Summers, Lianne v. Astrue, Michael

Filing 39

Transmission of Notice of Appeal, Docket Sheet and Judgment to Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals re 36 Notice of Appeal. (Attachments: # 1 Order, # 2 Judgment, # 3 Order, # 4 Docket sheet) (jef),(ps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
LIANNE RACHEL SUMMERS,
Plaintiff,

OPINION AND ORDER

v.
12-cv-22-wmc
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
In this pro se action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), plaintiff Lianne

Summers seeks judicial review of an adverse decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security finding her ineligible for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social
Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423(d), and Supplemental Security
Income benefits under Title XVI of the Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381(a) and
1382(a). Summers has submitted several pages of additional medical records not before
the administrative law judge (ALJ) and contends that the ALJ (1) made a faulty credibility
assessment, (2) failed to explain why he found her capable of frequent fine manipulations
and (3) erred in not considering the full effects of her Lyme disease, chronic constipation
and back problems. In response, the Commissioner seeks affirmance. Because there is
substantial evidence in the record to support the decision, and no reversible error, the
court will affirm the Commissioner‟s decision and dismiss this case.

BACKGROUND FACTS
The following facts are drawn from the administrative record (AR):

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Plaintiff Lianne Summers injured her back in a motor vehicle accident on June 12,
2004. (AR 351, 353.) Summers‟s insured status expired on September 30, 2007. (AR
168, 262.) On September 17, 2009, she filed applications for disability insurance and
supplemental security income benefits, claiming that she had been disabled since June 1,
2004, because of back problems and possible Crohn‟s disease. (AR 244, 250, 307, 386.)
On March 25, 2011, Summers appeared in a video hearing before Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) Joseph Jacobson at which she was represented by a lawyer, William
Wulf. (AR 53-84.) At the hearing, Summers testified that she could not work because
of: (1) chronic back pain that sometimes radiates into her feet; (2) joint pain in her
knees, hips, shoulders, and ankles from fibromyalgia and Lyme‟s disease that sometimes
forces her to lie down for hours; and (3) occasional pain in her hands and fingers. (AR
65-66, 71-72.)

She acknowledged not having too much trouble picking things up or

doing things with her hands and fingers, but described problems sleeping, walking more
than a quarter of a mile, falling once every couple of months and being able to stand or sit
for extended periods. (AR 68-69, 72-74.)
In a written decision issued on April 14, 2011, the ALJ concluded that although
Summers had several severe impairments (obesity, fibromyalgia and disorders of the back,
muscles, ligaments and fascia), which prevented her from performing past work as a
correction officer, retail manager and laborer, Summers still had the residual functional
capacity (RFC) to perform sedentary work involving simple, routine and repetitive tasks

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and frequent fine manipulation. 1

(AR 168-69, 171.)

Relying on the testimony of a

vocational expert, the ALJ also concluded that Summers was not disabled because she
could perform more than 24,000 jobs available in Wisconsin. (AR 172.)
While still represented by Wulf, Summers requested that the Appeals Council
review the ALJ‟s decision, arguing that the ALJ made a faulty credibility assessment, failed
to explain why he found her capable of frequent fine manipulation and erred in not
considering the full effects of her Lyme disease, chronic constipation and back problems.
(AR 162-64.) The Appeals Council denied Summers‟ request for review on October 20,
2011, making the ALJ‟s determination the final Agency decision.

OPINION
A federal court reviews an administrative disability determination with deference
and will uphold a denial of benefits unless the ALJ‟s decision is not supported by
substantial evidence or is based on an error of law. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Terry v. Astrue,
580 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2009). Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). “Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds
to differ about whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on
the [C]ommissioner, or the [C]ommissioner‟s designate, the ALJ.” Herr v. Sullivan, 912
F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir.

1

These facts are drawn from the administrative record (AR).

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1987) (citation omitted). Thus, a reviewing court cannot reconsider facts, re-weigh the
evidence, decide questions of credibility or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that
of the ALJ. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000).
In her pro se briefs before this court, Summers states that she is renewing her
arguments made before the Appeals Council and challenging many of the ALJ‟s findings
concerning the medical evidence, claiming that he either misunderstood or ignored various
aspects of her medical records. See Pltf‟s Br., dkt. 26; Pltf‟s Req. for Rev. of Hrng. Dec.,
AR 162-63. Most of her arguments relate to the ALJ‟s assessment of her impairments
and credibility.

In addition, Summers has filed several pages of additional medical

records that were not before the ALJ at the time of the hearing.

These issues are

addressed in reverse order below.

A.

Additional Medical Evidence

Because the additional medical evidence was neither part of the record before the
original ALJ nor considered by the Appeals Council in a decision on the merits, this court
cannot consider it in reviewing that decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wolfe v. Shalala,
997 F.2d 321, 322 n.3 (7th Cir. 1993); Eads v. Secretary of Dep’t of Health and Human
Services, 983 F.2d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 1993). A district court may remand in light of
additional evidence without considering the correctness of the commissioner‟s decision
under sentence six of § 405(g), but only if (1) the evidence is new and material and (2)

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there is good cause for the failure to produce the evidence before the ALJ. See Melkonyan
v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 100-01 (1991).
As for the first of these two requirements, evidence is deemed “new” if it was “not
in existence or available to the claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding”; and
is deemed “material” if there is a “reasonable probability” that the ALJ would have
reached a different conclusion had the evidence been considered. Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395
F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Johnson v. Apfel, 191 F.3d 770, 776 (7th Cir. 1999));
Perkins v. Chater, 107 F.3d 1290, 1296 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, new evidence is material
only if it is relevant to the claimant's condition “during the relevant time period
encompassed by the disability application under review.” Id. (citing Kapusta v. Sullivan,
900 F.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1990)).
The “additional evidence” submitted by plaintiff consists of the following:

(1)

medical records showing that Summers was given antibiotics in May 2006 for “possible
Lyme disease because Summers had reported that she had been diagnosed with the
disease 11 years earlier (see Pltf‟s “Exh. Q,” dkt. 23, exh. 3); (2) a February 22, 1981
emergency room report of an examination of Summers after she was in a car accident
when she was nine years old (see Pltf‟s “Exh. X,” dkt. 16, exh. 1); (3) a report from social
worker Richard Pike dated January 23, 2012, detailing Summers‟s counseling sessions
over the past few months (see Pltf‟s “Exh. Y,” dkt. 23, exh. 4); a psychiatric review
technique form completed by Pike on January 24, 2012 (see Plf‟s “Exh. Z,” dkt. 16, exh.

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2); and (5) progress notes from Summers‟ visits to a free clinic from June 2011 to January
2012 (see Pltf‟s supplement to medical records, dkt. 7 at 7-17).
None of this evidence satisfies either criteria for a remand under sentence six.
First, the records from 1981 and 2006 were obviously in existence and available to
Summer at the time of the administrative hearing, they are not new. Summers provides
no reason why she did not submit the above records at the administrative hearing. As
the commissioner points out, an applicant represented by counsel is presumed to have
made her “strongest case for benefits.” Glenn v. Secretary of Health and Human Services,
814 F.2d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 1987). Here, Summers was represented by an attorney who
affirmatively acknowledged at the hearing that the file was complete. (AR 57.) Second,
although the 2011-2012 clinic progress notes are new, they are not material because they
document visits and treatment that took place after the administrative hearing in March
2011, which closed the relevant disability period. See Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 484
(7th Cir. 2008) (Since “[m]edical evidence postdating the ALJ's decision, unless it speaks
to the patient's condition at or before the time of the administrative hearing, could not
have affected the ALJ's decision and, therefore, does not meet the materiality
requirement.”).

Third, the same is true of Pike‟s report and psychiatric review form.

Although Pike wrote on the form that the assessment covered “September 2010 to
present,” his report indicates that he had seen Summers only over the past few months.
(AR 3.) Further, Pike did not support his report with objective findings and admitted
that he was not qualified to render a medical opinion: “I would hazard a guess, not being

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a trained medical fractional, that [Summers‟s] ability to hold down a traditional forty
hour a week job is not possible.

This guess is based on some forty-five years as a

psychotherapist.” (AR 5.)
Accordingly, this court will not remand this case pursuant to sentence six of §
405(g) for consideration of the additional evidence submitted by Summers.

B.

Impairments not Considered

Summers also argued to the Appeals Council and in her briefs to this court that the
ALJ erred in failing to find that her Lyme disease and constipation constituted severe
impairments or resulted in disabling symptoms.

Under the Social Security Act, 42

U.S.C. § 223(d)(3), an impairment must result from “anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.”

A claimant‟s statements alone cannot establish an

impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508, § 404.1528(a). In addition, “[t]he mere presence of
some impairment [in the medical records] is not disabling per se.” Hames v. Heckler, 707
F.2d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Garmon v. Apfel, 210 F.3d 374, at *4 (Table) (7th
Cir. Mar. 22, 2000) (rejecting claimant‟s argument that he had severe impairment because
he sought medical treatment for various symptoms).
a.

Lyme disease

Although Summers insisted to numerous providers and the Social Security
Administration that she has had Lyme disease since 1995, there are no records to

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corroborate her claim. Summers points out that a nurse treated her with antibiotics in
April 2010 after she presented with a tick bite and rash. (AR 423-24.) As the ALJ noted
in his opinion, however, the nurse had her tested for Lyme disease and the results were
negative. (AR 435.) Further, Dr. Ramon Espada, who was treating Summers for various
conditions at the time, noted on July 20, 2010, that three different consulting physicians
in infectious diseases, physical medicine and rheumatology opined that Lyme disease was
not a concern and refused to acquiesce to Summers‟ demands for additional testing. (AR
513.) Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ‟s decision not to include Lyme
disease as one of Summers‟s severe impairments.2
b.

Constipation

Although Summers claims that the ALJ failed to consider evidence of her
debilitating and chronic constipation, she never raised it at the hearing. While Summers
identified Crohn‟s disease as one of her impairments on her applications for benefits, she
has never received such a diagnosis. And while she now explains in her brief that she
actually was referring to her constipation, there is no documentation of any
gastrointestinal disorder in her medical records. (See Opin. of Dr. Bush, state agency
physician, concluding same, AR 387.)
In support of her alleged disabling symptoms, Summers instead identifies the
following self-reports of her constipation in her medical records:

(1) August 4, 2004

Even though there was no evidence of Lyme disease, the ALJ did credit Summers‟s
complaints of joint pain in finding that she was severely impaired with fibromyalgia and
disorders of the muscle, ligaments and fascia.
2

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progress note indicating she has constipation (AR 353); (2) September 1, 2005 progress
note indicating that she is “really constipated” (AR 372); and (3) April 19, 2010 progress
note listing severe chronic constipation as one of 25 stated health concerns (AR 437).
These sporadic references to Summers being constipated do not constitute significant
evidence of a disabling condition or severe impairment. See Baker v. Astrue, 2010 WL
538228, *5 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 8, 2010) (finding sporadic complaints of medication side
effects did not evidence severe impairment or limitation).
treatment for her constipation.

Summers never received

The physician who examined her on April 19, 2010

noted that her abdomen was normal but offered her a referral for a colonoscopy, which
she apparently never received, even though she continued to receive medical care at the
same provider for another four months.

(AR 440-41.)

Further, all of the above

notations were based on Summers‟s self-reports, and as explained further below, the ALJ
noted good reasons for not finding Summers entirely credible.

C.

Credibility Determination

Because an ALJ is in the best position to determine a witness's truthfulness, this
court will not overturn an ALJ's credibility determination unless it is “patently wrong.”
Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006); Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d
881, 887 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). This does not mean the court is
abdicating its supervisory role, but a credibility determination will be affirmed as long as
the ALJ gives specific reasons that are supported by the record for his finding. Sims v.

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Barnhart, 442 F.3d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 2006) (credibility determinations rarely disturbed
by a reviewing court); Skarbeck v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 505 (7th Cir. 2004). Here,
Summers has failed to show that the ALJ‟s reasons for credibility finding are without
record support.
In reaching his decision, the ALJ thoroughly reviewed the medical record and
provided several reasons for his decision (AR 170-71), most of which Summers challenges
by offering her own explanation for a test result or why a particular treatment was not
provided. However, Summers‟s lay assessments are not relevant. Scheck v. Barnhart, 357
F.3d 697, 702 (7th Cir. 2004)) (claimant “bears the burden of producing medical records
showing her impairment”).
Specifically, the ALJ indicated that Summers appeared eager to receive disability
and prone to exaggeration. He pointed out that on April 8, 2010, a neurologist reported
that “[t]he patient comes right off the bat stating that she „needs to go on disability‟” (AR
420), and that on April 19, 2010, Summers listed over 25 medical concerns to her
provider

(AR

436-37).

Summers

attempts

to

excuse

both

occurrences

as

misunderstandings, claiming that the neurologist mischaracterized her statement because
he was aloof and unwilling to listen to her.

She also claims to have provided an

exhaustive list of her conditions because she was seeing a new provider.

The ALJ

correctly noted, however, that Summers has continued to claim that she suffers from
several conditions that were not substantiated in the medical record, including Lyme‟s

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disease, Crohn‟s disease, intermittent foot pain, carpal tunnel syndrome and rheumatoid
arthritis.
Although an ALJ may not ignore a claimant's subjective reports of pain simply
because they are not fully supported by objective medical evidence, discrepancies between
objective evidence and self-reports may substantiate an ALJ‟s finding of exaggeration.
Sienkiewicz v. Barnhart, 409 F.3d 798, 804 (7th Cir. 2005); Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431,
435–36 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, such discrepancies exist. First, Summers claims to have
been diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome, for which she was given splints to wear, but
(1) EMG testing in June 2010 could not conclusively diagnose carpal tunnel syndrome
and (2) Summers has not otherwise been treated for the condition. (AR 487.) Second,
despite her insistence that she has Lyme disease, Summers tested negative. (AR 503,
513.) Third, laboratory tests and x-rays also ruled out rheumatoid arthritis. (AR 511.)
Finally, physicians found no evidence of infection to account for her claims of muscle and
joint pain. (AR 453.) This does not mean some, or even all of these maladies, may not
be, or have been, present, simply that the ALJ had good grounds to question Summers‟
self-reports.3

Although Summers continues to deny exaggerating her conditions and claims to only be
reporting what had been told her, the fact remains that she did provide either untrue or
misleading information in some instances. Even one of her own treating physicians
reported on July 13, 2010, that her reported pain was out of proportion to the physical
findings. (AR 497, 501.) As a result, it was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that
Summers may not be the most reliable source regarding the nature and extent of her
impairments. See Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 843–44 (7th Cir. 2007) (ALJ may
disregard claimant's assertions of own pain if he validly finds them not credible).
3

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Similarly, the record does not contain significant evidence of Summers having foot
problems independent of her back pain. (Summers has alleged that her back condition
can cause pain, tingling and numbness in her feet.) Although she complained of foot
pain on February 2, 2005, x-rays of her foot showed normal bone and joint relationships.
(AR 375, 378.) While Summers also takes issue with the fact that the ALJ found that
she has retained the ability to ambulate effectively, alleging that her back disorder and
fibromyalgia both greatly affect her ability to walk, the ALJ made his comment in
reference to Summers‟ alleged foot pain. In any event, because the ALJ found Summers
capable of sedentary work, her ability to ambulate on a sustained basis is not at issue in
this case.
The ALJ also concluded that the medical findings and treatment related to
Summers‟ back pain and fibromyalgia were not consistent with her reported symptoms.
In doing so, the ALJ correctly reported that the treatment for Summers‟s fibromyalgia was
limited to the use of hot and cold compresses (AR 474); noted that testing showed
Summers has good muscle strength and normal neurological symptoms (AR 422); and
pointed out that Summers‟s physicians also used only conservative treatment for her back
pain. (AR 517.) Indeed, Summers did not seek any treatment between 2005 and 2009
(AR 513) or again after August 2010. (Id.) In 2010, a spinal MRI also showed only
minimal findings (some early degenerative changes at L1-2, possible tiny annual tear,
bulging at T7-8 and T8-9 levels), and her neurological examination was within normal
limits. (AR 420-22, 443-44, 500-01.)

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While Summers argues that the ALJ failed to give sufficient weight to her earlier
MRI and CT scan, neither of these tests negate the 2010 findings. A July 21, 2004, MRI
of Summers‟s thoracic spine showed mild levoscoliosis (spinal curve to the left) and an
intervertebral disk bulge to the left at T8-9, and an MRI of her lumbar spine showed
bulging disks with central annular tears at L1-2 and L5-S1 with moderate facet
arthropathy (degenerative disease affecting joints) at L5-S1. (AR 345-46.) By February
15, 2005, however, a CT scan of her lumbar spine showed a large right posterior
paramedian disk extrusion at L1-2 but only minimal degenerative changes at L2-3 and no
abnormality at L5-S1. (AR 347.) Although Dr. Mark Kabins indicated on February 28,
2005, that Summers might be a candidate for surgical reconstruction at the L1-2 level,
because she had not responded to conservative treatment and injection therapy, he noted
on March 28, 2005, that surgery had not been recommended and Summers was to
continue with conservative care, including physical therapy and muscle relaxers.

(AR

349, 357, 481-83.) Summers did not receive further treatment until 2010, when she
reported sciatic pain. (AR 394-95.)4

Error! Main Document Only.In this case, there was evidence in the record and at the
hearing that Summers did not seek treatment during that time because she did not have
health insurance and could not afford it. (AR 57.) Error! Main Document Only.Because
the Social Security Agency “has expressly endorsed the inability to pay as an explanation
excusing a claimant's failure to seek treatment,” Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 638 (7th
Cir. 2013) (citing SSR 96–7p at *8), the ALJ should have addressed Summers‟
explanation explicitly in reaching his credibility determination, but failed to do so. To
the extent that the ALJ erred in not considering Summers‟s lack of health insurance,
however, that error was not fatal because substantial, other evidence discussed in the text
above support his finding that her back pain was not as disabling as she claimed. See
Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413-14 (7th Cir. 2008) (“It is only when the ALJ's
4

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In sum, the ALJ considered the relevant factors and gave specific reasons for not
believing Summers‟ assertions that her pain precluded her from working, which are
supported by the record. Skarbeck, 390 F.3d at 505. The court also is persuaded that the
ALJ built a sufficiently accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to justify his
conclusion that Summers‟ subjective complaints about her inability to work were
exaggerated. Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 2000). As a result, Summers
has not demonstrated that this is one of those rare occasions in which the court should
disturb the ALJ‟s credibility finding.

D.

RFC Assessment
a.

General

Although Summers does not challenge the ALJ‟s assessment of her Residual
Functional Capacity (“RFC”) directly, Summers alleges that she suffers from fibromyalgia
and chronic back pain on a daily basis, and that these conditions severely limit her ability

determination lacks any explanation or support that we will declare it to be „patently
wrong.‟”). As discussed, Summers‟s condition did not worsen between 2005 and 2010:
her 2010 imaging studies showed only minimal degeneration and she admits that she cut
off treatment in August 2010, because she did not want to undergo further injections that
were recommended before her providers would order pain medication or a surgical
consult. (Pltf‟s Br., dkt. 26 at 8.) Moreover, while Summers implies that she could not
afford medical care after 2010, her medical records indicate that she continued to access
treatment and medication for a variety of conditions at a free clinic. As a result, it was
reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that she could have continued to seek help for her
back as well.

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to stand, sit, turn, twist, reach and bend. 5

In determining Summers‟ RFC, the ALJ

appears to have considered all of Summers‟s reported symptoms, her treatment history
and the opinion of the state agency physicians, Dr. Patricia Bush and Dr. Philip Cohen.
(AR 169-71, 387, 407.) Ultimately, the ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of Dr.
Cohen, who found Summers capable of sedentary work, because Dr. Cohen had reviewed
the most recent medical evidence and stated an opinion more consistent with the medical
evidence as a whole. (AR 171.) (Dr. Bush had found Summers capable of medium level
work. (AR 387.))
Summers criticizes the ALJ‟s reliance on the consulting physician opinions because
they did not examine her on a regular basis, but there are no opinions from Summers‟
treating physicians in the record. Instead, Summers relies only on her own, subjective
complaints to support her stated limitations.

As discussed above, the ALJ articulated

good grounds for finding that Summers was not entirely credible. In the absence of other
reliable, contradictory evidence, the ALJ was, therefore, entitled to consider the consultant
reports and attribute them significant weight. See Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 700
(7th Cir. 2004) (“ALJ may properly rely upon the opinion of these medical experts”); 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f), 416.927(f) (“Administrative law judges must consider the findings

The RFC assessment is an issue reserved to the ALJ and “is based upon consideration of
all relevant evidence in the case record, including medical evidence and relevant
nonmedical evidence, such as observations of lay witnesses of an individual's apparent
symptomology, an individual's own statement of what he or she is able or unable to do,
and many other factors that could help the adjudicator determine the most reasonable
findings in light of all the evidence.” SSR 96–5p; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545,
416.945.
5

15

of State agency medical and psychological consultants . . . as opinion evidence. . .”); SSR
96–5p (ALJ must consider state agency consulting reports as expert opinion evidence and
address them in the decision).
b.

Fine Manipulation

Finally, Summers argued before the Appeals Council that the ALJ failed to explain
why he found her capable of frequent versus occasional fine manipulation in assessing her
residual functional capacity.

(AR 164.)

However, the ALJ discussed Summers‟s

allegations that she suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome and correctly noted that there is
no documentation in the record of her having any loss of function in her wrists and hands.
(AR 170.) In fact, Summers testified at the hearing that (1) she only has occasional
pain in her hands and fingers, and (2) she did not have too much trouble picking things
up or doing things with her hands and fingers.

As a result, the ALJ‟s decision that

Summers could perform frequent fine manipulation is supported by substantial evidence.
Even assuming that the ALJ should have limited Summers to occasional fine
manipulation, the vocational expert testified that this more restrictive limitation would
not prevent Summers from working as a security monitor, for which there are 800
positions in Wisconsin. (AR 79-80.) Although the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has not drawn a bright line with respect to what number of jobs it considers
significant, it has noted that other courts have found that as few as 174 jobs satisfy the
commissioner‟s burden at this step. Liskowitz v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2009)
(citing Allen v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 600, 602 (11th Cir. 1987)); see also Trimiar v. Sullivan, 966

16

F.2d 1326, 1330–32 (10th Cir. 1992) (850–1,000 jobs were significant number); Jenkins v.
Bowen, 861 F.2d 1083, 1087 (8th Cir. 1988) (500 jobs are significant number); Nix v.
Sullivan, 744 F. Supp. 855, 863 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (675 jobs are significant number), aff'd,
936 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1991). As a result, the ALJ did not commit reversible error with
respect to Summers‟s fine manipulation limitation.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that the decision of defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security, is AFFIRMED, and that plaintiff Lianne Summers‟
appeal is DISMISSED.

The clerk of court is directed to enter judgment in favor of

defendant and close this case.
Entered this 13th day of December, 2013.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
_______________________
WILLIAM M. CONLEY
District Judge

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