Sandifer v. Sparks et al

Filing 104

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by Senior Judge William J. Haynes, Jr on 3/8/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment TEXT SEARCHABLE VERSION)(xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COLUMBIA DIVISION
LANCE THOMAS SANDIFER,
Plaintiff,
v.
ASHLEY SPARKS, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 1-13-0138
Senior Judge Haynes

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Lance Sandifer, an inmate at South Central Correctional Facility ("SCCF") in
Clifton, Tennessee, filed this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Defendants: Ashley
Sparks and Brad Morton, SCCF corrections officers.1

Plaintiff asserts, in essence, Eighth

Amendment claims for excessive force, deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs
and the denial of basic necessities of a meal and shower. Plaintiff alleges that on November 5, 2012,
Defendant Sparks denied Plaintiff and his cell mate permission to take a shower and that Sparks told
Plaintiff’s cell mate that he needed to “handle” Plaintiff and that if he did Plaintiff’s cell mate would
get a shower. Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff’s cell mate did not take any action against Plaintiff.
Plaintiff also alleges that on November 20, 2012, Defendant Sparks refused to give Plaintiff his food
tray and closed the chute of the cell door on his hand. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Morton later
released Plaintiff’s hand from the chute, refused to give Plaintiff fresh trays of food, only offering
Plaintiff his cold food tray, and denied Plaintiff medical treatment for his hand.
Before the Court is the Magistrate Judge=s Report and Recommendation (Docket Entry No.
96) to grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss and for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 87).

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Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Jason Woodall, Sean Brantley, Ben Killingsworth and
Arvil Chapman were dismissed. (Docket Entry Nos. 31 and 51).

Plaintiff filed an objection (Docket Entry No. 99). Defendants filed a response (Docket Entry No.
101) to which Plaintiff filed a response (Docket Entry No. 103).
Defendants filed contemporaneously with their motion for summary judgment a statement
of undisputed facts (Docket Entry No. 89), in accordance with Local Rule 56.01(b). Plaintiff did not
file a response to Defendants' statement of undisputed facts. Accordingly, Defendants' proffered
statements of fact are undisputed for purposes of summary judgment. Local Rule 56.01(g).
In her declaration (Docket Entry No. 90), Defendant Sparks denies that she refused Plaintiff
a shower, denies that she instructed Plaintiff’s cell mate to “handle” Plaintiff, states that Plaintiff
refused his food tray, and denies that she saw or slammed Plaintiff’s hand in the door chute.
Defendant Sparks sates that Plaintiff did not yell or indicate that his hand was in the chute. Similarly,
Defendant Morton in his declaration (Docket Entry No. 91) states that he offered Plaintiff his food
tray, but Plaintiff refused. Defendant Morton further states that Plaintiff’s hand was not stuck in the
door chute, that Plaintiff did not report to him that Defendant Sparks closed Plaintiff’s hand in the
door chute, that Plaintiff did not have any discernable or obvious injury, and that Plaintiff did not ask
Defendant Morton for medical aid.
The Magistrate Judge concluded that based upon the undisputed facts Plaintiff failed to show
a genuine dispute as to any material facts and that Defendants Sparks and Morton are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. The Magistrate Judge warned that “[f]ailure to file specific objections
within 14 days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further
appeal of this Recommendation.” (Docket Entry No. 96 at 5, citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140,
Reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986)).
In his objection, Plaintiff asserts that based upon his understanding “the plaintiff’s accusations
are to be taken as fact,” and that Defendants’ denials of his allegations are not enough to dismiss his

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complaint. (Docket Entry No. 99 at 1). Plaintiff also references his previously filed “exhibit A and
B.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Sparks denied him a “shower or rec,” submitting grievance
records in support. Id. at 1-2.2 In his response (Docket Entry No. 103), Plaintiff further asserts that
“[e]verything I stated in complaint is true,” that Defendant Sparks denied Plaintiff a “shower and rec’
several times and that Defendant Sparks “did assault me, and I could’ve been killed if my cell mate
would’ve ‘handled’ me as she instructed.” Id. at 2.
The Sixth Circuit has stated:
A party who does not file objections to a magistrate judge's report and
recommendation, after being advised to do so, waives her right to appeal. A general
objection which does not specify the issues of contention is tantamount to filing no
objections at all and does not satisfy the requirement that objections be filed.
Exceptional circumstances, however, will warrant an exception to the rule in the
interests of justice. . . . . Although the court holds pleadings filed by pro se litigants
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, there is no cause
for extending this lenient standard to “straightforward procedural requirements that
a layperson can comprehend as easily as a lawyer.” the requirements for responding
to a magistrate judge's report are clear . . . .
Murphy v. Reed, 22 F. App'x 390, 391 (6th Cir. 2001); McCready v. Kamminga, 113 F. App'x 47,
48 (6th Cir. 2004).
The Court notes that Plaintiff’s complaint (Docket Entry No. 1 at 6) is verified by making his
allegations under “penalty of perjury.” Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d 901, 904-05 (6th Cir. 1992).
A court must consider any specific facts in a plaintiff's verified complaint. Lavado v. Keohane, 992
F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[S]ince [the plaintiff] filed a verified complaint his allegations ‘have
the same force and effect as an affidavit’ for purposes of responding to a motion for summary
judgment.”) (quoting Williams, 981 F.2d at 905). Yet, here Plaintiff failed to raise specific objections

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Plaintiff did not assert a claim for denial of recreation in his complaint. Thus, such a claim
is not before the Court and will not be considered.

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as to any claims against Defendant Morton, to any claim for lack of a meal, to any claim for denial
of medical care and to his claim regarding his hand being slammed in the chute. Thus, these claims
are deemed waived.
In any event, the record reflects that Plaintiff did not file any grievances against Defendant
Morton or regarding Plaintiff’s denial of medical care claim. (Docket Entry No. 89, Defendants’
Statement of Undisputed Facts at ¶ 8). Plaintiff does not allege in his verified complaint that he did
so or otherwise dispute that he failed to do so. Thus, any claims against Defendant Morton or any
claim regarding a denial of medical care should be denied for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006); Cook v. Caruso, 531 F. App'x 554 (6th Cir. 2013).
Also, Plaintiff’s allegation that he was denied one food tray, without more, does not state an Eighth
Amendment violation. Richmond v. Settles, 450 F. App'x 448, 455 (6th Cir. 2011) (no Eighth
Amendment violation where the plaintiff was deprived seven meals during his six days on behavioral
management).
As to Plaintiff's excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment for the alleged closing
of the chute on his hand, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the "‘unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain.'" Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
670 (1977) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). An Eighth Amendment claim for
excessive force has both a subjective and an objective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994). "Thus, courts considering a prisoner's claim must ask both if ‘the officials act[ed] with
a sufficiently culpable state of mind' and if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively ‘harmful enough'
to establish a constitutional violation." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (citing Wilson
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). In the excessive force context, "whenever prison officials stand
accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,

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the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Id. at 7. "‘[S]uch factors as the need for
the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used,
[and] the extent of injury inflicted,' are relevant [in determining the manner in which the force was
applied]." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321 (citation omitted).
Other relevant factors include "the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as
reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them, and any
efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response." Id. "From such considerations inferences
may be drawn as to whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary, or instead
evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is tantamount to a
knowing willingness that it occur." Id. Thus, "[t]he absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the
Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end it." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim requires that the pain be serious.
Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 1993). The objective component is contextual and is
responsive to "contemporary standards of decency." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). In the excessive force context, regardless of any significant injury "[w]hen
prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of
decency always are violated. . . . Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical
punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of
injury." Id. at 9 (citation omitted).
To be sure, not "every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of
action." Id.; see id. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Not every push
or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a

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prisoner's constitutional rights.")). The Eighth Amendment recognizes "de minimis uses of physical
force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'" Id. at
9-10 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force should also be dismissed because Plaintiff failed
to allege facts demonstrating that Defendant Sparks acted maliciously or sadistically for the purpose
of causing harm or that he suffered any injury that would support an inference that Sparks used an
unnecessary amount of force. Plaintiff’s lack of an objection to this claim reinforces this conclusion.
See Tuttle v. Carroll Cty. Det. Ctr., 500 F. App'x 480, 481-82 (6th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the
plaintiff’s “bare-bones allegation that the female deputy ‘grabbed my privates and squeezed them
really hard’ [was] simply too subjective and vague to state an Eighth Amendment violation,” the
Sixth Circuit explained, “In assessing the objective component, we conduct a contextual inquiry to
determine whether the pain inflicted was ‘sufficiently serious.’ The extent of a prisoner's injury may
suggest whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation
and may also provide some indication of the amount of force applied.”) (citations omitted); Hunter
v. Clark, No. 2:11-CV-06, 2013 WL 3049085, at *7, 8 (E.D. Tenn. June 17, 2013), aff'd (Jan. 8,
2014) (granting summary judgment against plaintiff where the plaintiff stated that he had no injuries
to his neck to a little bruising, the district court explained, “While the absence of serious injury or
presence of a injury which is de minimis does not bar an excessive force claim, it is a factor . . . in
ascertaining whether the use of force could have been thought necessary and also in determining the
amount of force applied. . . . [T]he extent of the injury may provide evidence of the nature of the
force used, and it appears that such is the case here. . . .”).
As to Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied a shower, the Sixth Circuit has stated, “This Court
has concluded that deprivation of a shower and other personal hygiene items for a ‘brief span of time

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..., i.e., only six days’ is not actionable conduct.” Richmond, 450 F. App'x at 455 (citations omitted).
Thus, the Court concludes that this claim should be denied.
Finally, as to Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Sparks told Plaintiff’s cell mate to “handle”
Plaintiff, the Court concludes that this alleged vague statement fails to establish an Eighth
Amendment claim. “[A]llegations of verbal abuse, threats, or harassment by a guard to a prisoner
are not cognizable under section 1983.” Banks v. Klapish, 717 F. Supp. 520, 522 (W.D. Mich. 1989);
Rahman v. Stephenson, 626 F. Supp. 886, 888 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
Accordingly, having considered Plaintiff's objection and conducted a de novo review of the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, for the reasons stated above and the reasons stated
in the Report and Recommendation, the Court concludes that the Report and Recommendation should
be adopted and Defendants’ motion to dismiss and for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 87)
should be granted.
An appropriate Order is filed herewith.

ENTERED this the

day of March, 2016.

WILLIAM J. HAYNES, JR.
Senior United States District Judge

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