McClure Family Limited Partnership et al v. Texas Legal Apps, LLC et al

Filing 1

COMPLAINT against All Defendants (Filing fee $ 350 receipt number 0541-9770549) filed by McClure Family Limited Partnership, JMP Interests, L.P. d/b/a Jones McClure Publishing. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Easterby, Edwin)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
McCLURE FAMILY
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, and
JMP INTERESTS, L.P. d/b/a
JONES McCLURE PUBLISHING
Plaintiff,

v.
TEXAS LEGAL APPS, LLC,
TEXAS LEGAL APPS, INC.,
TEXAS-LEGAL-APPS,
JONATHAN J. PAULL,
ALEX TORRY,
RICHARD MCNAIRY, and
DOES 1-5
Defendants.

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ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

EXHIBIT A

CASE NO. _ _ __

WILLIAMS. KHERKHER
01 COUNSEL
Nedllarnett
R.be" C. Knehm

E.ARMISTEAD EASTERBY
Attorney at Law
Direct 713-230-2308

[e-mail]

May 1, 2012

Via Facsimile [phone] &
Certified Mail. RRR No. 7005 1160 0001 96044873
Mr. Jonathan j. Paull, President
Alex Torry, Chief Operating Officer
Richard McNairy, Chief Financial Officer
Push Legal
The Commercial Bank Building
917 Franklin, Suite 250
Houston, Texas 77002

Re:

Copyright work of McClure F.L.P.

Dear Mr. Paull:
This law firm represents McClure Family Limited Partnership ("McClure F.L.P.")
with regard to potential claims against Jonathan j. Paull, Alex Torry, Richard McNairy, Push
Legal, Texas Legal Apps, LL[, and Texas Legal Apps, Inc. (collectively referred to as "Push
Legal"). If Push Legal is represented by counsel, please direct this letter to your attorney
and have your attorney notify us of such representation.
We are writing to notify you that your unlawful copying of McClure F.L.P.'s various
copyrighted works, which are specified below, infringe on our client's copyrights.
Accordingly, Push Legal is hereby directed to
CEASE AND DESIST ALL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT.

McClure F.L.P. is the owner of the following copyrighted works, amongst others.
The following is a list of McClure F.L.P.'s copyrighted works that have been copied by Push
Legal (according to our current analysis):

Williams Kherkher Hart Boundas, IlP + 8441 Gulf Freeway, Suite 600 • Houston, Texas 77017·5051
713·230·2200 • 1-800·220·9341 + Fax 713·643-6226 + williamskherkher.com

No.

1.
2.

Book Name
O'Connor's Federal Rules * Civil Trials
O'Connor's Texas Criminal Codes Plus

3.

O'Connor's Texas Rules * Civil Trials

4.

O'Connor's Federal Criminal Rules & Codes Plus

5.

O'Connor's Federal Rules * Civil Trials

6.

O'Connor's Family Code Plus

7.

O'Connor's Probate Code Plus

8.

O'Connor's Business & Commerce Code Plus

9.

O'Connor's CPRC Plus

10. O'Connor's Property Code Plus
11. O'Connor's Business Organizations Code Plus
12. O~Connor's California Practice * Civil Pretrial

Editionfs)

2010
2009
2010
2010
2011
2010
2011
2009
2010
2011
2009
2010
2008
2009
2010
2011
2008
2009
2010
2010
2010
2011

It has come to our attention that Push Legal has been copying McClure F.L.P:s
above-described copyrighted works. We have undertaken to preserve each and every page
containing evidence of impermissible copying from Push Legal's various e-books to
preserve as evidence. Your actions constitute copyright infringement in violation of United
States copyright laws. Under 17 U.s.c. § 504(c)(1), the consequences of copyright
infringement include, at the Court's discretion, statutory damages of between $750 and
$30,000 per work, and damages of $150,000 per work for willful infringement. If you
continue to engage in copyright infringement after receiving this missive, your continued
actions will be evidence of willful infringement.
McClure F.L.P. has spent millions of dollars and, countless bours creating the
aforementioned books. Each book includes thousands of case annotations, each of which
was independently authored by a McClure EL.P, employee. Each book, therefore, includes
McClure F.L.P:s selection and arrangement of statutes, rules, case law, and many other
resources. These works are protected from infringement under 17 U.S.c. § SOl.
As you are no doubt aware, the United States copyright laws reserves to the owner
of the copyright the exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work, prepare derivative
works from the original, and distribute copies of the work and derivative works. 17 U.S,C. §
106(1)-(3). If Push Legal wants to engage in any of these acts, it must first obtain a license
to do so, which it has not done.
Moreover, Push Legal cannot claim that its conduct is protected by § 109(a) of the
Copyright Act under the "first sale doctrine." That provision allows the owner of a
"particular copy . .. lawfully made under this title" to sell that particular copy. It does not

allow Push Legal to make another copy and sell it. See Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque
A.RT. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9 th Cir. 1988)(holding the right to transfer [under the first
sale doctrine1applies only to the particular copy of the book purchased and nothing else).
We have undertaken a forensic investigation and review of the follOwing Push Legal
e-books, and have found conclusive evidence of copying with regard to the following:
Push Le!'al E-Book
California Evidence Code
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure
Fed';{;al Rules of Evidence
(Civil
Federal Rules of Evidence
(Criminal)

Texas Business & Commerce
Code
Texas Business Organizations
Code
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies
Code
Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure
Texas Family Code

McClure P.L.P. Book
O'Connor's California Practice *
Civil Pretrial
O'Connor's Federal Rules * Civil
Trials
O'Connor's Federal Criminal
Rules & Codes Plus
O'Connor's Federal Rules' Civil
Trials
O'Connor's Federal Criminal
Rules & Codes Plus; and
O'Connor's Federal Rules' Civil
Trials
O'Connor's Business &
Commerce Code Plus
O'Connor's Business
Organizations Code Plus
O'Connor's CPRC Plus
O'CDnnor's Texas Criminal
CDdes Plus
O'CDnnor's Family Code Plus

Texas Health & Safety Code

O'Connor's Texas Criminal
Codes Plus

Texas Penal Code

O'Connor's Texas Climinal

Texas Probate Code

Codes Plus
O'Connor's Probate Code Plus

Texas Property CDde

O'Connor's·Property Code Plus

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure

O'Connor's Texas Rules * Civil
Trials
O'Connor's Texas Criminal
Codes Plus
O'Connor's Texas Criminal
Codes Plus

Texas Rules of Civil Evidence,
[Criminall
Texas Transportation Code
Title 7, subtitle B, ch, 524
Title 7, subtitle C, ch. 550, suhch. B
Title 7,.subtitie J, ch, 724

No. of Copied Annotations
299, or about 45% of Push
Legal's Annotations
286, or about 62% of Push
Legal's Annotations
369, or about 58% of Push
Legal's Annotations
73, or about 43% of Push
Legal's Annotations
139, or about 67% of Push
Legal's Annotations

413, orabout40% of Push
Legal's Annotations
292, or about 79% of Push
Le~'s Annotations
810,orabout51% of Push
Legal's Annotations
740, or about 67% of Push
Legal's Annotations
780, Dr about 55% of Push
Legal's Annotations
59, or about 70% of Push
Legal's Annotati.ons
309, or about 56% of Push
Legal's Annotations
653, or about 73% .of Push
Legal's Annotations
564, or about 68% of Push
Legal's Annotations
530, or about 39% of Push
Le~'s Annotations
68, or about 53% of Push
Le.ga!'s Annotations
SO, or about 50% of Push
Legal's Annotations

J

It appears that Push Legal, rather than authoring an independent work, has chosen instead
to engage' in wholesale copying of McClure F.L.P.'s books, Push Legal has copied McClure
F.L.P.'s format and usage of case annotations as an expression of how various courts have
analyzed and interpreted various statutes and rules. Further, we have amassed literally
hundreds of examples where the Push Legal case annotation is identical to the McClure

F.L.P. annotation. As demonstrated above, Push Legal has copied thousands of McClure
F.L.P. annotations, and in most cases well over 50% of the Push Legal e-book is comprised
of copied McClure F.L.P. content
We have .attached side-by-side comparisons to further demonstrate Push Legal's
copying. As demonstrated in the attached materials, there can be no question that Push
Legal simply copied McClure F.L.P.'s copyrighted books. 1 It defies logic and reason to
believe that Push Legal would have independently selected the exact same cases for its
annotations. It is further beyond belief that Push Legal would have summarized these
cases, many of which are 30-40 pages in length, with the exact same quoted materials or
summaries. In many instances we have found that Push Legal even copied string-cites and
internal McClure F.L.P. editorial practices, such as replacing party names with bracketed
identifiers. Most of the Push Legal annotations even include McClure F.L.P.'s exact use of
ellipses and punctuation.
We therefore demand that you immediately: (i) cease and desist your unlawful
copying of McClure F.L.P.'s copyrighted works; (ii) remove the aforementioned Push Legal
e-books from the Apple App Store, the Google App Store and the Blackberry App Store (and
otherwise remove them from any other website or means of sale whatsoever); (iii) remove
the aforementioned Push Legal books from your customer accounts, or take steps to ensure
that such customers can no longer access the infringing e-books; (iv) remove,the following
web address: 69.164.202.37; and (iv) destroy the above-referenced Push Legal e-books
and return to McClure F.L.P: any unauthorized reproductions of McClure F.L.P.'s
copyrighted works that are in your possession, custody, and/or controJ.2 Please provide us
with a written assnrance within seven (7) days from the date you receive this letter that
you will comply with each of their directives.
We also request that Push Legal, and its affiliates, employees, and third-party
contractors (induding Mobisoft Infotech), preserve and maintain all documents (whether
stored electronically or in hard copy) relating to the development, creation, and/or
publication of the aforementioned Push Legal e-books.
If you do not comply with this cease and desist demand within this time period,
McClure F.L.P. is entitled to use your noncompliance as evidence of willful infringement
and will file an action in federal court seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief
(including a temporary and permanent injunction). McClure F.L.P. has asked us to
communicate to you that it will seek all available legal remedies, including statutory
damages, actual damages, court costs, attorney's fees, and special damages for willful
infringement
McClure F.L.P. will also pursue its remedies against individuals who are vicariously
liable for Push Legal's copyright infringement, including any individuals who control Push
1 It also appears that most, if not alL of Push Legal's other annotations were copied from
other copyrighted materials owned by third parties.
2 This includes Mobisoft Infotech.

Legal's actions, and who derive a direct financial benefit from the direct infringement. See
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007).
These matters are of the utmost importance to McClure F.L.P. If Push Legal
continues to violate McClure F.L.P:s rights under United States copyright law, we assure
you that we will immediately pursue all available legal remedies. We hope that you will
respect McClure F.L.P.'srights and that we will not be required to take such action.

Regards,

Edwin Armistead "Armi" Easterby

cc:

Hon: Michol O'Connor

Attachment

Side by Side

Comparisons

O'Connor's Crinllnal Codes Plus (2010~11)
Code of Criminal Procedure art. 42.12

PUSH: legal App
Code of Criminal Procedure art. 42.12

In re Hall, 989 S.W.2d 786, 789
(Tex.App.-Waco 1999, no pet.).

hl re Hall, 989 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex.
App. Waco 1999)

"[D] argues that Respondent's orders
suspending his sentence Iand placing him
into boot-camp program] are void
because they were entered outside the 75to 90-day [now 75~ to ISO-day] statutory
window. [~ The boot camp statute
provides a 75- to 90-day [now 75-to
ISO-day] window. The Court of Criminal
Appeals has interpreted a similar window
under the former shock probation statute
to require the sentencing court to act
solely within that window. We believe
that the boot camp statute should be
similarly applied."

[D] argues that Respondent's orders
suspending his sentence [and placing him
into boot-camp program] are void
because they were entered outside the 75to 90-day [now 75- to ISO-day] statutory
window. The boot camp statute
provides a 75- to 90-day [now 75- to
ISO-day] window. The Court of Criminal
Appeals has interpreted a sinrilar window
under the former shock probation statute
to require the sentencing court to act
solely within that window. We believe
that the boot camp statute should be
similarly applied.

JMP Expression
•

JMP selected this' case to annotate.

•

JMP began its annotation by replacing the defendant's proper name, Hall, with a bracketed "D" .
for "defendant."

•

JMP added the information in the second set of brackets to give the reader relevant context
that does not appear here in the court's opinion. This change makes the annotation easier to
understand.

•

JMP added the information in the third set of brackets to inform the reader that the statutory
time frame referenced by the court changed after this opinion was issued.

•

JMP added the bracketed paragraph symbol to indicate that the quoted language following the
paragraph symbol was taken from a different paragraph on the same page of the court's
opinion. This helps the reader locate the quoted language in the opinion.

•

JMP deleted from its annotation an Id. citation used in the court's opinion. This makes the
annotation more concise and easlerto read.

•

JMP provided a jump cite in the case citation to help the reader locate the quoted language in
the opinion. PL is inconsistent in how it formats case citations and infrequently provides jump
cites.

CPRC Plus (2009-10)
CPRC §14.004

PUSH: legal App
CPRC §14.004

III re Taylor, 28 S.W.3d240, 247
(Tex.App.-Waco 2000), disapproved on
other grounds, In re :?.L.T., 124 S.W.3d
163 (Tex.2003).

Inre Taylor, 28 S.W.3d 240, 247 (Tex.
App. - Waco 2000) disapproved on other
grounds, In re z.L.T., 124 S. W.3d 163
(Tex. 2003).

"[T]he provisions of[CPRC] ch. 14 .. ,
regarding inmate litigation apply 'only to
a suit brought by an inmate in a district,
county, justice of the peace, or small
claims court.' Therefore, because this is
an original proceeding filed in a court of
appeals, the declaration of previous
litigation mandated by § 14.004 is not
required." See also Nabelek v. Garrett, 94
S.W.3d 648,649 (Tex.App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2002, pet. dism'd).

[T]he provisions of [CPRC] ch. 14 ...
regarding inmate litigation apply only to
a suit brought by an inmate in a district,
county, justice of the peace, or small
claims court." Therefore, because this is
an original proceeding filed in a court of
appeals, the declaration of previous
litigation mandated by §14.004 is not
required. See also Nabelek v. Garrett, 94
S. W.3d 648, 649 (Tex. App. - Houston
[14th Dist.j 2002, pet. dism'd).

JMP Expression
•
•

JMP selected this case to annotate.
JMP bracketed the first letter of the first word in its annotation to indicate that the annotation
begins in the middle of the sentence found in the court's opinion.

•

JMP used the second set of brackets to give the reader relevant context that does not appear
here in the court's opinion. This change makes the annotation easier to understand.

•

JMP abbreviated "chapter," which is spelled out in the quoted portion of court's opinion, to
flCh.1.I to make the annotation mOre concise.

•

JMP uses the ellipsis to indicate that text has been deleted from the quoted sentence.

•

JMP abbreviated the word "section," which is spelled out in the quoted portion of court's
opinion, to a section symbol "§." This was done to make the annotation more concise.

•

JMP deleted from its annotation a citation used by the court in its opinion; this change makes
the annotation more concise and easier to read.

•

JMP selected an additional relevant case for the reader to consider and appended its citation
to the end of the annotation. The Nabelek case is not referenced in the In re Taylor opinion.

•

JMP formats the case citations for both the annotated case and the case at the end of the
annotation uniformly and includes jump cites to help the reader locate the quoted language
from the opinions. Although PL is inconsistent in how it formats case citations and
infrequently provides jump cites, both PL's case citations here are identical to JMP's citations.

PUSH:legal
Family Code §232.009

O'Connor's Family Code Plus (2010-11)
Family Code §232.009

In Fe c.G., 261 S.W.3d 842, 850 (Tex.App.-·-DalIas 2008,
no pet.).

IN RE CG, 261 SW 3d 842 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2008, no
pet.)

"Mother. .. argues ... that Father failed to appear at 'the
scheduled heariug[l' .... Therefore, ... under §232.009 the
trial court properly cousidered the allegatious of the
petitiou for suspension to be admitted pursuaut to
§232.009, and did not abuse its discretion in rendering the
license sUBpension order, ['Ill We disagree .... At 851:
Although it appears Father did not request a hearing at all
[, he] states that Mother noticed a hearing on the motion
for suspension of license ... , which Mother does not
dispute. Accordingly, it was not necessary that Father
request a hearing to avoid the default procedure under
§232.009. [11 Mother ... asserts Father's failure to appear
in person at the hearing authorizes the court to proceed
under §232.009 even though his attorney did appear aud
participate in the hearing. [11 [Wle decline to hold that a
court may proceed under §232.009 when the person whose
license is sought to be suspended appears at a scheduled

Mother ... argues ... that Father failed to appear at 'the
scheduled hearingO' ... Therefore ... ,under §232.009 the
trial court properly considered the allegations of the
petition for suspension to be admitted pursuant to §
232.009, aud did not abuse its discretion in rendering the
license suspension order.

We disagree ...
Although it appears Father did not request a hearing at all
[, he,] states that Mother noticed a hearing on the motion
for suspension of license ... which Mother does not dispute.
Accordingly; it was not necessary that Father request a
hearing to avoid the default procedure under §232.009.
Mother. .. asserts Father's failure to appear in person at the
hearing authorizes the court to proceed under §232.009
even though his attorney did appear aud participate in the
hearing.

hearing through his attorney of record."

[WJe decline to hold that a court may proceed under
§232.009 when the person whose license is sought to be
suspended appears at a scheduled hearing through his
attorney of record.

Expression
o

JMP selected this case to annotate.

o

JMP used three-dot ellipses throughout the annotation to indicate that text was deleted from the quoted sentences.
JMP used a four-dot ellipsis to indicate that the end of the quoted sentence has been deleted.

o

JMP used the first set of double brackets to indicate that a comma had been deleted from the quoted sentence. In the
context of the annotation, the comma is no longer grammaticalfy correct.

o

o

JMP added bracketed paragraph symbols throughout the .annotation to indicate that the quoted language following the

paragraph symbol was taken from a different paragraph on the same page of the court's opinion. This helps the reader
locate the quoted language in the opinion.
JMP placed double quotation marks around its entire annotation to indicate that the language is quoted from the
court's opinion; consequently JMP also changed any quotations marks within the court's opinion to single quotation
marks.

o

JMP abbreviated the word "section," which is spelled out five times in the quoted portion of the opinion, to a section
symbol It§." This is done to make the annotation more concise.

•

JMP used "At 851:" to indicate a change in jump cite, so the reader can locate the quoted language in the opinion.

o

JMP used the second set of brackets to indicate that language from the court's opinion was deleted and to replace
J~Father"

o

with the pronoun "he. 1I

JMP used the third set of brackets to capitalize the

"w" in "[W]e" to indicate that the annotated sentence begins in the

middle of the sentence found in the court's opinion.

O'Connor's Probate Code Plus (2008-09)
Probate Code §41

PUSH: legal App
Probate Code §41

(Tex.App.-San Antonio 1964, writ rerd).

Simon v. Dibble, 380 SW 2d 898 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1964, writ redd)

Can "an insane hnsband who shoots and kills
his wife ... receive the proceeds of insurance
policies taken ant by her with him as
beneficiary, and [can he] inherit her share of
the connntinity property[7)" Held: Yes.

[AJn insane husband who shoots and kills his
wife ... receive the proceeds of insurance
policies taken out by her with him as
beneficiary, and [can he] inherit her share of
the community property. [7]" Help: Yes.

Simon v. Dibble, 380 S.W.2d 898, 899

JMP Expression
•

JMP selected this case to annotate.

•

The first word of this annotation is not a quotation from the court's opinion; instead, JMP
created a one-word lead-in .to present the issue in the form of a questioh. This is a concise
presentation that is easy for the reader to understand. PL mistakenly left off the lead-in word
when copying this annotation, so the question framework does not make sense in the PL
annotation.

•

JMP used the ellipsis to indicate that text has beendeleted from the sentence.

•

JMP used the first set of brackets to replace a word in the case with language that furthers the
question format of the annotation. The language in the brackets does not appear in the
court's opinion.

•

JMP used the second set of brackets to insert a question mark to facilitate the question format
of the annotation.

•

The last two words ofthe annotation do not appear in the court's opinion; instead, JMP gave a
one-word holding statement in answer to the question posed by the annotation.

•

Note that PL mistakenly typed "Help" instead of "Held" when copying this annotation.

0' Connor's Criminal Codes Plus (2010-11)
Code of Criminal Procednre art. 42.02

PUSH: legal App
Code of Criminal Procedure art. 42.02

Carroll v. State, 42 S.W.3d 129, 133
(Tex.Crim.App.2001). '

Can'oll v. State, 42 S.W.3d 129, 133
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001)

"[A]fier Mitchell [v. United States, 526
U.S. 314 (1999)], [we cannot conclude]
that the trial court may consider
invocation by appellant of her federal
constitutional right to silence as a
circumstance against her whcn
determining her punishment."

[A]frer Mitchell [v. United States, 526
U.S. 314 (1999)], [we cannot conclude]
that the trial court may consider
invocation by appellant of her federal
constitutional right to silence as a
circnrnstaoce against her when
determining her punishment.

JMP Expression

•

JMP selected this case to annotate.

•

JMP bracketed the first letter of the first word in its annotation to indicate that the annotation
begins in the middle ofthe sentence found in the court's opinion.

•

JM? added the information in the second set of brackets to provide the reader with the full
citation of the case being referenced by the court. The citation does not appear here in the I'
opinion.

•

JMP added the information in the third set of brackets to make the annotation more concise
and easierto understand.

•

JM? provided a jump cite in the case citation of the annotated opinion to help the reader
locate the quoted language from the opinion. PL is inconsistent in how it formats case
citations and infrequently provides jump cites.

I

O'Connor's California Practice * Civil Pretrial2011
California Evidence Code §356

PUSH: legal App
California Evidence Code §356

Leboire v. Royce (Ist Dist. 1950) 100
CaLApp.2d 610, 619.

Leboire v. Royce, (Is' Dist. 1950) 100 Cal.
App. 2d 610

"Once [D-purchaser] saw fit to place a part
of the conversation before the court, [Pbroker], under [CCP §1854, now Evid.
Code §356], was legally entitled to bring
out the balance of the conversation. [Dpurchaser] was obyjously trying to create
the impression that [p-broker] was trying to
collect improperly from both [D-purchaser]
and [third-party supplier] without [DpurchaSer's] knowledge."

Once [D-purchaser] saw fit to place a part
of the conversation before the court, [Pbroker], under [CCP §1854, now Eyjd.
Code §356], was legally entitled to bring
out the balaoce of the conversation, [Dpurchaser] was obviously trying to create
the impression that [P-broker] was trying to
collect improperly from both [Dcpurchaser]
aod [third-party supplier] without [Dpurchaser's] knowledge.

JMP Expression
•

JMP selected this case to annotate.

•

JMP used brackets throughout the annotation to replace the generic party names used in the
court's opinion with more informative name5.

o
o
o
•

The word "Appellant" and the appellant's proper name, "Royce," were replaced with
." [D-purchaser] ,"
The proper name "Leboire" was replaced with "[P-broker]."
The proper name "Davis" was replaced with "[third-party supplier]."

JMP also used brackets in this annotation to replace the court's reference to "this section" with
the actual code section and. to further inform the reader that the code section was recodified
under the Evidence Code after the opinion was issued .
.

O'Connor's Criminal Codes Plus (2010-11)
Code of Criminal Procedure art. 40.00 I

PUSH: legal App
Code of Criminal Procedure art. 40.001

Keeter v. State, 74 S.W.3d 31, 38
(Tex.Crim.App.2002).

Keeterv. State, 74 S.W.3d 31,38 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002)

With respect to evidence of recantation,
in denying a motion for new trial based
on newly discovered evidence, "the trial
court acts within its discretion so long as
the record provides some basis for
disbelieving the testimony. Such bases
include, but are not limited to: evidence
that the recanting witness was subject to
pressure by family members or to threats
from co-conspirators, evidence showing
part of the recantation to be false,
circumstances showing that the
complainant recanted after moving in
with family members of the defendant,
and where an accomplice recants after
being convicted."

With respect to evidence of recantation,
in denying a motion for new trial based
on newly discovered evidence, "the trial
court acts ",o.trun its discretion so long as
the record provides some basis for
disbelieving the testimony. Such bases
include, but are not limited to: evidence
that the recanting witness was subj ect to
pressure by family members or to threats
from co-conspirators, evidence showing
part of the recantation to be false,
circumstances showing that the
complainant recanted after moving in
with family members of the defendant,
and where an accomplice recants after
being convicted."

JMP Expression
•

JMP selected this case to annotate.

•

The beginning of this annotation is not a quotation from the court's opinion; instead, JMP
drafted a lead-in phrase to make the annotation more concise and easier to read.

•

JMP deleted from its annotation four footnote references used in the court's opinion. This
makes the annotation more concise and easier to read.

•

JM? provided a jump cite in the case citation to help the reader locate the quoted language in
the opinion. PL is inconsistent in how it formats case citations and infrequently provides jump
cites.

PUSH: legal App
Penal Code §37.02

O'Connor's Criminal Codes Plus (2010-11)
Penal Code §37.02

State v. Salinas, 982 S.W.2d 9,11-12
(Tex.App.-Houston [1 st Dist.J1997, pet.

State v. Salinas, 982 S.W.2d 9, 11-12
(Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1997)

..

~~.

"[T]he Election Code provides: 'This code
supersedes a conflicting statute outside this
code unless this code or the outside statute
expressly provides otherwise.' Because
neither the Election Code nor the perjury
statute expressly provides otherwise, the
Election Code supersedes the perjury
statute." Held: Prosecution for inaccurate
contribution and expenditure reports must
be conducted under Election Code.

The Election Code Provides: "This code
supersedes a conflicting statute outside this
code unless this code or the outside statute
expressly provides otherwise." Because
neither the Election Code not the perjury
statute expressly provides otherwise, the
Election Code supersedes the perjury
statute. Held: Prosecution for inaccurate
contribution and expenditure reports must
be conducted under Election Code.

JMP Expression
•

JMP selected this case to annotate.

•

JMP bracketed the first letter of the first word in its annotation to indicate that the annotation
begins in the middle of the sentence found in the court's opinion.

•

JM? deleted from its annotation a citation used in the court opinion. This deletion makes the
annotation more concise and easier to read.

•

The last sentence is not a quotation from the court's opinion; instead, JMP summarized the
holding of the case for the reader.

•

JMP provided a jump cite in the case citation to help the reader locate the quoted language in
the court's opinion. ?l is inconsistent in how it formats case citations and infrequently provides
jump cites.
.

CPRC Plus (2009-10)
CPRC §16.035

Palmer v. Palmer, 831 S.W.2d 479, 48082 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ).
Held: The statnte of limitations that
applies to an action on an installment note
secured by a deed of trust on real property
is CPRe §16.035 (not CPRC §16.004,
which applies to installment notes that are
not secured). Under § 16.035, the fouryear statnte begins to run on the entire
debt when the fmal installment becomes
due in a suit seeking foreclosure on the
deed of trust and order of sale. Unpaid
installments due more than four years
before that suit are not barred by
limitations. See also McLemore v. Pacific
Sw. Bank, 872 S.W.2d 286,292-93
(Tex.App.-Texarkana 1994, writ
dism'd).

PUSH: legal App
CPRe §16.035
Palmer v. Palmer, 831 SW 2d 479,480-82
(Tex. App .. Texarkana 1992, no writ)
Held: The statute oflimitations that
applies to an action on an Installment note
secured by a deed of trust on real property
is CPRC §16.035 (not CPRe §16.004,
which applies to installment notes that are
not secured). Under § 16.035, the fouryear statnte begins to run on the entire
debt when the final installment becomes
due in a suit seeking foreclosure on the
deed of trust and order of sale. Unpaid
. iristallments due more than four years
before that suit are not barred by
limitations. See also :McLemore v. Paciic
Sw. Bank, 872 S. W2d 286, 292-93 (rex.
App. - Texarkcma 1994, writ dism 'd).

JMP Expression
•

JMP selected this case to annotate.

•

This annotation is not a quotation from the court's opinion; instead, it is JMP's summary of the
court's holding. JMP summarizes a holding only when the actual language of a case will not
make a good explanation of the law---no matter how it is pieced together.

•

JMP selected an additional relevant case for the reader to consider and appended the citation
to the end of its annotation. The Mclemore case is not referenced in the Palmer opinion.

•

JMP's case citations for both the annotated case and the case at the end of the annotation are
formatted uniformly and include jump cites to help the reader locate the quoted language
from the opinion. Although Pl is inconsistent in how it formats case citations and infrequently
provides jump cites, both of PL's case citations here mirror JMP's citations and include the
same multi-paged jump cites.

O'Connor's Criminal Codes Plus (2010-11)
Code of Criminal Procedure art. 2.132

PUSH: legal App
Code of Criminal Procedure art. 2.132

Ex parte Brooks, 97 S.W.3d 639,640
(Tex.App.-W~o 2002, orig.
proceeding) .

Ex parte Brooks, 97 S.W.3d 639, 640
(Tex.App. Waco 2002)

/

Held: D's pretrial application for writ of
habeas corpus denied because he had an
adequate remedy at law. He couId assert
his racial-profiling claims in a motion to
suppress.

Held: D's pretrial application for writ of
habeas corpus denied because he had an
adequate remedy at law. He eouId assert
his racial-profiling claims in a motion to
suppress.

JMP Expression
•

JMP selected this case to annotate.

•

This annotation is not a quotation from the court's opinion; instead, it is JMP's summary of the
court's holding. JMP summarizes a holding only when the actual language of a case will not
make a good explanation of the law-no matter how it is pieced together.

•

JMP used the letter "D" in place ofthe defendant's proper name, Brooks.

•

JMP provided a jump cite in the case citation to help the reader locate the quoted language in
the opinion. PL is inconsistent in how it formats case citations and infrequently provides jump

cites.

CPRC Plus (2009-10)
CPRC §15.011

PUSH: legal App
CPRC §15.011

KJ Eastwood Invs. v. Enlow, 923 S.W.2d
255,257 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996,
orig. proceeding).

KJ Eastwood Investments, Inc. v. Enlow,

"[M]andatory venue provisions are
inapplicable where the action in question
involves title only incidentally or
secondarily, and not directly." See also
Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Bridges,
889 S.W.2d 17,18-19 (Tex.App.Eastland 1994, writ denied) (title to land
was only incidentally involved in suit);
Scarth v. First Bank & Trust Co., 711
S.W.2d 140, 142-43 (Tex.App.-Amarillo
1986, no writ) (suit attempting to fix lien
on real property did not directly involve
title).

[M]andatory venue provisions are
inapplicable where the action in question
involves title only incidentally or
secondarily, and not directly .... See also
Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Bridges,
889 S. W2d 17, 18-19 (rex. App. Eastland 1994, writ denied) (title to land
was only incidentally involved in suit);
Scarth v. First Bank & Trust Co., 711
S. W 2d 140, 142-43 (rex. App. - Amarillo
1986, no writ) (suit attempting to fix lien
on real property did not directly involve
title).

923 SW 2d 255,257 (Tex. App. - Fort
Worth 1996, orig. proceeding)

JMP Expression
•

JMP selected this case to annotate.

•

JMP bracketed the first letter of the first word in its annotation to indicate that the annotation
begins in the middle ofthe sentence found in the court's opinion.

•

JMP selected two additional relevant cases for the reader to consider and appended the
citations for each to the end of the annotation. For each citation, JMP provided original
parentheticals to help the reader understand the relevance of the opinions. The SCQrth caSe is
discussed in KJ Eastwood, Inc., but the Midland case is not.

•

JMP's case dtations for the annotated opinion and both appended opinions are formatted
uniformly and include jump pages to help the reader locate the quoted language in the
opinions. Although Pl is inconsistent in how it formats case citations and infrequently provides
jump cites, all three of Pl's case citations here mirror JMP's citations and include jump cites.

O'Connor's Business Organization Code Plus (2010-11)
BOC §9.202

PUSH: legal App
BOC §9.202

Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).

Conner v. Conti Carriers and Terminals,
944 SW 2d 405 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1997, no writ).

"[W]e find that a foreign corporation
cannot logically enjoy the same privileges
as a domestic corporation nn1ess it
actually does business in the state. A
foreign corporation seeking to do business
in Texas must obtain a certificate of
authority and must appoint an agent for
service or otherwise have the secretary of .
state automatically become its agent for
service. A foreign corporation, however,
cannot voluntarily consent to jurisdiction
by compliance with the Texas registration
statute unless it is actually' doing
business' in Texas. By registering to do
business, a foreign corporation only
potentially subjects itselfto jurisdiction."
But see Goldman v. Pre-Fab Transit Co.,
this page.

[W]e find that a foreign corporation
cannot logically enjoy the same privileges
as a domestic corporation unless it
actually does business in the state. A
foreign corporation seeking to do business
in Texas must obtain a certificate of
authority and must appoint an agent for
service or otherwise have the secretary of
state automatically become its agent for
service. A foreign corporation, however,
cannot voluntarily consent to jurisdiction
by compliance with the Texas registration
statute unless it is actually "doing
business" in Texas. By registering to do
business, a foreign corporation only
potentially subjects itselfto jurisdiction.
But see Goldman v. Pre-Fab Transit Co.,
this page.

Conner v. ContiCarriers & Terminals,
Inc., 944 S.W.2d405, 416 (Tex.App.~

1M P Expression
o

JMP selected this case to annotate.

o

JMP brackets the first letter of the first word in its annotation to indicate that the annotation
begins in the middle of the sentence found in the court's opinion.

o

At the end of the annotated case, JMP cross references the reader to a contrary opinion that it
also annotates. Because the annotation appears on the same page, JMP uses the following
format: "But see ... this page." PL is an electronic app (with no pages). so its use of this same
format makes no sense.

CPRC Plus (2009-10)
CPRC §IS.002

PUSH: legal App
CPRC §15.002

Moveforfree.com, Inc. v. DavidHetrick, Inc.,
_
S.W.3d _ (Tex.App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2009, n.p.h.) (No. 14-07-00044-CV; 521-09).

Moveforfree.com, Inc. v. David Hetrick, Inc.,
S.W.3d _ (Tex. App. - Houston [14th
Dist.] 2009, n.p.h.) (No. 14-07-00044-CV; 521-09)

"In assessing venue under §15.002(aXI), we
analyze whether the evidence shows that the

[fJn assessing venue under §15.002(a)(1), we
analyze whether the evidence shows that the
actions or omissions at issue are materially
connected to the cause of action. See KW
Constr., 165 S.W.3d at 882; Chiriboga v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 96 S.W.3d 673, 680
(Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.). More than
one county can coustitute a county in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred. Velasco,
144 S.W.3d at 634-35; S. County Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Ochoa, 19 S.W.3d 452, 457-59 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.). Thus, our
initial inquiry is whether the defendant
challenging venue under this provision proved
there was no substantial counection between
the plaintiffs claim and chosen county, not
whether it proved a substantial connection to
the defendant's alternative choice. See
Velasco, 144 S. W.3d at 632, 635 (Tex. App. _
Dallas 2004, pet. denied). In other words, if
both counties at issue would be appropriate
venue choices, the plaintiff's choice controls.
See KWConstr., 165 S.W.3d at 879;
Unauthorized Practice ofLaw Comm v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co" 155 S.W.3d 590,
596 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet.
denied).

actions or omissions at issue are materially
connected to the cause of action. More than .
one county can constitute a county in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred. Thus, our
initial inquiry is whether the defendant
challenging venue under this provision proved
there was no substantial connection between
the plaintiffs claim and chosen county, not
whether it proved a substantial connection to
the defendant's alternative choice. In other
words, if both counties at issue would be
appropriate venue choices, the plaintiff's
choice controls." See also Velasco v. Texas
Kenworth Co., 144 S.W.3d 632, 635
(Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet denied).

JMP Expression
•

JMP selected this case to annotate.

•

JMP used its unique case citation format for opinions that have not yet been reported. This
format includes both the docket number and the date the opinion was issued, so readers are
not restricted to using lexis or Westlaw numbers when locating the case.

•

JMP abbreviated the word "section," which is spelled out in the quoted portion of the court's
opinion, to a section symbol "§." This is done to make the annotation more concise.

•

JMP deleted from its annotation five citations used by the court in its opinion; this makes the
annotation more concise and easier to read.

O'Connor's Family Code Plus (2010-11)
Family Code §153.257

PUSH: legal App
Family Code §153.257

.

In re MA.s., 233 S.W.3d 915,922-23
(Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied).

In re MAS, 233 SW 3d 915 (Tex. App.Dallas 2007, pet. denied)

"When specifying a means of travel, even
if optional, the trial court must specify the
duties of the conservators to provide
transportation to and from [, in this case,]
the airport. The trial court's notice
provision [requiring timely, written notice
between parents] is merely part of those
duties. It is prudent to require written
notice when flight numbers and flight
times are involved."

When specifying a means of travel, even
if optional, the trial court must specify the
duties of the conservators to provide
transportation to and from [, in the case,]
the airport. The trial court's notice
provision [requiring timely, written notice
between parents] is merely part of those
duties. It is prudent to require written
notice when flight numbers and flight
times are involved.

JMP Expression
•
•

JMP selected this case to annotate.
JMP added the information in both the first and second set of brackets to give the reader
relevant context that does not appear in these sentences in the court's opinion. These
changes make the annotation easier to read and understand.

•

JMP deleted from its annotation one citation used by the court in its opinion; this makes the
annotation more concise and easier to read.

O'Connor's Business Organization Code Plus (2010-11)
BOC §5.053

PUSH: legal App
BOC §S.053

Ergon, Inc. v. Dean, 649 S.W.2d 772,
774 (Tex.App.-Anstin 1983, no writ).

Ergon, Inc. v. Dean, 649 SW 2d 772 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1983, no writ).

"[TJhe Secretary [of State] issued rules
outlining the factors to be considered
when making the determination whether a
name is 'deemed similar' to another name.
Currently, the rules propose three
categories of name similarity: (1) same,
(2) deceptively similar, and (3) similar
requiring letter of consent. In addition, the
rules provide a subcategory that, for want
of a better description, we will refer to as
'corporate name not similar requiring
letter of consent.' A violation of these
rules is the functional equivalent of a
violation of the statnte." (Internal quotes
omitted.)

[T]he Secretary issued rules outlining the
factors to be considered when making the
determination whether a name is "deemed
similar" to another name. Currently, the
rules propose three categories of name
similarity: (1) same, (2) deceptively
similar, and (3) similar requiring letter of
consent. In addition, the rules provide a
snbcategory that, for want of a better
description, we will refer to as corporate
name not similar requiring letter of
consent. A violation of these rules is the
functional equivalent of a violation of the
statnte.(Internal quotes omitted.)

JMP Expression
•

JMP selected this case to annotate.

•

JMP brackets the first letter ofthefirst word in its annotation to indicate that the annotation begins in
the middle ofthe sentence found in the court's opinion.

•

JMP adds the information in the second bracket to clarify for the reader which Secretary is being
discussed.

•

JMP deleted from its annotation two citations used in the court opinion; this deletion makes the
annotation more concise and easier to read.

•

JMP has included a parenthetical at the end of the annotation to let the reader know that the
annotation does not include internal quotation marks-a JMP rule when a court uses single quotation
marks in its opinion; this language does not appear in the opinion.

O'Connor's California Practice * Civil Pretrial 2011
California Evidence Code §452

PUSH: legal App.
California Evidence Code§452

Quintana v. Mercury Cos. Co. (1995) 11
CalA th 1049, 1062.

Quintana v. Mercury Casualty Co., (1995)
906 P. 2d 1057

"[D] asks that we take judicial notice [of
statements made by] the author of the bill
[enacting the legislation at issue].
[S]tatements of an individual legislator,
including the author of a bill, are
generally not considered in construing a
statute, as the court's task is to ascertain
the intent of the Legislature as a whole in
adopting a piece oflegislation."

[D] asks that we take judicial notice [of
statements made by] the author of the bill
[enacting the legislation at issue.]
[S]tatements of an individual legislator,
including the author of a bill, are
generally not considered in construing a
statute, as the court's task to ascertain the
intent ofthe Legislature as a whole in
adopting a piece oflegislation.

JMP Expression
•

JMP selected this case to annotate.

•

JMP began its annotation by replacing the defendant's proper name, Mercury, with a
bracketed ((D" for "defendant.#

•

JMP used the second and third set of brackets to give the reader relevant context that does
not appear here in the court's opinion and to indicate that language from the opinion has been
deleted. These changes make the annotation more concise and easier to understand.

•

JMP used the last set of brackets to indicate that the annotated sentence begins in the middle
ofthe sentence found in the court's opinion.

PUSH: legal App
BOC §1l.356
Gomez v. PASADENA HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT, 246 SW 3d 306 (Tex.App.Houston [l4ti1 Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
The first issue in this appeal is whether application of the three-year survival provision of
[TBCA] Art. 7.12 [now BOC §11.356] to a minor's health care liability claim violates the Open
Courts Provision of the Texas Constitution. [parent] contends that [TBCA] Art. 7.12 [now BOC
§ 11.356] effectively cuts off a minor's cause of action against a dissolved corporation before he
is legally able to assert it, in direct violation of [Tex. Const.] art.l, §§13 and 19 .... [Parent]
asserts that [minor] has a well-recognized cause of action for medical negligence at common
law, and argues that the legislature has failed to provide an adequate substitute remedy for
minors with claims against dissolved hospital corporations. [parent] therefore urges this Court to
find a reasonable. exception to [TBCA] Art. 7.12 [BOC §11.356] as applied to minor
claimants. [Held: BOC §11.356 does not violate Open Courts Provision.]
The next issue in this appeal is whether the statute of limitations of [Medical Liability and
Insurance Improvement Act § 10.01, now CPRC §74.25l ,] or the three-year survival provision
of [TBCA] Art. 7.12 [now BOC §11.356], applies to [parent's] suit. [Parent] contends that, in
this case, [TBCA] Art. 7.12 [now BOC §11.356], conflicts with the provisions ofthe Medical
Liability Act as construed by the Texas Supreme COUli ... and therefore the three-year survival
provision of [TBCA] Art. 7.12 [now BOC §l1.356], should not be applied to [minor's] claims
against [corporation].
[T]he Medical Liability Act is a tolling statute that tolls the tort statute of limitations for a
specific amount oftime.
However, [TBCA] Art. 7 .12 [now BOC §11.3 56] is a survival stntute, not a statute oflimitations.
When a plaintiff fails to sue within the period provided by a stntute of limitations, the claim still
exists, but, unless the statute of limitations affirmative defense is waived, it can no longer be
brought by that plaintiff. Martin, 930 S.W.2d at 721. Conversely, if a party fails to sue within
the time limits of the survival statute, there is no longer an entity that can be sued.
Under [TBCA] Art. 7.12 [nowBOC §11.356],[parent]was required to file suit on behalf of
[minor] within three years of [corporation'sI dissolution, or the claim would thereafter be
extingnishecL
[TBCA] Art. 7.12 [nowBOC §11.356] prevails over the statute oflimitations contained in the
Medical Liability Act."
Comparative Analysisfound Dn last page of document.

Comparative Analysis for SOC §11.356
JMP Expression
•

JMP used bracketed language throughout the annotation in the following ways:
o To abbreviate "Texas Business Corporation Act" to "TBCA" to make the annotation more
concise and easier to read.
o To inform the reader when a specific TBCA article had been codified under the BOC, which
took place after the opinion was issued.
o To replace specific party names with more informative names.
•

•

Proper name "MichaefJ was replaced with "minor_II

•

o
o
o

Proper name I(GomezJJ was replaced with the word Ifparent,lI

Proper name "Pasadena" was replaced with ((corporation,"

To indicate that language from the case was deleted.
To abbreviate "Texas Constitution" to "Tex. Canst."
To provide the complete name of the "Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act"
and to inform the reader that the section being referenced by the court had been codified
as CPRC §74.251.

•

JMP also used brackets to provide a summary of the court's holding on the first issue presented in
the annotation. This language does not appearin the opinion, but providing a summary at this point
in the annotation makes it more concise and easier fpr the reader to understand.

•

JMP deleted from its annotation four footnote references and two case citations used in the quoted
portions of the opinion. These changes make the annotation easier to read.

•

JMP abbreviated the word "article," which is spelled out nine times in the quoted portions of
opinion, to "art." to make the annotation more concise and easier to read.

•

JMP abbreviated the word "sections" to two section symbols (§§) to make the annotation more
concise.

•

JMP used ellipses to indicate that text has been deleted from the quoted sentences.

•

JMP added bracketed paragraph symbols throughout the annotation to indicate that the quoted
language following the paragraph symbol was taken from a different paragraph on the same page of
the court's opinion. This helps the reader locate the quoted language in the opinion.

•

JMP added "At 314-15;" and "At 316:" to indicate a change in jump cite, so the reader will know
where to find the quoted material in the opinion.

P.
•

•

•

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