Smith v. Woods et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by Senior Judge William J. Haynes, Jr on 9/7/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Text Searchable Version)(xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COLUMBIA DIVISION
ANTOINE SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRUCE WOODS, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 1:15-cv-00011
Senior Judge Haynes
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff, Antoine Smith, an inmate at the Trousdale Turner Correctional Center formerly
confined at the South Central Correctional Facility (“SCCF”) in Clifton, Tennessee, filed this pro
se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Defendants: Bruce Woods, Corrections Corporation
of America (“CCA”),1 Arvil Chapman, Daniel Pritchard, Daniel Sullivan, and Bryon Ponds. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Woods sexually propositioned him and grabbed his testicles, and that
Defendant Woods subsequently retaliated against Plaintiff by issuing him a series of ten disciplinary
write-ups that were dismissed. Plaintiff asserts claims that Defendant Woods violated his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain and his First
Amendment right to be free from retaliation. Plaintiff also assert an Eighth Amendment claim
against all other Defendants for knowingly exposing inmates to Defendant Woods’s sexual advances.
Defendants Chapman, Woods, Sullivan, and Pritchard filed a motion for summary judgment
(Docket Entry No. 52) with supporting documents that included a statement of undisputed facts
(Docket Entry No. 54), to which Plaintiff filed a response (Docket Entry No. 71). Plaintiff filed a
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The Court dismissed Defendant CCA from this action in the Court’s Order adopting the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that Defendant CCA’s motion to dismiss be granted.
(Docket Entry No. 63).
motion for partial summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 62) with a late-filed statement of
undisputed facts (Docket Entry No. 93), to which Defendants Chapman, Woods, Sullivan, and
Pritchard filed a response (Docket Entry No. 94). Defendants Chapman, Woods, Sullivan, and
Pritchard also filed a response to Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (Docket Entry No.
73) with supporting documents that included a statement of undisputed facts (Docket Entry No. 75),
to which Plaintiff filed a response (Docket Entry No. 90). Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss
Defendants Chapman and Sullivan (Docket Entry No. 92) as well as a motion for a temporary
restraining order (Docket Entry No. 95), to which Defendant CCA filed a response (Docket Entry
No. 96). Defendant Ponds filed a motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 97) with
supporting documents that included a statement of undisputed facts (Docket Entry No. 101), to
which Plaintiff filed a late response (Docket Entry No. 116).
Before the Court is the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Docket Entry No.
109) recommending: (1) that Defendants Chapman and Sullivan be dismissed with prejudice in
accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2); (2) that the motion for summary judgment of Defendants
Chapman, Woods, Sullivan, and Pritchard (Docket Entry No. 52) be granted; (3) that Defendant
Ponds’s motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 97) be granted; (4) that Plaintiff’s motion
for partial summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 62) be denied; (5) that Plaintiff’s motion for a
temporary restraining order (Docket Entry No. 95) be denied; and (6) that this action be dismissed
with prejudice as to all Defendants.
Plaintiff filed objections to the Report and Recommendation (Docket Entry No. 115), to
which Defendants filed a response (Docket Entry No. 117). Plaintiff’s specific objections are, in
essence: (1) that he has submitted sufficient evidence to support his claims; (2) that he submitted
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grievances that were not answered or returned and completed an incident report that was destroyed;
(3) that the Magistrate Judge misconstrued Defendant Woods’ alleged actions as a search; and (4)
that the Magistrate Judge did not account for the difficulties that Plaintiff’s conditions of
confinement impose on his preparation of filings in this action. Defendants argue that the Report and
Recommendation should be adopted in its entirety. (Docket Entry No. 117 at 5). Plaintiff did not
object to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that Defendants Chapman and Sullivan be
dismissed with prejudice in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). The Court concludes that
Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Defendants Chapman and Sullivan (Docket Entry No. 92) should be
granted and the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Chapman and Sullivan (Docket
Entry No. 52) should be denied as moot.
Upon de novo review, the Court ADOPTS in part the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that based upon the
undisputed facts, Defendants have demonstrated that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies as to his claims against Defendants Pritchard and Ponds. The Court also concludes that
Plaintiff’s proof fails to establish that the allegations underlying Plaintiff’s First Amendment
retaliation claim against Defendant Woods rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Finally, the
Court concludes that Defendant Woods is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s sexual
assault claim because a genuine dispute of material fact exists on whether Defendant Woods violated
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights.
Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner that files an action to
challenge his prison conditions must exhaust all available administrative remedies established by
state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218-20 (2007). The PLRA
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“requires proper exhaustion,” and “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s
deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 93 (2006). “[A]n
inmate cannot simply fail to file a grievance or abandon the process before completion and claim that
he has exhausted his remedies or that it is futile for him to do so because his grievance is now
time-barred under the regulations.” Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305, 309 (6th Cir. 1999). To seek
dismissal, a defendant must show that the prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Jones, 549 U.S. at 217.
Here, SCCF followed the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) Policy regarding
inmate grievances. (Docket Entry No. 71 at ¶ 45). The grievance policy applies to inmate concerns
with the substance or application of SCCF practices, any single action toward an inmate by staff or
other inmates, or any condition that personally affects the inmate. Id. TDOC Policy requires an
inmate to file a grievance with specific details such as “dates, times, and the names of the persons
involved” in the occurrence underlying the grievance. Id. at ¶ 49. A grievance is exhausted where
the grievance complies with applicable TDOC policies and the inmate appeals any adverse ruling
through the TDOC commissioner’s office. Id. at ¶¶ 46, 60.
The record reflects that the grievance chairperson received three grievances from Plaintiff.
On February 4, 2014, Plaintiff filed a grievance stating that, on January 23, 2014, he was “verbally
and morally offended” by Defendant Woods and requesting that Defendant Woods be held
accountable for his “unprofessional attitude [and] tone.” (Docket Entry No. 79-2 at 4). Plaintiff
explained that he had visited Defendant Woods’s office to deliver requested material and tapped on
his window, and Defendant Woods “storm[ed] out of his office,” used a “negative tone” to convey
his “dislike” of Plaintiff’s greeting,” and told Plaintiff “never to tap on his office window again.” Id.
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at 5. The “Response of Supervisor of Grieved Employee or Department” reflects that the supervisor
“did not determine that any policy violation occurred.” Id. at 6. The “Chairperson’s Response and
Reason(s)” section of the “Inmate Grievance Response” reflects that Plaintiff’s grievance was
“inappropriate” because it was filed more than seven days following the incident. Id. at 4. Plaintiff
appealed this ruling to the TDOC commissioner’s office and the deputy commissioner of operations
concurred with the supervisor. Id. at 1.
On February 19, 2014, Plaintiff filed a grievance stating that Defendant Woods sexually
assaulted him in his office and requesting that Defendant Woods be terminated. (Docket Entry No.
79-3 at 4-5). Plaintiff explained that Defendant Woods “grabbed [his] crotch” and Plaintiff hit
Defendant Woods’s hand away. Id. at 5. According to this grievance, Defendant Woods then told
Plaintiff to leave his office, called security to report that Plaintiff refused to leave his office, and
Plaintiff “quickly left an[d] waited for the security team.” Id. The “Response of Supervisor of
Grieved Employee or Department” states: “This incident was reviewed and investigated per protocol
on 2/19/2014 by the facility investigator and was determined to be unsubstantiated.” Id. at 6. The
“Chairperson’s Response and Reason(s)” section of the “Inmate Grievance Response” states:
“Inappropriate per policy 501.01 Section 01 same or similar 272235.” Id. at 4. Upon Plaintiff’s
appeal, the warden and the deputy commissioner of operations concurred with the supervisor. Id. at
1-3.
On July 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed a grievance stating that Defendant Woods approached him
in the library and threatened to retaliate against Plaintiff for the allegations in his sexual assault
grievance. (Docket Entry No. 79-4 at 1-2). Plaintiff stated that he then drew attention to the situation,
and Defendant Woods told prison guard that Plaintiff was threatening him. Id. at 2. Plaintiff was then
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“handcuffed and escorted to lock-up pending a[n] investigation.” Id. at 2. The “Response of
Supervisor of Grieved Employee or Department” states: “After review, . . . it was [Plaintiff] who
approached [Defendant] Woods’ personal space [and] it was also documented on a disciplinary
report that day. . . . [Plaintiff] was restrained [and] escorted to medical after failing to comply . . .
.” Id. at 3. The “Chairperson’s Response and Reason(s)” section of the “Inmate Grievance Response”
states: “Inappropriate per policy 501.01 Sec VI I-1 Same or similar to grievance #272760-20658.”
Id. at 1. The grievance form reflects that Plaintiff appealed this ruling, but the outcome of any appeal
is not attached to the grievance. Id. at 1.
Plaintiff’s first objection is a list of supporting evidence that he contends to have submitted
regarding his claims in this action, including: copies of two grievances; “write-ups” endorsed by
Defendant Woods; two witness affidavits regarding Defendant Woods’s sexual assault and
retaliation; Plaintiff’s declaration; Plaintiff’s statement of facts; and an incident report that Plaintiff
asserts was thrown in the trash can by Defendants Pritchard and Ponds. (Docket Entry No. 115 at
6). Based on the Court’s review, there are not any “write-ups” endorsed by Defendant Woods in the
record. Nonetheless, the Court has considered the other listed documents, as well as Plaintiff’s other
filings, in its de novo review of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.
Plaintiff’s second objection concerns exhaustion under the PLRA. The Magistrate Judge
found that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Pritchard and Ponds should be dismissed because
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he exhausted the available administrative remedies. (Docket Entry
No. 109 at 7-8). Plaintiff argues that he filed grievances against Defendants Pritchard and Ponds that
were not answered or returned. (Docket Entry No. 115 at 7).
The Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to
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Defendants Pritchard and Ponds because there is not any admissible evidence that he submitted any
grievances regarding Defendants Pritchard and Ponds. Proper exhaustion requires filing a grievance
in accordance with applicable TDOC policies. (Docket Entry No. 71 at ¶ 46). Under TDOC Policy,
an inmate grievance must include specific details such as “dates, times, and the names of the persons
involved” in the occurrence underlying the grievance. Id. at ¶ 49. Here, Plaintiff’s three grievances
do not mention Defendants Pritchard and Ponds by name, nor were Defendants Pritchard and Ponds
involved in the allegations underlying Plaintiff’s grievances. Although Plaintiff now contends that
he filed grievances regarding Defendants Pritchard and Ponds that were not answered or returned,
Plaintiff’s bare assertion is not properly supported as required by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c)(1). Further, Plaintiff does not provide any detail regarding
the substance of these alleged grievances that would tie the grievances to Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Pritchard and Ponds in this action.
Plaintiff argues that he completed an incident report “in front of [Defendant] Ponds [that] was
found in the trash can of [Defendant] Pritchard,” (Docket Entry No. 115 at 7), but that does not bear
on whether he filed grievances against those Defendants. With his “motion to submit Plaintiff
incident report as evidence,” filed after the Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff included an
incident statement that he completed and that appears to bear the signatures of Defendants Pritchard
and Ponds. (Docket Entry No. 114). Even considering this incident statement, the statement only
describes Defendant Woods’s alleged sexual assault. Id. at 2. The statement does not concern activity
by Defendants Pritchard and Ponds, nor does it refer to any grievances that Plaintiff submitted
regarding Defendants Pritchard and Ponds. Id. Because Plaintiff presents no admissible evidence to
rebut Defendants’ showing, Defendants have carried their burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff
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failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to Defendants Pritchard and Ponds. See Jones, 549
U.S. at 217. Thus, Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Pritchard and Ponds should be dismissed.
Plaintiff’s third objection is that the Magistrate Judge misconstrued Defendant Woods’s
alleged sexual assault of Plaintiff as a search. (Docket Entry No. 115 at 7). Upon review of the
Report and Recommendation, the Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge did not consider the
allegations against Defendant Woods to constitute a search. Instead, the Magistrate Judge found a
material factual dispute as to whether Defendant Woods sexually propositioned Plaintiff and grabbed
and squeezed his testicles. (Docket entry No. 109 at 10). Yet, the Magistrate Judge also found that
these alleged actions failed to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Id. at 10-11. The Court
agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the facts surrounding Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment sexual
assault claim are disputed, but concludes that this dispute creates a constitutional harm when viewed
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals has noted that “sexual abuse of a prisoner by a corrections officer may
in some circumstances violate the prisoner’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment”
under the Eighth Amendment. Jackson v. Madery, 158 F.App’x 656, 662 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 860-61 (2d Cir.1997)). “To prevail on a constitutional claim of
sexual [abuse], an inmate must . . . prove, as an objective matter, that the alleged abuse . . . caused
‘pain’ and, as a subjective matter, that the officer in question acted with a sufficiently culpable state
of mind.” Kelly v. Moose, No. 3:12-cv-1339, 2013 WL 141132, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 10, 2013)
(Trauger, J.) (quoting Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1338 (8th Cir. 1997)). The objective
component is “contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Jackson, 158
F.App’x at 662 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 8 (1992)). Yet, “not ‘every malevolent
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touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.’” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37
(2010) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). “[M]inor, isolated incidents of sexual touching, even
coupled with occasional offensive sexual remarks, do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation.” Kelly, 2013 WL 141132, at *2.
Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Woods sexually propositioned him as well as grabbed
and squeezed his testicles while Plaintiff was in Defendant Woods’s office. Defendant Woods denies
touching or sexually propositioning Plaintiff. (Docket Entry No. 56 at ¶¶ 14-15). Viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, as required at this juncture, this was more than a
“minor” incident of sexual touching. See Kelly, 2013 WL 141132, at *2. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Woods “grabbed and squeezed” his testicles, an action more likely to cause pain than
mere touching. See Perkins v. Jacobsen, No. 2:11-CV-271, 2013 WL 3776303, at *1 (W.D. Mich.
July 17, 2013) (“[W]hile a brief touching of the penis or buttocks might properly be considered a
‘minor’ incident within the Eighth Amendment context, the Court is not convinced that the grabbing
of an inmate’s penis is necessarily a similarly ‘minor’ incident.”). Further, unlike the cases cited by
the Magistrate Judge as demonstrating “isolated and minor incidents of alleged sexual assault,” this
incident occurred outside the context of a routine search or pat-down. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Carroll
Cnty. Det. Ctr., 500 F.App’x 480, 482 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming the district court’s dismissal where
a pretrial detainee alleged that a female deputy grabbed and squeezed his “privates” during a pat
down). In this context, the Court concludes that there is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether
Defendant Woods violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights.
Plaintiff also asserts a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Woods for
harassing Plaintiff and issuing ten write-ups against Plaintiff that were dismissed after Plaintiff filed
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the sexual assault grievance. (Docket Entry No. 1 at 5). The Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff
properly exhausted his administrative remedies as to this claim, but that the claim should be
dismissed because there is not any evidence that Defendant Woods’s alleged actions were more than
de minimis. (Docket Entry No. 109 at 9-12). Plaintiff does not specifically object to the Magistrate
Judge’s finding, but generally states in his first objection that he provided sufficient evidence to
support his claims. (Docket Entry No. 115 at 6).
For his retaliation claim, Plaintiff must prove: (1) that he engaged in constitutionally
protected conduct; (2) that he suffered an adverse action that would deter a person of ordinary
firmness from continuing to engage in the protected conduct; and (3) that the adverse action was
motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th
Cir.1999). An inmate has a constitutionally protected right under the First Amendment to file nonfrivolous grievances against prison officials. Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000).
Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he suffered an adverse action that would “deter a
person of ordinary firmness” from filing grievances. See Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 394. As the Sixth
Circuit has explained, “not every objectionable act directed at a prisoner constitutes adverse action
sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in protected activities.” Reynolds-Bey
v. Harris, 428 F.App’x 493, 503 (6th Cir. 2011) (discussing Sixth Circuit decisional law regarding
the “adverse action” prong of retaliation claims in the prisoner context).
Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Woods issued ten write-ups against him—and
Plaintiff’s first objection states that he submitted “write-up’s endorse [sic] by Bruce Woods” as
evidence supporting his claims—the record does not contain such evidence. Plaintiff’s July 2014
grievance does describe an incident of alleged retaliation by Defendant Woods, but that action does
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not support Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. There, Plaintiff stated that Defendant Woods approached
him in the library and threatened retaliation for filing the sexual assault grievance. (Docket Entry No.
79-4 at 1-2). Plaintiff stated that he drew attention the situation, and Defendant Woods told prison
guards that Plaintiff was threatening him. Id. at 2. Plaintiff was then “handcuffed and escorted to
lock-up pending a[n] investigation.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff admits that he was released from “inmate
segregation” after the investigation was complete. (Docket Entry No. 62-1 at 2). The Court
concludes, as the Magistrate Judge found, that “Plaintiff being taken to temporary segregation for
a short period of time . . . is an act inherent to incarceration and one that falls within the scope of a
de minimis action that does not support a retaliation claim.” (Docket Entry No. 109 at 12); see
Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 398 (“[C]ertain threats or deprivations are so de minimis that they do not
rise to the level of being constitutional violations . . . .”). Thus, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against
Defendant Woods should be dismissed.
In his final objection, Plaintiff states that he is treated unfairly at the CCA facility where he
is currently confined because he filed this action, and that facility’s “lock downs” limit his
opportunities to conduct legal research. (Docket Entry No. 115 at 8). These assertions pertain to the
conditions of his current confinement, not the allegations underlying his complaint. Plaintiff’s
objection is misplaced in this action.
Finally, Plaintiff did not object to the Magistrate Judge’s denial of his motion for partial
summary judgment or his motion for a temporary restraining order. As to Plaintiff’s motion for
partial summary judgment regarding Defendant Woods’s liability (Docket Entry No. 62), there is a
genuine dispute of fact as to whether Defendant Woods violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights
and Plaintiff’s proof fails to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Woods.
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Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (Docket Entry No.
62) should be denied.
As to his motion for a temporary restraining order, Plaintiff requests an order that he be
transferred to a TDOC facility for the remainder of his confinement due to concerns about his safety
and well-being at CCA facilities. (Docket Entry No. 95). Plaintiff may not seek an injunction
pertaining to conduct unrelated to his claims in this action. See Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 300
(6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[A] party moving
for a preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury claimed in
the party’s motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.”). Thus, Plaintiff’s motion for a
temporary restraining order should be denied.
For these collective reasons, the Report and Recommendation (Docket Entry No. 109) should
be adopted in part. Defendants Chapman and Sullivan should be dismissed with prejudice under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 41(a) and Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss these Defendants (Docket Entry No. 92) should
be granted. The motion for summary judgment of Defendants Chapman, Pritchard, Sullivan, and
Woods (Docket Entry No. 52) should be granted in part and denied in part. The motion for summary
judgment of Defendant Ponds (Docket Entry No. 97) should be granted. Plaintiff’s motion for partial
summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 62) and motion for a temporary restraining order (Docket
Entry No. 95) should be denied.
An appropriate Order is filed herewith.
ENTERED this the _____ day of September, 2016.
____________________________
WILLIAM J. HAYNES, JR.
Senior United States District Judge
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