Jacobs v. Robeson County Public Library, et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATIONS regarding 24 First MOTION to Dismiss and 30 MOTION for Summary Judgment - This court RECOMMENDS that the individually-named Defendants' motion to dismiss [DE-24] be denied without prejudice and Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment [DE-30] be denied without prejudice. Objections due by 6/4/2012. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robert B. Jones, Jr. on 05/18/2012. (Attachments: # 1 Notice) (Baker, C.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

No. 7:12-CV-20-FL

SHERRYL LYNN JACOBS,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
ROBESON COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRARY, )
BOARD OF DIRECTORS FOR
)
ROBESON COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRARY,)
ROBERT F. FISHER, HORACE STACY, )
GAYLE MCLEAN, and TINA MELLEN )
STEPP THOMAS,
)
)
Defendants.
)

MEMORANDUM AND
RECOMMENDATION

This matter comes before this court on the motion by the individually-named Defendants
Robert F. Fisher, Horace Stacy, Gayle McLean and Tina Mellen Stepp-Thomas (altogether
"Individually-Named Defendants") to dismiss the complaint [DE-24] and on the motion by
Plaintiff Sherryl Lynn Jacobs ("Plaintiff') for summary judgment. [DE-30]. The motions were
referred to this court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B) and Local Civil Rule 72.3(c),
and are considered here as a recommendation to the district court. For the reasons below, this
court recommends that each of the motions be denied without prejudice.

BACKGROUND
On January 19,2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants Robeson County
Public Library, members of the Robeson County Library Board of Directors from 2007-2009,
Robert F. Fisher, Horace Stacy, Gayle McLean and Tina Mellen Stepp-Thomas. Compl. [DE-l­
1] '2. The individually-named Defendants are identified in the complaint as either directors or

,.. .

members of the Robeson County Library Board of Directors. ld.

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7. Plaintiff's complaint seeks

redress for alleged employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act. l ld. ~ 3, 4. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
discriminated against her from January 2007 through September 2009. ld.

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8. In particular,

Plaintiff alleges she was discharged from her employment and retaliated against based on her
disability. ld.

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4, 6. Plaintiff alleges further that Defendants refused to provide her with

"work area equipment to satisfY Work Place Evaluation" and required her to use her lunchtime to
travel from one duty location to another. ld.

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9. Plaintiff alleges that she was the only employee

denied lunch breaks on a consistent basis and that Defendants refused to authorize breaks as
allowed by the employee manual. ld. Plaintiff alleges further that Defendants "took away" her
position and awarded it to a part-time employee and "took away" her office and moved her to a
work space where Defendants knew the equipment failed to meet the requirements of the "Work
Place Evaluation." ld. Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") regarding Defendants' alleged discriminatory conduct on or
about October 19,2009, and Plaintiff received her Notice of Suit Rights letter from the EEOC on
October 26,2011.2 ld. ~ 11; [DE-I-2].

Plaintiff's complaint appears to be either a form Title VII employment
discrimination complaint or adapted from such a form complaint wherein the governing statute
for the asserted cause of action (Title VII) is preprinted on the form and the complainant is to
provide information substantiating her claims.
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The Charge of Discrimination attached to the complaint indicates the basis of the
alleged discrimination reported to the EEOC is retaliation and disability occurring on September
8,2009. [DE-I-2] at 1. According to the charge narrative, Plaintiff requested a disability
accommodation from January 2008 through July 2009. ld. The narrative provides further that on
or about August 5, 2009, Plaintiffwas demoted to a clerk position by Defendant Stepp and
discharged on September 8, 2009. ld.

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....

On April 3, 2012, the individually-named Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint.
Mot. to Dismiss [DE-24]. On the same date, all Defendants filed ajoint answer to the complaint.
Ans. [DE-26]. Thereafter, on April 17, 2012, Plaintiff filed an amendment to her complaint.
Pl.'s Am. to Compl. [DE-29]. In her purported amendment, Plaintiff states that the individuallynamed Defendants and two new defendants 3 harassed Plaintiff and retaliated against her for
filing a workers compensation claim against the Robeson County Library. [d. at 1. In particular,
Plaintiff alleges that after her "initial on the job neck injury and finalization of [her] workers
compensation claim Mr. Fisher took away [her] supervisory position and awarded it to a parttime employee." [d. at 2-3. She alleges further that Defendants' refused to accommodate her
disability by failing to provide her with a work area equipped to satisfy the Work Place
Evaluation. [d. at 3. Plaintiff alleges that while she regained her supervisory position, she was
denied work breaks after being diagnosed with "Bilateral Carpal Tunnel" in violation of the
library's employee manual. [d. Finally, Plaintiff alleges she. was denied permission to speak
with other employees during and after work. [d.
On April!7, 2012, Plaintiff filed a document entitled "Reply" to Defendants' motion to
dismiss. Reply (DE-30]. Plaintiffs reply is directed to Defendants' answer and provides
responses to Defendants' numbered responses and defenses contained in their answer. [d. at 2-4.
Within her reply, however, Plaintiff states that she "requests a motion for summary judgment"
and requests that Defendants "be held accountable for their actions through a summary
judgment." [d. at 1,4.

The two new defendants are identified in Plaintiff s amendment to her original
complaint as Elizabeth Townsend and Larry McGougan. Pl.'s Am. to Compl. [DE-29] at 1.
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On April 17, 2012, Plaintiff filed a memorandum in response to Defendants' motion to
dismiss. Pl.'s Mem. [DE-31]. On April 27, 2012, all Defendants with the exception of
Townsend and McGougan, filed an answer to Plaintiffs purported amendment to her complaint.
Ans. to Pl.'s Am. to Compi. [DE-32]. Within their answer, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs
amendment should be stricken because Plaintiff filed her amendment after Defendants had filed
their responsive pleading and Plaintiff failed to obtain Defendants' consent or leave of court to
amend her complaint. ld. at 1.
DISCUSSION
A.

The Effect of Plaintiffs Purported Amendment
In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1), a party may amend a pleading as of right

before being served with a responsive pleading. Once the amending party has received a
response to its initial pleading, amendment is permissible with the opposing party's written
consent or leave of court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In that circumstance, amendment rests
with the court's discretion and should be freely granted "when justice so requires." ld. "As a
general rule, an amended pleading ordinarily supercedes the original and renders it of no legal
effect." Young v. City o/Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal
quotations omitted).
"Rule 15 requires that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires, and
that leave should be granted with extreme liberality because cases should be decided on the
merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities." Kuria v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC,
752 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1297-98 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) ("The court should freely give leave when justice so requires."); accord
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Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404,426 (4th Cir. 2006) (describing Rule 15(a) as "a liberal rule
[which] gives effect to the federal policy in favor of resolving cases on their merits instead of
disposing of them on technicalities"). Accordingly, leave to amend "should be denied only when
the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of
the moving party, or the amendment would have been futile." Laber, 438 F.3d at 426.
Here, Plaintiff failed to amend her pleading prior to Defendants' responsive pleading nor
did she move the court to amend her complaint or seek consent from Defendants. Plaintiffs
actions clearly violate Rule 15. Nonetheless, the court finds that amendment should be allowed.
Plaintiff s amendment was made early in the case and Defendants have not demonstrated any
prejudice as a result of Plaintiff s amendment. In fact, Defendants have answered the amended
complaint and asserted no objection to the amendment other than Plaintiff failed to follow the
proper amendment procedure. Because Plaintiffs amendment is allowed, Plaintiffs amendment
supercedes Plaintiffs original complaint. See Young, 238 F.3d at 572. Accordingly, the motion
filed by the individually-named Defendants to dismiss the initial complaint is moot and
Plaintiffs motion is denied without prejudice.
B.

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
As part of her response to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiff has moved for

summary judgment. [DE-30]. However, Plaintiffs motion is premature. The Supreme Court has
noted "[i]n our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment,
after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986);

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...

see Temkin v. Frederick v. Frderick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 719 (4th Cir. 1991)
("Summary judgment may only be entered after 'adequate time for discovery."') (citing Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322). A case management order has been entered today and discovery between the
parties has not yet commenced. The case record contains no affidavits or discovery responses on
which to sustain such a motion, but only allegations contained in the parties respective pleadings,
and averments contained in their few filings. In fact, Plaintiff filed her motion before Defendants
answered her amended complaint. Ultimately, however, Defendants are entitled to conduct
discovery before being compelled to respond to a motion for summary judgment. Rudolph v.

Buncombe County Government, No. 1:10-CV-203, 2011 WL 1883814, at *1 (W.D.N.C. May 17,
2011); Williams v. Calton, No. 7:1O-CV-75, 2011 WL 320813, at *3 (W.D. Va. Jan 28,2011)
(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). Under the present circumstances summary judgment is
premature. See Rudolph, 2011 WL 1883814, at * 1 (pro se plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment denied without prejudice as premature where plaintiff included motion in her reply to
Defendant's answer before discovery had been completed). Accordingly, it is recommended that
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied without prejudice.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this court RECOMMENDS that the individually-named
Defendants' motion to dismiss [DE-24] be denied without prejudice and Plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment [DE-30] be denied without prejudice.
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation to counsel for the
respective parties, who have fourteen (14) days upon receipt to file written objections. Failure to
file timely written objections shall bar an aggrieved party from receiving a de novo review by the
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District Court on an issue covered in the Memorandum and Recommendation and, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions not objected to, and accepted by, the District Court.
This, the 18th day of May, 2012.

United States Magistrate Judge

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