Transamerica Life Insurance Company v. Caramadre et al

Filing 158

RESPONSE in Opposition re (116 in 1:09-cv-00564-S-PAS) MOTION to Attach Prejudgment Attachment of Defendant Joseph Caramadre's Assets, including his Membership Interest in ADM Associates, LLC WITH SUPPORTING MEMO filed by Joseph Caramadre, Joseph A. Caramadre. (Attachments: #1 Supporting Memorandum Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Joseph Caramadre's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to Attach)Associated Cases: 1:09-cv-00470-S-PAS et al.(Flanders, Robert)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
____________________________________
)
WESTERN RESERVE LIFE ASSURANCE )
CO. OF OHIO,
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
C.A. No. 09-470-S
JOSEPH CARAMADRE, RAYMOUR
)
RADHAKRISHNAN, ESTATE PLANNING )
RESOURCES, INC., HARRISON CONDIT, )
and FORTUNE FINANCIAL SERVICES,
)
INC.,
)
Defendants;
)
____________________________________ )
)
TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE
)
COMPANY,
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
C.A. No. 09-471-S
JOSEPH CARAMADRE, RAYMOUR
)
RADHAKRISHNAN, ESTATE PLANNING )
RESOURCES, INC., ESTELA
)
RODRIGUES, EDWARD MAGGIACOMO, )
JR., LIFEMARK SECURITIES CORP., and )
PATRICK GARVEY,
)
Defendants;
)
____________________________________ )
)
WESTERN RESERVE LIFE ASSURANCE )
CO. OF OHIO,
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
C.A. No. 09-472-S
)
JOSEPH CARAMADRE, RAYMOUR
)
RADHAKRISHNAN, ESTATE PLANNING )
RESOURCES, INC., ADM ASSOCIATES, )
LLC, EDWARD HANRAHAN, THE
)
LEADERS GROUP, INC., and CHARLES )
BUCKMAN,
)
Defendants;
)

____________________________________
)
WESTERN RESERVE LIFE ASSURANCE )
CO. OF OHIO,
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
JOSEPH CARAMADRE, RAYMOUR
)
RADHAKRISHNAN, ESTATE PLANNING )
RESOURCES, INC., DK LLC, EDWARD
)
HANRAHAN, THE LEADERS GROUP,
)
INC., and JASON VEVEIROS,
)
Defendants;
)
)
)
WESTERN RESERVE LIFE ASSURANCE )
CO. OF OHIO,
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
JOSEPH CARAMADRE, RAYMOUR
)
RADHAKRISHNAN, ESTATE PLANNING )
RESOURCES, INC., NATCO PRODUCTS )
CORP., EDWARD HANRAHAN, and THE )
LEADERS GROUP, INC.,
)
Defendants;
)
)
)
TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE
)
COMPANY,
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
LIFEMARK SECURITIES CORP., JOSEPH )
CARAMADRE, RAYMOUR
)
RADHAKRISHNAN, ESTATE PLANNING )
RESOURCES, INC. and EDWARD
)
MAGGIACOMO, JR.,
)
Defendants; and
)
)

C.A. No. 09-473-S

C.A. No. 09-502-S

C.A. No. 09-549-S

____________________________________
WESTERN RESERVE LIFE ASSURANCE )
CO. OF OHIO,
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
JOSEPH CARAMADRE, RAYMOUR
)
RADHAKRISHNAN, ESTATE PLANNING )
RESOURCES, INC., HARRISON CONDIT, )
and FORTUNE FINANCIAL SERVICES,
)
INC.,
)
Defendants.
)
)

C.A. No. 09-564-S

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JOSEPH CARAMADRE’S
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ATTACH

Defendant Joseph Caramadre submits this memorandum of law in support of his
objection to the Motion to Attach filed by Plaintiffs Western Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio
(“WRL”) and Transamerica Life Insurance Company (“TLI”) in which they seek a prejudgment
attachment of his assets, and, in particular, attachment of Mr. Caramadre’s interest in ADM
Associates, LLC. For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should deny the motion.
I.

INTRODUCTION
This Court should deny Plaintiffs’ motion because it violates the stay order in this case.

The Court specifically determined that the stay would remain in place until the completion of the
criminal proceedings involving Mr. Caramadre. Because these proceedings are ongoing, the stay
order prohibits Plaintiffs’ motion. In any event, the Plaintiffs’ motion fails to demonstrate the
requisite likelihood of success on the merits to support a prejudgment motion to attach.
Plaintiff’s failure in this respect is twofold: (1) Plaintiffs rely heavily on Mr. Caramadre’s guilty
plea in their attempt to demonstrate a likelihood of success; yet that guilty plea (a) does not
establish Mr. Caramadre’s liability for the remaining civil claims against him (as plaintiffs argue

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in their memorandum) and (b) it is subject to a pending motion to vacate; and (2) Plaintiffs
assume a likelihood of success on civil RICO claims and claims for civil liability for the crimes
of civil conspiracy, mail fraud, and wire fraud – claims which (a) they have not yet asserted,
(b) have not yet even been the subject of any motion for leave to add such claims, and (c) as
Mr. Caramadre will vigorously argue, are untimely because Plaintiffs should not be permitted to
add to these new civil claims at this late date (four years after filing their initial complaint) after
having already amended their complaints on numerous previous occasions.
II.

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs filed these actions in 2009, alleging multiple counts against numerous

defendants, including Mr. Caramadre. The counts asserted against Mr. Caramadre included
fraud, civil liability for crimes and offenses, and civil conspiracy. W. Reserve Life Assur. Co. v.
Conreal, LLC, 715 F. Supp.2d 270, 275 (D.R.I. 2010) (“Caramadre I”). The counts asserted
against Mr. Caramadre, however, were not uniform across all seven cases. For example, WRL
did not assert a civil conspiracy claim against Mr. Caramadre in C.A. No. 09-470. See
Complaint (ECF No. 1 in C.A. No. 09-470). Additionally, the claims for civil liability for crimes
and offenses in the initial complaint (which Plaintiffs also failed to assert in each of the cases)
alleged liability only for insurance fraud. See Caramadre I, 715 F. Supp.2d at 275.
Mr. Caramadre moved to dismiss the claims against him in the initial complaints, and on June 2,
2010, this Court entered an order that, among other things, dismissed the claims against
Mr. Caramadre for civil liability for crimes and offenses based on alleged insurance fraud. See
id. at 287.
Plaintiffs filed amended complaints following this Court’s decision on the motion to
dismiss. W. Reserve Life Assur. Co. v. Caramadre, 847 F. Supp.2d 329, 333, 335-36 (D.R.I.

2

2012) (“Caramadre II”). The amended complaints added claims against Mr. Caramadre (and
other defendants) for fraud in the factum and for civil liability for crimes and offenses based on
forgery.1 Id. at 335. Mr. Caramadre (and other defendants) again filed a motion to dismiss the
claims in the second amended complaint. Id. at 333. Mr. Caramadre also asked this Court to
reconsider the portion of its prior decision denying the motion to dismiss the fraud claims against
him. Id. This Court issued its decision and order on the motions to dismiss the amended
complaints on February 7, 2012. Id. That decision and order dismissed all claims against
Mr. Caramadre except the claims for civil conspiracy with certain of the representatives and
broker-dealer defendants, supposedly for conspiring with them to violate their agency contracts
with Plaintiffs and certain claims for civil liability for the crime of forgery.2 Id. at 340, 343-44,
347-50.
Before this Court decided the second round of dismissal motions, on November 17, 2011,
the United States Attorney’s Office (the “U.S. Attorney”) issued a 66-count criminal indictment
against Mr. Caramadre and Raymour Radhakrishnan. See Indictment (ECF No. United States v.
Caramadre, CR 11-86). As a result of the criminal indictment, this Court entered an order
staying this matter until the resolution of the criminal matter. See Stay Order (ECF No. 134 in
C.A. No. 09-470). This Court entered the stay order on March 2, 2012. Id. The stay order
includes only certain limited exceptions to a complete stay of the case: (1) document discovery
in accordance with the terms of the initial case management order;3 (2) motions for entry of final

1

Plaintiffs asserted claims for civil liability for crimes and offenses based of forgery in some, but not all, of the
cases.
2
Notably, WRL did not assert a claim against Mr. Caramadre for civil conspiracy in C.A. No. 09-470. Thus,
there are no currently pending claims against Mr. Caramadre in that matter.
3
Earlier, this Court entered an initial case management order that instituted some protections for the defendants’
Fifth Amendment rights in connection with discovery and pleadings in this matter. See Initial Case Management
Order (ECF No. 58 in C.A. No. 09-470).

3

judgment by defendants against whom no claims remained; and (3) appeals from the entry of any
final judgments. Id.
When the stay order entered, no claims remained against Mr. Caramadre in C.A. No.
09-470, and Mr. Caramadre moved for entry of final judgment in his favor in that case.4 See
Motion for Entry of Final Judgment (ECF No. 135 in C.A. No. 09-470). As part of its opposition
to Mr. Caramadre’s motion for entry of final judgment, WRL moved to amend its complaint in
09-470 to add Mr. Caramadre (and Mr. Radhakrishnan) as defendants to the pending claim of
civil liability for crimes and offenses and to add a claim for civil conspiracy. See Motion to
Amend Complaints (ECF No. 141 in C.A. No. 09-470). This Court allowed the motion to
amend. See Text Order dated July 27, 2012 (attached as Exhibit A). To date, however, WRL
has not filed an amended complaint in C.A. No. 09-470 to add those claims.
On November 19, 2012, Mr. Caramadre changed his plea to guilty in the criminal matter
on two counts of the indictment – counts 9 and 33. See Minute Entry for proceedings held
before Judge William E. Smith dated November 19, 2012 (Docket in United States v.
Caramadre, CR 11-86) (attached as Exhibit B). Count 9 is a specific wire fraud count with
regarding a specific transaction, and Count 33 is a broader criminal conspiracy count. See
Indictment. After the entry of Mr. Caramadre’s guilty plea, this Court conducted a chambers
conference on December 5, 2012, at which time this Court determined that the stay order would
remain in place until the criminal matter was completely resolved. See Minute Entry for
proceedings held before Judge William E. Smith (attached as Exhibit C). At that time, it was
anticipated that the stay would remain in place until after Mr. Caramadre’s sentencing, which has
not occurred to date. The only additional exception to the stay was the scheduling of settlement
4

Other defendants (against whom no claims remained in certain of the cases) also moved for entry of final
judgment.

4

conferences in an attempt to resolve the civil matters. See Text Order dated December 5, 2012
(attached as Exhibit D). Mr. Caramadre has since obtained substitute counsel in the criminal
matter and he has filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on February 28, 2013. See Docket
(attached as Exhibit B); Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty (ECF No. 122 in United States v.
Caramadre, CR 11-86). Thus, the criminal matter remains pending.
Now, without even moving to vacate the stay, much less persuading this Court to grant
such a motion, Plaintiffs have filed this motion to attach. Mr. Caramadre’s guilty plea (and the
associated statement of agreed facts) forms the entire basis for Plaintiffs’ argument that they
have a likelihood of success on the merits of this matter on their claim against Mr. Caramadre for
civil conspiracy. Plaintiffs also argue that the guilty plea creates a likelihood of success on their
as yet unplead claims against Mr. Caramadre for: (1) civil liability for the alleged crime of
criminal conspiracy; (2) civil liability for the alleged crimes of mail and wire fraud; and (3) civil
RICO violations. Plaintiffs, however, have not yet even moved to vacate the stay so that they
can bring such claims against Mr. Caramadre on any of these theories – much less have they
been granted leave to amend their complaints to add these claims.
III.

ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs are not entitled to a prejudgment attachment of Mr. Caramadre’s assets for both

procedural and substantive reasons. As a matter of procedure, the mere filing of the motion to
attach violates the stay order, which remains in full force and effect. On substantive grounds,
Plaintiffs have not and cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits.5 Accordingly, this
Court should deny the motion to attach.

5

To succeed on a motion for prejudgment attachment, Plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) a probability of obtaining
a judgment in their favor, and (2) a need for security. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Rhode Island courts interpret a
probability of obtaining a judgment in their favor as a likelihood of success on the merits of a claim. See, e.g., E.W.
Burman v. Bradford Dyeing Ass’n, 2011 R.I. Super. LEXIS 16, *11 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 2011).

5

A. The stay order precludes Plaintiffs’ motion to attach.
It is undisputed that the stay order that this Court entered on March 2, 2012 remains in
effect. The stay order expressly states that “these cases (C.A. Nos. 09-470, 09-471, 09-472,
09-473, 09-502, 09-549 and 09-564) are stayed pending the resolution of the criminal matter,
United States v. Caramadre, et al., Cr. No. 11-186.” See Stay Order. The criminal matter
remains pending, and therefore the plain language of the order bars this motion. Additionally, at
the chambers conference on December 5, 2012, this Court considered whether it should lift the
stay in light of the Caramadre and Radhakrishnan guilty pleas, but it declined to do so, deciding
that the stay should continue until after sentencing Mr. Caramadre and Mr. Radhakrishnan.
Accordingly, the current motion to attach is improper because the stay order precludes Plaintiffs
from prosecuting such a motion.
The stay order contains only three exemptions from the stay: (1) document discovery
pursuant to the restrictions in the initial case management order, (2) motions for entry of final
judgment by defendants against whom no claims remain following the decision on the second
motion to dismiss, and (3) appeals by the Plaintiffs from any entry of final judgment. See Stay
Order. Since the entry of the stay, this Court permitted Plaintiffs to move to amend the
complaint in connection with their opposition to a motion for entry of final judgment by
Mr. Caramadre, Mr. Radhakrishnan, and Estate Planning Resources, Inc. in C.A. No. 09-470.
See Exhibit A. Additionally, at the December 5, 2012 chambers conference, this Court also
permitted settlement conferences to proceed during the pendency of the stay. See Exhibit D.
This Court has approved no other exceptions to the stay, and Plaintiffs have not sought leave to
file this motion or sought relief from the stay before filing this motion, nor would any such leave
be warranted at this time.

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Thus, this motion violates the stay, and, for this reason alone, this Court should deny the
motion. “When a trial court is faced with a violation of a court order, it may choose from a
‘broad universe of possible sanctions.’” Velazquez Linares v. United States, 546 F.3d 710, 711
(1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Tower Ventures, Inc. v. City of Westfield, 296 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir.
2002)). At a minimum, this Court, therefore, should deny the Plaintiffs’ motion to attach
because it is not permitted under the stay order, and because the Plaintiff has not obtained leave
to file the motion or relief from the stay.
B.

Plaintiffs have not and cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits
of their claims against Mr. Caramadre.

Currently, there are only two types of claims pending against Mr. Caramadre across these
seven related cases: (1) civil conspiracy with the broker-dealer defendants for them to violate
their contracts with Plaintiffs; and (2) civil liability for forgery. Plaintiffs’ motion to attach,
however, asserts that plaintiffs have a likelihood of success on unasserted claims of: (1) civil
liability for the crime of criminal conspiracy; (2) civil liability for the crime of wire fraud and
mail fraud; (3) civil conspiracy; and (4) RICO claims. See Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Prejudgment Attachment (ECF No. 116 in C.A. No. 09-564) (“Plaintiffs’
Memorandum”) at 8-14. But the only claim that is actually pending for which Plaintiffs contend
they have a likelihood of success on the merits is the civil conspiracy claim, yet they have not
and cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on such a claim. Additionally, Plaintiffs cannot
properly show a likelihood of success against Mr. Caramadre on claims they have not as yet even
asserted against him.

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1. Plaintiffs are not likely to prevail on their claim against Mr. Caramadre
for civil conspiracy.
This Court previously and properly concluded that Plaintiffs do not have a legally
cognizable claim against Mr. Caramadre for civil fraud of any kind. See Caramadre II, 847 F.
Supp.2d at 340, 343-44, 347-50. Accordingly, the Court determined that the only way that
Mr. Caramadre could be liable for fraud in these matters is if he is liable as part of a conspiracy
with the broker-dealer defendants and their representatives for alleged fraud committed by those
other defendants to violate the broker-dealers’ contracts with Plaintiffs. Id. at 340, 347. As this
Court aptly pointed out in its Opinion and Order on the second round of motions to dismiss, there
must be a valid underlying intentional tort theory to support a claim of civil conspiracy. See id.
at 347. This Court’s previous decisions definitively determined that the only valid underlying
intentional tort claim that could trigger civil conspiracy liability for Mr. Caramadre is the
potential liability for fraud faced by his alleged co-conspirators. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
burden to establish a likelihood of success on the merits on the civil conspiracy claims against
Mr. Caramadre is twofold: first, they must establish a likelihood of success on their fraud claims
against alleged co-conspirators; and second, they must establish a likelihood of success in
proving that Mr. Caramadre conspired with those co-conspirators to accomplish that fraud.
Plaintiffs fail to meet this burden.
Plaintiffs rely entirely on Mr. Caramadre’s plea agreement in their attempt to establish a
likelihood of success on the merits; they note that Mr. Caramadre “already has admitted that he
participated in a conspiracy with Radhakrishnan ‘and others’ to commit mail, wire and identity
fraud . . . and ‘executed a scheme to defraud financial institutions and terminally ill individuals
. . . .,’ including plaintiffs.” See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum at 11. From that statement, Plaintiffs
conclude “there is no serious doubt that the Registered Representatives . . . worked in

8

conjunction with Caramadre” and that “it is likely that plaintiffs will prove the Registered
Representatives knowingly and intentionally concealed information from plaintiffs in an effort to
advance Caramadre’s admitted scheme.” See id. Thus, Plaintiffs attempt to use
Mr. Caramadre’s plea agreement to achieve both their likelihood of proving that
Mr. Caramadre’s alleged co-conspirators committed fraud, and that Mr. Caramadre conspired
with those alleged co-conspirators to commit that fraud. This argument falls short in two
respects.
First, Mr. Caramadre is in the process of seeking to vacate his plea. It is currently
unknown whether Mr. Caramadre will be successful in that effort, but the lack of finality to the
plea undercuts the impact of the factual statements made in connection with that plea. Those
statements cannot be treated as conclusively established facts for purposes of assessing
Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits. See Fed. R. Evid. R. 410 (stating that a statement
made in connection with a later withdrawn guilty plea is not admissible in a civil case except if
in fairness it ought be considered in connection with other statements). Rather, if Mr. Caramadre
is successful in vacating his plea, the most Plaintiffs will be able to do with the factual statements
in the plea agreement is to use them to impeach any contradictory testimony Mr. Caramadre may
give in this matter. See id. Mr. Caramadre maintains that he committed no wrongdoing in
connection with any of the claims asserted in this case and that all his actions giving rise to both
these civil cases and the criminal matter were legal and appropriate. It will be a credibility
question for the jury to decide whether the facts in the plea agreement – if they survive a motion
to vacate – are sufficient to overcome any such testimony. The statements in the plea agreement,
therefore, cannot on their own establish a likelihood of success on the merits of the civil
conspiracy claim.

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Second, even if Mr. Caramadre was completely bound to the statements he made in
connection with the plea agreement he now seeks to vacate, those statements would not be
sufficient to establish a likelihood of success on the claims against his alleged co-conspirators for
fraud. Rather, the jury would be presented with the likely conflicting testimony of those alleged
co-conspirators denying the allegations of fraud against them. The jury would be left to assess
the evidence and determine if it believed that a fraud had occurred. Mr. Caramadre’s statements
in connection with his plea agreement would be only one piece of evidence that entered into the
calculus. Thus, Mr. Caramadre’s factual statements made in connection with his plea agreement
cannot alone establish a likelihood of success on Plaintiffs’ claims that other defendants
committed civil fraud. Therefore, the plea agreement cannot establish a likelihood of success on
the claim that Mr. Caramadre was involved in a civil conspiracy to commit a fraud that other
defendants allegedly committed, but as to which Plaintiffs have offered no proof whatsoever.
2. A motion to attach cannot be based on an alleged likelihood of success on
claims that are not yet plead.
The rest of the claims for which Plaintiffs assert they have a likelihood of success are
claims that Plaintiffs have not yet asserted or included in any pleading before this Court. The
current active complaints in each of the cases do not assert any claims against Mr. Caramadre
for: (1) civil liability for criminal conspiracy, (2) civil liability for wire fraud and mail fraud, or
(3) violations of the RICO Act. In fact, Plaintiffs have not even sought leave to add these claims
in any of these seven cases. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs now assert that they have established a
likelihood of success on these unasserted claims that entitles them to a prejudgment writ of
attachment. Plaintiffs are wrong.
For Plaintiffs to establish a likelihood of success on any of these claims, Plaintiffs first
must demonstrate that they will be able to obtain leave to add these claims. Plaintiffs have not

10

yet sought such leave, but their ability to obtain such leave certainly is in doubt. Mr. Caramadre
will vigorously oppose any attempt by Plaintiffs to obtain such leave. First, Plaintiffs already
have amended their complaints in these matters numerous times. Although leave to amend is
usually freely granted, Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not intended to be a
mechanism for Plaintiffs to continually amend their complaints to assert new claims until they
find one that works. See Grundy v. Skolnick, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178960, *3 (D. Nev. Dec.
18, 2012) (“There is a limit to the number of times the Court will permit a party to attempt to
amend a complaint when his repeated efforts still fail.”); Walder v. Paramount Publix Corp., 135
F. Supp. 228, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (denying leave to amend a complaint in the face of the
dismissal of another claim).
Plaintiffs lost a motion to dismiss, then amended their complaint to assert new claims.
Plaintiffs then lost a second motion to dismiss. Undeterred, they then sought leave to amend to
add still more new claims. Now Plaintiffs want to add even more new claims. At some point a
defendant is entitled to finality on the claims against which he must defend, and that time has
long since passed in this matter. If Plaintiffs do in fact seek leave to amend their complaints to
add a new claim of civil liability for criminal acts and RICO claims, this Court should deny those
motions. But, at this time, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on any of
those unasserted claims and this Court should deny the current motion to attach.
Additionally, Plaintiffs premise the substance of their argument that they have a
likelihood of success on these claims on the statements Mr. Caramadre made in connection with
his plea agreement. As set forth, supra, the plea agreement is insufficient to establish a
likelihood of success on the merits of any pending claims. Mr. Caramadre is seeking to vacate
that plea agreement, and at best it will be a single piece of evidence in the broad context of the

11

claims asserted against him. The conclusive weight Plaintiffs give to that plea agreement in their
motion to attach is entirely inappropriate. Accordingly, Plaintiffs completely fail to meet their
burden of establishing a likelihood of success on the merits, and this Court should deny the
motion to attach.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should deny Plaintiffs’ motion to attach.

Dated: Providence, Rhode Island
March 4, 2013
JOSEPH CARAMADRE, RAYMOUR
RADHAKRISHNAN, ESTATE PLANNING
RESOURCES, INC., and HARRISON CONDIT,
By their Attorneys,
/s/ Robert G. Flanders, Jr.
Robert G. Flanders, Jr. (# 1785)
Adam M. Ramos (#7591)
HINCKLEY, ALLEN & SNYDER LLP
50 Kennedy Plaza, Suite 1500
Providence, RI 02903
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
[e-mail]

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on March 4, 2013, a copy of the foregoing was filed electronically
and served by mail on anyone unable to accept electronic filing. Notice of this filing will be sent
by e-mail to all parties by operation of the court’s electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of
Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the court’s CM/ECF system.
/s/ Robert G. Flanders, Jr.

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