Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services et al v. Lakey et al

Filing 1

COMPLAINT ( Filing fee $ 350 receipt number 0542-3699135), filed by Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services, a class represented by Metropolitan OB-GYN, P.A., Alan Braid. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Grigg, Richard)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
TEXAS MEDICAL PROVIDERS PERFORMING
ABORTION SERVICES, a class represented by
METROPOLITAN OB-GYN, P.A., d/b/a
REPRODUCTIVE SERVICES OF SAN ANTONIO
and ALAN BRAID, M.D., on behalf of themselves
and their patients seeking abortions,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
v.
)
)
DAVID LAKEY, M.D., Commissioner of the Texas
)
Department of State Health Services, in his official
)
capacity; MARI ROBINSON, Executive Director of
)
the Texas Medical Board, in her official capacity; and )
DAVID ESCAMILLA, County Attorney for Travis
)
County, in his official capacity and as representative
)
of the class of all county and district attorneys in the
)
State of Texas with authority to prosecute
)
misdemeanors; and their employees, agents, and
)
successors,
)
)
Defendants.
)

CIVIL ACTION

11-486
CASE NO. _______________

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned attorneys, bring this complaint against the
above-named Defendants, their employees, agents, and successors in office, and in support
thereof allege the following:
I.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1.

Plaintiffs are Texas medical providers who assert their rights, as well as their duties,

to provide ethical and appropriate care to all of their patients

including those who seek

abortions. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves, their patients, and a class of all
physicians and medical facilities that provide abortions to women in the State of Texas currently

1

and/or in the future, asserting claims on behalf of the class members and their patients seeking
abortions.
2.

Plaintiffs bring this civil rights action under the U.S. Constitution and

42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the constitutionality of Texas House Bill No. 15 (“the Act”),1
which amends the Texas “Woman’s Right to Know Act,” Tex. Health & Safety Code
Ann. §§ 171.001 et seq.
3.

The Act profoundly intrudes on the practice of medicine, forces physicians to deliver

ideological speech to patients, and treats women as less than fully competent adults.
4.

The Act imposes strict liability, criminal penalties, and a mandatory penalty of the

non-renewal of a medical license on any physician who fails to comply with any one of myriad
requirements for providing government-mandated information to a patient in advance of an
abortion. The Act imposes numerous requirements that are contrary to standard medical practice
and/or violate standards of medical ethics. For example, the Act will compel physicians to
deliver to their patients government-mandated speech
of the fetus

including visual and auditory depictions

that falls outside the accepted standards and practices for medical informed

consent.
5.

Moreover, given its harsh penalties and vague requirements, the Act will force

physicians to deliver this government-mandated speech even where a patient declines to receive
it, or else risk losing his or her license. Thus, the Act will force physicians to violate basic
standards of medical ethics by compelling them to disregard the wishes of patients who do not
want to receive this information.

1

A copy of the Act is annexed hereto as Exhibit 1.

2

6.

The Act was signed by Governor Perry on May 19, 2011, takes effect on September 1,

2011, and applies to any and all abortions performed on or after October 1, 2011. See the Act at
secs. 13, 16.
7.

The Act threatens irreparable injury to Plaintiffs, the members of the proposed class

of all Texas medical providers performing abortions, and their patients and violates their rights to
free speech, privacy, equal protection of the laws, and due process.
8.
II.

Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief from those constitutional deprivations.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
9.
10.

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3).
Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are authorized by

28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, by Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and by
the general legal and equitable powers of this Court.
11.

Venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) because some Defendants reside

in this district.
III.

PLAINTIFFS
12.

Plaintiff Metropolitan Ob-Gyn, P.A., provides abortion services through the licensed

abortion facility Reproductive Services of San Antonio (“the Medical Facility”). The Medical
Facility provides medical services in San Antonio, Texas, including medical and surgical
abortions. The Medical Facility sues on its own behalf and on behalf of its patients seeking
abortions.
13.

Plaintiff Alan Braid, M.D. (“Dr. Braid”) is a physician licensed to practice medicine

in the State of Texas and is board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology. Dr. Braid is the owner,
Medical Director, and Executive Administrator of the Medical Facility, where he provides

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abortion services. Dr. Braid sues on his own behalf and on behalf of his patients seeking
abortions.
14.

Dr. Braid and the Medical Facility seek to serve as representatives of a class of all

Texas medical providers performing abortion services, on behalf of themselves and their patients
seeking abortions (“Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services” or “Texas Medical
Providers”).
IV.

DEFENDANTS
15.

Defendant David Lakey, M.D., is the Commissioner of the Texas Department of
The Department is generally charged with

State Health Services (“the Department”).

enforcement of the provisions of Chapter 171 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. Tex. Health
& Safety Code Ann. § 171.005. Commissioner Lakey is sued in his official capacity.
16.

Defendant Mari Robinson, is the Executive Director of the Texas Medical Board

(“the Board”). The Board is required to undertake disciplinary proceedings against, and not
renew the medical license of, a physician who violates the requirements of the Act. The Act at
sec. 10 (amending Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 164.055(a)). Ms. Robinson is sued in her official
capacity.
17.

Defendant David Escamilla is the County Attorney for Travis County.

responsible for prosecuting misdemeanors

He is

and therefore criminal violations of the Act,

see Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.018

occurring in Travis County. He is sued in his

official capacity and as a representative of the class of all county and district attorneys in the
State of Texas with authority to prosecute misdemeanors.

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V.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Woman’s Right to Know Act Prior to Enactment of Texas House Bill No. 15
18.

In 2003, Texas enacted a statute, known as the Woman’s Right to Know Act (“the

WRKA”), which mandates that certain procedures and content be used in the informed consent
process when the patient is a woman seeking an abortion.

Tex. Health & Safety Code

Ann. § 171.001 et. seq.
19.

The current version of the WRKA mandates that, except in the case of a medical

emergency, the performing or referring physician inform the woman of: (1) the name of the
physician who will perform the abortion; (2) the medical risks “associated with the particular
abortion procedure;” (3) the probable gestational age of the fetus; and (4) the medical risks of
carrying a pregnancy to term.

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.012(a)(1).

The

performing physician or the physician’s agent must also inform the woman that: (1) specified
types of medical assistance benefits may be available to her; (2) the father is liable for child
support; (3) public and private agencies provide pregnancy prevention counseling and referrals
for obtaining birth control; and (4) she has the right to view printed state materials, which are
also accessible on the Internet, describing the fetus and listing agencies that offer abortion
alternatives. Id. § 171.012(a)(2). This information must be given to the woman by telephone or
in person at least 24 hours before the abortion. Id. § 171.012(b).
20.

Intentional performance of an abortion in violation of the WRKA constitutes a

misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $10,000. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.018.
21.

The Act amends the WRKA in a number of important respects.

The Imposition of Strict Liability
22.

The Act dramatically alters the penalty structure for violations of the WRKA.

Previously, the WRKA contained a single penalty provision, making intentional performance of

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an abortion in violation of that law a criminal offense punishable by a fine of up to $10,000.
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.018. The Act adds a new penalty provision that imposes
strict liability for violation of any provision of the WRKA, regardless of fault or mental state.
This new penalty provision requires the Texas Medical Board to take “appropriate disciplinary
action” against and refuse to renew the license of any physician who violates the WRKA. The
Act at sec. 10 (amending Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 164.055(a)). The Act also provides that the
Board must “refuse to admit to examination or refuse to issue a license” to any person who
violates that law. Id. Thus, a physician need not be convicted of a violation of the WRKA or
have intended to violate it to have his or her license renewal denied.
The Act’s Ultrasound and Heart Auscultation Requirements
23.

The Act requires that

in order to obtain informed consent for an abortion

the

physician who will perform the abortion (either personally or through an agent who is a certified
sonographer) must perform an ultrasound (referred to as “sonogram” in the Act) at least 24 hours
before the beginning of the abortion (the “pre-abortion ultrasound”), and the physician (in some
cases, personally, and in other cases, personally or through an agent who is a certified
sonographer) must undertake certain steps with respect to the pre-abortion ultrasound. The Act
at sec. 2 (to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.012(a)(4)).
24.

For women who live at least 100 miles from “the nearest abortion provider that is a

[licensed abortion facility] or a facility that performs more than 50 abortions in any 12 month
period,” the Act provides a two-hour required waiting period instead of a 24-hour waiting period.
The Act sec. 2 (to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.012(a)(4)). By its terms,
this two-hour waiting period is not available to a woman who lives within 100 miles of any
abortion provider, even if the only provider(s) within 100 miles of the woman’s residence is not

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willing or able to provide her abortion (e.g., because the facility is a hospital which only provides
abortions in narrow circumstances; because the facility only provides abortions in the first
trimester and the woman’s pregnancy has reached the second trimester). Consequently, the
Act’s shorter waiting period will not apply to some women who must travel more than 100 miles
to obtain an abortion.
25.

The Act does not permit the pre-abortion ultrasound or any of the required steps

accompanying the pre-abortion ultrasound to be performed by a referring physician, even if the
referring physician is another doctor in the same medical practice.
26.

Although the law allows a certified sonographer to perform the pre-abortion

ultrasound, the Act requires the physician who will perform the abortion to personally carry out
certain steps related to the pre-abortion ultrasound.
27.

Under the Act the physician who will perform the abortion must “display[] the

sonogram images in a quality consistent with medical practice in a manner that the pregnant
woman may view them.” The Act at sec. 2 (to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code
Ann. § 171.012(a)(4)(B)).
28.

The physician who will perform the abortion must also describe the fetal image to

the pregnant woman in detail. The Act at sec. 2 (to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code
Ann. § 171.012(a)(4)(C)) (the physician must provide “in a manner understandable to a
layperson, a verbal explanation of the results of the sonogram images, including a medical
description of the dimensions of the embryo or fetus, the presence of cardiac activity, and the
presence of external members and internal organs”).
29.

Additionally, the physician who will perform the abortion or a certified sonographer

must “make[] audible the heart auscultation for the pregnant woman to hear, if present, in a

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quality consistent with current medical practice” and must verbally explain the fetal auscultation
to the pregnant woman. The Act at sec. 2 (to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code
Ann. § 171.012(a)(4)(D)).
30.

Prior to the pre-abortion ultrasound, the woman must fill out a certification form

indicating that she understands that: (1) Texas law requires she receive a ultrasound prior to
receiving an abortion; (2) she has “the option to view the sonogram images;” (3) she has the
“option to hear the heartbeat;” and (4) she is “required by law to hear [the physician’s]
explanation of the sonogram images” unless she certifies in writing that she falls into one of
three limited categories. The Act at sec. 2 (to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code
Ann. § 171.012(a)(5)). The Act allows the woman to certify that she elects not to hear an
explanation of the ultrasound images in only three circumstances: (a) if she is “pregnant as a
result of a sexual assault, incest or other violation of the Texas Penal Code that has been reported
to law enforcement authorities or that has not been reported because [the woman] reasonably
believe[s] that doing so would put [her] at risk of retaliation resulting in serious bodily injury;”
(b) if she is a minor obtaining an abortion pursuant to a judicial bypass; or (c) if the “fetus has an
irreversible medical condition or abnormality, as identified by reliable diagnostic procedures and
documented in [the patient’s] medical file.” Id.
31.

The Act states that a pregnant woman: (1) “may choose not to view the sonogram

images required to be provided to and reviewed [with her] under Section 171.012(a)(4);”
(2) “may choose not to hear the heart auscultation required to be provided to and reviewed [with
her] under Section 171.012(a)(4);” and (3), if she falls within one of the three designated
categories, “may choose not to receive the verbal explanation of the results of the sonogram
images under Section 171.012(a)(4)(C).” The Act at sec. 3 (to be codified at Tex. Health &

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Safety Code Ann. § 171.0122(b), (c), (d)). This provision goes on to state that “the physician
[performing the abortion] and the pregnant woman are not subject to a penalty under this chapter
solely because” the woman chooses not to view the ultrasound images or chooses not to hear the
auscultation or verbal explanations. The Act at sec. 3 (to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety
Code Ann. § 171.0122(e)). However, this provision only provides an exemption from “a penalty
under [Chapter 171 of the Texas Health and Safety Code],” which set forth criminal penalties.
See Tex. Health & Safety Code, § 171.018. The provision does not appear to apply to the
penalties of mandatory disciplinary action and non-renewal of medical license which are
contained in a different chapter, of a different code. Compare, the Act, at sec. 3 (to be codified
at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.0122(e)) (“penalty under this chapter”) with the Act, at
sec. 10 (amending Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 164.055(a)). Thus, the Act may expose physicians to
loss of medical licensure based on the woman’s choices not to view or hear the mandated
information.
32.

Although the Act (sec. 3) and the required certification form indicate that the

pregnant woman has the option not to view the ultrasound images, the Act also states that the
ultrasound images are “required to be provided to” the woman and that “consent to an abortion is
voluntary and informed only if,” inter alia, the image is placed in the woman’s view. The Act at
sec. 3 (to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.0122(b)); id. at sec. 2 (to be
codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.012(a)).
33.

Similarly, while the Act (Sec. 3) and the required certification form indicate that a

woman coming within one of the three designated categories may choose not to listen to the
physician’s verbal description of the fetus, the Act also states that “consent to an abortion is

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voluntary and informed only if,” inter alia, the verbal description is provided. The Act at sec. 2
(to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.012(a)).
34.

Likewise, while the Act (sec. 3) and the required certification form indicate that the

woman has the option not to hear the heart auscultation, the heart auscultation is “required to be
provided to” the woman under the Act, and the Act also states that “consent to an abortion is
voluntary and informed only if,” inter alia, the physician “makes audible” the heart auscultation
for the woman to hear, “if present.” The Act at sec. 3 (to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety
Code Ann. § 171.0122(c)); id. at sec. 2 (to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code
Ann. § 171.012(a)).
35.

Accordingly, in order to obtain informed consent, the terms of the Act appear to

require the physician to place the ultrasound images in the woman’s view, describe the fetal
images to the woman, make the heart auscultation audible, if present, and explain the heart
auscultation regardless of the woman’s choices. See Act, generally.
36.

In light of the foregoing, it is not clear under the Act whether: (1) the woman’s

choice not to view the ultrasound images relieves the physician of the obligation to place the
ultrasound images in the woman’s view; (2) the woman’s choice not to hear the verbal
explanation relieves the physician of the obligation to provide that verbal explanation; and
(3) the woman’s choice not to hear the heart auscultation relieves the physician of the obligation
to make the heart auscultation audible, if present. In light of these ambiguities, and the harsh
penalties and strict liability imposed by the Act, a physician seeking to avoid those penalties,
including the risk of losing his or her medical license, will be compelled to: (1) place the
ultrasound images in the woman’s view even if the woman has indicated that she does not want
to see them; (2) describe the ultrasound images to every woman seeking an abortion, even to a

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woman who falls in one of the three designated categories and has indicated that she does not
want to hear the explanation; and (3) make the heart auscultation audible (either personally or
through an agent who is a certified sonographer).
37.

Moreover, the Act does not give any woman the option not to hear the mandated

explanation of the heart auscultation. Compare the Act, at sec. 2 (to be codified at Tex. Health &
Safety Code Ann. § 171.012(a)(4)(D) (requiring a verbal explanation of the heart auscultation)
with the Act, at sec. 3 (to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.0122(c) (stating a
woman can opt not to hear the heart auscultation but making no mention of the verbal
explanation of the heart auscultation). Thus, it appears that even where the woman has chosen
not to hear the auscultation, and even where the woman falls in one of the designated categories
for sexual assault victims, minors with judicial bypass, and pregnancies involving fetal
anomalies, the physician apparently must (either personally or through an agent who is a
certified sonographer) provide an explanation of the auscultation to the woman in order to
comply with the law.
Other Provisions of the Act
38.

The Act mandates that the information provided to the woman verbally 24 hours

before the abortion may be given only by the physician who will perform the procedure. The
Act at sec. 2 (amending Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.012(a), (b)). The Act thus
prohibits the provision of the mandated information by a referring physician. The Act also
requires that the performing physician provide this information in person unless the woman lives
100 miles or more from “the nearest abortion provider that is a [licensed abortion facility] or a
facility that performs more than 50 abortions in any 12 month period.” Id. (amending Tex.

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Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.012(b)). Thus, in most cases, the physician is precluded from
providing this information by telephone.
39.

For women who live at least 100 miles from “the nearest abortion provider that is a

[licensed abortion facility] or a facility that performs more than 50 abortions in any 12 month
period,” the Act provides a two-hour required waiting period after provision of the mandated
information, instead of a 24-hour waiting period. The Act at sec. 2 (to be codified at Tex. Health
& Safety Code Ann. § 171.012(b)). By its terms, this two-hour waiting period is not available to
a woman who lives within 100 miles of any abortion provider, even if the only provider(s) within
100 miles of the woman’s residence is not willing or able to provide her abortion (e.g., because
the facility is a hospital which only provides abortions in narrow circumstances; because the
facility only provides abortions in the first trimester and the woman’s pregnancy has reached the
second trimester).
40.

The Act dictates that during “a visit made to a facility to fulfill the requirements”

described above regarding the mandated information, ultrasound, and related steps in advance of
the abortion procedure, the physician and facility “may not accept any form of payment, deposit,
or exchange or make any financial agreement for an abortion or abortion-related services other
than for payment of a service required by Subsection (a) [of the WRKA as amended].” The Act
at sec. 2 (to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.012(a-1)). The Act further
provides that “the amount charged for a service required by Subsection (a) may not exceed the
reimbursement rate established for the service by the Health and Human Services Commission
for statewide medical reimbursement programs.” Id.
41.

The Act requires that “[i]f after being provided with a sonogram and the information

required under this subchapter, the pregnant woman chooses not to have an abortion, the

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physician or an agent of the physician shall provide the pregnant women with a publication
developed by the Title IV-D agency that provides information about paternity establishment and
child support.” The Act at sec. 3 (to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.0123).
VI.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS: PLAINTIFF CLASS OF TEXAS MEDICAL
PROVIDERS PERFORMING ABORTION SERVICES IN TEXAS
42.

Plaintiffs Dr. Braid and the Medical Facility bring this action on behalf of

themselves and the class consisting of all Texas medical providers performing abortion services
currently and/or in the future, asserting claims on behalf of the class members and their patients.
43.

This action is maintainable as a class action on behalf of the proposed plaintiff class

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, subsections (a) and (b)(2) or, in the alternative,
subsection (b)(1).
44.

Class Size: Plaintiffs do not know the exact size of the proposed plaintiff class.

A publicly available survey report states that in 2008, abortions were performed at 67 facilities
(clinics, hospitals and physicians’ offices) in the State of Texas. See Rachel K. Jones & Kathryn
Kooistra, Abortion Incidence and Access to Services in the United States, 2008, 43 Perspectives
on

Sexual

and

Reprod.

Health

41

(March

2011),

available

http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/4304111.pdf (last visited June 9, 2011).

at
Upon

information and belief, this number likely underrepresents the total number of facilities as it may
not include all facilities at which an occasional abortion is performed. Some facilities at which
abortions are performed are not required to be licensed as “abortion facilities” in Texas,
including hospitals and some physicians’ offices.

Tex. Health & Safety Code § 254.004.

Plaintiffs have been able to discern the identities of only approximately 40 of the facilities that
provide abortions in Texas. Those facilities are spread over a large geographical area: they are
located in nineteen different counties, some in each of the four federal judicial districts in Texas.

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Plaintiffs also do not know the total number of physicians who perform abortions at medical
facilities in Texas. More than one physician provides abortion services at some of the facilities;
thus, on information and belief, the number of physicians performing abortions in Texas likely
exceeds the number of facilities at which abortions are performed. Plaintiffs do not know, and
have been unable to discern through publicly-available information, the identity of many of the
physicians who perform abortions in Texas. In light of the above, Plaintiffs estimate that the
proposed plaintiff class consists of more than 100 members, many of whom cannot be identified
via publicly-available information.

The proposed class is so numerous and geographically

dispersed that joinder of all members of the class is impracticable.
45.

Questions of Law and Fact Common to the Class: This suit poses questions of law

and fact that are common to and affect the rights of all of the Texas Medical Providers. All
members of the proposed class provide abortion services to women in Texas and all members of
the proposed class are subject to the mandates and prohibitions of the Act. The common
questions presented by the case include, but are not limited to: (a) whether the Act subjects
abortion providers to vague standards; (b) whether requiring physicians who perform abortions
to engage in conduct that violates standards of medical ethics violates the constitutional rights of
the physicians and/or their patients; (c) whether compelling physicians to deliver to abortion
patients unwanted government speech violates the constitutional rights of the physicians and/or
their patients; (d) whether the Act’s discriminatory treatment of physicians who perform
abortions and women who seek abortions is sufficiently justified to meet the requirements of
Equal Protection; and (e) whether the Act’s discriminatory treatment of patients who live more
than 100 miles from an abortion provider who is willing and able to provide the woman’s
abortion is sufficiently justified to meet the requirements of Equal Protection. This action seeks

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only class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief, and the relief sought does not turn on
circumstances specific to individual members of the proposed plaintiff class.
46.

Typicality of the Claims of the Class Representatives: The claims of Plaintiffs Dr.

Braid and the Medical Facility are typical of the claims of all members of the proposed plaintiff
class. The claims asserted by Plaintiffs Dr. Braid and the Medical Facility are based on factual
assertions and legal theories applicable to all of the Texas Medical Providers, and Dr. Braid and
the Medical Facility are subject to the same requirements and penalties under the Act as all other
members of the proposed plaintiff class.
47.

Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiffs Dr. Braid and the Medical Facility will fairly

and adequately protect the interests of the class.

In this action, they have no interests

antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of the other members of the proposed plaintiff
class. Plaintiffs’ counsel are qualified and competent to represent the Texas Medical Providers
in this action. Plaintiffs’ counsel have represented plaintiff classes in other class actions and
have litigated numerous cases involving reproductive rights, specifically including, but not
limited to, cases challenging the constitutionality of abortion-specific informed consent statutes.
48.

This case may be maintained as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) because in

enforcing the Act, Defendants will act on grounds generally applicable to the proposed plaintiff
class as a whole. This is an action asserting civil rights and constitutional claims and seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief.

Plaintiffs Dr. Braid and the Medical Facility seek final

injunctive and declaratory relief that will generally benefit the members of the proposed plaintiff
class and their patients. Monetary damages are not sought in this action. In the alternative, this
case may be maintained as a class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) because separate actions by
individual members of the proposed plaintiff class challenging the constitutionality of the Act

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would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, resulting in incompatible and
incongruous standards of conduct for, and enforcement of the Act by, Defendants.
VII.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS: DEFENDANT CLASS OF PROSECUTING
ATTORNEYS
49.

Plaintiffs bring this action against, inter alia, a class of all county and district

attorneys in the State of Texas with authority to prosecute misdemeanors, represented by
Defendant David Escamilla (collectively, the “Prosecutors”).

Each of the members of the

proposed defendant class has authority, in his or her official capacity, to prosecute violations of
the Act when an element of an offense occurs within his or her jurisdiction.
50.

This action is maintainable against that defendant class under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 23, subsections (a) and subsection (b)(1) or, in the alternative, subsection (b)(2).
51.

Class Size:

On information and belief, there are approximately 250 county

attorneys, district attorneys, and criminal district attorneys in the State of Texas with authority to
prosecute misdemeanors. Texas has 254 counties, most of which have a county attorney with
authority to prosecute misdemeanors.

Because Plaintiffs cannot discern the identities and

locations of all physicians and medical facilities in Texas that provide abortions, and because one
or more such physicians or facilities may exist in each Texas county, this action must be
maintained against all those with prosecutorial authority under the Act in order to provide
protection to all members of the proposed plaintiff class.

The members of the proposed

defendant class are located throughout the State of Texas, with some members in each of the four
federal judicial districts in Texas.

The proposed defendant class is so numerous and

geographically dispersed that the joinder of all members is impracticable.
52.

Questions of Law and Fact Common to the Class: This suit poses questions of law

and fact that are common to all of the Prosecutors. All of the Prosecutors have the authority to

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prosecute misdemeanors and therefore have the authority to prosecute violations under the Act.
The common questions posed by this case include those set forth in paragraph 45, supra. The
injunctive and declaratory relief sought in this action does not turn on circumstances specific to
particular members of the proposed defendant class.
53.

Typicality of the Claims of the Class Representatives: The defenses of Defendant

Escamilla will be typical of the defenses of the proposed defendant class. As a Texas County
Attorney, Defendant Escamilla is authorized to prosecute violations of the Act; all of the other
members of the proposed defendant class also are authorized to prosecute violations of the Act.
In this action challenging the constitutionality of a state statute, the defenses asserted by
Defendant Escamilla will be based on legal theories that are applicable to the entire proposed
defendant class.
54.

Adequacy of Representation: Defendant Escamilla will fairly and adequately protect

the interests of the Prosecutors. His position as County Attorney for Travis County places him in
the same position with respect to this challenge as all of the other members of the proposed
defendant class. On information and belief, in this action he has no interests antagonistic to or in
conflict with the interests of other members of the proposed class. Because the functions of all
prosecuting attorneys with respect to this statute are substantially the same, Defendant Escamilla
will be able to represent the interests of all county and district attorneys with authority to
prosecute misdemeanors. On information and belief, as County Attorney for Travis County,
Defendant Escamilla is qualified and competent to represent the Prosecutors in this action.
55.

This case may be maintained as a class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) because

separate actions against individual members of the proposed defendant class challenging the
constitutionality of the Act would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, resulting

17

in incompatible enforcement and incongruous standards of conduct for Plaintiffs and members of
Texas Medical Providers, as would separate actions by individual members of the proposed
defendant class enforcing the Act. In the alternative, this case may be maintained as a class
action under Rule 23(b)(2) because, in enforcing the Act, the Defendants will act or refuse to act
on grounds that apply generally to the Texas Medical Providers, thereby making appropriate
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the proposed defendant
class as a whole.
VIII. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Abortion Background
56.

Legal abortion is a very safe medical procedure; it is one of the safest procedures in

contemporary medical practice. Major complications from abortion are very rare. Abortion
through the 21st week of pregnancy is significantly safer than pregnancy and childbirth.
57.

Women seek abortions for a variety of psychological, emotional, medical, familial,

economic and personal reasons.
58.

Abortion providers perform abortions up to differing gestational ages. The vast

majority of abortions in Texas are performed in the first trimester of pregnancy, which consists
of the first twelve weeks postfertilization. Over half of the abortions reported by the Texas
Department of State Health Services for Texas residents during each of the years from 2001
through 2008 occurred at 8 or fewer weeks gestation and over three-fourths of the procedures
were performed at 10 weeks gestation or earlier. Virtually all of the abortion procedures in
Texas are performed prior to viability.
59.

At very early gestational ages, it may not be possible to make fetal heart auscultation

audible to the pregnant woman using any equipment. Using equipment that is likely to be
available in an obstetrics practice, the heart auscultation is not easily audible until approximately

18

eight to ten weeks gestational age. Whether heart auscultation can be made audible depends on
the equipment used and also on factors specific to the patient, including, but not limited to, the
position of the woman’s uterus, the position of the fetus, and the size of the woman.
60.

In Texas, abortions are performed in facilities licensed as abortion facilities, in some

facilities licensed as ambulatory surgical centers, in some facilities licensed as hospitals, and in
some physician’s offices.
61.

Among hospitals and physician’s offices that provide abortions, some provide

abortions only in very limited circumstances.
62.

Some physicians who provide abortions in Texas do so in group (multi-physician)

practices. Typically, in these practices not all of the physicians provide services on the same
day, but rotate through the facility, much as physicians in other facilities do.
63.

Abortions may be performed by surgical or medical means. Medication abortion

(also called “medical abortion”) involves the administration of medication(s) to induce an
abortion. Some physicians perform both surgical and medication abortions; some physicians
provide only medication abortions.
64.

Surgical abortion is analogous to a number of other outpatient procedures in terms of

risks, invasiveness, instrumentation, and duration. Medication abortion is analogous to a number
of other outpatient procedures in terms of risks, procedure, and duration.
65.

Studies have shown that abortion poses little risk of negative psychological

consequences or sequelae for women of all ages, and this risk is lower than that associated with
childbirth.

19

Standards of Medical Ethics Governing Informed Consent
66.

In medical practice, the informed consent process takes place in the context of a

confidential medical consultation between the healthcare provider and the patient.
67.

In obtaining informed consent, healthcare providers have an obligation to comply

with standards of medical ethics.
68.

The purpose of the informed consent process is to ensure that the patient’s consent

consists of an informed and autonomous decision, and to make it possible to respect the
individual patient’s views about what she wants to do.
69.

Central tenets of the standards of medical ethics provide that the physician may not

act upon the patient without her consent; that the physician must respect the patient’s autonomy;
and that the physician must act in the patient’s best interests. The Act requires physicians to
violate each of these ethical obligations.
70.

As a matter of medical ethics, the informed consent process is non-directive. In

other words, the physician’s role in the informed consent process is to provide the patient with
information that will allow the patient to make an autonomous choice. This includes material
factual information about the nature of the proposed procedure, the patient’s indications for the
procedure, the procedure’s medical risks and benefits, and alternatives to the procedure. Unless
requested by the patient, as a matter of medical ethics it is inappropriate for a physician to
interject into the informed consent discussion the physician’s own value-based views or the
value-based views of the government or any other third party.
71.

If a patient says that she does not want to receive particular information in the

informed consent process, as a matter of medical ethics that decision must be respected by the
physician.

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72.

The Act violates the most basic standards of medical ethics by requiring physicians

to subject their abortion patients to an experience
explanations of these images and sounds

of visual images and sounds as well as

even when the patients have chosen not to receive

this information and experience and do not believe this information will inform their autonomous
choices.
73.

The Act conveys to the woman the state-mandated message that she should prioritize

the fetus (and the continued life of the fetus) above all other considerations.
Other Standards of Medical Practice
74.

The Act conflicts with prevailing standards of medical practice to the extent that it

requires that the physician who is to perform an abortion must personally provide specified
information to the patient in advance of the procedure and must personally take certain steps,
such as explaining the fetal image, with respect to the patient’s mandatory pre-abortion
ultrasound.
75.

It is common practice for physicians (including those in obstetrics and gynecology)

to work in group (multi-physician) practices, in which the responsibilities for patients’ care are
shared among different physicians. It is standard, accepted and ethical practice for a physician in
such a practice to perform a procedure on a patient whose preliminary “work-up” for the
procedure, including obtaining the patient’s informed consent, has been done by a different
physician in the practice. The Act interferes with this common, accepted and ethical practice.
76.

By requiring that the same physician who will perform the abortion also perform the

pre-abortion ultrasound and provide specified information to a woman and that, in most cases,
the physician do so at least 24 hours before performing the abortion, the Act will impose delays
greater than 24 hours for many women.

These additional delays will result from factors

21

including physicians’ schedules, physician unavailability due to unexpected situations such as a
medical emergency with another patient, and/or the women’s inability to return to the facility
24 hours later due to difficulty arranging transportation and time off from work and child-care
obligations.
77.

The Act conflicts with prevailing standards of medical practice to the extent that it

prohibits anyone other than a physician or a “sonographer certified by a national registry of
medical sonographers” from performing the pre-abortion ultrasound mandated by the Act.
Ultrasounds performed prior to abortions are performed to determine the presence of an
intrauterine pregnancy and to determine the gestational age of the pregnancy. It is common,
acceptable medical practice for a trained, but non-certified, individual to perform such an
ultrasound, the results of which are reviewed by the physician. The certification process required
to become “certified by a national registry of medical sonographers” is not required by the
standard of care for an ultrasound performed prior to an abortion.
78.

Currently, some physicians in Texas comply with the WRKA by having referring

physicians provide the state-mandated information, as allowed under the WRKA prior to its
amendment by the Act.
79.

Currently, some physicians comply with the WRKA by providing the state-mandated

information by telephone, as allowed under the WRKA prior to amendment by the Act.
Forced Speech and Compelled Listening
80.

As explained above, the Act will compel physicians to deliver government-mandated

speech to their patients. This speech consists of both actual speech (verbal explanations) and
symbolic speech (displaying ultrasound images and making audible the fetal heart auscultation).
The speech and experiences which the Act compels physicians to convey to their patients are

22

inconsistent with general principles of informed consent and medical ethics. Moreover, they are
aimed at interjecting the state’s views regarding the decision the pregnant woman should make
and how she should prioritize the potential life of the fetus over all other factors in her life (e.g.,
medical conditions, existing family obligations, socio-economic circumstances). The Act will
compel physicians to subject some of their patients to an experience and information that the
patient considers unwanted, immaterial and/or irrelevant.
81.

Similarly, the Act will expose abortion patients to delivery, by their physicians, of

unwanted government-mandated speech during the informed consent process. This compulsion
will take place in a private medical setting and must occur in order for the patients to receive
their desired health care.
Sex Discrimination
82.

The Act rests upon and perpetuates sex-based stereotypes and imposes “protections”

on women that are not imposed on men.
83.

The Act treats women as less competent, less mature, and less informed decision-

makers than men.
84.

The Act seeks to steer women into gender-stereotyped roles in family and society.

85.

The Act imposes special treatment and burdens on women seeking health care that

are not imposed on men, including, but not limited to: mandating an additional trip to a
healthcare facility to obtain state-mandated information and services; and requiring a woman to
be subjected to visual and/or audio experiences regarding her health care when she has chosen
not to be subjected to them.

23

86.

The differential treatment of women under the Act is not substantially or even

rationally related to the promotion of women’s health or any other important governmental
interest.
Irrational Treatment of Physicians and Facilities Providing Abortions
87.

The Act singles out abortion providers for different and more burdensome treatment

than all other healthcare providers regulated by the state.
88.

The differential treatment and special burdens imposed by the Act on physicians

providing abortions include, but are not limited to: precluding a physician from relying on a
colleague physician to provide the patient’s counseling or pre-abortion ultrasound; forcing a
physician to violate standards of medical ethics in order to avoid loss of his or her medical
license; precluding a physician from relying upon a trained ultrasound technician who has not
been “certified by a national registry of medical sonographers;” dictating how much a physician
may charge a private patient for services; and severely limiting a physician’s ability to schedule
and manage his or her medical practice by requiring the physician to personally undertake, at
designated time intervals, tasks that in other areas of medical care would be delegable.
89.

The Act’s differential treatment of abortion care and all other health care is not

rationally related to the promotion of women’s health or to any other important or legitimate
governmental interest, especially in light of how safe abortion is compared to other medical
procedures.
Discriminatory Treatment of Women Unable to Obtain an Abortion Within 100 Miles
90.

The Act imposes a 24 hour waiting period after receipt of the required pre-abortion

ultrasound and information for women who live within 100 miles of “the nearest abortion
provider that is a [licensed abortion facility] or a facility that performs more than 50 abortions in

24

any 12 month period;” all other women are subject to two-hour waiting period. Act, Sec. 2 (to
be codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.012(b)). The 24-hour waiting period is
imposed on some women who do not live within 100 miles of a physician willing and/or able to
perform their procedure, because they live within 100 miles of some abortion provider.
91.

The Act’s differential treatment of women who live at least 100 miles from any

abortion facility that is licensed or that performed more than 50 abortions in any 12 months and
women who live at least 100 miles from an abortion facility that is willing and able to perform
the woman’s abortion is not narrowly tailored, or substantially, or even rationally, related to the
promotion of women’s health or any other compelling, important, or legitimate governmental
interest.
Lack of Notice
92.

The Act appears to impose strict liability for any failure to comply with any

provision in the WRKA, irrespective of the physician’s mental state and irrespective of the
nature of the failure.
93.

The Act imposes a number of vague requirements or prohibitions that fail to give

Plaintiffs and all Medical Providers of Abortions in Texas notice of how to conform their
conduct to the law. These include, but are not limited to, the examples set forth in the following
paragraphs.
94.

The Act does not make clear what effect, if any, a woman’s choice not to view the

ultrasound images, hear the fetal heart auscultation, and/or receive the mandatory explanations of
the images and auscultation have on the physician’s obligations to place the ultrasound images in
the woman’s view (either personally, or, in some cases, through an agent who is a certified

25

sonographer), make the heart auscultation audible, and/or provide a verbal explanation of the
ultrasound images and/or heart auscultation.
95.

The Act does not make clear what effect, if any, its provision that “the physician

[performing the abortion] and the pregnant woman are not subject to a penalty . . . solely
because” the woman chooses not to view the ultrasound images or chooses not to hear the
auscultation or verbal explanations, the Act sec. 3 (to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code
Ann. § 171.0122(e)), has on a physician’s obligation to place the ultrasound images in the
woman’s view, describe the fetal images to the woman, make the heart auscultation audible, if
present, and explain the heart auscultation in order to obtain informed consent. For example, it is
not clear whether the provision means that a physician must place the ultrasound images in the
woman’s view but will not be penalized if the woman averts her eyes, or if it means that the
physician will not be penalized for failure to place the images in her view if she chooses not to
view them. Similarly, does it mean the physician must provide the verbal descriptions to the
woman but will not be penalized if the woman puts her hands over her ears, or that the physician
will not be penalized for failure to provide that description if she chooses not to hear it?
Moreover, the meaning of this provision is unclear in part because neither the Act nor the
WRKA contain any reference to penalties to which a pregnant woman could be subject.
96.

The Act requires the display of ultrasound images “in a quality consistent with

medical practice.” The Act, at sec. 2 (Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.012(a)(4)(B)). The
Act, however, does not indicate the scope of medical practice to which it refers. Thus, the Act
does not indicate whether the images must be of a quality consistent with medical practice
among outpatient abortion providers, among obstetrician-gynecologists generally, or some other
scope of practice.

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97.

The Act requires that the heart auscultation be made audible, if present. The Act, at

sec. 2 (Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.012(a)(4)(D)). The Act does not make clear what
equipment or methods must be used to determine if the “heart auscultation” is “present,” and
Plaintiffs are unable to ascertain what equipment and methods they must use to comply with this
requirement. Moreover, the Act does not make clear how much time and effort the physician
must expend to try to make the heart auscultation audible to the patient. It is unclear whether
good faith, but unsuccessful, efforts will suffice under the Act, especially in situations in which
audibility might be expected based on gestational age, but factors specific to the patient make it
difficult to make the heart auscultation audible.
98.

Plaintiffs are also unable to ascertain what equipment and methods they must use to

comply with the requirement that the heart auscultation is made audible in a quality “consistent
with current medical practice.”
Ann. § 171.012(a)(4)(D)).

The Act, at sec. 2 (Tex. Health & Safety Code

This requirement is particularly difficult to understand because

current medical practice does not entail making heart auscultation audible to women seeking
abortions.
99.

It is not clear what a physician must say about the ultrasound images to satisfy the

requirements of the Act. The Act requires a physician to provide a verbal explanation of the
ultrasound images “in a manner understandable to a layperson,” the Act, at sec. 2 (Tex. Health &
Safety Code Ann. § 171.012(a)(4)(C)), without giving any guidance on how to ensure that
requirement is met so as to avoid the risk of mandatory penalties under the Act.
100.

The Act requires the woman to certify that she is “making this election of [her] own

free will and without coercion.” The Act at sec. 2 (to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code
Ann. § 171.012(a)(5)). It is, however, not clear whether the term “this election” refers to her

27

choice to have an abortion, her choices with respect to the “options” stated on the certification
form, or only (where applicable) her indication on the certification form that she comes within
one of the three categories listed in relation to the ultrasound image explanation.
101.

The Act does not indicate how a woman can or will know whether she lives more

than 100 miles from “the nearest abortion provider that is a [licensed abortion facility] or a
facility that performs more than 50 abortions in any 12 month period.” Moreover, the Act does
not make clear whether an abortion provider has any obligation to provide any information to
patients about the location of other abortion providers.
102.

The Act does not make clear what steps, if any, a physician providing an abortion

must undertake to verify the accuracy of a woman’s claim that she lives more than 100 miles
from “the nearest abortion provider that is a [licensed abortion facility] or a facility that performs
more than 50 abortions in any 12 month period” and thus is subject to a two-hour, rather than 24hour, waiting period and/or is eligible to receive certain information by telephone rather than inperson. Moreover, the Act does not make clear whether a physician may rely solely on the
woman’s certification, irrespective of knowledge the physician, but not the woman, may have
about the location of abortion providers. In addition, if the Act does impose some obligation on
the physician to verify the accuracy of the woman’s claim, it is not clear how the physician will
determine in every instance whether the woman lives more than 100 miles from such a facility.
103.

The Act does not make clear what steps, if any, a physician providing an abortion

must undertake to verify the accuracy of a woman’s assertions that she is pregnant as a result of
“a sexual assault, incest or other violation of the Texas Penal Code” and that either the violation
has been reported to law enforcement authorities or it has not been reported because the woman
“reasonably believe[s] that doing so would put [her] at risk of retaliation resulting in serious

28

bodily injury.” See the Act, at sec. 3 (Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.0122(d)(1)). In
particular, it is not clear whether the physician has any obligation to determine if the alleged
violation has been reported to law enforcement and/or to evaluate the reasonableness of the
woman’s alleged belief. Moreover, it is not clear what constitutes “serious bodily injury” for
purposes of the Act. For example, if the woman fears retaliation likely to result in a black eye or
broken nose, can she certify that she is a risk of “serious bodily injury”?
104.

The Act does not make clear what steps, if any, a physician providing an abortion

must undertake to verify the accuracy of a woman’s assertion that “her fetus has an irreversible
medical condition or abnormality, as identified by reliable diagnostic procedures and
documented in [her] medical file.”

The Act, at sec. 3 (Tex. Health & Safety Code

Ann. § 171.0122(d)(3)). In particular, it is not clear whether the physician has any obligation to
determine personally whether the fetus has “an irreversible medical condition or abnormality;”
whether the physician may merely rely on the woman’s certification; whether the physician may
rely on the conclusion of another physician and, if so, what documentation the physician must
obtain; and whether the “medical file” referred to is the one maintained by the physician
performing the abortion or, if different, by whomever diagnosed the condition of the fetus.
Moreover, it is not clear what conditions or abnormalities would qualify for this exception. For
example, does “irreversible” apply only to conditions and abnormalities that cannot ever be fully
corrected by surgery or medication or to those that are rarely fully correctable or typically not
fully correctable? Do any irreversible conditions or abnormalities qualify, irrespective of their
potential impact?
105.

The meaning of the Act’s provision restricting payment and financial arrangements

“[d]uring a visit made to a facility to fulfill the requirements” of Texas Health and Safety Code

29

section 171.012(a), as amended by the Act, is unclear in several respects, including the
following. See the Act, sec. 2 (Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.012(a-1)). The term
“abortion-related services” is unclear; for example, does it refer to services that the woman may
need prior to having an abortion even if those services would be needed if she decided to carry
the pregnancy to term but might assist her in deciding whether to have an abortion (e.g.,
pregnancy test, lab work, options counseling)? It is unclear what constitutes a “visit made to
fulfill the [Act’s] requirements.” For example, if a woman comes to an abortion facility for the
purpose of obtaining pre-abortion lab work and also to comply with the Act’s requirements, is
the abortion facility prohibited from accepting payment for the pre-abortion lab work? Does the
answer differ if the woman leaves the facility after obtaining the lab work and returns a few
minutes later for the ultrasound and state-mandated information? With respect to women who
certify that they qualify to have their abortion performed two hours, rather than 24 hours, after
they receive the state-mandated pre-abortion ultrasound and state-mandated information, must
the woman leave the facility during that two-hour period in order for the facility to be able to
accept payment for the abortion?
106.

The Act requires that “[i]f after being provided with a sonogram and the

information required under this subchapter, the pregnant woman chooses not to have an abortion,
the physician or an agent of the physician shall provide the pregnant women with a publication
developed by the Title IV-D agency that provides information about paternity establishment and
child support.” The Act, sec. 3 (Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.0123)). It is unclear
whether this provision imposes that obligation only if the woman indicates her choice to the
physician or physician’s agent immediately after she is provided with the ultrasound and
information, or whether this obligation is imposed if, at any time thereafter, the woman decides

30

not to have an abortion. Thus, this provision imposes a mandatory obligation with no apparent
end date and no limitation as to the provider’s knowledge, or lack of knowledge, of the woman’s
ultimate decision.
Irreparable Harms
107.

The Act will harm the integrity of the medical profession and of the Texas Medical

Providers by forcing physicians to take actions contrary to their ethical duties to act in their
patients’ best interests, with respect for their patients’ autonomy, and with their patients’ consent.
108.

The Act will inflict significant harm on the physician-patient relationship. For

example, in situations where the Act requires a physician to subject a patient to an experience or
information that the patient does not want, it puts the patient in a position of protecting or
defending herself against something her physician is doing to her.
109.

The Act also threatens to inflict significant harm on the health and well-being of

abortion patients. For example, in situations where the Act requires a physician to subject a
patient to an experience or information that the patient has declined to accept, it will
unnecessarily stress, upset, and/or anger her as she prepares to undergo a medical procedure.
110.

The Act will chill physicians in their provision of constitutionally-protected

abortion procedures by imposing vague standards under a strict liability regime punishable by
mandatory non-renewal of the physician’s medical license and other mandatory disciplinary
actions.
111.

The Act will significantly, and unjustifiably, increase the costs of providing and

obtaining lawful abortion services, thereby reducing women’s access to those services. To give
just one example, the mandate that a physician who provides an abortion must personally, and
in-person, undertake certain steps in advance of the patient’s procedure will necessitate

31

significant changes in the organization of group medical practices which may currently rely on
the physician on duty at a particular time or day to undertake any preliminary steps needed by a
patient for a procedure that a different physician will perform for the patient on a later date.
Requiring that a single physician undertake (personally and in person) the host of steps that the
Act requires in advance of an abortion procedure will greatly undermine the efficiencies of time,
costs, and scheduling that currently exist in group practice settings, to the detriment of providers
and their patients.
112.

The Act will impose irreparable harms on patients who seek, and physicians who

provide, abortions by depriving them of their constitutional rights to free speech, privacy, equal
protection, and due process.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Vagueness)
113.

The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 112 are incorporated as though fully set

forth herein.
114.

Texas House Bill No. 15 violates the rights of Plaintiffs and the Texas Medical

Providers Performing Abortion Services under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it fails to give Plaintiffs and the class fair notice of
the requirements of the Act and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Compelled Government Speech Physicians)
115.

The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 114 are incorporated as though fully set

forth herein.
116.

Texas House Bill No. 15 violates the rights of Plaintiff Dr. Braid and the

physician members of the Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by forcing them to deliver unwanted,

32

government-mandated speech; in particular, the Act compels physicians to convey to their
abortion patients in a private medical setting unwanted government speech that falls outside
accepted and ethical standards and practices for medical informed consent.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Compelled Government Speech Patients)
117.

The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 116 are incorporated as though fully set

forth herein.
118.

Texas House Bill No. 15 violates the rights of patients seeking abortions in Texas,

from Plaintiffs and/or the Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services, under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by subjecting them to unwanted,
government-mandated speech in a private setting; in particular, the Act compels patients seeking
abortions in a private medical setting to be subjected to unwanted government speech that falls
outside the accepted standards and practices for medical informed consent, in violation of their
free speech and privacy rights.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Equal Protection Sex Discrimination)
119.

The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 118 are incorporated as though fully set

forth herein.
120.

Texas House Bill No. 15 violates the rights of women seeking abortions in Texas,

from Plaintiffs and/or the Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services, by
impermissibly discriminating on the basis of sex, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; the Act does so by subjecting women to
burdens not imposed on men; by perpetuating patronizing and paternalistic stereotypes of women
as in need of special “protections” and unable to make medical decisions on their own; and by
enforcing the notion that a woman’s primary and proper role is that of mother.

33

(Equal Protection
121.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Discrimination Against Abortion Patients and Providers)

The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 120 are incorporated as though fully set

forth herein.
122.

Texas House Bill No. 15 violates the rights of Plaintiffs, the Texas Medical

Providers Performing Abortion Services, and their patients under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by treating them differently than providers
and patients of all other medical services in the state without any basis for the differential
treatment other than discriminatory views towards women and animus toward abortion providers
and patients who seek their services.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Equal Protection Discrimination Against Women Who Live at Least 100 Miles from an
Abortion Facility Willing and Able to Perform the Woman’s Abortion)
123.

The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 122 are incorporated as though fully set

forth herein.
124.

Texas House Bill No. 15 violates the rights of patients who seek abortions in

Texas, from Plaintiffs and/or the Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services, and
who live at least 100 miles from an abortion facility willing and able to perform the patient’s
abortion. Specifically, Texas House Bill No. 15 violates these patients’ rights under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by unjustifiably treating
them differently from patients who live at least 100 miles from any abortion provider.
ATTORNEY’S FEES
125.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:

34

1.

Issue a declaratory judgment that Texas House Bill No. 15 is unconstitutional and

unenforceable as a whole and/or in part;
2.

Issue permanent injunctive relief, without bond, restraining Defendants, their

employees, agents, and successors in office from enforcing Texas House Bill No. 15 as a whole
and/or in part;
3.

Grant Plaintiffs attorney’s fees, costs and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;

and/or;
4.

Grant such other and further relief as this Court may deem just, proper, and equitable.

Dated: June 13, 2011
Respectfully submitted,
/S/ Dicky Grigg_____________
Dicky Grigg, TX Bar #08487500
Spivey & Grigg, LLP
48 East Avenue
Austin, TX 78701
[phone]
[phone] Fax
[e-mail]

Bebe J. Anderson*
Bonnie Scott Jones*
Center for Reproductive Rights
120 Wall Street, 14th Floor
New York, NY 10005
[phone]
[phone] Fax
[e-mail]
[e-mail]

Susan Hays, TX Bar #24002249
Godwin Ronquillo, PC
1201 Elm Street, Suite 1700
Dallas, TX 75270
[phone]
[phone] Fax
[e-mail]

Jamie A. Levitt*
J. Alexander Lawrence*
Morrison & Foerster, LLP
1290 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10104
[phone]
[phone] Fax
[e-mail]
*Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice to be filed

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

35