Curtin et al v. Virginia State Board of Elections et al

Filing 1

Complaint For Declaratory & Injunctive Relief against Virginia State Board of Elections, Robert H. Brink, John O'Bannon, Jamilah D. Lecruise, Christopher E. Piper ( Filing fee $ 400, receipt number 0422-7203257.), filed by Suzanne A. Spikes, Kelley Pinzon, Donna Curtin, Tom Cranmer, Thomas Curtin, Carol D. Fox. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Declaration of Judy Flaig, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet, # 3 Exhibit Verification of Plaintiff Cranmer, # 4 Exhibit Verification of Plaintiff Fox, # 5 Exhibit Verification of Plaintiff Spikes, # 6 Exhibit Verification of Plaintiff T. Curtin, # 7 Exhibit Verification of Plaintiff Pinzon, # 8 Exhibit Verification of Plaintiff D. Curtin)(Henry, Patrick) Modified text on 5/14/2020 (klau, ).

United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia
Alexandria Division
Thomas Curtin, Donna Curtin, Suzanne A.
Spikes, Kelley Pinzon, Tom Cranmer, and Carol
D. Fox,
Plaintiffs,

Civ. No. ____________________

v.
Virginia State Board of Elections; Robert H.
Brink, in his official capacity as Chairman of the
Board, John O’Bannon, in his official capacity as
Vice Chair of the Board, and Jamilah D. Lecruise,
in her official capacity as Secretary of the Board;
and Christopher E. Piper, in his official capacity
as Commissioner of the Virginia Department Of
Elections,

Declaration of Judy Flaig

Defendants.

Declaration of Judy Flaig
I, Judy Flaig, declare as follows:
1. I was the Fairfax County Election Manager from July 1999 through my retirement in January 2018.
2. As the Election Manager, I was responsible for planning and implementing all phases of
election administration. This included, inter alia, establishing timelines, ensuring compliance
with statutory deadlines, security arrangements, contingency planning, securing polling places,
determining the number of ballots to be printed and supplies to be ordered, producing training
materials, recruiting and training election officers, supervising office staff, and submitting budgets.

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Exhibit A

3. Prior to being the Election Manager, I was on the staff at the Fairfax County Election Office from September 1987 through March 1996 and served as an Election Officer from 1976
through 1986.
4. I am a Certified Elections/Registration Administrator, and have been since August 2004.
5. I have direct knowledge of the Fairfax County Election Office and Virginia elections.
6. I am familiar with both in-person and absentee voting processes in Virginia, and have
personal experience with both.
7. I have personally participated in the absentee voting process in Fairfax County.
8. While the number of absentee ballots have increased in recent years, the number of voters
voting by mail is roughly 5-10% for normal elections.
9. A sudden dramatic increase in absentee ballots, would be a logistical nightmare and increases the risk of disenfranchisement. Some examples of most detrimental issues are detailed
below.
10. First, Virginia does not have the necessary equipment, infrastructure, or processes to
deal with a dramatic increase in absentee ballots. While some states have transititioned to allmail voting, these states have automated systems, barcodes, methods of tracking boxes, etc. and
had several years to plan and implement their new system. Virginia has never had a large percentage of ballots submitted by mail.
11. Moreover, Virginia does not have a reliable way to track ballots, so there would be no
way of knowing whether ballots were properly delivered or properly received.
12. Second, election offices are staffed to deal with the standard number of absentee ballots.
If there were to be a large influx of absentee ballots, it is likely that many jurisdictions will not
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Exhibit A

have enough staff to process them. Moreover, with existing social distancing guidelines, many
locations will not have space available to adequately staff election offices to deal with the large
influx of absentee ballots.
13. The lack of space and social distancing requirements may also prevent political party
observers from observing the vote count, which increases the chances of mistakes going undetected.
14. Third, the process of sending, receiving, and counting ballots is a tedious process. For
example, almost all of the process is still done manually. While voter information is entered into
the computer system, all mailings are assembled by hand and labels manually attached.
15. Despite all of the established processes and precautions to avoid errors, there is normal
human error in every election. This would be sure to increase if an elections office is overwhelmed with applications and ballots.
16. My experience with election workers is that they are hardworking, dedicated individuals
who will work around the clock, if necessary. But if workers are overworked and tired, mistakes
are certain to increase.
17. Fourth, many jurisdictions will not have adequate space for counting absentee ballots,
especially under social distancing guidelines. In normal years, the Fairfax County Elections Office pre-processes a large number of absentee ballots in a small conference room and on Election
Night takes over and secures the entire conference center (3 large capacity rooms and 3 small
capacity rooms) to process and count absentee ballots. To handle a large influx of ballots,
pre-processing would have to increase dramatically in Fairfax County which requires more
space, and pre-processing would need to be implemented in many other jurisdictions which adds

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Exhibit A

to the complexity of the process with respect to space, security, tracking, and storage of ballots.
Any increase in complexity, especially without adequate time to prepare, will certainly lead to an
increased number of errors.
18. Fifth, the existing secure storage options are not equipped to handle a massive influx of
absentee ballots. Before an election, secure storage is needed to ensure that all ballots get
counted. After an election, secure storage of the absentee ballots is necessary for recount situations.
19. While some larger jurisdictions may be able to comply with the secure storage needs,
smaller jurisdictions will likely run out of secure storage options. This will result in either boxes
being moved or boxes being stored in a variety of locations—both of which risk loss of boxes.
There is also an increased risk of boxes being tampered with, as Virginia does not require tamper
evident security measures.
20. In years with a normal amount of absentee ballots, Fairfax County has dealt with space
issues—a problem that is sure to be exasperated with an influx of absentee ballots. It is almost
certain that Fairfax County would have to obtain additional secure storage to store ballots.
21. In a prior election recount, the Clerk of Court refused to allow the boxes to be transferred offsite to avoid misplacing boxes. Transport of boxes greatly increases the risk of loss or
misplacement.
22. Sixth, election offices may not be able to afford to administer additional absentee ballots. Absentee balloting is much more expensive than in-person voting. For example, it costs two
to three cents per ballot just to have the absentee ballots folded for mailing (in-person voting
ballots are not folded). There are also additional costs for postage, envelopes, labels, boxes, etc,

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Exhibit A

Exhibit A

Exhibit A