sept. 16, 2013); PX 7519 (Chevron managed nine teams of
experts in order to ‘suffocate’ Ecuador, EL TELÉGRAFO, Sept. 17, 2013); PX 7520 (Tr.,
Enlace Presidencial, Pres. Correa, Sept. 21, 2013); PX 7526 (Tr. Cadena Presidencial,
Pres. Correa, Sept. 28, 2013).
1658

Supra Facts § IX.A.4.
It bears mention that unlike Zambrano, Álvarez stated that he has been labeled a traitor and
someone who “sold out his country” as a result of the opinions he presented to the Court.
Tr. (Álvarez) 2008:9-2011:21.
1659

“Evidence that the judiciary was dominated by the political branches of government . . .
support[s] a conclusion that the legal system was one whose judgments are not entitled to
recognition.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 482 cmt. b; see also Bridgeway, 201 F.3d at 142 n.3.
1660

It fails also because Chevron has proved that it did not have a full and fair opportunity to
defend itself. See Republic of Ecuador, 638 F.3d at 400 (“Collateral estoppel bars
relitigation of an issue that has already been fully and fairly litigated in a prior proceeding.”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

434
VIII.

This Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Over the LAP Representatives
A.

The Personal Jurisdiction Defense Has Been Stricken
Lack of personal jurisdiction is an affirmative defense. Camacho and Piaguaje – the

LAP Representatives – pled that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. The Court struck
this defense as a sanction for their failure to produce documents relevant to their personal
jurisdiction defense. Accordingly, there is no need to address the merits of the stricken defense.
Nevertheless, against the possibility that a reviewing court might disagree with the sanctions ruling,
the Court concludes that it would have had personal jurisdiction over these defendants in any case.

B.

In Any Case, This Court Would Have Personal Jurisdiction At Least Under N.Y.
CPLR 302(a)(1)
In determining whether a court has personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state

defendant, it “must determine whether the plaintiff has shown that the defendant[s] [are] amenable
to service of process under the forum state’s laws; and [] it must assess whether the court’s assertion
of jurisdiction under these laws comports with the requirements of due process.”1661

1661

Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 489 F.3d 542, 547 (2d Cir. 2007), certified question accepted sub
nom. Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 872 N.E.2d 866 (N.Y. 2007), and certified question
answered sub nom. Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830 (N.Y. 2007).

435
1.

Relevant Facts

Donziger lives and works on Manhattan’s Upper West Side. His family and law
practice are here. It is here that he long has spent the majority of his time.1662
The LAP Representatives have engaged in activities in New York through Donziger
– their attorney and agent – and otherwise since as far back as 1993 and extending up to and beyond
February 2011, when this action was filed.
Donziger has pursued his quest to hold Texaco and later Chevron accountable for the
alleged pollution in Ecuador, first through Aguinda in this Court and then in the Lago Agrio case,
for over twenty years. He has done little else in that time. The only other client he has represented
has been Russell DeLeon, an investor in the Ecuador litigation.1663
That he has had time for little else is not surprising considering the scope of the
campaign in which Donziger and others acting at his direction have carried out against Chevron.
He has run a three-pronged strategy that included litigation, lobbying, and a media campaign.
All of this is spelled out in Donziger’s January 2011 retainer agreement,1664 which
simply codified in black and white what had been going on for years. Its terms are instructive, as
it makes clear the scope of the activity, including extensive activity in New York, that the LAPs
hired Donziger to perform. Among the key points are these:

1662

Donziger’s Ecuadorian travel records show that he spent approximately 187 out of 1,460
days in Ecuador between 2007 and 2011. PX 1509 (Donziger’s Ecuador Travel Records).
While he of course has not spent every moment of his life in New York that was not spent
in Ecuador, the Court infers that a majority of that time was spent here.
1663

See Tr. (Dahlberg) 871:9-25; PX 4900 (Dahlberg Direct), at 16.
1664

PX 558 (Donziger Jan. 2011 Retainer Agreement).

436
•

The recitals define the “Litigation” to include the Lago Agrio case; the
Section 1782 actions; enforcement proceedings in Ecuador, the United States
and elsewhere.1665

•

They acknowledge that “the Plaintiffs previously engaged [Donziger] to
provide legal services to pursue and defend, as the case may be, the
Litigation to its conclusion” and reflect the desire “to document and define
the economic compensation to which [Donziger] is entitled to receive [sic]
for [his] representation of the Plaintiffs in connection with the Litigation.”1666

•

The agreement fixed Donziger’s compensation as a monthly retainer plus
expenses plus a contingent fee equal to a percentage of the amount collected
in the Litigation.1667

•

It stated that Donziger had “acted as the primary United States attorney on
behalf of the Plaintiffs to date,”1668 continued the engagement,1669 and
designated Donziger as the “Plaintiffs’ U.S. Representative.”1670

•

It designated Donziger “to exercise overall responsibility for the strategic
direction . . . and the day-to-day management of the Litigation” including
•

“coordinating the overall legal strategy of the Plaintiffs to pursue and
defend all aspects of the Litigation,”

•

“coordinating the efforts to procure funding . . . . for the Litigation
. . . (including, without limitation . . . obtaining and evaluating bids
from third parties in respect of such funding . . . , making
recommendations to the Plaintiffs in respect of such bids and

1665

Id. at 1.
1666

Id.
1667

Id. ¶ 3.
1668

Id. at 1-2.
1669

Id. ¶ 1.
1670

Id. ¶ 2(b).

437
preparing and negotiating on behalf of the Plaintiffs the definitive
transactional documents and agreements with each funder . . . ).”
•

•

•

“assembling and organizing the various non-legal advisors, experts,
service providers and others who or which from time to time will
assist the Plaintiffs in pursuing and/or defending various aspects of
the Litigation, and coordinating the efforts and undertakings of such
advisors, experts, service providers and others.”
“coordinating the media, public affairs and public relations activities
on behalf of the Plaintiffs (including, without limitation, retaining
lobbyists, public affairs advisors and public relations advisors on
behalf of the Plaintiffs).”1671

It designated New York law as governing the entire relationship.1672

Many of Donziger’s and his associates’ actions in support of that strategy took place
in New York. His office – run out of his apartment in Manhattan – has been the functional
equivalent of the LAPs’ New York office.1673 He had numerous New York bank accounts, including
an “Ecuador Case Account,” a law firm account, and a Chase account in his name.1674 These bank

1671

Id. (emphasis added).
1672

Id. ¶¶ 10(a), 11.
1673

PX 3200 (Russell Direct) ¶ 32 (“At times, Donziger worked on this case in Ecuador, but he
also directed the team’s activities from Manhattan by phone and email.”).
The LAP representatives appear to concede that Donziger ran the case out of his apartment.
Tr. (Gomez Opening) 40:3-4; see also Woods June 18, 2013 Dep. Tr. at 159:24-160:16.
1674

PX 0616 (Ecuador Case Project Account -2758; Law Firm Account -0218); PX 617 (S.
Donziger Personal Checking Account -5365). The Court takes judicial notice of the fact
that the routing number at the bottom of a check corresponds to the state in which the
account was opened.

438
accounts were used to support the litigation and related efforts by, among other means, receiving
deposits from investors and paying lawyers and expenses in Ecuador.1675
Donziger has managed the fundraising efforts for the LAPs – which have been
integral to keeping the LAP team afloat – largely from New York. Acting from his New York base,
he reached out to and entered into agreements with numerous investors. Most of the agreements
among the LAPs, the investors, and others contain New York governing law clauses,1676 and some
provide for the giving of notice to the LAPs by giving notice to Donziger at his New York Office.1677
Some of the investors too have been from New York. In one instance, for example, Donziger
informed Yanza of “two possible investors in New York who can help us quite a bit with money
now through the upcoming years” with a potential investment of $10 million.1678 He solicited the
help of and was in frequent communication with the New York based firm H5 in so doing,1679 and
he secured a substantial financing commitment from Burford Capital, which had New York

1675

E.g., PX 4900 (Dahlberg Direct) ¶¶ 44, 50, 58, 71, 75, 78.
1676

E.g., PX 559 (Fajardo Retention Agreement), at 6; PX 553 (Patton Boggs Retention
Agreement), at 7; PX 544 (Emery Celli Retention Agreement), at 4 (signed by Donziger and
Fajardo); PX 566 (H5 Retention Agreement), at 5; PX 552 (Burford Agreement), at 32
(listing Piaguaje but not Camacho as a claimant).
1677

E.g., PX 566 (H5 Retention Agreement), at 6-7; PX 552 (Burford Agreement), at 37.
1678

PX 1063 (Sept. 9, 2008 Email from S. Donziger to L. Yanza), at 1.
1679

PX 3100 (Bogart Direct) ¶ 5; PX 566 (H5 Retention Agreement). PX 2196 shows that
Donziger exchanged 583 text messages with individuals from H5 between September 14,
2009 and May 13, 2011. The exhibit is not entirely clear as to whether Donziger and H5
called one another 1,287 times or spoke for 1,287 minutes but, in either case, it is clear that
they communicated extensively. PX 2196 (Donziger’s Call Volume), at 2.

439
employees and an office here.1680 To ensure Burford’s financial commitment, which was absolutely
crucial to the LAP team, Donziger, Burford, and Patton Boggs crafted the Invictus Memo, which
was discussed and circulated in New York.1681 Fajardo and Yanza attended a meeting in New York
to discuss the Invictus Memo in mid-2010.1682
Donziger micromanaged the Stratus operation in major part from New York.1683 As
we know, that operation led to the Cabrera Report, which was an integral weapon in Donziger’s
pressure campaign. Donziger regularly emailed with the Stratus consultants to oversee the drafting
of the report and ultimately edited the report and annexes.1684 Among other things, he discussed with
1680

PX 3100 (Bogart Direct) ¶ 6. Patton Boggs, Donziger, and Burford spent “a number of
months” negotiating the funding deal. Id. ¶ 7.
1681

E.g., PX 1310 (Apr. 30, 2010 Email from E. Daleo to J. Brickell, I. Maazel, S. Donziger,
L. Garr, J. Abady, A. Wilson, N. Economou, I. Moll, A. Woods, and W. Narwold re: 1:00
Invictus Meeting in New York); PX 1386 (July 4, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to S.
Seidel, N. Economou, C. Bogart, J. Molot, and J. Tyrrell re: Next Steps, Invictus Draft
Budget); PX 1394 (July 13, 2010 Email from [e-mail] to S.
Sepulveda re: Ecuador – Invictus Chart).
1682

PX 3100 (Bogart Direct) ¶ 7.
1683

The Court recognizes that Donziger did not spend all of the 1,273 days that he was not in
Ecuador between 2007 and 2011 in New York. That the center of his operations, home, and
family are were located in New York, however, permits an inference that he spent much of
that time in New York. Absent evidence to the contrary, the Court thus infers that at least
some if not most of the documented communications at issue were received in or made from
New York.
1684

PX 962 (Jan. 24, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger and A. Maest re: Draft
Outline of the Cabrera Report); PX 2433 (Feb. 8, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to S.
Donziger, A. Maest, J. Peers, B. Lazar, and P. Fajardo re: Draft Outline of the Cabrera
Report) (“These revisions are based on what we talked about last Friday.”); PX 978 (Feb.
27, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger re: Start on Report Text) (attaching a draft
of the Cabrera Report asking for guidance and edits); PX 985 (Mar. 5, 2008 Email from D.
Beltman to S. Donziger re: Annex Tracking Table); PX 987 (Mar. 6, 2008 Email Chain
Between D. Beltman and S. Donziger re: Translation of Uhl Report); PX 1018 (Mar. 30,

440
Beltman the results of water contamination tests and the claim that the contamination in Ecuador
was substantially worse than the Exxon Valdez oil spill,1685 conspired to limit Clapp’s public
statements about the Cabrera Report,1686 and coordinated a press release concerning the LAPs’
comments on the Cabrera Report.1687
Donziger orchestrated the LAP team’s efforts first to conceal and later to minimize
the Cabrera fraud after the truth about it started coming to light. Fajardo traveled to Donziger’s
Manhattan apartment in order to “deal with various issues relating to the Lago Agrio case,”
including drafting Fajardo’s Declaration used in the Section 1782 proceedings.1688 Donziger was
extensively involved in the drafting and editing of that declaration, which was used in attempts in
sixteen federal courts including this one to obfuscate the fraud.1689 And he hired New York counsel
2008 Email Chain Between D. Beltman and S. Donziger re: Table of Calculated Damages);
PX 1030 (Apr. 2, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger and A. Maest re: List of
Items Moving Forward); PX 1060 (Aug. 15, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger
and J. Kohn re: Work Status) (updating Donziger on each aspect of Stratus’ work, per
Donziger’s request).
1685

PX 1207 (Jan. 11, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to D. Beltman and Response re: “30x
Valdez”); PX 1110 (Mar. 1, 2009 Email from S. Donziger to D. Beltman re: “30x Valdez”);
PX 1669 (Jan. 10-12, 2009 Email Chain Between C. Mitchell, S. Donziger, E. Bloom, S.
Saucedo, and D. Beltman re: Cabrera Report).
1686

PX 1079 (Nov. 5, 2008 Email chain Between D. Beltman and S. Donziger re: Clapp); PX
2438 (May 14, 2008 Email chain Between D. Beltman and S. Donziger re: “Urgent Issue”)
(discussing need to keep the Clapp report away from the press).
1687

PX 1667 (Sept. 24, 2008 Email from D. Beltman to S. Donziger, A. Maest, and J. Peers re:
“Draft Press Release”).
1688

Donziger Jan. 14, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 2794:10-20.
1689

PX 2205 (Proceedings in Which Fajardo Declaration Was Filed); PX 1304 (Apr. 24, 2010
Email chain Between S. Donziger, A. Wilson, J. Abady, I. Maazel, E. Westenberger re:
“Fajardo Letter”); PX 1313 (May 3, 2010 Email from E. Yennock to S. Donziger and others

441
to represent the LAPs in the Section 1782 proceedings related to Cabrera.1690 Donziger met with
Shinder in Manhattan in 2009 to discuss Shinder’s potential representation of the LAPs in those
Section 1782 proceedings also.1691
Donziger has directed many aspects of the Lago Agrio case itself from his New York
office. For example, the first meeting between Donziger and David Russell, who was the LAPs’
first scientist and whose cost estimate the defendants misused, took place in New York.1692 In late
2004, Donziger and Russell participated in a strategy meeting in New York in which they discussed
test results indicating that PetroEcuador, not Chevron, may have been responsible for some of the
contamination.1693
Beyond securing investors, coordinating strategy, and working with experts,
Donziger controlled, largely from New York, the extraordinary media campaign waged against
Chevron1694 and reached out to financial and political bodies in New York to support and further
re: “Fajardo Declaration”); PX 1315 (May 3, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to E.
Westenberger and others re: “Fajardo Declaration Edits”).
1690

PX 551 (Oct. 18, 2010 Retainer Agreement with Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady, LLC);
PX 1319 (May 3, 2010 Email from I. Maazel to others).
1691

Tr. (Shinder) 1268:4-1273:19.
1692

Tr. (Russell) 298:5.
Russell testified that in summer 2004, he “did [his] work from both the United States and
Ecuador, and communicated the activities of the scientific team primarily by email with
Donziger when he was in New York City and also when he was in Ecuador. . . . All of [his]
work was performed at Donziger’s direction.” PX 3200 (Russell Direct) ¶ 24.
1693

DX 1750 (Donziger Direct) ¶ 113; Tr. (Russell) 394:6-19.
1694

PX 1094 (Jan. 4, 2009 Email from K. Hinton to S. Donziger re: “Planning”); PX 2444 (Feb.
3, 2009 Email from S. Donziger to K. Hinton re: “DiNapoli”); PX 1106 (Feb. 13, 2009

442
publicize the litigation and to exert pressure on Chevron to settle. He arranged for New York’s then
Attorney General, who sent Chevron a letter requesting follow up about the veracity of Chevron’s
public disclosures respecting liability in Ecuador.1695 Donziger arranged also for the New York
State Comptroller to make a similar inquiry to Chevron.1696 He persuaded Berlinger, another New
York resident, to film and produce Crude.1697
Finally, the LAP Representatives themselves participated repeatedly in litigation in
New York courts either as parties or as volunteers. Piaguaje was a plaintiff in Aguinda.1698 Both
he and Camacho were plaintiffs in an action before Judge Sand to enjoin Chevron’s BIT arbitration
Email from S. Donziger to B. Barnes, S. Moorhead, P. Thomasson, and K. Hinton re:
“D[i]Napoli info/instructions for Ben”); PX 1133 (May 5, 2009 Email Chain Between S.
Donziger and K. Hinton re: “Cuomo Letter”); PX 1132 (May 5, 2009 Email chain among
S. Donziger, A. Woods, and K. Hinton re: “Bob McCarty”); PX 1228 (Feb. 17, 2010 Email
chain between S. Donziger, A. Woods, K. Hinton, L. Garr, and H. Shan re: “Blog Advice”);
PX 1456 (Nov. 5, 2010 Email from S. Donziger to H. Shan, M. Ramos, M. Anderson, B.
Tarbatton, K. Koenig, A. Woods, K. Hinton re: “Blogging and Such”) (chastising the
recipients for failing to blog about the “case and the struggle of the Amazonian
communities” more frequently).
1695

PX 1048 (July 11, 2008 Email from K. Hinton to S. Donziger); PX 1131 (May 4, 2011 Ltr.
from A. Cuomo to D. O’Reilly [Chevron]); PX 2445 (May 11, 2009 Ltr. from C. James
[Chevron] to A. Cuomo).
1696

PX 1106 (Feb. 13, 2009 Email from S. Donziger to B. Barnes, S. Moorhead, P. Thomasson,
and K. Hinton); PX 7489 (Nov. 17, 2008 Ltr from T. DiNapoli to Chevron); PX 5802 (Dec.
6, 2010 Ltr. from P. Doherty at the Office of T. DiNapoli to Chevron); PX 7457 (Apr. 18,
2010 Email from M. Anderson to S. Donziger and A. Woods re: “DiNapoli Investor
Statement”).
1697

This occurred in summer 2005 when, according to Berlinger, “a charismatic American
environmental lawyer named Steven Donziger knocked on my Manhattan office door. He
was running a class-action lawsuit on behalf of 30,000 Ecuadorian inhabitants of the
Amazon rainforest and was looking for a filmmaker to tell his clients’ story.” Chevron
Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 302-03 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Application of
Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)) (emphasis omitted).
1698

See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 93 Civ. 7527 (JSR).

443
against the ROE.1699 They have appeared voluntarily by counsel in both of the Section 1782
proceedings1700 – although they were not named as parties – to oppose the discovery that Chevron
there sought, first from Berlinger and then from Donziger.

2.

Section 302 – Specific Jurisdiction
a.

Legal Standard
i.

Transacting Business

This Court has jurisdiction over the LAP Representatives under New York CPLR
Section 302(a)(1), which provides “[a]s to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated
in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor
or administrator, who in person or through an agent: . . . transacts any business within the state . .
. .” This is because the LAP Representatives, principally through their agent Donziger, “avail[ed]
[themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities within New York.”1701
In determining whether a defendant transacts business in New York, courts typically
consider the totality of the circumstances.1702 An out-of-state defendant need not enter the forum

1699

See Yaiguaje et al. v. Chevron Corp., 10 Civ. 316 (LBS).
1700

In re Application of Chevron Corp., 10 MC 1 (LAK) [DI 6]; In re Application of Chevron
Corp., 10 MC 2 (LAK) [DI 17].
1701

Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 130 (2d Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds
Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000).
1702

Sunward Electronics, Inc. v. McDonald, 362 F.3d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 2004).

444
state, and a single contact in some circumstances may be sufficient to support jurisdiction.1703
Moreover, a defendant’s agent’s contacts with New York also may provide the basis for finding that
personal jurisdiction exists. “Among the factors considered” in evaluating agency based jurisdiction
“are whether the nondomiciliary consented to the actor’s conduct, whether the nondomiciliary
benefitted from that conduct, and whether the nondomiciliary exercised ‘some control’ over the
agent.”1704
Both commercial and non-commercial activities may support jurisdiction under
Section 302(a)(1).1705 Courts have enumerated several relevant commercial activities in a nonexhaustive list, including “(i) whether the defendant has an on-going contractual relationship with
a New York corporation; (ii) whether the contract was negotiated or executed in New York and
whether, after executing a contract with a New York business, the defendant has visited New York
for the purpose of meeting with parties to the contract regarding the relationship; (iii) what the
choice-of-law clause is in any such contract . . . .”1706 The existence of a New York choice of law
clause in a contract is significant because “the parties, by so choosing, invoke the benefits and
protections of New York law.”1707

1703

PDK Labs, Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1109 (2d Cir. 1997).
1704

Pennie & Edmonds v. Austad Co., 681 F. Supp. 1074, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also
Grove Press, Inc. v. Angleton, 649 F.2d 121, 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
1705

Girl Scouts of U.S. v. Steir, 102 F. App’x 217, 219 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
1706

Agency Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Grand Rent A Car Corp., 98 F.3d 25, 29 (2d Cir.1996).
1707

Sunward, 362 F.3d at 23 (citing CutCo Indus., Inc. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 367 (2d Cir.
1986)).

445
Other actions by defendants, such as having their New York-based agent make
multiple contacts with a plaintiff,1708 sending a single shipment to New York while employed by an
out-of-state business that regularly sells products to buyers in the forum state,1709 or purposeful and
repeated use of a New York correspondent bank account by a foreign bank1710 satisfy the
“transacting business” requirement as well. New York courts typically find, in the context of fee
dispute cases, that an out of state entity’s retention and use of the services of a New York lawyer
constitutes transaction of business.1711 This is so regardless of where the litigation, for which the
New York lawyer was retained, took place.1712 In addition, the act of litigating a case as a plaintiff
in New York has been held sufficient to confer jurisdiction over a subsequent action to enforce a
judgment rendered in the initial case.1713
This is not to say that limited activities in New York to further the aims of foreign
litigation necessarily are sufficient to find personal jurisdiction. Merely sending a cease and desist
1708

PDK Labs, 103 F.3d at 1109.
1709

Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2010).
1710

Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2013).
1711

Fischbarg v. Doucet, 38 A.D.3d 270, 273, 832 N.Y.S.2d 164, 167 (1st Dep’t), aff’d 9
N.Y.3d 375, 880 N.E.2d 22 (2007).
1712

Id. at 274-75; see also Pennie, 681 F. Supp. at 1078.
1713

See SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., 95 Civ. 2951 (JSR), 2012 WL 1681167, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 9,
2012) (personal jurisdiction existed where the defendant “transacted business in New York
when he litigated the case that resulted in the judgment the SEC now seeks to enforce. This
enforcement action arises directly from the litigation in which Cosby participated.
Moreover, Cosby’s appeal to courts located in New York constituted purposeful availment
of the state’s privileges, and he could reasonably foresee that, if he did not prevail, the SEC
might enforce the judgment against him in the very courts to which he had turned.”).

446
letter or serving documents upon a New York entity, for example, have been held insufficient
because such actions do not “invoke the privileges or protections of our State’s laws.”1714

ii.

“Arising Out of”

In order to establish personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1), a plaintiff must
prove also that its cause of action arises out of the defendant’s transaction of business in New
York.1715 This requires “‘an articulable nexus,’ or a ‘substantial relationship,’ between the claim
asserted and the actions that occurred in New York.”1716 It “does not[, however,] require a causal
link between the defendant’s New York business activity and a plaintiff’s injury.”1717 It is enough
that “at least one element [of the cause of action] arises from the New York contacts.”1718

1714

Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 9 N.Y.3d 501, 509, 881 N.E.2d 830 (2007).
1715

Chloe, 616 F.3d at 170-71.
1716

Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 130 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Kreutter v. McFadden
Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 466-67, 522 N.E.2d 40, 43 (1988)).
1717

Licci, 732 F.3d at 168-69 (there was personal jurisdiction over the Lebanese Canadian Bank
in New York where the bank engaged in transactions with correspondent New York
accounts to funnel money to terrorist organizations that injured or killed plaintiffs or their
family members); see also Sole Resort, S.A. de C.V. v. Allure Resorts Mgmt., LLC, 450 F.3d
100, 104 (2d Cir. 2006) (“In cases where claims have been dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds for lack of a sufficient nexus between the parties’ New York contacts and the claim
asserted, the event giving rise to the plaintiff’s injury had, at best, a tangential relationship
to any contacts the defendant had with New York. In fact, in those cases, the injuries
sustained and the resulting disputes bore such an attenuated connection to the New York
activity upon which the plaintiffs attempted to premise jurisdiction that the disputes could
not be characterized as having ‘arisen from’ the New York activity.”); Sunward, 362 F.3d
at 23-24; Kronisch, 150 F.3d at 130-31.
1718

Licci, 732 F.3d at 169.

447
For example, in PDK Labs,1719 the defendant’s attorney – acting as his agent –
“initiated from New York persistent, vexing communications” with the plaintiff for approximately
three months.1720 These communications apparently included threats of a lawsuit alleging patent
violations and false advertising and attempts to compel the plaintiff into investing in defendant’s
product.1721 The plaintiff then filed a declaratory judgment action against the defendant seeking a
declaration that the defendant lacked standing to sue for patent violations or false advertising, and
the defendant asserted personal jurisdiction as a defense.1722 Relying on the New York
communications, the Second Circuit there held that the plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action was
adequately related to activities in New York to confer personal jurisdiction even though the central
issue in the case was whether the defendant – a Georgia resident – would have had standing to sue
for harms he allegedly suffered in Georgia.1723

1719

103 F.3d 1105 (2d Cir. 1997).
1720

Id. at 1109.
1721

Id. at 1109-10.
1722

Id. at 1107.
1723

Id. at 1110-11.

448
b.

Discussion
i.

The LAP Representatives Transacted Business in New York

As an initial matter, Donziger was the LAP Representatives’ agent both under general
principles of agency law1724 and the analysis used in determining agency for the purposes of personal
jurisdiction.
Finding that an agency relationship exists in these circumstances comports with
Elman v. Benson,1725 in which the Appellate Division held that an attorney was the defendant-client’s
agent even though the client denied having knowledge of or control over the attorney’s actions.1726
It held that a lawyer’s activities in attempting to secure a judgment favorable for its client naturally
are conducted for the client’s benefit. Where a client effectively delegates certain tasks to an
attorney, the “attorney has the implied authority to take all steps necessary in an action which he has
been hired to bring.”1727 Indeed, “[a] company [or individual] cannot deputize another to take certain
actions on its behalf and then disclaim knowledge or interest when those actions give rise to a legal
dispute.”1728
That Donziger acted for the LAP Representatives’ benefit is without question. All
of the actions he took in New York relating to the Ecuador litigation and pressure campaign were
1724

See supra note 1304.
1725

32 A.D.2d 422, 302 N.Y.S.2d 961 (2d Dep’t 1969).
1726

Id. at 425.
1727

Id. at 426.
1728

Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA. v. BP Amoco P.L.C., 319 F. Supp. 2d 352, 360
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).

449
designed to secure a substantial judgment in their favor. Although the LAP Representatives did not
consent to or control case management and strategy minutiae, their views were considered through
the Assembly, which “me[]t on a regular basis and [] monitor[ed] the lawsuit and [] work[ed] with
the lawyers to make [the affected communities’] views known about how they thought the lawsuit
should be litigated, or whatever issues that they wanted to express . . . .”1729 Moreover, the LAP
Representatives repeatedly testified that they “trusted their attorneys” and delegated tasks, including
fundraising and hiring, to those attorneys.1730 They cannot now disclaim responsibility for the
actions that those attorneys took on their behalf and in their interest.1731
The LAP Representatives’ very retention of Donziger constituted transacting business
in New York.1732 That their retainer agreement and numerous other agreements to which they are
parties contain New York governing law clauses further demonstrates that the LAP Representatives
transacted business in the state and availed themselves of the benefits and protections offered by

1729

Tr. (Donziger) 2635:11-22.
1730

Camacho Dep. Tr. at 94:12-14, 105:20-22, 108:23-24, 133:20-21, 196:8-11, 219:18-20; J.
Piaguaje Dep. Tr. at 53:24-54:3.
1731

The LAP Representatives argue that any fraudulent actions that Donziger took were not and
could not have been in their interest. First, not all of the relevant actions that Donziger took
in New York in and of themselves were illegal. More importantly, the LAPs effectively
gave Donziger, Fajardo, and their other lawyers carte blanche to do as they saw fit. Tr. (J.
Piaguaje) 2388:23-2389:1 (“Q. You approved of each and every one of the actions
undertaken by Mr. Fajardo in all the courts in which he represented you, correct? A. Yes.”).
Those attorneys endeavored unwaiveringly to obtain the money damages and remediation
that their clients sought. To the extent that those clients buried their heads in the sand and
did not ask questions of their attorneys, they cannot now use their past indifference to
means to escape accountability for their part in the fraud.
1732

Cf. Fischbarg, 38 A.D.3d at 273.

450
New York’s laws.1733 Additionally, they took repeated advantage of New York law and New York
courts. Filing suit in New York in the Aguinda case, suing to enjoin the BIT arbitration, and
appearing in the New York 1782 actions qualify also as transacting business in the state under the
reasoning of SEC v. Softpoint.1734
Moreover, the LAP Representatives conducted business in New York and enjoyed
the advantages offered by its position as the largest city in the United States and the center of the
country’s financial system. Donziger’s work principally was done here. His associates worked out
of his kitchen. He had multiple bank accounts in New York in which funds to support the litigation
were deposited and from which payments to lawyers and for expenses were made. He spent a
considerable amount of his time in New York, conducting the Stratus operation and pressure
campaign, among activities, at least in part from New York. And it is no coincidence that Donziger
conducted many of his litigation, fundraising, and public relations activities from and in New York.
That he recruited investors, lawyers, and experts in and from New York shows not only that New
York was central to the case because Donziger was located here, but also because many of those
investors and lawyers themselves were located in New York. Understanding the unique role that
New York state and local officials could play in influencing the company, he arranged for the state’s
attorney general and the city comptroller to exert pressure on Chevron.
There can be no serious doubt that the LAP Representatives transacted business in
New York. Donziger was not merely a lawyer hired by an out-of-state resident to prosecute or
defend litigation in a New York court or, for that matter, to do so elsewhere. These defendants
1733

Cf. Sunward, 362 F.3d at 23.
1734

2012 WL 1681167, at *3.

451
engaged Donziger to run litigation in Ecuador, New York, and elsewhere. They explicitly
designated him as their U.S. Representative. They put him in charge of raising money to finance
the operation over a period of years; to plan and execute complex public relations and lobbying
strategies in New York, elsewhere in the United States, and abroad; and to select and hire all manner
of non-legal advisors, experts and service providers.

ii.

The Claims in This Suit Arise Out of the Transaction of
Business in New York

Having found that the LAP Representatives transacted business in New York, the
Court turns now to whether that transaction of business arises out of the claims asserted in this
action. Unquestionably, it does.
The nexus here is greater than that in PDK and at least equivalent to that in Licci.
Chevron’s fraud claims arise out of many of Donziger’s activities in New York, including
orchestrating the Cabrera Report, retaining Russell and later misusing his work, recruiting Berlinger,
coordinating and supervising Stratus, supervising the Ecuadorian lawyers, meeting with Shinder
concerning his Section 1782 representation, drafting and editing Fajardo’s misleading declaration
in the Section 1782 proceedings, work on the Invictus Memo, and engaging in a public relations
pressure campaign against Chevron. And much like in Licci, Donziger’s maintenance and use of
New York bank accounts was essential to support the very operation that proximately caused
Chevron’s injury. The alleged fraud does not, as the LAP Representatives suggest, arise solely out
of the bribe, ghostwriting, or other actions that took place exclusively in Ecuador.
This action arises as well out of the Aguinda action, action to enjoin the BIT
arbitration, and Section 1782 proceedings in which the LAP Representatives appeared as well. The

452
facts here loosely are analogous to those in Softpoint, where this court held that personal jurisdiction
was proper in an action to enforce a judgment against the party who brought the original action.
Past litigation in this forum forms a part of Donziger and the LAPs’ overall strategy to secure the
judgment against Texaco/Chevron which Chevron now challenges. The Aguinda litigation raised
the same principal factual allegations as the Ecuador litigation that ultimately gave rise to the
fraudulently obtained judgment. In the action to enjoin the BIT arbitration, the LAPs sought to have
the Court enjoin Chevron from collaterally attacking the Ecuador litigation through arbitration.
Chevron’s claims here form part of the same protracted legal battle to obtain relief from the
fraudulent judgment in Ecuador. Finally, the Section 1782 proceedings represent Chevron’s attempt
and the LAPs’ strenuous efforts to avoid producing inculpatory documents from Berlinger and
Donziger. The facts ultimately uncovered in the documents that Berlinger and Donziger did produce
are central to the issues in this case.
For all these reasons, the LAP Representatives’ claims in this action arise out of their
extensive transaction of business in New York since 1993 and extending up to and beyond
commencement of this lawsuit. Jurisdiction is proper under Section 302(a)(1).1735
3.

Due Process

The Court still must determine that exercising jurisdiction over the LAP
representatives comports with the constitutional requirements of fair play and substantial justice.1736

1735

Chevron argues also that the Court has general personal jurisdiction over the LAP
Representatives under CPLR Section 301. In view both of the sanctions ruling and the
strength of showing of personal jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(2), the Court declines to
address that argument.
1736

The Second Circuit in Licci observed that it would be anomalous if the court were to find
that the due process requirements were not met in a case in which personal jurisdiction

453
Such a determination rests on whether the defendants have had adequate minimum contacts with
the forum state and whether exercising jurisdiction over them would be reasonable.
The Court first must consider the nature and quality of the defendants’ contacts with
the forum state based on the totality of the circumstances. It is said that “[w]here the claim arises
out of, or relates to, the defendants’ contacts with the forum – i.e., specific jurisdiction [is asserted]
– minimum contacts [necessary to support such jurisdiction] exist where the defendant purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum and could foresee being haled into court
there.”1737 The Court has found already that Chevron’s claims arise out of the LAP Representatives’
contacts with New York. It has found that the LAP Representatives purposefully have availed
themselves of the benefits of New York and its laws and could foresee being haled into court here.
Having brought or joined in multiple lawsuits in this jurisdiction spanning many years and having
secured legal representation plus public relations and fundraising services from an agent dedicated
solely to their cause demonstrates their purposeful availment of the forum state and this action’s
foreseeability.
Next, the Court considers whether exercising jurisdiction would comport with fair
play and substantial justice.1738 Relevant considerations here include “(1) the burden that the
exercise of jurisdiction will impose on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state in
adjudicating the case; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the

existed under N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(1). See Licci, 732 F.3d at 170.
1737

Id. (quoting Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 305 F.3d 120, 127
(2d Cir. 2002)) (alterations in original).
1738

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).

454
interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversy; and
(5) the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies.”1739 As to the first prong,
the Second Circuit has recognized that “[e]ven if forcing the defendant to litigate in a forum
relatively distant from its home base were found to be a burden, the argument would provide
defendant only weak support, if any, because the conveniences of modern communication and
transportation ease what would have been a serious burden only a few decades ago.”1740
The LAP Representatives’ primary due process argument against the exercise of
jurisdiction is that they have been disadvantaged in this litigation because they were unable to obtain
testimony or documents from Fajardo, Yanza, Sáenz and Prieto.1741 Fajardo, Sáenz, and Prieto are
the LAP Representatives’ lawyers. In fact, Fajardo sought an extension of time on their behalf in
this case1742 and is their attorney-in-fact under broad powers of attorney. Yanza is their case
coordinator. Yet, through three years of litigation, the LAP Representatives have evidenced not the
slightest interest in procuring the testimony of these individuals or the relevant documents they
possess in Ecuador. They did not seek their depositions or the evidence they possess, either through
this Court or through letters rogatory. They did not revoke Fajardo’s power of attorney.1743 There
is no evidence that they threatened to fire them if they would not cooperate. They simply did
1739

Chloe, 616 F.3d at 164 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102,
113–14 (1987)).
1740

Bank Brussels, 305 F.3d at 129-30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1741

DI 1851 (LAP Reps.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 17-18.
1742

DI 127, DI 128.
1743

Tr. (J. Piaguaje) 2387:23-2388:3.

455
nothing. They did nothing because their lawyers and advisers concluded that participation in this
case by Fajardo, Sáenz, Prieto and Yanza would hurt far more than it could help, if indeed it would
help at all. The idea that the LAP Representatives were disadvantaged by litigating in New York
because their own lawyers would not cooperate with them is absurd.
Finally, the fact that New York is a long way from Ecuador avails the LAP
Representatives not at all. Piaguaje appeared regularly in court during the trial. Moncayo and
Humberto Piaguaje, witnesses whom the defendants thought would be helpful, had no trouble
coming here, just as Donziger has had no trouble going to Ecuador on a monthly basis for years.
Fajardo has come to the United States in general and New York in particular on several occasions.
The exercise of personal jurisdiction over the LAP Representatives would be entirely
consistent with the Due Process Clause even if the LAP Representatives had not forfeited their
personal jurisdiction defenses.

IX.

The Other Affirmative Defenses
A.

The Judicial Estoppel Defense is Without Merit
Donziger argues in substance that Chevron is judicially estopped to proceed with this

case because it allegedly agreed in Aguinda to being sued in Ecuador, offered to satisfy any
judgment rendered there except in limited circumstances, and extolled the supposed virtues of the
Ecuadorian legal system in order to procure the forum non conveniens dismissal.1744 He simply
ignores the fact that Chevron was not a party to Aguinda, proceeding instead on the basis of the
obvious inaccuracy. The LAP Representatives make essentially the same argument, although they

1744

DI 1850 (Donziger Defs.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 55-57.

456
in some but not all places in their brief recognize that Texaco – not Chevron – was the defendant
in Aguinda and argue that Chevron is bound by Texaco’s alleged promises.1745
The judicial estoppel argument is both shopworn and unsupported by sufficient facts.
It was made and rejected in the Count 9 Action in an extensive opinion.1746 Defendants have made
no effort whatever to address that decision. There is no need to cover again the ground covered
there. But there are three points that warrant mention.
First, for reasons previously set forth, the statements concerning the characteristics
of the Ecuadorian courts, even if binding on Chevron, pertained to an entirely different time period
and entirely different circumstances and thus could not be controlling here.
Second, the principal basis of the attempts to bind Chevron to statements allegedly
made by Texaco was the proposition that Chevron “merged” with Texaco and therefore succeeded
to its obligations. Alternatively, it depends heavily on piercing the corporate veil or otherwise
disregarding the separate corporate existence of Texaco, which now is an indirect subsidiary of
Chevron.
The record in this case establishes, and the Court finds, that Chevron did not merge
with Texaco. To the contrary, “[o]n October 9, 2001, Texaco Inc. merged with a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Chevron Corporation, Keepep Inc., and emerged from that transaction as the surviving
corporation and a direct subsidiary of Chevron.1747 After 2001, however, Texaco continued
1745

DI 1851 (LAP Reps.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 33-38.
1746

Chevron v. Salazar, 807 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
1747

The LAP Representatives persist, in the face of the evidence, falsely to assert that Chevron
merged with Texaco. DI 1851 (LAP Reps.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 34 (“Texaco merged
with Chevron”).

457
operating independently of Chevron; and it has been maintained as a separately-constituted
corporation ever since.”1748 Moreover, despite the Court’s observations in the prior decision that
defendants had not alleged any basis for disregarding Texaco’s separate corporate existence and that
the key facts relating to such an argument were disputed,1749 defendants neither alleged nor proved
any such basis at trial. Indeed, defendants failed even to cross-examine the Chevron witness, Reis
Veiga, who testified about Chevron’s acquisition of the shares of Texaco through a reverse
triangular merger, which left Texaco as the surviving company, concerning any of these matters.
Accordingly, the Court holds that (1) Chevron is not bound by any of the statements made in
Aguinda by Texaco and relied upon by defendants by virtue of any merger, and (2) defendants failed
to establish any basis for disregarding the separate corporate existence of Texaco and attributing the
statements relied upon to Chevron.1750

Donziger’s post-trial memorandum is slightly less inaccurate but misleading nonetheless.
It states that “Texaco became a wholly owned subsidiary of Chevron in 2001 and, between
2001-2005 the combined company was known as ChevronTexaco.” DI 1850 (Donziger
Defs.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 7 n.12. The first part of the sentence is consistent with
the facts but also is inconsistent with any merger of Texaco and Chevron – merged
companies do not become parent and subsidiary. The second part of the sentence seeks to
imply that a parent company and a wholly owned subsidiary are a “combined company” and
that the parent is liable for the debts and obligations of the subsidiary. That of course is not
so unless the corporate veil is pierced or the separate corporate existence of the subsidiary
is disregarded on another basis. Moreover, there is no evidence that any “combined
company” ever was known as ChevronTexaco. Supra note 426.
1748

PX 3000 (Reis Vega Direct) ¶ 8.
1749

Chevron v. Salazar, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 193, 196, 198.
1750

This Court referred also to the fact that the panel in Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp.,
638 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2011), which had been misinformed that Texaco had merged into
Chevron and that Chevron was the surviving company, stated that “lawyers from ChevronTexaco” had reaffirmed Texaco’s statements. Chevron v. Salazar, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 197
n.23. As this Court pointed out, the lawyers in question were Messrs. Veiga and Timms,
whose names appeared on Texaco’s brief in Aguinda. As the Court further noted, they had

458
Third, the Texaco statements upon which defendants rely were made in briefs and
declarations in Aguinda and were to the effect (1) that the Ecuadorian courts were neither corrupt
nor unfair and, allegedly, (2) that Texaco would satisfy any judgment for plaintiffs, reserving its
right to contest its validity in the circumstances permitted by New York’s Recognition of Foreign
Country Money Judgments Act.1751
The allegation that Texaco promised that it would satisfy any judgment for the
plaintiff as indicated above mischaracterizes the record and what actually transpired.
We start with the most recent. Donziger’s post-trial memorandum leads into this
subject with the following statements:
“To obtain dismissal, Chevron then ‘unambiguously agreed in writing to being sued
on [the plaintiffs’] claims (or their Eucadorian equivalent) in Ecuador. Aguinda v.
Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) . . . . Sure that it would
prevail in Ecuador, Chevron ‘also offered to satisfy any judgments in Plaintiffs’
favor, reserving its right to contest their validity only in the limited circumstances
permitted by New York’s Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments Act.’
Id. (emphasis added).”1752
In fact, the language he quoted about a promise to satisfy any judgments does not appear in Judge
Rakoff’s cited decision. It comes from somewhere else. Here is what actually happened.

been with Texaco for years before the Chevron transaction. Even assuming that they were
Chevron employees at the time of the Aguinda appeal, they acted as attorneys for Texaco
and their statements as Texaco’s attorneys did not bind Chevron. Id. In any case, the
evidence at this trial showed, and the Court finds, that Reis Veiga, at least, was an employee
of Texaco, not Chevron, in 2001 when the Aguinda appeal was decided. PX 3000 (Reis
Veiga Direct) ¶ 7.
1751

See DI 1850 (Donziger Defs.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 55-56; DI 1851 (LAP Reps.’
Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 33-35.
1752

DI 1850 (Donziger Defs.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 55-56 (emphasis in original).

459
Texaco did initially offer to make satisfaction of any judgment. One of a package
of proposed conditions of the forum non conveniens dismissal it sought, subject to its rights to
contest in some circumstances such a judgment.1753 Defendants have offered no evidence that they
accepted that offer or that any court relied upon any such proposal or promise. Certainly neither
Judge Rakoff in granting the forum non conveniens dismissal, nor the Second Circuit in substantially
affirming it, did so.1754 Indeed, the stipulation that the Aguinda parties signed to evidence

1753

Texaco Mem. in Support of Renewed Motion to Dismiss at 12-13, Aguinda v. Texaco Inc.,
93 Civ. 7527 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 11, 1999). A copy of a portion of this filing, which
appears to be missing from the court file (which antedated electronic filing), is PX 8004.
It should be noted also that the memorandum described the offer in general terms and
referred for the precise language to certain appendices. Id. at 13 n.7. The appendices do
not appear to be in the record of this case, and the Court has not located them in the record
of Aguinda. Texaco’s Aguinda reply memorandum, however, stated the offer as having
been “to satisfy any judgment in plaintiffs’ favor, reserving its right to contest their validity
only in the limited circumstances permitted by New York’s Recognition of Foreign Country
Money Judgments Act.” PX 8007 (Excerpt of Texaco Reply Mem. in Support of Renewed
Motion to Dismiss, Aguinda v. Texaco Inc., 93 Civ. 7527 (JSR), DI 142 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan.
25, 1999)), at 3.
1754

Aguinda v. Texaco Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (relying only on
agreements to being sued on the claims asserted, to accept service of process, and to limited
waiver of statute of limitations); Aguinda v. Texaco Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (the
one respect in which the Circuit modified the order was to expand the duration of the
limited limitations waiver from 60 days to one year). Id. at 478-79. It did not even mention
the conditions relied upon by Judge Rakoff.
As noted in Chevron Corp. v. Salazar, 807 F. Supp.2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), the Court is
aware that a footnote in Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.
2011), while recognizing that Judge Rakoff had not expressly adopted Texaco’s offer, stated
that he implicitly did so by granting the forum non conveniens dismissal. 638 F.3d at 389
n.4. For reasons stated there, that observation was dictum with which this Court
respectfully disagrees. See 807 F. Supp. 2d at 196-98. Nothing turns on this difference of
view, however, for reasons discussed in the ensuing text.

460
satisfaction of the conditions, a prerequisite to the forum non conveniens dismissal, contained no
promise to satisfy any Ecuadorian judgment.1755 Hence, there could be no judicial estoppel.
But let us assume arguendo that Texaco’s offer had been accepted, or that the court
had relied upon it in granting the dismissal, and that Chevron stands in Texaco’s shoes to that extent.
Even on those generous assumptions, the judicial estoppel argument would fail. A promise to
satisfy any Ecuadorian judgment, subject to the right to contest it in the circumstances permitted by
New York’s Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments Act, would have preserved the right
to contest the validity of any such judgment on any ground permitted by the New York Recognition
Act in any forum, not merely to contest validity in an enforcement action brought in New York.
Any other view would have rendered the reservation nonsensical, as it would have stripped Texaco
of any defense to enforcement of a judgment on any ground anywhere in the world save in New
York.1756 Indeed, that is precisely the view previously taken by the Circuit.1757

1755

PX 8003 (Stipulation and order, Aguinda v. Texaco Inc., 93 Civ. 7527 (JSR), DI 159
(S.D.N.Y. filed June 27, 2001)).
1756

Moreover, if there were any ambiguity on that point, that ambiguity would raise a question
of fact. The Court finds that the reservation of rights to contest an Ecuadorian judgment
limited only the grounds on which such a judgment could be contested and limited those
only to grounds permitted by the New York Recognition Act. It did not limit the venues
in which or procedural vehicles by which any such judgment could be attacked.
1757

Republic of Ecuador, 638 F.3d at 397 (“Chevron has thus reserved its right to challenge any
judgment issued in Lago Agrio on the grounds that the Ecuadorian judicial system ‘does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process
of law,’ that the judgment itself ‘was obtained by fraud,’ or that ‘the proceeding in [Lago
Agrio] was contrary to an agreement between the parties.’ [citation omitted] Nothing in that
reservation of rights purports to restrict the kind of forum or type of proceeding in which
Chevron can raise those defenses.”).

461
As Chevron’s arguments here all would be defenses to enforcement of the Judgment
under the New York Recognition Act, there could be no estoppel even if Texaco had made the
promise inaccurately attributed to it, and even if Chevron were bound by it.1758

B.

Defendants Have Abandoned All Other Pleaded Affirmative Defenses, Which in Any
Case Lacked Merit
The defendants’ answers contained long lists of purported affirmative defenses, most

of them pleaded in conspicuously conclusory terms.1759 Apart from those dealt with above,
defendants’ closing arguments and post-trial briefs mentioned none of them, with the exception that
the LAP Representatives’ post-trial memorandum argues that Chevron’s amended complaint failed
to allege fraud with the particularity required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).1760 Nor, with the exception
of a supposed unclean hands defense, was any evidence introduced to prove them. Accordingly, the
pleaded affirmative defenses not dealt with above are rejected on the grounds that they have been
abandoned and in any case would be unsupported by sufficient credible evidence.1761 We pause here
only to address, briefly, the Rule 9(b) argument and the lack of merit of the unclean hands defense.

1758

The LAP Representatives’ equitable estoppel argument is entirely without merit.
1759

DI 307 (Donziger Defs.’ Answer); DI 311 (LAP Reps.’ Answer).
1760

DI 1851 (Lap Reps.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 25.
1761

E.g., Harbison v. Little, 723 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1038 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (collecting cases);
United States v. Livecchi, 605 F. Supp. 2d 437, 451 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) aff’d, 711 F.3d 345
(2d Cir. 2013); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Hosp. Products Int’l Pty. Ltd., 701 F. Supp. 314 (D.
Conn. 1988) (“Insofar as any claim or defense urged by the defendant is founded upon a
particular prior art reference to which sufficient reference is not made in the post-trial brief,
such claim or defense is deemed abandoned.”); see also K & N Eng’g, Inc. v. Spectre
Performance, EDCV 09-01900-VAP, 2011 WL 6133258, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2011).

462

1.

Rule 9(b)

Donziger made no Rule 9(b) argument before trial and makes none now. The LAP
Representatives, however, moved before trial for judgment on the pleadings dismissing the amended
complaint1762 and made a brief Rule 9(b) argument as part of that motion,1763 which the Court denied
in relevant part long ago.1764 They now contend that Chevron waived at least part of its fraud claims
because the amended complaint did not comply with the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b).1765
At no point during the trial did any of the defendants object to the receipt of any
evidence on the ground that any lack of specificity in the amended complaint surprised or prejudiced
them. Nor did they seek a continuance during trial to meet any allegedly unexpected evidence.
Indeed, no such application would have been persuasive, as the LAP Representatives knew
Chevron’s contentions inside and out from extensive discovery, the pretrial orders, and four
voluminous motions for partial summary judgment.

1762

DI 600 (LAP Reps. Mot. for Judgment on the Pleadings).
1763

DI 601 (LAP Reps. Mem. of Law), at 19-24.
The principal point of the Rule 9(b) argument was that the complaint did not sufficiently
allege any misstatements by Camacho and Piaguaje. It argued also that it did not sufficiently
allege proximate cause, but allegations of causation are not covered by Rule 9(b) because
they are not “circumstances constituting fraud.” See, e.g., Wilamowsky v. Take–Two
Interactive Software, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 2d 744, 753 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (collecting cases).
1764

DI 634 (Nov. 27 2012 Memo. Endorsement).
1765

DI 1851 (LAP Reps.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 25-29.

463
In these circumstances, the LAP Representatives’ Rule 9(b) argument is baseless.
The notice and other functions of the rule were more than served here.1766 Moreover, Rule 15(b)(2)
provides in relevant part that “[w]hen an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties’
express or implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings.” Given the
lack of any objection to proof at trial based on any Rule 9(b) deficiency and the lack of any claim
of consequent surprise or prejudice, all of the issues were tried by consent even if all were not
specifically raised in the pleadings. Indeed, the complaint in these circumstances became irrelevant
as to any such issues.1767 In any case, the amended complaint is deemed amended to conform its
allegations to the proof.1768

1766

To the extent the LAP Representatives suggest otherwise, the suggestion is frivolous.
“Whether a complaint complies with the Rule, . . . depends ‘upon the nature of the case, the
complexity or simplicity of the transaction or occurrence, the relationship of the parties and
the determination of how much circumstantial detail is necessary to give notice to the
adverse party and enable him to prepare a responsive pleading.’ In re Cardiac Devices Qui
Tam Litig., 221 F.R.D. 318, 333 (D. Conn. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
particular, ‘where the alleged fraudulent scheme involved numerous transactions that
occurred over a long period of time, courts have found it impractical to require the plaintiff
to plead the specifics with respect to each and every instance of fraudulent conduct.’ Id.; see
United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., 501 F.3d 493, 509–10 (6th Cir. 2007);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. James M. Liguori, M.D., P.C., 589 F. Supp. 2d 221, 237
(E.D.N.Y. 2008); United States ex rel. Taylor v. Gabelli, 345 F. Supp. 2d 313, 326 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); Cardiac Devices, 221 F.R.D. at 333 (collecting cases); United States ex rel. Franklin
v. Parke–Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 47 (D. Mass. 2001).” United States v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., __ F. Supp.2d ___, No. 12 Civ. 7527 (JMF), 2013 WL 5312564, at *16
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013). In the circumstances of this case, the amended complaint
complied with Rule 9(b).
1767

See Torry v. Northrup Grumman Corp., 399 F.3d 876, 878 (7th Cir. 2005); 3 MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 15.18[1] (3d ed. 2013); see also Madeja v. Olympic Packers, LLC,
310 F.3d 628, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (parenthetical).
1768

“Even when a party does not move for leave to amend, a court may constructively amend
pleadings on unpleaded issues in order to render a decision consistent with the trial.” 3
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 15.18[3], at 15-95.

464

2.

Unclean Hands

The defendants all pleaded, albeit Donziger only in conclusory terms, that Chevron’s
claims were barred by alleged unclean hands.1769 The LAP Representatives opened on it at trial.1770
All defendants relied upon it, at one time or another, in urging the relevancy of evidence.1771 But
the pleaded defense disappeared from the case when the defendants barely even mentioned it in their
post-trial submissions.1772 Accordingly, they abandoned it. In any case, it is well established that
unclean hands is not a defense to fraud on the court.1773 Nevertheless, it is appropriate to find also

1769

DI 307 (Donziger Defs.’ Answer), at 71; DI 311 (LAP Reps.’ Answer), at 91.
That defense was dismissed in part in the Count 9 Action, Chevron Corp. v. Salazar, No.
11 Civ. 3718 (LAK), 2011 WL 3628843, at *6-10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2011). To the extent
the dismissal was on the sufficiency of the defense generally (as opposed to its alleged
applicability to legal and declaratory claims), the ruling is entirely applicable here, as the
pleadings in the Count 9 Action and this case are the very same documents.
1770

Tr. (Opening) 40:20-41:1.
1771

Tr. (Reis Veiga) 91:25-94:10, 143:8-149:12, 150:8-152:15; Tr. (Callejas) 807:9-809:19; Tr.
1944:22-1945:20.
1772

The only explicit mention of the defense is in a footnote in the LAP Representatives’ initial
trial brief in which they state: “Similarly, the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs reserve the rights to brief
the unclean hands defense if and when Chevron makes plain the specific nature of the
equitable relief it seeks.” DI 1851 (LAP Reps. Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 30 n.8.
Defendants in their reply brief make factual assertions that could be intended to support this
defense, but nowhere do they state specifically any such intent.
1773

12 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.21(4)(i); see Martina Theatre Corp. v. Schine Chain
Theatres, Inc., 278 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir. 1960) (dictum).

465
that there was no credible evidence to support any such defense even if it had been pressed and even
if proof of unclean hands would have been a defense in this case.1774
The one point upon which the Court thinks it appropriate to elaborate in this final
regard is the defendants’ claim with respect to the so-called Nuñez bribe scandal. The gist of the
assertion is Chevron, through Diego Borja, an employee of one of its contractors, schemed to have
Judge Nuñez removed from the case.1775 The allegation, however, has not been proved.
It is undisputed that in May and June of 2009, Borja had a series of secret videotaped
meetings with Judge Nuñez and Patricio Garcia, who was affiliated with the Republic of Ecuador’s
ruling party,1776 in which they discussed the Ecuador litigation.1777 Borja later provided the tapes to

1774

Defendants’ other factual allegations of Chevron misconduct that could be construed to
support an unclean hands defense relate to (1) the Aguinda forum non conveniens dismissal,
(2) the Section 1782 proceedings, (3) the inspection of the Guanta site, (4) ex parte
meetings with Ecuadorian judges, (5) lobbying efforts in the United States and Ecuador, and
(6) Chevron’s litigation tactics. The record does not support a finding of unclean hands as
to any of these allegations.
1775

DI 1850 (Donziger Defs.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 15.
Borja in 2009 worked for a company called InterIntelg, which “was a contractor for . . .
Texaco.” Borja Mar. 15, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 59:7-15.
1776

DX 31 (Aug. 31, 2009 Ltr. from T. Cullen to W. Pesantez), at 1 (“Patricio Garcia Ortega
[was] a political coordinator for Alianza País.”).
1777

See PX 2531 (Excerpts of video of May 11, 2009 Meeting between Carlos Patricio Ortega,
Aulo Gelio Servio Tulio Ávila Cartagena, Pablo Almeida, Rubén Darío Miranda Martínez,
and Diego Borja); PX 2531A (Transcript of Same); PX 2532 (Excerpts of video of May 15,
2009 Meeting between Judge Juan Evangelista Nuñez Sanabria, Aulo Gelio Servio Tulio
Ávila Cartagena, Pablo Almeida, Wayne Douglas Hansen, and Diego Fernando Borja
Sanchez); PX 2532A (Transcript of Same); PX 2533 (Excerpts of video of June 5, 2009
Meeting between Judge Juan Evangelista Nuñez Sanabria, Juan Pablo Novoa Velasco, Diego
Fernando Borja, and Wayne Hansen); PX 2533A (transcript of same).

466
Chevron, which turned them over to the Republic of Ecuador1778 and released them publicly in
August 2009.1779
Chevron claimed that the recordings showed that Judge Nuñez was implicated in a
$3 million bribery scheme and would rule against the company.1780 Donziger and the LAPs, in turn,
accused Chevron of attempting to entrap Judge Nuñez in a bribery scandal and “undermine the trial
process so the company c[ould] avoid paying a judgment.”1781
The effect of these public pronouncements were many. Borja and his wife relocated
to the United States, seeking asylum out of fear that they would be persecuted by the ROE for
Borja’s involvement.1782 Once in the United States, Chevron paid for Borja’s and his wife’s living
expenses for at least two years.1783 In addition, Judge Nuñez recused himself from the case.1784
Defendants now hold fast in their claim that Chevron created the scandal in an
attempt to disqualify Judge Nuñez.

1778

DX 31 (Aug. 31, 2009 Ltr. from T. Cullen to W. Pesantez).
1779

DX 30 (Chevron Aug. 31, 2009 Press Release).
1780

Id.
1781

PX 2524 (Sept. 1, 2009 Email from S. Donziger to S. Donziger), at 3.
1782

Borja Mar. 15, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 21:12-16; PX 2527 (U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security
Asylum Record for D. Borja).
1783

Borja Mar. 15, 2011 Dep. Tr. at 24:14-25:1.
1784

PX 2525 (Nuñez Recusal Motion).

467
As an initial matter, defendants point to Borja’s one-time position as a contractor for
the company and Chevron’s later financial support of Borja in contending that Chevron put Borja
up to the scheme that resulted in the recorded conversations. But the fact that Borja once worked
for a contractor used by Chevron is not persuasive evidence that he acted at the company’s behest
when he recorded the meetings in question. Likewise, Chevron’s payments to Borja upon his arrival
in the United States suggest that the company had some interest in him as a witness. But they do
not prove that Chevron was involved in or even knew of his efforts with respect to Judge Nuñez
until after the fact.
Defendants next rely on recorded statements Borja made to his friend, Santiago
Escobar, in which Borja purportedly admitted that the bribe scheme was illusory. But the recordings
of Borja speaking to Escobar are inadmissible hearsay.1785 And while defendants initially claimed
that they intended to call Escobar at trial, they never did so.
Finally, defendants are correct that the recordings of the meetings with Judge Nuñez
and others do not conclusively demonstrate that Judge Nuñez was offered or accepted a bribe,
although they do show that a bribe was discussed outside of his presence and that Judge Nuñez
made several statements that at least arguably indicated his intention to rule for the LAPs.1786 But
Chevron’s misunderstanding or even misrepresentation of the content of the conversations would

1785

Even if the recordings were not hearsay, they would not get defendants where they wish to
go. Although Borja claimed that the bribe scheme was a set up, he did not say that Chevron
knew about it or was involved in it in any way. PX 1200 (Email from A. Goelman to S.
Donziger, J. Kohn, W. Taylor, J. Hall re: “The Escobar-Borja tapes”), at 1-2; see DX 39-57
(Borja-Escobar Recording Transcripts).
1786

E.g., PX 2534A (June 22, 2009 Borja Recording), at 2-3, 5-9; PX 2533A (June 5, 2009
Borja Recording), at 16 (“In the ruling I say that so many millions have to be issued for
remediation every month.”).

468
not show unclean hands, which requires “a transgress[ion of] equitable standards of conduct”1787 that
has an “immediate and necessary relation to the equity that the [plaintiff] seeks in respect of the
matter in litigation.”1788 Even a deliberate misrepresentation of the content of the tapes, and the
defendants have failed to prove that, would not remotely have approached in gravity the misconduct
by the defendants proved in this case. This is particularly so in light of the fact that Chevron
released the tapes to the ROE and the public, which were in a position to reach their own
conclusions about what the tapes did and did not prove.
In the last analysis, the defendants have adduced no admissible evidence that
Chevron committed a “willful act concerning the cause of action which rightfully can be said to
transgress equitable standards of conduct.” Indeed, the LAPs’ own investigator concluded that “it
seems clear from the tapes that Chevron is telling the truth when they claim not to have instructed
Borja to make the first 3 tapes and not to have even known about these conversations until June”
2009, after the events occurred.1789

1787

Holm v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 7 F. App’x 40, 41 (2d Cir. 2001) (alteration in original).
1788

Specialty Minerals, Inc. v. Pluess-Staufer AG, 395 F. Supp. 2d 109, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(alteration in original).
1789

PX 1200 (Email from A. Goelman to S. Donziger, J. Kohn, W. Taylor, J. Hall re: “The
Escobar-Borja tapes”), at 1.

469
X.

Relief
A.

Chevron Has No Adequate Remedy at Law and is Threatened With Irreparable
Injury
Chevron has suffered injury – and is threatened with additional and irreparable injury

– in consequence of defendants’ fraud and their efforts to enforce the Judgment that they
fraudulently obtained. It has no adequate remedy at law.
Defendants resist this conclusion. Donziger argues that there Chevron has other
remedies that could result in modification or vacatur of the Judgment. Donziger and the LAP
Representatives all contend that Chevron may raise its claim that the Judgment was procured by
fraud wherever and whenever they seek to enforce the Judgment.1790 These contentions are baseless.

1.

Further Proceedings in Ecuador, If Any Even Theoretically Were Available,
Would Offer No Adequate Remedy

Donziger claims that “Chevron has had, and continues to have, available remedies
in Ecuador by which the judgment could be modified or vacated, including appeal to the
Constitutional Tribunal.”1791 The claim is unpersuasive.
The Court understands and assumes that there is a theoretical possibility of review
– limited to “fundamental constitutional rights violations” – by the Constitutional Court of
Ecuador.1792 But the possibility of such review is not adequate for at least two reasons.

1790

DI 1851 (LAP Reps.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law ), at 40; DI 1850 (Donziger Defs.’ Post-trial
Mem. of Law), at 59-61.
1791

DI 1850 (Donziger Defs.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 60.
1792

DI 134 (Coronel Aff.) ¶ 2.

470
First, Ecuador does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with
due process in cases of this nature. The evidence of political control of the Constitutional Court is
highly persuasive and that of the partiality of the political branches to the LAPs irrefutable.
Moreover, Donziger for years has described Ecuadorian judges as “corrupt,”1793 “not very bright,”1794
and “utter[ly] weak[].”1795 He has made clear that the entire judiciary is beholden to the executive,
that “this [case] is a political battle that’s being played out through a legal case,” and that one cannot
win the legal case without politics on its side.1796 When President Correa took office, Donziger
bragged that the LAP team had gotten politics firmly on its side.1797 Donziger’s contention that
Chevron may not obtain relief from this Court because there are remedies available to it in Ecuador
is ironic and without merit.1798
Second, the Judgment has been enforceable in Ecuador, and elsewhere, at least since
the intermediate appellate court ruled. Assets already have been seized in Ecuador. Given the size
of the Judgment and the comparative impecuniousness of the defendants, there is no assurance that
Chevron could recoup property applied to the Judgment between now and any decision by the
1793

PX 9A (Mar. 30, 2006 Crude Clip).
1794

PX 179 (Donziger Notebook), at 3.
1795

PX 7A (Mar. 30, 2006 Crude Clip), at CRS-053-02-CLIP-04.
1796

PX 11A (Apr. 3, 2006 Crude Clip), at CRS060-00-CLIP-04.
1797

PX 16A (Dec. 6, 2006 Crude Clip), at CRS138-01-CLIP-01x (the LAPs have “gone
basically from a situation where we couldn’t get in the door to meet many of these people
in these positions [in the government] to one where they’re actually asking us to come and
asking what they can do. . . .”).
1798

Supra Discussion § VII.C.

471
Constitutional Court even if it prevailed. Defendants, moreover, have taken extensive steps to
ensure that any funds recovered are held offshore and beyond the reach either of U.S. or Ecuadorian
courts.1799
No other potential Ecuadorian remedy has been identified. Any that may exist on
paper would be inadequate for the same reasons.

2.

Defense of Multiple Enforcement Actions Would Not Provide An Adequate
Remedy at Law

Neither would defense of multiple enforcement actions provide Chevron an adequate
legal remedy.
First, the LAP team’s enforcement strategy contemplates attacks on Chevron, its
assets, and subsidiaries in multiple jurisdictions outside the United States followed by proceedings
here.1800 It already has sued in Ecuador, Argentina, Brazil, and Canada. The Invictus Memo and
other evidence makes clear that the enforcement battle will not be limited to these four actions. The
LAPs intend to pursue additional actions both abroad and in the United States. Moreover, the
purpose of this multi-jurisdictional attack is to “increase[] the odds of obtaining expedient and
significant recovery, [and to] . . . keep[] Chevron on its heels.”1801 Thus, the legal remedy the
defendants tout is the defense of a multitude of lawsuits. The multiplicity of suits, moreover, is
entirely unnecessary and thus vexatious. It is attributable in significant measure to the defendants’
1799

See supra note 1110.
1800

See supra Facts § VII.E.2.
1801

PX 1389 (July 10, 2010 Email Chain Between J. Tyrrell, S. Seidel, C. Bogart, and J. Molot),
at 7.

472
desire to profit by the coercive effect of the added burden and risks thus imposed. They certainly
could have brought one enforcement action either in California or in Delaware, where Chevron is
headquartered and incorporated, respectively, and been sure of collecting the entire Judgment if they
prevailed without subjecting Chevron to the added burdens and risks of their strategy.
“The fact that there is [some] remedy at law, . . . does not preclude equitable
relief.”1802 Equitable relief is appropriate where a legal remedy is “incomplete and inadequate to
accomplish substantial justice.”1803 The defense of a multiplicity of suits – in circumstances like
these – does not afford an adequate remedy.1804
Second, defense of multiple enforcement actions would not avert interim harm to
Chevron even if it ultimately prevailed in every proceeding. The LAPs seek to grab as many of
Chevron’s and its subsidiaries’ assets as they can until the Judgment has been paid. And even if
Chevron were to win every enforcement action outside Ecuador, it would not be afforded complete
relief. Chevron’s injuries go well beyond the Judgment itself – indeed, they include among other
things the payment of legal fees to defend against the enforcement actions and harm to reputation
and goodwill. Success in the enforcement actions would not remedy these harms.

1802

Leasco Corp. v. Taussig, 473 F.2d 777, 786 (2d Cir. 1972).
1803

Id.
1804

Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415, 421 (1934); Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.S. 279, 304
(1905); see, e.g., Bruce v. Martin, 680 F. Supp. 616, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

473
3.

Money Damages Are Not, and Could Not Have Been, an Adequate Remedy

Finally, defendants contend that “any ‘injury’ Chevron might suffer could be
remedied by money damages. . . . If the injury is that Chevron may have to pay on the judgment, that
payment would be a monetary award that can be repaired in kind.”1805
This argument does not withstand analysis. The LAP Representatives are indigenous
people living in the Ecuadorian rainforest. Both they and Donziger repeatedly have cited their “lack
of resources” as reasons to delay this action.1806 Donziger’s claim, in particular, is strikingly at odds
with innumerable representations to this Court concerning his claimed lack of resources.1807 In such
circumstances, the theoretical availability of an action for damages is and always was entirely
immaterial. As Justice Scalia has written, while economic injury usually “is not considered
irreparable, . . . that is because money can usually be recovered from the person to whom it is paid.
If the expenditures cannot be recouped, the resulting loss may be irreparable.”1808 That is this case.

1805

DI 1850 (Donziger Defs.’ Post-trial Mem. of Law), at 60.
1806

DI 1197, at 6, 9; DI 1211, at 6, 9; DI 1370, at 3; DI 1415, at 3; DI 1442, at 4.
1807

See e.g., Tr. (Donziger Closing) 2921:7-13 (“THE COURT: Suppose [Chevron] could have
gotten a dollar-for-dollar judgment . . . . Against whom? Who is going to pay it? Mr.
Donziger?” Donziger’s counsel responded, “I don’t think he has got that kind of money.”);
DX 1750 ¶ 127 (Donziger’s claim that he was “operating under constant pressure of lack
of resources”); Tr. (Donziger) 2619:6-23 (affirming statements to the Court about “lacking
resources to defend in this case”); DI 1197, at 6, 9; DI 1211, at 6, 9; DI 1370, at 3; DI 1415,
at 3; DI 1442, at 4.
1808

Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott, 131 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2010); Douglas Laycock, The Death of the
Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 716. (1990) (“Damages are no remedy at
all if they cannot be collected, and most courts sensibly conclude that a damage judgment
against an insolvent defendant is an inadequate remedy.”).

474
*

*

*

A final point. The equitable relief the Court now grants would not provide a
complete remedy for Chevron’s injuries, existing and threatened. It does not set aside the Judgment.
It does not enjoin foreign enforcement proceedings. But that does not preclude the Court from
granting equitable relief that would solve the problem in part. Defendants have cited no authority
standing for the proposition that equitable relief is unavailable if it does not provide a complete
remedy to an injury that is not redressable at law.1809 That would make no sense at all. It essentially
would close the courts entirely to litigants who are threatened with injuries that are not compensable
by money damages nor wholly preventable or redressable in equity. The relief granted here – relief
that would prevent Donziger and the LAP Representatives from profiting from the Judgment or
seeking to enforce it in this country – would partially remedy and partially prevent the injuries,
existing and threatened, that cry out for relief. Certainly it is far better than pursuing fruitless claims
for money damages against these three defendants.1810

1809

By contrast, the Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to take a flexible approach when
determining whether to grant equitable relief. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra, 321 U.S. 321, 329
(1944) (“[t]he essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do
equity and to mo[]ld each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather
than rigidity has distinguished it.”) When considering whether to grant equitable relief,
courts should “balance[] the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to them
according as they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunction.” Yakus
v. U. S., 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944).
1810

See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1999) (“an injunction . . . is an
equitable remedy issued by a trial court, within the broad bounds of its discretion, after it
weighs the potential benefits and harm to be incurred by the parties from the granting or
denying of such relief.”).

475
B.

Chevron Is Entitled to Equitable Relief Preventing These Three Defendants From
Benefitting From the Fraud on the Court and Donziger From Profiting From the
RICO Violations
1.

Constructive Trust

Chief Judge (later Justice) Cardozo stated the governing principle years ago in words
cited many times since:
“A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds
expression. When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder
of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity
converts him into a trustee (Moore v. Crawford, 130 U. S. 122, 128; Pomeroy Eq.
Jur. sec. 1053).”1811
Among the circumstances in which a constructive trust may be imposed are those in which the
defendant stands to receive a benefit by virtue of fraud.1812 In this context, moreover, fraud “may
mean misrepresentation giving rise to a cause of action for deceit or it may imply the acquisition of
property by some other type of wrongdoing or by any type of inequitable conduct.”1813 The

1811

Beatty v. Guggenheim Exp. Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386 (1919).
1812

“[A]ssets acquired by fraud are subject to a constructive trust for the benefit of the defrauded
party.” SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 290 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 166 (1936)); see also 4 POMEROY § 1053. While New York law
often speaks of claims to impose constructive trusts having four elements – (1) a confidential
or fiduciary relationship; (2) a promise, express or implied; (3) a transfer made in reliance
on that promise; and (4) unjust enrichment – the key is unjust enrichment, “since the
purpose of the constructive trust is [its] prevention.” In re First Central Fin. Corp., 377 F.3d
209, 212 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted) (affirming constructive trust for pro rata
distribution to defrauded investors). To put it simply, “a constructive trust is a flexible
device and must not be bound by an ‘unyielding formula.’” Golden Budha Corp. v.
Canadian Land Co. of America, N.V., 931 F.2d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 1991) (party adequately
pleaded the elements of a constructive trust where the district court determined that all
elements other than unjust enrichment were lacking).
1813

GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 471, at 41-42 (3d
ed. 2009) (“BOGERT”) (footnotes omitted).

476
imposition of a constructive trust on Donziger’s right to a contingent fee, among other property
traceable to the Judgment, and the other defendants’ rights to recovery fits this mold to a tee.
Donziger’s retainer agreement1814 with the LAPs and the ADF, which is governed by
New York law,1815 provides that Donziger is entitled to be paid (a) 6.3 percent of all amounts paid
in respect of the litigation,1816 plus (b) any arrearages in his monthly retainer,1817 plus reimbursement
for expenses.1818 His contingent fee is payable only out of “Plaintiff Collection Monies,” which the
retainer agreement defines as “amounts paid . . . whether from Chevron Corporation. . . , any other
party listed as a defendant in respect of the Litigation . . . or any other party added or joined to the
Litigation as a defendant.”1819 Thus, the Judgment is the indispensable predicate of his right to
collect a contingent fee with respect to the Lago Agrio case. That Judgment is the direct result of

1814

PX 558 (Jan. 5, 2011 retainer agreement).
1815

The retainer agreement contains New York governing law clauses, PX 558, ¶¶ 10(a), 11,
which control under N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. L. § 5-1401(a).
1816

Id. ¶ 3(a) (the 6.3 percent is the product of 31.5 percent of the Total Contingency Fee
Payment, which is 20 percent of all funds collected).
It is conceivable that the percentage of any Judgment proceeds to which Donziger is entitled
has been slightly diluted subsequently in order to accommodate giving equity to new
investors, but this neither matters nor is persuasively shown on the record.
1817

See id. ¶ 3(b).
1818

Id. ¶ 3(d).
1819

PX 558 ¶ 3(a).

477
fraud by Donziger. Moreover, his right to a contingent fee and the fee itself are property subject to
execution and attachment1820 and certainly to the imposition of a constructive trust.
This is true also with respect to other property already seized from Chevron. Its
intellectual property rights in Ecuador, which are worth between $15 and $30 million, are being held
pending sale preparatory to the distribution of the cash proceeds to the Judgment creditors and their
investors, subject to Donziger’s right to his share of the recovery. Moreover, Donziger owns,
directly or through a nominee, shares of a Gibraltar company, Amazonia, through which the
property collected on the Judgment is to be funneled.1821 Those shares too are subject to a
constructive trust, as whatever value they now or hereafter may have is a direct function of the fraud
perpetrated by Donziger.

1820

Prior to the entry of the Judgment, Donziger’s retainer agreement was “an executory
contract” for the payment of his retainer and reimbursement of his expenses plus a “transfer
of a future fund [i.e., his share of the collections on the Judgment] upon which specific
performance [would] be granted when the fund [came] into existence.” Brandes v. North
Shore University Hosp., 18 M.3d 1112(A), 856 N.Y.S.2d 496, 2008 WL 80629, at *3 (Sup.
Ct. Queens Co. Jan. 8, 2008) (citing Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508 (1882)). The fund
came into existence “when there [wa]s a judgment,” i.e., on February 14, 2011. Aponte v.
Maritime Overseas Corp., 300 F. Supp. 1975, 1077 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). His rights to payments
when the fund came into existence, i.e., when judgment was entered, as well as his rights
against that fund once it came into being, were and are, respectively, assignable. Id. at 1077;
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. L. § 13-101; David D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries, 7B MCKINNEY’S
CONSOL. LAWS OF N.Y. – CPLR 5501 TO 5500 C5201:9, at 66-67 (McKinney 1997).
Accordingly, his claims to the contingent fee, to his monthly retainer, and to expense
reimbursements at all relevant times were and remain property subject to execution and
attachment under New York law. N.Y. CPLR § 5201(b) (“A money judgment may be
enforced against any property which could be assigned or transferred, whether it consists of
a present or future right or interest and whether or not it is vested, unless it is exempt from
application to the satisfaction of the judgment.); § 6202 (“Any . . . property against which
a money judgment may be enforced as provided in section 5201 is subject to attachment.”).
1821

Donziger testified that he has been given shares in Amazonia based on his proportionate
equity interest in the LAPs’ claim. Donziger June 25, 2013 Dep. Tr. at 632:4-9, 633:15634:2. See also supra note 1110.

478
Accordingly, the Court will impose a constructive trust for Chevron’s benefit on
Donziger’s contractual and other rights to fees and other payments and upon his Amazonia shares.
In addition, it will issue injunctive relief to ensure that Donziger, regardless of the ultimate efficacy
of the constructive trust and disgorgement order discussed below, never benefits in any material way
from the Judgment in the Lago Agrio case.

2.

Other Equitable Relief to Prevent These Defendants From Benefitting from
the Fraud

Equity is confined by no rigid formula in framing relief. “A court of equity in
decreeing a constructive trust is bound by no unyielding formula. The equity of the transaction must
shape the measure of relief.”1822 Moreover, “[a] court may grant more than one type of relief to a
wronged” party.
In the circumstances, an order will be entered requiring Donziger and the other
defendants to pay over and assign to Chevron all fees and other payments, property, and other
benefits that they have received or hereafter receive , directly or indirectly, in consequence of the
Judgment.

C.

Injunction Against Enforcement in the United States
As demonstrated above, courts of equity enjoin the enforcement of judgments

procured by fraud where there is no full, complete and adequate remedy at law and where the
plaintiff would be injured irreparably in the absence of such relief.

1822

Beatty, 225 N.Y. at 389.

479
Here, the Court has found that defendants always have intended to seek to enforce
the Judgment in the United States. They have delayed doing so temporarily for tactical reasons: (1)
the desire to avoid even the slightest risk that any U.S. enforcement action would be transferred to
the undersigned, and (2) pursuit of their “keystone strategy” which rests in part on the belief that
obtaining a foreign judgment recognizing the Ecuadorian Judgment might smooth their path to its
recognition in this country. Their intent ultimately to pursue enforcement in the United States,
where Chevron is incorporated and based (and where problems about reaching assets of Chevron
subsidiaries in efforts to enforce the Judgment against Chevron could be avoided entirely by
proceeding directly against Chevron), is clear.
Given the Court’s findings that Chevron has no adequate remedy at law and that the
expansion of the multiplicity of enforcement actions already pending (four are pending in other
countries already) would cause it additional irreparable injury, these defendants will be enjoined
from instituting any enforcement proceedings in the United States.

D.

This Relief Is Consistent with Naranjo
In March 2011, this Court issued a preliminary injunction temporarily barring

enforcement of the Judgment anywhere outside Ecuador. In April 2011, the Court bifurcated, and
later severed, Chevron’s declaratory judgment claim (the “Count 9 Action”) and stayed most
proceedings in the first eight counts pending its resolution.1823

1823

Donziger II, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 484; DI 328 (May 31, 2011 order severing Count 9).

480
In September 2011, the Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction. Its
subsequent opinion – Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo1824 – did not pass, one way or the other, on this
Court’s findings with respect to the nature of the Ecuadorian tribunals or the evidence of fraud in
the procurement of the Judgment. Rather, it explained that the panel had vacated the preliminary
injunction on the ground that:
“the procedural device [Chevron] has chosen to present those claims [in Count 9] is
simply unavailable: The [New York Recognition of Foreign Country Money
Judgments Act (“Recognition Act”)] nowhere authorizes a court to declare a foreign
judgment unenforceable on the preemptive suit of a putative judgment-debtor.”1825
In its view, a declaration with respect to the alleged unenforceability or non-recognizability of the
Judgment could not be had because the Recognition Act (1) “does not authorize a court to declare
a foreign judgment null and void for all purposes in all countries,”1826 and (2) could not justify a
declaration with respect to recognizability and enforcement in New York alone because there was
no indication that the LAPs ever would seek to enforce the Judgment here.1827 The panel noted also
that “[c]onsiderations of international comity provide additional reasons to conclude that the
Recognition Act cannot support the broad injunctive remedy granted by the district court.”1828 The

1824

667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012).
1825

Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 240.
1826

Id. at 245.
1827

Id. at 246.
1828

Id. at 242.

481
Circuit remanded Count 9 to this Court with instructions to dismiss it in its entirety,1829 a direction
that was carried out at once.
Defendants contend that Naranjo forecloses the relief Chevron here seeks. Donziger
argues that “this Court cannot give Chevron what it wants without transgressing basic principles of
international comity, as articulated by the Second Circuit in . . . Naranjo. . . .”1830 In so arguing, he
misrepresents the relief Chevron seeks, misconstrues the holding in Naranjo, and attempts to
broaden the panel’s international comity discussion well beyond the confines of the statute it was
interpreting.
First, the holding in Naranjo was limited to the panel’s interpretation of New York’s
Recognition Act and its determination that that statute could not be used preemptively to attack a
judgment. The Court of Appeals declined explicitly to pass on the “separate proceedings between
these parties on other causes of action before” this Court.1831 Those “other causes of action” were
the ones Chevron pressed at trial. None of them invokes the Recognition Act, and Naranjo simply
does not apply to them.1832
Chevron here seeks a determination that the defendants procured the Judgment by
fraud and through violation of the RICO statute. It asks this Court for, among other things, a
1829

Id. at 234.
1830

DI 1857 (Donziger Defs.’ Post-trial Reply Mem. of Law), at 11.
1831

Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 239 n.11.
1832

The only reason the Recognition Act has any application to this case is because defendants
pled collateral estoppel in their answers and attempted to rely on the Ecuadorian Judgment
as a basis for that defense. In so doing, they recognized that the recognizability and
enforceability of the Judgment under the Recognition Act was an essential element of their
collateral estoppel defense. See supra Discussion § VII.

482
constructive trust over the proceeds to these defendants of that Judgment and an injunction barring
these defendants from profiting from their fraud, including by seeking to enforce the Judgment in
the United States. While the Count Nine Action under the New York Recognition Act implicated
some of the same questions as those at issue here – most significantly, whether the Judgment was
procured by fraud – the claims in this case involve an entirely different statute, RICO, and nonstatutory state law causes of action about which the Naranjo panel said nothing substantive. Indeed,
as Judge Parker noted at oral argument on defendants’ most recent petition for a writ of mandamus
(the basis of which was that this Court supposedly had violated the “spirit” of Naranjo): “Judge
Kaplan is [here] adjudicating a different case” from that at issue in Naranjo.1833 “He is . . . not
adjudicating the Recognition Act . . . . He may be looking at the same problem, but he’s looking
at it from a decidedly different vantage point.”1834
Second, the international comity concerns expressed in Naranjo were tied to the
panel’s discussion of the Recognition Act.1835 Defendants’ attempt to apply Naranjo’s language
more broadly is misguided. The Naranjo panel determined that “[n]othing in the language, history,
or purposes of the [Recognition] Act suggests that it creates causes of action by which disappointed
litigants in foreign cases can ask a New York court to restrain efforts to enforce those foreign
judgments against them, or to preempt the courts of other countries from making their own decisions

1833

Tr., Sept. 26, 2013 (Hr’g on LAPs’ Pet. for Writ of Mandamus), at 0:11:21-11:29.
1834

Id. at 00:01:58-2:15.
1835

See Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 243.

483
about the enforceability of such judgments.”1836 But it recognized, however, that “[t]o resolve the
dispute before [it], [it] need only address whether the statutory scheme announced by New York’s
Recognition Act allows the district court to declare the Ecuadorian judgment non-recognizable, or
to enjoin plaintiffs from seeking to enforce the judgment.”1837 Defendants now ask the Court to
apply the Second Circuit’s analysis of the precise language and legislative intent behind a New York
statute to (1) an utterly different statute adopted by Congress, and (2) centuries-old non-statutory
causes of action. They have offered no persuasive reason why it should do so.
Third, even if the international comity concerns voiced in Naranjo were more broadly
applicable, they would not be implicated here. This Court does not here “set aside the Ecuadorian
Judgment.” It does not grant worldwide injunction barring any efforts to enforce the Judgment in
other countries. And it does not, as Donziger claims, issue “a worldwide anti-collection
injunction.”1838 It prevents the three defendants who appeared at trial – over whom it has personal
jurisdiction – from profiting from their fraud. This does not “disrespect the legal system . . . of the
country in which the judgment was issued” or those of “other countries” in which the LAPs now,
or later may, seek to enforce the Judgment.
It should be noted also that, although it does not pursue one here, Chevron’s amended
complaint sought a worldwide injunction as relief for Chevron’s RICO and common law fraud
claims. The Naranjo panel was keenly aware of that fact. And counsel for Chevron confirmed at
oral argument that, if the Second Circuit were to lift the preliminary injunction (as it ultimately did),
1836

Id.
1837

Id. at 244.
1838

DI 1857 (Donziger Defs.’ Post-trial Reply Mem. of Law), at 12.

484
it would ask this Court “to reactivate the RICO claims and seek the same injunction under those
claims[.]”1839 Although one member of the panel explicitly contemplated providing this Court with
“instructions . . . with respect to what [kind of relief] might be appropriate under RICO,”1840 the
opinion in Naranjo provided no such instruction. Instead, the Court of Appeals pointedly
“express[ed] no views on the merits of the parties’ various charges and counter-charges regarding
the Ecuadorian legal system and their adversaries’ conduct of this litigation[, nor the relief Chevron
sought,] which may be addressed as relevant in other litigation before the district court or
elsewhere.”1841 Thus, even if Chevron still were seeking an injunction preventing Donziger and the
LAP Representatives from enforcing the Judgment anywhere in the world – which it is not – nothing
in Naranjo would prevent it from doing so.

Conclusion
The saga of the Lago Agrio case is sad. It is distressing that the course of justice was
perverted. The LAPs received the zealous representation they wanted, but it is sad that it was not
always characterized by honor and honesty as well. It is troubling that, in the words of Jeffrey
Shinder, what happened here probably means that “we’ll never know whether or not there was a case
to be made against Chevron.”1842

1839

DI 445-14 (Naranjo Oral Arg. Tr.), at 76:19-77:1, 77:16-78:14.
1840

Id. 78:15-21.
1841

Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 246 n.17.
1842

Tr. (Shinder) 1298:21-1299:4.

485

But we have come full circle. As the Court wrote at the outset, “[t]he issue in this
case is not what happened in the Orienté more than twenty years ago and who, if anyone, now is
responsible for any wrongs then done. The issue here, instead, is whether a court decision was
procured by corrupt means, regardless of whether the cause was just.”
The decision in the Lago Agrio case was obtained by corrupt means. The defendants
here may not be allowed to benefit from that in any way. The order entered today will prevent them
from doing so.
The foregoing, together with the appendices to this opinion, constitute the Court’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Defendants’ motions to dismiss [DI 1860, DI 1862] are
denied.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

March 4, 2014
/s/ Lewis A. Kaplan
_________________________________________
Lewis A. Kaplan
United States District Judge