DEEN-MITCHELL v. LAPPIN et al

Filing 86

ORDER (1) plaintiffs motions to amend and/or supplement his complaint, (Doc. No. 76) & (Doc. No. 81), are GRANTED, and plaintiff shall file one final all-inclusive amended complaint by February 15, 2012 in accordance with the directions provided abov e;(2)plaintiffs motion to have supplement to complaint held in abeyance, (Doc. No. 82), is DENIED as moot;(3)plaintiffs motions for the defendants to return his legal materials, (Doc. No. 71), (Doc. No. 73), (Doc. No. 83) & (Doc. No. 85), areDENIED; (4)plaintiffs motion for a court order regarding the preservation of evidence, (Doc. No. 78), is DENIED; and(5)plaintiffs supplemental complaint, (Doc. No. 77), is stricken from the record.Signed by Magistrate Judge Malachy E. Mannion on 1/10/12 (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 3 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 4 Unpublished Opinion(s)) (bs, )

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PURCELL BRONSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. C.O. LEEDON, et al., Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:04-CV-1899
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50364

July 24, 2006, Decided
July 24, 2006, Filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Reconsideration denied by
Bronson v. Leedom, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64356 (M.D.
Pa., Sept. 8, 2006)

COUNSEL: [*1] Purcell Bronson, Plaintiff, Pro se,
Camp Hill, PA.
Leon Harris, Plaintiff, Pro se, Camp Hill, PA.
For C.O. Leedon, C.O. Martin, Defendants: Gwendolyn
T. Mosley, Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, PA.
JUDGES: A. Richard Caputo, United States District
Judge.
OPINION BY: A. Richard Caputo
OPINION

MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Action Status (Doc. 110), Motion to Compel
Discovery (Doc. 115) and Motion to Leave to File a
Supplemental Complaint (Doc. 17). The Court will
address each motion in turn.
1. Class Action Status

On August 23, 2004, Purcell Bronson and Leon
Harris commenced a section 1983 action. (Doc. 1.)
Plaintiffs are inmates at the State Correctional Institution
at Camp Hill. In this motion, Plaintiffs seek to join
"numerous prisoners who have been confined and are
confined, to the SMU (Special Management Unit), who
were assault[], starved, starved to death, and killed by
SMU guards" ("Class"). (Doc. 121 at 1.)
Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23, a class
action can only be certifed once all four of the following
requirements are met: (1) numerosity; (2) commonality;
[*2] (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation.
See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613, 117
S. Ct. 2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997). In evaluating the
ability of the class representatives to "fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class" under FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4), the Court must determine that the
interests of the named plaintiffs are sufficiently aligned
with those of the absentees and that the class counsel is
qualified. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 83 F.3d 610, 630
(3d Cir. 1996), aff'd by Amchem, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S. Ct.
2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689.
Pro se plaintiffs without any legal training are
generally not permitted to represent a class. Owens v.
Horn, No. 02-0356, at 2 (M.D. Pa. May 17, 2004) (citing
Nilsson v. Coughlin, 670 F. Supp. 1186, 1191 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Jeffery v. Malcolm, 353 F. Supp. 395, 397
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Davis v. City of Portsmouth, 579 F.

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2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50364, *2

Supp. 1205, 1208 (E.D. Va. 1983), aff'd without op., 742
F.2d 1448 (4th Cir. 1984); and Ethnic Awareness Org. v.
Gagnon, 568 F. Supp. 1186, 1187 (E.D. Wis. 1983)).
Plaintiffs Bronson and [*3] Harris seek to represent the
Class. The Court is concerned with the ability of the
named Plaintiffs in providing adequate legal
representation to the interests of the proposed Class. The
Court has spoken on this matter previously:
Although Plaintiff has demonstrated a
willingness to pursue his claims to the best
of his abilities given his limited resources
and lack of formal legal training, a class
action lawsuit is not a simple matter to
pursue. Given that the outcome of a class
action is binding on the entire class, not
just the lead plaintiff, I am not prepared to
say that Plaintiff is legally qualified to
represent the interests of an entire class.
Owens, No. 02-0356, at 3 (citing Owen v. Horn, No.
02-0356 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2002)).
Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the requirements of
FED. R. CIV. P.23(a)(4). Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion
for Class Action Status (Doc. 110) will be denied.
2. Discovery
Plaintiffs filed this motion asking the Court to
compel Defendants to answer Plaintiffs' requests for
production of documents, interrogatories and admissions.
(Doc. 115.) Plaintiffs specifically contend [*4] that
Defendants have failed to respond to their second set of
request for documents, fourth request for admission and
second set of request for interrogatories. (Doc. 116 at 1.)
These are the same requests addressed in Plaintiffs'
previous motion to compel discovery (Doc. 58), which
was addressed by Magistrate Judge J. Andrew Smyser on
September 26, 2005. (Doc. 103 at 11-13.) In that Order,
the Magistrate Judge denied Plaintiffs' motion as being
prematurely filed. (Id. at 13.)
According to Defendants brief in opposition to
Plaintiffs' previous motion to compel, they had until July
23, 2005 to respond to Plaintiffs' second set of requests
for documents and fourth request for admission. (Doc.
70-1 at 2.) They also had until August 11, 2005 to
respond to Plaintiffs' second set of requests for
[interrogatories]. (Id.) As of the date of this opinion,
Defendants have not responded to Plaintiffs requests.

Plaintiffs, however, have failed to file, as part of
their motion, "a statement certifying that counsel has
conferred with counsel for the opposing party in good
faith effort to resolve by agreement the issues raised by
the motion without the intervention of the court, together
[*5] with a detailed explanation why such agreement
could not be reached." M.D. Pa. LR 26.3.
Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery
(Doc. 115) will be denied.
3. Supplemental Complaint
Plaintiffs filed this motion seeking to file a
supplemental complaint. (Doc. 117.) Without leave of the
Court, Plaintiffs filed their Supplemental Complaint.
(Doc. 118.) In their brief in support of this motion,
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have falsely stated that
Defendant Martin no longer works in the SMU. (Doc.
119 at 1.) In the Supplemental Complaint, Plaintiff
Bronson alleges that on certain dates in July, August and
September of 2005, Defendant Martin made derogatory
remarks and deprived Bronson of food. (Doc. 118 at P
1,2,4.)
Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(d), "upon
motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice
and upon such terms as are just, permit the party to serve
a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or
occurrences or events which have happened since the
date of the pleading sought to be supplemented." Because
it refers to events that occurred after the original pleading
was filed, a supplemental [*6] pleading differs from an
amendment, which covers matters that occurred before
the filing of the original pleading but were overlooked at
the time. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co.,
Inc., 610 F.2d 1185, 1188 (3d Cir. 1979).
A motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading is
left "to the sound discretion of the trial court and should
be freely granted when doing so will promote the
justiciable disposition of the case, will not cause undue
prejudice or delay or trial inconvenience and will not
prejudice the rights of any parties to the action." Bates v.
Western Elec., 420 F. Supp. 521, 525 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(citing WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civil § 1504 at
542-43). This is particularly true in cases where the
supplemental pleading will cause no delay in the trial of
the case nor prejudice the other party in any way. Id.
Hence, unless the court find "undue delay, bad faith or

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2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50364, *6

dilatory motive on the part of the movant or undue
prejudice to the opposing party an appropriate exercise of
a court's discretion should result in affording a plaintiff
the opportunity to test its claim on the merits." Medeva
Pharma Ltd. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14305, [*7] at *5 (citation omitted).
The act of filing repetitive complaints alleging
virtually identical causes of action can be considered to
be malicious. Bronson v. Horn, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
38791,No. 02-663, at *6 (W.D. Pa. June 12, 2006). The
allegations made in Plaintiffs' Supplemental Complaint,
that Defendant Martin made derogatory remarks and
deprived Plaintiff Bronson of food (Doc. 118 at P 1,2,4),
are similar to the original allegations in the Complaint,
against the same Defendant (Doc. 1 at P 9, 10).
Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a
Supplemental Complaint (Doc. 117) will be denied.

/s/ A. Richard Caputo
United States District Judge
ORDER
NOW, this 24th of July, 2006, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that:
1) Plaintiff's Motion for Motion for
Class Action Status (Doc. 111) is
DENIED;
4) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel
Discovery (Doc. 115) is DENIED; and
5) Plaintiff's Motion to Leave to File a
Supplemental Complaint (Doc. 117) is
DENIED.

An appropriate Order follows.

/s/ A. Richard Caputo

July 24, 2006

United States District Judge

Date