State of Texas et al v. United States of America et al

Filing 1

COMPLAINT against All Defendants (Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0541-14130337) filed by South Dakota, Louisiana, C.L. "Butch" Otter, Alabama, Texas, West Virginia, Patrick L. McCrory, Kansas, Georgia, Nebraska, Utah, Wisconsin, Paul R. LePage, Montana, Idaho, Phil Bryant, South Carolina, Indiana. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(Oldham, Andrew)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
)
)
)
STATE OF ALABAMA;
)
)
STATE OF GEORGIA;
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO;
)
)
STATE OF INDIANA;
)
)
STATE OF KANSAS;
)
)
STATE OF LOUISIANA;
)
)
STATE OF MONTANA;
)
)
STATE OF NEBRASKA;
)
)
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA;
)
)
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA;
)
)
STATE OF UTAH;
)
)
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA;
)
)
STATE OF WISCONSIN;
)
)
GOVERNOR PHIL BRYANT, State of Mississippi;
)
)
GOVERNOR PAUL R. LEPAGE, State of Maine;
)
)
GOVERNOR PATRICK L. MCCRORY, State of North
)
Carolina; and
)
)
GOVERNOR C.L. “BUTCH” OTTER, State of Idaho,
)
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF TEXAS;

Case No. ___________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

)
)
JEH JOHNSON, Secretary of the Department of
)
Homeland Security;
)
)
R. GIL KERLIKOWSKE, Commissioner of U.S. Customs
)
and Border Protection;
)
)
RONALD D. VITIELLO, Deputy Chief of U.S. Border
)
Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border Protection;
)
)
THOMAS S. WINKOWSKI, Acting Director of U.S.
)
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and
)
)
)
LEÓN RODRÍGUEZ, Director of U.S. Citizenship and
)
Immigration Services,
)
Defendants. )
)

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
1.

The State of Texas, the State of Alabama, the State of Georgia, the

State of Idaho, the State of Indiana, the State of Kansas, the State of Louisiana, the
State of Montana, the State of Nebraska, the State of South Carolina, the State of
South Dakota, the State of Utah, the State of West Virginia, the State of Wisconsin,
and Governor Phil Bryant of Mississippi, Governor Paul R. LePage of Maine,
Governor Patrick L. McCrory of North Carolina, and Governor C.L. “Butch” Otter of
Idaho (collectively, “Plaintiffs” or “Plaintiff States”) seek declaratory and injunctive
relief against the United States and the above-named federal officials (collectively,
“the Defendants”) for their violations of the Take Care Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 3, cl. 5, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.
2.

This lawsuit is not about immigration. It is about the rule of law,

presidential power, and the structural limits of the U.S. Constitution.
2

3.

On November 20, 2014, the President of the United States announced

that he would unilaterally suspend the immigration laws as applied to 4 million of
the 11 million undocumented immigrants in the United States.
4.

The President candidly admitted that, in so doing, he unilaterally

rewrote the law: “What you’re not paying attention to is, I just took an action to
change the law.”
5.

In accordance with the President’s unilateral exercise of lawmaking,

his Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a directive
that purports to legalize the presence of approximately 40% of the known
undocumented-immigrant population, and affords them legal rights and benefits.
See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion
with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with
Respect to Certain Individuals Whose Parents are U.S. Citizens or Permanent
Residents (Nov. 20, 2014) (“DHS Directive”) (attached as Ex. A).
6.

That unilateral suspension of the Nation’s immigration laws is

unlawful. Only this Court’s immediate intervention can protect the Plaintiffs from
dramatic and irreparable injuries.
I. THE PARTIES
7.

Plaintiffs are the State of Texas, the State of Alabama, the State of

Georgia, the State of Idaho, the State of Indiana, the State of Kansas, the State of
Louisiana, the State of Montana, the State of Nebraska, the State of South
Carolina, the State of South Dakota, the State of Utah, the State of West Virginia,

3

the State of Wisconsin, and the Governors of Mississippi, Maine, North Carolina,
and Idaho.
8.

Defendant United States of America is sued under the Administrative

Procedure Act (“APA”). See 5 U.S.C. § 703 (“[T]he action for judicial review may be
brought against the United States.”).
9.

Defendant Jeh Johnson is the Secretary of DHS. Johnson and DHS

are responsible for U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), and U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”). Johnson authored the DHS Directive.
10.

Defendant R. Gil Kerlikowske is the Commissioner of CBP. Defendant

Kerlikowske shares responsibility for implementing the DHS Directive.

And

Kerlikowske is Defendant Vitiello’s supervisor.
11.

Defendant Ronald D. Vitiello is the Deputy Chief of U.S. Border Patrol.

Vitiello authored a May 30, 2014, memorandum entitled “Unaccompanied Alien
Children Transfer Process Bottleneck” (“Vitiello Memorandum”), which recognizes
that Defendants’ abandonment of the federal immigration laws caused and is
continuing to cause crises in the Plaintiff States.
12.

Defendant Thomas S. Winkowski is the Acting Director for ICE. ICE

administers a formal program for allowing undocumented immigrants to apply for
deferred action and to appeal for reconsideration if deferred action is denied.
13.

Defendant León Rodríguez is the Director of USCIS. Rodríguez and

USCIS administer the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program.

4

President Obama announced the DACA program on June 12, 2012, to allow
undocumented immigrants to stay in the United States in violation of the Nation’s
immigration laws. And USCIS is the principal agency charged with implementing
the DHS Directive.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
14.

The Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331

because this action arises under the U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 3, cl. 5, and the
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706.

The Court also has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346

because this is a civil action or claim against the United States. Finally, the Court
has jurisdiction to compel an officer or employee of the above-named federal
agencies to perform his or her duty under 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
15.

Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because the

State of Texas is a resident of this judicial district, and a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this District.
16.

This Court is authorized to award the requested declaratory and

injunctive relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, the
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, and 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
A.

The DREAM Act

17.

On March 26, 2009, Senator Richard Durbin and Representative

Howard Berman introduced the DREAM Act in the U.S. Senate and House,
respectively.

See DREAM Act of 2009, S. 729 (111th Cong.) (2009); American

Dream Act, H.R. 1751 (111th Cong.) (2009).
5

Both bills would have allowed

undocumented immigrants to apply for conditional permanent resident status if,
among other things, (a) they entered the United States before their 16th birthdays,
and (b) they had been in the United States continuously for five years.
18.

The President repeatedly and forcefully urged Congress to pass the

DREAM Act.
19.

And the President consistently insisted that he could not achieve the

goals of the DREAM Act on his own. He said, for instance:
•

“Comprehensive reform, that’s how we’re going to solve this problem. . . .
Anybody who tells you . . . that I can wave a magic wand and make it
happen hasn’t been paying attention to how this town works.” (May 5,
2010)

•

“I am president, I am not king. I can’t do these things just by myself. . . .
[T]here’s a limit to the discretion that I can show because I am obliged to
execute the law. . . . I can’t just make the laws up by myself.” (Oct. 25,
2010)

•

In response to a question about whether he could stop deportation of
undocumented students with an executive order:

“Well, first of all,

temporary protective status historically has been used for special
circumstances where you have immigrants to this country who are fleeing
persecution in their countries, or there is some emergency situation in
their native land that required them to come to the United States. So it
would not be appropriate to use that just for a particular group that came

6

here primarily . . . for economic opportunity. With respect to the notion
that I can just suspend deportations through executive order, that’s just not
the case, because there are laws on the books that Congress has
passed. . . . There are enough laws on the books by Congress that are very
clear in terms of how we have to enforce our immigration system that for
me to simply through executive order ignore those congressional mandates
would not conform with my appropriate role as President.”

(Mar. 28,

2011) (emphasis added)
•

“I can’t solve this problem by myself. . . . We’re going to have to change the
laws in Congress.” (Apr. 20, 2011)

•

“I know some here wish that I could just bypass Congress and change the
law myself. But that’s not how democracy works. See, democracy is
hard. But it’s right. Changing our laws means doing the hard work of
changing minds and changing votes, one by one.” (Apr. 29, 2011)

•

“And sometimes when I talk to immigration advocates, they wish I could
just bypass Congress and change the law myself. But that’s not how a
democracy works.” (May 10, 2011)

•

“[B]elieve me, the idea of doing things on my own is very tempting. . . .
But that’s not how . . . our system works. . . . That’s not how our
Constitution is written.” (July 25, 2011)

7

•

“Administratively, we can’t ignore the law. . . . We are doing everything
we can administratively. But the fact of the matter is there are laws on
the books that I have to enforce.” (Sept. 28, 2011)

20.

Neither congressional chamber passed the DREAM Act.

B.

DACA

21.

The President then asked the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal

Counsel (“OLC”) whether he could effectuate the goals of the un-enacted DREAM
Act by executive fiat. OLC said “yes,” with certain conditions. In particular, OLC
advised the President that he could use the concept of “deferred action for childhood
arrivals,” or “DACA,” to stop deporting individuals who (a) entered the United
States before their 16th birthdays, and (b) had been in the United States
continuously for five years.

See Memorandum Opinion for the Secretary of

Homeland Security, from Karl R. Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority
to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and
to Defer Removal of Others at 18 n.8 (Nov. 19, 2014) (“OLC Memo”) (attached as Ex.
B) (noting that OLC orally advised the President “[b]efore DACA was announced” in
2012). OLC further advised, however, that “it was critical that, like past policies
that made deferred action available to certain classes of aliens, the DACA program
require immigration officials to evaluate each application for deferred action on a
case-by-case basis, rather than granting deferred action automatically to all
applicants who satisfied the threshold eligibility criteria.” Ibid.

8

22.

Notwithstanding his repeated insistence that he could not stretch his

executive powers any further, the President announced his unilateral creation of
the DACA program on June 15, 2012.
23.
Nation’s

At the President’s direction, the DHS Secretary then suspended the
immigration

immigrants.

laws

for

approximately

1.7

million

undocumented

See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect
to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012) (“DACA
Memo”) (attached as Ex. C).
24.

The President and his DHS Secretary ordered federal immigration

officials to extend “deferred action” to undocumented immigrants who (a) entered
the United States before their 16th birthdays, and (b) had been in the United States
continuously for five years.
25.

Although OLC had cautioned the President that it was “critical” to

DACA’s legality that the Administration evaluate every application on a case-bycase basis, the President and DHS ignored that advice. According to the latest
figures available, the Administration granted deferred action to 99.5-99.8% of
DACA applicants.
C.

Nava-Martinez

26.

The Executive Branch did not stop at dispensing with the Nation’s

immigration laws. Rather, as this Court already has found, the Administration
adopted a policy that encouraged international child smuggling across the Texas-

9

Mexico border. See Order, United States v. Nava-Martinez, No. 1:13-cr-00441, at 2
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2013) (“Nava-Martinez Order”).
27.

The defendant in Nava-Martinez, an admitted human trafficker, was

caught attempting to smuggle a ten-year-old El Salvadorean girl into the United
States. Id. at 1.
28.

The Court noted that this was “the fourth case with the same factual

situation this Court has had in as many weeks.” Id. at 3. Although the human
traffickers were apprehended in each case, “the DHS completed the criminal
conspiracy . . . by delivering the minors to the custody of the parent.” Ibid.
29.

This was done pursuant to DHS’s “apparent policy . . . of completing

the criminal mission of individuals who are violating the border security of the
United States.” Id. at 2. As this Court observed, “[t]his DHS policy is a dangerous
course of action.” Ibid. Under the policy, “instead of enforcing the laws of the
United States, the Government [takes] direct steps to help the individuals who
violated it.” Id. at 3.
30.

Moreover, this Court found that DHS’s policy promotes human

trafficking, which in turn “help[s] fund the illegal drug cartels which are a very real
danger for both citizens of this country and Mexico.” Id. at 6. The Court explained
that citizens of the United States bear the economic brunt of this policy, because
DHS “funds these evil ventures with their tax dollars.” Id. at 8. In addition, the
policy harms the citizens of each country that suffers from the “nefarious activities
of the cartels.” Ibid.

10

D.

The Defendants Cause a Humanitarian Crisis

31.

The Defendants’ policies (including DACA and the policy described in

Nava-Martinez) have had and continue to have dire consequences in the Plaintiff
States. In the summer of 2014, an enormous wave of undocumented immigrants
surged across the Texas-Mexico border, creating what President Obama described
as a “humanitarian crisis.”

Nick Miroff & Joshua Partlow, Central American

Migrants Overwhelm Border Patrol Station in Texas, WASH. POST (Jun. 12, 2014).
32.

As many as 90,000 undocumented children are expected to be detained

this year, and as many as 140,000 may be detained in 2015.

Brett LoGiurato,

There’s a Staggering Humanitarian Crisis on the US Border, and It’s Only Going to
Get Worse, BUS. INSIDER (Jun. 16, 2014).

By comparison, only 6,000 to 7,500

children were detained between 2008 and 2011, under 14,000 were detained in
2012, and only 24,000 were detained in 2013. Alicia A. Caldwell, Border Patrol
Resources Stretched Thin As Children Illegally Enter U.S. Alone, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Jun. 5, 2014).
33.

Law enforcement officers reported “picking up children as young as 4

without their parents and other children with Hello Kitty backpacks, cellphones
and the telephone numbers of U.S. relatives on note cards.” Miroff & Partlow,
supra.
34.

But the humanitarian crisis is by no means limited to unaccompanied

children. There is also “an unprecedented surge of families crossing illegally into
the U.S.” Cindy Carcamo, Rumors of U.S. Haven for Families Spur Rise in Illegal
Immigration, L.A. TIMES (June 6, 2014). While immigration officials do not have an
11

official count of such families, they acknowledge that “the numbers appear to be
substantial.” Ibid.
35.

This wave of immigration has been concentrated in the Rio Grande

Valley of South Texas. Miroff & Partlow, supra. “Every day, hundreds of Central
American migrants, in groups as large as 250 people, are wading across the muddy
Rio Grande.” Ibid.
36.

The crisis has imposed enormous law enforcement costs on the

Plaintiff States. For example, the Texas Department of Public Safety estimated
that it was spending $1.3 million a week on troopers and resources to deal with the
immigration surge; in addition, Governor Perry deployed 1,000 National Guard
troops to the border at a cost of $38 million.
37.

This crisis was caused by the immigration policies of the federal

government, including the policy that this Court has already held to be unlawful.
As Defendant Vitiello explained in his May 30th memorandum, “[i]f the U.S.
government fails to deliver adequate consequences to deter aliens from attempting
to illegally enter the U.S., the result will be an even greater increase in the rate of
recidivism and first-time illicit entries.”

And the Obama Administration

acknowledges that there is a “growing perception minors are crossing the border
because they feel they will not be deported by the administration.”

LoGiurato,

supra. Indeed, a research report commissioned by DHS revealed that “[w]ord had
spread in Central America about a ‘lack of consequences’ for illegal entry” and that

12

“[s]mugglers were exploiting the system.” Susan Carroll, Report Warned of Child
Migrant Crisis, HOUSTON CHRON. (Jun. 17, 2014).
38.

The President himself predicted this outcome. On July 1, 2010, he

explained that it would be “both unwise and unfair” to “ignore the laws on the books
and put an end to deportation” because it “would suggest to those thinking about
coming here illegally that there will be no repercussion for such a decision.” That in
turn “could lead to a surge in more illegal immigration.”

As the President

concluded, “no matter how decent they are, no matter their reasons, the 11 million
who broke these laws should be held accountable.”
39.

The Defendants, however, have contributed to the surge of illegal

immigration by refusing to enforce the laws on the books. On average, only 1,600
unaccompanied children are removed each year; in 2013, there were over 20,000
detentions of unaccompanied children from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador,
but only 496 unaccompanied children from those countries were repatriated.
Carroll, supra. And the total number of undocumented children deported by the
Obama Administration in 2013 was only 1,669 — an 80 percent reduction from
2008.

Brian Bennett, Deportation Data Won’t Dispel Rumors Drawing Migrant

Minors to U.S., L.A. TIMES (July 5, 2014).
40.

Similarly, adults with children who are detained at the border are

routinely released and allowed to travel within the United States. Carcamo, supra.
And while they may be instructed to show up for a follow-up appointment, “ICE
officials said they couldn’t guarantee that they would pursue all cases in which

13

immigrants do not show up for follow-up appointments.”

Ibid.

Tellingly, the

immigrants arrested for illegally entering the U.S. refer to ICE’s Notice to Appear
documents as “permisos,” or permits.

Byron York, On Immigrant Surge, White

House Story Falls Apart, WASH. EXAMINER (Jun. 16, 2014).
41.

Unsurprisingly, the undocumented immigrants crossing the border are

motivated primarily by the belief that they will not be deported.
government’s own analysis demonstrates as much.

The federal

When Border Patrol agents

recently questioned 230 undocumented immigrants about why they came, “the
results showed overwhelmingly that the immigrants, including those classified as
. . . unaccompanied children, were motivated by the belief that they would be
allowed to stay in the United States.” Ibid.
42.

Multiple reports indicate that undocumented immigrants are counting

on federal officials for help in reuniting with their friends or family in the U.S.
Hundreds of Central American migrants “turn[ ] themselves in to the Border Patrol”
on a daily basis. Miroff & Partlow, supra. One undocumented immigrant stated
that she and her group “had looked forward to being caught . . . at one point even
waving down federal helicopters . . . because of the welcoming treatment they had
assumed they would receive.” Carcamo, supra. Another planned to surrender to
Border Patrol because she had heard “that the Americans are helping Hondurans
right now,” especially women and children. Miroff & Partlow, supra. All of the 230
undocumented immigrants interviewed by Border Patrol agents for their recent

14

report “stated that they had family members or, to a lesser extent, friends already
living in the U.S.” York, supra.
43.

And the Defendants have conceded that their failure to enforce the

federal immigration laws has increased the flow of illegal immigration across the
Texas-Mexico border. See Vitiello Memorandum. The effects of that failure have
caused acute crises in the Plaintiff States.
E.

The President “Change[s] the Law”

44.

Between his 2012 DACA announcement and the midterm elections in

November 2014, the President repeatedly acknowledged that his non-enforcement
efforts already had reached the outer limit of his administrative powers, and that
any further transformation of the immigration system would have to be
accomplished by legislation. He said, for instance:
•

“[A]s the head of the executive branch, there’s a limit to what I can do. . . .
[U]ntil we have a law in place that provides a pathway for legalization
and/or citizenship for the folks in question, we’re going to continue to be
bound by the law.” (Sept. 20, 2012)

•

“We are a nation of immigrants. . . . But we’re also a nation of laws. So
what I’ve said is, we need to fix a broken immigration system. And I’ve
done everything that I can on my own.” (Oct. 16, 2012)

•

In response to a question about the possibility of a moratorium on
deportations for non-criminals: “I’m not a king. I am the head of the

15

executive branch of government. I’m required to follow the law.” (Jan. 30,
2013)
•

In response to the question whether he could do for “an undocumented
mother of three” what he did for DACA recipients: “I’m not a king. . . .
[W]e can’t simply ignore the law. When it comes to the dreamers we were
able to identify that group. . . . But to sort through all the possible cases of
everybody who might have a sympathetic story to tell is very difficult to
do. This is why we need comprehensive immigration reform. . . . [I]f this
was an issue that I could do unilaterally I would have done it a long time
ago. . . . The way our system works is Congress has to pass legislation. I
then get an opportunity to sign and implement it.” (Jan. 30, 2013)

•

“This is something I’ve struggled with throughout my presidency. The
problem is that you know I’m the president of the United States, I’m not
the emperor of the United States. . . . And what that means is that we
have certain obligations to enforce the laws that are in place. . . . [W]e’ve
kind of stretched our administrative flexibility as much as we can.” (Feb.
14, 2013)

•

“I think that it’s very important for us to recognize that the way to solve
this problem has to be legislative. . . . And we’ve been able to provide help
through deferred action for young people and students. . . . But this is a
problem that needs to be fixed legislatively.” (July 16, 2013)

16

•

“[M]y job in the executive branch is supposed to be to carry out the laws
that are passed. Congress has said ‘here is the law’ when it comes to
those who are undocumented, and they’ve allocated a whole bunch of
money for enforcement. . . . What we can do is then carve out the DREAM
Act, saying young people who have basically grown up here are Americans
that we should welcome. . . . But if we start broadening that, then
essentially I would be ignoring the law in a way that I think would be very
difficult to defend legally.

So, that’s not an option.”

(Sept. 17, 2013)

(emphasis added)
•

“[I]f in fact I could solve all these problems without passing laws in
Congress, then I would do so. But we’re also a nation of laws. That’s part
of our tradition. And so the easy way out is to try to yell and pretend like
I can do something by violating our laws. And what I’m proposing is the
harder path, which is to use our democratic processes to achieve the same
goal.” (Nov. 25, 2013)

•

“[W]hat I’ve said in the past remains true, which is until Congress passes
a new law, then I am constrained in terms of what I am able to do. What
I’ve done is to use my prosecutorial discretion. . . . What we’ve said is focus
on folks who are engaged in criminal activity, focus on people who
engaged in gang activity. Do not focus on young people, who we’re calling
DREAMers. . . . That already stretched my administrative capacity very
far. But I was confident that that was the right thing to do. But at a

17

certain point the reason that these deportations are taking place is,
Congress said, ‘you have to enforce these laws.’ They fund the hiring of
officials at the department that’s charged with enforcing. And I cannot
ignore those laws any more than I could ignore, you know, any of the other
laws that are on the books.” (Mar. 6, 2014) (emphasis added)
45.

Accordingly, the President repeatedly called on Congress to pass an

immigration reform bill. On June 27, 2013, the Senate passed a bill that, among
other things, would have created a pathway to citizenship for undocumented
immigrants.

See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, & Immigration

Modernization Act, S. 744 (113th Cong.) (2013). The House, on the other hand, did
not pass similar legislation.
46.

Before the midterm elections in November 2014, Democrats in the

Senate urged the President not to act unilaterally because it “could be so politically
damaging in their states that it would destroy their chances to hold control of the
Senate.” Michael D. Shear & Julia Preston, Obama Pushed ‘Fullest Extent’ of His
Powers on Immigration Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2014). The President honored
that request.
47.

On November 20, 2014, the President announced that he would

unilaterally create legal protections for approximately 4 million undocumented
immigrants. Under the President’s plan, the undocumented parents of U.S. citizens
and legal permanent residents would receive deferred action status, as well as work
permits and tolling of their unlawful presence in the United States. The President

18

also expanded DACA to hundreds of thousands of additional undocumented
immigrants.
48.

The President candidly admitted that his plan was unilateral

legislation: “What you’re not paying attention to is, I just took an action to change
the law.”
49.

The President further admitted that he was changing the law because

Congress chose not to: “[W]hen members of Congress question my authority to
make our immigration system work better, I have a simple answer: Pass a bill. . . .
And the day I sign that bill into law, the actions I take will no longer be necessary.”
50.

The President also made clear that he was “offer[ing] the following

deal”: “[I]f you’ve taken responsibility, you’ve registered, undergone a background
check, you’re paying taxes, you’ve been here for five years, you’ve got roots in the
community — you’re not going to be deported. . . . If you meet the criteria, you can
come out of the shadows, you can get right with the law.”
F.

The DHS Directive

51.

The President’s new policies were effectuated through Defendant

Johnson’s DHS Directive. The DHS Directive closely resembled, and purported to
“supplement[ ] and amend[ ],” the DACA Memo. See Exs. A & C.
52.

In particular, Johnson instructed USCIS “to expand DACA as follows:”

by “[r]emov[ing] the age cap” that had previously applied, by “[e]xtend[ing] DACA
renewal and work authorization to three-years [sic]” from the previous two, and by
“[a]djust[ing] the date-of-entry requirement” from June 15, 2007, to January 1,
2010. DHS Directive at 3-4.
19

53.

Johnson also “direct[ed] USCIS to establish a process, similar to

DACA” for extending deferred action to the parents of citizens or lawful permanent
residents. Id. at 4. In addition, the beneficiaries of deferred action are eligible to
apply for federal work authorization.
54.

The DHS Directive sets out a series of explicit criteria for who will be

eligible for this expansion of deferred action.

It requires applicants to “file the

requisite applications for deferred action” and “submit biometrics for USCIS to
conduct background checks.”

Ibid.

USCIS is instructed to “begin accepting

applications from eligible applicants no later than one hundred and eighty (180)
days” from the date of the Directive. Id. at 5. Moreover, USCIS, ICE, and CBP are
directed to consider the new deferred action criteria “for all individuals [they]
encounter[ ],” including individuals in their custody, and individuals whose removal
is pending. Ibid.
55.

The Defendants have made clear that the DHS Directive will operate

like the DACA program that came before it — namely, as an entitlement to relief
for virtually every applicant who meets DHS’s eligibility criteria. That is evident
from the President’s statement that the DHS Directive provides a “deal” to ensure
that eligible applicants “will not be deported”; from the DHS Directive itself, which
creates an application process and eligibility criteria in mandatory terms (like
“shall” and “must”); and from the 99.5-99.8% acceptance rate for DACA applicants.
56.

The purported legal justification for the DHS Directive is contained in

the OLC Memo.

See Ex. B.

In relevant part, the memo analyzed two DHS

20

proposals. The first proposal, which the Administration adopted, was the extension
of deferred action status to parents of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent
residents. The second proposal, which the Administration has not yet adopted, was
the extension of deferred action status to parents of DACA recipients.

OLC

concluded that the first proposal would be a lawful exercise of enforcement
discretion, but the second would not.
57.

The OLC Memo acknowledged that there are three important

differences between the proposed programs and exercises of enforcement
discretion. Id. at 20-21. First, deferred action is not merely a “decision not to
prosecute an individual for past unlawful conduct”; instead, it is “a decision to
openly tolerate an undocumented alien’s continued presence in the United
States.” Id. at 20. Second, deferred action carries legal benefits beyond nonenforcement, such as the right to seek employment authorization. Ibid. Third,
class-based deferred action programs, like the ones at issue here, “do not merely
enable individual immigration officials to select deserving beneficiaries,” but
instead “set forth certain threshold eligibility criteria and then invite individuals
who satisfy these criteria to apply for deferred action status.” Ibid. In spite of all
this, OLC concluded that the programs could potentially constitute exercises of
enforcement discretion.
58.

OLC then considered whether the proposals would be lawful under

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), a seminal enforcement-discretion
case. OLC acknowledged that Chaney imposes four limitations on enforcement

21

discretion. First, enforcement decisions must rely on factors that are within the
agency’s expertise; second, the executive cannot effectively rewrite the laws under
the guise of enforcement discretion; third, the executive cannot adopt a general
policy that amounts to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities; and finally,
enforcement discretion generally requires case-by-case decisionmaking. OLC Memo
at 6-7.
59.

OLC concluded that the first DHS proposal, which concerned the

parents of citizens and legal permanent residents, met this test. Id. at 26-31. OLC
based that conclusion, in part, on much smaller and more targeted deferred action
programs that previous Congresses approved. In particular, OLC found probative
that Congress previously approved deferred action for victims of violence and
trafficking, family members of U.S. citizens killed in combat, and family members of
individuals killed in the September 11 attacks. Id. at 29-30. In OLC’s view, those
previous congressional approvals legalized DHS’s unilateral effort to create the
single largest deferred action program in our Nation’s history, permitting 4 million
undocumented immigrants to remain in the country.
60.

OLC reached the opposite conclusion with respect to the second DHS

proposal, which concerned deferred action for parents of DACA recipients.
Although OLC acknowledged that the two proposals had significant similarities, it
nevertheless rejected the second proposal as unlawful because it was not “consistent
with the congressional policies and priorities embodied in the immigration laws.”
Id. at 33.

22

G.

The DHS Directive Harms Plaintiffs

61.

The DHS Directive will substantially increase the number of

undocumented immigrants in the Plaintiff States.

At the most basic level, the

Directive is a promise to openly tolerate entire classes of undocumented
immigrants. In addition, the Directive offers affirmative legal inducements to stay,
such as work authorization and the tolling of unlawful presence.

White House

officials also have stated that the beneficiaries of deferred action are eligible for
Social Security and Medicare. The removal of the deportation threat, combined
with the incentives to stay, will make remaining in the United States far more
attractive for the affected classes of undocumented immigrants.
62.

Moreover, the DHS Directive is certain to trigger a new wave of

undocumented immigration. As explained above, DACA led directly to a flood of
immigration across the Texas-Mexico border and a “humanitarian crisis” in Texas.
The federal government itself recognized that its lax attitude toward the
immigration laws caused this wave. See Vitiello Memorandum. The DHS Directive
is a much larger step than DACA, and it will trigger a larger response.
63.

The DHS Directive will increase human trafficking in the Plaintiff

States. Such trafficking is largely controlled by the Mexican drug cartels, which are
the most significant organized crime threat to the State of Texas.

See Texas

Department of Public Safety, Texas Public Safety Threat Overview at 2, 23 (Feb.
2013). By boosting undocumented immigration, the DHS Directive will bolster the
business of the cartels and greatly exacerbate the risks and dangers imposed on

23

Plaintiffs by organized crime.

See Nava-Martinez Order at 6 (explaining that

human trafficking “help[s] fund the illegal drug cartels which are a very real danger
for both citizens of this country and Mexico”).
64.

The Plaintiff States will be forced to expend substantial resources on

law enforcement, healthcare, and education.

Some of these expenditures are

required or coerced by federal law. For instance, the Supreme Court has held that
States are constitutionally obligated to provide free education to children of
undocumented immigrants. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Similarly, both
Medicare and Medicaid require provision of emergency services, regardless of
documented immigration status, as a condition of participation.

See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1395dd; 42 C.F.R. § 440.225.
65.

Other expenditures are required by state law. For example, Texas law

requires local governments to provide healthcare for the indigent. See Indigent
Health Care and Treatment Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 61.001 et seq. In
FY2014, Texas counties reported over $23 million in indigent health care
expenditures. Texas law also requires nonprofit hospitals to provide unreimbursed
care for the indigent as a condition of maintaining their nonprofit status. See TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 311.043.
66.

Other costs follow specifically from the extension of deferred action

status. For instance, federal work authorization functions as a precondition for
certain professional licenses in the Plaintiff States. See, e.g., 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 33.10 (requiring applicants for an alcoholic beverage license to be “legally

24

authorized to work in the United States”); 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 35.21 (requiring
employees of private security companies to submit application, including a copy of a
current work authorization card); TEX. RULES GOVERN. BAR ADM’N, R. II(a)(5)(d)
(making individuals who are “authorized to work lawfully in the United States”
eligible to apply for admission as licensed attorneys).
67.

Texas and other Plaintiff States also rely on Defendants’ evidence of

lawful presence for certain benefits under their respective state laws. See, e.g., TEX.
LAB. CODE § 207.043(a)(2) (extending unemployment benefits to individuals who
were “lawfully present for purposes of performing the services”); TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 2.005(b)(4) (allowing an “Employment Authorization Card” to be used as proof of
identity for the purposes of a marriage license application).
68.

By authorizing a large class of undocumented immigrants to work in

the United States, the DHS Directive will expose Texas to the cost of processing and
issuing additional licenses and benefits. Moreover, it will cause Texas to issue such
licenses and benefits to individuals who are not legally authorized to be in the
country (or to take on the burdensome task of attempting to figure out which
undocumented immigrants have bona fide deferred action status and which ones
benefited from the unlawful DHS Directive).
69.

If the Plaintiff States had the sovereign power to redress these

problems, they would. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007) (citing
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)).
But the Supreme Court has held that authority over immigration is largely lodged

25

in the federal government.

See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492

(2012). Accordingly, litigation against the federal government is the only way for
the States to vindicate their interests and those of their citizens.
IV. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT ONE
Violation Of The Take Care Clause, Art. II, § 3, Cl. 5
70.

The allegations in paragraphs 1-69 are reincorporated herein.

71.

The DHS Directive violates the President’s constitutional duty to “take

Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
72.

The Supreme Court has made clear that the Take Care Clause is

judicially enforceable against presidential invocations of the dispensing power. See,
e.g., Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 612-13 (1838); Angelus Milling
Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 325 U.S. 293, 296 (1945).
73.

The Take Care Clause limits the President’s power and ensures that

he will faithfully execute Congress’s laws — not rewrite them under the guise of
executive “discretion.”
74.

In this case, the President admitted that he “took an action to change

the law.” The Defendants could hardly contend otherwise because a deferred action
program with an acceptance rate that rounds to 100% is a de facto entitlement —
one that even the President and OLC previously admitted would require a change
to the law.
75.

At least for the 4 million people who will benefit from the DHS

Directive, Congress has taken several steps to curtail the reunification of
26

undocumented immigrants and their documented family members.

The

undocumented parent of a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident generally can
stay in the United States only by (i) waiting until their child turns 21, (ii) leaving
the country, (iii) waiting 10 more years, and then (iv) obtaining a family-preference
visa

from

a

U.S.

consulate

abroad.

See

8

U.S.C.

§§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i),

1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), 1201(a), 1255. The Defendants cannot faithfully execute the law
by directly contravening Congress’s objectives.
76.

Accordingly, the Defendants’ actions violate the Take Care Clause.
COUNT TWO

Violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553
77.

The allegations in paragraphs 1-76 are reincorporated herein.

78.

The APA requires this Court to hold unlawful and set aside any agency

action taken “without observance of procedure required by law.”

5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(D).
79.

DHS is an “agency” under the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).

80.

The DHS Directive is a “rule” under the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).

81.

With exceptions that are not applicable here, agency rules must go

through notice-and-comment rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
82.

The Defendants promulgated and relied upon the DHS Directive

without authority and without notice-and-comment rulemaking.
unlawful.

27

It is therefore

COUNT THREE
Violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706
83.

The allegations in paragraphs 1-82 are reincorporated herein.

84.

The APA requires this Court to hold unlawful and set aside any agency

action that is “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity; [or] (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
85.

The DHS Directive purports to create legal rights for millions of

undocumented immigrants. And it does so by rewriting the immigration laws and
contradicting the priorities adopted by Congress. See, e.g., ¶ 75, supra.
86.

As such, the DHS Directive violates the aforementioned provisions in 5

U.S.C. § 706, and it is therefore unlawful.
V. DEMAND FOR JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs respectfully request the following relief from the Court:
A.

A declaratory judgment and injunction that the Defendants’ deferred
action program violates the Take Care Clause;

B.

A declaratory judgment that the Defendants’ deferred action program
is procedurally unlawful under the APA;

C.

A declaratory judgment that the Defendants’ deferred action program
is substantively unlawful under the APA; and

D.

All other relief to which the Plaintiffs may show themselves to be
entitled.
28

Respectfully submitted.
LUTHER STRANGE
Attorney General of Alabama

GREG ABBOTT
Attorney General of Texas

SAMUEL S. OLENS
Attorney General of Georgia

DANIEL T. HODGE
First Assistant Attorney General

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General of Idaho

JAMES D. BLACKLOCK
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

JOSEPH C. CHAPELLE
Counsel for the State of Indiana

ANDREW S. OLDHAM
Deputy Solicitor General
Attorney-in-Charge

DEREK SCHMIDT
Attorney General of Kansas
JAMES D. “BUDDY” CALDWELL
Attorney General of Louisiana

Office of the Attorney General of Texas
P.O. Box 78711
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
512-936-1700

TIMOTHY C. FOX
Attorney General of Montana
JON C. BRUNING
Attorney General of Nebraska
ALAN WILSON
Attorney General of South Carolina
MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General of South Dakota
SEAN D. REYES
Attorney General of Utah
PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General of West Virginia
J.B. VAN HOLLEN
Attorney General of Wisconsin
additional counsel on the following page

29

DREW SNYDER
Counsel for the Governor of Mississippi
CARLISLE MCLEAN
Counsel for the Governor of Maine
ROBERT C. STEPHENS
Counsel for the Governor of North
Carolina
TOM C. PERRY
CALLY YOUNGER
Counsel for the Governor of Idaho
Dated: December 3, 2014

30

Exhibits

A

Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528

Homeland
Security
November 20, 2014
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Leon Rodriguez
Director
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Thomas S. Winkowski
Acting Director
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
R. Gil Kerlikowske
Commissioner
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Johns~o:

FROM:

Jeh Charles
Secretary

SUBJECT:

Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to
Individuals Who Came to the United States as
Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals
Whose Parents are U.S. Citizens or Permanent
Residents

·----

~--·-

This memorandum is intended to reflect new policies for the use of deferred
action. By memorandum dated June 15, 2012, Secretary Napolitano issued guidance
entitled Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to
the United States as Children. The following supplements and amends that guidance.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its immigration components are
responsible for enforcing the Nation ' s immigration laws. Due to limited resources, DHS
and its Components cannot respond to all immigration violations or remove all persons
illegally in the United States. As is true of virtually every other law enforcement agency,
DHS must exercise prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of the law. Secretary
Napolitano noted two years ago, when she issued her prosecutorial discretion guidance
regarding children, that "[o]ur Nation' s immigration laws must be enforced in a strong
and sensible manner. They are not designed to be blindly enforced without consideration
given to the individual circumstances of each case."
1
www.dhs.gov

Deferred action is a long-standing administrative mechanism dating back decades,
by which the Secretary of Homeland Security may defer the removal of an undocumented
immigrant for a period of time. 1 A form of administrative relief similar to deferred
action, known then as "indefinite voluntary departure," was originally authorized by the
Reagan and Bush Administrations to defer the deportations of an estimated 1.5 million
undocumented spouses and minor children who did not qualify for legalization under the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Known as the "Family Fairness" program,
the policy was specifically implemented to promote the humane enforcement of the law
and ensure family unity.
Deferred action is a form of prosecutorial discretion by which the Secretary
deprioritizes an individual's case for humanitarian reasons, administrative convenience,
or in the interest of the Department' s overall enforcement mission. As an act of
prosecutorial discretion, deferred action is legally available so long as it is granted on a
case-by-case basis, and it may be terminated at any time at the agency's discretion.
Deferred action does not confer any form of legal status in this country, much less
citizenship; it simply means that, for a specified period of time, an individual is permitted
to be lawfully present in the United States. Nor can deferred action itself lead to a green
card. Although deferred action is not expressly conferred by statute, the practice is
2
referenced and therefore endorsed by implication in several federal statutes.
Historically, deferred action has been used on behalf of particular individuals, and
on a case-by-case basis, for classes of unlawfully present individuals, such as the spouses
and minor children of certain legalized immigrants, widows of U.S. citizens, or victims of
trafficking and domestic violence. 3 Most recently, beginning in 201 2, Secretary
Napolitano issued guidance for case-by-case deferred action with respect to those who
came to the United States as children, commonly referred to as "DACA."

1

Deferred action, in one fonn or another, dates back to at least the 1960s. "Deferred action" per se dates back at
least as far as 1975. See, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Operation Instructions§ 103.l(a)(I)(ii) (1975).
2

INA § 204(a){l )(D)(i)(ll), (IV) (Violence Against Women Act (VA WA) self-petitioners not in removal proceedings
are "eligible for deferred action and employment authorization "); INA § 23 7(d)(2) (DHS may grant stay of removal
to applicants for Tor U visas but that denial of a stay request "shall not preclude the alien from applying f or . . .
deferred action ''); REAL ID Act of 2005 § 202(c)(2)(B)(viii), Pub. L. 109- 13 (requiring states to examine
documentary evidence of lawful status f or driver 's license eligibility purposes, including "approved deferred action
status "); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 § 1703(c) (d) Pub. L. 108-136 (spouse, parent or
child of certain US. citizen who died as a result of honorable service may self-petition for permanent residence and
"shall be eligible for deferred action, advance parole, and work authorization ").
3
In August 200 I, the former-Immigration and Naturalization Service issued guidance providing deferred action to
individuals who were eligible for the recently created U and T visas. Two years later, USCIS issued subsequent
guidance, instructing its officers to use existing mechanisms like deferred action for certain U visa applicants facing
potential removal. More recently, in June 2009, USCIS issued a memorandum providing deferred action to certain
surviving spouses of deceased U.S. citizens and their children while Congress considered legislation to allow these
individuals to qualify for pennanent residence status.

2

By this memorandum, I am now expanding certain parameters ofDACA and
issuing guidance for case-by-case use of deferred action for those adults who have been
in this country since January 1, 2010, are the parents of U.S. citizens or lawful
permanent residents, and who are otherwise not enforcement priorities, as set forth in the
November 20, 20 14 Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of
Undocumented Immigrants Memorandum.
The reality is that most individuals in the categories set forth below are
hard-working people who have become integrated members of American society.
Provided they do not commit serious crimes or otherwise become enforcement priorities,
these people are extremely unlikely to be deported given this Department's limited
enforcement resources- which must continue to be focused on those who represent
threats to national security, public safety, and border security. Case-by-case exercises of
deferred action for children and long-standing members of American society who are not
enforcement priorities are in this Nation' s security and economic interests and make
common sense, because they encourage these people to come out of the shadows, submit
to background checks, pay fees, apply for work authorization (which by separate
authority I may grant), and be counted.

A.

Expanding DACA

DACA provides that those who were under the age of 31 on June 15, 2012, who
entered the United States before June 15, 2007 (5 years prior) as children under the age of
16, and who meet specific educational and public safety criteria, are eligible for deferred
action on a case-by-case basis. The initial DACA announcement of June 15, 20 12
provided deferred action for a period of two years. On June 5, 2014, U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) announced that DACA recipients could request to
renew their deferred action for an additional two years.
In order to further effectuate this program, I hereby direct USCIS to expand
DACA as follows:

Remove the age cap. DACA will apply to all otherwise eligible immigrants who
entered the United States by the requisite adj usted entry date before the age of sixteen
(16), regardless of how old they were in June 2012 or are today. The current age
restriction excludes those who were older than 31 on the date of announcement (i.e.,
those who were born before June 15, 1981 ). That restriction will no longer apply.
Extend DACA renewal and work authorization to three-years. The period for
which DACA and the accompanying employment authorization is granted will be
extended to three-year increments, rather than the current two-year increments. This
change shall apply to all first-time applications as well as all applications for renewal
effective November 24, 2014. Beginning on that date, USCIS should issue all work
3

authorization documents valid for three years, including to those individuals who have
applied and are awaiting two-year work authorization documents based on the renewal of
their DACA grants. USCIS should also consider means to extend those two-year
renewals already issued to three years.

Adjust the date-of-entry requirement. In order to align the DACA program
more closely with the other deferred action authorization outlined below, the eligibility
cut-off date by which a DACA applicant must have been in the United States should be
adjusted from June 15, 2007 to January 1, 2010.
USCIS should begin accepting applications under the new criteria from applicants
no later than ninety (90) days from the date of this announcement.

B.

Expanding Deferred Action

I hereby direct USCIS to establish a process, similar to DACA, for exercising
prosecutorial discretion through the use of deferred action, on a case-by-case basis, to
those individuals who:
•

have, on the date of this memorandum, a son or daughter who is a U.S.
citizen or lawful permanent resident;

•

have continuously resided in the United States since before
January 1, 201 O;

•

are physically present in the United States on the date of this
memorandum, and at the time of making a request for consideration of
deferred action with USCIS;

•

have no lawful status on the date of this memorandum;

•

are not an enforcement priority as reflected in the November 20, 2014
Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of
Undocumented Immigrants Memorandum; and

•

present no other factors that, in the exercise of discretion, makes the
grant of deferred action inappropriate.

Applicants must file the requisite applications for deferred action pursuant to the
new criteria described above. Applicants must also submit biometrics for USCIS to
conduct background checks similar to the background check that is required for DACA
applicants. Each person who applies for deferred action pursuant to the criteria above
shall also be eligible to apply for work authorization for the period of deferred action,
pursuant to my authority to grant such authorization reflected in section 274A(h)(3) of

4

the Immigration and Nationality Act. 4 Deferred action granted pursuant to the program
shall be for a period of three years. Applicants will pay the work authorization and
biometrics fees, which currently amount to $465. There will be no fee waivers and, like
DACA, very limited fee exemptions.
USCIS should begin accepting applications from eligible applicants no later than
one hundred and eighty (180) days after the date of this announcement. As with DACA,
the above criteria are to be considered for all individuals encountered by U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), or USCIS, whether or not the individual is already in removal proceedings or
subject to a final order of removal. Specifically:
•

ICE and CBP are instructed to immediately begin identifying persons in their
custody, as well as newly encountered individuals, who meet the above criteria
and may thus be eligible for deferred action to prevent the further expenditure of
enforcement resources with regard to these individuals.

•

ICE is further instructed to review pending removal cases, and seek administrative
closure or termination of the cases of individuals identified who meet the above
criteria, and to refer such individuals to USCIS for case-by-case
determinations. ICE should also establish a process to allow individuals in
removal proceedings to identify themselves as candidates for deferred action.

•

USCIS is instructed to implement this memorandum consistent with its existing
guidance regarding the issuance of notices to appear. The USCIS process shall
also be available to individuals subject to final orders of removal who otherwise
meet the above criteria.

Under any of the proposals outlined above, immigration officers will be provided
with specific eligibility criteria for deferred action, but the ultimate judgment as to
whether an immigrant is granted deferred action will be determined on a case-by-case
basis.
This memorandum confers no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to
citizenship. Only an Act of Congress can confer these rights. It remains within the
authority of the Executive Branch, however, to set forth policy for the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion and deferred action within the framework of existing law. This
memorandum is an exercise of that authority.
4

INA § 274A(h)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3 ) ("As used in this section, the term 'unauthorized alien' means, with
respect to the employment of an alien at a particular time, that the alien is not at that time either (A) an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by
the[Secretary]."); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (regulations establishing classes of aliens eligible for work authorization).

5

B

The Department of Homeland Securify's Authority to
Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present
in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others
The Deparlment of Homeland Security's proposed policy to prioritize the removal of certain aliens
unlawfully plesent in the United States would be a permissible exetcise of DHS's discretion to
enforce the immigration laws.
The Department of Homeland Seculity's ploposed deferred action program for parents of U.S. citizens
and legal permanent residents would also be a permissible exercise of DHS's discretion to enfblce
the immigration laws.
The Department of Homeland Security's proposed deferred action proglam for palents of recipients of
deferred action under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program would not be a permissible exercise of DHS's enfofcement discretion.

November 19,2014

Mgtr¿oReuouM OprNroN FoR THE SecR¡reRv oF HoMELAND SECURITY
AND THE COUSSPI TO THE PRESIOPNT

You have asked two questions concerning the scope of the Department of
Homeland Security's discretion to enforce the immigration laws. First, you have
asked whether, in light of the limited resources available to the Department
("DHS") to remove aliens unlawfully present in the United States, it would be
legally permissible for the Department to implement a policy prioritizing the
removal of certain categories of aliens over others. DHS has explained that
although there are approximately I1.3 million undocumented aliens in the country,
it has the resources to remove fewer than 400,000 such aliens each year. DHS's
proposed policy would prioritize the removal of aliens who present threats to
national security, public safety, or border security. Under the proposed policy,
DHS officials could remove an alien who did not fall into one of these categories
provided that an Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") Field Office
Director determined that "removing such an alien would serve an important
federal interest." Draft Memorandum for Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Director,
ICE, et al., from Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, Re.'
Policies for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Undocumented

Immigrants at 5 Qllov. 17 ,2014) ("Johnson Prioritization Memorandum").
Second, you have asked whether it would be permissible for DHS to extend
deferred action, a form of temporary administrative relief from removal, to certain
aliens who are the parents of children who are present in the United States.
Specifically, DHS has proposed to irnplement a program under which an alien
could apply for, and would be eligible to receive, deferred action if he or she is not
a DHS removal priority under the policy described above; has continuously
resided in the United States since before January 1,2010; has a child who is either
a U.S. citizen or a lawful permanent resident; is physically present in the United

Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 38

States both when DHS announces its program and at the time of application for
deferred action; and presents "no other factors that, in the exercise of discretion,
make[] the grant of deferred action inappropriate." Draft Memorandum for Leon
Rodriguez, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, et al., from Jeh
Charles Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, Re: Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children
and Others at 4 (Nov. 17,2014) ("Johnson Deferred Action Memorandum"). You
have also asked whether DHS could implement a similar program for parents of
individuals who have received deferred action under the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals ("DACA") program.

As has historically been true of deferred action, these proposed deferred action
programs would not "legalize" any aliens who are unlawfully present in the United
States: Deferred action does not confer any lawful immigration status, nor does it
provide apath to obtaining permanent residence or citizenship. Grants of deferred
action under the proposed programs would, rather, represent DHS's decision not
to seek an alien's removal for a prescribed period of time. See generally Reno v.

Am.-Arab Anti-Disøim. Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1999) (describing
deferred action). Under decades-old regulations promulgated pursuant to authority
delegated by Congress, see 8 U.S.C. $$ 1103(a)(3), 1324a(hX3), aliens who are
granted defered action-like certain other categories of aliens who do not have
lawful immigration status, such as asylum applicants-may apply for authorization to work in the United States in certain circumstances, 8 C.F.R.
$274a.12(cXl4) (providing that deferred action recipients may apply for work
authorization if they can show an "economic necessity for employment"); see also
8 C.F.R. $ 109.1(bX7) (1982). Under DHS policy guidance, a gtant of deferred
action also suspends an alien's accrual of unlawful presence for purposes of
8U.S.C. $ 1182(a)(9XBXi) and (a)(9)(C)(i)(I), provisions that restrict the
admission of aliens who have departed the United States after having been
unlawfully present for specifìed periods of time. A grant of deferred action under
the proposed programs would remain in effect for three years, subject to renewal,
and could be terminated at any time at DHS's discretion. S¿¿ Johnson Deferred
Action Memorandum at 2, 5.
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that DHS's proposed prioritization policy and its proposed deferred action program for parents of U.S. citizens
and lawful permanent residents would be permissible exercises of DHS's discretion to enforce the immigration laws. We further conclude that, as it has been
described to us, the proposed deferred action program for parents of DACA
recipients would not be a permissible exercise of enforcement discretion.

I.
We first address DHS's authority to prioritize the removal of certain categories
of aliens over others. We begin by discussing some of the sources and limits of

2

D-É1^S's

Authoríty to Prioritize Removal of Certaín Aliens Unløwfully Presenl

DHS's enforcement discretion under the immigration laws, and then analyze
DHS's proposed prioritization policy in light of these considerations.
A.
DHS's authority to remove aliens from the United States rests on the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA"), as amended, 8 U.S.C. $$ I101 et seq.In
the INA, Congress established a comprehensive scheme governing immigration
and naturalization. The INA specifies certain categories of aliens who are
inadmissible to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. $ 1182. It also specifies "which
aliens may be removed from the United States and the procedures for doing so."
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.2492,2499 (2012). "Aliens may be removed if
they were inadmissible at the time of entry, have been convicted of certain crimes,
or meet other criteria set by federal law." Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. $ 1227); see 8 U.S.C.
$ 1227(a) (providing that "[a]ny alien . . . in and admitted to the United States
shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien" falls within
one or more classes of deportable aliens); see also 8 U.S.C. $ 1182(a) (listing
classes of aliens ineligible to receive visas or be admitted to the United States).
Removal proceedings ordinarily take place in federal immigration courts administered by the Executive Office for Immigration Review, a component of the
Department of Justice. See id. $ 1229a (governing removal proceedings); see also
id. $$ 1225(bXlXA), 1228(b) (setting out expedited removal procedures for
ceftain arriving aliens and ceftain aliens convicted of aggravated felonies).
Before 2003, the Department of Justice, through the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("lNS"), was also responsible for providing immigration-related
administrative services and generally enforcing the immigration laws. In the
Horrrelantl Seuurit"y Aut uf 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, Congress
transferred most of these functions to DHS, giving it primary responsibility both
for initiating removal proceedings and for carrying out hnal orders of removal. ^See
6 U.S.C. $$ 101 et seq.; see also Clarkv. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371,374 n.1 (2005)
(noting that the immigration authorities previously exercised by the Attorney
General and INS "now reside" in the Secretary of Homeland Security and DHS).
The Act divided INS's functions among three different agencies within DHS: U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), which oversees legal immigration into the United States and provides immigration and naturalization services to
aliens; ICE, which enforces federal laws governing customs, trade, and immigration; and U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP"), which monitors and
secures the nation's borders and ports of entry.,S¿e Pub. L. No. 107-296, $$ 403,
442, 451, 471, I 16 Stat. 2735,2178, 2193, 2195,2205; see also Name Change
From the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services to U.S. Citizenship and
ImmigraÍion Services,6g Fed. Reg. 60938, 60938 (Oct. 13, 2004); Name Change
of Two DHS Components, 75 Fed. Reg. 12445, 12445 (Mar. 16, 2010). The
Secretary of Homeland Security is thus now "charged with the administration and

J

Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 38

enforcement of [the INA] and all other laws relating to the immigration and
naturalization of aliens." 8 U.S.C. $ 1103(a)(1).
As a general rule, when Congress vests enforcement authority in an executive
agency, that agency has the discretion to decide whether a particular violation of
the law warrants prosecution or other enforcement action. This discretion is rooted
in the President's constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed," U.S. Const. art. II, $ 3, and it reflects a recognition that the "faithful[]"
execution of the law does not necessarily entail "act[ing] against each technical
violation of the statute" that an agency is charged with enforcing. Heckler v.
Chaney,470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). Rather, as the Supreme Court explained in
Chaney, the decision whether to initiate enforcement proceedings is a complex
judgment that calls on the agency to "balanc[e] . . . a number of factors which are
peculiarly within its expertise." Id. These factors include "whether agency
resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely
to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits
the agency's overall policies, and . . . whether the agency has enough resources to
undertake the action at all." Id. at 831 cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456,465 (1996) (recognizing that exercises of prosecutorial discretion in criminal
cases involve consideration of "'fs]uch factors as the strength of the case, the
prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities,
and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan"'
(quoting Wayte v. (Jnited States,470 U.S. 598,607 (1985))). In Chaney, the Court
considered and rejected a challenge to the Food and Drug Administration's refusal
to initiate enforcement proceedings with respect to alleged violations of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, concluding that an agency's decision not
to initiate enforcement proceedings is presumptively immune from judicial review.
See 470 U.S. at 832. The Court explained that, while Congress may "providef]
guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers," in the
absence of such "legislative direction," an agency's non-enforcement determination is, much like a prosecutor's decision not to indict, a "special province of the
Executive." Id. at 832-33.
The principles of enforcement discretion discussed in Chaney apply with particular force in the context of immigration. Congress enacted the INA against a
background understanding that immigration is "a field where flexibility and the
adaptation of the congressional policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute
the essence of the program." United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537,543 (1950) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consistent with this understanding, the INA vested the Attorney General (now the Secretary of Homeland
Security) with broad authority to "establish such regulations; . . . issue such
instructions; and perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out
his authority" under the statute. 8 U.S.C. $ 1103(a)(3). Years later, when Congress
created the Department of Homeland Security, it expressly charged DHS with
responsibility for "[e]stablishing national immigration enforcement policies and

4

DHS's Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certøin Aliens Unlawfully Present

priorities." Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, $ 402(5), 116
Stat. 2135, 2178 (codified at 6 U.S.C. $ 202(5)).
With respect to removal decisions in particular, the Supreme Coutt has recognizedthat "the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials" is a "principal
feature of the removal system" under the INA. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. The
INA expressly authorizes immigration officials to grant certain forms of discretionary relief from removal for aliens, including parole, 8 U.S.C. $ 1182(dX5XA);
asylum, td $ 1158(bX1XA); and cancellation of removal, id. ç1229b. But in
addition to administering these statutory forms of relief, "[flederal officials, as an
initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all."
Arizona,l32 S. Ct. at2499. And, as the Court has explained, "[a]t each stage" of
the removal process-"commenc[ing] proceedings, adjudicatfing] cases, [and]
executfing] removal o¡ds¡s"-lrnmigration ofÍicials have "discretion to abandon
the endeavor." Am.-Arab Anti-Disuim. Comm.,525 U.S. at 483 (quoting 8 U.S.C.
$ 1252(9) (alterations in original)). Deciding whether to pursue removal at each of
these stages implicates a wide range of considerations. As the Court observed in
Arizona:
Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to support their
families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or
aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities of an individual
case may turn on many factors, including whether the alien has children born in the United States, long ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military service. Some discretionary decisions
involve policy choices that bear on this Nation's international relations. . . . The foreign state may be mired in civil war, complicit in
political persecution, or enduring conditions that create a real risk
that the alien or his family will be harmed upon return. The dynamic
nature of relations with other countries requires the Executive
Branch to ensure that enforcement policies are consistent with this
Nation's foreign policy with respect to these and other realities.
132 S. Ct. at2499.

Immigration officials' discretion in enforcing the laws is not, however, unlimited. Limits on enforcement discretion are both implicit in, and fundamental to, the
Constitution's allocation of governmental powers between the two political
branches. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,343 U.S. 579,5878S (1952). These limits, however, are not clearly defined. The open-ended nature
of the inquiry under the Take Care Clause-whether a particular exercise of
discretion is "faithful[]" to the law enacted by Congress-does not lend itself
easily to the application of set formulas or bright-line rules. And because the
exercise of enforcement discretion generally is not subject to judicial review, see

5

Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 38

Chaney,470 U.S. at 831-33, neither the Supreme Court nor the lower federal
courts have squarely addressed its constitutional bounds. Rather, the political
branches have addressed the proper allocation of enforcement authority through
the political process. As the Court noted in Chaney, Congress "may limit an
agency's exercise of enforcement power if it wishes, either by setting substantive
priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency's power to discriminate
among issues or cases it will pursue." Id. at 833. The history of immigration policy
illustrates this principle: Since the INA was enacted, the Executive Branch has on
numerous occasions exercised discretion to extend various forms of immigration
relief to categories of aliens for humanitarian, foreign policy, and other reasons.
When Congress has been dissatisfied with Executive action, it has responded, as
Chaney suggests, by enacting legislation to limit the Executive's discretion in
enforcing the immigration laws.'
Nonetheless, the nature of the Take Care duty does point to at least four general
(and closely related) principles governing the permissible scope of enforcement
discretion that we believe are particularly relevant here. First, enforcement
decisions should reflect "factors which are peculiarly within [the enforcing
agency's] expertise." Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831. Those factors may include
considerations related to agency resources, such as "whether the agency has
enough resources to undertake the action," or "whether agency resources are best
spent on this violation or another." Id. Other relevant considerations may include
"the proper ordering of [the agency's] priorities," id. at 832, and the agency's
assessment of "whether the particular enforcement action [at issue] best frts the
agency's overall policies," id. at 831.
Second, the Executive cannot, under the guise of exercising enforcement discretion, attempt to effectively rewrite the laws to match its policy preferences. See
id. at 833 (an agency may not "disregard legislative direction in the statutory
scheme that [it] administers"). In other words, an agency's enforcement decisions
should be consonant with, rather than contrary to, the congressional policy
underlying the statutes the agency is charged with administering. Cf. Youngstown,
343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("When the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its
lowest ebb."); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of llildlif", 551 U.S.
644, 658 (2007) (explaining that where Congress has given an agency the power to
administer a statutory scheme, a court will not vacate the agency's decision about
the proper administration of the statute unless, among other things, the agency
"'has relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to consider"' (quoting

' See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Presidenl and Immigt'atÌon Law,119 Yale
L,J. 458, 503-05 (2009) (describing Congress's response to its dissatisläction with the Executive's use
ofparole power tbr refugee populations in the 1960s and 1970s); see also, e.g., infra note 5 (discussing
legislative limitations on voluntary departure and extended voluntary departure).

6

DHS's Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.5., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,463 U.S.
29,43 (1983)).
Third, the Executive Branch ordinarily cannot, as the Court put it in Chaney,
"'consciously and expressly adopt[] a general policy' that is so extreme as to
amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities." 470 U.S. at 833 n.4
(quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, I162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc));
see id. (noting that in situations where an agency had adopted such an extreme
policy, "the statute conferring authority on the agency might indicate that such
decisions were not 'committed to agency discretion"'). Abdication of the duties
assigned to the agency by statute is ordinarily incompatible with the constitutional
obligation to faithfully execute the laws. But see, e.g., Presidential Authority to
Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199, 200 (1994)
(noting that under the Take Care Clause, "the President is required to act in
accordance with the laws-including the Constitution, which takes precedence
over other forms of law").
Finally, lower courts, following Chaney, have indicated that non-enforcement
decisions are most comfortably characterized as judicially unreviewable exercises
of enforcement discretion when they are made on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g.,
Kenney v. Glickman, g6 F.3d 1118, 1123 (8th Cir. 1996); Crowley Caribbean
Transp., Inc. v. Peña,37 F.3d 671,676-77 (D.C. Cir. 1994). That reading of
Chaney reflects a conclusion that case-by-case enforcement decisions generally
avoid the concerns mentioned above. Courts have noted that "single-shot nonenforcement decisions" almost inevitably rest on "the sort of mingled assessments
of fact, policy, and law . . . that are, as Chaney recognizes, peculiarly within the
agency's expertise and discretion." Crowley Caribbean Transp.,37 F.3d at 67677 (emphasis omitted). Individual enforcement decisions made on the basis of
case-specific factors are also unlikely to constitute "general polic[ies] that [are] so
extreme as to amount to an abdication of fthe agency's] statutory responsibilities."
Id. at 677 (quoting Chaney, 477 U.S. at 833 n.4). That does not mean that all
"general policies" respecting non-enforcement are categorically forbidden: Some
"general policies" may, for example, merely provide a framework for making
individualized, discretionary assessments about whether to initiate enforcement
actions in particular cases. Cf. Renov. Flores,507 U.S. 292,313 (1993) (explaining that an agency's use of "reasonable presumptions and generic rules" is not
incompatible with a requirement to make individualized determinations). But a
general policy of non-enforcement that forecloses the exercise of case-by-case
discretion poses "special risks" that the agency has exceeded the bounds of its
enforcement discretion . Crowley Caribbean Transp.,37 F.3d at 677.

B.
We now turn, against this backdrop, to DHS's proposed prioritization policy. In
their exercise of enforcement discretion, DHS and its predecessor, INS, have long

7

Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 38

employed guidance instructing immigration officers to prioritize the enforcement
of the immigration laws against certain categories of aliens and to deprioritize
their enforcement against others. See, e.9., INS Operating Instructions
$ 103(a)(l)(i) (1962); Memorandum for All Field Offìce Directors, ICE, et al.,
from John Morton, Director, ICE, Re: Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion
Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enþrcement Priorities of the Agency for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 20ll); Memorandum
for All ICE Employees, from John Morton, Director, ICE, Re: Civil Immigration
Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens
(Mar. 2, 2011); Memorandum for Regional Directors, INS, et al., from Doris
Meissner, Commissioner, INS, Re: Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion (Nov. 17,
2000). The policy DHS proposes, which is similar to but would supersede earlier
policy guidance, is designed to "provide clearer and more effective guidance in the
pursuit" of DHS's enforcement priorities; namely, "threats to national security,
public safety and border security." Johnson Prioritization Memorandum at 1.
Under the proposed policy, DHS would identify three categories of undocumented aliens who would be priorities for removal from the United States. S¿e
generally id. at 3-5. The highest priority category would include aliens who pose
particularly serious threats to national security, border security, or public safety,
including aliens engaged in or suspected of espionage or terrorism, aliens convicted of offenses related to participation in criminal street gangs, aliens convicted of
certain felony offenses, and aliens apprehended at the border while attempting to
enter the United States unlawfully. See id. at 3. The second-highest priority would
include aliens convicted of multiple or significant misdemeanor offenses; aliens
who are apprehended after unlawfully entering the United States who cannot
establish that they have been continuously present in the United States since
January l, 2014; and aliens determined to have significantly abused the visa or
visa waiver programs. See id. at 34. The third priority category would include
other aliens who have been issued a final order of removal on or after January 1,
2014. See id. at 4. The policy would also provide that none of these aliens should
be prioritized for removal if they "qualify for asylum or another form of relief
under our laws." Id. at3-5.
The policy would instruct that resources should be directed to these priority
categories in a manner "commensurate with the level of prioritization identified."
Id. at 5.It would, however, also leave significant room for immigration officials to
evaluate the circumstances of individual cases. See id. (stating that the policy
"requires DHS personnel to exercise discretion based on individual circumstances"). For example, the policy would permit an ICE Field Office Director, CBP
Sector Chief, or CBP Director of Field Operations to deprioritize the removal of
an alien falling in the highest priority category if, in her judgment, "there are
compelling and exceptional factors that clearly indicate the alien is not a threat to
national security, border security, or public safety and should not therefore be an
enforcement priority." Id. at 3. Similar discretionary provisions would apply to

8

DHS's Authority to Priorilize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlowfully Present

aliens in the second and third priority categories.2 The policy would also provide a

non-exhaustive list of factors DHS personnel should consider in making such
deprioritization judgments.3 In addition, the policy would expressly state that its
terms should not be construed "to prohibit or discourage the apprehension,
detention, or removal of aliens unlawfully in the United States who are not
identified as priorities," and would further provide that "[i]mmigration officers
and attorneys may pursue removal of an alien not identified as a priority" if, "in
the judgment of an ICE Field Office Director, removing such an alien would serve
an important federal interest." Id. at 5.
DHS has explained that the proposed policy is designed to respond to the practical reality that the number of aliens who are removable under the INA vastly
exceeds the resources Congress has made available to DHS for processing and
carrying out removals. The resource constraints are striking. As noted, DHS has
informed us that there are approximately 1 1.3 million undocumented aliens in the
country, but that Congress has appropriated sufficient resources for ICE to remove
fewer than 400,000 aliens each year, a significant percentage of whom are
typically encountered at or near the border rather than in the interior of the
country. See E-mail for Karl R. Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, from David Shahoulian, Deputy General
Counsel, DHS, Re: Immigration Opinion (Nov. 19,2014) ("Shahoulian E-mail").
The proposed policy explains that, because DHS "cannot respond to all immigration violations or remove all persons illegally in the United States," it seeks to
"prioritize the use of enforcement personnel, detention space, and removal assets"
to "ensure that use of its limited resources is devoted to the pursuit ofl' DHS's
hi ghest priorities. John son Prioritization Memoran dum at 2.
In our view, DHS's proposed prioritization policy falls within the scope of its
lawful discretion to enforce the immigration laws. To begin with, the policy is
based on a factor clearly "within [DHS's] expertise." Chaney,470 U.S. at 831.
Faced with sharply limited resources, DHS necessarily must make choices about
which removals to pursue and which removals to defer. DHS's organic statute
itself recognizes this inevitable fact, instructing the Secretary to establish "national

t Under the proposed policy, aliens in the second tier could be depriolitized iÎ, "in thejudgment of
an ICE Field Office Director', CBP Sector Chief, CBP Director of Field Operations, USCIS District
Director, or USCIS Sen¿ice Centet Director, thele ale fàctot's indicating the alien is not a threat to
national security, border security, ol public safety, and should not therefbre be an enforcement
priolity." Johnson Priolitization Memorandum at 4. Aliens in the third tier could be deprioritized if, "in
the judgment of an immiglation offìcer, the alien is not a threat to the integrity of the immigration
system or there are tàctors suggesting the alien should not be an enforcement pt'iot'ity." Id. ar.5.
'These factors include "extenuating circumstances involving the offense of conviction; extended
length of time since the offense of conviction; length of time in the United States; military selice;
family or community ties in the United States; status as a victim, witness or plaintiff in civil or criminal
proceedings; or compelling humanitarian factors such as poor health, age, pregnancy, a young child or
a

seliously ill relative." Johnson Prioritization Memorandum at

9

6.

Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 38

immigration enforcement policies and priorities." 6 U.S.C. $ 202(5). And an
agency's need to ensure that scarce enforcement resources are used in an effective
manner is a quintessential basis for the use of prosecutorial discretion. S¿e
Chaney,470 U.S. at 831 (among the factors "peculiarly within fan agency's]
expertise" are "whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or
another" and "whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at
all").
The policy DHS has proposed, moreover, is consistent with the removal priorities established by Congress. In appropriating funds for DHS's enforcement
activities-which, as noted, are sufficient to permit the removal of only a fraction
of the undocumented aliens cumently in the country-Congress has directed DHS
to "prioritize the identification and removal of aliens convicted of a crime by the
severity of that crime." Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act,
2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. F, tit. II, 128 Stat. 5,251 ("DHS Appropriations
Act"). Consistent with this directive, the proposed policy prioritizes individuals
convicted of criminal offenses involving active participation in a criminal street
gang, most offenses classifìed as felonies in the convicting jurisdiction, offenses
classified as "aggravated felonies" under the INA, and certain misdemeanor
offenses. Johnson Prioritization Memorandum at 34. The policy ranks these
priority categories according to the severity of the crime of conviction. The policy
also prioritizes the removal of other categories of aliens who pose threats to
national security or border security, matters about which Congress has demonstrated particular concern. See, e.9., 8 U.S.C. $ 1226(c)(l)(D) þroviding for
detention of aliens charged with removability on national security grounds); id.
$ 1225(b) & (c) (providing for an expedited removal process for certain aliens
apprehended at the border). The policy thus raises no concern that DHS has relied
"on factors which Congress had not intended it to consider." Nat'l Ass'n of Home
Builders,55l U.S. at 658.
Further, although the proposed policy is not a "single-shot non-enforcement
decision," neither does it amount to an abdication of DHS's statutory responsibilities, or constitute a legislative rule overiding the commands of the substantive
statute. Crowley Caribbean Transp.,37 F.3d at 676-77. The proposed policy
provides a general framework for exercising enforcement discretion in individual
cases, rather than establishing an absolute, inflexible policy of not enforcing the
immigration laws in certain categories of cases. Given that the resources Congress
has allocated to DHS are sufficient to remove only a small fraction of the total
population of undocumented aliens in the United States, setting forth written
guidance about how resources should presumptively be allocated in particular
cases is a reasonable means of ensuring that DHS's severely limited resources are
systematically directed to its highest priorities across a large and diverse agency,
as well as ensuring consistency in the administration of the removal system. The
proposed policy's identification of categories of aliens who constitute removal

10

DHS's Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unløwfully Present

priorities is also consistent with the categorical nature of Congress's instruction to
prioritize the removal of criminal aliens in the DHS Appropriations Act.
And, significantly, the proposed policy does not identifo any category of removable aliens whose removal may not be pursued under any circumstances.
Although the proposed policy limits the discretion of immigration officials to
expend resources to remove non-priority aliens, it does not eliminate that discretion entirely. It directs immigration officials to use their resources to remove aliens
in a manner "commensurate with the level of prioritization identified," but (as
noted above) it does not "prohibit or discourage the apprehension, detention, or
removal of aliens unlawfully in the United States who are not identified as
priorities." Johnson Prioritization Memorandum at 5. Instead, it authorizes the
removal of even non-priority aliens if, in the judgment of an ICE Field Office
Director, "removing such an alien would serve an important federal interest," a
standard the policy leaves open-ended. Id. Accordingly, the policy provides for
case-by-case determinations about whether an individual alien's circumstances
warrant the expenditure of removal resources, employing a broad standard that
leaves ample room for the exercise of individualized discretion by responsible
officials. For these reasons, the proposed policy avoids the difficulties that might
be raised by a more inflexible prioritization policy and dispels any concern that
DHS has either undertaken to rewrite the immigration laws or abdicated its
statutory responsibilities with respect to non-priority aliens.o

il.
We turn next to the permissibility of DHS's proposed deferred action programs
for certain aliens who are parents of U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents
("LPRs"), or DACA recipients, and who are not removal priorities under the
'We
proposed policy discussed above.
begin by discussing the history and curent
practice of deferred action. We then discuss the legal authorities on which defened
o

ln Crane v. Napolitano, a district courl recently concluded in a non-precedential opinion that the
INA "mandates the initiation of removal proceedings whenever an immigration ofhcer encountets an
illegal alien who is not'clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted."'Opinion and Order
Respecting Pl. App. for Prelim. Inj. Relief, No. 3:12-cv-03247-O,2013 WL 1744422, at *5 (N.D. Tex.
Apr.23) (quoting 8 U.S.C. $ 1225(bX2XA)). The court later dismissed the case for lack ofjurisdiction.
See Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247-O,2013 Ì/L 8211660, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 3l).
Although the opinion lacks plecedential value, we have nevertheless considered whether', as it suggests,
the text ofthe INA categorically forecloses the exercise ofenforcement discretion with respect to aliens
who have not been formally admitted. The distlict coult's conclusion is, in our view, inconsistent with
the Supleme Court's reading of the INA as permitting immiglation officials to exercise enforcement
discretion at any stage of the removal plocess, including when deciding r,vhethet' to initiate removal
proceedings against a particular alten. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at2499; Am.-Arab Anli-Disøim. Cotnm.,
525 U.S. at 483-84.It is also difficult to square with authorily holding that the presence of mandatory
language in a statute, standing alone, does not necessarily limit the Executive BI'anch's enfolcernent
discletion, see, e.g. , Chaney, 470 U.S. at 835; Inmales of At tica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F .2d
375,381 (2d Cr'. 1973).

11

Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 38

action relies and identiff legal principles against which the proposed use of
deferred action can be evaluated. Finally, we turn to an analysis of the proposed
deferred action programs themselves, beginning with the program for parents of
U.S. citizens and LPRs, and concluding with the program for parents of DACA
recipients.

A.

In immigration law, the term "deferred action" refers to an exercise of administrative discretion in which immigration officials temporarily defer the removal of
an alien unlawfully present in the United States. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrim. Comm.,
525 U.S. at 484 (citing 6 Charles Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure
ç72.03[2)lh] (1998)); see USCIS, Standard Operating Proceduresþr Handling
DeferredAction Requests at USCIS Field Offices at3 (2012) ("USCIS SOP"); INS
Operating Instructions $ 103.1(a)(lXii) (1977). It is one of a number of forms of
discretionary relief-in addition to such statutory and non-statutory measures as
parole, temporary protected status, deferred enforced departure, and extended
voluntary departure-that immigration officials have used over the years to
temporarily prevent the removal of undocumented aliens.t

5

Parole is available to aliens by statute "for urgent humanitarian l'easons or significant public
benefìt." 8 U.S.C. $ 1182(dX5XA). Among other things, parole gives aliens the ability to adjust their
status without leaving the United States if they are otherwise eligible for adjustment of status, see id.
g 1255(a), and may eventually qualify them for Federal means-tested benefits, see ld $$ 1613,
1641(b)(4). Tempolary ptotected status is available to nationals ofdesignated foreign states affected by
armed conflicts, environmental disasters, and other extraordinary conditions. Id. $ 1254a. Defert'ed
enf'orced departure, which "has no statutory basis" but rather is an exercise of'"the President's
constitutional powers to conduct foreign relations," may be granted to nationals ofappropriate fbreign
states. USCIS, Adjudicator's Field Manual g 38.2(a) (2014). Extended voluntary departure was a
remedy derived from the voluntary departure statute, which, before its amendmentin 1996, permitted
the Attorney General to make a fìnding of removability if an alien agreed to voluntarily depart the
United States, without imposing a time limit for the alien's departure. S¿¿ 8 U.S.C. $$ 1252(b), 1254(e)
(1988 & Supp. II 1990); cf.8 U.S.C. g 1229c (current provision of the INA providing authority to grant
voluntary departule, but limiting such grants to 120 days). Some commentatot's, howeveL, suggested
that extended voluntary departure was in fact a form of "discretionary relief formulated administratively undel the Attorney General's genelal authority for enforcing immigration law." Sharon Stephan,
Cong. Research Seru., 85-599 EPW , Exlended Voluntary Departure and Olher Granls of Blanket Relief
from Deporlationat I (Fe6.23,1985). It appeals that extended voluntary depaftule is no longel used
tbllowing enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990, which established the temporary protected status
plogram. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigralion Services Fee Schedule, 75 Fed. Reg. 33446,33457
(June I l, 201 0) (proposed rule) (noting that "since I 990 neither the Attorney General nor the Secretaty
have designated a class ol aliens tbl nationality-based 'extended voluntary depalture,' and there no
longer are aliens in the United States benehting from such a designation," but noting that deferred
enforced departure is still used); H.R. Rep. No. 102-123, at 2 (1991) (indicating that in establishing
tempolary protected status, Congress was "codif[ying] and supet'sed[ing]" extended voluntary
departure). See generally Andorra Bluno et al., Cong. Research Sew.,Analysis of June 15,2012 DHS
Memorandum, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the
United States as Children at 5-10 (July 13,2012) ("CRS Immigration Report").

12

DHS's Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Presenl

The practice of granting defered action dates back several decades. For many
years after the INA was enacted, INS exercised prosecutorial discretion to grant
"non-priority" status to removable aliens who presented "appealing humanitarian
'Wildes,
from E. A. Loughran, Associate Commissioner,
factors." Letter for Leon
(July 16, 1973) (defining a "non-priority case" as "one in which the
INS at 2
Service in the exercise of discretion determines that adverse action would be
unconscionable because of appealing humanitarian factors"); se¿ INS Operating
Instructions g 103.1(a)(lXii) (1962). This form of administrative discretion was
later termed "deferred action." Am.-Arab Anti-Discrim. Comm.,525 U.S. at 484;
see INS Operating Instructions $ 103.1(aX1)(ä) (1977) (instructing immigration
officers to recommend deferred action whenever "adverse action would be
unconscionable because of the existence of appealing humanitarian factors").

Although the practice of granting deferred action "developed without express
statutory authorization," it has become a regular feature of the immigration
removal system that has been acknowledged by both Congress and the Supreme
Court. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrim. Comm.,525 U.S. at484 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see id. at 485 (noting that a congressional enactment limiting judicial
review of decisions "to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
removal orders against any alien under [the INA]" in 8 U.S.C. $ 1252(9) "seems
clearly designed to give some measure of protection to 'no deferred action'
decisions and similar discretionary determinations"); see also, e.9., 8 U.S,C.
g l1sa(a)(IXDXiXID, (V) (providing that certain individuals are "eligible for
deferred action"). Deferred action "does not confer any immigration status"-i.e.,
it does not establish any enforceable legal right to remain in the United Statesand it may be revoked by immigration authorities at their discretion. USCIS SOP
at3,7. Assuming it is not revoked, however, it represents DHS's decision not to
seek the alien's removal for a specihed period of time.
Under longstanding regulations and policy guidance promulgated pursuant to
statutory authority in the INA, deferred action recipients may receive two
additional benefits. First, relying on DHS's statutory authority to authorize certain
aliens to work in the United States, DHS regulations permit recipients of deferred
action to apply for work authorization if they can demonstrate an "economic
necessity for employment." 8 C.F.R. $274a.12(cXla); see 8 U.S.C. $ l32aaft)(3)
(defining an "unauthorized alien" not entitled to work in the United States as an
alien who is neither an LPR nor "authorized to be . . . employed by [the INA] or
by the Attorney General fnow the Secretary of Homeland Security]"). Second,
DHS has promulgated regulations and issued policy guidance providing that aliens
who receive deferred action will temporarily cease accruing "unlawful presence"
for purposes of 8 U.S.C. $1182(a)(9XBXD and (aX9XCXiXD. 8 C.F.R.
$214.1a(dX3); 28 C.F.R. $ 1100.35(b)(2); Memorandum for Field Leadership,
from Donald Neufeld, Acting Associate Director, Domestic Operations Directorate, USCIS, Re: Consolidation of Guidance Concerning Unlawful Presence for
Purposes of Sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and 212(a)(9)(C)(Ð(Ð of the Act at 42

l3

Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 38

(May 6, 2009) ("USCIS Consolidation of Guidance") (noting that "fa]ccrual of
unlawful presence stops on the date an alien is granted deferred action"); see
8 U.S.C. $ 1182(a)(gXBXii) þroviding that an alien is "unlawfully present" if,
among other things, he "is present in the United States after the expiration of the
period of stay authorized by the Attorney General").u
Immigration officials today continue to grant deferred action in individual cases
for humanitarian and other purposes, a practice we will refer to as "ad hoc
deferred action." Recent USCIS guidance provides that personnel may recommend
ad hoc deferred action if they "encounter cases during [their] normal course of
business that they feel warrant deferred action." USüS SOP at 4. An alien may
also apply for ad hoc deferred action by submitting a signed, written request to
USCIS containing "[a]n explanation as to why he or she is seeking deferred
action" along with supporting documentation, proof of identity, and other records.
Id. at3.
For decades, INS and later DHS have also implemented broader programs that
make discretionary relief from removal available for particular classes of aliens. In
many instances, these agencies have made such broad-based relief available
through the use of parole, temporary protected status, deferred enforced departure,
or extended voluntary departure. For example, from 1956 to 1972, INS implemented an extended voluntary departure program for physically present aliens who
were beneficiaries of approved visa petitions-known as "Third Preference" visa
petitions-relating to a specific class of visas for Eastern Hemisphere natives. S¿¿
United States ex rel. Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976, 979-80 (8.D. Pa. 1977).
Similarly, for several years beginning in 1978, INS granted extended voluntary
departure to nurses who were eligible for H-1 visas. Voluntary Departure for Outqf-Status Nonimmigrant H-l Nurses,43 Fed. Req,.2776,2776 (Jan. 19, 1978). In
addition, in more than two dozen instances dating to 1956, INS and later DHS
granted parole, temporary protected status, deferred enforced departure, or
extended voluntary departure to large numbers of nationals of designated foreign
states. See, e.g., CRS Immigration Report at 20-23; Cong. Research Serv.,
8D206779, Review of U.S. Refugee Resettlement Programs and Policies at 9, 1214 (19S0). And in 1990, INS implemented a "Family Fairness" program that
authorized granting extended voluntary departure and work authorization to the
estimated 1.5 million spouses and children of aliens who had been granted legal
status under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99603, 100 Stat. 3359 ("IRCA"). See Memorandum for Regional Commissioners

6
Section I 182(a)(9)(B)(i) imposes three- and ten-year bars on the admission of aliens (other than
aliens admitted to pet'manent lesidence) who departed or wel'e removed flom the United States after

periods of unlawful presence of between I 80 days and one year, or one yeal or lrore. Section
1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) imposes an indefinite bar on the admission of any alien rvho, without being
admitted, enters ol' attelrpts to reenter the United States atter previously having been unlawälly
present in the United States for an a1gtegale period of mole than one yeat'.

t4

DHS's Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unløwfully Presenl

INS, from Gene McNary, Commissioner, INS, -Re; Family Fairness: Guidelines
for Voluntary Departure under I CFR 242.5 for the Ineligible Spouses and
Children of Legalized Aliens (Feb. 2, 1990) ("Family Fairness Memorandum");
see qlso CRS Immigration Report at 10.
On at least five occasions since the late 1990s, INS and later DHS have also
made discretionary relief available to certain classes of aliens through the use of
deferred action:

l.

Deferred Actionfor Battered Aliens Under the Violence Against Women Act.
INS established a class-based deferred action program in 1997 for the benefit of
selÊpetitioners under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA"), Pub.
L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902. VAWA authorized ceftain aliens
who have been abused by U.S. citizen or LPR spouses or parents to self-petition
for lawful immigration status, without having to rely on their abusive family
members to petition on their behalf. Id. $ a0701(a) (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. $ l15a(a)(lXAXiii)-(iv), (vii)). The INS program required immigration
officers who approved a VAWA self-petition to assess, "on a case-by-case basis,
whether to place the alien in deferred action status" while the alien waited for a
visa to become available. Memorandum for Regional Directors et al.,INS, from
Paul W. Virtue, Acting Executive Associate Commissioner, INS, Re: Supplemental Guidance on Battered Alien Self-Petitioning Process and Related Issues
at 3 (May 6, 1997). INS noted that "[b]y their nature, VAWA cases generally
possess factors that warrant consideration for deferred action." Id. But because
"[i]n an unusual case, there may be factors present that would militate against
deferred action," the agency instructed officers that requests for deferred action
should still "receive individual scrutiny." Id. ln 2000, INS reported to Congress
that, because of this program, no approved VAWA selÊpetitioner had been
removed from the country. See Bqttered Women Immigrant Protection Act:
Hearings on H.R. 3083 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. at 43 (July 20, 2000) ("H.R. 3083 Hearings").
2. Defewed Actionfor T and U Visa Applicants. Several years later, INS instituted a similar deferred action program for applicants for nonimmigrant status or
visas made available under the Victims of Trafflcking and Violence Protection Act
of 2000 ("VTVPA"), Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464.That Act created two
new nonimmigrant classifications: a "T visa" available to victims of human
trafficking and their family members, and a "IJ visa" for victims of certain other
crimes and their family members. 1d $$ 107(e), 1513(bX3) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
$ 1101(a)(15XTXD, OXi)). In 2001, INS issued a memorandum directing
immigration officers to locate "possible victims in the above categories," and to
use "[e]xisting authority and mechanisms such as parole, deferred action, and
stays of removal" to prevent those victims' removal "until they have had the
opporlunity to avail themselves of the provisions of the VTVPA." Memorandum

15

Opiníons of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 38

for Michael A. Pearson, Executive Associate Commissioner, INS, from Michael
D. Cronin, Acting Executive Associate Commissioner, INS, -Re.' Victims of
Trfficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA) Policy Memorandum
#2-"7" and "(J" Nonimmigrant Visas at 2 (Aug. 30, 2001). In subsequent
memoranda, INS instructed officers to make "deferred action assessment[s]" for
"all [T visa] applicants whose applications have been determined to be bona fide,"
Memorandum for Johnny N. Williams, Executive Associate Commissioner, INS,
from Stuart Anderson, Executive Associate Commissioner, INS, Re: Defewed
Action for Aliens with Bona Fide Applications for T Nonimmigrant Status at I
(May 8, 2002), as well as for all U visa applicants "determined to have submitted
prima facie evidence of [their] eligibility," Memorandum for the Director,
Vermont Service Center, INS, from William R. Yates, USCIS, Re: Centralization
of Interim Relief þr U Nonimmigrant Status Appliconts at 5 (Oct. 8, 2003). In
2002 and 2007,INS and DHS promulgated regulations embodying these policies.
,See 8 C.F.R. $ 214.1l(kxl), (kX4), (m)(2) þromulgatedby New Clossificationfor
Victims of Severe Forms of Trfficking in Persons; Eligibiliîy for "7" Nonimmigrant Status, 67 Fed. Pteg. 4784,4800-01 (Jan. 31,2002)) (providing that any
T visa applicant who presents"primafacie evidence" of his eligibility should have
his removal "automatically stay[ed]" and that applicants placed on a waiting list
for visas "shall maintain [their] current means to prevent removal (deferred action,
parole, or stay of removal)"); id. $ 214.14(d)(2) (promulgated by New Classificøtion for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibilily fo, "U" Nonimmigrant Status,
72Fed. Reg. 53014, 53039 (Sept. 17,2007)) ("USCIS will grant deferred action or
parole to U-1 petitioners and qualiffing family members while the U-l petitioners
are on the waiting list" for visas.).
j. Deferred Action for Foreign Students Affected by Huwicane Katrina. As a
consequence of the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005, several
thousand foreign students became temporarily unable to satisff the requirements
for maintaining their lawful status as F-l nonimmigrant students, which include
"pursuit of a 'full course of study."' USCIS, Interim Relief for Certain Foreign
Academic Students Adversely Affected by Hurricane Katrina: Frequently Asked
Questions (FAØ at I (Nov. 25,2005) (quoting 8 C.F.R. ç214.2(Ð(6)), available
at httpllwww.uscis.gov/sites/default/fliles/USCISÆIumanitarian/SpecialYo2}Situati
ons/Previous%20Speci alYo2}situations%20Byo/o20Topiclfaq-interim-student-relie
Êhurricane-katrina.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). DHS announced that it would
grant deferred action to these students "based on the fact that [their] failure to
maintain status is directly due to Hurricane Katrina." Id. at7. To apply for
deferred action under this program, students were required to send a letter
substantiating their need for deferred action, along with an application for work
authorization. Press Release, USCIS, USCIS Announces Interim Relieffor Foreign
Studenîs Adversely Impacted by Hurricane Katrina at l-2. (Nov. 25, 2005),
availqble at http.llwww.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/pressrelease/F l Student_
I I 25_05_PR.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). USCIS explained that such

16

DHS's Authority to Priorilize Removal of Certain Aliens Unløwfully Presenl

requests for deferred action would be "decided on a case-by-case basis" and that
could not "provide any assurance that all such requests will be granted." Id. at l.

it

4. Deferred Action þr Widows and Widowers of U.S. Citizens. In 2009, DHS
implemented a deferred action program for certain widows and widowers of U.S.
citizens. USCIS explained that "no avenue of immigration relief exists for the
surviving spouse of a deceased U.S. citizen if the surviving spouse and the U.S.
citizen were married less than 2 years at the time of the citizen's death" and
USCIS had not yet adjudicated a visa petition on the spouse's behalf. Memorandum for Field Leadership, USCIS, from Donald Neufeld, Acting Associate
Director, USCIS, Re: Guidance Regarding Surttiving Spouses of Deceased U.S.
Citizens and Their Children at I (Sept. 4,2009). "In order to address humanitarian
concerns arising from cases involving surviving spouses of U.S. citizens," USCIS
issued guidance permitting covered surviving spouses and "their qualiffing
children who are residing in the United States" to apply for deferred action. Id.
at2, 6. USüS clarif,red that such relief would not be automatic, but rather would
be unavailable in the presence of, for example, "serious adverse factors, such as
national security concerns, significant immigration fraud, commission of other
crimes, or public safety reasons." Id. at 6.1
5. Deferred Action for Childhood Awivols. Announced by DHS in 2012,
DACA makes deferred action available to "certain young people who were
brought to this country as children" and therefore "[a]s a general matter . . . lacked
the intent to violate the law." Memorandum for David Aguilar, Acting Commissioner, CBP, et al., from Janet Napolitano, Secretary, DHS, Re: Exercising
Proseculorial Discreîion with Respect to Individuals Wo Came to the United
States as Children at 1 (June 15,2012) ("Napolitano Memorandum"). An alien is
eligible for DACA if she was under the age of 31 when the program began;
aruived in the United States before the age of 16; continuously resided in the
United States for at least 5 years immediately preceding June 15, 2012; was
physically present on June 75, 2012; satisfies certain educational or military
service requirements; and neither has a serious criminal history nor "poses athreat
to national security or public safety." See id. DHS evaluates applicants' eligibility
for DACA on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 2; USCIS, Deferued Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Toolkit: Resources for Community Partners at ll
("DACA Toolkit"). Successful DACA applicants receive deferred action for a
7

Sevelal months after the deferred action program was announced, Congress eliminated the requilement that an alien be marlied to a U.S. citizen "for at least 2 yeals at the time of the citizen's
death" to retain his ol her eligibility fol lawful immigration status. Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. I l1-83, $ 568(c), 123 Stat. 2142,2186 (2009). Concluding that
this legislation rendered its surviving spouse guidance "obsolete," USCIS r,vithdlew its earlier guidance
and treated all pending applications fol deferled action as visa petitions. See Memorandum for
Executive Leadership, USCIS, from Donald Neufeld, Acting Associate Ditector, USCIS, et al., Re:
Additional Guidance Regarding Surviving Spouses of Deceased U.S. Citizens and Their Children
(REVISED) at 3, l0 (Dec.2,2009).

t7

Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 38

period of two years, subject to renewal. ,See DACA Toolkit at 11. DHS has stated
that grants of deferred action under DACA may be terminated at any time, id.
at 16, and "confer[] no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to
citizenship," Napolitano Memorandum at 3.'
Congress has long been aware of the practice of granting deferred action, including in its categorical variety, and of its salient features; and it has never acted
to disapprove or limit the practice.' On the contrary, it has enacted several pieces
of legislation that have either assumed that deferred action would be available in
certain circumstances, or expressly directed that deferred action be extended to
certain categories of aliens. For example, as Congress \¡/as considering VAWA
reauthorization legislation in 2000, INS officials testified before Congress about
their deferued action program for VAWA selÊpetitioners, explaining that
"[a]pproved IVAWA] selËpetitioners are placed in deferred action status," such
that "[n]o battered alien who has filed a[n approved] self petition . . . has been
deported." H.R. 3083 Hearings at 43. Congress responded by not only acknowledging but also expanding the deferred action program in the 2000 VAWA
reauthorization legislation, providing that children who could no longer selfpetition under VAWA because they were over the age of 21 would nonetheless be
"eligible for deferred action and work authorization." Victims of Trafficking and

t Befole DACA was announced, our Office was consulted about whether such a program would be
legally permissible. As we orally advised, our preliminary view was that such a program would be
peurrissible, provided that immigratiorr officials retained discretion to cvaluatc cach application on an
individualized basis. Vy'e noted that immigration offìcials typically consider factors such as having been
brought to the United States as a child in exercising their discretion to grant defered action in
individual cases. We explained, however, that extending defered action to individuals who satisfied
these and other specifìed criteria on a class-wide basis would raise distinct questions not implicated by

ad hoc grants of deferred action. We advised that

it

was critical that, like past policies that made

deferred action available to certain classes of aliens, the DACA program require immigration officials
to evaluate each application fbr defen'ed action on a case-by-case basis, rather than granting deferred
action automatically to all applicants who satisfied the threshold eligibility criteria. We also noted that,
although the proposed program was predicated on humanitarian concerns that appeared less particularized and acute than those underlying celtain prior class-wide defered action programs, the concems
animating DACA wele nonetheless consistent with the types of concerns that have customalily guided
the exercise of immigration enforcement discretion.
n

Congress has considered legislation that would limit the practice ofgranting deferled action, but it
has never enacted such a measure. In 2011, a bill was introduced in both the House and the Senate that

would have temporarily suspended DHS's authority to grant deferred action except in nart'ow
circumstances. S¿e H.R. 2497, ll2th Cong. (2011); S. 1380, 1l2th Cong. (201 l). Neithel chamber,
however, voted on the bill. This year, the House passed a bill that purported to bar any funding for
DACA ol other class-wide deferred action programs, H.R. 5272, ll3th Cong. (2014), but the Senate
has not considered the legislation. Because the Suprerne Coult has instructed that unenacted legislation

isanunreliableindicatoroflegislativeinlent,seeRedLÌonBroad.Co v FCC,395U.S.367,38ln.ll
(1969), we do not dlarv any inference regardir.rg congressional policy from these unenacted bills.

18

DHS's Authorify to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unløwfully Present

Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, $ 1503(dX2), l14 Stat.
1464,1522 (codified at 8 U.S.C. $ l15a(a)(IXDXiXII), (IV)).''
Congress demonstrated a similar awareness of INS's (and later DHS's) deferred action program for bona fide T and U visa applicants. As discussed above,
that program made deferred action available to nearly all individuals who could
make a prima facie showing of eligibility for a T or U visa. In 2008 legislation,
Congress authorized DHS to "grant. . , an administrative stay of a final order of
removal" to any such individual. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, $ 204, 122 Stat.
5044, 5060 (codified at 8 U.S.C. ç 1227(d)(1)). Congress further clarified that
"[t]he denial of a request for an administrative stay of removal under this subsection shall not preclude the alien from applying for . . . deferred action." Id.lt also
directed DHS to compile a report detailing, among other things, how long DHS's
"specially trained IVAWA] Unit at the [USCIS] Vermont Service Center" took to
adjudicate victim-based immigration applications for "deferred action," along with
"steps taken to improve in this area." Id. ç238. Representative Berman, the bill's
sponsor, explained that the Vermont Service Center should "strive to issue work
authorization and deferred action" to "[i]mmigrant victims of domestic violence,
sexual assault and other violence crimes . . . in most instances within 60 days of

filing." 154 Cong. Rec. 24603 (2008).
In addition, in other enactments, Congress has specified that certain classes of
individuals should be made "eligible for defened action." These classes include
certain immediate family members of LPRs who were killed on September 11,
2001, USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, $ 423(b), Il5 Stat.272,
361, and certain immediate family members of certain U.S. citizens killed in
combat, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-136, $ 1703(c)-(d), ll7 Stat. 7392, 1694.In the same legislation, Congress
made these individuals eligible to obtain lawful status as "family-sponsored
immigrant[s]" or "immediate relative[s]" of U.S. citizens. Pub. L. No. 107-56,
$423(b), 115 Stat. 272,361; Pub. L. No. 108-136, $ 1703(c)(lXA), 117 Stat.
1392, 1694; see generally Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct.2191,2197
(2014) (plurality opinion) (explaining which aliens typically qualify as familysponsored immigrants or immediate relatives).

Finally, Congress acknowledged the practice of granting deferued action in the
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, ll9 Stat.231,302 (codified at

to

Five years later', in the Violence Against Women and Depaftment of Justice Reauthorization Act

of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960,Congress specified that, "[u]pon the approval ofa
petition as a VAWA self-petitioner, the alien... is eligible for work authorization." 1d $ 814(b)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. g 1l5a(a)(l)(K)). One of the Act's sponsors explained that while this plovision
was intended to "give[] DHS statutory autholity to grant rvolk authorization . . . without having to rely
upon defèred action . . . [t]he currerìt practice of granting delèr'red action to apploved VAWA self-petitioners should continue." I 5 1 Cong. P.ec. 29334 (2005) (statement of Rep. Conyers).

t9

Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 38

49 U.S.C. $ 30301 note), which makes a state-issued driver's license or identification card acceptable for federal purposes only if the state verifies, among other
things, that the card's recipient has "[e]vidence of []awful [s]tatus." Congress
specified that, for this purpose, acceptable evidence of lawful status includes proof
of, among other things, citizenship, lawful petmanent or temporary residence, or
"approved deferred action status." Id. $ 202(c)(2XBXviii).
B

The practice of granting deferred action, like the practice of setting enforcement priorities, is an exercise of enforcement discretion rooted in DHS's authority
to enforce the immigration laws and the President's duty to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed. It is one of several mechanisms by which immigration
officials, against a backdrop of limited enforcement resources, exercise their
"broad discretion" to administer the removal system-and, more specifically, their
discretion to determine whether "it makes sense to pursue removal" in particular
circumstances. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at2499.
Deferred action, however, differs in at least three respects from more familiar
and widespread exercises of enforcement discretion. First, unlike (for example) the
paradigmatic exercise of prosecutorial discretion in a criminal case, the conferral
of deferred action does not represent a decision not to prosecute an individual for
past unlawful conduct; it instead represents a decision to openly tolerate an
undocumented alien's continued presence in the United States for a fixed period
(subject to revocation at the agency's discretion). Second, unlike most exercises of
enforcement discretion, deferred action carries with it benefits in addition to nonenforcement itself; specifically, the ability to seek employment authorization and
suspension of unlawful presenoe ft-rr purpt-rses of 8 U.S.C. $ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i) and
(aXgXCXi)(l). Third, class-based deferued action programs, like those for VA'WA
recipients and victims of Hurricane Katrina, do not merely enable individual
immigration officials to select deserving beneficiaries from among those aliens
who have been identified or apprehended for possible removal-as is the case with
ad hoc deferred action-but rather set forth certain threshold eligibility criteria and
then invite individuals who satisff these criteria to apply for deferred action status.
While these features of deferred action are somewhat unusual among exercises
of enforcement discretion, the differences between deferred action and other
exercises of enforcement discretion are less significant than they might initially
appear. The first feature-the toleration of an alien's continued unlawful pressnss-i5 an inevitable element of almost any exercise of discretion in immigration
enforcement. Any decision not to remove an unlawfully preserit alien-even
through an exercise of routine enforcement discretion-necessarily carries with it
a tacit acknowledgment that the alien will continue to be present in the United
States without legal status. Deferred action arguably goes beyond such tacit
acknowledgment by expressly communicating to the alien that his or her unlawful

20

DHS's Authority to Prìoritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present

will be tolerated for a prescribed period of time. This difference is not, in
our view, insignificant. But neither does it fundamentally transform deferred
action into something other than an exercise of enforcement discretion: As we
have previously noted, deferred action confers no lawful immigration status,

presence

provides no path to lawful permanent residence or citizenship, and is revocable at
any time in the agency's discretion.
With respect to the second feature, the additional benefits deferred action confers-the ability to apply for work authorization and the tolling of unlawful
presence-do not depend on background principles of agency discretion under
DHS's general immigration authorities or the Take Care Clause atall, but rather
depend on independent and more specific statutory authority rooted in the text of
the INA. The first of those authorities, DHS's power to prescribe which aliens are
authorized to work in the United States, is grounded in 8 U.S.C. $ 1324a(h)(3),
which defrnes an "unauthorized alien" not entitled to work in the United States as
an alien who is neither an LPR nor "authorized to be . . . employed by [the INA]
or by the Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security]." This
statutory provision has long been understood to recognize the authority of the
Secretary (and the Attorney General before him) to grant work authorization to
particular classes of aliens.,S¿e 8 C.F.R. $274a.12; see also Perales v. Casillas,
903 F.2d 1043, 1048-50 (5th Cir. 1990) (describing the authority recognized by
section ß2aaþ)(3) as "permissive" and largely "unfettered")." Although the INA
rrSection ß2aaþ)(3) was enacted in 1986 as part of IRCA. Before then, the INA contained no
provisions complehensively addressing the employment of aliens or explessly delegating the authority
to regulate the employment of aliens to a responsible federal agency. INS assumed the authorify to
prescribe the classes ofaliens authorized to work in the United States under its general responsibility to

In 1981, INS promulgated legulations codiffing its existing
tbr glanting employment authorization. See Employment Aulhorization to
AliensintheUnitedstates,46 Fed.Reg.25079,25080-81 (May5, l98l)(citing8U.S.C. $ 1103(a)).
Those regulations permitted certain categories of aliens who lacked lawful immigration status,
including deferred action recipients, to apply for work authorization under ceftain circumstances.
administer the immigration laws.

procedures and criteria

8 C.F.R. ö 109. I (bX7) (1982).In IRCA, Congress introduced a "comprehensive scheme prohibiting the
employment of illegal aliens in the United States," Hofman Plaslic Compounds, Inc. tt. NLRB, 535
U.S. 137, 147 (2002), to be enforced primarily through criminal and civil penalties on employers who
knowingly employ an "unautholized alien." As relevant hele, Congress defined an "unauthorized
alien" balred flom employment in the United States as an alien who "is not . . . either (A) an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by
the Attorney General;'8 U.S.C. $ l32aa(h)(3) (emphasis added). Shortly aftel IRCA was enacted, INS
denied a petition to rescind its employment authorization regulation, rejecting an argument that "the
phrase 'authorized to be so employed by this Act or the Attorney Genel'al' does not recognize the
Attorney General's autholity to glant work authorization except to those aliens who have already been
granted specifìc authorization by the Act." Employment Authorization; Classes of Aliens Eligible, 52
Fed. Reg. 46092, 46093 (Dec. 4, 1987). Because the same statutory phrase refers both to aliens
authorized to be employed by the INA and aliens authorized to be employed by the Attorney General,
INS concluded that the only way to give eflèct to both refèrences is to conclude "that Congress, being
fully aware of the Attorney General's authority to promulgate regulations, and approving of the manner
in which he has exercised that authority in this matter, defined 'unauthorized alien' in such fashion as
to exclude aliens who have been autholized employment by the Attorney General through the

21

Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 38

requires the Secretary to grant work authorization to particular classes of aliens,
see, e.g.,8U.S.C. $ ll58(c)(l)(B) (aliens granted asylum), it places few limitations on the Secretary's authority to grant work authorization to other classes of
aliens. Fufther, and notably, additional provisions of the INA expressly contemplate that the Secretary may grant work authorization to aliens lacking lawful
immigration status----even those who are in active removal proceedings or, in
certain circumstances, those who have already received final orders of removal.
See id. $ 1226(a)(3) (permitting the Secretary to grant work authorization to an
otherwise work-eligible alien who has been arrested and detained pending a
decision whether to remove the alien from the United States); id. 51231(aX7)
(permitting the Secretary under ceftain narrow circumstances to grant work
authorization to aliens who have received final orders of removal). Consistent with
these provisions, the Secretary has long permitted certain additional classes of
aliens who lack lawful immigration status to apply for work authorization,
including deferred action recipients who can demonstrate an economic necessity
for employment. See 8 C.F.R. $274a.12(cXla); see qlso id. $274a.12(c)(8)
(applicants for asylum), (c)(10) (applicants for cancellation of removal); supra
note 1 1 (discussing 1981 regulations).
The Secretary's authority to suspend the accrual of unlawful presence of deferued action recipients is similarly grounded in the INA. The relevant statutory
provision treats an alien as "unlawfully present" for purposes of 8 U.S.C.
$ 1 182(a)(9XBXi) and (a)(9)(CXiXD if he "is present in the United States after the
expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General." 8 U.S.C.
$ 1182(a)(9XBXii). That language contemplates that the Attorney General (and
now the Secretary) may authorize an alien to stay in the United States without
accruing unlawful presence under section 1 182(a)(9XBXi) or section
I182(a)(9)(C)(i). And DHS regulations and policy guidance interpret a "period of
stay authortzedby the Attorney General" to include periods during which an alien
has been granted deferred action. See 8 C.F.R. $ 214.14(d)(3); 28 C.F.R.
$ 1 100.35(b)(2); USüS Consolidation of Guidance at 42.
The final unusual feature of deferred action programs is particular to classbased programs. The breadth of such programs, in combination with the f,irst two
features of deferred action, may raise particular concerns about whether immigration officials have undertaken to substantively change the statutory removal
system rather than simply adapting its application to individual circumstances. But
the salient feature of class-based programs-the establishment of an affirmative
application process with threshold eligibility criteria-does not in and of itself
cross the line between executing the law and rewriting it. Although every classwide deferred action program that has been implemented to date has established
regulatory process, in addition to those who are authorized employment by statute." Id.; see Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor,478 U.S. 833,844 (1986) (stating that "considerable weight must
be accorded" an agency's "contemporaneous interpretation ofthe statute it is entlusted to administer").

22

DHS's Authority ro Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unløwfully Presenl

ceftain threshold eligibility criteria, each program has also left room for case-bycase determinations, giving immigration officials discretion to deny applications
even if the applicant fulfills all of the program criteria. See supra pp. l5-18. Like
the establishment of enforcement priorities discussed in Part I, the establishment
of threshold eligibility criteria can serve to avoid arbitrary enforcement decisions
by individual officers, thereby furthering the goal of ensuring consistency across a
large agency. The guarantee of individualized, case-by-case review helps avoid
potential concerns that, in establishing such eligibility criteria, the Executive is
attempting to rewrite the law by defining new categories of aliens who are
automatically entitled to particular immigration relief. See Crowley Caribbean
Transp.,37 F.3d at676-77; see qlso Chaney,470 U.S. at 833 n.4. Furthermore,
while permitting potentially eligible individuals to apply for an exercise of
enforcement discretion is not especially common, many law enforcement agencies
have developed programs that invite violators of the law to identify themselves to
the authorities in exchange for leniency.'' Much as is the case with those programs, inviting eligible aliens to identiff themselves through an application
process may serve the agency's law enforcement interests by encouraging lowerpriority individuals to identiff themselves to the agency. In so doing, the process
may enable the agency to better focus its scarce resources on higher enforcement
priorities.
Apart from the considerations just discussed, perhaps the clearest indication
that these features of deferred action programs are not per se impermissible is the
fact that Congress, aware of these features, has repeatedly enacted legislation
appearing to endorse such programs. As discussed above, Congress has not only
directed that certain classes of aliens be made eligible for defened action programs-and in at least one instance, in the case of VAWA beneficiaries, directed
the expansion of an existing program-but also ranked evidence of approved
deferred action status as evidence of "lawful status" for purposes of the REAL ID
Act. These enactments strongly suggest that when DHS in the past has decided to
grant deferred action to an individual or class of individuals, it has been acting in a
manner consistent with congressional policy "'rather than embarking on a frolic of
its own."' United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139
12For example, since 1978, the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division has implemented a
"leniency plogram" undet which a corporation that reveals an antitrust conspiracy in which it
participated may receive a conditional promise that it will not be prosecuted. S¿e Dep't of Justice,
Frequently Asked Queslions Regarding lhe Anlilrust Division's Leniency Program and Model Leniency
(last
Letters (November 19, 2008), available at hrtp:llwwwjustice.gov/atrlpublic/criminal/239583.pdf
visited Nov. 19,2014); see also Internal Revenue Manual $ 9.5.11.9(2) (Revised IRS Voluntary
Disclosure Practice), qvailable at http:llwww.irs.gov/uac/Revised-IRS-Voluntary-Disclosure-Practice
(last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (explaining that a taxpayer's voluntary disclosure of misreported tax
information "may result in prosecution not being recommended"); U.S. Marshals Service, Fugilive Safe
Surrender FAQs, available athttp:llwww.usmarshals.gov/safèsurrender/faqs.html (last visited Nov. 19,
2014) (stating that fugitives who sun'ender at designated sites and times under the "Fugitive Safe
Sun'ender" pl'ogram ale likely to receive "favolable consideration").

23

Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 38

(19S5) (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969)); cf. id. at
137-39 (concluding that Congress acquiesced in an agency's asseftion of regulatory authority by "refus[ing] . . . to overrule" the agency's view after it was specifically "brought to Congress'[s] attention," and further finding implicit congressional approval in legislation that appeared to acknowledge the regulatory authority in

question); Dames & Moore v. Regan,453 U.S. 654, 680 (1981) (finding that
Congress "implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive
agreement" by enacting the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, which
"create[d] a procedure to implement" those very agreements).
Congress's apparent endorsement of certain deferred action programs does not
mean, of course, that a deferred action program can be lawfully extended to any
group of aliens, no matter its characteristics or its scope, and no matter the
circumstances in which the program is implemented. Because deferred action, like
the prioritization policy discussed above, is an exercise of enforcement discretion
rooted in the Secretary's broad authority to enforce the immigration laws and the
President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, it is subject to
the same four general principles previously discussed. See supra pp. 6-7. Thus,
any expansion of deferred action to new classes of aliens must be carefully
scrutinized to ensure that it reflects considerations within the agency's expertise,
and that it does not seek to effectively rewrite the laws to match the Executive's
policy preferences, but rather operates in a manner consonant with congressional
policy expressed in the statute. See supra pp. 6-7 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at
637, and Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders,55l U.S. at 658). Immigration officials
cannot abdicate their statutory responsibilities under the guise of exercising
enforcement discretion. See supra p. 7 (citing Chaney,470 U.S. at 833 n.4). And
any ne\¡/ deferred action program should leave room for individualized evaluation
of whether a particular case warrants the expenditure of resources for enforcement.
See supra p. 7 (citing Glichnan,96 F.3d at 1123, and Crowley Cøribbean Transp.,
37 F.3d at 676-77).
Furthermore, because deferred action programs depart in certain respects from
more familiar and widespread exercises of enforcement discretion, particularly
careful examination is needed to ensure that any proposed expansion of deferred
action complies with these general principles, so that the proposed program does
not, in effect, cross the line between executing the law and rewriting it. In
analyzing whether the proposed programs cross this line, we will draw substantial
guidance from Congress's history of legislation concerning deferred action. In the
absence of express statutory guidance, the nature of deferred action programs
Congress has implicitly approved by statute helps to shed light on Congress's own
understandings about the permissible uses of defemed action. Those understandings, in turn, help to inform our consideration of whether the proposed deferred
action programs are "faithful[]" to the statutory scheme Congress has enacted.
U.S. Const. art. II, $ 3.

24

DHS's Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unløwfully Presenî

C.

We now turn to the specifics of DHS's proposed deferred action programs.
DHS has proposed implementing a policy under which an alien could apply for,
and would be eligible to receive, deferred action if he or she: (1) is not an enforcement priority under DHS policy; (2) has continuously resided in the United
States since before January 1,2010; (3) is physically present in the United States
both when DHS announces its program and at the time of application for deferred
action; (4) has a child who is a U.S. citizen or LPR; and (5) presents "no other
factors that, in the exercise of discretion, make[] the grant of deferred action
inappropriate." Johnson Deferred Action Memorandum at 4. You have also asked
about the permissibility of a similar program that would be open to parents of
children who have received deferred action under the DACA program. We hrst
address DHS's proposal to implement a deferred action program for the parents of
U.S. citizens and LPRs, and then turn to the permissibility of the program for
parents of DACA recipients in the next section.
1

We begin by considering whether the proposed program for the parents of U.S.
citizens and LPRs reflects considerations within the agency's expeftise. DHS has
offered two justifications for the proposed program for the parents of U.S. citizens
and LPRs. First, as noted above, severe resource constraints make it inevitable that
DHS will not remove the vast majority of aliens who are unlawfully present in the
United States. Consistent with Congress's instruction, DHS prioritizes the removal
of individuals who have significant criminal records, as well as others who present
dangers to national security, public safety, or border security. See supra p. 10,
Parents with longstanding ties to the country and who have no significant criminal
records or other risk factors rank among the agency's lowest enforcement
priorities; absent signifìcant increases in funding, the likelihood that any individual in that category will be determined to warrant the expenditure of severely
limited enforcement resources is very low. Second, DHS has explained that the
program would serve an important humanitarian interest in keeping parents
together with children who are lawfully present in the United States, in situations
where such parents have demonstrated significant ties to community and family in
this country.,See Shahoulian E-mail.
With respect to DHS's hrst justification, the need to efficiently allocate scarce
enforcement resources is a quintessential basis for an agency's exercise of
enforcement discretion. See Chaney,470 U.S. at 831. Because, as discussed
earlier, Congress has appropriated only a small fraction of the funds needed for
full enforcement, DHS can remove no more than a small fraction of the individuals who are removable under the immigration laws. See supra p. 9. The agency
must therefore make choices about which violations of the immigration laws it

25

Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 38

will prioritize

And as Chaney makes clear, such choices are entrusted
largely to the Executive's discretion. 470 U.S. at 831.
The deferred action program DHS proposes would not, of course, be costless.
Processing applications for deferred action and its renewal requires manpower and
resources. See Arizona, I32 S. Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). But DHS has informed us that the costs of administering the
proposed program would be borne almost entirely by USCIS through the collection of application fees. ,S¿e Shahoulian E-mail; see also 8 U.S.C. $ 1356(m);
8 C.F.R. $ 103.7(bXlXiXC), (bxlXiXHH). DHS has indicated that the costs of
administering the deferred action program would therefore not detract in any
significant way from the resources available to ICE and CBP-the enforcement
arms of DHS-which rely on money appropriated by Congress to fund their
operations. ,lee Shahoulian E-mail. DHS has explained that, if anything, the
proposed deferred action program might increase ICE's and CBP's efficiency by
in effect using USCIS's fee-funded resources to enable those enforcement
divisions to more easily identiff non-priority aliens and focus their resources on
pursuing aliens who are strong candidates for removal. See id. The proposed
program, in short, might help DHS address its severe resource limitations, and at
the very least likely would not exacerbate them. See id.
DHS does not, however, attempt to justiff the proposed program solely as a
cost-saving measure, or suggest that its lack of resources alone is sufficient to
justify creating a deferred action program for the proposed class. Rather, as noted
above, DHS has explained that the program would also serve a particularized
humanitarian interest in promoting family unity by enabling those parents of U.S.
citizens and LPRs who are not otherwise enforcement priorities and who have
demonstrated community and family ties in the United States (as evidenced by the
length of time they have remained in the country) to remain united with their
children in the United States. Like determining how best to respond to resource
constraints, determining how to address such "human concerns" in the immigration context is a consideration that is generally understood to fall within DHS's
expertise. Arizona,l32 S. Ct. at2499.
This second justification for the program also appears consonant with congressional policy embodied in the INA. Numerous provisions of the statute reflect a
particular concern with uniting aliens with close relatives who have attained
lawful immigration status in the United States. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell,430 U.S'
787,795 n.6 (1977);1N^Sv. Errico,385 U.S. 214,220 n.9 (1966) ("'The legislative
history of the Immigration and Nationality Act clearly indicates that the Congress . . . was concerned with the problem of keeping families of United States
citizens and immigrants united."' (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85-1L99, at7 (1957)).
The INA provides a path to lawful status for the parents, as well as other immediate relatives, of U.S. citizens: U.S. citizens aged twenty-one or over may petition
for parents to obtain visas that would permit them to enter and permanently reside
and pursue.

26

DHS's Authorily to Priorilize Removal of Certaín Aliens Unlawfully Presenî

in the United States, and there is no limit on the overall number of such petitions
that may be granted. See 8 U.S.C. $ I 151(bX2XAXi); see also Cuellar de Osorio,
134 S. Ct. at 2197-99 (describing the process for obtaining a family-based
immigrant visa). And although the INA contains no parallel provision permitting
LPRs to petition on behalf of their parents, it does provide a path for LPRs to
become citizens, at which point they too can petition to obtain visas for their
parents. See, e.g.,8U.S.C. $ru27@) (providing that aliens are generally eligible
to become naturalized citizens after five years of lawful permanent residence); ld
g la30(a) (alien spouses of U.S. citizens become eligible after three years of
lawful permanent residence); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 5I0, 544 (2003)."
Additionally, the INA empowers the Attorney General to cancel the removal of,
and adjust to lawful permanent resident status, aliens who have been physically
present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than ten years,
exhibit good moral character, have not been convicted of specifred offenses, and
have immediate relatives who are U.S. citizens or LPRs and who would suffer
exceptional hardship from the alien's removal. 8 U.S.C. $ 1229b(bxl). DHS's
proposal to focus on the parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs thus tracks a congressional concern, expressed in the INA, with uniting the immediate families of
individuals who have permanent legal ties to the United States.
At the same time, because the temporary relief DHS's proposed program would
confer to such parents is sharply limited in comparison to the benefits Congress
has made available through statute, DHS's proposed program would not operate to
circumvent the limits Congress has placed on the availability of those benefits.
The statutory provisions discussed above offer the parents of U.S. citizens and
LPRs the prospect of permanent lawful status in the United States. The cancellation of removal provision, moreover, offers the prospect of receiving such status

t'The INA

does permit LPRs to petition on behalf of their spouses and children even before they
have attained citizenship. See 8 U.S.C. $ ll53(a)(2). However, the exclusion of LPRs'parents from
this provision does not appear to reflect a conglessional judgment that, until they attain citizenship,
LPRs lack an interest in being united with their parents comparable to their intel'est in being united with
their other immediate relatives. The distinction between parents and other relatives originated with a
1924 sfafite that exempted the wives and minol children of U.S. citizens flom immigration quotas,
gave "prefere¡çs sf¿f¡s"-eligibility fol a specially designated pool of immigrant visas-to other
relatives of U.S. citizens, and gave no favol'able tleatment to the lelatives of LPRs. Immigration Act of
1924,Pub. L. No.68-139, $$4(a),6,43 Stat. 153, 155-56. ln 1928, Congress extended preference
status to LPRs' wives and minol childlen, reasoning that because such t'elatives would be eligible lbr
visas without regard to any quota when their LPR relatives became citizens, granting prefet'ence status
to LPRs'wives and minor children would "hasten[]" the "family reunion." S. Rep. No.70-245,at2
(1928); see Act of May 29,1928, ch.914,45 Stat. 1009, 1009-10. The special visa status for wives and
children of LPRs thus mirloled, and was designed to complement, the special visa status given to wives
and minor children of U.S. citizens. In 1965, Congless eliminated the basis on which the distinction
had rested by exempting all "immediate relatives" of U.S. citizens, including parents, from numerical
resttictions on immigration. Pub. L. No. 89-236, $ 1,79 Stat. 911,911. But it did not amend eligibility
for prefelence status for relatives of LPRs to reflect that change.'We have not been able to discern any
lationale for this omission in the legislative history or statutory text of the 1965 law.

27

Opínions of the Ofrtce of Legal Counsel in Volume 38

immediately, without the delays generally associated with the family-based
immigrant visa process. DHS's proposed program, in contrast, would not grant the
parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs any lawful immigration status, provide a path to
permanent residence or citizenship, or otherwise confer any legally enforceable
entitlement to remain in the United States. See USCIS SOP at 3. It is true that, as
we have discussed, agrant of deferred action would confer eligibility to apply for
and obtain work authorization, pursuant to the Secretary's statutory authority to
grant such authorization and the longstanding regulations promulgated thereunder.
See supra pp. 13, 21--22. But unlike the automatic employment eligibility that
accompanies LPR status, s¿e 8 U.S.C. $ 1324a(hx3), this authorization could be
granted only on a showing of economic necessity, and would last only for the
limited duration of the deferred action grant, see 8 C.F.R. $ 274a.12(c)(1a).
The other salient features of the proposal are similarly consonant with congressional policy. The proposed program would focus on parents who are not
enforcement priorities under the prioritization policy discussed above-a policy
that, as explained earlier, comports with the removal priorities set by Congress.
See supra p. 10. The continuous residence requirement is likewise consistent
with legislative judgments that extended periods of continuous residence are
indicative of strong family and community ties. ^See IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
$201(a), 100 Stat.3359,3394 (1986) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
$ 1255a(a)(2)) (granting lawful status to certain aliens unlawfully present in the
United States since January l, 1982); id. $ 302(a) (codified as amended at
, 8 U.S.C. $ 1160) (granting similar relief to certain agricultural workers); H.R.
Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at49 (1986) (stating that aliens present in the United
States for five years "have become apart of their communitiesl,] . . . have strong
family ties here which include U.S. citizens and lawful residents[,] . . . have
built social networks in this countryf, and] . . . have contributed to the United
States in myriad ways"); S. Rep. No. 99-132, at 16 (1985) (deporting aliens who
"have become well settled in this country" would be a "wasteful use of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service's limited enforcement resources"); see
also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499 (noting that "[t]he equities of an individual
case" turn on factors "including whether the alien has . . . long ties to the
community").
We also do not believe DHS's proposed program amounts to an abdication of
its statutory responsibilities, or a legislative rule overriding the commands of the
statute. As discussed earlier, DHS's severe resource constraints mean that, unless
circumstances change, it could not as a practical matter remove the vast majority
of removable aliens present in the United States. The fact that the proposed
program would defer the removal of a subset of these removable aliens-a subset
that ranks near the bottom of the list of the agency's removal priorities-thus does
not, by itself, demonstrate that the program amounts to an abdication of DHS's
responsibilities. And the case-by-case discretion given to immigration officials
under DHS's proposed program alleviates potential concerns that DHS has

28

DHS's Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present

abdicated its statutory enforcement responsibilities with respect to, or created a
categorical, rule-like entitlement to immigration relief for, the particular class of
aliens eligible for the program. An alien who meets all the criteria for defered
action under the program would receive deferred action only if he or she "present[ed] no other factors that, in the exercise of discretion," would "make[] the
grant of deferred action inappropriate." Johnson Deferred Action Memorandum
at 4. The proposed policy does not specify what would count as such a factor; it
thus leaves the relevant USüS official with substantial discretion to determine
whether a grant of deferred action is warranted. In other words, even if an alien is
not a removal priority under the proposed policy discussed in Part I, has continuously resided in the United States since before January l, 2010, is physically
present in the country, and is a parent of an LPR or a U.S. citizen, the USCIS
official evaluating the alien's deferred action application must still make a
judgment, in the exercise of her discretion, about whether that alien presents any
other factor that would make a grant of deferred action inappropriate. This feature
of the proposed program ensures that it does not create a categorical entitlement to
deferred action that could raise concerns that DHS is either impermissibly
attempting to rewrite or categorically declining to enforce the law with respect to a
particular group of undocumented aliens.
Finally, the proposed deferred action program would resemble in material
respects the kinds of deferred action programs Congress has implicitly approved in
the past, which provides some indication that the proposal is consonant not only
with interests reflected in immigration law as a general matter, but also with
congressional understandings about the permissible uses of defered action. As
noted above, the program uses deferred action as an interim measure for a group
of aliens to whom Congress has given a prospective entitlement to lawful immigration status. 'While Congress has provided a path to lawful status for the parents
of U.S. citizens and LPRs, the process of obtaining that status "takes time."
Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at2199.The proposed program would provide a
mechanism for families to remain together, depending on their circumstances, for
some or all of the intervening period.'a Immigration officials have on several

raDHS's proposed program would likely not permit all potentially eligible pal'ents to remain
together with theil children for the entile duration of the time until a visa is awarded. In parlicular,
undocumented parents of adult citizens who are physically present in the country would be ineligible to
adjust their status without first leaving the country if they had never been "inspected and admitted or
paroled into the United States." 8 U.S.C. $ 1255(a) (permitting the Attorney General to adjust to
permanent resident status certain aliens present in the United States if they become eligible for
immiglant visas). They would thus need to leave the country to obtain a visa at a U.S. consulate
abload. See id. g l20l(a); Cuellar de Osorio,134 S. Ct. at2197-99. But once such parents left the
country, they would in most instances become subject to the 3- or'l0-year bar under 8 U.S.C.
g I I 82(a)(9)(B)(i) and therefore unable to obtain a visa unless they remained outside the country for
the duration of the bar. DHS's ploposed ploglam would neveltheless enable other fàmilies to stay
togethel without regard to the 3- or lO-yeal bar. And even as to those fämilies with parents who would
become subject to that bar, the proposed deferred action program would have the effect ofreducing the

29

Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 38

occasions deployed deferred action programs as interim measures for other classes

of aliens with prospective entitlements to lawful immigration status, including
VAWA selÊpetitioners, bona frde T and U visa applicants, certain immediate
family members of certain U.S. citizens killed in combat, and certain immediate
family members of aliens killed on September 11,2001. As noted above, each of
these programs has received Congress's implicit approval-and, indeed, in the
case of VAWA self-petitioners, a direction to expand the program beyond its
original bounds. See supra pp. 18-20.'' In addition, much like these and other
programs Congress has implicitly endorsed, the program serves substantial and
particularized humanitarian interests. Removing the parents of U.S. citizens and
LPRs-that is, of children who have established permanent legal ties to the United
States-would separate them from their nuclear families, potentially for many
years, until they were able to secure visas through the path Congress has provided.
During that time, both the parents and their U.S. citizen or LPR children would be
deprived of both the economic support and the intangible benefits that families
provide.
We recognize that the proposed program would likely differ in size from these
prior deferred action programs. Although DHS has indicated that there is no
reliable way to know how many eligible aliens would actually apply for or would
be likely to receive defened action following individualized consideration under
the proposed program, it has informed us that approximately 4 million individuals
could be eligible to apply. See Shahoulian E-mail. 'We have thus considered
whether the size of the program alone sets it at odds with congressional policy or
the Executive's duties under the Take Care Clause. In the absence of express
statutory guidance, it is difficult to say exactly how the program's potential size
bears on its permissibility as an exercise of executive enforcement discretion. But
because the size of DHS's proposed program corresponds to the size of a population to which Congress has granted a prospective entitlement to lawful status

amount of time the family had to spend apart, and could enable them to adjust the timing of their
separation according to, for example, their children's needs for care and suppofi.
ts
Several extended voluntary departule progl'ams have been animated by a similal rationale, and
the most prominent of these programs also received Congress's implicit approval. In particular', as
noted above, the Family Fairness policy, implemented in 1990, authorized granting extended voluntary
departure and work authorization to the estimated 1.5 million spouses and children of aliens glanted
legal status under IRCA-aliens who would eventually "acquire lawful permanent l'esident status" and
be able to petition on behalf of their family membels. Family Fairness Memorandum at l; see supra
pp. 14-15. Later that year, Congress granted the beneficia¡ies of the Family Fairness pl'ogram an
indefìnite stay of deportation. ,See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, {i 301, 104 Stat.
4978,5030. Although it did not make that grant of relief effective for nearly a year, Congress clalified
that "the delay in effectiveness of this section shall not be construed as reflecting a Conglessional
belief that the existing family fairness program should be modifìed in any way before such daTe." Id.
g 301(g). INS's policies lbr qualifying Third Prefèrence visa applicants and nurses eligible for H-l
nonimmigrant status likervise extended to aliens with plospective entitlements to lawful status. See
supra p. 14.

30

DHS's Authority

1o

Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present

without numerical restriction, it seems to us difficult to sustain an argument, based
on numbers alone, that DHS's proposal to grant a limited form of administrative
relief as a temporary interim measure exceeds its enforcement discretion under the
INA. Furthermore, while the potential size of the program is large, it is nevertheless only a fraction of the approximately l1 million undocumented aliens who
remain in the United States each year because DHS lacks the resources to remove
them; and, as we have indicated, the program is limited to individuals who would
be unlikely to be removed under DHS's proposed prioritization policy. There is
thus little practical danger that the program, simply by virtue of its size, will
impede removals that would otherwise occur in its absence. And although we are
aware of no prior exercises of deferred action of the size contemplated here, INS's
1990 Family Fairness policy, which Congress later implicitly approved, made a
comparable fraction of undocumented aliens-approximately four in tenpotentially eligible for discretionary extended voluntary departure relief. Compare
CRS Immigration Report at22 (estimating the Family Fairness policy extended to
1.5 million undocumented aliens), with Office of Policy and Planning, INS,
Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United
Stotes: 1990 to 2000 at 10 (2003) (estimating an undocumented alien population
of 3.5 million in 1990); see suprq notes 5 & 15 (discussing extended voluntary
depafture and Congress's implicit approval of the Family Fairness policy). This
suggests that DHS's proposed deferred action program is not, simply by virtue of
its relative size, inconsistent with what Congress has previously considered a
permissible exercise of enforcement discretion in the immigration context.
In light of these considerations, we believe the proposed expansion of deferred
action to the parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs is lawful. It reflects considerations-responding to resource constraints and to pafücularized humanitarian
concerns arising in the immigration context-that fall within DHS's expertise. It is
consistent with congressional policy, since it focuses on a group-law-abiding
parents of lawfully present children who have substantial ties to the communitythat Congress itself has granted favorable treatment in the immigration process.
The program provides for the exercise ofcase-by-case discretion, thereby avoiding
creating a rule-like entitlement to immigration relief or abdicating DHS's enforcement responsibilities for a particular class of aliens. And, like several
deferred action programs Congress has approved in the past, the proposed program
provides interim relief that would prevent particularized harm that could otherwise
befall both the beneficiaries of the program and their families. We accordingly
conclude that the proposed program would constitute a permissible exercise of
DHS's enforcement discretion under the INA.
I
We now turn to the proposed deferred action program for the parents of DACA
recipients. The relevant considerations are, to a certain extent, similar to those

31

Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 38

discussed above: Like the program for the parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs, the
proposed program for parents of DACA recipients would respond to severe
resource constraints that dramatically limit DHS's ability to remove aliens who are
unlawfully present, and would be limited to individuals who would be unlikely to
be removed under DHS's proposed prioritization policy. And like the proposed
program for LPRs and U.S. citizens, the proposed program for DACA parents
would preserve a significant measure of case-by-case discretion not to award
deferred action even ifthe general eligibility criteria are satisfied.
But the proposed program for parents of DACA recipients is unlike the proposed program for parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs in two critical respects. First,
although DHS justifies the proposed program in large part based on considerations
of family unity, the parents of DACA recipients are differently situated from the
parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs under the family-related provisions of the
immigration law. Many provisions of the INA reflect Congress's general concern
with not separating individuals who are legally entitled to live in the United States
from their immediate family members. See, e.g.,8 U.S.C. $ 1151(bX2XAXi)

to

petition for parents, spouses and children); id.
$ 1229b(bx1) (allowing cancellation of removal for relatives of citizens and

þermitting citizens

LPRs). But the immigration laws do not express comparable concern for uniting
persons who lack lawful status (or prospective lawful status) in the United States
with their families. DACA recipients unquestionably lack lawful status in the
United States. ^See DACA Toolkit at 8 ("Deferued action . . . does not provide you
with a lawful status."). Although they may presumptively remain in the United
States, at least for the duration of the grant of deferred action, that grant is both
time-limited and contingent, revocable at any time in the agency's discretion.
Extending defered action to the parents of DACA recipients would therefore
expand family-based immigration relief in a manner that deviates in important
respects from the immigration system Congress has enacted and the policies that
system embodies.
Second, as it has been described to us, the proposed deferred action program
for the parents of DACA recipients would represent a significant departure from
deferred action programs that Congress has implicitly approved in the past.
Granting deferred action to the parents of DACA recipients would not operate as
an interim measure for individuals to whom Congress has given a prospective
entitlement to lawful status. Such parents have no special prospect of obtaining
visas, since Congress has not enabled them to self-petition-as it has for VAWA
self-petitioners and individuals eligible for T or U visas-or enabled their
undocumented children to petition for visas on their behalf. Nor would granting
deferred action to parents of DACA recipients, at least in the absence of other
factors, serve interests that are comparable to those that have prompted implementation of deferred action programs in the past. Family unity is, as we have
discussed, a significant humanitarian concern that underlies many provisions of
the INA. But a concern with furthering family unity alone would not justify the

32

DHS's Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlowfully Present

proposed program, because in the absence of any family member with lawful
status in the United States, it would not explain why that concern should be
satisfied by permitting family members to remain in the United States. The
decision to grant deferred action to DACA parents thus seems to depend critically
on the earlier decision to make deferred action available to their children. But we
are aware of no precedent for using deferred action in this way, to respond to
humanitarian needs rooted in earlier exercises of deferred action. The logic
underlying such an expansion does not have a clear stopping point: It would
appear to argue in favor of extending relief not only to parents of DACA recipients, but also to the close relatives of any alien granted deferred action through
DACA or any other program, those relatives' close relatives, and perhaps the
relatives (and relatives' relatives) of any alien granted any form of discretionary
relief from removal by the Executive.
For these reasons, the proposed deferred action program for the parents of
DACA recipients is meaningfully different from the proposed program for the
parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs. It does not sound in Congress's concern for
maintaining the integrity of families of individuals legally entitled to live in the
United States. And unlike prior deferred action programs in which Congress has
acquiesced, it would treat the Executive's prior decision to extend deferred action
to one population as justiffing the extension of deferred action to additional
populations. DHS, of course, remains free to consider whether to grant deferred
action to individual parents of DACA recipients on an ad hoc basis. But in the
absence of clearer indications that the proposed class-based defened action
program for DACA parents would be consistent with the congressional policies
and priorities embodied in the immigration laws, we conclude that it would not be
permissible.

uI.
In sum, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that DHS's

proposed
prioritization policy and its proposed deferred action program for parents of U.S.
citizens and lawful permanent residents would be legally permissible, but that the
proposed deferred action program for parents of DACA recipients would not be

permissible.

KARL R. THOMPSON
Principal Deputy AssistanÍ Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

JJ

C

Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528

Homeland
Security
June 15, 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR:

David V. Aguilar
Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Alejandro Mayorkas
Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
John Morton
Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

/J ~

FROM:

Janet Napolitano {/ J-1
Secretary of HomeJJ/ntr8'ecurfty /

SUBJECT:

Exercising Proset¢orial Discretion with Respect to Individuals
Who Came to thei.Jnited States as Children

By this memorandum, I am setting forth how, in the exercise of our prosecutorial discretion, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should enforce the Nation's immigration laws against
certain young people who were brought to this country as children and know only this country as
home. As a general matter, these individuals lacked the intent to violate the law and our ongoing
review of pending removal cases is already offering administrative closure to many of them.
However, additional measures are necessary to ensure that our enforcement resources are not
expended on these low priority cases but are instead appropriately focused on people who meet
our enforcement priorities.
The following criteria should be satisfied before an individual is considered for an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion pursuant to this memorandum:
•
•
•

•

•

came to the United States under the age of sixteen;
has continuously resided in the United States for a least five years preceding the date of
this memorandum and is present in the United States on the date of this memorandum;
is currently in school, has graduated from high school, has obtained a general education
development certificate, or is an honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or
Armed Forces ofthe United States;
has not been convicted of a felony offense, a significant misdemeanor offense, multiple
misdemeanor offenses, or otherwise poses a threat to national security or public safety;
and
is not above the age of thirty.

www.dhs.gov

Our Nation' s immigration laws must be enforced in a strong and sensible manner. They are not
designed to be blindly enforced without consideration given to the individual circumstances of
each case. Nor are they designed to remove productive young people to countries where they
may not have lived or even speak the language. Indeed, many of these young people have
already contributed to our country in significant ways. Prosecutorial discretion, which is used in
so many other areas, is especially justified here.
As part of this exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the above criteria are to be considered
whether or not an individual is already in removal proceedings or subject to a final order of
removal. No individual should receive deferred action under this memorandum unless they first
pass a background check and requests for relief pursuant to this memorandum are to be decided
on a case by case basis. DHS cannot provide any assurance that relief will be granted in all
cases.
1. With respect to individuals who are encountered by U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), or U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS):
•

•

With respect to individuals who meet the above criteria, ICE and CBP should
immediately exercise their discretion, on an individual basis, in order to prevent low
priority individuals from being placed into removal proceedings or removed from the
United States.
USCIS is instructed to implement this memorandum consistent with its existing guidance
regarding the issuance of notices to appear.

2. With respect to individuals who are in removal proceedings but not yet subject to a final order
of removal, and who meet the above criteria:
•

•

•
•

ICE should exercise prosecutorial discretion, on an individual basis, for individuals who
meet the above criteria by deferring action for a period of two years, subject to renewal,
in order to prevent low priority individuals from being removed from the United States.
ICE is instructed to use its Office of the Public Advocate to permit individuals who
believe they meet the above criteria to identify themselves through a clear and efficient
process.
ICE is directed to begin implementing this process within 60 days of the date of this
memorandum.
ICE is also instructed to immediately begin the process of deferring action against
individuals who meet the above criteria whose cases have already been identified through
the ongoing review of pending cases before the Executive Office for Immigration
Review.

3. With respect to the individuals who are not currently in removal proceedings and meet the
above criteria, and pass a background check:
•

USCIS should establish a clear and efficient process for exercising prosecutorial
discretion, on an individual basis, by deferring action against individuals who meet the

2

•
•

above criteria and are at least 15 years old, for a period of two years, subject to renewal,
in order to prevent low priority individuals from being placed into removal proceedings
or removed from the United States.
The USCIS process shall also be available to individuals subject to a final order of
removal regardless of their age.
US CIS is directed to begin implementing this process within 60 days of the date of this
memorandum.

For individuals who are granted deferred action by either ICE or USCIS, USCIS shall accept
applications to determine whether these individuals qualify for work authorization during this
period of deferred action.
This memorandum confers no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship.
Only the Congress, acting through its legislative authority, can confer these rights. It remains for
the executive branch, however, to set forth policy for the exercise of discretion within the
framework of the existing law. I have done so here.

~jJz~

3