Roger Cleveland Golf Company Inc v. Prince et al

Filing 140

RESPONSE in Opposition re 131 MOTION for New Trial MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law Motion for New Trial, Motion for Relief from Judgment, 135 Supplemental MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of LawSupplemental MOTION for New TrialSupplemental MOTION for Relief from Judgment Response filed by Roger Cleveland Golf Company Inc.Reply to Response to Motion due by 5/19/2011 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Prince Trial Testimony Excerpts, # 2 Exhibit B - Gingrich Trial Testimony Excerpts, # 3 Exhibit C - Jury Charges & Motions Excerpts, # 4 Exhibit D - Campbell v. BP, # 5 Exhibit E - Golson v. Green Tree Financial, # 6 Exhibit F - Laubach v. Khajawai, M.D., # 7 Exhibit G - East Tennessee Natural Gas v. Acres in Wythe County, VA, # 8 Exhibit H - Coach v. Gata)(McElwaine, John)

Exhibit D

Page 1

JEAN CAMPBELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BP AMOCO POLYMERS,
INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee, and BP AMOCO CORPORATION, an
Indiana Corporation; BP AMOCO CHEMICAL COMPANY, a Delaware
Corporation, Defendants. JEAN CAMPBELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BP AMOCO
POLYMERS, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee, and BP AMOCO
CORPORATION, an Indiana Corporation; BP AMOCO CHEMICAL COMPANY,
a Delaware Corporation, Defendants. JEAN CAMPBELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BP
AMOCO POLYMERS, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 02-1814, No. 02-1924, No. 03-1409
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
75 Fed. Appx. 907; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18800
August 5, 2003, Submitted
September 11, 2003, Decided
NOTICE:
[**1] RULES OF THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT
CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE
REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT.
PRIOR HISTORY:
Appeals from the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock
Hill. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge. (CA-00-810).
DISPOSITION:
Nos 02-1814 & 02-1924 AFFIRMED. No 03-1409 - DISMISSED.

COUNSEL: C. William Michaels, Baltimore, Maryland;
Stephine M. Wells, WELLS & HOPKINS, Chula Vista,
California, for Appellant.
Lisa D. Freeman, BP AMERICA, INC., Warrenville,
Illinois; Ingrid B. Erwin, NEXSEN, PRUET, JACOBS &
POLLARD, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
JUDGES: Before WIDENER,
GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
OPINION

MICHAEL,

and

[*908] PER CURIAM:
Jean Campbell filed suit against BP Amoco
Polymers, Inc., BP Amoco Corp., and BP Amoco
Chemical Co., alleging that her April 1999 termination
was based on gender discrimination and retaliation in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1994
& Supp. 2002), and South Carolina public policy. (J.A.
32-39). Following a jury trial, the district court entered
judgment in favor of [**2] BP Amoco Polymers.
Campbell filed a timely notice of appeal. The district
court subsequently denied Campbell's post-trial motions.
Campbell filed a second notice of appeal. The two
appeals were consolidated in Nos. 021814 and 02-1924.
BP Amoco Polymers has filed a cross-appeal of the
district court's order granting a stay in the execution of
the judgment pending appeal and denying BP Amoco
Polymers' petition for attorney's fees, with leave to refile
when Campbell's appeal is no longer pending in this
Court. BP Amoco Polymers' cross-appeal, No. 03-1409,
has been consolidated with Campbell's appeals.
BP Amoco Corp. and BP Amoco Chemical Co. filed
motions to dismiss in which they alleged BP Amoco

Page 2
75 Fed. Appx. 907, *908; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18800, **2

Polymers was Campbell's sole employer and they were
entitled to dismissal as party defendants. In a report and
recommendation, the magistrate judge construed the
motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment
because it considered matters outside the pleadings and
determined BP Amoco Polymers was Campbell's sole
employer. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing
BP Amoco Corp. and BP Amoco Chemical Co. as party
defendants without prejudice so that Campbell could file
a motion to reinstate [**3] either or both corporations as
party defendants should the evidence adduced through
discovery so warrant. The district court adopted the
report and recommendation.
BP Amoco Polymers filed a motion for summary
judgment alleging Campbell's claims were barred
because she executed a Special Resignation Agreement
that contained a release of all claims arising out of her
employment with BP Amoco Polymers. In a report and
recommendation, the magistrate judge recommended
denying BP Amoco Polymers' motion for summary
judgment. BP Amoco Polymers filed objections to the
report and recommendation. Campbell did not file
objections. The district court adopted the report and
recommendation and denied BP Amoco Polymers'
motion for summary judgment.
Before trial, Campbell filed several motions in
limine, including a motion seeking to exclude evidence
regarding the executed Special Resignation Agreement.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied
Campbell's motion. The case proceeded with an eight-day
jury trial. The district court denied Campbell's Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law at
the close of all the evidence. The jury determined the
parties entered [**4] into a Special Resignation
Agreement dated May 3, 1999 that barred Campbell from
recovery. The district court denied Campbell's post-trial
motions for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively,
for a new trial.
[*909] On appeal, Campbell argues: (1) the district
court erred in failing to rule as a matter of law when it
considered the summary judgment motion that the
Special Resignation Agreement was not effective; (2) the
district court abused its discretion by not granting
Campbell's motion in limine to exclude the Special
Resignation Agreement; (3) the district court abused its
discretion when it failed to grant Campbell's Rule 50(a)
motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all

the evidence; (4) the district court erred when it failed to
grant Campbell's Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a
matter of law following the verdict; (5) the district court
abused its discretion in failing to grant Campbell's Rule
59 motion for a new trial because the verdict was against
the weight of the evidence before the jury; and (6) the
district court erred when it granted BP Amoco Corp. and
BP Amoco Chemical Company's motions to dismiss. In
its cross-appeal, BP Amoco Polymers argues: (1) [**5]
the district court erred in failing to consider the merits of
its petition for attorney's fees, costs and expenses; (2) the
district court erred in failing to award costs; and (3) the
district court erred in failing to award attorney's fees,
costs and expenses because the parties had a binding
agreement.
First, Campbell asserts the district court erred in
failing to rule as a matter of law that the Special
Resignation Agreement was ineffective when it
considered the summary judgment motions. To the extent
Campbell contends the court should have granted
summary judgment in her favor on this issue, we need not
review the court's pre-trial determination, as Campbell
received a full trial, offering her various avenues through
which to challenge the court's ruling, several of which
Campbell exercised. See Chesapeake Paper Prods. Co. v.
S&W Engineering, 51 F.3d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir. 1995).
We address those challenges, under the appropriate
standards, below.
Second, Campbell asserts the district court erred
when it denied her motion in limine seeking to exclude
the Special Resignation Agreement. We review a district
court's ruling on such a motion in limine for abuse of
[**6] discretion. Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d
471, 480 (4th Cir. 1994). We have reviewed the record
and find no abuse of discretion.
Third, Campbell argues the district court erred in
denying her motion for judgment as a matter of law under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) at the close of all the evidence.
Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if "there is no
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury
to find" in favor of a party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). We
review the district court's denial of a motion for judgment
as a matter of law de novo. Private Mortgage Inv. Servs.,
Inc. v. Hotel & Club Assocs., Inc., 296 F.3d 308, 311-12
(4th Cir. 2002). We view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Id. We have reviewed
the record and find no error.

Page 3
75 Fed. Appx. 907, *909; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18800, **6

Fourth, Campbell argues the district court erred in
denying her post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of
law. Following trial, Campbell filed a motion titled
"Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict or
Alternatively for New Trial." The district court construed
the motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict as a
renewed motion for judgment as a matter [**7] of law
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) and denied the motion.

that persons from these corporate entities were involved
in the decision to terminate her. We have reviewed the
district court's order accepting the report and
recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no error
in the dismissal of BP Amoco Corp. and BP Amoco
Chemical Co. as party defendants. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court orders at issue in Campbell's
appeals in Nos. 02-1814 and 02-1924 in all respects.

We review the district court's denial of a Rule 50(b)
motion de novo. South Atl. Ltd. P'ship of Tenn., L.P. v.
Riese, 284 F.3d 518, 532 (4th Cir. 2002). "A district court
should grant a Rule 50(b) motion only if the court
'determines, without [*910] weighing the evidence or
considering the credibility of the witnesses, that
substantial evidence does not support the jury's findings.'"
Id. (quoting Konkel v. Bob Evans Farms Inc., 165 F.3d
275, 279 (4th Cir. 1999)). We view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. We have
reviewed the record and find no reversible error.

In BP Amoco Polymers' cross appeal, it seeks to
appeal the district court's order granting a stay of
execution of the judgment and denying its motion for
attorney's fees and expenses, with leave to refile, pending
this appeal. We may exercise jurisdiction only over final
orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000), and certain interlocutory
and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2000); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 93 L. Ed. 1528, 69 S. Ct. 1221 (1949). [**9]
The district court denied BP Amoco Polymers' petition
for attorney's fees with leave to refile when Campbell's
appeal is no longer pending in this Court. Because the
district court has not entered a final order ruling on BP
Amoco Polymers' motion, the cross-appeal is
interlocutory and not subject to appellate review. We
therefore dismiss BP Amoco Polymers' appeal in No.
03-1409. We grant Campbell's counsel's motion to
withdraw. We grant the motion to submit on briefs and
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.

Fifth, Campbell asserts the district court erred when
it denied her motion for a new trial. We review the
district court's denial of a motion for a new trial under
Fed. R. Civ. 59(a) for abuse of discretion. Cline v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 1998).
A new trial will only be granted in three circumstances:
(1) if the verdict is against the clear weight of the
evidence; (2) is based upon false evidence; or (3) will
result in a miscarriage of justice. [**8] Id. We have
reviewed the record and find no reversible error.
Finally, Campbell asserts the district court erred
when it dismissed BP Amoco Corp. and BP Amoco
Chemical Co. as defendants. Campbell asserts the names
of the companies were used interchangeably at trial and

Nos. 02-1814 & 02-1924 - AFFIRMED
No. 03-1409 - DISMISSED