Eolas Technologies Incorporated v. Adobe Systems Incorporated et al

Filing 1301

Opposed MOTION for Leave to File a Brief Re The Term "Browser Application" by Adobe Systems Incorporated, Amazon.com Inc., CDW Corporation, Google Inc., J.C. Penney Corporation, Inc., Staples, Inc., The Go Daddy Group, Inc., Yahoo! Inc., YouTube, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Defs Brief re the Term "Browser Application", # 2 Exhibit C to Brief - p353-meyrowitz82, # 3 Exhibit D to Brief - IRIS Hypermedia_Haan92, # 4 Exhibit E to Brief - ADBE0196713 Rowe92, # 5 Exhibit F to Brief - DBE0196715 Hindus93)(Wolff, Jason) (Additional attachment(s) added on 2/1/2012: # 6 Certificate of Authorization to File Under Seal, # 7 Text of Proposed Order) (mjc, ).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS TYLER DIVISION EOLAS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 6:09-CV-446 LED JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ADOBE SYSTEMS INC., ET AL., Defendants. DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF REGARDING THE TERM “BROWSER APPLICATION” DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF REGARDING THE TERM “BROWSER APPLICATION” The meaning of the term “browser application” is disputed by the parties and their respective experts. To avoid the legal scope of the term being argued to the jury and irrelevant testimony being offered at trial, Defendants request that the Court construe this term.1 Defendants’ Construction a program used to view or browse electronic documents2 Plaintiffs’ Construction A client program that presents an interface and processes requests on behalf of a user to display, and traverse hyperlinks within, hypertext and/or hypermedia documents that are located on the Internet3 The core disputed issue is whether the construction of “browser application” can properly be limited to a “web browser application” (as Plaintiffs contend) or whether it should be construed to also encompass other types of “browser applications” such as those that existed before the World Wide Web was launched in the 1990’s (as Defendants contend). The term “browser application” is not defined in the patent specification. Neither party offered it for construction because both parties initially offered liability related evidence that did not limit the meaning in any significant way, or in a manner that indicated there was a dispute over the meaning.4 Recently, to avoid some of defendants’ prior art, Plaintiffs’ liability expert Dr. Martin construed “browser application” in the narrow manner noted above. The claims broadly refer to a “browser application” without qualification. In fact certain dependent claims show that the browser is not limited to a “web” browser at all.5 1 O2 Micro Intern. Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Ex. A, 10/27/2011 Phillips Report at 135, ¶315. 3 Ex. B, 11/15/2011 Martin Rebuttal Report at 21, ¶48. Plaintiff’s expert alternately defines the term as a “web browser.” Id. 4 Plaintiffs, for instance, offered infringement theories based on browser applications that were not “web browsers” per se, such as the iTunes program; likewise Defendants offered invalidity theories based on prior art that were also not “web browsers,” such as HyperCard and MediaView. 5 See, e.g., ’985 patent, asserted claims 18, 22, 38, 42, which limit the “text formats” to “HTML tags.” Given that the claimed “text formats” need not be “HTML tags” or even “tags,” the 2 DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF REGARDING THE TERM “BROWSER APPLICATION” - Page 1 Importantly, the claims in the original specification filed in 1994 refer to a “hypermedia browser application.”6 The term “browser application” without qualification was added to the independent claims later.7 Eventually Plaintiffs removed the qualifier “hypermedia” before “browser application” entirely.8 The specification likewise supports a broad construction. The specification use the terms “browser,” “browser program,” “browser software,” “browser client,” “browser application,” and “hypermedia browser,” but not the term “web browser.” The specification states that examples of browser programs are the Mosaic and Cello software.9 The figures provide block diagrams showing a “browser client” but do not limit the browser to a “web” browser. The specification states simply that “browser client 208” “is a process that a user of a client computer 200 invokes in order to access various data objects, such as hypermedia documents, on a network 206.”10 The specification also uses the term “browser application” in other contexts, such as referencing a “client-based image browser application” that relays information to a “hypermedia browser application.”11 In short, nothing in the specification justifies limiting the claimed genus of “browser applications” to the species “web browser application.” Furthermore, neither the claims nor the specification limit the claims to the Web or the Internet, or even a wide-area network. Like the Court’s construction of “text format” and “embed text format,” the construction of client workstation and network server is broad and framed in doctrine of claim differentiation weighs heavily against Plaintiffs’ argument to limit the “browser application” to a “web browser application.” The Court’s broad construction of the terms “text formats,” “embed text formats,” “network server,” and “client workstation” compels a similarly broad construction of “browser application.” 6 See, e.g., D.I. 570-1 at 33 of 190 (claim 2). 7 See, e.g., D.I. 570-1 at 73 of 190 (claim 1). 8 See, e.g., D.I. 570-2 at 42 of 94 (claim 2). 9 ’906 patent, 1:9-13, 10:17-18. 10 ’906 patent at 9:15-17. 11 ’906 patent at 11:67-12:8. DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF REGARDING THE TERM “BROWSER APPLICATION” - Page 2 terms of information requesters and information providers.12 FIG. 2 shows two or more computers connected to the same network (e.g. server A 106 is connected to clients 108 and 104), and the specification expressly states that the “object 16” and “file 40 may reside at any of the computers shown in FIG. 2” and that “it is not necessary to traverse long distances via the Internet in order to retrieve the data object.”13 The specification notes that in FIG. 2 the “Internet 100 may be replaced by any suitable computer network.”14 The additional imported limitations in Plaintiffs’ proposed construction, such as traversing hyperlinks and limiting the location of the hypermedia document, and even “hypertext” and “hypermedia” are arbitrary and unnecessary. Additionally, during prosecution of the patents, the USPTO rejected the claims based on prior art that disclosed “browser applications” that were not “web” browser applications, and Plaintiffs did not challenge this interpretation. Writing in the ’906 patent file history, the Examiner, presumed to be a person ordinary skill in the art, found that “at the time of the invention, one of ordinary skill in the art would consider the BookManager READ program of Cohen as a ‘browser application,” even though it was not a “web” browser application.15 Plaintiffs did not dispute this finding regarding the Cohen prior art. There are many other examples of “browsers” in prior art that pre-date the World Wide Web. A 1982 paper regarding hypermedia systems remarks after discussing “browsers” that “A browser-like interface would be attractive in other environments as well.”16 A 1986 paper 12 D.I. 914 at 23 (“the Court construes ‘client workstation’ as a computer system connected to a network that serves the role of an information requester,’ and a ‘network server’ as ‘a computer system that serves the role of an information provider.’”) 13 ’906 patent at 5:14-23. 14 ’906 patent at 3:60-63. 15 D.I. 573-1 at PH_001_0000786973, see also PH_001_0000786972 (“‘The BookManager READ product can then manage, search, and show the on-line books created by BookManager Build.’ It is noted that this is the same functionality as a browser application.”) 16 Ex. C, (Meyrowitz82) at 399 [ADBE018751, p353-meyrowitz.pdf]. DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF REGARDING THE TERM “BROWSER APPLICATION” - Page 3 discussing a hypertext system describes the use of a “browser” to view electronic documents.17 Plaintiff University of California has published other papers referring to “browsers” more generically too.18 Even a 1990 Adobe documents refer to Acrobat Reader as a “browser”19 and it is undisputed that Acrobat is not a web browser. Even the inventors testified in effect that a “browser application” is not limited to a “web browser.” First named inventor Michael Doyle testified that his MetaMAP patent20 was a browser.21 There is no dispute that MetaMAP was not a web browser. Cheong Ang, also a coinventor, testified regarding the patent that “[i]t’s not restricted to the web and HTML documents.”22 Consequently, the court should reject the Plaintiff’s proposal to limit the claimed “browser application” to a “web browser application” and should construe “browser application” as “a program used to view or browse electronic documents.” 17 Ex. D, (Haan92) at 38, 40, 41 [ADBE018751, IRIS Hypermedia.pdf]. Ex. E, (Rowe92) at §1, Fig. 1; Ex. F, (Hindus93) at 384 (“The postcall Browser application…”) and Fig. 3. 19 D.I. 869-09 at ADTXT0002025 (“a viewer and browser will be written that will read IPS [now PDF] files, and render those files on displays”) (emphasis added). 20 See ’906 patent at 11:58-59, referencing U.S. Patent No. 4,847,604 as the MetaMAP invention. 21 Ex. G, (8/10/11 Doyle Tr.) at 150:21-22, 151:19-22, 152:7-10; also see Ex. H, (8/11/11 Doyle Tr.) at 443:18-446:5. 22 Ex. I, (7/21/11 Ang Tr.) at 293:5-20. 18 DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF REGARDING THE TERM “BROWSER APPLICATION” - Page 4 Dated: January 26, 2012 Respectfully submitted, FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. By: /s/ Jason W. Wolff Frank E. Scherkenbach E-mail: Scherkenbach@fr.com Proshanto Mukherji Email: Mukherji@fr.com FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. One Marina Park Drive Boston, MA 02110-1878 (617) 542-5070 (Telephone) (617) 542-8906 (Facsimile) David J. Healey E-mail: Healey@fr.com FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 1 Houston Center 1221 McKinney Street, Suite 2800 Houston, TX 77010 (713) 654-5300 (Telephone) (713) 652-0109 (Facsimile) Jason W. Wolff E-mail: Wolff@fr.com FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 12390 El Camino Real San Diego, CA 92130 (858) 678-5070 (Telephone) (858) 678-5099 (Facsimile) Michael E. Florey Email: florey@fr.com FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 3200 RBC Plaza 60 South Sixth Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 (612) 335-5070 (Telephone) (612) 288-9696 (Facsimile) Counsel for Defendant ADOBE SYSTEMS INCORPORATED /s/ Edward R. Reines (with permission) Edward R. Reines DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF REGARDING THE TERM “BROWSER APPLICATION” - Page 5 Jared Bobrow Sonal N. Mehta Aaron Y. Huang Andrew L. Perito WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 201 Redwood Shores Parkway Redwood Shores, CA 94065 Telephone: (650) 802-3000 Facsimile: (650) 802-3100 Email: edward.reines@weil.com Email: jared.bobrow@weil.com Email: sonal.mehta@weil.com Email: aaron.huang@weil.com Email: andrew.perito@weil.com Doug W. McClellan Email: doug.mcclellan@weil.com WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 700 Louisiana, Suite 1600 Houston, TX 77002 Telephone: (713) 546-5000 Facsimile: (713) 224-9511 Jennifer H. Doan Joshua R. Thane Shawn A. Latchford Stephen W. Creekmore, IV HALTOM & DOAN Crown Executive Center, Suite 100 6500 Summerhill Road Texarkana, TX 75503 Telephone: (903) 255-1000 Facsimile: (903) 255-0800 Email: jdoan@haltomdoan.com Email: jthane@haltomdoan.com Email: slatchford@haltomdoan.com Email: screekmore@haltomdoan.com Otis Carroll Deborah Race IRELAND, CARROLL & KELLEY, P.C. 6101 South Broadway, Suite 500 Tyler, Texas 75703 Telephone: (903) 561-1600 Facsimile: (903) 581-1071 Email: fedserv@icklaw.com Attorneys for Defendants AMAZON.COM INC. AND YAHOO! INC. DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF REGARDING THE TERM “BROWSER APPLICATION” - Page 6 /s/ Proshanto Mukherji (with permission) Thomas M. Melsheimer Email: melsheimer@fr.com Neil J. McNabnay Email: mcnabnay@fr.com Carl E. Bruce Email: bruce@fr.com FISH & RICHARDSON 1717 Main Street, Suite 5000 Dallas, TX 75201 Tel: (214) 474.5070 Proshanto Mukherji Email: mukherji@fr.com FISH & RICHARDSON One Marina Park Drive Boston, MA 02110-1878 Telephone: (617) 542-5070 Attorneys for Defendant THE GO DADDY GROUP, INC. /s/ Douglas E. Lumish (with permission) Douglas E. Lumish Jeffrey G. Homrig Joseph H. Lee Parker C. Ankrum KASOWITZ, BENSON, TORRES & FRIEDMAN, LLP 333 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 200 Redwood Shores, CA 94065 Tel: (650) 453-5170 Email: dlumish@kasowitz.com Email: jhomrig@kasowitz.com Email: jlee@kasowitz.com Email: pankrum@kasowitz.com Jonathan K. Waldrop KASOWITZ, BENSON, TORRES & FRIEDMAN, LLP 1360 Peachtree St., N.E. Suite 1150 Atlanta, GA 30309 Tel: (404) 260-6080 Email: jwaldrop@kasowitz.com James R. Batchelder Sasha G. Rao Brandon H. Stroy Rebecca R. Hermes DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF REGARDING THE TERM “BROWSER APPLICATION” - Page 7 Lauren N. Robinson ROPES & GRAY LLP 1900 University Avenue, 6th Floor East Palo Alto, CA 94303-2284 Tel: (650) 617-4000 Email: james.batchelder@ropesgray.com Email: sasha.rao@ropesgray.com Email: brandon.stroy@ropes.gray.com Email: lauren.robinson@ropesgray.com Email: rebecca.hermes@ropesgray.com Han Xu ROPES & GRAY LLP Prudential Tower, 800 Boylston St. Boston, MA 02199-3600 Tel: (617) 951-7000 Email: han.xu@ropesgray.com Daryl Joseffer Adam Conrad KING & SPALDING 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 2006-4707 Tel: (202) 737-0500 Email: djoseffer@kslaw.com Email: aconrad@kslaw.com Michael E. Jones Allen F. Gardner POTTER MINTON 110 N. College, Suite 500 Tyler, TX 75702 Tel: (903) 597-8311 Email: mikejones@potterminton.com Email: allengardner@potterminton.com ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS GOOGLE INC. AND YOUTUBE LLC DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF REGARDING THE TERM “BROWSER APPLICATION” - Page 8 /s/ Christopher M. Joe (with permission) Christopher M. Joe Brian Carpenter Eric W. Buether BUETHER JOE & CARPENTER 1700 Pacific, Suite 2390 Dallas, TX 75201 Tel: (214) 466-1270 Chris.Joe@BJCIPLaw.com Eric.Buether@BJCIPLaw.com Brian.Carpenter@BJCIPLaw.com Attorneys for Defendant J.C. PENNEY CORPORATION, INC. /s/ Donald R. Steinberg (with permission) Mark Matuschak Donald R. Steinberg Alexandra Boudreau WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR, LLP 60 State Street Boston, MA 02109 Tel. (617) 526.5000 mark.matuschak@wilmerhale.com don.steinberg@wilmerhale.com silena.paik@wilmerhale.com Kate Hutchins WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR, LLP 399 Park Avenue New York, NY 10022 Tel: (212) 230.8800 kate.hutchins@wilmerhale.com Daniel V. Williams WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR, LLP 1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 202.663.6012 daniel.williams@wilmerhale.com Joe W. Redden, Jr. Michael E. Richardson BECK REDDEN & SECREST 1221 McKinney DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF REGARDING THE TERM “BROWSER APPLICATION” - Page 9 Suite 4500 Houston, TX 77010 Tel: (713) 951.6284 mrichardson@brsfirm.com jredden@brsfirm.com Attorneys for Defendant STAPLES, INC. DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF REGARDING THE TERM “BROWSER APPLICATION” - Page 10 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on January 26, 2012 to all counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to electronic service via the Court’s CM/ECF system per Local Rule CV-5(a)(3). /s/ Jason W. Wolff 11196374.doc DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF REGARDING THE TERM “BROWSER APPLICATION” - Page 11

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