Amsden v. Ebbert et al
Filing
5
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Kyle Ray Amsden Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 2/21/14. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 3 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 4 Unpublished Opinion(s))(bs)
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310 Prisons
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
M.D. Pennsylvania.
Kevin Paul WOODRUFF, Petitioner
v.
Troy WILLIAMSON, Respondent.
Civil No. 3:CV–06–2310.
March 12, 2009.
West KeySummaryConstitutional Law 92
4829
92 Constitutional Law
92XXVII Due Process
92XXVII(H) Criminal Law
92XXVII(H)11 Imprisonment and Incidents Thereof
92k4829 k. Reduction of Term; Good-Time
Credits. Most Cited Cases
Habeas Corpus 197
515
197 Habeas Corpus
197II Grounds for Relief; Illegality of Restraint
197II(B) Particular Defects and Authority for Detention
in General
197k512 Nature and Place of Confinement
197k515 k. Good Conduct Credit. Most Cited
Cases
Prisons 310
247
310 Prisons
310II Prisoners and Inmates
310II(F) Duration of Confinement
310k243 Good Conduct or Other Earned Credits
Against Sentence
310k247 k. Loss and Restoration of Credits.
Most Cited Cases
Prisons 310
289(3)
310II Prisoners and Inmates
310II(H) Proceedings
310k279 Requisites, Course, and Conduct of
Proceedings
310k289 Evidence and Witnesses
310k289(3) k. Right to Present Evidence and
Witnesses. Most Cited Cases
Habeas petitioner was not denied substantive due process
when his good conduct time (GCT) was removed due to
disciplinary sanctions. Petitioner alleged that, with respect to
an incident where he was accused of possessing a weapon, a
videotape of the incident in the yard was exculpatory. The
disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) specifically addressed
petitioner's claim by informing “the inmate that the video
footage did not focus on” him. Throughout the exhaustion
process and his habeas proceedings, petitioner did not provide
any evidence to dispute the DHO's finding. Based on the facts,
there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that
petitioner was in possession of the weapon on the day of the
charged incident. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
Kevin Paul Woodruff, USP-Big Sandy Special Mail, Inez, KY,
pro se.
Dennis Pfannenschmidt, Michael Butler, U.S. Attorney's
Office, Harrisburg, PA, for Respondent.
MEMORANDUM
A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.
I. Introduction.
*1 Kevin Paul Woodruff, a pro se petitioner, has filed a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and has
paid the $5.00 filing fee. FN1 Woodruff, a federal prisoner
challenges the loss of Good Conduct Time (“GCT”) as a result
of two separate disciplinary at two different facilities,
USP–Victorville, Adelanto, California, and USP–Lewisburg,
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. Woodruff also claims he was
transferred to USP–Lewisburg's Special Management Unit
(“SMU”) in retaliation for filing administrative remedies and
for racially motivated reasons. While housed in the SMU,
Woodruff states he was denied appropriate medical care for his
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asthma and complaints of chest pain. Finally, Woodruff asserts
the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has miscalculated his sentence
by denying him prior custody credit and disallowing vested
GCT. Woodruff contends the correction of his sentence would
result in his immediate release and seeks monetary damages for
the remaining charges. (Doc. 1, Petition .)
FN1. Woodruff is presently housed at USP–Big
Sandy, Inez, Kentucky. Although USP–Big Sandy is
not located in the Middle District of Pennsylvania,
this Court retains jurisdiction since Woodruff was in
this district when he filed his Petition. See Rumsfeld
v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 2721,
159 L.Ed.2d 513 (2004) (citing Ex parte Mitsuye
Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 304, 65 S.Ct. 209, 219, 89 L.Ed.
243 (1944)); see also Kennedy v. Warden, USP
Allenwood, 239 Fed. Appx. 718 (3d Cir.2007).
For the reasons discussed below, certain claims will be
dismissed without prejudice to Woodruff's right to pursue them
in a properly filed civil rights complaint. The claims properly
brought in this habeas petition will be denied.
II. Factual Background.
A. Disciplinary Proceedings at USP–Victorville.
On September 13, 2005, Woodruff received an incident
report charging him with offense code violations 104,
Possession of a Weapon, and 307, Refusing an Order. (Doc.
15–6, Exhibits in Support of Respondent's Response to the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at R. 21.) FN2 The report,
authored by Officer Jarvis, contains the following information:
FN2. “R.” or “RR.” references are to the CM/ECF
pagination of the document cited.
On September 12, 2005, at approximately 7:05 p.m., I
observed inmate Woodruff, Kevin, Reg. No. 56195–07,
holding in his hand a homemade weapon that looked like an
ice-pick style metal rod approximately 6 inches long. The
inmate was ordered to get on the ground, he did not comply
until Tower # 7 fired two blast dispersion rounds. At this
time Woodruff handed the weapon to inmate Fields,
Dwayne, Reg. No. 86688–011, who walked over to a trash
can and tried to hide the weapon under it. The weapon was
recovered an placed in evidence.
(Id.) Photographs of three 6 inch weapons found that day are
supplied by Respondent. Two of the weapons were found by
CO Jarvis. (See Id. at RR. 23–25.) On September 15, 2003,
Woodruff attended a hearing conducted by the Unit
Disciplinary Committee (“UDC”). (Id. at RR. 21–22.) The
UDC referred the matter to a disciplinary hearing officer
(“DHO”) for further hearing. (Id.) Woodruff requested that
the DHO review the video tapes of the yard that day
claiming they would exonerate him of all charges. (Id.) The
UDC advised Woodruff of his rights before the DHO and he
was issued a written copy of the same. (Id. at R. 26.)
Woodruff waived his right to have a staff representative
present and his right to call witnesses before the DHO. (Id.
at R. 27.)
*2 The disciplinary hearing was held on September 21,
2005. Woodruff again waived his right to a staff representative
and after being advised of his rights, indicating that he
understood them, and denied the charges. The DHO recorded
his statement as follows:
Inmate Woodruff ... stated he saw some other inmates
outside, so he ran up there to break it up. Inmate Woodruff
stated the tower fired a gun shot, and he got down. Inmate
Woodruff stated he was told to go around the corner, and he
did this when staff handcuffed him. When questioned by the
DHO what his actions were when he arrived at the group of
other inmates, inmate Woodruff stated “Nothing really, I just
stood there.”
(Id. at R. 17.) In reaching his decision in this matter, the
DHO relied upon the Incident Report and Investigation, a
Memorandum authored by CO Jarvis, and photographs of the
weapons found. (Id.) The DHO informed Woodruff that the
videotape of the events in the yard that day “does not focus on”
him. (Id.)
Relying on the greater weight of the evidence, the DHO found
Woodruff committed the prohibited act of possession of a
weapon and expunged the refusing to obey and order charge.
(Id.)
Specifically, the DHO relies upon the reporting officer's
eyewitness observation that the inmate was observed with an
ice-pick type weapon, 6 inches in length, in his hand, and
handed it over to another inmate. The DHO compared this
observation to the photograph of the weapons which were
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recovered. The DHO determined the weapons recovered at
the scene of the physical altercation compared to the weapon
described by the reporting officer. The DHO found no
reason to question the validity of the reporting officer, since
his observatins were made strictly in the performance of his
duties, without any reason to submit a falser report.
The DHO relies upon the photograph of the weapon which
depicts an instrument capable of inflicting serious
life-threatening injuries.
The DHO relies upon the inmate's statement at his DHO
hearing in which he admitted he voluntarily ran over to a
physical altercation which was taking place between other
inmates. The DHO determined the inmate had no business in
that area, and did not believe the inmate's version he went to
break it up.
(Id. at RR. 18–19.) As a result, Woodruff was sanctioned
as follows: 40 days loss of GCT; 40 days disciplinary
segregation; 20 days disciplinary segregation—suspended
pending 6 months clear conduct; 60 days loss of commissary
privileges; and 60 days loss of telephone privileges.FN3 (Id.)
FN3. Respondent concedes that “Woodruff has
exhausted with regard to both DHO issues he raises in
this petition, and with regard to his challenge to his
sentence computation.” (Id. at R. 4, Exh. 1,
Cunningham Decl. at ¶ 9.)
B. Disciplinary Proceedings at USP–Lewisburg.
On May 23, 2006, Woodruff received an incident report
for refusing to provide a urine sample the previous day. (Id. at
R. 11.) On May 22, 2006, at approximately 5:30 p.m., CO
Shade “gave inmate Woodruff # 56195–097 an order to
provide a urine sample for testing. Inmate Woodruff refused to
provide a sample, stating that he already provided a sample this
month.” (Id.) Woodruff appeared before the UDC on May 26,
2006, acknowledged that he was advised of his rights before
the DHO and understood them, and stated that he “never
refused, I'm in disruptive group I piss once a month .” (Id.)
Woodruff requested a staff representative and one inmate
witness at his DHO hearing. (Id. at R. 14.) At the conclusion of
the hearing, the UDC referred the matter to the DHO. (Id. at R.
11.)
*3 On June 5, 2005, the DHO held a hearing at which both
Woodruff and his staff representative appeared. (Id. at R. 7.)
The DHO advised Woodruff of his rights and he indicated he
understood them. Woodruff's staff representative indicated that
Woodruff wanted to know how many times he could be tested
in a month. (Id.) Woodruff testified that the disciplinary report
was false and stated:
I asked the officer what type of sample I was giving and he
said Disruptive Group. I told the officer that there was a
discrepancy because I had already given a DG urine sample
for the month. I wanted to talk to the Lieutenant. I told him
I wasn't refusing. He left my cell and the next morning I got
the incident report. He never gave me the two hour window.
(Id.) Woodruff's inmate witness testified that in response
to the officer's request of Woodruff responded “there is a
problem because I already gave a DG piss test ... why don't you
call the LT for me because I only get one a month.” (Id. at R.
8.) The witness also stated that the officer responded that “the
LT wasn't coming down,” and that the officer didn't come back
until later when he told Woodruff he wrote an incident report.
(Id.) Woodruff did not raise any procedural errors at the
hearing. (Id . at R. 7.)
The DHO found Woodruff guilty of the offense of Interfering
with Staff, most like Refusing to Provide a Urine Sample. (Id.
at R. 8.) In making his decision, the DHO relied on the
eyewitness account of the reporting office who stated that at
5:30 p.m., “Woodruff refused to provide a sample, stating that
he already provided a sample this month.” (Id.) The also DHO
noted that inmates with a disruptive group assignment are
required to provide a urinalysis test once a month, but may be
required to provide samples “under several other categories
within that same month.” FN4 (Id.) The DHO examined the
urinalysis testing logbook and records, and learned Woodruff
had not provided a urine test under the disruptive group
category, or any other category, during the month of May
2006. (Id.) According to the log, Woodruff was last tested on
April 27, 2006. (Id.)
FN4. In March 2000, the BOP identified Woodruff as
a Disruptive Group Member due to his affiliation with
the Black Guerilla Family, a disruptive group within
the BOP. His classification was simultaneously
altered to reflect him as a Central Inmate Monitoring
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case requiring his separation from other inmates
currently confined within the BOP “for the mutual
protection of all concerned.” (Doc. 15–6 at R. 54.)
The DHO held that although Woodruff claims he did not
refuse to provide the specimen sample, both he and his witness
testified that he did not provide the sample when the officer
requested it. “The DHO relied upon the inmate's
acknowledgment that he did not provide the reporting officer
with a urine sample when requested. Woodruff would not
provide the sample when requested and indicated he wanted to
speak to the Lieutenant, who would have been busy monitoring
the feeding of the evening meal in the dining room at that
time.” (Id. at R. 9.)
To the extent Woodruff argued he was denied the two hour
time period, as required by policy, “the DHO determined that
once Woodruff refused to provide the sample until he saw a
Lieutenant, he interfered with the reporting officer while
attempting to perform his duty of obtaining a urine test as he
had been instructed to do by the SIS, thus negating the two
hour requirement provided to inmates to provide urine samples
to staff. FN5 The inmate cannot refuse to provide the urine
sample when requested by a staff member while attempting to
dictate staff actions and response. Therefore, the greater weight
of the evidence supports the finding that Woodruff is guilty of
the offense of Interfering with Staff, most like Refusing to
Provide a Urine Sample.” FN6 (Id. at R. 9.)
C. Woodruff's Placement in the SMU.
On February 27, 2006, Woodruff was transferred from
USP–Victorville to USP–Lewisburg and placed in
USP–Lewisburg's SMU. (Doc. 1, Petition at R. 8.) The SMU
is a 12–18 month multi-phase program designed to teach
inmates self-discipline, prosocial values, and to facilitate an
inmate's ability to successfully coexist with members of other
geographical, cultural, and religious backgrounds. (Doc. 15–6
at R. 31.) Successful completion of the program “will allow for
[an inmate's] reintegration into general population.” (Id.)
Woodruff was referred to the SMU program for receiving
an incident report related to the possession of a dangerous
weapon. (Doc. 22, Petitioner's Traverse at R. 68.) Prior to his
transfer to the SMU, Woodruff received 14 incident reports,
some of the more notable incidents are identified as:
FN5. 28 C.F.R. § 550.31 provides “No waiting period
... needs to be allowed for an inmate who directly and
specifically refuses to provide a urine sample.” (Doc.
15, Respondent's Response to the Habeas Petition at
R. 7, fn. 3.)
FN6. Under 28 C.F.R. § 542.17(f)(1), the DHO may
find the inmate committed the prohibited act charged
and/or a similar prohibited act if reflected by the
incident report. (See Doc. 15 at R. 7.)
*4 The DHO imposed the following sanctions:
disallowance of 41 days GCT, 30 days, suspended pending 180
days clear conduct; 180 days loss of visiting privileges; and
non-contact only visits for 180 days (to begin at the conclusion
of the loss of visiting privilege sanction). (Id.)
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08–15–1998
Possessing a Dangerous Weapon
05–02–2005
Refusing Work
Refusing to Obey an Order
09–12–2005
Possessing a Dangerous Weapon
12–20–2005
Fighting with Another Person
(Doc. 15–7 at R. 2.) Woodruff exhausted his
administrative remedies with respect to his SMU placement.
(Doc. 15–6 at R. 4; Doc. 15–7 at RR. 9–14.) Woodruff did not
raise the issue of race discrimination or retaliation as a basis of
challenging his SMU placement. Likewise, Woodruff does not
complain of the lack of medical care while in the SMU. (See
Doc. 15–7 at RR. 9–14.) Respondent notes that as of March
2007, “Woodruff has successfully participated in the SMU
program. He is currently in phase four of the four part program,
and is expected to complete the program at the end of March.”
(Doc. 15 at R. 9, fn. 9.) Woodruff is currently housed at
USPBig Sandy, thus it is clear that he is no longer being held
in USP–Lewisburg's SMU.
D. Computation of Woodruff's Sentence.
In May 2006, Woodruff filed an administrative remedy
request to correct what he perceived to be errors in his sentence
calculation. (See Doc. 1, Petition at RR. 51–58; Doc. 15–7 at
RR. 16–34.) Specifically, Woodruff seeks reinstatement of 95
days of disallowed GCT that he lost via various disciplinary
matters prior to 2005.FN7 Woodruff also notes that “from June
17, 1992 to July 26, 1993 [his state] parole was revoked.”
(Doc. 22, Traverse at R. 21.) He seeks credit for “his parole
revocation [as it] was not credited to any other ‘time served’ on
parole.” (Id. at R. 22.)
FN7. As a result of disciplinary hearing on the
following events, Woodruff incurred a disallowance
of 95 days earned GCT:
December 28, 2004
27 days
Fighting with another Person
August 15, 1998
41 days
Possession of a Razor Blade
Embedded in a Tooth Brush
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February 1, 1998
27 days
Assault on another Inmate
(See Doc. 15–7 at RR. 5–7.)
While serving a California state parole violation,
Woodruff was sentenced on July 14, 1998, in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, to serve
a 235 month prison term. (Id. at RR. 26–27.) The sentencing
court directed that Woodruff receive “credit for time served
with the exception to the time defendant was in custody for a
probation/parole hold.” (Id.) Woodruff was paroled from his
California State sentence to a federal detainer on July 28, 1993.
(Id. at R. 31.) Woodruff received jail credit from July 29, 1993
(the day after he was paroled from his California sentence),
through July 13, 1998 (the date before his federal sentence
began), a total of 1811 days. (Id. at R. 33.) Woodruff's
projected release date is December 30, 2010, via GCT release.
(Id.)
*5 Woodruff's anniversary date for the calculation of his
GCT is July 29, 1994. (Doc. 15–7, Kerstetter Decl. at R. 23, ¶
6.) The BOP has calculated that Woodruff would earn a total
of 940 days of GCT between July 29, 1994 and December 20,
2010.FN8 (Id.) As of March 2, 2007, Woodruff had incurred
five disciplinary sanctions which resulted in the disallowance
of GCT totaling 176 days.FN9 (Id. at ¶ 7.) According to the
BOP, Woodruff has presently earned 553 days GCT. If he does
not lose any additional GCT due to additional rules infractions,
Woodruff will earn a total of 791 days of GCT. (Id. at ¶¶ 6–8.)
FN8. The BOP reached this calculation as follows: 54
days multiplied by 17 full years of custody, plus 22
days for the last partial year of custody. (Id.; see also
Doc. 1, Petition at R. 59 and Doc. 15–7 at R. 34.)
FN9. Woodruff lost GCT on the following dates:
February 5, 1998
27 days (assault charge)
August 20, 1998
41 days (possession of a weapon)
December 28, 2004
27 days (fighting)
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September 21, 2005
40 days (possession of a weapon)
June 5, 2006
41 days (interference with staff in the performance of their
duty)
III. Discussion.
A. Woodruff's Claims Challenging his SMU Administrative
Confinement, Racial Discrimination and Denial of Medical
Care.
It is well settled that relief requested through a writ of
habeas corpus is limited. See Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532
(3d Cir.2002). The “core of habeas” lies in a challenge to “the
validity of the continued conviction or the fact or length of the
sentence.” Id. at 542. In the context of a federal inmate's
conditions-of-confinement claim, a Bivens action, the federal
counterpart to a § 1983 claim, is appropriate. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971); Egervary
v. Young, 366 F.3d 238, 246 (3d Cir.2004). Claims that do not
directly implicate the fact or duration of an inmate's
confinement may not be pursued by means of a habeas corpus
petition. Leamer, 288 F.3d at 542.
Here, a ruling in Woodruff's favor as to his claims of improper
SMU placement, racial discrimination, and denial of medical
care would have no affect on the fact or duration of his
confinement. Further, he may not receive monetary
compensation, earlier release, or modification of his sentence
in response to these claims.FN10 Thus, his remedy lies not in a
habeas corpus action for these claims, but in a Bivens action.
Therefore, as the claims for improper SMU placement, denial
of medical care and race discrimination do not lie at the core
of habeas, this claims will be dismissed without prejudice. See
McKettrick v. Williamson, No. 4:CV–06–0543, 2006 WL
1307929, at *2 (M.D.Pa. March 22, 2006) (prisoner's claim
regarding placement in special housing proper under Bivens,
not § 2241).
FN10. It appears Woodruff filed a Bivens complaint
before the United States District Court for the Central
District of California challenging his SMU placement
based on retaliation, race discrimination and denial of
access to housing, work and other programs. (See
Doc. 22, Woodruff v. Wrigley,
2:05–CV–03567–UA–AJW (C.D.Ca.)) Upon review
of the docket in that matter, it appears the Court
dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. See
Woodruff v. Wrigley, 2:05–CV–03567–UA–AJW
(C.D.Ca. August 18, 2005).
B. Loss of GCT Due to Disciplinary Sanctions.
“Habeas corpus relief is available to a prisoner who has
been sanctioned in violation of due process to a loss of good
conduct time.” Robinson v. Warden, 250 Fed. Appx. 462, 464
(3d Cir.2007). In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94
S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Court observed
that, while inmates are entitled to a fair process before GCT
may be removed, prison disciplinary hearings “are not part of
a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a
defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” An inmate
receives adequate due process in an institutional disciplinary
proceeding where GCT credits are at risk if given: “(1)
advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an
opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and
correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary
evidence ...; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the
evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.”
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S.Ct. 2768,
2773, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). If these protections are provided
and there is “some evidence” to support the resolution of the
disciplinary charge, then the Due Process Clause's procedural
requirements have been met. Id., 472 U.S. at 454, 105 S.Ct. at
2773. The determination of whether the standard is satisfied
“does not require examination of the entire record, independent
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the
evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any
evidence in the record that could support the conclusion
reached by the disciplinary board.” Id., 472 U.S. at 455, 105
S.Ct. at 2774. The standard is met if there was a modicum of
evidence from which the conclusion of the tribunal could be
deduced. Id. Under Hill, judicial review of a prison
disciplinary decision is limited to ensuring that the prisoner
was afforded certain procedures, the action against him was not
arbitrary, and that the ultimate decision has some evidentiary
support. Id.
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*6 With regard to the Petitioner's claims of substantive due
process or arbitrariness in the disciplinary proceedings at
USP–Victorville and/or USP–Lewisburg, we find Woodruff
received all procedural due process protection required and
there is more than “some evidence” to support Woodruff's guilt
as to each charge. In both disciplinary instances, Woodruff
received written notice of the charges against him more than 24
hours before the hearing, received a copy of the various
incident reports, and initially appeared before the UDC at each
facility. In both instances, the UDC referred the matter to the
DHO. A review of the record reveals that Woodruff was
allowed to attend the hearing and was provided an opportunity
to call witnesses, present evidence and have a staff
representative if desired. In each instance the DHO prepared a
written record of the hearing which document his findings and
the evidence upon which he relied, and the reasons for the
sanctions imposed. Woodruff does not dispute these findings
of fact. He does, however, allege that with respect to the
incident at USP–Victorville, where he was accused of
possessing a weapon, that a videotape of the incident in the
yard that day was exculpatory and yet he was arbitrarily found
guilty by the DHO.FN11 As such, Woodruff concludes that the
evidentiary standard was not satisfied by the USPVictorville
DHO in reaching his decision in the matter. We disagree.
FN11. According to Woodruff, SIS Basett “informed
Petitioner that the video footage ... does not reveal
that Petitioner ever was in possession of any weapon
or weapons”. (Doc. 1, Petition at R. 6 .) Woodruff
does not offer a declaration of SIS Basett, or a copy
of her report, in support of his assertions. Thus,
Woodruff's assertion of what Basett told him was on
the tape is inadmissable hearsay. See Petruzzi's IGA
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling–Delaware Comp., 998
F.2d 1224, 1234 n. 9 (3d Cir.1993).
The DHO specifically addressed Woodruff's claim as to
the exculpatory nature of the videotape. The DHO “informed
the inmate that the video footage does not focus on inmate
Woodruff.” (Doc. 15–6 at R. 18.) Nonetheless, throughout the
exhaustion process and these proceedings, Woodruff did not,
and has not, provided any evidence to dispute the DHO's
finding that the videotape did not focus on Woodruff and thus
was not probative to the proceedings. The DHO relied on the
reporting eyewitness officer who said that Woodruff was
observed with a weapon in his hand, saw him hand it off to
another inmate who disposed of it, and then located two
weapons in the area that were similar in size and description as
alleged to be in Woodruff's possession. The DHO also relied
upon Woodruff's statement that he was not originally involved
in the altercation but “ran over to the incident to break it up”
but then did “[n]othing, ... just stood there” when he entered
the fray. (Doc. 15–6 at R. 17.) “The DHO determined the
inmate had no business in the area, and did not believe the
inmate's version he went to break it up.” Based on the above,
there is clearly sufficient evidence to support the finding that
Woodruff was in possession of a weapon that day.
As for the disciplinary event at USP–Lewisburg, again
Woodruff is not questioning advance notice of the charge, the
opportunity to have a staff representative or call witnesses or
present evidence. He again questions the evidentiary standard
of the proceedings. Woodruff claims his request to have the
Lieutenant come to the block to resolve whether he had to give
a second disruptive group urine sample, when he was under the
impression he had already given one that month, did not
constitute a refusal to provide the specimen. As such the officer
failed to follow BOP policy by not providing him with a 2 hour
window of opportunity to produce the urine sample prior to
issuing him a disciplinary incident report. (Doc. 22, Traverse
at RR. 18–19.) Woodruff's witness confirmed that Woodruff
requested the officer call the Lieutenant to clarify the situation
as he claimed that he had already provided a disruptive group
sample that month. The witness also testified that the officer
told Woodruff that the “Lieutenant was not coming down,” and
that the officer never returned to Woodruff's cell to ask a
second time for the specimen. (Doc. 15–6 at R. 9.)
*7 In this instance, there is some evidence to support the
DHO's decision to find Woodruff guilty of interfering with
staff, most like refusing to provide a urine sample. The DHO
investigated Woodruff's claim that he already provided his
disruptive group urine sample for the month of May, and found
Woodruff mistaken. Woodruff had not provided a specimen
since April 27, 2006. Moreover, the DHO found that when
Woodruff refused to provide the sample until he spoke to the
Lieutenant, he was interfering with the officer while he was
attempting to perform his duty of obtaining a urine test as
instructed. (Id.) The DHO perceived this act as an attempt to
dictate staff actions and response. (Id.) Thus, even where
Woodruff does not agree with the DHO's findings, there is
some evidence that he attempted to interfere with staff, most
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like refusing to provide a urine sample. Because the DHO's
decisions are supported by “some evidence” in the record,
Woodruff is not entitled to habeas relief on either of his
challenges to the disciplinary proceedings that resulted in the
loss of GCT.
C. Computation of Woodruff's Sentence.FN12
FN12. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under
§ 2241 to consider the instant subject of the Petition
because Woodruff challenges the calculation of his
sentence and he was incarcerated in the Middle
District of Pennsylvania at the time he filed the
Petition. See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310,
313 (3d Cir.2007) (challenge to BOP's failure to give
credit for time served prior to federal sentencing is
cognizable under § 2241).
Petitioner's sentence computation argument is two fold.
First, Woodruff claims that the BOP improperly denied him
credit for the time period of June 17, 1992 to July 26, 1993,
while incarcerated after his California state parole was
revoked. Woodruff claims “his parole revocation was not
credited to any other ‘time served’ on parole.” (Doc. 22 at R.
22.) Petitioner contends he is entitled to receive credit for this
time as his parole violation, and his present federal charge,
resulted from the same conduct. Next, Woodruff alleges that
GCT lost in two separate disciplinary incidents in 1998, which
occurred after he was paroled from his California sentence and
while in federal custody, but before his federal sentence was
imposed should be completely restored. He similarly argues
that any GCT earned prior to 2005 was vested, and not subject
to disallowance to satisfy future disciplinary sanctions. As such
Woodruff seeks the restoration of 95 days GCT lost as a result
of disciplinary infractions and the restoration vested GCT
improperly taken.FN13
FN13. See footnote 7, supra. for details as to the
specific disciplinary incidents in question.
The BOP is the agency responsible for implementing and
applying federal law concerning the computation of federal
sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329,
331, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992). In addressing
any sentencing computation issue, a district court must
consider: (1) when the federal sentence commenced; and, (2)
the extent to which the petitioner may be entitled to credit for
time spent in custody prior to commencement of the sentence.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3585; Chambers v. Holland, 920 F.Supp. 618,
621 (M.D.Pa.), affd, 100 F.3d 946 (3d Cir.1996). A federal
sentence commences on the date the prisoner is received at the
detention facility at which the sentence is to be served. See 18
U.S.C. § 3585(a). Section 3585(b) gives the BOP authority to
credit against the sentence for time served prior to the
commencement of the federal sentence provided that period of
time “has not been credited against another sentence.”
*8 In this case, Woodruff's sentence commenced on July
14, 1998, the date the sentence was imposed by the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California.
The next step is computing what prior custody credit, if any,
Woodruff is entitled to receive pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3585(b). FN14 When calculating Woodruff's sentence, the BOP
took into account the sentencing court's direction that
Woodruff was to receive “credit for time served with the
exception to the time defendant was in custody for a
probation/parole hold.” (See Doc. 15–7 at R. 23, ¶ 2, and R.
27.) The BOP then determined that Woodruff was entitled to
1811 days of prior custody credit for the period from July 29,
1993 through July 13, 1998, which represents the period after
he was paroled from his California sentence until the date he
was sentenced. (Doc. 15–7 at R. 33.) He was not awarded
credit for the period of July 17, 1992 through July 26, 1993,
the time spent in California state custody serving his parole
violation related to his underlying state sentence.
FN14. The sentencing court directed that Woodruff
was to receive “credit for time served with the
exception to the time defendant was in custody for a
probation/parole hold.” (See Doc. 15–7 at R. 23, ¶ 2,
and R. 27.)
Here, the government correctly asserts that § 3585(b) does
not allow the BOP to give Woodruff credit for time spent in
state custody prior to his federal sentencing. It is undisputed
that Woodruff was paroled from his state sentence to
commence his federal sentence. Even if it were true that
Woodruff's current federal sentence and state parole violation
arose from the same conduct, Woodruff is not entitled to credit
for the period of July 17, 1992 through July 26, 1993, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b), as this time was credited towards his
state sentence resulting in his parole on July 29, 1993, allowing
him to commence his federal sentence. Aside from Woodruff's
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own assertion, there is no evidence before the Court to suggest
he did not receive credit for this time period toward his state.
Time spent serving a state parole violation, prior to the
commencement of his federal sentence, cannot be credited
towards his federal sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)
as Petitioner has already received credit for that time frame
against his state sentence. See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d
310, 314 (3d Cir.2007) (the BOP did not err when it
disallowed prior custody credit under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)
because the time at issue had been credited against the
petitioner's state parole violation); Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257,
269 (3d Cir.2001) ( section 3585(b) does not permit BOP to
grant credit for time served that has been credited against
defendant's state sentence). Woodruff, however, did receive
1811 days of prior custody credit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3585(b) for the period of July 29, 1993, the day after his
release from the state sentence, through July 13, 1998, the day
before commencement of his federal sentence. Finally,
although the federal sentencing court ordered Woodruff's
federal sentences to run concurrent to one another, the court
specifically held that Woodruff was not to receive credit,
towards his federal sentence, for time he was on a
probation/parole hold.FN15 Therefore, for the reasons stated
above, Woodruff is not entitled to receive credit towards his
federal sentence for the approximately 374 days he spent in
state custody serving his parole violation prior to the
commencement of his federal sentence.
The SRA is part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984 (“CCCA”) which was enacted into law on October 12,
1984, and became effective on November 1, 1987. The CCCA
repealed an earlier GCT statute which applied different rates of
GCT for different lengths of sentences and allowed prison
officials to withhold or restore credits depending on an inmates
subsequent behavior. The SRA enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)
which provided all prisoners with the same opportunity to earn
GCT each year so long as they comply with the BOP's
institutional disciplinary rules. Under the SRA, GCT earned
each year is vested at the end of that year and cannot be
disallowed in the future. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1987). On
September 13, 1994, section 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) was amended
as a result of the enactment of the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (“VCCLEA”). The VCCLEA
applied to offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994,
but before April 26, 1996, when the Prisoner Litigation Reform
Act (“PLRA”) went into effect and it was amended again.
Under the PLRA, the amended provision of 18 U.S.C. §
3624(b) provides in pertinent part when GCT vests. Under the
amended version of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), effective April 26,
1996, “credit awarded under this provision after the date of the
enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act shall vest on the
date the prisoner is released from custody.”
FN15. To the extent Woodruff takes issue with the
sentencing Court's order, this Court cannot modify the
sentencing court's sentencing order. Without
expressing an opinion as to the success of such an
effort, Woodruff would have to approach the
sentencing court for a modification or amendment to
his sentencing order.
Nonetheless, “[s]entences imposed [for offences
committed] between November 1, 1987 to September 12,
1994, are computed under the SRA” and not the PLRA.
Vitrano v. Marberry, 2008 WL 471642 (W.D.Pa. Feb.19,
2008). Because Woodruff's underlying offense was committed
while the SRA was in effect, his sentence is governed by the
SRA. The BOP has calculated his sentence accordingly. See
Doc. 15–7, R. 32 (“Sentence Procedure: 3559 SRA Sentence,
Date of Offense: 03–01–1991”).
*9 Next, we turn to Woodruff's assertion that because he
was sentenced under the Sentence Reform Act of 1984
(“SRA”) he is entitled to the restoration of 95 days disallowed
GCT for maintaining a disciplinary free period of
incarceration. (See Doc. 22 at R. 20.) Alternatively, Woodruff
suggests that because he was sentenced under the SRA, once
his GCT vested each year on his anniversary, it can not be
disallowed at a later time to satisfy past or future disciplinary
sanctions once vested. He seeks the restoration of vested GCT
that was wrongfully disallowed.
Under the SRA, Woodruff was eligible to receive 54 days
GCT per year, which was awarded at the end of each year of
term, i.e. his “anniversary date”. Per BOP calculations,
Woodruff's anniversary date is July 29 of each year. See 18
U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1991). The BOP has 15 days from
Woodruff's yearly anniversary date, or until August 12 each
year, to determine the amount of GCT to be awarded for that
year. If Woodruff was disallowed GCT to be awarded for that
year as a result of disciplinary proceedings, only the remainder
of the 54 days will be awarded, and will vest, at that time. See
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Kokoski v. Small, Civ. No. 5:07–0145, 2008 WL 3200811 at
*24 (S.D.W.Va. August 5, 2008) (Slip op.); 18 U.S.C. §
3624(b) (1991). Credit that has vested may not later be
withdrawn, except under very limited circumstances. (Id.)
Credit for the last year or portion of a year of the term of
imprisonment shall be prorated and credited within the last six
weeks of the sentence. (Id.) Furthermore, GCT that is
disallowed may not be awarded at a later time. However, if
disallowance of GCT is successfully appealed via the BOP's
applicable administrative remedy process, or if the BOP has
some reason erroneously disallowed the GCT, then the GCT
may be credited at that time.
*10 For GCT calculation purposes, Woodruff's first
anniversary date is July 29, 1994. (Id. at R. 24.) It is
undisputed that Woodruff earned jail credit from July 29, 1993,
through July 13, 1998 (the date before his federal sentence
began). (See Id. at R. 33.) It is also undisputed that Woodruff
earned GCT during this same period even though he was a
pre-trial detainee. (See Doc. 1 at R. 59, and Doc. 15–7 at R.
34.) The record reveals the following with respect to when, and
what GCT, Woodruff has accrued over the years:
Time Period
Disallowed GCT
Vested GCT
Date Vested
07/29/93
07/28/94
0
54
08/12/94
07/29/94
07/28/95
0
54
08/12/95
07/29/95
07/28/96
0
54
08/12/96
07/29/96
07/28/97
0
54
08/12/97
07/29/97
07/28/98
27
27
08/12/98
07/29/98
07/28/99
41
13
08/12/99
07/29/99
07/28/00
0
54
08/12/00
07/29/00
07/28/01
0
54
08/12/01
07/29/01
07/28/02
0
54
08/12/02
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07/29/02
07/28/03
0
54
08/12/03
07/29/03
07/28/04
0
54
08/12/04
07/29/04
07/28/05
27
27
08/12/05
07/29/05
07/28/06
81
0
08/12/06
(See Doc. 15–7 at R. 34.)
In February 1998, Woodruff was sanctioned the disallowance
of 27 days GCT after he was found guilty of assaulting another
inmate. In August 1998, Woodruff was found guilty of
possessing a razor blade embedded in a tooth brush. For this
infraction, 41 days GCT was disallowed. Although these two
events occurred in the same calendar year, they did not appear
in the same year of imprisonment for the purposes of
calculating GCT. Thus, no vested GCT was disallowed as a
result of either of this disciplinary sanctions. As for the
December 20, 2004, incident for which Woodruff was found
guilty of fighting with others, and where 27 days of GCT were
disallowed, this was the only disciplinary sanction where GCT
was taken for that year of imprisonment, thus no vested GCT
was taken. In all three incidents, the disallowed GCT was taken
during the appropriate term and prior to it vesting during the
corresponding anniversary/vesting date. For the reasons set
forth above, Woodruff is not entitled to the restoration of the
95 days disallowed GCT.
Not specifically addressed by Respondent, but clearly
raised by this analysis is the question of whether the 81 GCT
days were improperly disallowed during Woodruff's July 29,
2005—July 28, 2006, term.FN16 Clearly, as GCT under the SRA
is vested when awarded at the conclusion of each anniversary
year, the most GCT an inmate sentenced under the SRA may
be disallowed each year is 54 days. Woodruff believes the
entire 81 disallowed GCT was deducted from his earned GCT.
This assumption is incorrect. It is clear from the record before
the Court that only 54 days GCT was disallowed and no vested
or future GCT was taken from Woodruff.
FN16. The 81 days is a total number of days
disallowed as a result of two disciplinary infractions:
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September 21, 2005
40 days (possession of a weapon)
June 5, 2005
41 days (interference with staff in the performance of their
duty)
See Doc. 15–7, R. 23, Kerstetter Decl. at ¶ 7.
IV. Conclusion.
As of the date of the Response, Woodruff had the potential
of earning 702 days GCT.FN17 However, he incurred 5
disciplinary infractions which resulted in him not earning the
maximum allowable 54 days GCT per anniversary year. As
discussed above, there is no argument that in 1998, 1999, and
2005, the disallowed GCT was within the appropriate range for
each anniversary year. The only unresolved issue are the 81
GCT disallowed after Woodruff incurred two disciplinary
sanctions within the same anniversary year. Although
Woodruff received a total of 81 days disallowed GCT, only the
maximum potential number of earned GCT days, 54, were
disallowed for the 2006 term.FN18 The additional sanctioned 27
days disallowance of GCT were never subtracted from
Woodruff's earned GCT credits because the sanctions
disallowed more GCT than Woodruff could earn in a year.
Thus, Woodruff's actual disallowed GCT total is 149 days, not
176 days. The BOP did not violate the SRA by deducting
vested GCT to cover the additional 27 days GCT disallowed in
the 2006 anniversary year. Based on the foregoing, Woodruff's
149 days of GCT were properly disallowed in accordance with
the provisions of the S RA.
FN17. 54 days x 13 years = 702 days GCT
FN18. The Court's calculations are based on the
information gleaned from Woodruff's GCT Data (see
Doc. 15–7 at R.34):
Maximum potential GCT: 54 days x 13 years = 702
days GCT
*11 Based on the foregoing, Woodruff's challenge to the
loss of GCT as a result of his disciplinary incidents at
USP–Victorville, Adelanto, California, and USPLewisburg,
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania are denied. Woodruff's claim that he
was transferred to USP–Lewisburg's Special Management Unit
(“SMU”) in retaliation for filing administrative remedies and
for racially motivated reasons is denied. Woodruff's denial of
medical care claim while housed in the SMU is denied.
Wooddruff's claim that the BOP denied him prior custody
credit is denied. Woodruff's claim that the BOP violated the
SRA by disallowing 27 days vested GCT in the calculation of
his sentence is also denied. Based on the above, Woodruff's
Motion to Supplement (doc. 29) and Motion to Expedite (doc.
30) are denied.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
NOW, THIS 12th DAY OF MARCH, 2009, in
accordance with the foregoing Memorandum, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Woodruff' Petition for Habeas Corpus (doc. 1) is denied.
2. Woodruff's Motion to Supplement (doc. 29) is denied.
3. Woodruff's Motion to Expedite (doc. 30) is denied.
4. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
M.D.Pa.,2009.
Actual Disallowed GCT: 27 + 41 + 27 + 54 = 149
days GCT
702 GCT–149 GCT = 553 Earned GCT
Woodruff v. Williamson
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2009 WL 703200 (M.D.Pa.)
END OF DOCUMENT
If the entire 176 GCT were disallowed, Woodruff's
earned GCT would reflect 526, not 553 days.
(702–176 = 526).
© 2014 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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