Defense Distributed et al v. Grewal et al
Filing
1
COMPLAINT ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0542-11059998). No Summons requested at this time, filed by Defense Distributed, Second Amendment Foundation, Inc.. (Attachments: #1 Civil Cover Sheet, #2 Exhibit A, #3 Exhibit B, #4 Exhibit C, #5 Exhibit D, #6 Exhibit E, #7 Exhibit F, #8 Exhibit G, #9 Exhibit H, #10 Exhibit I)(Blackman, Joshua) (Attachment 1 replaced on 7/30/2018 to flatten image) (afd).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
DEFENSE
DISTRIBUTED
AMENDMENT FOUNDATION,
and
SECOND § Case No. 1:18-CV-637
§
§ COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs,
§
§
v.
§
§
GURBIR S. GREWAL, individually, and in his official §
capacity as Attorney General of New Jersey; MICHAEL §
FEUER, individually, and in his official capacity as Los §
Angeles City Attorney,
§
§
Defendants.
§
§
COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs Defense Distributed and Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., by and through
undersigned counsel, complain of Defendants as follows:
INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to a license and other authorization from the State Department, Defense
Distributed has published and will continue to publish Computer-Aided Design (CAD) and
Computer-Numeric Control (CNC) files on its Internet servers in furtherance of its mission to
promote firearms knowledge and possession. The Second Amendment Foundation’s members and
supporters are among Defense Distributed’s audience. New Jersey’s Attorney General (Gurbir S.
Grewal) and Los Angeles’s City Attorney (Michael Feuer), have waged an ideologically-fueled
program of intimidation and harassment against Defense Distributed. Grewal and Feuer have
1
threatened and intend to drag Defense Distributed before all manner of far-flung criminal and civil
tribunals in an effort to silence the organization.
Alas these state and municipal officers from across the country cannot veto Defense
Distributed’s constitutionally-protected and federally-licensed speech. The Defendants’ threatened
legal actions violate the First Amendment speech rights of Defense Distributed and its audience,
including SAF’s members; run afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause; infringe upon the Second
Amendment rights of those who would make use of the knowledge disseminated by Defense
Distributed; constitute a tortious interference with Defense Distributed’s business; and are in any
event, federally pre-empted by Congress’s export control laws as well as Defense Distributed’s
export license, by which the State Department has explicitly authorized the speech that the
Defendants are seeking to silence. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief,
damages, and attorney fees.
The Parties
1.
Plaintiff Defense Distributed is a Texas corporation organized under the laws of the
State of Texas, whose headquarters are located in Austin, Texas, and whose principal place of
business is located in Austin, Texas. Defense Distributed was organized and is operated for the
purpose of defending the civil liberty of popular access to arms guaranteed by the United States
Constitution through facilitating access to, and the collaborative production of, information and
knowledge related to the production of arms; and to publish and distribute, at no cost to the public,
such information and knowledge on the Internet in promotion of the public interest.
2.
Consistent with the President’s role as Commander and Chief, and the delegation
of Congress’s powers under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, Congress has
2
conferred the President with the exclusive authority to issue licenses and other forms of
authorizations for the export of technical data on firearms controlled under the Arms Export
Control Act (“AECA”), 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq. The President has delegated this authority to the
State Department. Executive Order 13637 of March 8, 2013.
3.
Pursuant to its exclusive authority under the AECA, the State Department issued a
license expressly authorizing the Plaintiffs to publish certain firearms files for “unlimited
distribution” pursuant to ITAR § 125.4(b)(13). See Exhibit A.
4.
Further pursuant to its exclusive authority under the AECA, the State Department
issued an authorization under ITAR § 126.2 to allow every U.S. person to access, discuss, use,
reproduce or otherwise benefit from technical data for the development, production, and/or use of
firearms. See Exhibit B.
5.
Plaintiff Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., is a non-profit membership
organization incorporated under the laws of Washington with its principal place of business in
Bellevue, Washington. SAF has over 650,000 members and supporters nationwide, including
members in Texas, New Jersey, and Los Angeles. The purposes of SAF include promoting the
exercise of the right to keep and bear arms; and education, research, publishing and legal action
focusing on the constitutional right to privately own and possess firearms, and the consequences
of gun control. SAF brings this action on behalf of its members. Cody Wilson, Defense
Distributed’s principal, is a SAF member. SAF members seek to download the files shared by
Defense Distributed, as well as use Defense Distributed’s facilities to share their own files with
others
6.
Defendant Gurbir S. Grewal is the Attorney General of New Jersey. He is sued in
his official and individual capacities.
3
7.
Defendant Michael Feuer is the City Attorney for Los Angeles, California. He is
sued in his official and individual capacities.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
8.
This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1331, 1332, 1367, 2201, and 2202.
9.
Plaintiff Defense Distributed resides within the jurisdiction of the U.S. District
10.
Venue lies in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), as a substantial part of
Court.
the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, and a substantial part of property that is
the subject of the action, are situated within the Western District of Texas.
11.
This action involves actions taken by Defendants in New Jersey and Los Angeles
with respect to the Plaintiffs’ business, activities, and property in Austin. Therefore, venue lies in
this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3), because there is no district in which this action may
otherwise be brought, and both Defendants are subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction.
Defendants’ Threats of Legal Actions Against Defense Distributed
12.
On July 26, 2018, Defendant Grewal sent a letter to Defense Distributed’s
headquarters in Austin, Texas.
13.
The letter “directed [Plaintiff] to cease and desist from publishing printable-gun
computer files for use by New Jersey residents.” See Exhibit C.
14.
Grewal asserted that publishing these files would violate New Jersey’s “public
nuisance laws.” Id.
15.
Grewal’s letter closed with a clear and present threat: “Should you fail to comply
4
with this letter, my Office will initiate legal action barring you from publishing these files before
August 1, 2018.” Id.
16.
In a press release, Grewal explicitly reiterated that threat: “Attorney General
Grewal threatened Defense Distributed with ‘legal action’ if it fails to comply with his demand.”
Grewal also expressed his belief that “[p]osting this material online is no different than driving to
New Jersey and handing out hard-copy files on any street corner.” See Exhibit D.
17.
On July 27, 2018, Defendant Feuer caused to be filed in this Court, in the case of
Defense Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 1:15-CV-372-RP, a letter addressed to the Hon.
Robert Pitman, who was then presiding over that case. See Exhibit E.
18.
The letter, at Dkt. 109-1, expressed Feuer’s belief that Defense Distributed’s
publication of files “would pose a direct and immediate threat to public safety in the City of Los
Angeles, and cause numerous violations of California and City laws designed to protect the public
from gun violence.” Id.
19.
Feuer noted that “[as] the City’s chief lawyer and prosecutor, it is [his] job to
enforce the gun laws of the City and California.” Id.
20.
Feuer added that “Defense Distributed’s blueprints” may violate California civil
and criminal laws. Id.
21.
Feuer threatened Defense Distributed with legal action: “his office is authorized to
file lawsuits to ‘enjoin’ the manufacture, importation, or possession of an undetectable firearm.”
Id.
22.
Feuer expressed his intent to seek to intervene in that case, for the express purpose
of silencing Defense Distributed. Id.
23.
To convey this message, at least two of Feuer’s attorneys appeared telephonically
5
during an emergency hearing before Judge Pitman. (At that juncture, the City of Los Angeles was
not yet a party to the case, nor had it even filed a motion to intervene.)
24.
On July 28, 2019, Feuer released the following tweet from the @CityAttorneyLA
Account: “City Atty Mike Feuer & @ManhattanDA Cyrus Vance, Jr. to @StateDept: NO #DIY
#guns! #gunviolence #GunControl #gunsense ▶▶https://goo.gl/L377y3 @ProsecutorsAGV.”
See Exhibit F.
25.
That tweet linked to a press release from the Prosecutors Against Gun Violence,
which is chaired by the Los Angeles City Attorney and the Manhattan District Attorney. It stated
that Defense Distributed’s “blueprints should not be published under any circumstances.” See
Exhibit G.
26.
On information and belief, Plaintiffs anticipate further legal actions from the
Manhattan District Attorney.
Plaintiff Responds to Defendant Grewal
27.
On July 27, 2018, Plaintiff responded to Grewal. See Exhibit H. Plaintiff explained
that the “Letter takes only vague and general positions regarding nuisance and negligence law.”
Plaintiff also explained that “all actions contemplated by Defense Distributed are fully protected
by the First Amendment, and [Grewal’s] attempts to prevent such actions constitute an
unconstitutional prior restraint and otherwise violate the United States Constitution and the New
Jersey Constitution.” Plaintiff added that “the Letter constitutes an unlawful threat, in violation of
Defense Distributed’s Constitutional rights,” and “demand[ed] that [the Defendant] withdraw the
Letter.”
28.
Plaintiff conveyed to the Grewal that “at this time Defense Distribute will attempt
to restrict files made available on the internet to prevent download within New Jersey.” Plaintiff
6
stated that “this [modification] should not be construed as an acknowledgment of the validity of
your position, and Defense Distributed reserves all of its rights in this regard.”
Great, Irreparable, and Continuing Harm
29.
But for Defendant Grewal’s letter, Defense Distributed would freely distribute the
files in New Jersey. However, Defense Distributed has taken steps to prevent the distribution of
files in New Jersey because Defense Distributed reasonably fears that Defendant Grewal would
pursue civil enforcement proceedings against Plaintiff. See Exhibit H. Users with New Jerseybased IP Addresses are currently blocked from accessing the files. See Exhibit I. 1
30.
But for Defendant Feuer’s letter, Defense Distributed would freely distribute the
files in Los Angeles. However, Defense Distributed has already taken steps to prevent the
distribution of files in Los Angeles because Defense Distributed reasonably fears that Defendant
Feuer would pursue civil and t enforcement proceedings against Plaintiff. Users with Los Angelesbased IP Addresses are currently blocked from accessing the files. See Exhibit I.
31.
Notwithstanding its efforts to placate the Defendants, a legitimate controversy
exists between Defense Distributed, and Defendants Grewal and Feuer, as to the legality of
Defense Distributed’s conduct. Defense Distributed can reasonably expect a continuing campaign
of harassment and intimidation aimed at silencing it and tortiously interfering with its business.
32.
Defense Distributed is entitled to appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief
against all further acts of harassment and intimidation by Grewal, Feuer, and all others who may
act in concert with them.
COUNT ONE
1
Defense Distributed also blocked access to the files from IP addresses based in the following foreign countries:
Islamic Republic of Iran, Belarus, Myanmar (Burma), Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, The Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Somalia,
Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
7
42 U.S.C. § 1983
RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH—U.S. CONST. AMEND. I
33.
Defendants’ threats of legal actions are invalid on their face, and as applied to
Plaintiffs’ public speech, are an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected expression. Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
34.
Defendants’ interruption and prevention of Plaintiffs from publishing the subject
files, under color of law, violates Plaintiffs’ rights under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, causing Plaintiffs, their customers, visitors
and members significant damages, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
35.
Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief, and an award of
damages and attorney fees, against Defendants.
COUNT TWO
42 U.S.C. § 1983
“DORMANT” COMMERCE CLAUSE, U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8
36.
The threatened legal actions would not only require Plaintiffs to cease sharing files
on its Texas-based servers within New Jersey and Los Angeles, respectively, but would also
prohibit Plaintiffs from sharing the files within Texas, and other states.
37.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the “Commerce Clause . . . precludes the
application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders,
whether or not the commerce has effects within the State.” Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324,
336 (1989).
38.
Through the threatened legal actions, New Jersey and Los Angeles “project[s] its
8
legislation” into other states, in violation of the “Dormant” Commerce Clause. See Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583 (1986). See also Am.
Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 103–04 (2nd Cir. 2003); Publius v. Boyer-Vine, 237 F.
Supp. 3d 997, 1025 (E.D. Cal. 2017);
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d
946, 958–59 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
39.
Defendants’ interruption and prevention of Plaintiffs from publishing the subject
files on its Texas-based servers, under color of law, violates the Plaintiffs rights to freely
participate in intrastate and interstate commerce under the “Dormant” Commerce Clause, U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8.
40.
Defendants’ actions have caused Plaintiffs, their customers, visitors and members
significant damages, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991).
41.
Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief, and an award of
damages and attorney fees, against Defendants.
COUNT THREE
42 U.S.C. § 1983
RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS—U.S. CONST. AMEND. II
42.
The fundamental Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms inherently
embodies two complimentary guarantees: the right to acquire arms, and the right to make arms.
43.
If one cannot acquire or create arms, one cannot exercise Second Amendment
rights. Infringing upon the creation and acquisition of arms of the kind in common use for
traditional lawful purposes violates the Second Amendment, as applied to the states by virtue of
the Fourteenth Amendment. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008); McDonald
9
v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
44.
By forbidding Defense Distributed from distributing files that concern the lawful
manufacture of firearms, Defendants are violating the Second Amendment rights of Plaintiffs, their
customers, members, and visitors.
45.
Defendants’ interruption and prevention of Plaintiffs from publishing the subject
files, under color of law, violates Plaintiffs’ rights under the Second Amendment to the United
States Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, causing Plaintiffs, their customers,
visitors and members significant damages, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
46.
Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief, and an award of
damages and attorney fees, against Defendants
COUNT FOUR
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, U.S. CONST. ART. VI, CL. 2
PRE-EMPTION BASED ON EXPORT LICENSE ISSUED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT
47.
Consistent with the President’s role as Commander and Chief, and the delegation
of Congress’s powers under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, Congress has
conferred the President with the exclusive authority to issue licenses and other forms of
authorizations for the export of technical data on firearms controlled under the Arms Export
Control Act (“AECA”), 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq. The President has delegated this authority to the
State Department. Executive Order 13637 of March 8, 2013.
48.
Pursuant to its exclusive authority under the AECA, the State Department issued a
license expressly authorizing the Plaintiffs to publish certain firearms files for “unlimited
distribution” pursuant to ITAR § 125.4(b)(13). See Exhibit A.
10
49.
Further pursuant to its exclusive authority under the AECA, the State Department
issued an authorization under ITAR § 126.2 to allow every U.S. person to access, discuss, use,
reproduce or otherwise benefit from technical data for the development, production, and/or use of
firearms. See Exhibit B.
50.
The Defendants’ threatened legal actions conflict with the State Department’s
exclusive authority and seek to interfere with this federal licensing framework. See Exhibits C, D,
and E.
51.
In a press release, Defendant Grewal expressly stated that he seeks to override the
federal government’s licensing framework: “The federal government is no longer willing to stop
Defense Distributed from publishing this dangerous code, and so New Jersey must step up.” See
Exhibit D.
52.
New Jersey and Los Angeles can no more prohibit the operation of a federally
licensed export framework than could Maryland prohibit the operation of a federally chartered
bank. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
53.
The threatened legal actions are preempted based on Defense Distributed’s Export
License that was issued by the State Department.
54.
“[I]f an individual claims federal law immunizes him from state regulation, the
court may issue an injunction upon finding the state regulatory actions preempted.” Armstrong v.
Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015).
55.
Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to injunctive relief against Defendants’ threat of
legal actions that are pre-empted.
COUNT FIVE
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, U.S. CONST. ART. VI, CL. 2
11
EXPRESS PREEMPTION
56.
Through federal export control law, Congress has expressly preempted state law.
57.
Therefore, the threatened legal actions are expressly preempted by federal export
control law. See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990).
58.
“[I]f an individual claims federal law immunizes him from state regulation, the
court may issue an injunction upon finding the state regulatory actions preempted.” Armstrong v.
Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015).
59.
Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to injunctive relief against Defendants’ threat of
legal actions that are pre-empted.
COUNT SIX
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, U.S. CONST. ART. VI, CL. 2
FIELD PREEMPTION
60.
Congress has occupied the entire field of export control law.
61.
Therefore, the threatened legal actions are preempted by field preemption. See
English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
62.
“[I]f an individual claims federal law immunizes him from state regulation, the
court may issue an injunction upon finding the state regulatory actions preempted.” Armstrong v.
Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015).
63.
Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to injunctive relief against Defendants’ threat of
legal actions that are pre-empted by federal export control law.
COUNT SEVEN
12
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, U.S. CONST. ART. VI, CL. 2
CONFLICT PREEMPTION
64.
The threatened legal actions would stand as an obstacle and would frustrate the
accomplishment of objectives authorized by federal export control law. See Crosby v. Nat’l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375 (2000); Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, Inc. v.
Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 738-742 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
65.
Therefore, the threatened legal actions are preempted by conflict preemption.
66.
“[I]f an individual claims federal law immunizes him from state regulation, the
court may issue an injunction upon finding the state regulatory actions preempted.” Armstrong v.
Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015).
67.
Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to injunctive relief against Defendants’ threat of
legal actions that are pre-empted by federal export control law.
COUNT EIGHT
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTS
68.
Defensed Distributed receives advertising revenue from its file-sharing system
through contracts with third-parties. In the past, these revenues have exceeded $75,000 per annum.
69.
Defendants willfully and intentionally sought to interfere with those contracts.
70.
Defense Distributed has taken steps to prevent the distribution of files in New
Jersey and Los Angeles because Defense Distributed reasonably fears that Defendants Grewal and
Feuer would pursue civil and criminal enforcement proceedings against Plaintiff for doing so.
71.
The willful and intentional actions of Defendants Grewal and Feuer have
proximately and directly caused damages to Defense Distributed’s contracts.
13
72.
The willful and intentional actions of Defendants Grewal and Feuer have resulted
in actual damages.
73.
Defendants’ conduct, as described in this complaint, constitutes tortious
interference with contracts. See ACS Inv’rs, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 943 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex.1997).
74.
Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to injunctive relief against Defendants’ tortious
interference with contracts.
COUNT NINE
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE CONTRACTS
75.
There was a reasonable probability that Defense Distributed was to enter into
contract(s) to do business with other third parties in New Jersey and Los Angeles.
76.
The threatened legal actions constitute a wrongful, deliberate, willful, intentional
or otherwise tortious interference with prospective contracts in New Jersey and Los Angeles.
77.
Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to injunctive relief against Defendants’ tortious
interference with prospective contracts.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that judgment be entered in their favor and
against Defendant as follows:
1.
A declaration, and injunctive relief, to prevent Defendants’ threatened legal actions
that violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution;
2.
A declaration, and injunctive relief, to prevent Defendants’ threatened legal actions
14
that violate the Dormant Commerce Clause;
3.
A declaration, and injunctive relief, to prevent Defendants’ threatened legal actions
that violate the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution;
4.
A declaration, and injunctive relief, to prevent Defendants’ threatened legal actions
that are preempted based on Defense Distributed’s Export License that was issued by the State
Department;
5.
A declaration, and injunctive relief, to prevent Defendants’ threatened legal actions
that are expressly preempted by federal export control law;
6.
A declaration, and injunctive relief, to prevent Defendants’ threatened legal actions
that are preempted by field preemption by federal export control law;
7.
A declaration, and injunctive relief, to prevent Defendants’ threatened legal actions
that are preempted by conflict preemption by federal export control law;
8.
A declaration, and injunctive relief, to prevent Defendants’ threatened legal actions
that tortiously interfere with contracts, and damages to be determined for Defendants’ tortious
interference with contracts;
9.
A declaration, and injunctive relief, to prevent Defendants’ threatened legal actions
that tortiously interfere with prospective contracts, and damages to be determined for Defendants’
tortious interference with prospective contracts;
10.
Actual damages in an amount according to proof at trial;
11.
Attorney fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
12.
Any other further relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.
The Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial.
15
Dated: July 29, 2018
Alan Gura
Virginia Bar No. 68842*
Gura PLLC
916 Prince Street, Suite 107
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
703.835.9085 / Fax 703.997.7665
alan@gurapllc.com
*Admission pro hac vice pending
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Josh Blackman
Virginia Bar No. 78292
1303 San Jacinto Street
Houston, Texas 77002
202.294.9003/Fax: 713.646.1766
Josh@JoshBlackman.com
Counsel of Record
16
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?