STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, et al

Filing 50

RESPONSE in Opposition re 39 MOTION to Intervene filed by STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC.. Replies due by 8/7/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Students v Harvard Order, # 2 Exhibit B - Fisher v. Texas Order)(RULEY, DANIEL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CASE NO. 1:14-CV-954
STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC.
Plaintiff,
v.
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH
CAROLINA,
et al.,
Defendants.

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PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION TO INTERVENE
I.

NATURE OF THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT
A group of four minorities who currently attend the University of North Carolina at

Chapel Hill and five minority high school students who intend to apply to the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (“Movants”) have filed a Motion to Intervene (“Motion”)
in this matter under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) as of right. In the alternative,
they seek permissive intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b). For the
reasons set forth below, the Motion should be denied and Movants instead should be
allowed to participate as amici curiae.
II.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The use of racial preferences at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and

other top universities is an issue of national importance. Plaintiff thus has no desire to

foreclose Movants from weighing in on the relevant legal issues in this case and believes
the Court should exercise its discretion to allow Movants to participate in this case as amici
curiae. Doing so would allow Movants to be heard on the legal and policy issues they wish
to raise without impairing the parties’ ability to conduct discovery in an expeditious
fashion.
Intervention, however, is not justified. Intervention as of right is not warranted for
several reasons. First, Movants do not have a protectable legal interest in the continued use
of racial preferences. Unlike Plaintiff’s members, whose equal-protection and Title VI
rights are jeopardized by the discriminatory policies of Defendants (“UNC-Chapel Hill”),
Movants would not suffer a cognizable injury if UNC-Chapel Hill discontinued the use of
racial preferences, either voluntarily or in compliance with an order from this Court. The
Supreme Court has made clear that there is no legal right to preference on the basis of race.
See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights &
Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). Second, UNCChapel Hill will adequately represent any conceivable interest Movants might possess.
UNC-Chapel Hill and Movants share the same ultimate goal—the rejection of Plaintiff’s
challenge—and UNC-Chapel Hill is vigorously defending this challenge to its admissions
system. Third, Movants’ failure to seek intervention for more than seven months after the
Complaint was filed and more than three months after UNC-Chapel Hill filed its Answer
has prejudiced the parties. If intervention is granted, the parties will not be able to complete

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discovery in the timeframe the Court established; indeed the discovery schedule would
need to be extended, likely by several months.
Permissive intervention should be denied for these same reasons. The Court enjoys
broad discretion under Rule 24(b) to assess whether permissive intervention is appropriate
under the circumstances of this case. Given Movants’ lack of a protectable interest, UNCChapel Hill’s willingness to vigorously defend its admissions system, and the discovery
complexities that Movants would introduce, the Court should exercise its discretion to deny
permissive intervention and allow Movants instead to participate as amici curiae. That is
what the district courts did in both Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin and Students for
Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College when confronted with
similar intervention motions. Following that course allowed the district court in Fisher to
efficiently manage a complex case while allowing students similarly situated to Movants
to share their views on legal issues relevant to the case. The district court in Harvard
College adopted that same approach after concluding that similarly situated Harvard
students and future applicants had no protectable interest. See Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 1414176, 2015 WL 3683230 (D. Mass. June 15, 2015) (Doc. 52) (copy attached as Exhibit
A). The Court should follow the lead of those courts by denying the Motion and affording
Movants status as amici curiae.

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III.

ARGUMENT
A.

Movants Are Not Entitled To Intervention As Of Right

“Applicants to intervene as of right must meet all four of the following
requirements: (1) the application to intervene must be timely; (2) the applicant must have
an interest in the subject matter of the underlying action; (3) the denial of the motion to
intervene would impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect its interest; and (4) the
applicant’s interest is not adequately represented by the existing parties to the litigation.”
Hous. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 193 F.3d 838, 839 (4th Cir. 1999). Because Movants must
meet all four of these requirements, the failure to satisfy any one of them dooms their
request to intervene as of right. See id. Here, Movants cannot meet any of the preconditions
to intervention as of right.
1.

Movants lack a “significantly protectable interest” in this action.

Although Rule 24 does not specify what type of interest a party must have to
intervene as a matter of right, the Supreme Court has recognized that “‘[w]hat is obviously
meant ... is a significantly protectable interest.’” Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517,
531 (1971). Thus, “a general interest in the subject matter of pending litigation does not
constitute a protectable interest within the meaning of Rule 24(a)(2). To be protectable, the
putative intervenor’s claim must bear a close relationship to the dispute between the
existing litigants and therefore must be direct, rather than remote or contingent.” Dairy

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Maid Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 147 F.R.D. 109, 111 (E.D. Va. 1993) (citing 3B Moore’s
Federal Practice ¶ 24.07[2]).
Movants lack a “significantly protectable interest” in this action and hence are
unable to show that denial of intervention threatens to impair their rights. As a preliminary
matter, Movant’s interest is not at all direct; it “is indirect, as it is derivative of [the
university’s] right to consider race in its admissions process.” Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc., 2015 WL 3683230 at *6. More importantly, the Supreme Court recently
made clear that Movants have no protectable interest—let alone a significantly protectable
interest—in the continued use of racial preferences at UNC-Chapel Hill or anywhere else.
See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights &
Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). The Schuette
plaintiffs, who included “prospective applicants to Michigan public universities,” filed suit
claiming that a ballot initiative banning the use of racial preferences in admissions violated
their legal rights. Id. at 1629-30. The Court disagreed. While use of racial preferences in
admissions is presumptively unconstitutional and thus subject to strict scrutiny, a
university’s decision to refrain from using or to discontinue use of such racial preferences
is never illegal. See id. at 1629-36. As the Court explained, a university’s decision to shift
from a race-based admissions system to a race-neutral admissions system does not cause
any potential applicant “specific injury of the kind” needed to create a protectable legal
interest. Id. at 1636. The Equal Protection Clause could never “forbid” a university “from
banning a practice that the Clause barely—and only provisionally—permits.” Id. at 1639

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(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Indeed, even the dissent in Schuette (which
objected to the particular way in which Michigan pursued the change) agreed that a
university is perfectly free to eliminate racial preferences in admissions without offending
the Constitution. See id. at 1652-53, 1669-70 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Schuette thus is fatal to Movants’ assertion of a significantly protectable legal
interest. Movants claim to have an interest “in having their applications considered under
a holistic admissions process that includes appropriate consideration of race and thus
complies with Title VI and the Constitution.” Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed
Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion to Intervene (“Memo”) at 8. By reaffirming that racial
preferences are presumptively unconstitutional and holding that a university’s decision to
discontinue use of racial preferences is never illegal, Schuette makes plain that Movants
would lack any legal interest in objecting even if UNC-Chapel Hill voluntarily decided to
discontinue racial preferences. See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629-36; see also Students for
Fair Admissions, Inc., 2015 WL 3683230 at *6 (recognizing that Harvard students and
applicants “have no constitutional right to have their race considered by Harvard”) (internal
quotation omitted).
Movants’ legal rights are no greater because that same question arises here in the
context of a lawsuit seeking to compel UNC-Chapel Hill to discontinue racial preferences
in admissions. Whether UNC-Chapel Hill’s challenged conduct is ended voluntarily or by
court order, the end result would be a race-neutral admissions system at UNC-Chapel Hill
that would in no way disparage the rights of any applicant for undergraduate admission,

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including Movants. See id. (“Plaintiff’s interest in preventing Harvard from considering
race in its admissions decisions is qualitatively different from the proposed-intervenors’
interest in supporting Harvard’s admissions policies. The former gives rise to a
constitutional claim, while the latter does not.”).
Finally, although whether Rule 24(a)(2) requires Movants to have Article III
standing to intervene as of right remains an open question, see Diamond v. Charles, 476
U.S. 54, 69 (1986), “in the ordinary case, an applicant who satisfies the ‘interest’
requirement of the intervention rule is almost always going to have a sufficient stake in the
controversy to satisfy Article III as well.” Cotter v. Massachusetts Ass’n of Minority Law
Enforcement Officers, 219 F.3d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 2000). 1 Movants clearly lack Article III
standing given that they could not sue UNC-Chapel Hill for discontinuing the use of racial
preferences in admissions. That alone is a powerful signal that intervention as of right
should be denied. But Movants’ lack of injury provides an additional reason to deny
intervention as of right, because standing certainly would be required to continue the case
in the event UNC-Chapel Hill declined to appeal an adverse judgment or settled the case.
See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (“[S]tanding ‘must be met by
persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of
first instance.’”) (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64

1

In an unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit has stated that a movant seeking
intervention as of right “must have standing to assert his claim in a separate action.”
Patterson v. Shumate, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1990) (table), 1990 WL 122240, at *2.

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(1997)). That Movants would lack appellate standing further counsels against granting
intervention as of right.
2.

UNC-Chapel Hill adequately represents Movants’ interests.

Even assuming that Movants have a significantly protectable interest in the
continued use of racial preferences, UNC-Chapel Hill will adequately represent that
interest. As the Fourth Circuit has explained, “[w]hen the party seeking intervention has
the same ultimate objective as a party to the suit, a presumption arises that its interests are
adequately represented.” Virginia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 542 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir.
1976); see also Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Reichhold, Inc., No.
1:06CV939, 2008 WL 90186 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 8, 2008) (same). Movants may overcome this
presumption only by demonstrating “adversity of interest, collusion, or nonfeasance.”
Westinghouse Elec., 542 F.2d at 216.
The presumption applies here. Movants’ ultimate objective in intervening is the
rejection of SFFA’s claim and the continued use of racial preferences in undergraduate
admissions at UNC-Chapel Hill. See Memo at 6 (highlighting Movants’ interest in a
“comprehensive defense of UNC-Chapel-Hill’s consideration of race in admissions”); id.
at 9-10 (explaining that Movants seek to intervene to “defend[] a program that enhances
their fair chance for admission to UNC-Chapel Hill” and “ensur[es] that future applications

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are considered under a holistic process that includes the lawful consideration of race”).
UNC-Chapel Hill, of course, shares that ultimate objective.
Movants cannot overcome the presumption. They do not even suggest collusion or
nonfeasance. Rather, they claim to have adversity of interest because they disagree with
certain aspects of UNC-Chapel Hill’s admissions system, including legacy preferences,
early action admissions, and reliance on standardized tests. See id. at 17-18. Movants,
however, have not sought intervention to challenge these policies—nor could they.
Moreover, Movants’ interest in exposing the allegedly disparate impact of UNC-Chapel
Hill’s use of legacy preferences, early action admissions, and standardized tests “is already
represented in this case, if not by [the university], then by SFFA.” Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc., 2015 WL 3683230 at *9; see Compl. ¶¶ 5, 87-98, 134-45 (highlighting
the effect of standardized testing, legacy preferences, and early action admissions on racial
diversity at UNC-Chapel Hill).
However they dress up their argument, Movants seek intervention to defend UNCChapel Hill’s use of race in admissions decisions. Any policy dispute between Movants
and UNC-Chapel Hill is beyond the scope of this case. At most, Movants might offer
additional arguments, Memo at 12, for why, in their view, it is important to retain racial
preferences in undergraduate admissions, i.e., the ultimate objective they and UNC-Chapel
Hill share. But that is not a basis for intervention as of right, see Stuart v. Huff, 706 F.3d
345, 353 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[D]isagreement over how to approach the conduct of the
litigation is not enough to rebut the presumption of adequacy.”); United States v. N.

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Carolina, No. 1:13CV861, 2014 WL 494911, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2014) (same); Little
Rock Sch. Dist. v. N. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 378 F.3d 774, 780 (8th Cir. 2004) (“It is not
sufficient that the party seeking intervention merely disagrees with the litigation strategy
or objectives of the party representing its interests.”), especially “[g]iven the relative
weakness of [Movants’] purported interests,” Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 2015 WL
3683230 at *10. It was precisely these types of arguments that resulted in the denial of
intervention in Fisher and in Harvard College. See Order at 2, Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at
Austin, No. A-08-CA-263-SS, (W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2008) (Doc. 83) (copy attached as
Exhibit B hereto) (“Specifically, the Court finds movants’ interests adequately represented
by the existing parties, specifically the defendants, in this litigation. The Court also finds
denial of the motions to intervene to be in the best interest of an efficient resolution of this
case.”); Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 2015 WL 3683230 at *10 (“[T]he Court notes
that any unique arguments [Movants] wish to advance can be submitted via amicus briefs
and [supporting] personal declarations.”). If there was adequacy of representation in Fisher
and Harvard College, there is adequacy of representation here.
In fact, this is exactly the type of intervention application of which a district court
should be especially wary; “piling on parties” can “result in delay as parties and court
expend resources trying to overcome the centrifugal forces springing from intervention,
and prejudice will take the form not only of the extra cost but also of an increased risk of
error.” Mass. School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. United States, 118 F.3d 776, 782 (D.C. Cir.
1997). A district court that grants party status to those who “only marginally satisfy the

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standing requirements” and are not “truly aggrieved” will be “repeatedly required to
respond to vague hypotheticals and speculation rather than concrete and actual harms.”
Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 825 n.75 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
Finally, Movants’ suggestion that UNC-Chapel Hill is not sufficiently motivated or
not politically inclined to defend the use of racial preferences in admissions, see Memo at
14-15, 16-17, is untenable. As Movants acknowledge, “‘where the party who shares the
intervenor’s objective is a government agency, the intervenor has the burden of making a
strong showing of inadequacy.’” Memo at 16 (quoting Stuart v. Huff, 706 F.3d 345, 350
(4th Cir. 2013)). 2
Moreover, UNC-Chapel Hill, which is represented jointly here by the North
Carolina Department of Justice and a major international law firm, has made clear from the
outset of this case and throughout that it will vigorously defend its admissions system. See
Asian Students Allege Entrance Discrimination At UNC, Harvard, ABC11 Eyewitness
News (Nov. 17, 2014) (“UNC issued a statement on the lawsuit Monday from Rick White,

2

Although Movants suggest that this heightened burden applies only where the
government agency is called upon to defend a statute it administers, see Memo at 16-17,
Movants cite no case from anywhere in this Circuit to support this limiting proposition.
Nor does Stuart itself support such a limitation. If anything, Stuart confirms that the
heightened burden applies anytime a would-be intervenor is aligned with a governmental
agency, because one of the federal appellate decisions Stuart relies on in endorsing this
heightened burden involved a case like this one, where the proposed intervenor was aligned
with governmental agencies defending their conduct against alleged violations of federal
law. See Stuart, 706 F.3d at 350 (“find[ing] persuasive” and adopting the heightened
burden applied by several sister circuits) (citing, among other cases, Wade v.
Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 186 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982)).

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Associate Vice Chancellor for Communications and Public Affairs: ‘The University stands
by its current undergraduate admissions policy and process. … [T]he University continues
to affirm the educational benefits diversity brings to students, as well as the importance of
preparing students for a diverse society and assuring a pool of strong state leaders by
admitting

undergraduates

from

every

background.’”),

available

at

http://abc11.com/education/asian-students-allege-entrance-discrimination-at-uncharvard/398639/; Answer at 3 (“It is expressly denied that Defendants unlawfully
discriminate in any aspect of UNC-Chapel Hill undergraduate admissions[.]”); see also
Ans. ¶¶ 7, 20, 198, 205, 215. Furthermore, UNC-Chapel Hill has championed the fact that
it employs racial preferences in undergraduate admissions, emphasizing its repeated
affirmations that using race in admissions is “essential” to its mission. See Brief of Amicus
Curiae University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Supporting Respondents at 9, Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. filed Aug. 9, 2012). There is no basis to
suppose that UNC-Chapel Hill is going to suddenly and voluntarily abandon a practice it
deems essential to its institutional mission. And, given their lack of standing, Movants
would have no recourse even if UNC-Chapel Hill did.
3.

Movants’ application is untimely.

Although this action was filed on November 18, 2014, Movants delayed seeking
intervention until June 30, 2015—more than seven months later. Movants claim they could
have not sought intervention earlier because UNC-Chapel Hill did not identify the “list of
areas and subjects on which they plan to conduct discovery,” until they submitted their

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Rule 26(f) Report on May 4, 2015. Memo at 6. But UNC-Chapel Hill made its position
regarding this lawsuit publicly known from the outset, and certainly no later than when it
filed its Answer on March 24, 2015—more than three months before Movants sought
intervention. Much shorter delays have resulted in findings of untimeliness. See, e.g.,
NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 367 (1973) (motion to intervene filed 17 days after
“the date [movants] allegedly were first informed of the pendency of the action” was
deemed “untimely”). Movants were obligated “to proceed with reasonable dispatch to
protect [their] interests.” R & G Mortgage Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 584
F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2009); Gen. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 193 F.3d 838, 839 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation
omitted) (“[T]imeliness is a ‘cardinal consideration’ of whether to permit intervention.”).
They failed to do so.
More fundamentally, the existing parties will be “prejudiced by the failure of wouldbe intervenors to act in a timely fashion.” Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825, 834 (1st
Cir. 1987) (citation and quotations omitted). Between March 24, 2015 and May 4, 2015,
the parties worked diligently to produce a discovery schedule that would lead to as
expeditious a resolution as possible of this complex case. Although the parties were unable
to agree on the length of discovery, the Court placed the case on the “exceptional” casemanagement track and ordered a discovery period of 9 months. This discovery period will
need to be revisited and expanded if Movants are permitted to intervene. Movants claim
they will accept the established schedule. See Memo at 6. But they have made clear that
they plan to participate extensively in discovery. Though they try to downplay the extent

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to which their participation will complicate discovery, it is apparent that Movants intend
to participate extensively in discovery by propounding written interrogatories, taking
multiple depositions, and submitting expert testimony. Id. (stating that Movants intend to
present “expert testimony” and fact discovery that they believe will not “significantly
increase[]” the “number of depositions and the mount of written discovery”). As a result,
the established discovery schedule likely would need to be expanded by at least several
months if Movants are granted intervention to allow for extra time to review, conduct
additional fact discovery (if necessary), rebut additional expert reports, and depose those
additional experts. See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 2015 WL 3683230 at *12
(“[T]he addition of [several] additional parties propounding discovery, presenting expert
testimony, cross-examining witnesses, and participating in all other aspects of the
adversary process would inevitably slow and unduly complicate the progress of this
litigation.”). That is reason enough to deny the request.
B.

Movants Should Be Allowed To Participate As Amici Curiae Instead Of
Being Granted Permissive Intervention.

“The discretion afforded to the district court under Rule 24, substantial in any event,
is even broader when the issue is one of permissive intervention.” Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v.
San Juan Cable, LLC, 298 F.R.D. 28, 30 (D.P.R. 2014). Indeed, “[i]f there is no right to
intervene under Rule 24(a), it is wholly discretionary with the court whether to allow

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intervention under Rule 24(b).” Grogan v. American Brands, Inc., 70 F.R.D. 579, 584
(M.D.N.C. 1976) (internal quotations omitted).
Permissive intervention should be denied here because, as explained above, the
parties will be prejudiced by Movants’ participation in discovery. See Hill v. Western Elec.
Co., Inc., 672 F.2d 381, 386 (4th Cir. 1982) (internal quotations omitted) (noting that, when
considering a motion for permissive intervention, the “most important consideration (in
passing on an application for intervention) is whether the delay has prejudiced the other
parties”); Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 260 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (“Notwithstanding
the existence of common questions of law or fact, a request to intervene may be denied
when granting the motion would unduly expand the litigation.”).
Moreover, denying permissive intervention will not harm Movants because they
have no protectable interest at stake in this litigation and UNC-Chapel Hill will adequately
protect any conceivable interest they do have. See 6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s
Federal Practice ¶ 24.10[2][d] (2000) (“Courts are understandably reluctant to grant
permissive intervention to an applicant where interests are already fully represented by one
of the existing parties.”). In short, “[i]ntervention of the type which is sought in this action
would serve no useful purpose, would cause unnecessary delay and time expenditure, and
would thus unduly prejudice the adjudication for all concerned.” Grogan v. American
Brands, Inc., 70 F.R.D. 579, 584 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (internal quotations omitted). Because
movants would only “muddy the waters unnecessarily,” the Court should deny permissive
intervention. Id.; see also Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 2015 WL 3683230 at *12

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(“[T]he Court has declined to permit discretionary intervention precisely because the
addition of fourteen additional parties propounding discovery, presenting expert testimony,
cross-examining witnesses, and participating in all other aspects of the adversary process
would inevitably slow and unduly complicate the progress of this litigation.”).
Indeed, even where “there is a common question of law or fact, or the requirements
of Rule 24(b) are otherwise satisfied, the court may refuse to allow intervention.” Grogan
v. American Brands, Inc., 70 F.R.D. 579, 584 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (internal quotations
omitted); see also Hopwood v. State, No. CIV. A-92-CA-563-SS, 1994 WL 242362, at *2
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 1994) (citations omitted) (“[T]he existence of a common question of
law or fact will not automatically entitle a movant to intervene.”). The court still retains
“the discretion to determine the fairest and most efficient method of handling the lawsuit.”
Hopwood v. State, No. CIV. A-92-CA-563-SS, 1994 WL 242362, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Jan.
20, 1994) (citations omitted); see also id. at *1 (denying intervention in part because “as a
practical matter, the prospective intervenors and the Defendants have the same ultimate
objective in this lawsuit—the preservation of the admissions policy and procedure
currently used by the law school”).
Here, the fairest and most efficient path forward is to allow Movants to participate
as amici curiae. Movants are chiefly concerned with matters of law and policy; at bottom,
they wish to advocate in support of UNC-Chapel Hill’s policy of considering race as a
factor in undergraduate admissions decisions and to share with the Court their views and
perspectives on this policy. See generally Movants’ Memo & Exhibits 1.1 to 1.9. That is

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precisely the kind of presentation that can be shared through participation as amici curiae.
See Stuart v. Huff, 706 F.3d 345, 355 (4th Cir. 2013) (“While a would-be intervenor may
prefer party status to that of friend-of-court, the fact remains that amici often make useful
contributions to litigation. The availability of such alternative avenues of expression
reinforces our disinclination to drive district courts into multi-cornered lawsuits by
indiscriminately granting would-be intervenors party status and all the privileges pertaining
thereto.”); see also Order at 2, Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, No. A-08-CA-263-SS
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2008) (Doc. 83) (“[A]t the conclusion of the trial on the merits in this
case, each group of proposed interveners will be permitted to file an amicus brief no more
than twenty (20) pages in length.”); Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 2015 WL 3683230
at *11 (“The Court finds that amicus status will be sufficient for the Students to present
their views and arguments in this case.”).
IV.

CONCLUSION
For all of these reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny the

Movants’ Motion to Intervene.
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of July, 2015.
/s/ Alan M. Ruley
Alan M. Ruley, N.C. State Bar No. 16407
/s/ Andrew A. Freeman
Andrew A. Freeman, N.C. State Bar No. 41248
Bell, Davis & Pitt, P.A.
Post Office Box 21029
Winston-Salem, N.C. 27120-1029
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: 336/722-8153
Email: [e-mail]

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Email: [e-mail]
Attorneys for Plaintiff
STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC.

Thomas R. McCarthy
William S. Consovoy
J. Michael Connolly
CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PARK PLLC
3033 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 700
Arlington, Virginia 22201
[phone]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
Attorneys (admitted pro hac vice) for Plaintiff
STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 21, 2015, I filed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such
filing to all parties through the Court’s CM/ECF system.
/s/ Alan M. Ruley
Alan M. Ruley, N.C. State Bar No. 16407

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