Eolas Technologies Incorporated v. Adobe Systems Incorporated et al

Filing 1043

SUR-REPLY to Reply to Response to Motion re 874 SEALED PATENT MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement Based on Divided Infringement filed by Eolas Technologies Incorporated. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Josh Budwin, # 2 Exhibit A)(McKool, Mike)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION

Eolas Technologies Incorporated,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Adobe Systems Inc., Amazon.com, Inc.,
Apple Inc., Argosy Publishing, Inc.,
Blockbuster Inc., CDW Corp.,
Citigroup Inc., eBay Inc., Frito-Lay, Inc.,
The Go Daddy Group, Inc., Google Inc.,
J.C. Penney Company, Inc., JPMorgan
Chase & Co., New Frontier Media, Inc.,
Office Depot, Inc., Perot Systems Corp.,
Playboy Enterprises International, Inc.,
Rent-A-Center, Inc., Staples, Inc., Sun
Microsystems Inc., Texas Instruments Inc.,
Yahoo! Inc., and YouTube, LLC
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 6:09-CV-00446-LED

JURY TRIAL

PLAINTIFFS’ SUR-REPLY IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NONINFRINGEMENT BASED ON DIVIDED INFRINGEMENT (DKT. NO. 874)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1

II.

DISCUSSION ......................................................................................................................1
A.
B.

Plaintiffs’ Reliance On Uniloc and Advanced Is Proper..........................................3

C.
III.

Defendants Ignore Differences In the Structure of
Plaintiffs’ Claims. ....................................................................................................1

The Federal Circuit’s Divided Infringement Law is In Flux. ..................................4

CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................4

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fiserv, Inc.,
641 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..........................................................................................2, 3, 4
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,
629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 8167 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2011) ......................................................................................4
BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.,
498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................3
Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc.,
620 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................3
McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp.,
No. 2010-1291, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7531 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 2011), vacated,
reh’g en banc granted, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10674 (Fed. Cir. May 26, 2011) ....................4
Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..............................................................................................2, 3

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I.

INTRODUCTION
Despite containing language nearly identical to Plaintiffs’ asserted method claims,

Defendants do not contend that Plaintiffs’ asserted apparatus claims (i.e., ’906 patent claim 6 and
’985 patent claim 16) present divided infringement issues. Instead, Defendants’ Reply advances
a misinterpretation of Uniloc to argue that in the divided infringement context, method claims
are somehow treated differently than apparatus claims. As set forth herein, the reasoning of
BMC, Uniloc, and Advanced applies equally to method and apparatus claims alike—and
Defendants’ recognition that Plaintiffs’ apparatus claims do not present divided infringement
issues shows Plaintiffs’ similar method claims also do not present divided infringement issues.
As explained in Plaintiffs’ Opposition, each asserted method claim—“browser-side” and
“server-side”—is directly infringed by acts of a single entity. Dkt. 995 at 2–9. This is because—
consistent with the Federal Circuit’s teachings—the claims have been drafted such that they are
infringed by actions performed on either the server-side or browser-side (but not both) of the
environment recited in the claims. In an attempt to circumvent Plaintiffs’ proper claim drafting,
Defendants ignore crucial differences in the structure of Plaintiffs’ server-side and browser-side
claims and attempt to overcome these differences by manufacturing new method steps. Thus,
summary judgment is not appropriate and Defendants’ Motion should be denied.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Defendants Ignore Differences In the Structure of Plaintiffs’ Claims.

Defendants’ Reply ignores crucial differences in the structure of Plaintiffs’ server-side
and browser-claims. This is shown most clearly in Defendants’ side-by-side comparison of
claim 1 of the ’985 Patent (which is a browser-side claim) with claim 20 of the ’985 Patent
(which is a server-side claim). Dkt. 1021 at 1–2. Defendants bold and italicize similar words,
but ignore a crucial difference in the structure of these claims: unlike the browser-side claims,
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the server-side claims (e.g., claim 20 of the ’985 patent) require “communicating via network
server . . . in order to cause said client workstation to.” Id.; See also Dkt. 995 at 7–9.
Defendants’ argument attempts to negate this difference by rewriting Plaintiffs’ method claims to
include a fabricated “receive at the client” step. This attempt is wholly improper, because
Plaintiffs’ server-side claims manifestly include no such limitation. To the contrary, the recited
activities are confined to the server and its formatting of communications “in order to cause.”
Defendants’ assertion that the “communicating . . . in order to cause” language requires a
“client workstation” participation step, Dkt. 1021 at n.1, is incorrect, as Plaintiffs’ Response
explained. Dkt. 995 at n.8 (“Just as it was allowable in Uniloc to require some ID generation and
mode switching to be present on a non-claimed platform, it is allowable to draft a claim—as
Plaintiffs have done here—to define the environment to include a client workstation.”). By
attempting to import method steps (i.e. activities on the client) from the environment within
which the server-side claims operate, Defendants attempt to do exactly what their quoted Uniloc
language cautioned against—namely, importing aspects of a claim’s environment into the
claim’s limitations. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“Accepting Microsoft’s argument that the local side of Claim 19 requires an end-user’s
participation . . . would be akin to importing a method step into this software system—something
the language of Claim 19 does not support.”); See also Dkt 1021 at 3 (quoting the Uniloc
language).1
While the Defendants are generally correct that in cases where “receiv[ing] a
communication” is a step of a method claim, the “method claim is infringed only where the
client actually receives the communication and performs those steps,” their argument—

1

See also Dkt. 995 at n.9 (refuting Defendants’ “execute . . . a browser application” argument).
2

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incorrectly—presupposes that Plaintiffs’ server-side claims include a client “receiv[ing] a
communication” step. Dkt. 1021 at 3 (emphasis omitted). No such requirement appears within
the language of Plaintiffs’ server-side claims. While Plaintiffs’ server-side claims require a
server to “communicat[e] . . . in order to cause,” none of Plaintiffs’ server-side claims include a
requirement that the client “receive the server’s communication.”2 Thus, for Plaintiffs’ serverside claims infringement is confined to the server and its formatting of communications “in order
to cause.” See also Dkt. 995 at 8–9.
B.

Plaintiffs’ Reliance On Uniloc and Advanced Is Proper.

Defendants wrongly contend that Uniloc, 632 F.3d 1292 does not apply in the context of
method claims. Defendants base their reasoning solely on the fact that the claim at-issue in
Uniloc was an apparatus claim. Dkt. 1021 at 3. Uniloc contains no language limiting its
reasoning or holding to apparatus claims. Furthermore, this distinction is disingenuous given
that Uniloc relies upon a case involving method claims—BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.,
498 F.3d 1373, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2007)—to support the proposition that “‘[a] patentee can
usually structure a claim to capture infringement by a single party,’ by ‘focus[ing] on one
entity.” Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1309 (citing BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381). Further showing that
Defendants’ attempt to limit Uniloc to apparatus claims is misplaced, Advanced—a case
involving a method claim—relies upon Uniloc to support drafting claims within an environment
that focuses on only one entity, just as Plaintiffs have done here. E.g., Advanced Software Design
Corp. v. Fiserv, Inc., 641 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Like the claim in Uniloc, the claims

2

Defendants’ citation to Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010) is
immaterial given their improper importation of steps into the claims. Dkt. 1021 at 3.
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at issue in this case . . . define the environment in which an accused infringer must act . . . .”).3
Plaintiffs’ claims follow the teachings of the Federal Circuit by defining an environment
within which an invention operates and then structuring the claims so that infringement is found
on only one side of the defined environment. There is no divided infringement issue.
C. The Federal Circuit’s Divided Infringement Law is In Flux.
As Plaintiffs explained in their Opposition, the Akamai and McKesson divided
infringement cases Defendants’ Motion relies upon have been vacated pending rehearing en
banc. Opposition at 2.4 The Federal Circuit is set to hear the en banc oral arguments on
November 18, 2011.5 The decision of the en banc Federal Circuit may change the state of the
divided infringement law. As Judge Newman noted in her dissent in McKesson (before the
rehearing en banc was granted): “[a] patent that can never be infringed is not a patent . . . , for a
patent that cannot be infringed does not have the ‘right to exclude.’” McKesson, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 7531 at *22 (Newman, J., dissenting).
III.

CONCLUSION
As demonstrated herein and in Plaintiffs’ Response no divided infringement issue exists

and Defendants’ Motion should be denied.

3

The facts of the present case are also analogous to Advanced. Advanced dealt with a financial
instrument with encrypted selected information printed on it, Advanced. 641 F.3d at 1374. In
Advanced, infringement was found even where the infringer did not print the encrypted selected
information. Id. Similarly, in order to infringe the method steps of Plaintiffs’ server-side claims,
the Defendants’ need not operate a client workstation that performs the recited steps—rather,
they need only operate a server which “communicat[es]” with a client workstation “in order to
cause.” Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims also follow the teachings of Advanced.
4
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010), vacated, reh’g
en banc granted, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 8167 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2011); McKesson Techs. Inc.
v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 2010-1291, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7531 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 2011),
vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10674 (Fed. Cir. May 26, 2011).
5
Ex. A (Upcoming Federal Circuit Oral Arguments) (providing that oral arguments for Akamai
and McKesson will be en banc and on November 18, 2011 at 2:00 P.M.).
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Dated: October 21, 2011.

MCKOOL SMITH, P.C.
/s/ Mike McKool
Mike McKool
Lead Attorney
Texas State Bar No. 13732100
[e-mail]
Douglas Cawley
Texas State Bar No. 04035500
[e-mail]
Holly Engelmann
Texas State Bar No. 24040865
[e-mail]
J.R. Johnson
Texas State Bar No. 24070000
[e-mail]
MCKOOL SMITH, P.C.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 1500
Dallas, Texas 75201
Telephone: [phone]
Telecopier: [phone]
Kevin L. Burgess
Texas State Bar No. 24006927
[e-mail]
Josh W. Budwin
Texas State Bar No. 24050347
[e-mail]
Gretchen K. Curran
Texas State Bar No. 24055979
[e-mail]
Matthew B. Rappaport
Texas State Bar No. 24070472
[e-mail]
MCKOOL SMITH, P.C.
300 West Sixth Street, Suite 1700
Austin, Texas 78701
Telephone: [phone]
Telecopier: [phone]

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Robert M. Parker
Texas State Bar No. 15498000
[e-mail]
Robert Christopher Bunt
Texas Bar No. 00787165
[e-mail]
Andrew T. Gorham
Texas State Bar No. 24012715
[e-mail]
PARKER, BUNT & AINSWORTH, P.C.
100 E. Ferguson, Suite 1114
Tyler, Texas 75702
[phone]
[phone]- Facsimile
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
EOLAS TECHNOLOGIES INC.
AND THE REGENTS OF
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

McKool 400655v2

THE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has
been served on all counsel of record via the Court’s ECF system on October 21, 2011.
/s/ Josh Budwin
Josh Budwin

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