State of Washington, et al., v. Trump., et al

Filing 113

RESPONSE by Plaintiff State of Washington re 108 Notice-Other Notice of Filing of Executive Order (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of N. Purcell, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Exhibit J)(Melody, Colleen)

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Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 113 Filed 03/09/17 Page 1 of 16 1 THE HONORABLE JAMES L. ROBART 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 STATE OF WASHINGTON, and 9 STATE OF MINNESOTA, Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-00141-JLR 10 11 Plaintiffs, v. 12 DONALD TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United 13 States; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; JOHN 14 F. KELLY, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of 15 Homeland Security; REX W. TILLERSON, in his official capacity 16 as Secretary of State; and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 17 Defendants. 18 19 I. RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF EXECUTIVE ORDER INTRODUCTION 20 When a court enjoins a defendant from implementing policies, the defendant cannot 21 evade that injunction simply by reissuing the same basic policies in a new form. Courts do not 22 issue injunctive relief in a game of whack-a-mole, forced to start anew at a defendant’s whim. 23 See, e.g., Sys. Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961) (“[N]either 24 the plaintiff nor the court should be subjected to the unnecessary burden of re-establishing 25 what has once been decided.”). Of course, a defendant need not be bound forever by an 26 RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 113 Filed 03/09/17 Page 2 of 16 1 injunction, and can request its modification or termination under well-settled rules, but it is the 2 court—not the defendant—that decides whether modification is warranted. 3 President Trump here seeks to evade these fundamental principles. On February 3, this 4 Court enjoined key provisions of Executive Order No. 13769 (First Executive Order). The 5 Ninth Circuit unequivocally rejected President Trump’s request to stay or narrow this Court’s 6 injunction. Nonetheless, on March 6, President Trump signed a new Executive Order (Second 7 Executive Order) that, in the words of his own senior advisers, adopts “the same basic policy” 8 as the first: “the goal is obviously to maintain the way that we did it the first time.” In 9 particular, the policy purports to reinstate two provisions of the prior order that this Court 10 enjoined: (1) a 90-day ban on entry of persons from several Muslim-majority countries, and 11 (2) a 120-day suspension of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. See First Executive Order 12 §§ 3(c), 5(a) (imposing these bans), and ECF No. 52, at 5 (enjoining §§ 3(c), 5(a)), and Second 13 Executive Order §§ 2(c), 6(a) (reinstating these bans). 14 Although seeking to reinstate the “same basic policy” this Court already enjoined, 15 President Trump did not first ask this Court to modify or dissolve its injunction. Instead, in a 16 “Notice” filed with the Court on Monday, the President simply asserted that “[t]his Court’s 17 injunctive order does not limit [his] ability to immediately begin enforcing the [Second 18 Executive Order].” ECF No. 108, at 14 (Notice of Filing). Saying it does not make it so. While 19 this assertion may be in keeping with the President’s position that courts are powerless to 20 review his executive orders related to immigration, it is utterly inconsistent with basic legal 21 principles. It is the judicial branch, not the President, that decides whether actions are lawful, 22 and this Court should confirm that its injunction applies to these reissued provisions. The 23 burden is on Defendants to show that modification or termination of the injunction as to these 24 provisions is warranted, a burden they have not met. This Court should confirm that its 25 injunction applies to reinstated provisions 2(c) and 6(a) in the Second Executive Order and 26 direct Defendants to file a motion for modification if they wish to enforce those provisions. RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 2 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 113 Filed 03/09/17 Page 3 of 16 1 2 II. A. 3 4 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This Court and Other Courts Enjoined Key Provisions of the First Executive Order on Multiple Grounds President Trump campaigned on the promise of “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.”1 First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 42-43, Ex. 1, ECF No. 18 5 (Am. Compl.). Although he was repeatedly asked to reconsider this campaign promise, he 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 refused. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46-47, Exs. 4-5 (refusing to “pull-back” the Muslim ban; instead, referring to “extreme vetting” as “an expansion” of his position); Declaration of Noah G. Purcell in Support of Response to Defendants’ Notice of Filing of Executive Order (Purcell Decl.) ¶ 3, Ex. A (declining to “re-think” his position in the Republican primary debate); ¶ 4, Ex. B (responding to a question about his position on Muslims after being elected: “You know my plans. All along, I’ve been proven to be right”); see also Am. Compl. ¶ 43, Ex. 1 (noting President Trump’s call for a Muslim ban, to date, remains available on his campaign website). Put simply, “[t]he ‘Muslim ban’ was a centerpiece of the president’s campaign for months[.]” 14 Aziz v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-1116-LMB/TCB, 2017 WL 580855, at *8 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 15 2017). 16 One week after his inauguration, President Trump acted on his campaign promise by 17 issuing the First Executive Order. Am. Compl. ¶ 49, Ex. 7. President Trump confirmed that the 18 19 20 First Executive Order was meant to “follow[ ] through” on his campaign promise. See Purcell Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. C (“I’m here following through on what I pledged to do. That’s all I’m doing.”); see also id. (“I keep my campaign promises.”). President Trump’s advisors confirmed that the 21 First Executive Order was meant to fulfill the campaign promise. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 61, 22 23 Ex. 17 (citing cybersecurity advisor’s statement that the executive order was designed to be a “legal” ban on Muslims). 24 25 26 1 On or before March 15, 2017, a motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, to include allegations related to the Second Executive Order, shall be filed with the Court. It is anticipated that other states may join as plaintiffs at that time. RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 3 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 113 Filed 03/09/17 Page 4 of 16 1 On February 3, following a week of chaos and confusion at airports across the country, 2 this Court enjoined five sections of the First Executive Order. ECF No. 52, at IV(1)(a)-(e). The 3 Court found that the States had established: (1) both proprietary and parens patriae standing; 4 (2) that they were “likely to succeed on the merits of the claims that would entitle them to 5 relief”; (3) that they were likely to suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction; and (4) that the 6 equities and public interest tipped in their favor. ECF 52, at 4-5. Defendants sought an 7 emergency stay, but the Ninth Circuit declined to stay the injunction or alter it in any respect. 8 Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017). In particular, the Ninth Circuit refused 9 Defendants’ request to narrow the injunction to cover only lawful permanent residents and 10 other previously admitted aliens who wished to travel. Id. at 1166. Defendants have since 11 abandoned their preliminary injunction appeal and it has been dismissed. 9th Cir. ECF Nos. 12 186-87. 13 Many other courts agreed with this Court and the Ninth Circuit that the First Executive 14 Order was likely unconstitutional.2 In particular, the district court for the Eastern District of 15 Virginia issued a detailed opinion reviewing the history of the President’s statements regarding 16 the order and holding that the plaintiff State of Virginia was “likely to succeed on an 17 Establishment Clause claim.” See Aziz, 2017 WL 580855, at *8. 18 B. 19 The Second Executive Order Adopts “the Same Basic Policy” as the First and Retains Two Key Provisions Already Enjoined by this Court After being restrained from implementing the First Executive Order, President Trump 20 issued a second. According to his senior staff, the revisions in the Second Executive Order are 21 intended to address only “very technical issues” and achieve “the same basic policy outcome” 22 as the first. Purcell Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. D (statements of Senior Policy Advisor Stephen Miller); see 23 2 24 25 26 In addition to this Court’s preliminary injunction, federal courts in the following cases have enjoined parts or all of the travel ban: Arab Am. Civil Rights League v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-10310, ECF 8 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2017) (order granting permanent injunction, in part); Darweesh v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00480, ECF 8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017) (order granting stay of removal and TRO); Vayeghan v. Kelly, No. 2:17-cv-00702, ECF 5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2017) (granting TRO); Mohammed v. United States, No. 2:17-cv-00786, ECF 7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) (granting TRO). RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 4 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 113 Filed 03/09/17 Page 5 of 16 1 also id. ¶ 7, Ex. E (statement of White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer on March 6, that “if 2 you think about it, the principles of the executive order remain the same”). In the words of the 3 President’s spokesman: “the goal is obviously to maintain the way that we did it the first time.” 4 Id. ¶ 8, Ex. F. President Trump likewise tied the Second Executive Order to his previous 5 campaign promises, sending a fundraising email the day that he signed the Second Executive 6 Order citing it as an example of keeping a campaign promise and again emphasizing its focus 7 on “radical” Muslims. Id. ¶ 9, Ex. G. 8 The Second Executive Order purports to reinstate two key provisions that have already 9 been enjoined by this Court. While the provisions differ slightly from their original 10 incarnations, the differences do not remove them from the ambit of this Court’s injunction. 11 The first reinstated provision is the bar on entry of individuals based on their national 12 origin. Enjoined section 3(c) of the First Executive Order barred entry of individuals for 90 13 days from seven Muslim-majority countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and 14 Yemen. The Second Executive Order retains this unconstitutional provision. Section (2)(c) of 15 the Second Executive Order bars entry of individuals for 90 days from the same Muslim- 16 majority countries, with the exception of Iraq. While section 3 of the Second Executive Order 17 differs from the original in that it excludes lawful permanent residents, visa-holders, and 18 refugees living in the United States from its travel ban, it bars entry for virtually all other aliens 19 from the listed countries, including: relatives of U.S. citizens from the listed countries; students 20 who have been admitted to state universities but not yet received visas; prospective employees 21 of state universities or private businesses who have been offered positions but not yet obtained 22 visas; students and employees who may need to renew their visas; and many other individuals 23 protected by this Court’s order. The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected Defendants’ request to 24 narrow the injunction to exclude these categories of individuals. Washington, 847 F.3d at 1166. 25 The second reinstated provision is the 120-day suspension of the U.S. Refugee 26 Admissions Program. Section 6(a) of the Second Executive Order is almost identical to its RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 5 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 113 Filed 03/09/17 Page 6 of 16 1 predecessor—enjoined section 5(a)—and differs only cosmetically, such as by modifying the 2 refugee suspension to exclude those already scheduled for travel. While the Second Executive 3 Order removes other provisions related to refugees enjoined by this Court (particularly section 4 5(c), which indefinitely suspended entry of Syrian refugees, and section 5(e)’s explicit 5 preference based on religious minority status), removal of those provisions does not alter the 6 virtually complete overlap between new section 6(a) and enjoined section 5(a). 7 As with the First Executive Order, the Second Executive Order states that the six- 8 country and refugee bans are subject to possible waivers. For the six-country ban, the Second 9 Executive Order provides that “case-by-case waivers could be appropriate.” Second Executive 10 Order § 3(c). This parallels the “national interest” waivers following “case-by-case 11 determinations” available under section 3(g) of the First Executive Order. Likewise, the 12 refugee ban remains subject to waivers on the same terms as the First Executive Order: “[O]n a 13 case-by-case basis, in their discretion, but only so long as [the Secretaries of State and 14 Homeland Security] determine” that the refugee’s admission (1) “is in the national interest,” 15 and (2) does not pose a threat “to the security or welfare of the United States.” First Executive 16 Order § 5(e); Second Executive Order § 6(c). 17 In short, with the retention of these provisions, it remains apparent that President 18 Trump is not backing down from his campaign promise. Like their predecessors, new sections 19 2(c) and 6(a) have the same effect as sections of the First Executive Order that have already 20 been enjoined: they broadly ban aliens from listed majority-Muslim countries and suspend the 21 U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. 22 III. ARGUMENT 23 The President cannot unilaterally declare himself free of this Court’s injunction and 24 reinstate policies that this Court already enjoined. Rather, President Trump bears the burden of 25 showing that the factual or legal background has changed significantly enough to warrant a 26 modification of this Court’s injunction. He has not met and cannot meet this burden. RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 6 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 113 Filed 03/09/17 Page 7 of 16 1 A. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 “A party seeking modification or dissolution of an injunction bears the burden of establishing that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision or dissolution of the injunction.” Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2000). This standard applies to motions to dissolve preliminary injunctions. Alto v. Black, 738 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2013). Modification may be appropriate where a significant change “threaten[s] to convert a previously proper injunction ‘into an instrument of wrong,’ ” such that “judicial intervention may be necessary to prevent inequities.” Gooch v. Life Inv’rs Ins. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 402, 414 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714-15 (2010)). 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Defendants Must Show a Significant Change in Fact or Law, and that Inequity Will Result if the Status Quo Remains in Place In considering a motion to modify or dissolve a preliminary injunction, the Court does not revisit its underlying order, but limits its consideration to “new material presented with respect to the motion to dissolve.” Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1170; see also Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[A] motion to modify a preliminary injunction is meant only to relieve inequities that arise after the original order.” (emphasis added) (quoting Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1993))). Finally, the moving party must show that its proposed modification is “suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.” Bellevue Manor Assocs. v. United States, 165 F.3d 1249, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 393 (1992)). B. Defendants Are Not Excused From Proving the Modification Requirements Here, Defendants do not even attempt the required showing, apparently assuming that the Second Executive Order exempts them from the normal rules.3 They are mistaken. 22 23 24 25 26 3 Despite baldly asserting that the Second Executive Order will operate free of the injunction, Defendants neglect to note their Notice of Filing as a motion, cite the Court to the applicable standard for modification or dissolution, or explain how maintaining the injunction results in inequity to them. Defendants’ attempt to slip their request for relief into the Notice of Filing violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b). Under that Rule, Defendants are required to “state with particularity the grounds” for relief and “state the relief sought.” Id. 7(b)(1)(b)-(c). They do neither. If the Court is inclined to grant Defendants’ motion, the undersigned respectfully request that the Court first set a hearing and consider argument on Defendants’ claim that they may ignore the preliminary injunction. See LCR 7(b)(4). RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 7 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 113 Filed 03/09/17 Page 8 of 16 1 Under well-settled law, this Court’s preliminary injunction remains in effect unless it is 2 altered by this Court or an appellate court, or until a final judgment on the merits is rendered. 3 See Order, ECF No. 78, at 4 (“[T]he Court agrees that the Ninth Circuit has construed the TRO 4 as a preliminary injunction”); U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank N.V., 590 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th 5 Cir. 2010) (“[T]he very purpose of a preliminary injunction . . . is to preserve the status quo 6 and the rights of the parties until a final judgment issues in the cause.” (citing Univ. of Texas v. 7 Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981))). “The ‘purpose of a preliminary injunction is to 8 preserve the status quo ante litem pending a determination of the action on the merits.’ ” 9 Boardman v. Pac. Seafood Grp., 822 F.3d 1011, 1024 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Sierra Forest 10 Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2009)). “ ‘Status quo ante litem’ refers to ‘the last 11 uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.’ ” Boardman, 822 F.3d at 1024 12 (quoting GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000)). Until then, 13 “neither the plaintiff nor the court should be subjected to the unnecessary burden of re- 14 establishing what has once been decided.” Sys. Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t, 364 U.S. at 15 647. 16 It should go without saying that Defendants cannot evade this rule by unilaterally 17 declaring that they have made sufficient changes to the enjoined policy to take it outside the 18 scope of the prior injunction. See, e.g., Movers Conference of Am. v. United States, 251 F. 19 Supp. 882, 885 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (holding that federal government should have sought 20 modification of injunction rather than simply adopting revised policy that purported to address 21 court’s prior holding); McCarty Corp. v. Rice, No. 89-2668-OG, 1989 WL 201077, at *1 22 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 1989) (holding that “[d]efendants may not evade the legal effect of [the] 23 preliminary injunction by circumventing normal legal channels,” and enforcing preliminary 24 injunction against Defendants’ proposed actions that were “inconsistent with the injunctive 25 order still in effect”); see also id. (“[D]efendants may not effectively remove from this Court 26 jurisdiction and control over a case which is still pending before it.”); see also Innovation RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 8 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 113 Filed 03/09/17 Page 9 of 16 1 Ventures, LLC v. N2G Distrib., Inc., No. 08-CV-10983, 2013 WL 2145677, at *6 (E.D. Mich. 2 May 15, 2013) (holding defendants in contempt for making only “minor changes” to enjoined 3 conduct in an effort “to hide from and avoid [their] obligations under this Court’s order”), 4 aff’d, 763 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014). Issuing a Second Executive Order that repeats two of the 5 five enjoined provisions, while within the President’s prerogative, does nothing to alter or 6 dispose of this Court’s injunction. Sections 2(c) and 6(a) of the Second Executive Order, which 7 have “the same effect as the already-enjoined . . . policy,” may not be implemented without 8 this Court first agreeing to modify or terminate the injunction. Potter v. District of Columbia, 9 Nos. 01-1189-JR, 05-1792-JR, 2007 WL 2892685, *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2007) (confirming that 10 preliminary injunction of employer’s “grooming policy,” which required that firefighters who 11 wear beards for religious reasons be clean-shaven, also enjoined subsequent “safety policy,” 12 which forbade certain workers to have facial hair); see also Movers Conference of Am., 251 F. 13 Supp. at 885; McCarty Corp., 1989 WL 201077, at *1. 14 Defendants make only a passing argument to the contrary, citing Fusari v. Steinberg, 15 419 U.S. 379 (1975), and Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church of Miami, Fla., Inc., 404 U.S. 16 412 (1972), for the proposition that the Second Executive Order “falls outside of this Court’s 17 injunction” because it is substantially different from the now-revoked First Executive Order. 18 Notice of Filing, ECF No. 108, at 14. But Fusari and Diffenderfer provide no authority for that 19 proposition. In Fusari, a federal district court held that aspects of Connecticut’s unemployment 20 compensation scheme violated due process and enjoined the state from denying benefits under 21 that scheme, but it stayed its injunction pending appeal. While the case was on appeal, the 22 legislature “completely altered” the challenged system. Fusari, 419 U.S. at 379-80, 384-85. 23 The Supreme Court expressed no opinion about the injunction, which was stayed in any event, 24 and instead declined to rule in the first instance on the constitutionality of the “completely 25 altered” scheme, remanding to the trial court for “reconsideration in light of the intervening 26 changes in Connecticut law.” Fusari, 419 U.S. at 389-90. The case is an example of appellate RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 9 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 113 Filed 03/09/17 Page 10 of 16 1 restraint to avoid ruling in the first instance on a constitutional question where the underlying 2 law had changed dramatically; it says nothing about a district court’s ability to enforce its own 3 injunction in the face of a defendant’s attempt to reinstate enjoined policies. Diffenderfer is 4 even less relevant, as it did not involve an injunction at all and instead simply held that changes 5 to state law while the appeal was pending had rendered the case moot, an argument that 6 Defendants have not advanced and could not plausibly advance here. Diffenderfer, 404 U.S. at 7 414-15. 8 To the extent Defendants mean to imply that they have mooted the entire injunction by 9 revising some of the enjoined provisions, they are mistaken. Compare Second Executive Order 10 § 1(i) (“revoking” and “replacing” the First Executive Order), with Ne. Fla. Chapter of 11 Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 660-62 (1993) 12 (concluding controversy was not moot where City “repealed” and “replaced” challenged 13 ordinance, though new ordinance differed in certain respects from the prior one, because it 14 disadvantaged complainants “in the same fundamental way”); see also Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 15 101 F.3d 1544, 1548 (8th Cir. 1996) (“The Supreme Court has held that where a new statute ‘is 16 sufficiently similar to the repealed [statute] that it is permissible to say that the challenged 17 conduct continues’ the controversy is not mooted by the change . . . .” (alteration in original) 18 (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors, 508 U.S. at 662 n.3)); Smith v. 19 Exec. Dir. of Ind. War Mem’ls Comm’n, 742 F.3d 282, 287 (7th Cir. 2014) (“When a 20 challenged policy is repealed or amended mid-lawsuit—a ‘recurring problem when injunctive 21 relief is sought’—the case is not moot if a substantially similar policy has been instituted or is 22 likely to be instituted.” (quoting ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire Prot. Dist., 724 23 F.3d 854, 864 (7th Cir. 2013))). 24 Simply put, Defendants cannot unilaterally declare that they are free to implement 25 Sections 2(c) or 6(a) of the Second Executive Order. Absent a successful motion to modify the 26 preliminary injunction, “such injunction will remain in force as applied to [the] amended RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 10 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 113 Filed 03/09/17 Page 11 of 16 1 [Executive Order].” See Mescall v. Rochford, No. 75 C 3913, 1976 WL 1672, *2 (N.D. Ill. 2 May 3, 1976) (denying motion to vacate preliminary injunction issued against challenged rule 3 because “amended [rule] remains of questionable constitutionality”). 4 C. To the Extent Defendants’ Notice Is Construed as a Motion, It Should Be Denied 5 Even assuming that Defendants’ notice can be construed as a motion to modify the 6 preliminary injunction with respect to the six-country or refugee bans, the Court should deny 7 Defendants’ request. Not only do the Second Executive Order’s provisions share fundamental 8 features with those enjoined in the First Executive Order, but, by Defendants’ own admission, 9 they were motivated by the same goals and designed to achieve the “same basic policy 10 outcome.” See Purcell Decl. ¶¶ 6-8, Exs. D-F. 11 First, the President admits that the Second Executive Order redeploys “critical 12 provisions” of the First Executive Order. Second Executive Order § 1(c). Sections 2(c) and 13 6(a) have the same basic effects as sections of the First Executive Order that this Court already 14 enjoined, namely sections 3(c) and 5(a). Although section 2(c) now exempts certain individuals 15 covered by the prior section 3(c) (including green card holders and visa holders), the Ninth 16 Circuit already rejected the idea that the prior injunction protected only these individuals. 17 Washington, 847 F.3d at 1166. And although the revised order eliminates other provisions 18 related to refugees that this Court enjoined, it makes no material change to section 5(a) in new 19 section 6(a). The bottom line is that this Court already enjoined Defendants from suspending 20 the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program and the entry of nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, 21 Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The President cannot unilaterally reinstate these provisions just by 22 repackaging them. 23 To the extent Defendants seek to treat the Second Executive Order’s waiver provisions 24 as a get-out-of-jail free card, it is inappropriate because materially identical waiver provisions 25 applied to the First Executive Order. Compare First Executive Order §§ 3(g), 5(e), with Second 26 Executive Order §§ 3(c), 6(a). As before, waivers, if any, will be granted exclusively at RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 113 Filed 03/09/17 Page 12 of 16 1 Defendants’ discretion. See Second Executive Order § 3(c) (identifying circumstances where a 2 case-by-case waiver “could be appropriate”) (emphasis added). And, unlike almost all other 3 provisions in the Second Executive Order—which instruct federal agencies to submit detailed 4 reports on their progress, implement “uniform screening and vetting standards,” and issue 5 appropriate “directives,”—the waiver provisions carry no such procedural requirements. 6 Cf. Second Executive Order § 2(b) (report on worldwide review); § 2(e) (submission of 7 recommendations); § 2(g) (joint report); § 5(a) (“implement a program”); § 5(b) (reports at 60, 8 100, and 200 days of the order); § 6(a) (review and implement procedures); § 7 (reconsider 9 certain authority, directives, and guidance); § 8(b) (periodic reports at 100, 180, 200, and 365 10 days); § 11(a)-(b) (collect and publish information every 180 days). In light of Defendants’ 11 alleged motivations in issuing the Second Executive Order, the lack of any implementing 12 provisions suggests the waivers may be nothing more than an empty promise. See also 13 Washington, 847 F.3d at 1169 (rejecting argument that “waiver provisions are a sufficient 14 safety valve”). 15 Second, Defendants have not shown and cannot show that the unlawful, discriminatory 16 motives that played a part in the adoption of the First Executive Order somehow disappeared in 17 adopting nearly identical provisions of the Second Executive Order. See Aziz, 2017 WL 18 580855, at *8 (“the world is not made brand new every morning” (quoting McCreary Cty. v. 19 ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005)). This Court, the Ninth Circuit, and other courts have all 20 found that states’ Establishment Clause and equal protection claims based on improper 21 religious intent are quite strong. See, e.g., ECF 52, at 4; Washington, 847 F.3d at 1168 (“The 22 States’ [Establishment Clause and Equal Protection] claims raise serious allegations and 23 present significant constitutional questions.”); Aziz, 2017 WL 580855, at *8 (same). Thus, 24 Defendants are simply incorrect to claim that “the concerns relied upon by the States in 25 bringing this action are no longer at issue.” Notice of Filing, ECF No. 108, at 14. 26 RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 113 Filed 03/09/17 Page 13 of 16 1 Indeed, senior Administration officials have reiterated that Defendants’ current 2 motivations are no different than the first time around. See Purcell Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. D; (Second 3 Executive Order designed to achieve “the same basic policy outcome”); see also id. ¶ 7, Ex. E 4 (“[I]f you think about it, the principles of the executive order remain the same.”); Peacock v. 5 Duval, 694 F.2d 644, 646 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding “post hoc rationalizations” cannot prevent a 6 “searching inquiry” into the motives behind alleged constitutional violations). And the 7 evidence that has appeared since the Court’s initial injunction only further highlights that 8 Defendants’ purported national security motivations for issuing the executive orders are 9 pretextual. See Purcell Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. H at 1 (“Key Finding[ ]” by Department of Homeland 10 Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis that “country of citizenship is unlikely to be a 11 reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity”); id. ¶ 11, Ex. I at 1 (“Key Judgment[ ]” of same 12 office that “most foreign-born, US-based extremists likely radicalized several years after their 13 entry to the United States, limiting the ability of screening and vetting officials to prevent their 14 entry because of national security concerns”). The Administration’s rejection of intelligence 15 reports that conflict with its preferred outcome only adds to the mountain of motive evidence 16 already present in this case. See Purcell Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. J (lamentation by senior Administration 17 official that “[t]his is not the intelligence assessment the president asked for”). 18 Finally, Defendants point to no evidence that inequity will result from maintaining the 19 status quo until the merits are determined. Cf. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 400 F.3d at 20 1124 (“[A] motion to modify a preliminary injunction is meant only to relieve inequities that 21 arise after the original order.”). Instead, equity favors “preserv[ing] the status quo and the 22 rights of the parties until a final judgment issues[.]” U.S. Philips Corp., 590 F.3d at 1094. As 23 the Ninth Circuit held in rejecting Defendants’ claim that they would suffer irreparable harm 24 absent a stay of this Court’s injunction, “the Government submitted no evidence to rebut the 25 States’ argument that the district court’s order merely returned the nation temporarily to the 26 position it has occupied for many previous years.” Washington, 847 F.3d at 1168; accord Aziz, RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 113 Filed 03/09/17 Page 14 of 16 1 2017 WL 580855, at *10 (finding that Defendants had shown no harm from enjoining the First 2 Executive Order by presenting no “evidence of harm they or the nation will suffer” beyond 3 “bare assertions that the [Executive Order] is necessary for national security”). That analysis 4 remains correct. Defendants will suffer no inequity from leaving the status quo in place until 5 the merits are settled. 6 In summary, Defendants show no significant change in fact, law, or equity that would 7 warrant modification of this Court’s preliminary injunction. Sections 2(c) and 6(a) of the 8 Second Executive Order are materially indistinguishable from provisions this Court already 9 enjoined, and are motivated by the same religious animus as the First Executive Order. Absent 10 modification by this Court following a properly noted motion and opportunity to be heard, the 11 injunction applies and restrains Defendants from implementing these provisions. 12 IV. CONCLUSION 13 Defendants unilaterally declare that “[t]his Court’s injunctive order does not limit the 14 Government’s ability to immediately begin enforcing the New Executive Order.” Notice of 15 Filing, ECF No. 108, at 14. Defendants are incorrect. This Court should confirm that its 16 preliminary injunction continues to restrain Defendants from implementing sections 2(c) and 17 6(a) of the Second Executive Order, which purport to reinstate provisions of the First 18 Executive Order already enjoined by the Court. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 14 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 113 Filed 03/09/17 Page 15 of 16 1 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of March 2017. 2 ROBERT W. FERGUSON Washington Attorney General 3 s/ Robert W. Ferguson ROBERT W. FERGUSON, WSBA #26004 4 5 NOAH G. PURCELL, WSBA #43492 Solicitor General 6 7 COLLEEN M. MELODY, WSBA #42275 Civil Rights Unit Chief 8 ANNE E. EGELER, WSBA #20258 Deputy Solicitor General 9 MARSHA CHIEN, WSBA #47020 PATRICIO A. MARQUEZ, WSBA #47693 Assistant Attorneys General 10 11 Office of the Attorney General 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 464-7744 Noahp@atg.wa.gov 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 15 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 113 Filed 03/09/17 Page 16 of 16 1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 2 I hereby certify that the foregoing document was electronically filed with the United 3 States District Court using the CM/ECF system. I certify that all participants in the case are 4 registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF 5 system. 6 7 March 9, 2017 s/ Noah G. Purcell NOAH G. PURCELL, WSBA 43492 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 16 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744

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