Siddharth Hariharan, et al v. Adobe Systems, Inc., et al

Filing 1

FILED ON 11/07/2013 PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL PURSUANT TO RULE 23(f). SERVED ON 11/07/2013. [8856405] (HC)

Download PDF
Case No. __________ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT IN RE HIGH-TECH EMPLOYEE ANTITRUST LITIGATION Petition for permission to appeal from the United States District Court Northern District of California The Honorable Lucy H. Koh, Presiding Case No. 5:11-2509-LHK DEFENDANT-PETITIONERS’ EXCERPTS OF RECORD VOLUME II OF VIII ROBERT A. VAN NEST, #84065 DANIEL PURCELL, #191424 EUGENE M. PAIGE, #202849 JUSTINA SESSIONS, #270914 KEKER & VAN NEST LLP 633 Battery Street San Francisco, CA 94111-1809 Telephone: 415 391 5400 Facsimile: 415 397 7188 Attorneys for Defendant and Petitioner Google Inc. 789556 EXCERPTS OF RECORD N.D.CAL. DOCKET # DOCUMENT PAGE Volume I of VIII (District Court Orders—Public Versions) 1. 531 Oct. 24, 2013 Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion for Class Certification (public redacted version) 0001 2. 382 April 15, 2013 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (public redacted version) 0087 Volume II of VIII (Expert Reports – Public Versions) 3. 518-2 518-4 Expert Report of Professor Kevin M. Murphy (public redacted version) 0140 4. 424-2 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E. Leamer, Ph.D. (public redacted version) 0340 Volume III of VIII (Expert Reports – Public Versions) 5. 440 Supplemental Expert Report of Professor Kevin M. Murphy (public redacted version) 0402 6. 442 Expert Report of Kathryn M. Shaw, Ph.D. (public redacted version) 0570 Volume IV of VIII (Depositions and Declarations – Public Versions) 7. 308-1, 445-2 Deposition of Edward Leamer 0676 8. 538-8 538-11 Declaration of Danny McKell in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (public redacted version) 0691 1 789556 N.D.CAL. DOCKET # 9. 516-6 10. DOCUMENT PAGE Declaration of Frank Wagner in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (public redacted version) 0713 District Court Docket Report 0725 Volume V of VIII (District Court Orders FILED UNDER SEAL) 11. Oct. 24, 2013 Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (under seal version) 0804 12. 383 April 15, 2013 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (under seal version) 0890 Volume VI of VIII (Expert Reports FILED UNDER SEAL) 13. Expert Report of Professor Kevin M. Murphy (under seal version) 0944 14. Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E. Leamer, Ph.D. (under seal version) 1144 Volume VII of VIII (Expert Reports FILED UNDER SEAL) 15. Supplemental Expert Report of Professor Kevin M. Murphy (under seal version) 1180 16. Expert Report of Kathryn M. Shaw, Ph.D. (under seal version) 1348 17. Expert Witness Report of Kevin F. Hallock, Figure 7 1454 2 N.D.CAL. DOCKET # DOCUMENT PAGE Volume VIII of VIII (Depositions and Declarations FILED UNDER SEAL) 18. Deposition of Michael Devine 1455 19. Declaration of Danny McKell in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (under seal version) 1458 20. Declaration of Frank Wagner in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (under seal version) 1480 21. Exhibit 24 to Declaration of Lin W. Kahn in Support 1492 of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion for Class Certification 3 3 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 2 Filed10 07 13 Page1 of 81 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION RE HIGH TECH EMPLOYEE ANTITRUST LITIGATION IN Master Docket No 11 CV2509 LHK EXPERT REPORT OF PROFESSOR KEVIN MURPHY THIS M DOCUMENT RELATES TO Date ALL ACTIONS Time January 17 130 pm 8 4th Floor 2013 Courtroom Judge Honorable Lucy H Koh Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 Filed10 07 13 2 Page2 of 81 Table of Contents I CREDENTIALS 1 II ASSIGNMENT AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 2 III BACKGROUND ON THE DEFENDANTS 13 IV ECONOMIC THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCESHOW THAT INDIVIDUAL FACTORS PREDOMINATE OVER ANY COMMON FACTORS IN DETERMINING WHETHER AND BY HOW MUCH ANY MEMBER OF THE PROPOSED CLASS WAS INJURED BY THE CHALLENGED CONDUCT A The Challenged Agreements Would Not Meaningfully Reduce the Supply of 17 Information 1 Shows Evidence Source Employees that Restrictions C The Alleged Conspiracy Would D on Harmed if Methods Would Not Recruiting Benefit There any is Affect Market Compensation Some Members of 22 Employees and Therefore Determining Individualized were Injured and By How Much Would Require 25 Analysis Tremendous The Composition Variation in Compensation of Total Compensation Paid to Individual Differs Across Employers Employees 26 V DR LEAMER PROVIDES NO ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR PLAINTIFFS CLASS CERTIFICATION REQUEST Summary B Economic of Dr Leamers Analysis 28 28 Opinions Does not Support Dr Leamers Claim that Agreements would Reduce Information Flows Limit Compensation 1 Evidence Dr Shows that the 30 Flow Leamer Wrongly Claims Discovery of Information and thus the Challenged Compensation Data Shows 3 the Challenged Price Discovery or Affect Generally Not be Reduced by 2 25 and Employees A 20 Class Even the Proposed Others Individualized 1 2 an Important 18 Employee Compensation is Highly Which of Other Defendants are not and Hires of Recruits B if it 15 Price Discovery Would 30 Agreements that His EmpiricalAnalysis of that Restricting Defendants Cold Calling Impedes the Price 38 Process Data do not Support Dr Leamers Agreements Prevented Increased Class that Otherwise Would Claim that the Timing of the Compensation to Members Have Accompanied Economic NonCompete of the Proposed Expansion 40 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK C Googles Big Document518 Bang Does Filed10 07 13 2 Not Support Plaintiffs and Page3 Dr Leamers 81 of Claim of Class Wide Evidence D 42 Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence a Rigid Salary Compensation at Adjustment Dr Dr Dr that in Some Employees Results of in 47 of Others Some Common Factors then Only Individuals Compensation if Common is Factors Potentially Compensation Leamers Process 5 Compensation 44 Structure Defendants Necessitate Several Analysis Wrongly Assumes that Leamers Affect 4 Practices Circumstances Increased Reduced Compensation Affected by Claim that 43 Economic Theory Does not Support Some 3 Dr Leamers Rigid Compensation Structures Defendants have 1 2 Refute 49 Model Does not Demonstrate Because Leamers it his Hypothesized Price Discovery Cannot Explain Compensation Changes Constant Ranking Compensation Attribute 54 Analysis is 55 Misleading 6 One Cannot Conclude that Because Some Defendants had Policies and Even Formulas for Annual Compensation Adjustments Move E Dr Leamers Dr Dr Model Econometric Impact Because 1 2 Common Exercise Impact across Defendants Framework Underlying Statistical 5 Dr Show Common 57 59 is Impact Assumed Not 61 his Regression Leamer Does not Report any Whether Fails to in its Implementation No Common Demonstrates The of 56 Undercompensation of in Dr that a Limited Flawed Both Conceptually and Warm up Leamers Leamers is it Demonstrated 3 4 Number the Structure Cold Calls Would Additional his Results are Robust Leamers Regression Dr Leamers Analysis Sensitivity Tests from which is Improper 70 or Fragile Model Does Not Explain Changes in Compensation Over Time 6 Dr 72 Leamers Conduct Variable Cannot Capture the Impact of the Challenged 74 Agreements 7 Estimated Persistence Discovery 66 to Evaluate Model and Effects are Inconsistent with his Claim that Defendants Dr Leamers Price had Rigid Compensation Structures 8 77 Summary 78 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK I My Filed10 07 13 2 Page4 81 of CREDENTIALS 1 Document518 Professor name I of earned a doctorate my bachelors Angeles in At I I degree degree the University theory empirical have taught in from also in of labor economics from the University of Chicago Economics I I teach economics in My Of teach economics and graduate level courses the economics the incentives of public of my teaching focuses focus in both research particular relevance across wage industries to structure labor economics by age of the Political education wages and age have authored or economics Those including price issues In these courses policy to how and the to apply economic economic I the use the tools of economics has been on integrating articles by skill Several of and gender My to analysis principles and on my papers My structure work in labor economics labor has as well as the determination of relative level have focused on the determinants work on wage determination labor mobility I teach with a focus on the wage groups differentiated by I microeconomics in the issues in this matter I have published extensively and occupations addressed the links between 5 I Los of California the impacts of regulation on two things how and teaching addressed the market determinants of wage of the 1986 that motivate firms and individuals markets and the determinants of wages and compensation wages in analysis empirical 4 Economics at of both the Booth School of Business markets the determinants of market prices and of system Most data Service of Chicago the University understand the behavior of individuals firms and markets and to Distinguished 1983 since economics cover a wide range of topics including legal J Stigler George 1981 and the Department operation am the in the Booth School of Business and the Department Chicago where received 3 M Murphy Kevin Economics of the University 2 is PhD level courses on also has empirical and the determinants of relative wages across education and skill co authored more than sixtyfive articles have been published American Economic Review in leading the Journal of Economy 1 scholarly in a variety of areas in and professional Law and Economics journals and the Journal Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK 6 I am a Fellow of the Econometric Arts and Sciences Economic In 1997 under the age of forty five year fellowship 7 In addition regulatory matters In the John was named I my position to matters joint 2005 who show to individuals consulting member of Bates Clark the exceptional Medal 81 of which the American American economist outstanding merit of American Academy MacArthur Fellow an award a I the University at firm that specializes on a have consulted economic and involving practices was awarded a Page5 and promise that provides a for continued and work creative Economics a I and Society Filed10 07 13 2 awarded once every two years to an Association 1 enhanced Document518 ventures and of in the application variety I am of economics mergers class of anticompetitive at Navigant also a Principal of antitrust intellectual legal issues such as allegations Chicago law and to and other property damages certification exclusionary access labor tying price fixing and price discrimination 8 I bodies and US I have submitted expert of the reports I have attached per hour for reports in Trade Commission and Federal my CV Court have submitted testimony in Federal as Appendix on A Navigant I US Senate numerous cases have consulted and the testimony filed my work I the for the I and to have state testified US Department on behalf of the of Justice have given over the past four years Economics is being compensated regulatory at is a A list provided rate of in 1,250 this matter II ASSIGNMENT AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 9 I Google have been asked by Counsel for Adobe Systems Google Intel Inc Lucasfilm and by 1 individual Pixar Intel Corporation collectively and representative Defendants 2 Inc to provide Adobe Apple Inc biennially until 2009 but it Apple Intuit Lucasfilm Ltd an economic Plaintiffs that an alleged plaintiffs The John Bates Clark Medal was awarded Intuit Inc now is analysis of claims conspiracy awarded annually among See http www aeaweborghonors awards clarkmedal php 2 In Re High Tech Certification Employee Antitrust and Memorandum of Law Litigation in Support Plaintiffs Notice of Motion and Motion for Class Motion 2 October 1 2012 p 1 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Defendants to and fix the compensation suppress impact and would be susceptible a class of ll natural persons Document518 to class employees of their wide proof employed on Filed10 07 13 2 Class AllSalaried Employee or Court to certify a creative and or research United States Class Technical by one excluded categories or and development potential 10 two the alternative when classes only calling each others that cold calling impact essential to their claim of antitrust who limited to the particular individuals Consolidated 4 Amended Complaint define the All Salaried Plaintiffs in Re receive Employee Class from March 2005 through December Lucasfilm 2009 and senior 6 7 8 is cold the Defendants from the Class are executives 50 between the two 2009 c Google e Intuit Ph Motion D ways and Plaintiffs claim that due to the Litigation persons employed Complaint on a salaried 1 basis in the 2005 through December 2009 b 2009 December 2009 f from March 2005 through December g Pixar corporate d from January 2005 through December officers p1 October of effects of cold calling are not from June 2007 through or method 6 7 a variety in 8 Antitrust recruiting cold members of the boards of directors 1 2012 46 Complaint distinguish 42 Complaint E Leamer calls All natural as employees of all Defendants Expert Report of Edward Complaint retail same The to refrain from a particularly effective a Apple from March from January 2005 through December 2009 Excluded 5 Report do not the of their claims In support also distinguish the compensation that Adobe from May 2005 through December 2009 5 among High Tech Employee United States by one or more of the following Intel I cold calling has a significant impact on employee compensation that 3 my report in the technical and with periods typically and in more evidence specific to one or the other present employees same time Dr Leamer and or a a salaried basis in the Leamer claim that there was a conspiracy Plaintiffs employed on E Leamer PhD class definitions I who work AllSalaried Employee Class Plaintiffs certify have asked the Plaintiffs natural persons the wide 2005 through December 2009 alternative fields that are Edward by arguments and evidence provided between ll more of the Defendants during offer the Expert Report of Plaintiffs a as a class by one States 4 defined as identified for the would have a salaried basis in the United Class As an 81 of have asked the Court to Plaintiffs of the Defendants during part or all of the period from January the 3 Page6 including According to Dr Leamer orally in writing telephonically otherwise applied for a job opening ColdCalling or electronically refers to Leamer Report Footnote 3 communicating with another 3 adopting firms directly employee essentially the in who same any manner has not definition as in Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK conspiracy alleged the resulting and mobility had a cumulative Document518 on Filed10 07 13 9 Class members resulting in all from Defendants than they otherwise would have received 11 Plaintiffs acknowledge of a small number consisted challenged agreements or Defendants to not cold conspiracy do impact on a class that includes DNCC employees identified virtually all among the which 11 claim that the small number of Plaintiffs during the periods agreements not cold call each others call US I by employees who did not receive reduced the compensation of engineers to agreements job workers cafeteria 41 Complaint Plaintiffs bilateral in general My application if if those potential in cold calls a Defendant those employees potential all do not cold call restrictions to received but also from firms as well by not prohibited the challenged at issue in this at case is words that they generally a firmwith which employment with in other if or potential before filing an information emailing employees in general have received about a particular job opening had expressed no interest in exploring new employment opportunities was that simply were gathering or According or almost all employees in their proposed conduct include 12 pairs of the compensation of the Defendant by potential applicants from calling of the alleged between value their that they might otherwise applicants certain pairs of agreements had a class wide not only affected claim that would This definition understanding of the were intended to prevent exploring Plaintiffs as the salaried employees at all seven Defendants allegedly calls my report Despite the limited nature other salaried employees such as responding to inquiries openings agreement all cold lower compensation agreements between Defendants reduced the information available to employees about Plaintiffs the reduced flow of information 81 seven Defendants refer to in claim that the reduction Plaintiffs of 10 conspiracy that the alleged of bilateral Page7 of competition and suppression of compensation elimination effect 2 the it had an Defendant or in they were a totally passive candidate 9 10 11 Complaint 123 Dr Leamer says that he Report 12 110 emphasis added Complaint According who are s that Defendants entered into several Plaintiffs leverage claim that that the e outreach cold calling i seeking employment and other active compensation negotiating by restricting to Plaintiffs not actively depressed showing understand additional agreements Leamer 22 by impairing information to solicit applications competition for flow about compensation and job offers reducing of employees and minimizing movement of employees Dr Leamer Defendants describes agreements preventing class members from discovering abundant evidence would tend the true to of their between to all Class suppress employee value 4 common work from candidates employees the agreements firms Motion members capable compensation Motion p 16 p3 of generally by Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK classes were by an amount affected conventional methods and 12 In his report Dr common Leamer Document518 that can Filed10 07 13 2 be measured on a class wide Page8 81 of basis using evidence 1 whether two questions addresses there is common proof to Classwide Non Compete each proposed class capable of showing that the the competition sic compensation 13 of its members or formulaic method capable of quantifying suffered by each class that or nearly all 14 Dr Leamer all members Dr Leamers 2 whether and amount of both classes had their reliably using materially reduce the information available to there is reliable yes and is suppressed economic methods First the challenged to Defendants a both questions compensation standard analysis has three essential steps reduced artificially of suppressed compensation concludes that the answer aggregate amount that can be quantified 13 the Agreements by an 15 agreements must employees Second that reduction informationmust cause the salaries of individual employees to be reduced Third the rigid compensation must cause the reductions some employees of to reduce compensation First the labor markets from recruiting practices of number would of employees Defendant the information 15 wide basis Economic theory and provided common to others compensation of the Defendants Leamer Report at 10 see would not at be to one 11 5 effects would be common at the second Finally if highly In particular employee likely would an impact on one 21 57 the directly affect only a small of the proposed class This would stop the chain would enormous and diverse and Second any members across are not rigid then Leamer Depo hire are is critically the information levels of employees at any the first step Ibid Leamer Report that that reduced the informationprovided impact on individual 14 not meaningfully affect and would not be same conduct structures of employers This would break the chain individualized 13 a class which Defendants a small number the on somewhat in the compensation evidence demonstrate that his analysis of each of these essential steps empirical flawed structures of the Defendants in increase step since the the compensation individuals compensation Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK would 14 Thus None based on my analysis I with economic Opinion 1 The implausibility suppressed as logic by which I explain was dwarfed by to the 11 percent number Opinion by estimated 2 Empirical challenged during the Dr Leamer recruiting employee turnover movements between turnover agreements Given to recruit that from method their 16 DNCC recruiting activity See Table 1 below to of Defendants subject and from other Defendants to will were tend to overstate 6 new actual their that implausible employees by the large that the employees whether resulting from cold calling one was this percent 2001 to of Defendants 2011 Employee means that during by unaffected 1A still and 1B available DNCC agreement the agreements was agreements was even lower and see Exhibits a It is Defendants to hires and separations over the period of potential And the class wide impact on the information for only about Defendants that had opinions VB1 below other Defendants accounted that of over 8,000 hiring activities demonstrates forms of recruiting of other than cold calling employees movements or empirical at these firms they received as a proxy for underlying recruiting activity about 99 percent 16 to opinions my core are combined workforces economically significant Employee movements Dr Leamers an average hired undercompensated see Part at class period demonstrates compensation of their evidence of Defendants had no conduct or another 81 three not surprising is it about labor market opportunities and compensation available a of detail in this report of applications for five years these firms consistently amount in 2005 and 2009 Defendants equal all The following evidence empirical of Dr Leamers claim that average Dr Leamer and Plaintiffs claim workers per year alone to their allegations high level of hiring by Defendants Collectively between hiring Page9 by documentary and theory and contradicted Plaintiffs claims are not supported Plaintiffs allegations let conclude that Plaintiffs claims and Given the lack of economic regarding hold links in the chain of the required are both inconsistent evidence Filed10 07 13 2 compensation for other members of the class This would stop the chain not increase the third step Document518 fraction the actual Using this period the challenged for details 17,18 Given the and used during the class period of turnover accounted for importance of the challenged by the Case5 11cv 02509LHK relative unimportance outside effect of the class period cross hires separations before and and any in that restriction hires cross separations movement would not have a represented after The the class period Defendants 1.1 percent just 1.2 percent the Defendants of on counterfactually 1 As such the information available material collective hires total hires and shares from clearly demonstrate that employee of the labor market changes in those flows would have no to Defendants those flows and the associated 81 Defendants of their total account for a minute fraction activity for employees of these firms effect data in Table of Defendants both within and the class period represented Page10 a share that is not materially different than the corresponding movements between substantial Filed1007 13 2 employee movement between on compensation Moreover during from other Defendants hires Document518 employees even recruiting activity represented if the only source of information available to employees 17 For purpose According of this discussion to Plaintiffs Google Intel began in I use the period from 2005 to 2009 to approximate the agreements 2005 Together annual employment at the Defendants 18 This analysis the uses involving these hires and separations slightly one year windows between out four companies from 2001 to to identify previous employer and the hire date at Defendants due to the two different windows the of the seven Defendant four accounted class period Adobe Apple about 92 percent of total average 2011 hires looking back new employer and in a for companies given year the numbers used 7 one year between separations of hires the separation and separations date at year For may differ looking ahead one Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 Filed1007 13 2 Page11 81 of Table 1 Summary of Hires and Separations Defendant Companies at Annual Average 2001 From Other Defendant Companies 2010 2001 2009 2011 2011 5,795 Overall Hires 2005 2004 8,814 11,435 8,193 35 From Other DNCC Defendant Companies 95 159 85 28 69 123 64 From Other Defendant Companies 0.6 1.1 1.4 1.0 From Other DNCC Defendant Companies 0.5 0.8 1.1 0.8 12,182 15,985 16,525 14,700 Overall Hires and Separations FromTo Other Defendant Companies 71 FromTo From Other DNCC Defendant Companies Source b Based on analysis There were many in Exhibit sources Defendants averaged hires total 1 averaged suggests 20 of percent market and the associated During looking for Defendants labor market to work of and employees total agreement was in place 1A leaving at Therefore in a typical year co workers some This with the labor Other sources of at other firms dedicated whom may internet of have sites based advertising as well as cold calling from employers and from Defendants where Plaintiffs theory 8 new of Defendants during the year employees had direct contact friends working Under workforce about 11.3 percent workforce total informationfrom non Defendant Defendants roughly 7,200 a year based on Table information such as job boards and media and internet number hires the class period 1 averaged of Defendants labor market information include DNCC 1.1 0.9 during the year while separations that about the very large 1.8 1.4 about 78,000 employees a year see Exhibit about 9.2 percent been actively 1.2 0.9 Defendants including roughly 8,800 a year based on Table workforce 127 of labor market information available non Defendants to 168 239 1A and 1B employees other than cold calling Defendants to go 305 139 0.6 0.5 Other Defendant Companies 191 57 From Other DNCC Defendant Companies no of the spread of information Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 informationfrom these other sources Filed1007 13 2 which any vastly exceeds Page12 reduction of 81 in information resulting from the challenged Defendants employees even c agreements would have been widely disseminated among if Yearto year fluctuations that might have Defendants widely from varied roughly one percent the hypothesized fluctuations in overall in cold There was no reduction DNCC 2005 for by Defendants as a whole Thus of 4,100 in Opinion 3 A reduction because there are a Market agreements alleged a all other in inter Defendant cold calling including by which Defendants the price employers agreements affected words they affected available fill to compensation b As a matter of neither the those jobs VB1 below see Part Defendants or 2005 2009 with b Defendants as during the Dr Leamers economic theory would would not recruit 2001 central employee number there is wide harm for labor number no reason why they would see Part conspiracy when not lower compensation demand jobs nor the of the class generally in other of employees affect market IVB below to restrict a small number of approaching employees at one or a on a class wide basis agreements were not commitments to reduce salaries or 9 in class determined by supply and demand for labor is of available the alleged result employees neither the supply of nor the Therefore or compensation other firms large pay for labor and thus the compensation employers from using a single recruiting tool few Such Defendants during the class period The the data are inconsistent earned by members of the proposed class The a Defendants many channels price 2009 would be caused by premise that the agreements reduced informationflows and consequently movements between hiring with economically significant agreements was essentially the same during 2011 period low that calling due to the challenged hires between cross the class period to a conduct on class wide compensation in any hiring changes aggregate changes dwarf any changes in the percentage of Defendants hiring from either with Over agreements hiring activity are inconsistent effects of the challenged pairs of Defendants hiring activity vastly exceed of total hires accounted reduction calling between a high of 12,700 in of over 8,500 hires These difference no cold resulted from the challenged by Defendants d in there were restrict The challenged employment and would Case5 11cv 02509LHK not have changed Document518 Defendants had to positions demand the supply of or a certain employees through The fill for labor overall or the Page13 number agreements only affected alleged method particular Filed1007 13 2 cold Even calling if of 81 of job recruiting of the agreements reduced recruiting of certain employees from particular employers and potentially affected certain individuals a new employee for Adobe rather than from class benefitted c As a matter rather than potential of the person hired see Part Defendants had This reduction Plaintiffs theory of information employees as well which fact that a reduction could be positive would Opinion a is If such as Microsoft member of to the extent less cold the proposed has an effect could raise it number calling reduced the would reduce it could increase the or flow this the opposite would the pool of potential amount increase of the effect negative Moreover for of of compensation hires that the employees from the smaller resulting labor pool some compensation by hypothesized available to members The both sides of the in is ambiguous cold calling and reduce demand for others across Under of other Plaintiffs the fact that the reduction individuals on wages would not be common implies of the proposed class that see IVB below 4 Defendants Defendants had highly between below compensation structures are not rigid and exercised substantial employees individual was calling in cold calling affects the options demand increase the impact Part a Apple firms and workers means that any overall impact on compensation market it cold by Defendants contacted offer to attract to non Defendant from Microsoft reduce average compensation for those Defendants Adobe those IVC below economics reduced candidates by Defendants through agreement with from a an open position recruiting through to increase benefit those hired For example if as a result of an alleged channels recruited which would channels other unrestricted would be the impact as a result Dr Leamers own similar individuals in every year and for each compensation model with large variations individualized observationally flexibility unexplained by Defendant in setting compensation implies that employee compensation even within particular job categories see Part IVD below there is substantial Dr Leamers model Dr Leamer 10 of As I and demonstrate dispersion in employee has shown that different Case5 11cv 02509LHK jobs have Document518 different average compensation compensation Filed1007 13 2 but not that increases Page14 of 81 in an individuals resulting from a cold call results in higher compensation for other employees b Dr Leamers premise a change not imply that also in A rigid flawed compensation wage increase for all structure even if one existed would more employees would for one or because the cost of increasing entire structure enormous an is compensation for one employee employees and would be Thus Dr resisted the shift would be Leamers theory makes no economic sense c Finally Dr Leamers alternative analysis cannot distinguish that compensation hypothesis the impact of Defendants he hypothesizes from an employees is broadly determined by competition in a vast labor market and that adjustments for individual employees unique circumstances individualized Opinion methodological outside offer are highly VD3 below see Part 5 Dr Leamers such as an attractive conduct and regressions suffer from severe conceptual flaws and are completely unreliable and thus uninformative His regression methodology provides evidence that is with his conclusion inconsistent of class wide impact and damages a Given the nature of Plaintiffs allegations common challenged conduct was there is class Dr Leamer during the conduct period were methodology values of his some suggests so called Dr Leamers own common whether the impact of the is critical effect is not actually and substantial variation overcompensated across Indeed common Specifically positive statistical across a class see Part whether wide changes application of his the estimated Defendants and for VE 2 below methods which I Thus critique Defendants in the estimated as the result of the challenged 11 on that compensation conduct effects vary substantially the understanding Defendants across were to can be measured to demonstrate regression specification below show some employees the impact fail that the changes of the Defendants further Defendants across wide impact and whether Data analyzed by basis the question conduct impact with Case5 11cv 02509LHK b Dr Leamers data theory how members When firm level compensation The shows the conduct and theory effect estimated Defendants economic SP 500 existence My economic their analysis evidence to support on members fails of these factors invalidates should not change periods see Part as follows recruiting IV I hiring show Moreover benefitted there is these same facts that he fails to support his findings of class if Plaintiffs conduct effect the members for all as measured by changes in the or even In Part III I provide background and compensation practices that is relevant that there is neither is information on the economic logic many my nor empirical conduct would have a only one of to common impact recruiting tools and other These facts together refute imply that some members of the proposed class will have basis to certify the VE 5 agreements would reduce compensation on a class wide from the same conduct that no economic see Part VE 5 below Cold calling Plaintiffs claim that the challenged his statistical undercompensation smaller Plaintiffs claims that the challenged of the class overall determinants Similarly simply controlling for changes in overall yields substantially estimates In Part regression For example limiting his regression analysis Defendants are not an important source of hires for any Defendant basis conduct to account for important and financial market performance report is organized Defendants and Leamers to but also a major error conduct effects are unreliable VE 4 below index highly not only contrary is determined implying overcompensation positive conditions overcompensation 15 is is effects also are highly unstable reflecting the estimated post conduct see Part stock This Yet doing so completely changes his estimated correct is 81 VE3 below Dr Leamer imprecision with which they are estimated to is Dr estimated see Part that his claimed below Dr Leamers of evidence that the challenged agreements reduced compensation of the proposed class analysis and Page15 and obvious feature of his a critical compensation properly In his conduct regression analysis of Filed1007 13 not independent are correlated an individuals no meaningful provides c of inference in statistical of only because he ignores significant that his observations own his 2 impact of the challenged agreements on compensation estimated statistically Document518 Plaintiffs a class allege Part harmed other employees which means V critiques Dr Leamers economic requirements for 12 class certification analysis and explains Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 2 Filed1007 13 Page16 of 81 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 2 Filed1007 13 Page17 of 81 Case5 11cv 02509LHK 21 Third bonus to on employee referrals current employees important channels are new who website LinkedIn and dice com changed over time throughout 22 graduates is LinkedIn for 28 example for by implications First It implies that the use a utilize 81 use of in companys to the networking firm Other importance may have mid2000s since the job such as sites of these different channels by Defendants of many but the different recruiting and in the use of one channel can or at least reliance that both employers implies applications the the recruiting practices of these firms reduction information on hiring and compensation members that of more and increased it unsolicited increased by ultimately are hired The importance different channels has characterized important compensated who 27 com professional and job fairs the past decade Page18 have formal referral programs that provide a refer individuals From an economic standpoint channels Many such as monster job boards many 26 university applicant use of Filed1007 13 2 use a large variety of channels for recruiting employees They tend the companies rely heavily to Document518 on other channels it these other channels will have implies that individuals expanded opportunities be This has two and employees have alternative Second will sources including critical of class as a result of the reduced cold calling IV ECONOMIC THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SHOW THAT INDIVIDUAL FACTORS PREDOMINATE OVER ANY COMMON FACTORS IN DETERMINING WHETHER AND BY HOW MUCH ANY MEMBER OF THE PROPOSED CLASS WAS INJURED BY THE CHALLENGED CONDUCT 23 The allegations pairs of Defendants Declaration of Steven to in this matter concern the impact of the challenged cold calling on compensation eliminate Burmeister in Support of Defendants received Opposition For example employee of Fichtner 28 referral new hires See Opposition to Plaintiffs 27 the Defendants Motion to Plaintiffs 26 percent by for Class p3 Certification 40 agreements between Motion for Depo at 177 210 See See Declaration and Declaration of Jeff is the most important recruiting Declaration Vijungco of Tina Evangelista of Jeff Vijungco Class Certification also pp Declaration of of method Declaration of Jeff Tina Evangelista 23 Declaration of p3 15 for Adobe Adobe Systems Inc Frank Wagner in accounting for about 35 Support of Defendants Vijungco p2 p 12 p 10 Declaration of Chris Galy p2 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 employees The challenged agreements salaried 24 The who five individual certified at issues in and that there each class member without Plaintiffsclaims compensation many members other recruiting channels claim to represent salaried in things both that the of quantifying common how that analysis explains if 2 do not 2 that had a issues predominate in to analysis can 1 do not agreements that another 3 do not compensation Thus labor markets operate at damages owed of An economic evaluations and reference or at restrict the relevant Defendants economic an agreement that potentially limited one of one Defendant might have been made aware Defendant would reduce compensation theory has three essential elements reduction relative to what in gentlemens a Pixar employee in of by received under his theory In particular by members informationmust lead to a reduction they would have received of the compensation class wide reduction Pixar of the seven affect direct determinants of an employees or performance opportunities amount the analyses agreements to affect compensation received rigid nature 29 persons all order to have such a class compensation August would 2 2012 notify at at the defendant that Lucasfilm it if it in compensation for internal equity would not counter 123 16 126 15 134 23 135 6 148 3 16 if and 5 3 a This sequence Lucasfilm offer to 1 for those firms must then generate Pixarmade an order by Defendants absent the challenged agreements through the pressure agreement with Lucasfilm and that Pixar see McAdams Depo structures in of the proposed class those agreements must materially reduce the level of informationpossessed individuals or fix of the proposed class for the alleged employees virtually employees technical understand that I individualized methods by which employees Dr Leamers 25 on way cause class wide changes employment 81 many employees could be hired in this lawsuit among other reasonable relying only whether given how recruiting specific a such as promotions hiring nevertheless issue is is compensation relate directly to of determining whether class members have been injured by the alleged conspiracy support Page19 29 2005 and 2009 must demonstrate Plaintiffs did not restrict or in the alternative any time between over individual named plaintiffs were salaried employees Defendants all compensation or any other element of Filed1007 13 limit how prohibit hiring employees of other Defendants wages 2 made an a Lucasfilm offer to employee Case5 11cv 02509LHK which underlies Dr Leamers and inconsistent with economics A The Document518 price discovery and Filed1007 13 2 and internal evidence empirical equity frameworks of 81 speculative is show below as I Agreements Would Not Meaningfully Challenged Page20 Reduce the Supply of Information 26 As a matter of economic theory the impact source will depend on the size of the supply the extent source is which supply to reduced Here challenged agreements provides leads to is the supply of Dr In Plaintiffs Dr and at Classwide impact A would Defendant period A has a depend on DNCC 25 Dr Leamer 31 Cold calling available is any specific fraction recruited 32 at my discussions A has DNCC is possible or almost all class to employees importance of cold calling 32 recruiting If outside As hires while employees agreements account for one percent in the with either Defendants them that than reduces compensation above or and the evidence does not disagree that there that is not tracked data with this but he simply claims that his conduct However as by directly the to managers explain I do not in their have channels does not account that other for many employees a very were referrals was an impact which means that 40 425 183 223 413 21 414 7 of an assumption he Therefore cold calling generally from the Defendants recruiting such as employee of other below market data and their recruiting this generally and interviews the class gained by cold calling could reveal information is with which of other Defendants measures of the importance of cold calling relative to other recruiting of recruiting pudding that compensation provided in declarations through other channels Dr Leamer in the It not clearly identified and in than information large nor explains or employees that current declarations 1 the importance assumes that all price discovery raises rather acknowledges recruiters of of Defendant percent for all the that cold calling the information hires then the share of Defendant As hiring potentially affected Defendant As neither was reduced by agreements on informationpossessed by employees 2 the and when supply from one less information available combined impact the Defendants with which Defendant 30 in or recruiting activity with information flow agreement as a source of potential calling accounts for cold in of the challenged relative to other recruiting channels31 Defendant the reduction Leamer equate and claim that reduced cold calling results 27 increases less price discovery and lower compensation In effect of market supply the elasticity information that allegedly model Leamers 30 members and restriction to the market from other sources it supply to the market from one of eliminating I explain does not demonstrate impact 17 this combined below his effect conduct regression provides the must be large regression is Leamer proof Depo so flawed that it Case5 11cv 02509LHK agreements during the class period important from firms in general A did As heavily Even expand not companys employee a no cold A had Defendant 1 DNCC has was the impact hired of Recruits Defendants Defendants new 33 hires no was of agreement s because it as assumes that more likely that another A did with which Defendant of the Defendants recruited Other Defendants a without with which call cold a B would cold loss of the top not single firm just for of other I if 20 previous employers 34 by Defendant of in a from an agreement between impact on the information available cross hires between a very small fraction the Defendant Defendants employees summarized the former employer of opportunities call not have a meaningful have accounted 3 shows are not an Important employee compensation by agreements affected the relative importance based on recruiting data provided that more one or even earned by employees of either company Exhibit as cold calling employees of a Defendant Using Defendants data The A and B could compensation it 81 and Hires on recruiting efforts Defendant make is to non Defendant that the challenged likelihood reducing informationdepends Defendants A avoids someone from Evidence Shows that Employees The 29 either agreement a call agreements is other recruiting channels utilizing Defendant if the effect of lost information is replaced Source 28 it by A has DNCC Defendant overestimate recruiting efforts Page21 assuming that cold calling a cold call agreement if that employee by which process its would Filed1007 13 2 only 0.25 percent likely this below explained Defendants with which not have is hiring from the Defendants with which in Defendant Document518 of their total new A striking and to A and Defendant hiring anyway hires at each of the Defendants observation from this exhibit firms accounts for more than six percent is of hires at any Defendant and that the top 20 firms combined typically account for less than 20 percent of 33 Despite the availability of this information to Plaintiffs deposition hires 34 First Set of that he had no by a Defendant My Defendants way to for which understand was provided by the Defendants I Document Production quantify See Leamer staff standardized field in the Requests Depo the at October importance of other Defendants in response claimed during his as the former employer of new 45 18 48 25 employer names in the recruiting databases data typically 3 2011 Dr Leamer was self reported to the extent by the applicant 18 possible and was entered the prior employer as free form text Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 Filed1007 13 2 Defendant and hires total collectively other Defendants Thus even a policy stronger than the limitation on periods class that Plaintiffs members 30 typically accounted that eliminated a would In fact measured over all for less than three percent hiring from other Defendants all single recruiting channel here challenge only about one percent from certain Defendants not meaningfully affect Defendants numbers could mask a narrower time period by low of employees of other Defendants by one Defendant that any reduction were an effect for individual of the importance to 31 The number initiated to identify by cold number as a fraction be lost by of hires 4B shows from these exhibits these separations same the total by one Defendant even outside the class agreements would Thus even if calling among Defendants Defendants versus between year At the from another and Exhibit at 4A shows the the seven Defendants RD class out of the Defendant same time movements between As can be seen firms is large the defendants are the class period If hiring Defendant were economically important in the price discovery process then employee movement between 19 a Defendants and other firms Creative and of employees in provides price discovery that could regardless if one looks before during or after of employees analysis transitions that might have been transitions to and from Defendants figures for the Technical to there any damages they suffered as a percentage of total employees movement and highly variable from year miniscule by comparison and thus But the extremely the proposed class labor market of all employee on cold restrictions and on conduct of the challenged information and potential of broken out by movements between Exhibit quantify Defendant to Defendant of summarize the amount conceivably effect or narrower and of cold calling as a recruiting channel would be and those individuals calls accounts for employees or small groups of employees an individualized of other Defendants needed the alleged in cold calling because any significant class wide economic not have during certain share of hires for a substantial been affected implies much the flow of information to particular employees that might have period is of of total hires Theoretically these aggregate level of hiring which hiring from other Defendants group of employees where other Defendants accounted total 81 of hires Other Defendants account for at most three of the top 20 former employers at any total way Page22 Defendants should account for a Case5 11cv 02509LHK substantial part of the overall opposite true Even calls is amount the members if all of the proposed class B 32 Market price separations including agreements affected affected jobs neither the Therefore compensation 33 Even there is no reason why they would if contrary a meaningful class wide basis While some employees that that upward Plaintiffs Affect Market Compensation demand number for labor affect market compensation pressure The decline in overall a reduction same in reduction above the decline recruiting efforts The reduction on compensation fact that the reduction in this that effect has been reduced in potential at hires required Defendants to would fill raise Vijungco would not on a hires for those the level of recruiting of the open positions which would of the effect hypothesized the opposite in cold calling affects the options available to by both ambiguous even if it were discovery process given that information on compensation to a small only at the later stages group that then is pp 56 and Declaration of the recruiting interviewed and Intuit clearly state that they do not discuss compensation of Jeff was scenario the fact that there would be more demand for some most commonly provided to candidates Declaration those fill or in cold calling the pool of potential in recruiting reduces Hiring should be a reasonable proxy for the price candidates to they cold calling would reduce the number of firms contacting and the level of compensation material Moreover is The words in other of employees available employers and employees makes the overall impact on compensation 35 for more intensively compensation and certainly would not reduce compensation same amount other individuals put the evidence presented to necessarily reduce overall by into account the incentive and of the class generally sufficient to cause firms by received determined by supply and demand for labor jobs nor the of available by cold initiated pay for labor and thus the compensation neither the supply of nor the number the limited both in terms of its magnitude the price employers is 81 of that exactly impact on compensation Would Not Methods Page23 shows exhibit other recruiting channels earned by members of the proposed class alleged The even before taking fluctuations by using Filed1007 13 and from Defendants were to would be extremely on Recruiting Restrictions workers of lost and the potential of information recruiters to compensate and 2 35 movement hires relative to other market level Document518 pp process once the number of a job or job opening until the later stages of Chris Galy 20 for 34 Both Adobe of the recruiting process See Case5 11cv 02509LHK and individuals common hires less members across would stand 34 One demand types employees of employment are widespread in of software engineers in the United employment of software engineers in the industries 35 The economics Employees when they are Exhibits leaving 1A and 1B show about 11.3 percent of the performed this comparison conservative 37 Robert Details the Defendants reason why of several in jobs of or less of of operate 36 compensation of Defendants and to relocate Defendants are very of employees hired at for of employees at Defendants engage demonstrates and Michael by Defendant 2 1992 are a Google Intel in hires at Defendants during a year of workers Defendants averaged participants of the average 9.2 percent in the job market software engineers and limited the analysis that e employees i year This means that on average about 20 were active Defendants P Ward p 440 shown new the class period annual focusing on software engineers calculation Journal of Economics 38 percent willing to change based on CapIQ information for the Defendants compete H Topel which percent leaving and restricting total employment to firms engaged Defendants two Defendants average number e workers Defendants combined workforces I in more other with any single States and only about 10 percent 6 During employed during of workers Defendants industries for and the labor forces that turnover 38 i while annual separations number and and or joining is substantial represented 36 37 For example as shown in Exhibit and Pixar were 36 young are of both proposed engineers meaningfully by changes will not be influenced recruiting and hiring practices young across of labor mobility provides an additional Defendants employees geographically for software accounted employment would be harmed accounting for only a small fraction collectively 5 Defendants Exhibit 81 of in the pool of potential and a large portion and geographically the seven Defendants As shown are left out potentially opportunities Page24 on compensation would not be Workers who remain to all Defendants Employment software engineers employer or even who Filed1007 13 2 that the impact implies while those common job category is for others of the proposed class to benefit classes Document518 in account Job Mobility Appendices because that 1A is the profession businesses of the type for 21 that of in a general in 2D Men in which even this the named sense in Plaintiffs which only a small share of job opportunities and the Careers of Young through of in a typical year to industries simply to show percent 107 The Quarterly Case5 11cv 02509LHK the sense that they had sought out a Document518 new This extensive source of information on market compensation also shows that employee movements extremely small fraction 37 Thus data of total show Filed1007 13 by job or been recruited informationabout compensation obtained 2 to or cross across is for compensation employers because of employees means that Defendants The if 38 it same the labor markets in which skills Defendants a large a to number of other firms than others but the and experience these firms recruit and to equalize hire is broad of employees into and out of Defendants employees have access for an and and other firms vast flow of informationabout market and compensation opportunities C at for employees against of employees with the employees are mobile The movement thereby provides a natural Defendants accounted companies The competition may be more immediate with some tendency 81 employer and another employee turnover hires between compete of both employees and employers The exhibit hires and separations that Defendants Page25 Alleged Conspiracy Would Benefit Some Members of the Proposed Class Even Harmed Others Even if the alleged the proposed class because cold call the necessary conspiracy reduced the compensation they did not receive corollary is that it information or a job opportunity of because of a lost compensation of other members of the increased proposed class by opening up opportunities by some members received that they otherwise would not have received or under Plaintiffs theory providing them with information that they otherwise would not have obtained Thus Plaintiffs uniform across class and Dr membersnor at least in principle Defendants generally follow the same process open position 39 arguments imply that the impact Adobe Intuit reaches out to the and Intel all processes See Declaration of describe Jeff companys the roles Vijungco p 2 Nearly defendants use Jeff Vijungco pp 23 Declaration of Frank Tina Evangelista p3 Evangelista all is neither even harmful to all but rather a mix of benefits to some caused by the same conduct that could 39 own Leamers for filling open jobs recruiting department of managers sourcers p3 have injured others Declaration multiple Wagner to a 39 talent 22 Declaration with an manager or and recruiters as key to their recruiting of Chris Galy p 2 and Declaration sources to find potential candidates p 10 A manager of Chris Galy of Tina See Declaration p 2 and Declaration of of Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 Filed1007 13 2 Page26 81 of thirdparty who recruiter either before or at the of pursue a variety who is of avenues responsible candidates inappropriate interviews methods The manager Plaintiffs claims and the recruiters role the decision is how affected Plaintiffs to fill fill that job is led only the methods alleged if agreements including DNCC would be job by DNCC or hired through See Bates Document initiate is institutional cold open positions from fill fill some open a also use contact on networking sourcer with potential and or for important in evaluating Dr Leamer the impact that the recruiter cold framework The in person recruiters would 23 the decision manager and Since the role of a find candidates calling employees at certain companies companies such The at would be recruited through by the as Defendants firms with which they net effect of the challenged channels other than cold calling employees of a 76550DOC000014 claims to agreements challenged by or recruiting employees that candidates whether The made by is alleged calling employees at other agreement the likelihood and to hire generally agreements through other channels to increase In order to used to find qualified job candidates they were constrained with which there was no have to by fairs may then generally use phone interviews incentives who and selection of To add to hire given the relevant recruiter is to identify candidates other channels identify to make economic sense and whether a job to marketing including that are unqualified uninterested who and candidates the recruiter a small group of promising candidates ultimately decides has a logical magnitude whether there to obtain of finding employees current candidates Recruiters applicants and on an employee makes a efforts recruiter by referred efforts 40 way to fill some Defendants difficult active to eliminate for the position Understanding estimate making more any posted internally jobs website important and sponsoring job through cold calling including other screening 40 for more An is the friend then submits an application to identify additional typically those that are job opening companys the not require and candidates such as LinkedIn and attending positions 40 may an employment opportunity and the pool of internal applicants websites on that it is posted through employee referrals which friend aware to same time such as monstercom and LinkedIn com websites is The will assist with the search for candidates agreements interviewed DNCC offered Defendant a Case5 11cv 02509LHK cold including would who denied to the employees 100,000 inquiries a month on receives begin applications 41 while The consequence would the class common a receives that already salary working by doing hardware engineers so for the reduction probability that in potential person hired off was If able to obtain Declaration See harm The class one company who of Jeff the class call but where cold worked Vijungco to a accepted a to Plaintiffs only because of is Fichtner not be In Plaintiffs compensation but for world for the position hired might be an different external candidate employs etc fairs etc employees The non Defendant all that recruiters called or hired increases means software including that he the use 43 with any fact that the was made that person better becomes a claims has been injured even though he the challenged conduct 44 Thus under the p3 him it this person would not have been hired for that he would not have received would have been higher 24 done claim harmed the html Depo at 144 521 147 12 19 44 of gets hired employees have access to the job all some members member who http online wsj com article SB10001424052970203750404577173031991814896 43 which two could professionals a Defendants employed by thus according a better position calls is example jobs and potentially switches hire might be of those other candidates hires through and Instead member who human resource accountants he was previously of the class 41 42 The that million resumes in 2011.42 of the hundreds or thousands of firms that wherever he previously by doing so member two received for the portal through site employee referrals LinkedIn monstercom job other methods Adobe and distinguishing Or the new Defendant firms where recruiters do not cold The career Dr Leamer the cold call 81 value allegedly the Plaintiffs logic from the conduct that Plaintiffs to did not receive someone Through their hires is vast not be class wide some were harmed if someone who was employed at one 42 Google evidence such as that offered by higher engineers adobe com that there could benefit even member who internal hire its of and possibly the benefit of a better job the cold call of such potential reported is it is has benefited according class The pool Page27 Defendants information about the did not receive with one of the Defendants with obtain Filed1007 13 2 non DNCC or other channels directed at calls process these other individuals 41 Document518 is irrelevant whether Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 Filed1007 13 2 Page28 very theory put forward by Plaintiffs the challenged conduct would benefit even harmed others There if it D is Employee Compensation Which if any no class wide harm even if Highly Individualized is Employees were Injured and By some and some class members are injured individuals Therefore 81 of Determining How Much Would Require Individualized Analysis 1 43 There is Tremendous The tremendous Variation in Compensation Paid to Individual Employees variation in annual compensation 7A each Defendant shown in Exhibits at theory that a rigid compensation and structure employees resulting from cold individual each year the range of at odds is would be changes of the proposed classes with a central tenet of Plaintiffs that changes necessitates calls compensation total 7B members for transmitted in compensation substantially differs the class across for 45,46 In Defendants across 47 44 Thus compensation during the alleged percent 45 The the is conspiracy Dr Leamer by presented analysis below his data no promoted cannot I he analyzes be moved discuss in 48 Changes in Appendix example tenure sex base salaries also show 4A through Company specific for job Pixars 4D 14A Dr very large the distribution performance bonuses that also of affects are tied to the 48 In a particular Defendant same conclusion differences Even and this understates 3 14B Leamer takes variations in point out in any year a 10 received in response is employee of not Dr in pay variation to external since e pressure one of there g explained by individual and Appendix also compensation films critique in his regression 3A Appendix levels which my even for individuals the level of account into success of individual 25 I this variation see compensation changes As compensation in across job classifications below and show in Exhibits age at the Defendants This implies that under Plaintiffs theory the from Software Engineer 2 to Software Engineer characteristics 47 this substantial 46 As raise supports show over 4,000 narrow job categories no reason individuals in lock step across period some employees raise while others received data Leamers move does not show at analyses 3B substantial I also show variations a particular Defendant see McAdams Depo at 42 243 3 Case5 11cv 02509LHK propensity for salary changes coworkers would vary terms employees received across for an individual substantially show these data Document518 that the requirement of internal would have understand 2 any employees compensation affected first equity and increases why one employee received The Composition of a much In of his or her Dr Leamers annually differ substantially for each Defendant In order to understand whether and if 81 the degree to which His theory would have to be tested and evaluated separately to understand the source of the variation across of the proposed class similar percentage compensation Defendants Page29 employee to be propagated members across Filed1007 13 2 so by how much it is a cold call necessary to larger raise than the other Total Compensation Differs Across Employers and Employees 45 at 8A Exhibits the Defendants components of and 8B summarize the These exhibits show that Defendants differ in their relative reliance employee compensation base salary bonus and example during conspiracy the alleged equity likely varies across internal equity Plaintiffs Defendants as well evaluated 46 49 For compensation structure which compensation the degree to theories apply is which would vary across This implies that the validity of the Plaintiffs theory would have to be The composition Exhibits 9A Apple and Google that 50 to the three types of compensation rigid options three separately for each of the Defendants Defendant 49 and or on period a Since the degree individualized by employees composition of compensation received Leamer Depo at of compensation and 9B show Dr Leamer also varies substantially the composition of total analyzes in his Figures across are in Appendices 15 through 26 5A titles within each compensation for the jobs at 17.50 278 25 282 22 Corresponding exhibits for other Defendants job through 5E Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 2 Filed1007 13 Page30 of This variation the validity of Plaintiffs employees 47 individual level as Dr and Plaintiffs The impact theories would need Leamer have of differences well The in be in job offer will depend on his preference riskaverse employee or one who the share of compensation on may options and stock Thus salary an offer of substantially company another will affect how The and all its stock match if the outside on stock will vest an employee offer is heavily compensation vest offered to an when the that are unvested employee without 51 same compensation Consequently employer wants to match of may place may receives is in another how All else equal company where 273 1 4 the equity because I value of base to from offered to by offer that he at same outside his current employer an employee that would a potential interest that holds substantial the employees inquiry individualized soon an employees the current employer options if the offer also will likely differ For example Plaintiff Siddharth Hariharan testified that while employed by employment elsewhere little base compensation creates stock options the response the outside A highly be worth less an outside allowing them to be exercised in the near future will be more likely to hire than 51 he holds options forms weighted toward stock options then by some Defendants options and how many different in resulting a corresponding amount because the impact of the challenged agreements will depend on options and any potential than lower compensation options that offer might require only a small increase reliance the compensation in base salary These same factors an employer might respond when asks his employer to matching almost that provides less than to provided in base salary employers frequently much extends greater expected total compensation consists of a large expected bonus if it 48 to change value expected bonus call compensation for receiving expects that do so failed to the composition of total compensation difference implies separately for each group of established and equity means that the value to an employee of a cold bonus him to 81 was still vesting was growing again and I at Zynga I would have to 27 Zynga was not looking start all over to again he turned work for down an offer another Hariharan Depo at Case5 11cv 02509LHK V Document518 Filed1007 13 2 Page31 81 of DR LEAMER PROVIDES NO ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR PLAINTIFFS CLASS CERTIFICATION REQUEST 49 support Plaintiffs class certification motion their with the Leamer Report which they claim demonstrates that the challenged agreements suppressed the compensation of all Class members52 Leamers and so provides reduction in compensation of the proposed class were A for proving impact Summaryof Dr Dr Leamer 50 evidence types divides capable is generally 54 of or the link between showing amount 2 Defendants of that the to of cold 52 price discovery to Motion 53 In his asked at or nearly all has not provided or members a class wide First he argues that agreements suppressed compensation mean that on average members which he says negotiating of the proposed class In support leverage and movement 3 empirical that raises compensation of employees their evidence that job supports He offers three about compensation documents which he claims demonstrate stayers which he claims he supported by economic literature of a is b informationflows calling and class wide his conclusions and between concern about the movers receive that cold calling explained at his deposition that he also p 23 report Dr Leamer does not provide a in his deposition and when Greater than 50 percent Leamer Report clear definition of what he means by all or nearly all When Dr Leamer what percentage are you confident class that my opinion is that most members of each class were your expert opinion members were undercompensated undercompensated 54 all was an average damages non compete impact of cold calling on compensation and leads Dr Leamer that because of the challenged conduct internal higher compensation than members nor Dr Opinions 1 economic theory a the 53 neither that there or nearly However for class certification his analysis into three parts job opportunities employees firms amount Leamers by which he appears of evidence of class undercompensated lower compensation received support analysis and the evidence he offers demonstrate generalized method the required all asked he replied what Leamer Depo 65 heading IV A percentage is 322033 10 emphasis added 28 most and asked to provide a range he responded Case5 11cv 02509LHK regards his conduct regression agreements was to suppress Document518 Filed1007 13 2 his claim that the impact as supporting Page32 of 81 of the challenged 55 compensation generally noncompete 51 Dr Leamer Second claims that class wide evidence agreements suppressed the compensation of employee class and class technical that he claims to establish through members nearly all individual support part of his this 56 which I interpret argument he again more that Defendants Agreements 52 55 don’t was would Dr Leamer the aggregate not at require have the made information I 80725 a that tells you Leamer Depo 56 57 58 opines that amount Q How I members consequence of the agreement done to it answer that It’s determined is through that damage the impact of these at agreements 100heading IV B And And Leamer Report or some members To 1 results in economic theory somewhat rigid I by common that factors and NonCompete analysis are capable of I don’t Apple and Adobe between A Well have the cold calling agreements secondly I to translate that into some measure of you can haven’t Q Your largely claims shows thing that 101 added 29 do So had a database I tell regression 101 Leamer Report to all suppression to members of the proposed model because emphasis harm of cold calling that was made and all the cold calling that the all 97 19 100 12 Leamer Report average impact 58 was suppressed no simple question of the allsalaried broad effects on compensation of the indicated I already have the information on that the undercompensation such that one would expect information have that the forms of econometric standard much don’t members regression analysis that he of compensation going to be very difficult econometric exercise have indirectly e the rigid salary structures data set that don’t as a is 3 multiple class showing documents which he claims confirm concern with have widespread effects on compensation to Leamer Depo that maintained Finally computing and earned by individual compensation internal of of evidence equity internal all opinion reflects offers three types specifically demonstrat Non Compete Agreements 57 an as of the proposed class and not just 2 Defendants and internal equity capable or nearly his first set of analyses that he claims demonstrates that concerns with salary structures all is that you need to carry would allow me you that before or after analysis A The to out an do it But I during comparisons regression yeah See also Case5 11cv 02509LHK class caused by the model statistical 53 As I Non Compete Agreements 2 Filed1007 13 59 words he claims In other explain none of Dr Leamers opinions are supported analysis Empiricalevidence including evidence he ignores interpretation of evidence that he offers contradicts members have members B Analysis Does not Support Compensation Dr Leamers is available Dr Leamers all or nearly all economic theory does by many ways characterized to employees Price Discovery or Affect Generally on available of recruiting jobs of the labor market at issue here not fit the facts employees a vast amount useful an economic fit the key characteristics Dr modeled and model must Leamer has not attempted theory of compensation impact the competitive nature to of the environment to match in economic frameworks and that these frameworks can suppress worker Leamer Report Leamer Depo explain compensation 135 emphasis at price discovery various In order to be framework and their and thus employees operate Price Discovery to link the challenged useful He in evaluating agreements claims that to there the are three the impact of the agreements mechanisms by which anti Cold Calling generally Would Agreements claimed by Plaintiffs that are particularly Defendants or market that is being of the industry of Information on economic theory widespread effect on compensation movement which Defendants and Not be Reduced by the Challenged relies his where evidence on the amount of available informationand available Evidence Shows that the Flow Dr Leamer of information and market compensation mobile employees and employment and employee 60 to Claim that the Challenged Flows Limit of 59 60 his opinions and demonstrates that class account for only a small fraction 55 to provide a as well as proper analysis and tremendous density of employers and employees in small geographic areas 1 81 of the proposed class Economic one that of by proper economic generally and that there has been no harm not been injured Agreements would Reduce Information 54 Page33 aggregate damages and demonstrating causality for calculating now Document518 He added 24825 16 30 focuses primarily on the agreements market price Case5 11cv 02509LHK framework discovery workers down slows occur transactions Calling an is many Calling uninformed logic channel of information labor contracts employees price discovery 63 are negotiated by members is inconsistent a and valuing 62 According he concludes claims is many Dr Leamer Cold to opportunities and unequal bargains and the unique features of Dr Leamer Consequently levels 81 of absent Cold informed and between that the challenged agreements of the proposed class and cause employees to be Dr Leamers that he claims supports compensation 61 Page34 very sluggish price discovery about outside in The consequence However undercompensated process prices far from equilibrium important Filed1007 13 of uncovering task the price discovery at 2 that labor markets can have arguing expensive and time consuming that the restrict Document518 argument about price discovery is invalid and the reduced cold calling and class wide reduced a link between with assertions that he makes to support Dr Leamer Exaggerates that link Information from the Challenged the Loss of Conduct 56 Dr Leamer how much provides no evidence of and concedes informationmight have been lost from the challenged agreements Defendants plays in available 57 between and 62 63 64 65 calling his logic and 4B at among Defendants for I discussed above Ibid 75 Leamer Report Leamer Depo at 80423 Leamer Depo at members in Part 47248 14 31 the employees calling by other amount A1 showed IV after the impact evaluate to of information of the proposed Class before and know he has done no that roughly one percent during the periods 73 Leamer Report of be used would have on a very small fraction including he claims cold data that can the Defendants and does not potential he provides and concedes on compensation which Defendants accounted employee flows 61 by 4A Exhibits the central role that recruiting and hiring flows on cold thus Despite Defendants employees and the price discovery process analysis of Defendants that restrictions 64 to he has not studied 65 movements of the overall the challenged Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 Filed1007 13 2 Page35 81 of toyear Thus conduct any reduction informationflow from the challenged agreements would be in extremely small relative to the level of the overall flow of information or to the natural year fluctuation 58 and Plaintiffs employees the flow of in Dr Leamer allege that the informationflow that data show that these were through become aware obtain indicator of the importance extremely small mean that This does not a cold call Some of this only because employees compensation However even greater compensation for Plaintiffs theory some employees that would it same conduct would if may not create and information opportunities may compensation then use the informationgained to the loss of cold calls benefit flows and under certain may have below market of a cold call and of the of cross of such reduced information an employee could not benefit from additional circumstances obtained a good is members lost to The number proposed class occurs as a part of the hiring and recruiting process Defendant hires was resulted in lower harm Indeed class wide some members under of the proposed class as I explained above Dr Leamer 59 also ignores employees to compensate the informationflow through restriction on calling among the number the vast would Google at including 60 software engineers candidates engineers in cold 5 shows Exhibit these exhibits calls to the ability including also to accounted targeted for two Defendants operate Consistent demonstrate that the reduced information 32 so total the use of cold did not cold call Defendants on the restriction good candidates would be expected would have been the Defendants for the economics other if hire and cold calling to employees to at They cold calling Other firms change their behavior employees percent States and only about 10 percent in which suitable recruits their non Defendants in the United skills recruiters at Intel job boards more intensively that the Defendants the industries with eg Intel meaningfully restricted both Defendants and and make additional if recruiters one channel by Defendants need not even reduce the of other firms from which Google at their a matter of during certain periods they likely increased also use other channels employees As other channels For example calling in their recruiting processes employees and for restrictions in informationflowing through increasing cold of both employers the incentive of or less of employment many other with employment results of of software employers had established above flow through a limited channel would Case5 11cv 02509LHK not have impact on the a meaningful through efforts by provided 1A Exhibit Page36 still would have access firms other than the Defendants as well as to of available to 81 to the recruiting Defendants recruiting other channels A simple exercise 61 Filed1007 13 2 flow of labor market information total Indeed employees employees of the Defendants opportunities Document518 the realities illustrates hiring from and movements of total hires over the class period As shown of this marketplace to other Defendants accounted A conservative one for roughly to help understand calculation Table 1 and in percent how much information potentially could have been reduced by the challenged agreements could use the 2010 2011 higher post period lost hires as the difference rate of 1.4 percent between as a base of hire level in the post and class periods the cross Defendant cross hires were lower by only about 0.3 percent an annual difference with Defendants each of the 30 additional if provided information would be 60 provided of cross hires of roughly of one percent employees movements seeking work elsewhere material economic all sources effect on left available to total labor turnover and the firm to which In other it moved there to add to the total bits of information 8,800 7,200 Defendants employees sources friends etc would be even smaller Such overall compared year from one Defendant to another through other channels internet Inter of about 7,200 per year at of 16,000 bits of information in the bits of information informationfrom who moved bits of information annually by employee 30 employees per of Defendants both the firm that employee information on market conditions actively in to additional of 0.38 percent obtain twotenths or less than 66 the of total hires during the class period hires of about 8,800 per year and total departures total words number in the comparison and measure such as new the actual 67 or an increase Since employees hires co workers percentage reduction a small difference would have no compensation 66 This calculation as a benchmark slightly Even conservative is because as I discuss share this employee of above using both no change in aggregate crosshiring among higher cross hiring in the post class period increased 67 is there may reflect the the pre class and post class Defendants periods during the class period growth of Defendants and thus their employment overall percentage is movement and much too large because ignores information it assumes all information obtained by employees 33 in other acquisition ways comes through The Case5 11cv 02509LHK 62 This change also is de minimis Over recruiting activity 12,700 in 2005 That range is Document518 low to a compared with yearto year by Defendants the class period hiring 2009 of roughly 4,100 in more than 200 times Filed1007 13 2 the variation the challenged Leamers agreements marketplace implied by the calculations the evidence presented small of the relevant Even Plaintiffs if there were employee compensation Technical are poster children by characterized facilitate opportunities Dr to other forces simply untenable 24 22 and given the do not and at wide impact is discovery that apply in Amounts of to lost with not grounded in the proposed class Available some markets with such a group a large portion The labor force Information limited access to of the In particular members of the AllSalaried Employee labor market in which they participate class is use of internet and other channels by both employees and employers and information flows contacts allegedly so that incremental cold calling might affect represent least such as monstercom dice and of the information analysis ignore and are inconsistent Vast of employees compensation an informed and Have and Defendants Plaintiffs extensive current employees friendships is his claim of class dynamics of information Employee for mobility market and some groups informationabout appropriate Fichtner due above demonstrates that any such effect His theory and empirical labor of the specific b proposed flows that provides no evidence of the importance vanishingly consideration 68 in cold calling due reduction in hiring roughly 30 realities Dr Leamer the nature to above based on his Figures of total compensation incremental information to because of the agreements 64 from a high of almost claims that the impact of the challenged conduct was economically significant imply a sensitivity would be 81 a range of roughly 8,500 employees per year Given the degree of fluctuation implying effects as large as 20 percent 63 of in hiring and fluctuations varied employees per year of what would be caused by the hypothesized to Page37 university many publicly com graduates with fellow students salarycom who available etc are recruited and colleagues Depo at 45 946 4 34 data sources and networking by technology 68 on salaries and among both firms and maintain Case5 11cv 02509LHK Dr Leamer 65 implies Defendants employees Document518 that the labor market 2 Filed1007 13 from which Defendants when Page38 81 of and where hire watercooler compensation obtain information that they can use consists of hapless by weakly with employers who market of technical centers contradicts Dr Leamers hiring and separations annual hires and separations percent that 70 compensation at of average annual lacks changing number of Valley and other geographic implication 71 firms to But this characterization in Silicon The high Defendants shown in Exhibits as a fraction consulting members that high costs for transactions involve on of information which scraps large and constantly unsupported their rely mostly often hire private time money and personal dislocation services including obtain to and other employees located proposed class are employed in jobs that turnover sources The agglomeration of Defendants and a other employers technology 69 Internet provide aggregated informationabout credibility who and poorly informed employees talk perhaps supplemented they then use to bargaining they negotiate of the involving labor rates of employee 4A and 4B with the employment between sum of 10 and 25 during the conduct period demonstrates the substantial flow of information of the type Dr Leamer Dr Leamers claims was restricted into and out of these firms and contradicts claims that these employees were immobile c Lost Information will not have Class wide Impact if it is Unique to Individual Employees 66 valuing According to Dr Leamer expensive and timeconsuming task of uncovering the the unique features of workers that cold calling helps uncover slows unique down the price discovery features of potential process employees is 72 and But his claim inconsistent with his claim that there would be class wide impact from reduced cold calling through the price discovery process Indeed he stated 69 70 71 72 Leamer Report 75 Leamer Report 74 Leamer Report 73 emphasis his deposition 75 Leamer Report at added 35 that employers including the Defendants Case5 11cv 02509LHK often differentiate compensation information would lost would Filed1007 13 2 the price discovery process employee specific d is employee specific unique well accepted economic Dr Leamer Claims about Lost Information provides economic models the labor which Leamer to lower market but cites all prices might rise faster cites but the rockets for understanding limitations that paper does not why prices rise quickly in by itself information by Joseph show socalled than they fall in Stiglitz many demonstrate that imperfections The limitations other three and feathers phenomenon rockets is or claim that 75 as a result of information the framework cites markets with imperfect information according 76 Dr in the labor market leads of information and feathers model does not imply that a restriction of information in the labor market would cause a reduction only Price Discovery nor the broader the cited literature of his claim that restriction these in support wages Neither and incorporate involve and claims One paper he neoclassical that acknowledge economic papers he that Literature model has for his undercompensated employees are to 74 literature support argues that the fullinformation markets including The cold called and the extent flow and price discovery claims that his information in the economics literature 73 There would be no class wide impact Dr Leamers Finally 81 features not To features of then the effect of reducing cold calling also are not Supported by the Economic 67 who was to the unique features of the worker relate Page39 unique employees to account for such across any impact on employees without those not have will be Document518 in wages Rather response to positive information but fall these models explain slowly in response to unfavorable information 73 I Leamer Depo know dont occur are are Leamer Report Joseph Stiglitz Review 76 The 460 June cited people for who promotions thinking result in the price these internal turned out to be extraordinarily A discovery process promotions the big bumps up that good Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics 92 American Economic 2002 paper by Green et al Ye 2006 internal 66 major over the counter and Q Dont would be relevant Because Im it compensation 74 75 316 16 317 17 at that develop financial theoretical 2010 is an empirical market not models paper documenting asymmetric price a labor market The cited papers by Tappata explaining asymmetric price responses 36 adjustment in a 2006 and Yang Case5 11cv 02509LHK 68 The economic closely to on and in turn Samuelson made an results Dr Leamer to parties have would knows prevail with more is 77 information 78 some mutually Similarly more recent economic Dr beneficial Leamer Thus are forgone asserts in his report that lack employers and employees the available supported by the economic by William Samuelson In February Ausubel Lawrence 80 81 Science full when similar results J and BV beneficial model Samuelsons party who when does not generally to information but instead the demonstrates 79 there is asymmetric information of information would disadvantage both Leamers empirical his claim that the challenged price discovery framework 1986 Ibid Motty Perry study unique features of individual agreements had a class wide impact 52 July 81 1984 bargaining game with asymmetric to calculate from the behavior Sequential not evidence of Defendants recruiting and a sequential In order is correctly of his his informed Bargaining under payoff the opponent uninformed player p 1004 Cramton and Raymond J Deneckere Bargaining with Incomplete Game Theory Aumann Robert J and Sergiu Hart eds Vol 3 Amsterdam Peter of chapter Leamer Report 6870 Leamer Report 50 2002 73 37 And Asymmetric Information Academic 2 1986 M Information Handbook Elsevier or and draw the proper inferences Grossman Sanford Press revised 79 literature a similar vein Grossman and Perry must anticipate literature Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information Econometrica information and obtain see However Further his argument that cold calling uncovers employees contradicts 78 some mutually evidence shows that the challenged agreements would not Dr 77 that 80 meaningfully affect information flows hiring practices 81 of the proposed class information is more favorable with asymmetric trades of to the informed party than the price favorable informed party than the price that would prevail with 69 members that the informed party has superior information will take this into account establish that the price that prevails Indeed of information Rather he explains that an uninformed full formulating his strategy that Page40 informationcorresponds more literature showing asymmetric does not establish that the resulting price that this Filed1007 13 hypothesizes that reduced cold calling affects under compensation early contribution when are foregone in 2 with asymmetric bargaining mechanism by which the negotiations trades literature Document518 Case5 11cv 02509LHK 2 Dr Leamer Wrongly Document518 Filed1007 13 2 Claims that His Empirical Analysis Page41 81 of Defendants of Compensation Data Shows that Restricting Cold Calling Impedes the Price Discovery 70 In addition Process wrongly claiming to economic theory and economic that show literature that reduced cold calling limited informationflows and price discovery and thereby ed suppress 82 employee compensation on a widespread basis analysis that he characterizes Cold Calling would discovery process 83 Dr Leamer compensation He Defendant85 this However claims that packages a show 6 and symptom empirical evidence capable of showing that instead restricting the price no common evidence that there is of price discovery at who moved for those 7 which between compare Defendants than for those of it does not support this process his conclusion better who stayed 84 compensation total Defendants and employees that 2001 and 2011 demonstrate were meaningful work would be median base and the move between each year between comparison provides employee compensation by impeding his data of employees that in common Leamer compensation says that his Figures respectively additional suppress artificially suppressed employee 71 as Dr 86 stay However at a even if that the challenged agreements impaired informationflows and price discovery 72 First the economics generally receive atypically large occur generally and 82 83 84 85 wage increases so the pattern 89 emphasis Leamer Report shows shown by that job changers Dr Leamer would Economic theory and evidence imply not evidence of disequilibrium Leamer Report mobility 80 91 Dr Leamer There are thousands and the of between those who stayed at a Defendant 91 but his stayers category also stayers category only excludes from the Defendants total employees the individuals Defendants very few stayers movers in Dr his data Leamer has only between not controlled 26 to 178 movers in a for potential differences year compared in mix between with tens of the few movers many stayers Topel Robert Journal added stayers as describes new hires His who moved 87 on between employer 87 is Leamer Report includes 86 literature of H and Michael Economics May 1992 P Ward Bartel Job Mobility Ann P and the Careers of Young and George 38 J Borjas Men The Quarterly Middle Age Job Mobility Its Case5 11cv 02509LHK that an employee who moves costs However he portion of their higher Second the process movers are desirable to another their compensation for same compensation movers do employee increase not increase firm matching if stayers and they had the compensation moving costs and what of such attractive to means that ex ante unique features because it In other words The because they are Dr Leamer says but as nothing about reveals not evidence that stayers of stayers uniquely will be and were chosen exactly this conclusion supports moving and generally moved that the relevant movers are selected their is employers must in promoted not affect compensation than observably must net out movers Employees who move on average in effect getting 81 of for this rather than reflects a disequilibrium movers by which recognizes acknowledges the magnitude compensates firm perhaps because of movement does appropriate 88 Dr Leamer suppressed is no evidence about compensation stayers are not equivalent the hiring firm First as Page42 in compensation a larger increase whether compensation provides Filed1007 13 2 moving Dr Leamer employees for the cost of disparity for evaluating earnings likely will obtain employees for two reasons similar incumbent compensate Document518 would have compensation increases economic vast received but does not rely literature on the of on disequilibrium or undercompensation 73 their Second and movement compares critically evidence that affects the compensation the compensation that the compensation of of affects argument requires that the change Without stayers this concerns that converts unproven one Determinants and Consequences Borjas George J Topel Robert Journal of compensation for which he wrongly Working Paper stayers is not evidence that comparison year Yet but provides No 161 NBER is closed by employees no evidence the compensation there is paper May 1992 Determinants and Consequences Bartel Job Mobility and the Careers of Young Ann P and Working Paper George J Borjas No 161 39 NBER of internal equity Working Paper Series Cycle Working it his price discovery movers also changes claims is static No no support for January 1977 233 NBER Working 1978 H and Michael P Ward Economics of stayers raise into raises for all Job Mobility and Earnings Over the Life Paper Series February 88 stayers in a particular in compensation link persons Dr Leamers of stayers movers and movers movers earn more than Men The Quarterly Middle Age Job Mobility Its Working Paper Series January 1977 Case5 11cv 02509LHK on his claim that a restriction Document518 information employees of other Defendants affected 74 Thus not support Dr Leamers his claim that compensation 3 According 2005 because its expansion period began we 2004 in in his Figure 9 he uses agreements was motivated expansion with employees average provides data He was peremployee support expansion after from Apple by Defendants incentive 89 90 91 revenue at Proposed of the Expansion these agreements were 90 members He put in place of expansion period of informed in would that claims that this of the proposed class referencing his Figure if 8 91 his claim that the timing of the sharing improved Apple during the profits NonCompete the risk of sharing the gains of Apple with average per employee compensation in his Figure 9 Dr Leamer appears employees to increased DNCC 94 Leamer Report Members Non Compete a threat to the firms high levels of profits and that the comparison 434 17 18 Leamer Report of the Economic Apple revenues surged and when for this conclusion them at to rise to desire to avoid to enter into information restricting Leamer Depo conduct or that the with periods to support agreements as evidence that the Defendants incentive that the cost to the alleged do of labor markets and claims that Apple data show that the went into effect when with the workforce to compensation than would be expected absent the challenged agreements less equity Agreements why and that subsequently use 2010 and 2011 as the relevant Then members of class calls members generally Claim that the Timing surprise 81 equilibrium the timing of the agreements coincided otherwise have caused compensation received a of through cold obtained Have Accompanied not Page43 operation Compensation Increased Dr Leamer to the normal from reaching Class that Otherwise Would 89 of class was impaired by Dr Leamers Data do not Support Agreements Prevented 75 reflect price discovery conduct prevented compensation alleged would have been that 6 and 7 Figures Filed1007 13 2 98 40 to view the timing of the challenged reduce informationflows when their profits equivalently increased agreements also increased at so their that time Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 2 Filed1007 13 Page44 of 81 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 2 Filed1007 13 Page45 of 81 Case5 11cv 02509LHK 79 The change in heavily influenced Google responded fact that compensation by Dr Leamers Thus Economic of Big the Bang uncommon nature is offers three additional class 101 a were points in time common evidence Dr Leamers Facebook Claim that Rigid Compensation Structures Dr Leamers analysis in support evidence that he claims demonstrates the link between specific at 81 instituting of evidence related to factors such as Refute of at Defendants not only fails to demonstrate AllEmployee Class102 To supplement evidence showed outcomes to different Defendants employee compensation would have been widespread the Page46 from Facebook by that compensation specific essential element of motion Filed1007 13 to a unique challenge view factors that were have The second certification the 2 Theory and Empirical Evidence Defendants 80 supports discussion but in fact highlights D Document518 that the artificial suppression of extending which I to all or nearly above discussed of analysis that he says support his claim of members all that agreements and suppressed compensation the challenged types of Plaintiffs class of he claimed generally he wide spread impact on members See http for example techcrunch a November 2007 online com 2007 11 21 facebook Facebook article Googlers At Stealing stealing googlers at an alarming rate a An Alarming Rate May 2008 online article Google Finds That Perks Cant Keep Some Employees From Leaving http www dailytech com Google Finds That Perks Cant KeepSomeEmployeesFromLeaving article 11794 htm at President of global communications and public affairs Elliot Schrage jumped ship to work week Just two months prior Sheryl Sandberg had left to become Facebook and a May 2009 Wall Street Journal online article Google Searches Facebook this last the number two for Staffing at executive Answers startups http recent online wsj com article SB124269038041932531 weeks amid display advertising the departures chief of top 102 Facebook Leamer Report html including David Rosenblatt Meanwhile engineering director Steve Horowitz like executives Inc and Twitter 101 emphasis Concerns advertising about a talent exodus sales midlevel employees and search quality chief Inc added 43 Santosh like lead Jayaram have revived boss Tim Armstrong designer in and Doug Bowman continue to decamp to hot Case5 11cv 02509LHK Economic theory principles Defendants Multiple As I now through a the impact regression common of the proposed class though maintaining a discuss somewhat rigid compensation considerable structure difference objective individual do 105 the sparse 106 evidence is employ to evidence faculty Journal by of the rapidly 105 a or circumstances more in flexible There hand and performance and does not is seniority and other the one in broad labor the and other my review 106 Based on of declarations support of this claim in detail its employees market for members of the proposed times and the unimportance price 2003 However by Facebook discovery find that I and class with of cold calling among process procedural equity is more important than sample Do New York Basic Books 1984 World Can Unions and Industrial Competition vol 22 Winter 2008 pp 153 176 What Do Unions a Dynamic Economic Perspectives in about cold calling of at various and Honoree in their B and James L Medoff Sluggish Institutions of Dr Leamer concern information flows and the Terpstra T at each Defendant by However he compensation and compensation changes offered hiring work Freeman Richard Coexist that would loyalty contributions compensation on in setting goals loyalty than unionized workforces to the university For example in their Hirsch Barry to maintain worker relative to other compensation he cites relate to Googles in contributing equity Dr with structure to assure internal equity salary structure to determine employers such as Facebook internal 104 101 not address Defendants compensation firms have incentives of workers by another Defendant This new rigid with compensation managers note that documents not a promotes greater worker between characteristics Leamer Report I to internal equity evidence are inconsistent systems of the Defendants that rely on individual my interviews to agreements on compensation that emphasizes and rewards individual characteristics compensation 104 Dr Leamer salary structure rigid by adhering 103 Theory Does not Support a Rigid Salary Structure the strength of this incentive which a 103 to loyalty 81 of evidence demonstrates a widespread impact on compensation of members According salary structure theory and empirical claim that 81 maintain worker Page47 analysis Leamers Economic rigid of the challenged explain both economic 1 to that he says reflect adherence internal documents and principles Filed1007 13 firm incentives implicating of internal equity 2 Document518 1 44 p 135 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 2 Filed1007 13 Page48 of 81 Case5 11cv 02509LHK importance Alexandre Document518 of this effect or even that Mas111 to support his is it performance argument but Mas does not than the one role of at issue demand and this article new acrossthe board wage cuts of employee translates Dr Leamer no adjust compensation hiring call their was reduced by of incumbent the challenged theory in less Microsoft those challenged Yahoo or at any Adobe internal no decline in not explicitly considered information 113 or analyzed made Leamer Report Footnote 126 Quarterly Leamer Report Footnote 126 Labor Economics 243 at referring See faculty to of time Defendants with Albert Rees by a pressures employment that in resulting DNCC to or place Since Dr the according However from which it if new The Role of 1993 87 101 18 4132 20 46 Apple did hires from employees obtained same adjustments to maintain Leamer has Mas Pay 2006 to agreements than called or otherwise recruited Apple and 783 but but simply that Defendants agreed not to cold cold Alexandre 112 received any hypothesized not shown and indeed has whether the challenged agreements resulted Journal of Economics the the information that results and the available evidence demonstrates that there was not Performance 121 Leamer Depo to be to describes claims do not claim agreements were not but instead who maintain internal equity there was to of the hundreds of other companies equity would have had members job adjustments for other hires transmit Plaintiffs agreements then the same information was transmitted 113 new employees employee movement between if by higher compensation Dr Leamers employees of certain other Defendants for certain periods not cold call employees of how at all into compensation to maintain internal equity would have occurred 112 inherent in in this source of informationand thus reduction 81 the dispersion in salary structures of university the fact that if ignores adjustments to compensation in on forces if police union of article changes by Albert Rees article fairness which does not support employees to preserve Finally an also cites the impact of market on an cites consider the effect Page49 a very different labor market and different event simply emphasizes the uncertainty or incumbent 84 Dr Leamer here He context in this wages within an employer Rather he examines of 111 present Filed1007 13 2 Reference Fairness in it is in any loss of irrelevant Points and Police Wage Determination 11 Journal Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 2 Filed1007 13 Page50 of 81 Case5 11cv 02509LHK informationconsidered in employees For example Each manager overall setting an overall in 2004 Intel the poorest the top performance 87 Assume rating averaged Assume that the implication receiving Leamers the managers to much smaller based heavily Intel on compensation Based on my with similar budget that year increases discussion filed in this matter employees willingness I the fact that the total a cold call percent is 116 from salary increase who This an is not only that the individual five percent generally is too he manages 25 employees market adjustment then his other 20 Thus the exact the budgeting a system where amount depends process granting that other employees receive implied by Dr Leamers amount budgeted that drives above average below average theory for salary increases generally by thirdparty companies surveys performed on like 76583DOC001487pptx with compensation understand that Defendants to the and responsibilities skills than five percent average increases data from the compensation data a 20 market compensation that who received a cold call received provide information calls among those 20 employees ignores to increase that salary increase both for the individual some employees may require Dr Leamer who for 115 ability a job offer with received claim that cold increases rather than the above 116 match salaries guidelines Intels of those employees received give five of his employees a 20 percent to employee employees were that employees salary increase changes at Defendants essentially creates salary increases 115 to salary increase the salary distribution compensation 2005 In learns that one of his engineers undercompensated but a job offer is employees will receive 88 when one that the engineer manager wants Dr of and he wants is policies across over 10 percent the job offer and for other engineers received If at one Defendant 81 companies performance ratings should get no salary increase while those Defendant and another low salary increase for a group of employees manager a in of to allocate her pro rata share of that budget in salary Given this system a manager would have only limited compensation Page51 for the change a four percent some cases by company distributing the aggregate budgeted received Filed1007 13 2 budget for salary increases budgeted how then decided to her staff guided in increases Document518 pursue outside reasons and would remain so even if managers at the infrequently opportunities as evidence he received an increase 48 Defendants and counter outside in that pay the my review of Declarations offers employee because they consider an is disaffected for other Case5 11cv 02509LHK Radford and employees on not 117 The informationeach Defendant that information is specific positions at but his ability to least in process the short obtain to much may even 81 of hires and separated and similar firms is broader than the Defendant firms and Defendant which then by a raise will not provide a basis threatening on which are matched move to the company Due compensation increases lead to smaller to another would decide the Defendant salaries throughout in favor of increasing it new from Radford receives the at from Page52 with the An which the Defendant benchmark employee compensation might be able do so market intelligence budgeting types of jobs the firms against employee individual to Filed1007 13 2 information obtained idiosyncratic from data on salaries paid in a marketplace derived same Document518 for other to Defendant to ignore the fixed employees at run 3 Dr Leamers Affected by Analysis Wrongly Some Common Assumes that Factors then Only if Individuals Common Compensation Factors Potentially is Affect Compensation Dr Leamer 89 who would claims that changes in compensation of a small number of employees have received a cold call would have class wide impact increase compensation most in demand common at across any to of let However alternative 117 Indeed current Plaintiff in part To support by common individuals factors provides such as experience because they received that the level of compensation Hariharan testified that he did not share a new job Hariharan 120 49 on paid by Defendants His analysis cannot distinguish employers when considering Leamer Report claim he this that compensation 185 16 118 and related practices would be expected his analysis does not demonstrate that changes class wide hypothesis time show alone a small number of compensation Defendant but for the challenged conduct the board rather than be narrowly focused 118 factors analysis another Cold Calling that point in employees can be explained education from those the impact compensation at an to that are empirical individual job title compensation a cold call of Defendants Depo in the skills to would and of a subset affect he hypothesizes from an employees information is broadly with prospective 104 105 18 136 24 137 12 184 5 or Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 Filed1007 13 2 Page53 of 81 determined by competition in a vast labor market for similar employees and that adjustments for unique circumstances Dr Leamers 90 members tended to of particular employees are highly individualized claim to be able to demonstrate that generally move claim of class wide impact 119 time over together Such movement is is neither the compensation nor informative surprising of class about his As the hallmark of a competitive marketplace I explained above the labor market in which Defendants compete for employees and in which members of the proposed class seek extensive flow of informationthrough a variety of channels and high employee it is not surprising common factors that employers and jobs across the market would have compensation more or pay variation An attracting less attractive 11A a claims that 119 120 variation Leamer Report The degree of across to 121 Exhibits Google jobs 123 that If several with makes Leamer never even examines he had he would have discovered grades and He many a regression variation it with job categories will understate ignores and 11B show Dr Leamer the ability of that both the level within his job categories 122 titles titles and that which analysis that see left built relatively little scope about that the distribution across of annual changes in total compensation analyzes in his Figures job categories companies for the pay in for the using the same algorithm that 121 122 50 Apple 17 Appendix 6A through 6E show major jobs at the other five Defendants 15 through jobs at Apple and Google Leamer Report employers to differentiate events major at these Leamer Report the ability of Dr Leamer on high level he claims shows employers to move individuals of annual changes in total compensation 123 Dr that Defendants had highly structured compensation systems identify 122 unique characteristics vary greatly across individuals distribution the not competitive and keeping good employees At the same time provides cold calls or other 11A is 130 individuals since response Thus mobility in average compensation compensation that ranges of salaries for grades and established for individual offered of the variation rapid and 11B120,121 and two dimensional matrix with management much any given employer within these job categories Dr Leamer 91 to by broad and characterized employees because each possesses and rate of growth of compensation Exhibits is explain who employer difficulty varies across that individual employment uses to identify and the I the top ten Case5 11cv 02509LHK 90 percent age of the variability in a class tenure gender location job Leamer concludes Document518 124 and employer title time can be explained by a common he bases this conclusion the a that is explained by 81 of in each year Based on his regression results 125 characteristics that measures statistic The statistic the fraction by Dr salaries within each firm at each point in set of employee Rsquared is Page54 members compensation can be explained almost the entire variation that Filed1007 13 2 in on which of the variance Rsquared in the dependent variable power and zero no explanatory means of 0.9 or so variables do an individuals good job of explaining 12 compares 92 perfect explanatory that the regression which job title Exhibit a one the independent is power As used has a good equation employer variables and that lies between an fit and the independent age specific Dr Leamer by tenure gender and location compensation the persons Rsquareds reported in Dr Leamers Figures 11 and 13 with the employeespecific when values only the employerspecific job age factors of same with not demonstrated claims that he has as he he would acknowledge compensation among employees is The exhibit employee or without the affect are included variables tenure gender and location regression is almost the that even title but not the shows specific an employees largely explained compensation but only that variation by employerspecific job compensation average pay across job categories fact that job titles explain mean 124 Regression analysis many the 126 identifying a statistical tool to different individuals the measure in with different The wide of the Plaintiffs because variation titles in dependent or time periods variables and crop yields the here age by using data for with different dependent to the here a class variables variables the does not addition variable control on the dependent and or different However in compensation within job independent 126 values for the amount variables 129 variation classes in different levels of average impact on a variables titles can be used to understand the relationship between sunshine and fertilizer the independent Leamer Report the one or more characteristics analysis firm wide in compensation impact of the independent variables For example regression proposed of the variation annual compensation of changes etc of rainfall 125 is in a large fraction that there is not substantial members tenure wide variation Leamer has controlled for important employee specific factors job titles have is Dr variables employees with different employerspecific and there fit of the that the in pay across Hence Dr class rather job Leamers categories finding is a consequence of a high than any homogeneity 51 R squared of the broad definitions to a large extent of the Plaintiffs reflects the heterogeneity Case5 11cv 02509LHK variation across Document518 In fact the data used in titles Filed1007 13 2 Dr Leamers Page55 regression analysis of show 81 exactly the opposite A simple test 93 employees individual 12 and 14 Figures of the ability shown is drawn from schedule compensation The 2008 and 2009 in which is that remains unexplained Leamers Figure compensation Defendant example actual explain in Exhibits 12 that Leamers there is substantial in 2007 and predicted between regression dispersion 127 Exhibit 14B shows between plus or minus of compensation rigid 15.4 and 1.7 percent more 8.4 percent predicted their shows that while an dispersion accounting and actual an individuals in the unexplained 15 13 In the same year differences based on 52 title of his based on the results in compensation Dr and the In each year and for each portion 9 job individuals of compensation the percentage difference 5 11 5 and resulting employee specific factors actual 127 predicts Plaintiffs remains in the portion for the distribution model named of percent or for Dr Leamers or Figure For between more for half Apple Google the percentage difference compensation was about plus or minus 25 percent the distribution for there is considerable compensation was about plus or minus 10 percent Intuit Lucasfilm and Pixar respectively and predicted after in the middle of his conduct period Adobes employees and actual even which shows of the difference Dr the Second compensation wide his compensation 14A Brandon Marshall models 2006 than respectively factors regression analysis compensation is illustrated in were overcompensated Plaintiffs Dr Leamers and actual predicted helps to from his with a rigid compensation system and employer This named in the difference inconsistent between difference of conclusions can be 2006 and 2007 respecively and 37.9 and years and individuals Dr Leamers common from in Two while Daniel Stover received predicts compensation use regression estimates of the Defendants greater compensation than predicted than predicted across based on compensation I to explain would have been earned by each named that he was employed by one Dr Leamer by asserted compensation 94 regressions 13A and 13B in Exhibits 17.4 percent received less compensation variation Leamers this table First for the most part the relative to their predicted example Dr to predict the compensation in each year that Plaintiff of more 14 for 10 of Intel between percent of Case5 11cv 02509LHK Adobes employees and plus or Document518 minus 44 40 14 29 22 128 Intel Intuit Lucasfilm and Pixar respectively imply that 10 percent his regression estimates Filed1007 13 2 and 30 percent Based on of Googles scope to pay differentiate 129 Therefore studies structure employees of over 4,000 specific to Dr Leamers model demonstrates who earned by employees his regression which employees even across contrary his regression by predicted in 2007 salaries accounting percent for of the demonstrates that there was wide job classifications he claims of a relatively rigid compensation that there is substantial year included in in compensation variation have the identical values of the characteristics job titles in a typical Apple Google more than 40 or the narrow within for 81 of the 5th and 95th percentile approximately 900 classmembers earned less than 40 percent average compensation Page56 including Dr Leamers being regression in model one 130 This evidence shows that the Defendants did not have the type of formulaic compensation structure would that challenged conduct 95 Even unexplained based on a given job Dr Leamers Dr Leamers compensation 128 there is large variation regression and the compensation that which was The title 132 In 2007 Exhibits model amount the in 15A the of Software Developer the actual predicts for the top ten Engineer 3 employees at Dr Leamer job based on the algorithm simply because observations the distribution between model regression of compensation 15B show and of the differences Dr Leamers ten percent the top ranking Apple fits Intel data better regression model Figure 12 regression Apple and Google jobs Apple would be class wide impact from 131 within by Plaintiffs claim that there support from Intels employees used in his such a constitute highperforming large 129 about 60 percent portion This of course ignores of the regression the firms ability and otherwise potentially data to differentiate undercompensated compensation employees across into new employees jobs by moving with higher average compensation 130 According over 100,000 60,000 131 As employees I noted compensation across 132 The shown Dr job Leamers employees in 2005 and 2009 about 7,000 different the proposed All Salaried job titles and the proposed Employee Class Technical Class includes includes over about 2,400 job titles above even in response these figures understate to external the flexibility that the Defendants pressure because they ignore Defendants had to differentiate ability to move individuals titles distributions in data between in Appendices of the of differences 7A through in actual and predicted 7E 53 compensation for the other five defendants are Case5 11cv 02509LHK Dr by predicted again necessary to model job by predicted Together assumed and because of other factors were not harmed by his which any Model VD minus percent that individualized was under individual analysis would be or overcompensated from the of undercompensation the conclusions compensation that Does not Demonstrate discuss Dr Leamer in his Hypothesized Price Discovery detail the regression analysis which offers as evidence that the challenged and damages allegedly Dr Leamer suffered draws from it are inconsistent that allows structure him to infer that the by refer to as I conduct affected price discovery to affect all members his conduct regression estimates I simulate with his claim that there assumed loss identical individuals based on the empirical year for each Defendant 133 I person so in that subsequent into account 2004 the I result only difference years compensation and thereby the persistence for individuals otherwise similar people compensation can diverge shows how Assume that in their predict effects I identical in all characteristics 54 Using compensation in each two compensation can diverge who individuals are comparable in their residuals compensation each subsequent based on 2004 The over time common way is the difference in their from the prior two years were identical in equity causes unexplained performed the same experiment 50,000 who internal over in all unexplained portion of their compensation for each 2005 compensation the difference rigid over time of otherwise dramatically there are or the a in compensation distribution of randomly draw residuals randomly drawn residuals of The perform the following experiment characteristics in 133 is of informationand of the proposed class in a the change the the Class That analysis and reduced price discovery combined with Defendants commitment to localized who challenged agreements aggregate compensation of members of the proposed class and that he uses to estimate amount of the Cannot Explain Compensation Changes it conduct regression that employees at Google III paying damages to members of the proposed class my report I of Engineer because of the challenged conduct rather than structure to avoid Process Because In Section to 81 of 2007 and indeed could have benefited 4 Dr Leamers 97 in on compensation means wage rigid model Page57 or less than the compensation of the employees earned plus or Dr Leamers the evidence more Similarly for Software percent determine the extent relative to the Filed1007 13 2 earned approximately 42 percent Leamers the top ranking compensation 96 17 15 through Figures Document518 that Dr in Leamers times to obtain resulting distributions Dr Leamer model and I do the same year taking the a distribution new of resulting show how compensation claims explain an individuals Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 due time for otherwise comparable individuals Dr by that remains unexplained Leamers Filed1007 13 2 to the portion conduct of an Page58 individuals 81 of compensation which regression each year the effect of cumulates over time 98 Compare for example two characteristic controlled tenure and location Dr Leamers for Dr Leamer model implies e 2004 and that these By 2009 by 24 percent demonstrate that otherwise Thus Dr compensation compensation schedule 134 Such conduct own model His somewhat rigid wage structure results regression estimates results provide the proposed class could no the compensation shown model different a his claim of contradicts imply that he has no basis to salaries 17 end up with tremendously rigid conclude that class wide effects through his claimed to in both the levels As such Dr even within job categories for Plaintiffs claims that the support By 2006 two of the 16 and in Exhibits Empirical evidence shows wide variation and rates of growth of employee compensation Leamers e 2003 compensation between changes in compensation would translate individual age gender company i prior identical employees can rapidly Leamers are identical in every two employees would on average have the difference would be around 37 percent individuals 2004 of in his conduct regression i as well as current conduct that differed by who as employees amount of harm members to of be determined on a class wide basis 5 Dr Leamers Attribute Compensation Constant Ranking Analysis is Misleading 99 compensation I excluded and by Lucasfilm of the pairs at least 86 18B show and Pixar If differences would the likely evidence masks years in compensation Exhibit exhibits situated the 17 shows The 55 variation two firms 90th percentile the I have converted the analysis to include Exhibit 16 shows figures indicate by at least 56 percent the entire distribution were promoted be even larger relatively stable and expanded that differed numbers assume employees of substantial because of missing data for those after five identically titles would have compensation of employees percent two Dr Leamers both by firm and overall differences from 2005 through 2010 In both each year that into annual changes and the 90th percentile percent and within and across job trends 15 17 his Figures 134 18A Exhibits two employees at different of differences the that after in mean ten two years each year have the same job rates the title then the compensation in Case5 11cv 02509LHK 25 job top titles Dr Leamers fashion groups linked across Dr Leamer structure 15 17 The at his deposition 136 not rigid 18A Exhibits that such evidence Moreover and link of the form required relevant than compensation changes in compensation by Dr in 18A within Defendants constant and the overall upward theory Changes Indeed was substantial compensation compensation in Dr Leamers relatively stable then one variation across titles in a year and mask that Because does not are would be and from year claims that If Dr this Some across 101 Dr Leamers logic level that substantially to his Figure 135 I 136 show exceeds 7 ripples through charts Q Could implies for the Would Move that year The and scale of his variation had Defendants of that of current employees the rigid compensation a nonrigid wage structure 8A forces Policies and Even of the Structure a small number top 10 jobs in Appendices that job titles Formulas for Annual Compensation Adjustments that a Limited Number Additional Cold Calls Leamer a given year large positive to more would expect similar in Defendants are which would be driven by market trend in compensation One Cannot Conclude in compensation changes with attribute a wage stable ordering changes in compensation for others titles independent of any internal equity concerns 6 are in any true would not be sufficient to establish a if for different job titles also changes in compensation across negative figures in even Leamers for one group drive 18B show and across alone causally related across groups let levels because they more closely proxy average compensation But Exhibits a roughly 135 parallel consistent with limited claim that changes which were correct that compensation across job changes would be the maintenance of 18B examine the similar for the different job categories causal in a of compensation fact that the ordering even mean that changes in compensation are correlated 100 and Google job titles for Apple imply that compensation increased 81 of through concerns about internal equity or other forces job categories was 10 Page59 stable over time does not imply that changes in compensation admitted that Filed1007 13 2 rather than just the top highly misleading is job titles is relatively way Defendant for each claim that his Figures across Document518 and as you’ve defined Depo 283 23 25 56 movers eg 20 hired at a compensation or 30 percent structures of Defendants higher according to cause an 8B it lead to parallel lines A Yes it could Leamer Case5 11cv 02509LHK or similarincrease equivalent unreasonable to expect earned by a amount cold compensation not who the person compensation new 102 hire and not One way in if compensation would it is Because is by 75,000 and a senior software engineer receives 110,000 The with an outside firm can respond perfectly rigid compensation by promoting impact E let causing a of all employees employee receives to a position if an outside higher that provides on compensation within wage the firms engineer 125,000 and a job title structure position a junior Dr to of senior software ripple effect on compensation Leamers Rsquared would be 1 Dr Leamers The third Model Econometric it is between of no compensation the challenged of would show a regression yet there is Undercompensation Flawed Both Conceptually and issue addressed by Dr Leamer is whether be used to demonstrate that the challenged agreements of any if ripple effect of junior and conduct had any alone a class wide impact Impact Because 103 a valued no informationabout whether provides higher directly gain information the junior software engineer and the rigid structure reflected in the fixed relationship senior software engineers job but job titles a junior software Using data such as this his the 25 as the result of a cold call with compensation offer structure who engineer position that pays 125,000 in compensation without other junior software engineers substantially employees only which occurs even two by a in compensation increase regression focuses firm has only required it cost the firmnot only current with a promotion countering not be able to identify this type of effect that pays engineer substantial Dr Leamers rigid To explain assume a software a required or even than employer would be willing to offer a only employees to which an employer can respond when offer of higher compensation total it An hire if performed compared with increase make the percent previously the proposed class in impact were limited to similar employees or from the by 25 greater compensation employee would called economically is it 81 of whether to offer employment to a employee would cold Page60 employees But percent of all salaried employees for all employees a substantial of current who demands 25 call In effect hiring the Filed1007 13 2 A firm considering current more than was earned by percent mover a attribute compensation increasing lesser constant in compensation to occur this identified through candidate Document518 members of the proposed class He first presents 57 in its standard Fails to Show Common Implementation econometric analysis can generally suppressed the compensation a simple analysis of the change in total Case5 11cv 02509LHK compensation an for Defendants claims that this he analysis later Filed1007 13 2 described Page61 warm up as a evidence that there was undercompensation suggestive is Document518 81 of He exercise during the class period Dr Leamer then performs a undercompensation from the alleged 104 conduct regression He agreements to attempt indicated at the aggregate to quantify his deposition that his conduct regression also had a central role in making up for the lack of direct supporting evidence for other parts of his theory to and evaluate agreements quantify amount 105 Thus Dr Leamers forms of econometric conduct process if the amount of computing his conceptual framework other independent empirical logic links the it of information reduction evidence informationand thereby hampered structure 106 to each However or almost and Dr Leamers and conduct 137 Leamer Depo at 413 21 414 7 cold calling declined identified 138 139 in his price period framework at Non support for which he has no the lynchpin in his chain of on compensation somewhat rigid compensation the proposed class common not that in multiple common impact to all Defendants he does not have evidence but stating that the regression is actually there 135 Leamer Report Leamer Depo discovery is acknowledging during the conduct is for standard of compensation but also as empirical price discovery regression is also flawed effect he estimates amount to a measurable impact implementation masks the fact that he has no evidence of undercompensation 139 through his claimed each member of demonstrate that agreements reduced cold calling and price discovery both on average for the proposed class substantial Employee Class caused by the His conduct regression that the challenged possibility to the aggregate aggregate damages and to measure was 137 suppression to the AllEmployee Class and Technical Compete Agreements though he lacked evidence of information lost regression is not only offered analysis are capable 138 said that even because his conduct regression would show during the conduct period to affect the price discovery he information that was lost because of the challenged of he did not need this evidence undercompensation enough the In particular 24 825 36 58 will ways First his but rather that the When on whether disaggregated the decide whether amount of the effect Case5 11cv 02509LHK by Defendant overcompensated independence fails his model by each implies that his are demonstrably of with his claim of a simple sensitivity tests 107 Before presenting his Figure compensation calculated illustrating how by contrasting the before for the US economy he can illustrate employs in Defendants the relevant 140 141 142 143 144 Motion and after Demonstrates econometric NonCompete the after warm up works 143 2001 and 2011 if comparing in relevant periods before No Common analysis his review 144 at 379 910 Leamer Depo at 380 21 140 59 that Impact in on employee when analysis of provides the Agreements 141 142 a At growth cycle 18 he his way of periods concludes that damages which he for measuring and after showing of Dr Leamer Agreements the regression company no Members the average change 136 fragile and is 140 in compensation at also the during the conduct period with He selects periods because he concludes that these years Leamer Depo Leamer Report to of regression provides summarized in his Figure they were a single lack NonCompete Agreements Based on p3 Leamer Report conduct model compensation during the periods before and model by as The structure regression or virtually all Class before and after methodology pooled together non conduct Leamers standard analysis as a between his regression what was happening all of the effect of the this determined independently which class wide methods and evidence are capable his proposed were in effect with compensation deposition he referred to Leamers Dr For these reasons statistical imprecise and are not reliable Dr Warm up Exercise an estimate 19 are highly impact Third suppression of compensation affected 1 Dr Leamers is somewhat rigid compensation estimates Dr Leamers Second false In particular his analysis assumes that a Defendants employees model for Plaintiffs claims that support 81 of employees during the conduct period or proof of class wide estimates Page62 conduct regression model would show that some Defendants received inconsistent Filed1007 13 own assumptions regarding is 2 their his compensation Document518 2004 and 2011 reveal the kind of as the Case5 11cv 02509LHK compensation Document518 that occur in expansion periods increases Based on this comparison he calculates for all Defendants 108 as a whole Dr Leamer While 19 19 I model warm up by an expanded version Dr Leamers defendant by defendant implies that the and theory and as Dr implies Defendant that allegedly 109 However substantial as at same he the judgment type of effect in Exhibit underlying differences according to his methodology undercompensated overcompensated by more Leamers individual 145 146 the 147 148 than 27 their percent that 147 19 Dr Leamers Defendants was better to because the firms namely undercompensation at Plaintiffs claim of each individual Figure 19 methodology undercompensation in estimated Intel it his the conspiracy at each and Google are the only two companies masks Defendant Indeed that employees during the conduct period while the other five Defendants employees Apple employees and Pixars he estimates for example were employees by more than 70 percent Figure 19 shows an overall average result an average that blends together negative overcompensated This suggests opposite effect only because two effects that Dr at out of seven 140 Leamer Report Dr their in rather than examined model more efficient In did in his Figure individually a minimum suppression of compensation participated shown 145 2005 2009 19 analysis during the conduct period should be found for each Defendant individually common impact for Leamer his claim that made then pool across firms in order to create a more coherent 148 81 problem with his of his Figure that I perform the analysis for each Defendant are sufficiently similar of 2005 2007 percentages a fundamental and after comparisons before them together simply pooling regression is similar to underpayment estimated Figure 19 as a uses perform the same The only change that were Page63 146 regression analysis can be illustrated Exhibit Filed1007 13 2 Leamer assumes that there would have been no change weak economy Leamer Depo at 364 24 365 16 Leamer Depo at 364 20 365 7 60 in compensation in 2008 and 2009 because of Case5 11cv 02509LHK Defendants show a negative 110 for impact and one of the employees in the percent warm This Dr Leamer whether there up him pause about of the when Class of 81 Intel accounts for about 60 by company should have large magnitudes of his methodology Page64 149 whether his regression to consider rather than reflecting the impact Filed1007 13 two Defendants disaggregated common impact The the ability 2 AllSalaried Employee exercise and caused him is Document518 is raised a red flag capable of determining of the effects also should have conduct to identify the effects of the challenged of other factors that differ between the conduct and given non conduct periods 2 Dr Leamers Common Demonstrated 111 After using Figure 19 as an illustration analysis which he says is defendants as well as for explain model Figures 112 total Impact across Defendants a better approach employees 150 Dr Leamer because He he calculates annual his Figure conduct had 150 151 at See Dr model among that attempts 20 and his Figures percentages because it 23 151 to Using this by Defendant and year his is Leamers not common impact Defendants Figure Leamer Report at Dr Leamers regression lower compensation Once disaggregated common at all Defendants by Defendant and for all Dr Leamers impact and implies instead that the Defendants 3 141 Dr across underlying assumes rather than establishes or demonstrates that regression analysis completely fails to demonstrate 149 a regression 19 analysis the approach common or virtually all employees of the impact conduct regression his allows for differences employees undercompensation analysis is fundamentally flawed alleged presents 24 As suggested by the challenged it constructs annual compensation of individual 22 and Assumed Not is in his Regression Leamer said his deposition that total compensation 121 821 61 is the relevant variable for analysis Leamer Depo Case5 11cv 02509LHK a Summaryof Dr Dr Leamers 113 indicator variable and variable variable Leamers model uses regression year as the dependent An Document518 includes when for This variable is the interaction153 between linger over 152 He includes employees within Dr Leamers Because variable to in those In effect purport two years 154 of the two The hiring for variables rate variable Leamer Report allegedly variables on participated in that represent and age squared and age reflect how a time trend and employer normal variation in over time and across Defendants on these variables the effects to measure the extent Dr Leamer compensation not full across 155 with age and hiring along with average employee to which then combines indicator caused by the challenged agreements initial annual undercompensation age and hiring by company undercompensation in one his initial undercompensation conduct years he assigns a on is interaction the of independent measured two explanatory value Since his year estimates of 0.5 and 0.25 to the conduct variables measures the multiplicative or joint variable as the log of the ratio of firm in the previous year 155 conduct the respectively model an a regression also includes which he claims effects undercompensation calculate 2005 and 2009 were 153 effect variable that is turned that Defendant and employee characteristics these to control estimates company variables industry the industry remains in subsequent years 152 zero one in Defendant 154 the immediate uses the coefficient persistence variables claims that his conduct variable alone and interacted identify rate at a given or in each time variables He Leamer the conduct variable characteristics rate together Dr 81 of of each employee agreements were dummy essentially a Page65 Compensation the following independent or lagged compensation Employee 114 of real annual compensation the challenged any of the challenged agreements Persistence Model during the period when for a particular Defendant the hiring rate at a given Filed1007 13 2 142 62 new hires to the number of employees at the Case5 11cv 02509LHK and the persistence 22 and 24 115 At measures Document518 Filed1007 13 2 his deposition Dr Leamer the average impact for acknowledged of the conduct across Defendant that the conduct variable Thus Defendant Defendants all measurement specific he claims that but claimed of the impact However conduct will differ at the two Defendants his model same even if assumed same for those individuals for a Defendants provision still the impact to be the forces the hire rate is the makes no firms is of the effect across unique Defendant another at at individuals employed by characteristics each of any to note that by his same age of the his are younger or rather than demonstrated two are that the the aggregate impact important is it model because he interacted that employees at one Defendant the extent to employer has a slower hiring rate than commonality since his Figures in his conduct variable with variables measuring the age of employees and hiring rate alleged 81 156 regression allowed their of by company annual undercompensation effects to calculate total Page66 model as long as He different Defendants to affect the potential impact of the challenged conduct even though his theory says that he should b Once Disaggregated Dr Leamers Undercompensation 116 Given the nature challenged conduct was of Plaintiffs allegations common across Defendants used the regression framework offered by have to estimate done of individual criteria 156 157 is critical observations for belonging Figure 22 presents technical and 22 employee The Dr as for to the Leamer acknowledged a particular Defendant class some his results for the class I will focus central conclusions Dr Leamer Leamer Depo at on a class to address this allsalaried my are the analysis same employee on 365 816 63 wide basis Thus question which annual data for class all are estimated Dr One way employee putative class I the large employees who is have to do so Leamer claims to number fit the only because he can while Figure 24 presents his results for that for the technical whether there in his deposition despite of his coefficients results differ 157 understanding to separately for each Defendant the regression however whether the impact of the the question class wide impact and whether the impact can be measured would be Does Not Show Regression for All Defendants class though his results for the his exhibits some Figures 20 of the individual Case5 11cv 02509LHK combine 158 Defendants data across Document518 Therefore in order to test whether challenged conduct was similar across Defendants conduct variables for each Defendant separate estimate 117 conduct effect of the aggregate Defendant 20 estimates I show 22 and 24 Figures I a combination reflects In stark contrast to for all Defendants common undercompensation but throughout The during the period agreements according magnitude also to and Plaintiffs Dr overcompensation show Leamers Dr and the sign of the estimated 2005 and 2009 conduct for Apple generally are positive two for one or hub much years of the network of Dr smaller than the conduct regression undercompensation reported In fact for for most years while the from results the Lucasfilm and estimates overcompensation Leamer impact undercompensation overcompensation estimates from Dr Leamers Leamers Class two Defendants once disaggregated by Defendant substantially Dr impact from the alleged instead undercompensation Thus results not only differ Dr specific of these disaggregated in every year between Google shows the period Adobe and Intel other companies Leamers that includes Defendant of the regression analysis nature both the AllSalaried Employee Class and Technical two separate 81 of the of his regression and also includes 159 results disaggregated analysis does not suggest percentages the effect of from the disaggregated model and compare them with results percentages negative Pixar show no use a version Page67 estimates specific In Exhibit Leamers By with age and hiring rate interactions Filed1007 13 2 but also vary greatly across in both results companies and over 160 time 158 Dr sector the Leamers model becomes period 159 2003 2011 regression includes overspecified 2006 160 Results unavailable As a multiplying outputs a Pixar specific which were result when many its to variables Dr is for that only vary by year example the new for hire ratio using annual data from a single effect Leamer I See was example change variable company As for the in IT a result nine year estimated from the disaggregated model are provided in Appendices conduct 2006 revenue the reported have included in Pixar reported revenues for my regression 2005 Pixars 9A and 9B revenue data In order after 2005 2011 xlsx Pixar was acquired by Disney only nine months I annualized the 2006 number by number by 12 9 of disaggregating by Defendant regression In Appendices 10A to 10C an specification aggregated estimated over which the regression Detailed regression to estimate in conduct employment in San Jose or by company by year regression I can also be illustrated using a simplified provide regression that includes details a single 64 and conduct version undercompensation of Dr Leamers estimates variable and excludes interactions from Case5 11cv 02509LHK Dr Leamer 118 Document518 Filed1007 13 2 should not be surprised by the finding Page68 uncommon impact of Defendants if as he believes the challenged agreements had an actual impact spurious or unrelated differences theory These include firms that differed 119 At so He efficiency Dr Leamer e i to offered no conduct Leamers the potential shown the in hiring with the single 11C Appendix four Defendants undercompensation 162 163 rate the level of the varies across a firmand that pressure information was reduced the and quantify would have been reduced Comparison 11A model except conduct Pixar Lucasfilm to still and to 11C I Adobe at at the impact However gain from of the of the ability to analyze Figures 22 and 24 shows that the the results differ somewhat from Dr undercompensation specification will details and for all Defendants be informative as to the undercompensation and even the sign of the estimated increase compensation and The differ substantially 364 8365 1 Leamer Depo of the efficiency had no undercompensation 257 814 Leamer Depo 163 results across in the expense provide regression percentages at and decided that the now disaggregate the model by interacting company now there are seven Defendant specific conduct variables vary greatly in magnitude Leamer Depo shows using the simplified variation in the size was While he had done that I so variable there is large differences Dr Leamers with Employee Class version is at if the was reasonable wrong conclusion about efficiency by results disaggregated of the data to identify he weighed the importance that results In Appendices impact of the challenged agreements 161 how the gain in This suggests from the simplified seven Defendants other to which data for all Defendants Technical Class the simplified impact of disaggregation indicators at structure other than acknowledging for reaching When and age and throughout the period estimates the ability very similar for the All Salaried for the wage said that he did not provide combining specifics challenged agreements results are for internal equity examined the models defendant by defendant have and no explanation pooling against between would depend on demand and that the extent impact of the challenged agreements gain from pooling Defendants Leamer acknowledged firms claimed Dr Leamer and was not just 161 Defendant because efficiency 162 Dr of the impact pressure will affect the general his deposition hypothesized his deposition the fact that the magnitude the situation each firmfaces across At for internal equity and the fact that outside on depends agreements across Defendants that would translate into different conduct effects even under his across demand firms to those 81 of 365 3366 2 65 but rather estimated from negative Dr Leamers effects As Three the estimated impacts at the of Case5 11cv 02509LHK the question at companies namely whether issue economic consistent with the were more estimates of Thus further below show substantial 3 The Statistical significance variation of his estimated However data an individuals 122 the amount case the Even reflect if compensation is that the efficiency to conclude methods which that his I critique impact with some 164 Analysis Improper is t values errors and to test the thus to test his hypothesis Dr Leamer these values is more of those of other that the assumes that employees then the whether the regression is insufficient is especially a major is a under his identifying and inference the larger the data although observations misleading measure in this of the an underlying relationship in the would differ by job type unsubstantiated if of individual highly theory of reliable estimates However variation own error in statistical statistically number to capture because that effect and obvious feature of his a critical are estimated years for the Defendants informative only under the not consistent ignores This provides the coefficients impact system that imposes an assumption that and not independent determined model by Defendant were any are Dr Leamers In calculating common impact statistically there Defendants a employee the disaggregation agreements across of to evaluate ability 164 number is a regression of data with which voluminous largely conduct reports standard Dr Leamer are correlated compensation All else equal Leamer statistical of the challenged coefficients only because significant that his observations how he did few at a impact of the challenged agreements on compensation are highly the estimated statistically and employee is independent of each individual Dr 81 or indeed any impact Defendants in the estimated Underlying 22 Dr Leamer as of were not meaningful his estimates across as the result Page69 few employees to claim senseless regression specification conduct reduced employee compensation the compensation is call a Doing so simply allowed Framework 20 and In his Figures common impact to cold failure it precise even though overcompensated employees how Filed1007 13 2 or not there is harm appropriate is Dr Leamers own 120 statistical theory translates into class wide gain from pooling data 121 Document518 wrong impact of the challenged Analyses disaggregated assumption of a rigid formulaic adjustments across all types of jobs locations etc within a firm with the evidence 66 Case5 11cv 02509LHK between and the labor empirical Dr Leamers 123 sample contains and 167 labor economics employeryear so a his statistical in literature Page70 the econometrics 81 literature Dr Leamers problem of this of 165,166 particular in severe version observations but fewer than 60 unique combinations thus effectively fewer than This means that Filed1007 13 2 widely recognized over 500,000 individual conduct variable Dr 60 from which to estimate observations Leamer has almost 10,000 analysis greatly overstates his per group observations of per sample size and the the effective of his estimates resulting precision Dr Leamer treats each Defendants employees as an employer But the supposed rigid compensation he or she provides completely determined at is and thus lack of independence structure economic framework on which he feature of the if about the underlying structure by which compensation independent information critical is regression suffers from employer and year 124 This problem the variables generally Document518 for his conclusion relies is a that the challenged agreements to reduce cold calling reduced price discovery which rippled through the members compensation of all compensation system He influence their This problem for all Pixar is well known and James MacKinnon within a given dataset ignore . is it and use when 166 Dr of ignoring thought that the within group OLS standard errors OLS are many H Econometric D and Jrn Angrist Joshua Leamers because he lacks University conduct revenue firm are affected movie In their correlation per Press regression statistical between it that in large and econometrics textbook . is small that commonfactors demand in the test for PCs and Russell across the Davidson observations may be tempting This can be a serious to mistake unless can be drastic underestimates even with small values of . sample group Davidson size is per group much Pischke is smaller Russell and James large The correlation than the actual G MacKinnon sample of size Econometric p 305 Analysis 6th Edition Chapter 9.3.3 Steffen by rigid Pixar can result at the correlation severe when the number of observations observations Defendants performing his covariance matrix and Methods Oxford University Press Inc 2004 Jersey Princeton 167 the particularly is Greene William 2008 it is a econometric literature the potential error terms within groups means that the effective there Theory If at of the or a short term reduction estimation with the usual zero since actually The problem the error OLS employees in the describe employees eg a highly successful compensation unusual bonuses when failed to take into account from the challenged agreements aside 165 of the proposed class because Mostly Harmless New Jersey Pearson Econometrics Prentice Chapter 8.2 Hall New 2009 includes data for Lucasfilm data for seven companies over nine years and Pixar for some years his regression employer years 67 2003 2011 However includes only 55 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 microprocessors that power them can cause a decline Intel to impose a wage Dr Leamers 125 compensation independence move together statistical inferences informing his estimates estimates must take A generally factors this Put differently groups estimated the price per ounce information the dairy and Dr errors or present Leamer the underlying nature a regression to explain package pints as sizes at a in a single within a for in estimates are that from the regression of his data well and is a the price of all package spike to price distance commonly is at they provided the cost of gasoline The this or but he did not even tstatistics used for by state It is were as if Dr using data on grocery stores in each state completely independent recognize that a store that rises sells high priced at that store gallons say because it needed to deliver the milk to the power from a dairy store quality etc 68 year to affect compensation and gallons sold sizes will increase common certain were not meaningful the price of gallons if in chance if used to not only failed to implement the price of milk per ounce store as would have by errors and resulting standard to result from unlikely and there the impact of gasoline receives the information inference that are affected impacts of variables hypothesized A proper analysis likely sells high priced store then company of pints quarts half gallons and treating the various from of observations a particular to address the estimated significant regression on employee compensation statistical who be accounted that must Dr Leamers affect employees to take into account the fact that observations in his report that his reported testing whether is far method contains any other methodology although observations clustering the standard referred to as Leamer had would calling such as into account such as those affecting statistically cold way in a of the Dr Leamer a shock of individual much more limited and any is accepted a regression acknowledge and through obtained are related or correlated based on over 500,000 individual estimate to Plaintiffs members of all generally and the impact would not be limited to only the employee Defendant and within a year making with his claims of a rigid inconsistent call Statistically this means that compensation the cold 126 According 81 of 2009 is in informationabout compensation compensation is assumption Page71 revenue and profitability and lead in Intels and with Plaintiffs claim that compensation structure proposed class would an increase such as occurred in freeze Filed1007 13 2 of the regression is not enhanced to identify by Case5 11cv 02509LHK including because individual 127 Dr Leamer cases such as this standard that it errors recognizes that 168 was When standard for shows that factors unrelated compensation 169 170 of 171 at Angrist Joshua University Standard counting about whether his your wealth New in describe to assumption in to cluster his failure Dr small change having commonly used 170 in lots Leamer admitted of individuals but In Exhibits 21A which are used Dr Leamers determine to estimates no meaningful estimates show coefficient once properly line in the table is 22A and 22B statistical I significance 22 and in his Figures estimates 4 24.171 This for any employer computed or standard are completely consistent with there conduct and his estimates Thus I variable errors In Exhibits undercompensation Leamers 21B and Figure 20 and 23 regressions except that the undercompensation Dr studies of labor markets and widely on employer year The conduct p values conduct members of Leamer Depo Chapter 9.3.3 his deposition Dr Leamers from imply that to that Leamer Depo 374 Princeton at significant at conventional levels under the properly regression provides 81 sizes at a particular store improper to rely on the independence such as this being no true effect of the desired 168 is errors is clustered none p values of firm at a Leamers is statistically errors The it significant under these proper standard Dr Page72 169 show t statistics and calculated exhibit details now errors are not statistically further to as necessary in analyses and other prices of four different package use of that language Clustering standard estimates year asked equivalent only having one experiment accepted Filed1007 13 2 same underlying information seems like appropriate 128 on observations the all reflect Document518 resulting entirely from analyzed Dr Leamers random conduct evidence that the challenged agreements reduced of the proposed class 618 375 19 376 5 D and Jrn Steffen Pischke Mostly Harmless Jersey errors for the annual undercompensation estimates 69 Chapter 8.2 Econometrics pp 308 315 and Greene William Pearson Prentice Hall 2008 p 188 Press 2009 H Econometric are calculated New Jersey Analysis 6th Edition using a bootstrap method Case5 11cv 02509LHK 4 Dr Leamer Does Whether 129 Dr Leamer several it he wrote analyses sensitivity reporting 130 and with Consistent Q Would we would have to is see in the I’ve done document sturdy but there’s models One As to the at or a consequence perform their own complete and more honest 172 as follows someone who the conduct regression on judgment is evaluating its reliability until saw that evaluator analysis would help to determine reliability your regression analysis know record of econometrics something practiced responded at his deposition Dr Leamer that sensitive First much more is purposes researchers think that the sensitivity I 81 of related to the regression analyses A would Q And how A you need it of statistical for individual inferences to reserve as art for reporting view Dr Leamer this econometric perhaps thousands ought to be demanding you agree sensitivity the that are selected efficient of claimed of the fragility analysis finds pleasing much more is many fitting that the researcher Page73 Robust or Fragile many years ago involves Filed1007 13 2 not Report any Sensitivity Tests from which to Evaluate his Results are wrote computer terminal Document518 did not carry out a complete sensitivity analysis I how that discusses But I have estimated and there is this should be carried out and more than one model more than one some dimensions some dimensions I of variability in which in which it’s not sensitive the changes have a this isn’t that and you it’s can be 173 substantial He testified further that there are conclusions with change the coherence the model of the which damages can be 172 Edward E Leamer that are this Lets Take the I 174 Leamer Depo at my suggested at of variability in which model Con Out of Econometrics 358 818 70 the and economic judgments about that are implied that demonstrates the 73 The American by method by 174 356 120 Leamer Depo directions the accuracy of the estimates 1983 173 some made econometric produced one as computed variability And substantially models and selected some Economic Review 1 Case5 11cv 02509LHK 131 Dr Leamers provided models Dr Leamer tried 177 to fit of any sensitivity to the data He also said that He Thus those other directions is it analyses 175 a acknowledged 176 one but its unclear what it substantial alternative is of 81 the which has 178 he but models models sic sensitive what alternative unclear specification examin ing and Page74 and computer programs he Thus out an extensive Ive carried not a complete different directions Filed1007 13 2 data documentation with data by a defendant with disaggregation defendant and the backup report no evidence contain Document518 to do defendant by analysis in several any did not describe Dr Leamer to tried fit of to the data 132 The results Defendants reported provided I clearly show above allowing the impact of the conduct to the fragility of the single regression specification common way Another conclusions that can be drawn period for which the regression of testing the robustness is estimated Dr Leamer to changes bases his conclusion challenged agreements reduced compensation on a regression that compares during the class period and 2004 and after essentially 2010 and 2011 An only the before period or only the regression and test 2005 2009 after to the alternative combined periods specification period as the that across Dr Leamer and of the of a regression specification verify that the results are robust is to differ that the compensation before effectively to test robustness control or benchmark whether the challenged agreements affected in the time period is 2003 to use in the compensation of members of the proposed class 133 Exhibit differences 23 shows in the estimation Leamers conduct regression undercompensation 175 176 177 178 179 Dr Leamers that period 179 implies model at generally at at at 22 and 24 365 1516 Leamer Depo in his Figures 360 1618 Leamer Depo 366 79 Detailed regression outputs are it is but very different substantial 359 6 Leamer Depo a test of whether robust Using only the pre period as the benchmark percentages than reported Leamer Depo fails provided in Appendices12A 71 to 12D to Dr estimated almost twice as large Case5 11cv 02509LHK Defendants but substantially for several Dr Leamers benchmark instead conduct overcompensation Another sensitivity using data outside compensation of virtually same magnitude Dr Leamers during the conduct period as Exhibit and compensation If 81 of as the no undercompensation though opposite model is to first estimate Dr Leamers higher 24 shows the least some model than actual in but sign from the is to predict robust one would expect the compensation during the conduct overcompensation of the years his conduct regression estimates compensation predicted therefore implying years and five Defendants in at sensitivity Using only the post period his conduct periods and then use the coefficient However period implies Page75 24 compensation to be generally predicted actual regression 22 and test Filed1007 13 2 lower for Intel of roughly the effects he reports in Figures 134 Document518 180 levels are in fact lower than two Defendants at Dr Leamers model again in all fails the test 5 Dr Leamers Regression Model Does Not Explain Changes in Compensation Over Time 135 from The analysis presented Dr Leamers correlated regression of his data nature firm level compensation relies on comparison predict obtaining showed above model that are not accounted level a reliable prediction critical 136 Exhibits the impact to estimating 25A and if implies we that can be for in his of compensation model factors that drive Given that his methodology to the level that his model would absent the challenged agreements that the factors that Leamer does not account for are by company and year between compensation earned by a firms employees and the average level of compensation 180 conduct Detailed regression plot the difference Dr important Dr Leamers regression outputs are Figures is those agreements quantitatively I drawn account for the that there are important of compensation any of 25B show conclusions are fundamentally different once That correlation of the actual that the statistical 20 and 23 provided in Appendices 72 The 13A and exhibit 13B shows the average predicted that these prediction by Case5 11cv 02509LHK errors are substantial in Document518 Dr Leamers an virtually all the factors that explain Dr Leamer Rather the is terms economically years and Defendants distributed across some predicts very poorly in years for I and predicted actual in compensation 2003 and 2004 and performed a standard firm level compensation Pixar in statistical test be are too large to explained for whether solely errors A consequence Leamers 181 Dr estimated Leamer used evaluating residuals results the year level at model companies in between model This test by company and year the regression and asks whether those average residuals test factors resoundingly rejects the and other in establishes the need to use ways statistically significant Critically the which that contrary implies for important factors that determine important compensation determinants of firm level compensation conduct effects will capture the term economically estimates the impact numerous significant one should focus on economic value predicted in his just not controlled significance Employee Class model Figure ranges from 39 percent provide accurate residual his or correct for that correlation of omitting in his All Salaried compensation above which means that at time the Defendants over 138 Defendant 182 standard claims Dr Leamer has his by to there are important factors explaining by sampling error The average residuals are economically not to one of which according with the most extreme examples Dr Leamers no such omitted firm specific that there are clustered not explained capturing 2004 that are omitted from in compensation hypothesis model were Large average differences are evident 81 of are not evenly different Defendant at essentially examines the average residuals from his regression variation the some companies outcomes different years have been left out of the regression 137 and whether the Defendant had a challenged agreement with another model being Google if compensation individuals Page76 significant181 would be expected as important factors that are unique to compensation employees Filed1007 13 2 by his of the below regression the A model that model is 16.5 percent roughly plus or minus indicating 33 percent economically by Dr Leamers predicts variable that his times in his deposition 20 are overall The root regression compensation mean square The average Actual real total significant to 49 percent so poorly cannot error of the average at using a 95 percent confidence level The test Ftest results are F39 5047711319.6 for Dr Leamers Figure 20 regression and F39,292367 832.09 for his Figure 23 regression Pvalues for both tests are virtually zero 73 Dr and stated that in model measures average compensation 182 that other than the and not just statistical significance value predicted impact of his conduct of variables is the company Case5 11cv 02509LHK challenged agreements that To the potential illustrate Document518 between systematically differ problem I Filed1007 13 2 Page77 non conduct the conduct and considered what would happen if I 81 of periods simply add a variable measuring the performance of the stock market from his regression which potentially would measure general acknowledges shows economic and financial performance from adding the change the results conduct regression 184 results the addition P 500 index Leamers much Dr Leamer that overcompensation 183 26 Exhibit as an explanatory variable Figure 22 and 24 smaller 2005 2009 Thus Class throughout economy S in the of this variable yields AllSalaried Employee Class and the Technical Dr In contrast to the see his Figure 8 and related discussion compensation likely affect in in his undercompensation undercompensation for all Defendants estimates except for the Google for of economically significant the existence classwide by factors not captured be unreliable measures his of Dr model causes damages and Figure 20 and 23 regression estimates Leamers unreliable as a method to of demonstrating common impact 6 Dr Leamers Conduct Variable Cannot Capture the Impact of the Challenged Agreements Dr Leamers 139 conduct variable challenged agreements between reflects refers to these throughout Plaintiffs do not claim in their non compete agreements his report as Complaint or in their Motion was 183 184 the independent 185 14A Appendices and 14B show expected See Declaration allege with Intuit through a cold call Defendant Evidence I that these 185 positive detailed outputs regression The sign and is statistically significant of Jeff Vijungco I am Apple See p6 on unaware of coefficient under Adobe and Apple continued any requisitions that went also Declaration of Chris has agreed to not cold call employees have never been instructed presented Dr estimate Leamers basis above on the change in SP assumption to refrain at Galy Google from making cold pp 45 to recruit unfilled I no cold as any other company and call understand that plaintiffs in this case To my knowledge calls to and hire from each other because of the Google employees no such agreement To the contrary I have made cold calls to Google employees am aware that other recruiters at Intuit have also done so 74 exists I and have never given any such instruction to anyone else at Intuit same as long as observations during the Class Period agreement understand that 98 Leamer Report 500 shows not identified or recruited I for Class Certification agreements prevented a Defendant from hiring applicants from another that applicant Dr employees for a period of time Although Defendants to avoid cold calling each others Leamer pairs of on the Case5 11cv 02509LHK Dr Leamers and that underlies Document518 Filed1007 13 2 demonstrates that during the period of the challenged agreements of other Defendants even amount when cold calling were an important if and hiring from other Defendants by the challenged variable conduct that he is call way Defendants hired employees during the conduct period eliminated would have as of recruiting from other Defendants calling activity were can identify and measure leading or substantially some restrictions extended to other firms as well 186 of the challenged to reduced agreements only the impact of those agreements properly of which were typically the impact Dr Leamer cites not limited to the other Defendant the the reasons 1 shows his Figure support to if represents His conduct variable cannot do so for several trying to evaluate First evidence I reviewed cold cold his regression that represents in 7 in his Figure agreements Dr Leamer 140 81 of they had agreed not to cold call those employees and that the of hiring from other Defendants did not decline occurred movers earned by analysis of compensation Page78 identified in Figure that 1 but In part this reflects the fact that the motivation for these ofinterest agreements generally does not appear to be holding undercompensating potential senior executives calling on or perceived of another employees the willingness agreements commercial a but not during the include the impact non Defendant corresponding See e non conduct If DNCC unchallenged same period biasing his estimated effect he can separate their Dr Leamer upwards If as he can measure impacts from the policies Yahoo EBay PayPal and Bizrate See 176 177 178 179 182 183 Bentley of cold agreements or by firms lead to undercompensation if of as the challenged periods then the effect estimated agreements only impact of unchallenged g 231APPLE041662 conflicts or concerns about the impact For example Google had restrictions on hiring from Genentech Geshuri Exhibits or from concerns about existed during the of those other policies the impact of the challenged 187 arose arrangements of partners to collaborate involving compensation of from membership on one companys Board of Directors Leamer claims DNCC agreements between 186 but instead 187 unilateral policies would a firms down Depo 61 21622 251618 75 Lambert Depo 21 78 Dr Case5 11cv 02509LHK 141 The Consent Decrees made clear that restrictions circumstances such as Document518 that the Defendants on recruiting other when they including are development technology joint signed with the the function integration in Section not to consider IV from employees applications ventures projects hire employees of another person provided any other person adopt enforce 142 of the Plaintiffs theory legal alternative to the challenged how not permissible an individual where restrictions understand what collaborations 188 190 in Final Judgment Final Judgment in in still there of 190 same way agreements and for Thus affected the affected Dr Leamers by would only be the by affected legal restrictions which employees were involved legal restrictions the price in analysis to calling etc a unilateral policy Directors is to and Proposed and Proposed avoid cold calling another CEO of a competitor of non discovery process would have been affected and the impact and loss from the challenged amount above 76 that and which employees were involved on cold Board of and would have been employees during the Class period to not cold call employees challenged agreements the incremental the and world for v Adobe Systems Inc et al 317 2011 p 7 v Lucasfilm Ltd 592011 p 6 theory pressuring opportunities but for This requires individualized example when a member of that hiring prohibitions United States of America employees was from v Adobe Systems Inc et al 317 2011 p 6 v Lucasfilm Ltd 592011 p 5 United States of America then under it requesting United States of America were unilateral policies at Defendants Defendants would have existed during the class period United States of America in from or recruit any less restrictive limiting cold calling Similarly nothing prevents an employer from implementing Defendants determined recruiting the other Defendants would have been that there Final Judgment Final Judgment 189 on as on balance procompetitive the likelihood is some employees determination call cold policy policy of employees involved in those collaborations requiring collaborations eg collaborations purposes of measuring impact and loss has others solicit to a 189 compensation agreements only to employees involved in actual compensation person or further that state to adopt or maintain such a policy and are prohibited or maintain such a including The Consent Decrees that Defendants are prohibited any other person to adopt enforce Under joint from unilaterally deciding of another of Justice agreement collaboration 188 81 of are legal under certain of a legitimate joint shall prohibit a Defendant Page79 US Department companies employees teaming agreements and the shared use of facilities n othing Filed1007 13 2 caused by legal agreements in the If Case5 11cv 02509LHK 143 Dr Leamers Second cold calling but treats conduct variable any agreement between agreements between multiple Document518 a Defendant Filed1007 13 2 cannot measure Apple pairs of Defendants participated Leamers in according challenged agreements with several to as having the better and in Plaintiffs and Dr Leamer Apple Dr that is Rather such models would show more as in a single challenged other Defendants simultaneously of price discovery they apply that more information results on same impact price discovery framework does not imply that the amount of information restricted is irrelevant to the process 81 For example Adobe and Apple and other Defendants while of the intensity of restrictions were assigned the same conduct values every year but Adobe engaged agreement with one Defendant Page80 where rapid price discovery than less agreements should have a larger impact than a single information and thus that multiple agreement 7 Estimated Persistence Effects Discovery Model and his are Inconsistent with Claim Defendants that Dr Leamers had Price Rigid Compensation Structures 144 Dr Leamer The describes percent in some year on for finding is that effect lingers frameworks this meaning when very persistent effects indicates However on which he relies that many makes him or all years inconsistent or virtually all levels gained Defendant affects only a weak 191 basis for why all gets a bump up in coworkers If this past compensation 144 77 agreements and a significant and wide spread claims that economic theory combined employees employees compensation the challenged would cause members Dr Leamer by one Defendants persistence between Leamer Report year and the with the price discovery and internal equity as the theoretical class a worker her better off than comparable with Defendants rigid compensation structures shows that compensation in the previous 191 resulting reduced flow of information to employees impact on as follows that two for each employer The fact that these numbers sum to around 90 compensation 145 estimates variables are the levels of total compensation persistence year before his persistence new information on appropriate from cold calls were true however levels and current from another then there should ones a mover who be is Case5 11cv 02509LHK induced to move a 30 receives to Defendant percent Dr Leamers Defendant irrespective is determined that any increase in persistent increase B by a cold his model implies restored more than 95 percent remain for Adobe Apple information in of damages imply reconcile with the employment per that any effect and a highly is slow as well as with his own it is of members of the flow has been fully the flow of information is after has the lowest estimated not just of the reduced employees have obtained after on compensation would of reduced information rates of hiring at these firms year the firm generates in the information after that even five years Google model Yet compensation and Pixar employees while more than 60 percent Dr Leamers As individuals no reason why aggregate compensation of the impact remain for Google employees A and compensation proposed class would remain depressed so long resumed Indeed twoyears compensation relative to others his estimates provides 81 in all Defendant by demonstrating that an informationflow persists strongly for an extended time even more information Yet he of employees previous compensation of those other in that individuals model and Page81 call from Defendant any year largely by his previous in an individuals Dr Leamers Filed1007 13 2 should cause a change regression rules out such an impact compensation 146 A from in compensation increase employees compensation Document518 persistence glacial averaging of the effect level The flow Such slow adjustment over would percent is of hard to of average theory price discovery 8 Summary 147 Dr Leamers undercompensation are made regression model of undercompensation and percentages by company and year are invalid to permit a test of his theory there is no evidence of his derived When common estimates of annual necessary corrections impact from the challenged conduct no evidence of average impact across members of the proposed class and no basis for his estimates of undercompensation Kevin M Murphy November 78 12 2012 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Filed10 07 13 3 Exhibit Hires Document518 1A and Separations at Defendant Companies Hires Page1 of 46 From Other Defendants vs To Separations Hires Overall Separations Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2001 2004 Avg 2005 2009 Avg 2010 2011 Avg 2001 2011 Avg 2001 2004 Total 2005 2009 Total 2010 2011 Total 2001 2011 Total Notes This analysis excludes hires indicated as acquisitions hires showing the same the hiring and separations employment Source Dr in that appear as immediately each year Leamer’s employee data rehired by the same defendant defendant company company as their immediate previous within one year Number employer within one year of of employees is calculated as average Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK 3 Exhibit Hires Document518 1B and Separations at Defendant Companies Hires Filed10 07 13 From To Page2 of 46 Other DNCC Defendants vs Overall Separations Hires Separations Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20012004 Avg 20052009 Avg 20102011 Avg 20012011 Avg 2001 2004 Total 2005 2009 Total 2010 2011 Total 2001 2011 Total Notes This analysis excludes the hiring and separations employment Source in hires indicated as acquisitions that appear as immediately each year Dr Leamer’s employee data hires showing the same defendant rehired by the same defendant company company as their immediate previous within one year Number employer within one year of of employees is calculated as average Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 Filed10 07 13 3 Page3 of 46 Exhibit 2A Number of Employees by Defendant and All Adobe Apple Salaried Employee Class Google 2001 2,503 5,096 2002 2,226 5,255 2003 2,291 5,424 1,329 2004 2,508 5,684 2005 3,791 6,474 2006 3,663 6,993 2007 3,951 2008 4,203 2009 Year Intel Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar All Defendants 210 3,169 66,242 542 3,982 63,569 4,311 62,439 2,346 4,247 64,172 4,117 4,418 73,556 6,873 4,498 74,045 7,951 8,768 5,069 73,247 9,135 10,983 5,081 75,205 4,928 10,005 11,175 4,683 75,166 2010 5,010 11,655 13,988 4,605 80,193 2011 5,385 13,226 18,179 4,770 90,070 Source Dr Leamer’s backup data and materials Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 Filed10 07 13 3 Page4 of 46 Exhibit 2B Number of Employees by Defendant and Technical Creative and Adobe Apple Google Intel RD Intuit Year Class Lucasfilm Pixar All Defendants 2001 1,582 2,670 101 1,557 34,484 2002 1,441 2,866 207 1,977 33,881 2003 1,450 2,954 509 1,907 33,517 2004 1,579 2,942 1,026 1,829 33,592 2005 2,205 3,358 2,258 1,814 40,479 2006 2,218 3,677 3,776 1,863 41,216 2007 2,277 4,248 5,290 2,244 42,550 2008 2,400 4,950 6,388 2,349 44,243 2009 2,552 5,589 6,825 2,237 45,453 2010 2,489 6,663 8,693 2,308 48,994 2011 2,639 7,582 11,139 2,457 55,338 Source Dr Leamer’s backup data and materials Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 Exhibit 3 Filed10 07 13 Page5 of 46 3 Top 20 Previous Employersof Hires by Defendant Companies Adobe Note Hires through transfers acquisitions are excluded This analysis uses Adobe’s compensation data and may not include all internal Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 Exhibit 3 Filed10 07 13 Page6 of 46 3 Top 20 Previous Employersof Hires by Defendant Companies Apple Note Analysis restricted to hires for job codes provided in the compensation data Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 Exhibit 3 Filed10 07 13 Page7 of 46 3 Top 20 Previous Employersof Hires by Defendant Companies Google Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 Exhibit 3 Filed10 07 13 Page8 of 46 3 Top 20 Previous Employersof Hires by Defendant Companies Intel Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 Exhibit 3 Filed10 07 13 Page9 of 46 3 Top 20 Previous Employersof Hires by Defendant Companies Intuit Case5 11cv 02509LHK Filed1007 13 Document5183 Exhibit Page10 of 46 3 Top 20 Previous Employersof Hires by Defendant Companies Lucasfilm Number Rank Previous of Hires Percentage of Total Hires 2008Q2 2012Q1 26 Employer LUCASFILM 2008Q2 2012Q1 7.1 1 ELECTRONIC ARTS 20 5.5 2 IMAGEMOVERS 8 2.2 3 WALT 6 1.6 4 ACTIVISION 5 1.4 5 ORPHANAGE 5 1.4 6 2K 4 1.1 7 CBS 4 8 DIGITAL 1.1 1.1 9 DIGITAL DISNEY INC GAMES DOMAIN 4 PDI 4 10 SONY 4 1.1 1.1 11 APPLE 3 0.8 12 DOUBLE 3 0.8 13 DREAMWORKS 3 0.8 14 MICROSOFT 3 0.8 15 PIXAR 3 0.8 16 ZYNGA 3 17 CRYSTAL DYNAMICS 2 0.8 0.5 18 MUNKYFUN 2 0.5 19 ADOBE 1 0.3 20 EBAY 1 0.3 3 0.8 61 16.7 187 51.2 0 0.0 7 1.9 365 100 Self FINE PRODUCTIONS INC EmployedUnemployed Unknown Other NonDefendants Other Defendants All Lucasfilm Defendants excluding Total Lucasfilm Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document5183 Exhibit Filed1007 13 Page11 of 46 3 Top 20 Previous Employersof Hires by Defendant Companies Pixar Number of Hires Percentage of Total Hires 2001 2012Q2 2001 2012Q2 PIXAR 5 0.6 1 LUCASFILM 22 2.5 2 BLUE SKY STUDIO 18 2.1 3 WALT 16 1.8 4 PDI 10 1.1 5 TIPPETT 10 1.1 6 APPLE 8 0.9 7 DREAMWORKS RHYTHM HUES 6 8 0.7 0.7 Rank Previous Employer DISNEY 6 9 UC BERKELEY 5 10 WDFA 5 0.6 0.6 11 ELECTRONIC ARTS 4 0.5 12 ESC ENTERTAINMENT 4 0.5 13 MICROSOFT 4 0.5 14 SONY 4 0.5 15 BRIGHAM 3 0.3 16 FRAMESTORE 3 17 GOOGLE 3 0.3 0.3 18 TAMU 3 0.3 19 WARNER BRO 3 0.3 ACTIVISION 2 0.2 7 0.8 420 48.2 294 33.7 7 0.8 40 4.6 872 100 20 Self YOUNG UNIV EmployedUnemployed Unknown Other NonDefendants Other Defendants All Defendants excluding Pixar Pixar Total Note The lengths of the periods analyzed vary by Sources Recruiting data from Apple Google company based on Intel Intuit Lucasfilm data availability and Pixar Compensation data from Adobe and Apple Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page12 of 46 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page13 of 46 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Filed1007 13 Document5183 Page14 of 46 Exhibit 5 Employment of Software Engineers of Industries of Defendant Companies Industries of Defendant Adobe Year Apple Google Intel Intuit LucasFilm Pixar Defendant Defendant Companies Companies Companies 79,910 2002 1,165 1,263 8,065 2003 1,167 1,228 7,811 101,470 2004 1,258 1,207 8,317 105,160 2005 1,694 1,336 10,656 106,890 2006 1,728 1,333 11,742 2007 1,880 1,411 13,907 108,650 2008 1,958 1,425 15,404 122,130 2009 1,984 1,282 16,301 127,860 2010 1,865 1,361 18,728 124,910 2011 1,939 1,475 22,318 134,150 96,440 Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit LucasFilm Pixar 1.5 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.1 1.2 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.0 12.2 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.1 15.0 10.1 7.7 7.9 10.0 12.8 12.6 12.7 16.6 2002 2004 Average 8.6 2005 2009 Average 12.1 2010 2011 Average 15.8 of All Industries Defendant Industries Adobe 584,020 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.4 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.7 868,210 All 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.8 1.9 2.2 921,500 0.2 0.2 2.4 651,740 717,420 758,050 Source Defendant employment numbers are based on data as well as classification of software engineers Employment Industry of industries of Specific Defendant Data for the following Dr Leamer’s employee performed by companies my 834,850 staff based on BLS OES National NAICS codes 764,430 based on CapIQ company information 851,850 852,670 Apple Google Intel Intuit LucasFilm Pixar 334100 Computer 519100 Other Information 334400 Semiconductor 511200 Software Publishers 2005 2009 Average 512100 Motion Picture 2010 2011 Average and Peripheral Equipment Manufacturing Companies Services and Other Electronic and Video Industries Component Manufacturing 2002 2004 Average 1.2 1.7 2.3 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 Filed1007 13 3 Page15 of 46 Exhibit 6 Age Distribution of New Hires 2001 through 2011 Adobe Apple Google All 31 to 35 36 to 40 41 and over 7 6 17 24 22 30 24 30 22 17 36 to 40 41 and over Source Dr Leamer’s RD 8 6 7 17 26 22 29 27 33 21 12 backup data and materials 19 30 24 14 13 Class 20 24 21 27 25 and under 31 to 35 Creative and Pixar Class 7 Technical 26 to 30 Employee Lucasfilm 19 24 22 28 25 and under 26 to 30 Salaried Intuit Intel 18 32 24 15 10 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page16 of 46 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page17 of 46 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page18 of 46 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page19 of 46 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page20 of 46 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page21 of 46 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 3 Filed10 07 13 Page22 of 46 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page23 of 46 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page24 of 46 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page25 of 46 Exhibit 12 RSquareds in Dr Leamer’s Compensation Structure Regressions Are Mostly Attributable to AllSalaried R Squareds in Dr Leamer’s Figure 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Source Dr Leamer’s 11 95 94 94 93 93 92 91 92 92 90 92 Figure 11 Employee Employer and Job Indicators Technical Class Including Only Excluding Employer and Job Employer and Job Indicators Indicators 94 93 93 93 92 92 91 91 92 90 91 and 13 regressions 21 21 22 19 20 21 21 20 20 22 24 RSquareds Dr in Leamer’s Figure 13 89 89 88 88 88 87 85 86 88 84 88 Creative and RD Class Including Only Excluding Employer and Job Employer and Job Indicators Indicators 89 88 88 88 87 87 85 86 88 84 87 15 16 16 18 16 19 17 19 17 18 21 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 Filed1007 13 3 Page26 46 of Exhibit 13A Named PlaintiffsActual Total Compensation by Dr Leamer’s Comp Actual Total Named Plaintiff Employer Year Predicted by Dr Comp Leamer’s Model 1 Brandon Marshall Predictions Model Figure 12 Total vs 2 Difference 3 ADOBE 2006 73,895 61,035 12 Difference 31 12,860 17.4 Michael Devine ADOBE 2006 131,222 124,424 6,798 Michael Devine ADOBE 2007 146,540 135,001 11,539 5.2 7.9 Mark Fichtner INTEL 2001 151,712 133,620 18,091 11.9 Mark Fichtner INTEL 2002 124,426 120,980 3,446 Mark Fichtner INTEL 2003 109,352 109,349 Mark Fichtner INTEL 2004 123,374 120,221 3,153 Mark Fichtner INTEL 2005 133,431 135,403 1,972 Mark Fichtner INTEL 2008 122,013 133,469 11,456 Mark Fichtner INTEL 2009 138,501 139,125 Mark Fichtner INTEL 2010 152,238 141,816 Daniel Stover INTUIT 2006 79,129 Daniel Stover INTUIT 2007 Daniel Stover INTUIT Daniel Stover INTUIT Siddharth Hariharan LUCASFILM Dr Leamer’s Figure 12 regressions Source 10,422 2.8 0.0 2.6 1.5 9.4 0.5 6.8 91,136 12,007 15.2 103,265 105,061 1,796 1.7 2008 175,177 108,817 66,361 37.9 2009 132,553 121,416 11,137 8.4 2007 102,000 90,819 11,182 11.0 3 624 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Filed10 07 13 Document5183 Page27 of 46 Exhibit 13B Named Plaintiffs by Actual Total Compensation Dr Leamer’s Actual Named Plaintiff Employer Year Total Comp 1 Brandon Marshall Predictions Model Figure 14 Total vs Comp Predicted by Dr Leamer’s Model 2 Difference 3 ADOBE 2006 73,895 60,754 12 Difference 31 13,141 17.8 Michael Devine ADOBE 2006 131,222 124,661 6,561 Michael Devine ADOBE 2007 146,540 134,724 11,816 5.0 8.1 Mark Fichtner INTEL 2001 151,712 135,177 16,534 10.9 Mark Fichtner INTEL 2002 124,426 121,965 2,461 2.0 Mark Fichtner INTEL 2003 109,352 109,866 Mark Fichtner INTEL 2004 123,374 119,152 Mark Fichtner INTEL 2005 133,431 134,261 Mark Fichtner INTEL 2008 122,013 132,988 Mark Fichtner INTEL 2009 138,501 139,074 Mark Fichtner INTEL 2010 152,238 141,186 Daniel Stover INTUIT 2007 103,265 105,025 1,760 1.7 Daniel Stover INTUIT 2008 175,177 108,866 66,311 37.9 Daniel Stover INTUIT 2009 132,553 122,644 9,909 7.5 Siddharth LUCASFILM 2007 102,000 89,439 12,561 12.3 Source Hariharan Dr Leamer’s Figure 14 regressions 514 4,222 830 10,974 573 11,052 0.5 3.4 0.6 9.0 0.4 7.3 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page28 of 46 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page29 of 46 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page30 of 46 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page31 of 46 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page32 of 46 Exhibit 16 Dr Leamer’s Model Implies Very Large Differences Over Time Individuals with Identical Characteristics and Starting Simulations Based Adobe on Dr Leamer’s 15 32 90th Percentile 31 67 Compensation Levels Intel Difference in Compensation after Average 46 Two Intuit All Firms Years 11 22 100 the Compensation of Conduct Regression Google Apple in 16 33 24 56 22 46 37 86 Difference in Compensation after Five Years 29 61 Average 90th Percentile 53 62 111 16 34 135 Notes 1 2 3 4 Compensation Percent Based using on 50,000 simulations of compensation Lucasfilm Source differences are constructed differences are defined as differences Dr and Pixar are excluded because Leamer’s backup data in and residuals from Dr Leamer’s Figure 20 regression logs growth there and materials coefficients from 2004 through is insufficient data to 2009 for each firm do simulations in all years model Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page33 of 46 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page34 of 46 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page35 of 46 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK 3 Document518 Exhibit Filed10 07 13 Page36 of 46 19 Average Percent Change in Total Compensation Dr Leamer’s Figure 19 Disaggregated by Company vs Dr Leamer’s Figure Average Change Year Adobe 2002 Compensation 27.8 2003 in Total Apple Google Lucasfilm Pixar Pooled Intel Intuit 27.2 0.6 1.5 2.1 5.1 8.5 4.7 2.3 13.1 8.3 10.3 9.8 6.9 1.3 2006 10.6 5.6 13.9 0.5 9.1 2007 11.2 4.5 8.8 2008 6.9 12.0 8.8 2009 7.5 2.9 0.1 7.4 6.8 7.4 2010 3.0 11.1 7.9 8.7 12.7 2011 2004 2005 EstimatedOverpayment Underpayment Year Adobe Apple Google 2005 3.4 0.6 4.2 8.8 4.9 0.0 14.5 16.4 2008 0.0 2009 0.0 0.0 2006 2007 6.5 9.7 1.8 Initial Lucasfilm Pixar Pooled Intel Intuit 8.7 12.2 0.6 0.4 8.9 2.8 8.5 35.6 17.2 26.8 9.5 0.9 0.0 6.4 0.0 3.8 0.0 3.8 0.0 9.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Pixar Pooled EstimatedOverpayment Underpayment Cumulative Year Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit 2005 3.4 4.2 8.7 12.2 0.6 2.8 35.6 9.5 2006 13.0 25.9 12.5 9.5 11.4 62.3 10.3 27.5 13.3 15.1 71.4 12.9 27.5 9.5 9.5 18.9 2008 4.0 8.9 8.9 18.9 13.3 15.1 71.4 12.9 2009 8.9 27.5 9.5 18.9 13.3 15.1 71.4 12.9 2007 Note This analysis follows Defendants even though Source Dr for Lucasfilm Leamer’s methodology in his Figure 19 of treating 2005 as the first year of the agreements for Intuit Lucasfilm and Pixar the first alleged agreements started in other years Leamer Report backup data and programs all 19 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 Exhibit Undercompensation Defendant Estimates Using Conduct Variables and Other Defendant Effects in Dr Specific Adobe Apple Google 2005 1.82 2.54 12.73 2006 4.37 0.72 26.90 0.68 2.65 19.16 6.26 6.45 2008 2.19 4.06 5.70 8.01 10.24 2009 20.26 1.53 5.43 8.96 10.02 RD Apple Google 2005 1.92 2.01 11.08 1.71 2006 5.82 2.95 22.47 0.62 2007 0.05 5.23 13.12 3.03 6.93 2008 1.29 7.33 0.88 3.44 8.59 2009 22.60 6.28 10.56 4.67 7.47 Leamer Figure 20 and 23 regressions including indicators Pixar revenue and Dr Leamer’s vs conduct age and data after 2005 are included Figures 22 and 24 Lucasfilm Pixar Year Adobe Apple Google 25.47 2005 1.61 1.59 1.78 1.67 30.64 2006 4.28 4.43 4.44 4.70 14.63 12.44 13.95 28.52 2007 6.64 6.94 6.39 7.46 3.24 17.24 14.28 14.15 36.96 2008 9.08 9.56 8.40 10.05 5.64 19.94 15.76 13.79 31.11 2009 9.15 9.73 7.51 9.95 5.70 20.12 14.65 Intel Technical Creative and Class Adobe company Undercompensation Estimates in Dr Leamer’s Interactive 9.59 Year Intel 46 1.70 Intuit 0.51 Technical Creative and of AllSalaried Employee Class 1.89 2007 Intel Page37 20 Employee Class Year Source Filed1007 13 Specific Leamer’s Regression AllSalaried 3 Intuit Lucasfilm 12.13 RD Pixar 10.56 Class hiring Pixar Year Adobe Apple Google 28.18 2005 1.56 1.90 3.07 1.64 17.23 interactions Lucasfilm 6.60 Intuit 30.70 2006 4.29 4.96 7.23 3.06 14.77 10.47 23.38 36.34 2007 6.48 7.79 9.36 3.38 3.41 18.08 10.61 24.38 34.92 2008 8.80 10.64 11.20 4.76 5.21 20.44 11.87 24.05 28.33 2009 8.44 10.51 9.00 4.19 4.96 20.54 9.62 between rate variables Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 10.80 Pixar 9.28 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 Exhibit Dr Page38 of 46 21A Leamer’s Figure 20 RegressionUsing Corrected Standard Errors Employee Class AllSalaried Dependant Filed10 07 13 3 Variable Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Variable Estimate St Error T Value Conduct Age 0.0067 0.0031 2.18 Conduct Age 2 0.0001 0.0000 2.45 Conduct Log Number 0.0028 0.0247 0.12 0.1647 0.1269 1.30 0.6949 0.0608 11.42 0.7404 0.0587 12.62 0.4945 0.0530 9.33 0.6690 0.0351 19.06 0.7090 0.0458 15.48 0.6944 0.1840 3.77 0.8131 0.1069 7.61 0.2963 0.0461 6.43 0.2610 0.0407 6.41 0.3732 0.0453 8.25 0.3001 0.0389 7.71 0.2551 0.0433 5.89 0.1983 0.0780 2.54 0.1779 0.0979 1.82 Log Age Years 0.3591 0.1799 2.00 Log Age 2 0.0394 0.0233 1.69 Log Company Tenure Months 0.0107 0.0415 0.26 Log Company Tenure 0.0012 0.0043 0.28 0.0027 0.0020 1.37 San Jose 1.4353 0.3827 3.75 Among Defendants 0.0961 0.0456 2.11 0.0038 0.0076 0.50 0.0154 0.0214 0.72 0.2485 0.0568 4.37 0.1070 0.0785 1.36 of New Hires In the Firm Number of Employees 1 Conduct 1 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI PIXAR 1 1 1 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 1 2 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI PIXAR 2 2 2 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 2 2 Male DLog Information Sector Employment Log Total Number Year of Transfers in trend Log Number of New Hires In the New Log Total Number of Log Firm Revenue Per DLog Firm Revenue Firm Number of Employees 1 Hires 1 EmployeeCPI 1 EmployeeCPI 0.2170 0.0814 2.67 APPLE 0.0627 0.2642 0.24 GOOGLE 1.0364 0.3351 3.09 INTEL 0.1522 0.2431 0.63 INTUIT 0.1462 0.2151 0.68 PIXAR 0.7251 0.6673 1.09 LUCASFILM 0.1352 0.2762 0.49 State Location Per YES Indicators Constant YES RSquare 0.926 Observations Note Source Significant Dr Leamer’s 504,897 at 1 level Significant at backup data and materials 5 level Standard Significant at 10 level errors clustered on employer year Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 Exhibit Dr Filed10 07 13 3 of 46 21B Leamer’s Figure 23 RegressionUsing Corrected Standard Errors Technical Creative and Dependant Page39 Variable RD Class Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Variable Estimate St Error T Value Conduct Age 0.0079 0.0033 2.38 Conduct Age 2 0.0001 0.0000 2.71 Conduct Log Number 0.0121 0.0281 0.43 0.2196 0.1362 1.61 0.6744 0.0650 10.38 0.7234 0.0570 12.70 0.4367 0.0672 6.50 0.6401 0.0325 19.67 0.6703 0.0486 13.81 0.6491 0.2295 2.83 0.8462 0.0911 9.29 0.3053 0.0523 5.83 0.2538 0.0391 6.49 0.3659 0.0476 7.68 0.3179 0.0353 9.00 0.2857 0.0439 6.51 0.1045 0.0896 1.17 0.1448 0.0805 1.80 Log Age Years 0.5894 0.1877 3.14 Log Age 2 0.0696 0.0239 2.92 Log Company Tenure Months 0.0297 0.0477 0.62 Log Company Tenure 0.0025 0.0049 0.52 0.0065 0.0024 2.64 San Jose 1.4378 0.4146 3.47 Among Defendants 0.0973 0.0493 1.98 0.0008 0.0080 0.10 0.0240 0.0241 0.99 0.2720 0.0617 4.41 0.0661 0.0853 0.78 of New Hires In the Firm Number of Employees 1 Conduct 1 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI PIXAR 1 1 1 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 1 2 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI PIXAR 2 2 2 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 2 2 Male DLog Information Sector Employment Log Total Number Year of Transfers in trend Log Number of New Hires In the New Log Total Number of Log Firm Revenue Per DLog Firm Revenue Firm Number of Employees 1 Hires 1 EmployeeCPI 1 EmployeeCPI 0.2068 0.0869 2.38 APPLE 0.1220 0.2718 0.45 GOOGLE 1.3682 0.4309 3.18 INTEL 0.1569 0.2761 0.57 INTUIT 0.1393 0.2268 0.61 PIXAR 1.5864 1.0458 1.52 LUCASFILM 0.0127 0.3184 0.04 State Location Per YES Indicators Constant YES RSquare 0.874 Observations Note Source Significant Dr Leamer’s 292,489 at 1 level Significant at backup data and materials 5 level Standard Significant at 10 level errors clustered on employer year Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 Filed1007 13 3 Page40 of 46 Exhibit 22A Dr Leamer’s Estimates of Undercompensation Are Not StatisticallySignificant AllSalaried Employee Adobe Google Apple Dr Class Intel Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Leamer’s Annual Undercompensation Estimates Figure 22 2005 1.61 1.59 1.78 1.67 12.13 10.56 2006 4.28 4.43 4.44 4.70 14.63 12.44 2007 6.64 6.94 6.39 7.46 17.24 14.28 2008 9.08 9.56 8.40 10.05 5.64 19.94 15.76 2009 9.15 9.73 7.51 9.95 5.70 20.12 14.65 T Statistics for 3.24 Annual Undercompensation Estimates 2005 0.94 0.74 0.47 0.96 1.17 0.91 2006 0.88 0.81 0.49 1.49 0.98 0.86 2007 0.90 0.80 0.55 1.62 0.86 0.93 0.88 2008 0.90 0.80 0.60 1.63 0.99 0.95 0.79 2009 0.94 0.82 0.64 1.62 1.04 0.96 0.72 P Values for Annual Undercompensation Estimates 2005 35.3 46.5 64.1 34.0 24.9 36.8 2006 38.2 42.3 62.7 14.2 33.0 39.3 2007 37.1 42.6 58.7 11.1 39.4 35.5 38.4 2008 37.0 42.6 55.1 10.8 32.6 34.4 43.2 2009 35.0 41.7 52.3 11.2 30.1 34.3 47.7 Notes 1 2 Estimates with Standard tstatistics below errors are clustered 1.96 in absolute value on employer Source Dr Leamer’s Figure 20 regression data and year or equivalently with pvalues greater than 5 are not statistically significant at the 95 level Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 Filed1007 13 3 Page41 of 46 Exhibit 22B Dr Leamer’s Estimates of Undercompensation Are Not StatisticallySignificant Technical Creative and Adobe Google Apple Dr RD Class Intel Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Leamer’s Annual Undercompensation Estimates Figure 24 2005 1.56 1.90 3.07 1.64 10.80 9.28 2006 4.29 4.96 7.23 3.06 14.77 10.47 2007 6.48 7.79 9.36 3.38 3.41 18.08 10.61 2008 8.80 10.64 11.20 4.76 5.21 20.44 11.87 2009 8.44 10.51 9.00 4.19 4.96 20.54 9.62 T Statistics for Annual Undercompensation Estimates 2005 0.81 0.77 0.71 0.83 0.91 0.78 2006 0.78 0.79 0.72 0.94 0.85 0.72 2007 0.79 0.80 0.75 0.76 0.79 0.83 0.67 2008 0.79 0.80 0.77 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.61 2009 0.79 0.81 0.80 0.72 0.84 0.83 0.49 P Values for Annual Undercompensation Estimates 2005 42.4 44.7 48.2 40.8 2006 43.7 43.0 47.5 35.0 39.9 47.4 2007 43.6 43.0 45.6 44.8 43.1 41.0 50.7 2008 43.5 42.8 44.3 42.4 40.9 41.0 54.1 2009 43.1 42.4 42.8 47.8 40.4 41.2 62.7 Notes 1 2 Estimates with Standard tstatistics below errors are clustered 1.96 in absolute value on employer Source Dr Leamer’s Figure 23 regression data and year or equivalently with pvalues greater than 36.8 5 are not statistically significant 44.1 at the 95 level Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 Exhibit Undercompensation as Benchmark Estimates Using in Dr AllSalaried Apple 2005 2.71 3.61 6.33 2006 7.94 9.12 15.64 2007 12.15 14.47 20.77 1.56 2008 16.55 19.95 25.25 2009 15.87 19.92 22.16 Apple Google of 46 23 Undercompensation as Benchmark Estimates Using Post Conduct Period in Dr Leamer’s Regression AllSalaried Employee Class Lucasfilm Pixar Year Adobe Apple Google Intel 2.81 14.56 16.52 2005 2.35 2.55 2.76 3.65 22.11 19.53 2006 6.66 6.74 6.80 6.18 27.43 19.88 2007 10.43 10.54 9.43 6.72 2.74 9.00 30.44 23.69 2008 14.40 14.43 11.85 1.37 8.34 30.04 20.65 2009 14.55 14.49 10.20 Intel Technical Creative and Adobe Page42 Employee Class Adobe Year Filed1007 13 vs Leamer’s Regression Year Google PreConduct Period 3 Intel Intuit RD Pixar 2.29 14.80 12.66 5.08 19.72 15.17 4.83 24.07 16.81 9.43 8.35 27.74 19.25 9.05 8.51 28.06 17.56 Technical Creative and Class Intuit Lucasfilm Lucasfilm Pixar Year Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit RD Class Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar 2005 3.46 4.70 8.39 3.54 16.57 18.91 2005 2.33 2.26 1.81 2.25 16.28 11.56 2006 10.10 11.69 20.04 3.90 25.84 21.64 2006 6.47 6.08 4.52 5.96 20.36 13.40 2007 15.29 20.74 18.40 25.15 25.38 7.90 10.96 31.64 34.10 2007 24.35 2008 10.17 14.00 9.38 12.71 6.50 8.46 9.12 12.50 4.58 8.08 24.38 29.55 0.43 1.63 20.55 2008 28.54 14.99 16.28 2009 19.53 24.64 23.64 0.33 9.96 32.41 19.40 2009 14.25 12.62 7.12 12.37 8.24 29.30 14.15 Source Leamer Figure 20 and 23 regressions estimated and pre conduct period data only using conduct Source Leamer Figure 20 and 23 regressions estimated and post conduct period data only using conduct Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 Exhibit Undercompensation Estimates Predicted Using Conduct Period Data in AllSalaried Dr Apple Google Intel vs 2005 5.01 0.84 0.72 2006 2.65 5.79 2007 4.26 2008 4.67 2009 1.00 Google 1.61 1.59 1.78 1.67 12.13 10.56 2006 4.28 4.43 4.44 4.70 14.63 12.44 4.45 2007 6.64 6.94 6.39 7.46 3.24 17.24 14.28 29.03 2008 9.08 9.56 8.40 10.05 5.64 19.94 15.76 2009 9.15 9.73 7.51 9.95 5.70 20.12 14.65 2.96 2.48 4.52 2005 5.61 2.73 5.99 16.84 12.56 2.34 8.78 6.72 3.78 0.10 18.53 7.36 10.78 3.88 2.21 3.13 7.87 12.05 3.93 32.40 Adobe Apple Google Intel 2005 5.83 0.97 1.89 3.43 2006 2.05 4.03 12.09 1.29 2007 5.83 9.57 7.59 5.47 6.76 2008 5.18 4.33 25.03 2.56 8.81 2009 1.46 2.26 6.45 3.09 10.53 Leamer Figure 20 and 23 regressions estimated Undercompensation calculated using residuals data after 2005 are included predicted 3.07 1.64 2006 4.29 4.96 7.23 3.06 14.77 10.47 2007 6.48 7.79 9.36 3.38 3.41 18.08 10.61 16.70 2008 8.80 10.64 11.20 4.76 5.21 20.44 11.87 23.03 2009 8.44 10.51 9.00 4.19 4.96 20.54 9.62 2005 24.15 1.52 6.44 1.86 1.90 the conduct period Class 1.90 11.66 period Pixar 1.56 Year non conduct RD Lucasfilm Google Pixar data Adobe Intuit Apple Lucasfilm 6.07 for Intel Technical Creative and 3.05 Intuit using Adobe Class Year 22 and 24 Apple Year RD 46 AllSalaried Employee Class Pixar Technical Creative and of Figures Lucasfilm Intuit Page43 24 Employee Class Adobe Pixar revenue Filed1007 13 Undercompensation Estimates in Dr Leamer’s Non Leamer’s Regression Year Source 3 Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 10.80 Pixar 9.28 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page44 of 46 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 3 Filed1007 13 Page45 of 46 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 Exhibit Undercompensation Estimates Including Change SP 500 in Dr Leamer’s AllSalaried Adobe Apple Google 2005 0.11 0.06 0.17 0.23 0.27 0.43 0.39 0.44 0.68 1.70 2008 0.55 0.62 1.01 2009 0.66 0.66 1.01 Figures Google 1.61 1.59 1.78 1.67 12.13 10.56 4.28 4.43 4.44 4.70 14.63 12.44 2007 6.64 6.94 6.39 7.46 3.24 17.24 14.28 2.25 2008 9.08 9.56 8.40 10.05 5.64 19.94 15.76 2.14 2009 9.15 9.73 7.51 9.95 5.70 20.12 14.65 1.64 2005 1.83 1.83 2006 0.22 1.96 2.23 2.22 0.55 2.28 2.32 0.61 2.31 Adobe Apple Google 2005 0.48 0.19 0.84 2006 1.20 0.69 1.82 2007 2008 1.93 2.64 1.00 1.32 1.87 1.74 4.26 5.59 2009 2.81 1.40 1.15 5.76 Lucasfilm Intuit RD Class 1.90 3.07 1.64 10.80 9.28 4.29 4.96 7.23 3.06 14.77 10.47 6.48 8.80 7.79 2008 10.64 9.36 11.20 3.38 4.76 3.41 5.21 18.08 20.44 10.61 11.87 2009 8.44 10.51 9.00 4.19 4.96 20.54 9.62 3.49 1.29 2005 3.17 1.43 2006 0.71 1.59 3.38 4.37 2.21 1.86 2007 1.74 4.57 1.65 P 500 Pixar 1.56 0.41 S RD Lucasfilm Google 2.12 Adobe Intuit Apple Year in Intel Technical Creative and Pixar Intuit Leamer Figure 20 and 23 regressions including change Adobe Class Lucasfilm Intel 22 and 24 Apple 1.90 Year Bloomberg vs Year Technical Creative and 46 AllSalaried Employee Class 0.84 2007 of 26 Pixar Intel Page46 Undercompensation Estimates in Dr Leamer’s in Regression 0.17 2006 Source Filed1007 13 Employee Class Year Net Total Return Index 3 Intel Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 4 Filed10 07 13 Page1 of 73 CurriculumVitae Kevin M Murphy October 2012 Home Address Business University Address of Chicago 1810 Pennington Court Booth School of Business New 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue Chicago Illinois 60637 murphy chicagobooth email kevin Lenox Illinois 60451 Phone 815463 4756 Fax 815463 4758 edu Current Positions July 2005 Present George J Department Faculty of Economics Research Stigler Distinguished Service Professor of and Booth School of Business University Bureau of Economic Associate National Economics of Chicago Research Education University of California Los Angeles University of Thesis Previous Topic Chicago Ph Specialization D and Research and Academic 2002 2005 George J Stigler A B Economics 1981 1986 Human Capital Positions Professor of Economics Department of Economics and Booth School of Business University of Chicago 1993 2002 George Relations 1989 University 1993 Pratt Shultz Professor of Business Economics and Industrial of Chicago Professor of Business Associate Professor Economics and Industrial Relations University Chicago 1988 1989 University of Chicago of Business Economics and Industrial Relations of Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK 1986 1988 University Document518 Assistant Professor of Business Filed10 07 13 4 Economics and Page2 of 73 Relations Industrial of Chicago 1983 1986 Lecturer Booth School 1982 1983 Teaching Associate Department of Economics University of Chicago 1979 1981 Research Assistant of Business University Unicon of Chicago Corporation Santa Monica Research California Honors and Awards 2008 John von Neumann Lecture 2007 Kenneth J Arrow Award 1998 Rajk with Robert October 2005 Garfield Research September Award Prize College Corvinus University Budapest H Topel with Robert H Topel 2005 MacArthur Foundation Fellow Elected Academy to the American 1997 John Bates of Arts Sciences Clark Medalist 1993 Fellow of The Econometric Society 1989 1991 Sloan 1983 1984 Earhart 1981 1983 Fellowship Friedman Fund 1980 1981 Phi Beta Kappa 1980 1981 1979 1981 Department Scholar Department Foundation Fellowship University of Chicago Earhart Foundation Fellowship University University University of Chicago of California Los Foundation Fellowship University of of Chicago Angeles of California Economics Los University Angeles of California Los Angeles Publications Books Social Economics Market Behavior Cambridge MA Harvard University in a Social Environment Press Measuring the Gains from Medical Research with Robert H Topel Chicago University with Gary S Becker 2000 An Economic Approach of Chicago Press edited volume 2003 2 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 Filed10 07 13 4 Page3 73 of Articles Government of Journal and Inference Estimation Journal of Cigarette Health Regulation Schneider 24 Lynne Law of Two Step in Unemployment Risk and Earnings with Benjamin Klein and 1981 Models Econometric with Robert H Topel Testing Wage for Equalizing Differences H Market with Robert Topel in Unemployment and the Structure of Markets pp 103139 ed Kevin Lang and Jonathan S Leonard London Basil Labor 3 1985 and Economic Statistics 370 Business Information and Economics 575 the in Labor Blackwell 1987 The Evolution Topel MA MIT Unemployment of NBER in in the United States pp 11 58 Annual Macroeconomics 1968 1985 ed H with Robert Stanley Fischer Cambridge 1987 Press Cohort Size and Earnings in the United States with Mark Plant and Finis Welch Economics Ronald Age of Changing D Lee W The Family and A Theory Distributions in Brian Arthur and Gerry State with Gary the Addiction of Rational Developed Countries pp 39 58 ed 1988 Rodgers Oxford Clarendon Press S Becker with Gary 31 Journal S Becker of 96 Law Journal Political 1988 1 and Economics of in Economy 675 1988 Vertical Restraints and Contract and Economics 265 Income Robert Wage Distribution W Vishny 104 Premiums for Welch 18 with Finis of Building Robert Political Quarterly of Economics 537 Researcher 1003 Push with 1989 17 W Vishny of Law in NBER Andrei Macroeconomic the Theory and Measurement Weiss and Gideon Fishelson with Andrei Shleifer and 1989 Shleifer Annual MA MIT London of and Robert Models Macmillan ed Olivier Jean 1989 with Robert Unemployment W Vishny 97 with Andrei Shleifer and pp 247 87 Press Wages Reconsidered Theory and Evidence in Journal 1989 Blocks of Market Clearing Business Cycle Efficiency Klein 31 Graduates Recent Growth and Possible Explanations College Educational Economy Journal Blanchard and Stanley Fischer Cambridge Advances with Benjamin Market Size and Industrialization Industrialization and the Big Journal Enforcement 1988 H Topel pp 204 240 ed in Yoram 1990 3 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Age Earnings Empirical Document518 Filed10 07 13 4 Profiles with Finis Welch 8 Journal of Page4 Labor of 73 Economics 202 1990 Human Capital Tamura 98 Accounting Political of Economy Slowdown for the The Role Changing Has Rational Michael Wages 106 Enterprise Quarterly Journal for Grossman 81 American Economic Graduates of College 121 40 ed Publishers E Becker William Increased in over Activity Growth with and the Effect of Price on Addiction F with Chinhui Juhn the United in Enterprise Institute Welch Finis States in Workers Marvin Kosters 1991 Institute Time H with Robert 1991 75 Andrei Shleifer and Robert 1991 Economics 503 of and Robert pp 39 69 ed States Papers on Economic Brookings Patterns with Differentials the United of Talent Implications Allocation W Vishny in Rate of Unemployment the Natural Topel and Chinhui Juhn 2 The Patterns DC American Washington Why Trade in Wage of International Convergence DC American Marvin Kosters Washington Wages and Their Black White Wage in S Becker Gary 1990 S12 and Their Wages Changing and Brooks Pierce in Workers pp 107143 ed 1991 Growth with and Economic Fertility Journal Consumption S Becker with Gary and 1991 Review 237 pp The Economics of American Higher Education Lewis Boston Kluwer Academic R 1992 Changes Katz 107 in The The Transition Journal Wages Structure of Shleifer The to and Robert Division Quarterly of Journal Industrial Wages 1963 1987 Relative Quarterly of Wage 101 of 107 Pitfalls Quarterly Quarterly of Partial Journal of Journal Economics 1137 the Rising in Planning Importance Economy of Skill in 410 1992 Reform with 1992 Andrei with pp 101 132 ed with Finis Gary Welch Peter Gottschalk Sage Foundation Publications and the Rise Political Economics 285 of S Becker 107 1992 America Russell F Economics 889 Labor Coordination Costs and Knowledge York Inequality Journal 107 with Lawrence 1992 with Finis Welch Economy Demand Factors Supply and Economics 35 W Vishny Change and New of a Market Tides Rising Inequality Danziger and Darrell in Uneven and Sheldon 1993 Returns to Skill with Chinhui Juhn and Brooks Pierce 1993 4 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Change and Occupational Document518 for Skill 1940 1990 Page5 with Finis of 73 Welch 83 1993 Wages and Relative Inequality Demand the Economic Review 122 American Filed10 07 13 4 with Finis Welch 83 Economic Review 104 American 1993 Why Is Rent Seeking Vishny 83 A Simple Journal of American So Costly to Growth Theory of Advertising as a with Andrei Shleifer W and Robert 1993 Review 409 Economic Good or Bad with Gary S Becker 108 Quarterly 1993 Economics 941 Relative Wages and Skill Demand 1940 1990 with Chinhui Juhn in Labor Markets Employment Policy and Job Creation pp 34360 ed Lewis Solmon and Alec C Levenson The Milken Westview Cattle Empirical Analysis of Cigarette Grossman 84 in with Chinhui Labor Market Outcomes Juhn 1 in Wage Political of The and Michael Contrasting the 1980s and Earlier Decades 1995 Review 26 Hike with Donald R Deere and 1995 on Minimum Wages and Employment with Donald Effects of the Finis R Deere MinimumWage on Employment pp 26 54 ed 1996 H Kosters Washington DC The AEI Press of Political Economy Inequality Economics 72 Quality and Wage Policy Review 232 Economic Social Status Education Journal Journal 1994 1990 91 Minimum Wage the Evidence and Finis Welch Marvin Economic the American Examining 102 S Becker Addiction with Gary Economic Review 396 American Employment and Welch 85 A Scheinkman Jose 1994 468 Inequality Boulder 1994 Press Cycles with Sherwin Rosen and Economy An Economics and Education Series in Institute R CO Growth with Chaim Fershtman and Yoram Weissm 104 1996 and Family Labor Supply with Chinhui Juhn 15 Journal of Labor 1997 Trade with Inequality Economics 72 and 108 Andrei Shleifer and Family Labor 53 Supply Journal of Development with Chinhui Economics Juhn 15 Journal of 1 1997 Labor 1997 Vertical Integration Klein 87 American as a SelfEnforcing Contractual Economic Review 415 Arrangement with Benjamin 1997 5 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Unemployment Nonemployment Skills and Technology M Romen and Paul on Perspectives the United in Page6 73 of 87 American Economic Growth 145 1999 Economic Review A Competitive Perspective Economic Review 184 Bush School W with Craig Riddell pp 283 Growth 1998 Press Solutions with Finis Welch 88 on with Gary S Becker Explorer Internet and Edward Glaeser 89 with Steven J Davis 90 American 2000 Change and Industrial Consequences MA MIT Canada and Economic 1998 and Economic Population States and the Social Security Crisis and Proposed Economic Review 142 American H Topel with Robert in General Purpose Technologies 309 ed Elhanan Helpman Cambridge American Filed10 07 13 4 1997 Review 295 Wages and Document518 the Demand of Increasing for Skill Economics of Series in the Welch in The Causes and Welch Volume II in the with Finis pp 26384 ed Inequality Public Finis Policy Chicago University of Chicago 2001 Press Wage Differentials Welch the 1990s Is the Glass Half Full or Half The Causes and Consequences in Volume in II in the Bush School of Chicago Press University on Software in pp 341 64 Inequality Economics of the Public ed Finis Finis Welch Policy Chicago 2001 Economic Perspectives with Steven Economy Increasing of Series Empty with J Davis Design PC Operating Systems and Platforms and Jack MacCrisken Selected Essays in Microsoft pp 361 420 ed Davis Antitrust S Evans and the Boston New MA Kluwer 2001 Current Unemployment Chinhui Juhn 1 The Economics Papers on Economic Brookings of Copyright Fair and Benjamin Klein 92 American The Economic Value M Murphy Use in Economic of Medical Gains from Medical Research and Kevin Contemplated Historically An Economics 299 Entrepreneurial Japanese Review of and 2002 A Networked World with Andres Lerner 2002 Research with Robert Economic Approach Chicago University H Topel in pp 41 73 ed 2003 Measuring the Robert H Topel of Chicago Press Market with Sam Peltzman 22 Journal of 2003 ability and market selection in an infant industry cotton spinning Economic 79 Review 205 School Performance and the Youth Labor Labor Activity H Topel with Robert Dynamics industry with Atsushi 354 Ohyama and evidence Serguey from the Braguinsky 7 2004 6 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Entry Pricing Document518 and Product Design Davis and Robert H Topel 112 an in Journal of Filed10 07 13 4 Initially S188 Diminishing Returns The Costs and benefits of Increased Topel 46 Perspectives Persuasion in in Biology Longevity of 73 with Steven with Robert J H 2004 S108 and Medicine Market 2004 Monopolized Economy Political Page7 Politics with Andrei Shleifer 94 American May Economic Review 435 2004 Black White Topel 48 The Differences Perspectives Equilibrium in in the Biology Distribution of Becker and IvÆn Werning 113 The Market for Illegal Grossman 114 Journal Two Competition in Fees Interchange Journal Economic Goods The of Political of Economy Sided Markets the Market for 38 The Drugs with 2006 Antitrust Status S with Gary 2005 Economy 282 Political Case of H 2005 Income and Journal Health with Robert Value of Improving S176 and Medicine Gary S Becker and Michael Economics of Payment Card with Benjamin Klein Kevin Green and Lacey Place 73 Antitrust Law 2006 571 The Value of Health Economy 871 and Longevity with Robert H Topel 2006 Social Value and the Speed of Review 433 Innovation with Robert Marketplace Why Capital Fertility a 1 The Journal of Journal in the Whole Foods Dealing in 97 American the Household Human Capital with Isaac Ehrlich Case with Robert Economic 1 Compared Winter 9 The Journal H Topel Competition for Distribution Intensifies Law Journal Vol 75 October Decline The Market Papers Political to 2007 of Human 3 2 GCP 2008 March Robert Tamura Women Need Capital Loss Analysis Exclusive Antitrust H Topel of 2007 1 Winter Critical S Becker with Gary Does Human Magazine Journal 2007 Education and Consumption The Effects of Education the 114 2 the Baby The Journal for College with Gary Proceedings Boom and Economic Human Capital 3 Growth with Fall 2008 Graduates and the Worldwide S Becker 229 of with Benjamin Klein 2008 and William Boom H J Hubbard in Curtis Simon and Higher Education of 100 American Economic Review May 2010 7 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK H J Hubbard William Boom the Worldwide Explaining Document518 Journal Higher Education of in Human of Filed10 07 13 4 Page8 Women Capital University of with Gary 73 S Becker of Chicago Press vol 43 203 2010 How Exclusivity with Benjamin Used is Klein 77 to Intensify Competition for Distribution Reply to Antitrust Law Maximum Long Run Growth Achieving City Proceedings of the Annual Hole Jackson No Journal forthcoming Conference Zenger 2011 2 the Federal in Bank Reserve of Kansas 2011 Selected Working Papers Gauging the Working War Economic Paper October NBER Working Estimating the Effect Unpublished Working The Interaction Unpublished Persuasion The Value Philipson On the Weighing No 12092 Growth Costs Its with Steven J Davis and Robert 2006 Steve Levitt and Roland Fryer and Income with Gary S Becker 2006 2007 and Indoctrination with Gary Becker of Life Near Unpublished 2006 in Population Paper the March Epidemic with of the Crack End and Terminal Care with Gary S Becker and Tomas 2007 Economics of Working Selected of Paper Paper September Working S Becker 2001 In Iraq Versus Containment H Topel 11th with Gary Impact of September Paper No Climate 234 Policy January with Gary S Becker 2010 Revised September and Robert H Topel 2010 Comments Comment on Reserve Bank Comment Reform Causes of Changing of Kansas City Comment on Answers Social of Investment Feldstein Equality by Robert pp 175 81 ed Andrew J of Chicago Press Federal Debate Medicare and Thomas R Rettenmaier 2000 Security and Demographic Uncertainty ed 2001 Based Social Security Reform Chicago University Z Lawrence 1998 Asking the Right Questions in the Medicare Reform Issues and Saving Chicago University Aspects Earnings of Chicago Press John by Henning Y Campbell Bohn in Risk and Martin 8 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Comment on High Filed10 07 13 4 Page9 of 73 R Varian by Hal Technology Industries and Market Structure 2001 Reserve Bank of Kansas City Federal Popular Document518 Press Articles Rap The Education Gap The American Antitrust with Gary Rethinking MarchApril 1990 pp 62 Enterprise S Becker Wall 26 2001 pp February Journal Street pA22 Out Prosperity Will Rise S Becker Gary Wall Street Journal 29 2001 pp pA22 October The Economics the request Articles Ashes with of the NFL Team of of the National Ownership Football with Robert League Players H Topel Association report prepared at 2009 January About Murphy Higher Learning Clearly March 12 1989 Jobs the Middle Class Is Extensive reference Unequal Business One pp 1 Section Long article Kleiman Chicago Carol The about Tribune Wages Structure of with Murphy picture of Why Means Higher Earning by to Pay Widespread Day section in pp 1 17 1992 by Louis S Richman to Is Business on income piece York Times August 14 1990 inequality Rut of Poverty by Sylvia Nasar New York Anothers pp 1 Section May 21 1990 pp 106 Fortune education US by Louis Uchitelle New Long Rags to Riches Studys Times June Anxious Murphy’s work on returns Long piece on the income inequality research Nobels Pile November Up for Chicago 4 1993 Business but Is Section the Glory pp 1 Featured a photo of five of the Murphy and a paragraph about Murphys This Sin Tax is Win Win Commentary section brightest stars by Christopher refers to Murphy Gone Long by Sylvia Nasar New York Times on Chicago School piece on the economics faculty of economics including research Farrell Business Becker Week April 11 1994 pp 30 and Grossmans work on rational addiction Growing and the economics inequality Sunday Globe August details 21 1994 pp about Murphy and replaced the old in his of fragmentation A1 Two page research article part of a series by David Warsh Boston with picture and biographical about how the new generation economics 9 Case5 11cv 02509LHK A Pay Impact by Raises Section pp 1 Articles featuring January Filed1007 13 4 Page10 of 73 New York Times January 12 1995 Business minimum wage of proposed increase in the Murphy’s comments on the minimum wage appeared in numerous including the Chicago Tribune Murphy was in addition on interviewed 26 1995 American Wall The Undereducated in Louis Uchitelle about consequences Article other publications CNN Document518 Street Journal August 19 1996 pp A12 Changes the rate of returns to education M Murphy Winner In Honor of Kevin Welch 14 Journal Testimony Reports and Depositions Canadian Vehicles District 15 16 January 2008 M Murphy Inc Appliances v February 1 2008 Tyco Healthcare M Murphy of Kevin Declaration Corporation v Eastern Inc v the Central District v Inc Inc Electronics its Inc Trustee States District v Inc et al v Electronics its Inc Trustee States District Initial Inc Jaco Hynix Hynix 22 2008 States District Inc Inc et v Court for the Northern al NA in District Court for the Matter of Sun Microsystems Inc Semiconductor Inc Hynix District v Inc et et al Hynix Semiconductor al v Inc et All American DRAM Claims Liquidation Semiconductor et al The United of California San Francisco Division 24 2008 in the Matter of Sun Microsystems Inc et al Consolidated Unisys Corporation v Jaco Inc Electronics Semiconductor Bank Court for the Northern Submission of Kevin United States al Consolidated Unisys Corporation Semiconductor Fargo in the Matter of Allied Orthopedic April Hynix Hynix Wells et 7 2008 Electronics Bank M Murphy v United States District in the Matter of Novelis LP The Semiconductor Fargo Hynix Semiconductor Semiconductor Trust by al Court for the Northern Hynix Semiconductor al Edge et v Wells Deposition of Kevin LP The District M Murphy March Hynix Semiconductor Semiconductor Group of California Western Hynix Semiconductor Trust by Court for the District 28 2008 February Tyco Healthcare Expert Report of Kevin al Edge States District Motor Division M Murphy Deposition of Kevin Appliances February Anheuser Busch Inc The United Ohio of al New the Matter of Allied in Group Court for the Central District of California Western et the Matter of The United Export Antitrust Litigation Orthopedic Inc in Maine of Expert Report of Kevin District by Finis 2000 Last 4 Years M Murphy Deposition of Kevin Medal of the John Bates Clark 193 Economic Perspectives of NA Inc Hynix District v Inc et al et Hynix Semiconductor al DRAM Claims Liquidation Semiconductor et al The United of California San Francisco M Murphy October Inc All American 6 2008 in the 2006 Division MSA Adjustment Proceeding 10 et Case5 11cv 02509LHK Filed1007 13 4 M Murphy October 29 2008 myFICO Consumer Services Inc vs Expert Report of Kevin Corporation and Document518 LLC Experian Information Solutions LLC and Does I through Information Services VantageScore District Systems Inc v News Court for the District v News FSI Inc America America Marketing In Store LLC The United No 07 706645 Services Deposition of Kevin Corporation and VantageScore 21 2008 Equifax United States LLC Court District ak a News Inc Services in the Matter of Valassis a k a News America Incorporated America Marketing America Marketing FSI aa a News LLC and M Murphy December 12 2008 Services News In Store American Marketing States Third Circuit Court of Michigan Detroit myFICO Consumer Information Services Division in the Matter of Fair Issac Inc vs Equifax Inc Equifax LLC Experian Information LLC and Does I through Solutions Solutions X The Inc TransUnion United States LLC District Court of Minnesota Deposition of Kevin v News Rebuttal X The Inc Inc TransUnion 21 2008 in the Matter of Insignia In Store Inc The United States District M Murphy November Group News District Solutions of Minnesota Communications Inc Inc in the Matter of Fair Issac Equifax M Murphy November America Marketing Expert Report of Kevin District 73 of of Minnesota Expert Report of Kevin Case Page11 M Murphy December 15 2008 America Marketing In Store Inc The in the Matter of Insignia Systems United States District Court for the of Minnesota Expert Report of Kevin Valassis Communications Marketing Group News Inc M Murphy December v News 26 2008 America Incorporated America FSI Inc ak a News aa Division Case a the Matter of News America Marketing News America Marketing In Store Services Inc In Store Services LLC The United States Third Circuit and in ak a News America FSI LLC American Marketing Court of Michigan Detroit No 07 706645 Final Submission of Kevin M Murphy January 16 2009 in the 2006 MSA Adjustment Proceeding Expert Report of Kevin v of M Murphy January Corp et al The United New York Report submitted on behalf Amerada Hess of Kevin Declaration Inc v News District M Murphy America Marketing January 23 2009 in States District the Matter of City of Court for the Southern of Citgo Petroleum 29 2009 In Store Inc The in New York District Corporation the Matter of Insignia Systems United States District Court for the of Minnesota 11 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 M Murphy Deposition of Kevin Communications Inc v News Group News FSI Inc America America Marketing Case In Store LLC The Services v Services News a a k a News Inc America Marketing LLC and America Marketing FSI aa News a News In Store American Marketing Division M Murphy Citgos Center on behalf States District all others Court for the Eastern Center on behalf supply M Murphy March of itself and Deposition of Kevin States District RFG share of total Expert Report of Kevin all Case Declaration of Kevin Declaration of Kevin M Murphy v District 17 2009 April v 6 2009 v April 16 2009 in April 23 2009 in of California San Francisco Expert Report of Kevin M Murphy May 11 2009 Judicial District v Inc Meritor LLC States District Meritor LLC and States District v Division Inc Sun Microsystems a Korean al The corporation United States Hynix District Division in the Matter of Jim Corporation Microsoft Sun Microsystems al The United States et the Matter of a California corporation et State of Mississippi Expert Report of Professor the Western United the Matter of Hynix Semiconductor District Petroleum Corporation ZF The United of California San Francisco Court Northern First ZF The United in the Matter of Eaton Corporation Inc rel Medical Inc The Division the Matter of in United Division CR Bard Eaton Corporation Semiconductor America Hinds County vs Medical Inc The in the Matter of St Francis situated Hynix Semiconductor M Murphy a California corporation General ex CR Bard No 06 CV 623 a California corporation Court Northern vs No 06 CV 623 M Murphy Case the Matter of St Francis situated of Missouri Southeastern District v in York Harbor of Missouri Southeastern similarly M Murphy March TransmissionCorporation Court of Delaware District New the Matter of City of in New 3 2009 District and Meritor TransmissionCorporation Deposition of Kevin the similarly others Court for the Eastern Court of Delaware at M Murphy March 6 2009 of itself and Expert Report of Kevin Meritor 13 2009 February Amerada Hess Corp et al The United States District Court for the Southern of New York Report submitted on behalf of Citgo Petroleum Corporation regarding Inc in the Matter of Valassis America Incorporated ak 73 of No 07 706645 District Inc 10 2009 February Page12 United States Third Circuit Court of Michigan Detroit Expert Report of Kevin York Filed1007 13 4 Hood The Chancery Attorney Court of District Kevin M Murphy Ranger Enterprises June 12 2009 Inc The in the Matter of CITGO United States District Court for of Wisconsin 12 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Expert Report of Kevin v Incorporated District Trial Filed1007 13 4 M Murphy June 24 2009 Page13 of 73 in the Matter of Novell The United Corporation Microsoft Court Northern States District of Maryland M Murphy Testimony of Kevin Communications Inc Group News v News July 16 2009 the Matter of Valassis in a k a News America Incorporated ak America Marketing FSI Inc a News America Marketing FSI LLC and News In Store Services Inc a a News American Marketing In Store America America Marketing LLC The United No 07 706645 Services Case Document518 a States Third Circuit Court of Michigan Detroit M Murphy August 14 2009 Declaration of Kevin Litigation The United Declaration submitted of EBay Antitrust Seller District of California Ebay Inc s motion of defendant support in in the Matter Court for the Northern States District Division for summary judgment Expert Report of Kevin Inc and S Jerrold M Murphy August 21 2009 Kaplan v in the Matter of The Corporation Microsoft Superior Go Computer Court for the State of California for the City and County of San Francisco Deposition of Kevin v Incorporated District M Murphy Microsoft 16 2009 in the Matter of Novell The United States District Court Northern September Corporation of Maryland Deposition of Kevin M Murphy September 21 2009 The United States District California Deposition in support of defendant Antitrust Litigation Ebay in the Matter of Court for the Northern Ebay Inc s motion for Seller of District summary judgment Expert Report of Kevin M Murphy September Temperature Sales Litigation The United States Trial Testimony of Kevin M Murphy October and Meritor TransmissionCorporation Court of Delaware Declaration of Kevin California Declaration District 1 2009 the Matter of Motor Fuel Court of Kansas ZF in the Matter of Eaton Corporation The United LLC Meritor States District No 06 CV 623 Case Antitrust Litigation v 29 2009 in M Murphy October The United in 16 2009 States District further support in the Matter of Ebay Court for the Northern of defendant Seller District Ebay Inc s motion for of summary judgment Expert Report of Kevin Devices Intel Inc and Kabushiki AMD M Murphy October International Kaisha The United Sales 20 2009 Service States District in the Matter of LTD v Intel Court for the Advanced Micro Corporation and District of Delaware 13 Case5 11cv 02509LHK M Murphy Deposition of Kevin S Jerrold and Document518 v Kaplan Filed1007 13 4 24 2009 October Court Superior 73 of Go Computer Inc the Matter of in The Corporation Microsoft Page14 the State of for California for the City and County of San Francisco M Murphy Deposition of Kevin Expert Report of Kevin Discount New Court for the Eastern District of Valassis Communications Group News Inc Card States District ak ak America FSI Inc a News a in the Matter of News a News America FSI LLC America Marketing American Marketing Court of Michigan Detroit No 07 706645 Testimony of Kevin and 21 2009 America Incorporated aa Inc The United M Murphy December v News News America Marketing In Store Services Inc In Store Services LLC The United States Third Circuit Trial Fuel the Matter of Payment in Antitrust Litigation and Division Case Motor Court of Kansas York Supplemental Expert Report of Kevin Marketing the Matter of in States District M Murphy December 14 2009 Fee and Merchant Interchange 26 2009 October The United Temperature Sales Litigation S Jerrold M Murphy Kaplan v 11 2010 January The Corporation Microsoft in the Matter of Go Computer Court for the Superior State of California for the City and County of San Francisco Supplemental Rebuttal America Marketing LLC News and Marketing Detroit Group News v Services Division Case LLC Communications Inc v News Group News FSI Inc America America Marketing Services Case In Store LLC The a k a News Inc Services The United aa a the in a News America Marketing News States Third Circuit FSI American Court of Michigan 26 2010 January in the Matter of Valassis America Incorporated ak News a Services Inc a k a News America Marketing America Marketing FSI aa a News LLC and American Marketing United States Third Circuit Court of Michigan Detroit News In Store Division No 07 706645 Declaration of Kevin Antitrust Cases I and the In Store ak No 07 706645 M Murphy Deposition of Kevin 14 2010 January News America Incorporated America FSI Inc America Marketing In Store M Murphy Expert Report of Kevin Matter of Valassis Communications Inc County Declaration M Murphy II The 28 2010 in the Matter of Automobile Court of the State of California for of San Francisco of Kevin M Murphy Determination of Interim al The United Court for the Eastern Court Southern M Murphy Fee and Merchant District 2 2010 April April Discount of in the Matter of the Application Fees for The Cromwell License States District Deposition of Kevin Interchange January United States Superior New 13 14 District 2010 in of Group Inc New et York the Matter of Payment Antitrust Litigation for the and Affiliates The United Card States District York 14 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 M Murphy June 1 2010 Supplemental Expert Report of Kevin Inc Insignia Systems 2010 The United v News America Marketing M Murphy June 21 2010 Comcast Corporation General to In Store Assign Licenses or Transfer Page15 73 of in the Matter of Inc 8 June corrected Court for the District of Minnesota States District Expert Report of Kevin Filed1007 13 4 in the Matter of Applications NBC Universal Company and Electric of Licensees Control Inc of for Consent Communications Federal Commission Supplement to Expert Report of Kevin Payment Card Interchange M Murphy June 24 2010 Fee and Merchant Discount Court for the Eastern District of States District Inc Insignia Systems District Court for the Deposition of Kevin v The United New York M Murphy Second Supplemental Expert Report of Kevin in the Matter of Antitrust Litigation July 6 2010 in the Matter of News America Marketing In Store Inc The United District States of Minnesota M Murphy 8 2010 July in the Matter of Insignia Systems News America Marketing In Store Inc The United Inc Court for the States District v District of Minnesota M Murphy 28 2010 by Thomas W Corbett Jr Expert Report of Kevin Pennsylvania July of Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania Response of Kevin 19 2010 M Murphy of Licensees NBC Universal Inc Federal Louis et al v of al et in the MD 2004 Israel and Michael Katz August Comcast Corporation General Electric Control or Transfer Commission M Murphy September 14 2010 in the Matter of City of Co et al The Circuit Court of American Tobacco of St St Louis the City of of Missouri State Deposition of Kevin et 212 Inc Products for Consent to Assign Licenses Communications Expert Report of Kevin No Commonwealth General of the as Attorney Pharmaceutical Reply Report of Mark to in the Matter of Applications Company and the Matter of his capacity in v TAP Commonwealth in al v M Murphy American Tobacco Co et 24 2010 September al The in St Louis the Matter of City of Court of the City of St Louis State of Circuit Missouri Supplemental Expert Report of Kevin Commonwealth al in the Commonwealth Expert Report of Kevin Hampshire v by Thomas of Pennsylvania General of the Commonwealth M Murphy September W Corbett of Pennsylvania v TAP Court of Pennsylvania M Murphy October Hess Corporation et al The No 1 2010 State of 30 2010 Jr in his capacity Pharmaceutical 212 in the Matter of Inc MD 2004 in the Matter of State New as Attorney Products of Hampshire Superior New Court 15 et Case5 11cv 02509LHK Expert Report of Kevin between Cordis Conflict Prevention M Murphy October Corporation and Abbott Cordis Conflict M Murphy Prevention of Kevin M Murphy November v BP Court for the Northern CPR Expert Report of Kevin 8 2010 v BP Inc Analysis of Kevin Dodd Frank Comments of Kevin L Katz and Michael of International RWJ States Division in the Matter of RWJ America Inc The United 19 2010 States Division al in the Matter of Craft et v a corporation and Philip Morris Incorporated a M Murphy Bank Judicial District City of St Louis to Guide Interpretation of Debit Interchange or Transfer on the November 10 2010 Report November 24 2010 Control v NFL of Provisions of the Fees November 23 2010 of America Corporation M Murphy Expert Report of Kevin in of Licensees the Matter of Applications NBC Universal Inc Federal Lockout 29 2010 Loans The Drs Mark of Israel Comcast for Consent to Assign Communications M Murphy November Lockout Insurance of Commission in the Matter of Reggie United States District White Court of Minnesota Deposition of Kevin v NFL District CPR the Matter of of Illinois Eastern District Corporation General Electric Company and al in 15 2010 Products North Act Regarding Regulation submission on behalf al the Matter of the 00200406 02 Economic District for Institute America Inc The United corporation Missouri Circuit Court Twenty Second et in Vascular 12 2010 M Murphy November Philip Morris Companies Licenses International of Illinois Eastern District Court for the Northern No for Institute the Matter of the Arbitration in Products North M Murphy November Management Company Inc Case International Resolution Prevention Expert Report of Kevin District 7 2010 Vascular M Murphy November Management Company Inc District 73 of in the Matter of the Arbitration CPR Cordis Corporation and Abbott for Conflict Declaration Page16 Resolution Testimony of Kevin Institute 4 2010 Vascular October Corporation and Abbott Arbitration between Filed1007 13 4 Resolution Deposition of Kevin between Trial Document518 Lockout M Murphy December 3 2010 Insurance Lockout in the Matter of Reggie Loans The United States District White et Court of Minnesota Deposition of Kevin Company Inc the Northern v BP District M Murphy December 13 2010 Products North in the Matter of America Inc The United of Illinois Eastern RWJ Management States District Court for Division 16 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Deposition of Kevin Document518 M Murphy Inc Philip Morris Companies Filed1007 13 4 17 18 January 2011 No 73 of v al the Matter of Craft et a corporation and Philip Morris Incorporated a corporation Missouri Circuit Court Twenty Second Case in Page17 St Louis District City of Judicial 00200406 02 Report of Kevin M Murphy 16 Corporation on February Consumer 15 2011 February submitted by TCF Financial 2011 to the Subcommittee on Financial Credit of the Committee on Financial Services of the and Institutions US House of Representatives Declaration Ben of Kevin S Bernanke M Murphy March Janet L Yellen Kevin 2 2011 in M Warsh Elizabeth and Sarah Bloom Raskin the Board of Governors capacities and John official Expert Report of Kevin LTD M Murphy Declaration Court Northern of Kevin Board on behalf Entertainment Consoles Judicial June District System in Reserve in his official the Matter of Datel Microsoft v Corporation their capacity Holdings The United 14 2011 v filed with the National Labor Relations Players Association in the Matter of Datel Corporation Microsoft LTD Holdings The United States of California M Murphy July 1 2011 in the Matter of Certain Gaming and and Components Thereof The United States Related Software Trade Commission Expert Report of Kevin Inc Basketball M Murphy Expert Report of Kevin Airlines v M Murphy May 26 2011 Court Northern International of the Currency in Bank National A Duke Daniel K Tarullo of the Federal 11 2011 TCF of California Development Inc and Datel Design District District of the National Deposition of Kevin April Development Inc and Datel Design States District Walsh Comptroller the Matter of v Sabre M Murphy August 17 2011 Inc et al The Judicial District in the Matter of American of Tarrant County Texas 67th District Expert Report of Kevin M Murphy August 19 2011 Temperature Sales Litigation The United in the Matter of States District Court for the Motor Fuel of District Kansas Deposition of Kevin M Murphy September 6 2011 and Entertainment Consoles Related Software States International v Intel the Matter of Certain Gaming Trade Commission Expert Report of Kevin York in and Components Thereof The United M Murphy September Corporation The United 9 2011 States District in the Matter of State of Court for the District of New Delaware 17 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Deposition of Kevin Document518 M Murphy Temperature Sales Litigation 14 2011 September The United Filed1007 13 4 Page18 in the Matter of Court for the States District 73 of Motor Fuel District of Kansas Direct Testimony M Murphy of Kevin Gaming and Entertainment Consoles York v Report of Kevin NRLC and M Murphy M Murphy October railroad 810 October The United Corporation Intel 2011 States District 10 2011 employees National Hearing Testimony of Kevin NRLC and Thereof The in connection railroad before M Murphy October employees National of District A13569 A13570 Emergency Board 13 2011 in No 243 connection with dispute Mediation Board Case A13570 A13572 A13573 A13574 A13575 A13592 Delaware between with dispute Nos New of in the Matter of State Court for the Mediation Board Case A13572 A13573 A13574 A13575 A13592 between in the Matter of Certain Software and Components Trade Commission United States International Deposition of Kevin 27 2011 September Related before Nos Emergency A13569 No Board 243 Expert Report of Kevin Hampshire Declaration v M Murphy October Hess Corporation of Kevin et al The 17 2011 M Murphy December 1 2011 Temperature Sales Litigation The United Hampshire Superior the Matter of States District New in the Matter of State of New State of Court Motor Fuel Court for the District of Kansas Expert Report of Kevin M Murphy December 5 2011 v the Matter of Retractable in Technologies Inc and Thomas Shaw States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas Marshall Trial Testimony of Kevin Incorporated District Trial v Microsoft Corporation The United in Company The United Division the Matter of Novell States District Court Northern of Maryland Testimony of Kevin M Murphy December v BP Court for the Northern M Murphy Technologies Inc and Thomas Shaw The United States District Court for the Eastern M Murphy January and Entertainment Consoles Related Software States International the Matter of RWJ America Inc The United of Illinois Eastern District Retractable Testimony of Kevin 29 2011 in Products North Supplemental Expert Report of Kevin Trial and M Murphy December 7 8 2011 Management Company Inc District Becton Dickinson January v States Division 15 2012 in the Matter of Becton Dickinson and Company District 18 2012 of Texas Marshall in Division the Matter of Certain Gaming and Components Thereof The United Trade Commission 18 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 M Murphy February Supplemental Expert Report of Kevin State New of v Hampshire Filed1007 13 4 Page19 23 2012 the Matter of in New Hess Corporation et al The State of 73 of Hampshire Court Superior M Murphy March Affidavit of Kevin 12 2012 Fruth Individually and on Behalf Michael of Sharon in the Matter of Others Similarly Incorporated The United States Circuit Court Third Situated Price and vs Philip Morris Court Madison Judicial County Illinois of Kevin Declaration M Murphy May 3 2012 v in the Matter Inc and Thomas Shaw States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas Marshall Comments of Kevin M Murphy of the Commissions Revision DIRECTV Group Inc Authority Assignees Subsidiaries Sabre Judicial Inc Sabre Holdings of Kevin Capital Partners LLC July Corp and July The United 20 2012 67th 21 2012 July v Motorola Inc The United Washington at the Matter of American Airlines Ltd The International Court 23 2012 Corporation Commission in the Matter of Kirk Dahl in v United States in District v District Bain of Massachusetts the Matter of Kirk Dahl Court 24 2012 July and or Corporation and District Judicial States District M Murphy in Sabre Travel States District M Murphy The United Expert Report of Kevin Corporation and the Time Warner Cable Inc to Communications Federal M Murphy LLC Expert Report of Kevin Capital Partners al County Texas Tarrant District Declaration et M Murphy Expert Report of Kevin the Matter of for Consent to the Assignment Communications Debtorsin Possession Assignors Subsidiaries in Transferors and Liberty Media Corporation Transferee for of Control of Licenses Adelphia Transfer United Division 2012 News Program Access Rules Company The and LLC June 22 DirecTV Control Applications Transfer to of Becton Dickinson of Retractable Technologies v Bain of Massachusetts the Matter of Microsoft Seattle Deposition of Kevin M Murphy August States District Court Western 22 2012 Corporation v Motorola Inc The United Washington at in District of the Matter of Microsoft Seattle Economic Evidence Analysis of the Impact from San Diego Commissions Program Inc Transferors August Control Applications Federal 31 2012 News submitted in District of of Carrying an the Matter of Revision Corporation and the and or RSN of the DIRECTV Group Corporation Transferee for Authority Transfer to Transfer of Control of Corporation and Subsidiaries Debtorsin Assignors to Time Warner Communications Court Western Subscribership for Consent to the Assignment Licenses Adelphia Communications Possession on DIRECTVs Access Rules and Liberty Media States District Cable Inc Subsidiaries Assignees et al Commission 19 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Expert Report of Kevin Brown et al v Document518 M Murphy September The American Tobacco California for the County of San Deposition of Kevin et of San Deposition of Kevin Inc Inc v Sabre State of Texas Court for the Sabre Holdings et 73 of in the Matter of Willard al Superior in al Superior September Corp and District 24 2012 Court for the R State of the Matter of Willard R Brown Court for the State of California Properties and in the Matter of American Airlines Sabre Travel International of Tarrant M Murphy October Innovative District et 14 2012 September Co Inc M Murphy for the Judicial v 3M 7 2102 Page20 Diego Expert Report of Kevin Corporation Co Inc Filed1007 13 Diego M Murphy al v The American Tobacco for the County 4 LTD for the County 10 2102 in the Matter of Avery Dennison 3M Company The United States District of Minnesota 20 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Appendix B Materials Relied Document518 Filed1007 13 4 Page21 of 73 Upon Court Documents Motion and Motion for Class Certification Plaintiffs Notice of Support Consolidated Amended Complaint in Re High Tech and Memorandum Law 1 2012 October Employee Antitrust Litigation of in September 2 2011 E Leamer PhD Expert Report of Edward 1 2012 October Leamer Backup Plaintiffs First Set of Requests M Declaration of Tina Declaration of of Documents October 3 2011 of Chris Galy Declaration for Production in Support of Opposition to Class Certification Evangelista Danny McKell in Support of Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification Declaration Plaintiffs Declaration of Donna Morris of Adobe Systems Inc in Support of Defendants Opposition to Motion for Class Certification of Frank Wagner in Support of Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification Declaration Plaintiffs Declaration of Jeff Vijungco of Adobe Systems Inc in Support of Defendants Opposition to Motion for Class Certification of Lori McAdams Defendants Opposition in Support of to Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification Mason Declaration of Stubblefield Declaration of Michelle Maupin in Support of Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification Declaration of Steven Burmeister in Support of Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification Declaration of Rosemary Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion Deposition of Lori Keiper of Adobe Systems Inc in Support of Defendants Arriada for Class Certification McAdams and Deposition of Arnnon Geshuri and Exhibits Deposition of Donna Morris and Exhibits Deposition of Jeffrey Vijungco 3 2012 October 5 2012 August Deposition of Daniel Stover and Exhibits Deposition of Mark Fichtner and Exhibits Hariharan and 24 2012 October October October Exhibits Deposition of Edward Leamer and Exhibits 23 2012 October Exhibits Deposition of Brandon Marshall and Exhibits Deposition of Siddharth 2 2012 August and Exhibits Devine and October August 21 ,2012 Deposition of Mark Bentley and Exhibits Deposition of Michael 17 2012 August Deposition of Danielle Lambert and Exhibits Deposition of James Morris and Exhibits 2 2012 August Exhibits 22 2012 29 2012 15 2012 October October 12 2012 26 2012 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 Filed1007 13 4 Deposition of Jack Gilmore and Exhibits June June of 73 28 2012 Deposition of Denise Miller and Exhibits Page22 28 2012 June Deposition of Shawna Dougherty June Deposition of John Schirm and Exhibits Yu and Deposition of Matthew Deposition of Shiloh Exhibits Howard and Kuz and 26 2012 29 2012 June July 17 2012 Exhibits 26 2012 June Exhibits Deposition of and AmberGay Remaley Exhibits Plaintiff Michael March 21 2012 June 21 2012 June and Exhibits Cruzat and Exhibits 26 2012 June Deposition of Mary Kathleen Galle and Exhibits Deposition of Eleterio 26 2012 June Deposition of Robert DeMartini and Exhibits del Torro 17 2012 July Deposition of Michelle Deneau and Exhibits Deposition of Rebecca 12 2012 and Exhibits Deposition of Mai Tran and Exhibits Deposition of Jaime 27 2012 July Deposition of Steven Burmeister and Exhibits June June 21 2012 22 2012 Answers and Objections 27 2012 Plaintiff March Plaintiff Mark Devine’s Answers and Objections Fichtner to to Defendants Defendants Set of Interrogatories First First Set of Interrogatories 28 2012 Siddharth Hariharan’s Plaintiff Brandon March to Defendants First Set of 27 2012 March Interrogatories Answers and Objections 27 2012 Plaintiff March Final Answers and Objections Marshall’s to Defendants Daniel Stover’s Answers and Objections to Defendants Interviews in United Final States of Judgment in United States v Adobe Systems Inc of America America v 23 2012 Jeff August 23 2012 Donna Morris Adobe 27 2012 30 2012 August 31 2012 August 30 2012 July 25 2012 19 2012 26 2012 September Vijungco Adobe Interview August June Set of Interrogatories Interview Interview Interview 6 2012 30 2012 August 16 2012 with Steve Burmeister Apple with Seth Williams Google Interview Interview August with Mark Bentley Apple Interview with Frank with Christina Wagner Google Dickenson with Danny McKell Interview Interview Interview with Chris Galy with Michelle with Laurie Intel Intel with Mason Stubbenfeld Intuit Intuit Maupin McAdams Lucasfilm Pixar et al Lucasfilm Ltd Conducted by Kevin Murphy August July First Set of Interrogatories 28 2012 Judgment Proposed July First March 17 2011 May 9 2011 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Academic Albert Document518 Filed1007 13 4 Page23 of 73 Papers Rees The Role of Fairness in Wage Determination 11 Economics 243 of Labor Journal 1993 Mas Pay Alexandre D Angrist Joshua Jersey Princeton and Jrn Vol M P Ann Science Working Paper J of Journal of New Chapter 8.2 No Bargaining with Game Theory Aumann Robert BV Chapter J Borjas and George Borjas George Quarterly Mostly Harmless Econometrics Cramton and Raymond J Deneckere Peter Information Handbook Consequences NBER Pischke Steffen 3 Amsterdam Elsevier Bartel 121 Press 2009 University Ausubel Lawrence Incomplete Performance Reference Points and Police 2006 Economics 783 50 NBER Sergiu Hart eds 2002 Middle Age Job Mobility 161 J and Its Determinants and Working Paper Series January 1977 Job Mobility and Earnings Over the Life Cycle Working paper No 233 Working Paper Series February 1978 Davidson University Press Inc E Leamer Edward G MacKinnon Econometric and James Russell Theory and Methods Oxford 2004 Take Lets the Con Out of Econometrics 73 The American Economic Review 1 1983 Freeman Richard Gary Becker B and Nobel Lecture Economy 385 Political James Greene William June L Medoff What The Economic Do Way of Unions Do Looking at New York Basic Behavior 101 Books 1984 Journal of 1993 H Econometric Analysis 6th Edition Chapter 9.3.3 New Jersey Pearson Hall 2008 Prentice Grossman Academic Sanford Press revised Hirsch Barry Competition Honoree Individual J and T Motty Perry February Sequential Bargaining under AsymmetricInformation 2 1986 Sluggish Institutions in a Dynamic Coexist Journal Andre I and David of Economic E Terpstra and Procedural Equity to World Can Perspectives vol The Relative Unions and Industrial 22 1 Importance Winter 2008 of External Internal Benefits Review Pay Satisfaction Compensation November December 2003 Joseph Stiglitz Economic Robert H Topel Quarterly Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Review 460 Journal and Michael of William Samuelson Economics 92 American 2002 P Ward Job Mobility and the Careers of Young Men 107 The Economics 2 1992 Bargaining Under AsymmetricInformation Econometrica 52 1984 Websites http online wsj comarticle SB10001424052970203750404577173031991814896 http online wsj comarticle SB124269038041932531 http techcrunch com2007 1121 facebook html html stealinggooglers at an alarming rate http www aeaweb org honors awards clark medal php http www dailytechcomGoogle FindsThat PerksCant KeepSomeEmployees FromLe aving article11794 htm Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 Bates Documents 76550DOC000014 231APPLE04166 76583DOC001487 Other Pixar Data Pixar revenues 2005 2011 xlsx 4 Filed1007 13 Page24 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509 LHK Document5184 Filed1007 13 Page25 of 73 Appendix1A Analysis of Hires from Other Defendants AllSalaried Employee Class Panel A 2001 2012 Last Previous Company Company within 1 year Adobe Apple Lucasfilm 0 6 0 2 0 Pixar 3 8 6 1 2 222 218 54 293 98 37 Last Previous Company Percentage 12 Hiring Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Other Total of Row Adobe Apple Google Intel Total Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit All Defendants Panel 35 1,369 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.15 0.00 1,367 0.22 0.59 0.44 0.07 0.15 0.88 91,971 0.24 0.24 0.06 0.32 0.11 0.04 91,014 0.73 0.04 B 2001 2004 Company within 1 year Adobe Apple Lucasfilm 0 1 0 1 0 Pixar 0 4 0 0 1 34 45 0 34 15 6 Last Previous Company Adobe Apple 0 5 Percentage 3 Hiring 1,351 1,335 10 Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm of Row Total Other Total Adobe Apple Google Intel 402 407 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.00 431 Pixar 439 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.68 23,181 0.15 0.19 0.00 0.15 0.06 0.03 Other Total Adobe Apple Google Intel 788 799 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.13 Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit All Defendants Panel Hiring 3 5 23,042 0.74 0.02 C 2005 2009 Company Google Intel Intuit within 1 year Lucasfilm Percentage Pixar of Row Total Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 1 0 0 5 1 3 5 1 1 6 104 97 27 167 44 17 Last Previous Company Adobe Apple Google 0 0 Pixar All Defendants Panel Hiring 0.63 674 0.15 0.45 0.74 0.15 0.15 0.89 44,069 0.24 0.22 0.06 0.38 0.10 0.04 Other Total Adobe Apple Google Intel 161 163 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 657 18 0.00 43,595 0.04 D 2010 2012 Company Intel Intuit within 1 year Lucasfilm Percentage Pixar of Row Total Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm Defendants Note Source 0 2 2 Pixar All 0 0 This analysis Dr 1 1 0 0 3 84 76 27 92 39 14 excludes hires indicated as acquisitions Leamer’s employee data and hires showing the same defendant 247 12 company 24,377 as their 0.00 1.23 254 0.79 0.39 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.18 24,721 0.34 0.31 0.11 0.37 0.16 0.06 immediate previous employer within one year of the hiring 0.05 Case5 11cv 02509 LHK Document5184 Filed1007 13 Page26 of 73 Appendix 1B Analysis of Separations Going to Other Defendants AllSalaried Employee Class Panel A 2001 2012 Next Separation Company Adobe Apple Google Company Intel within 1 year Intuit Percentage of Lucasfilm Pixar Other Total Row Total Adobe Apple Google Intel 0.00 0.59 0.98 0.07 0.00 0.00 1.46 0.80 0.27 0.00 0.93 0.17 0.45 0.46 0.05 0.10 0.02 Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 0 9 15 1 0 Pixar 0 11 6 2 0 7 122 326 336 35 74 15 All Defendants Panel 12 1,490 1,527 726 31 72,287 752 73,226 0.79 0.04 B 2001 2004 Next Separation Company Adobe Apple Google Company Intel within 1 year Intuit Percentage of Row Total Pixar Other Total Adobe Apple Google Intel 4 Lucasfilm 580 589 0.00 0.51 0.34 0.00 0.00 229 235 0.00 0.85 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.28 0.11 0.22 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.02 Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 0 3 2 0 0 Pixar 0 2 1 0 0 3 28 55 24 3 22 5 Adobe Apple Google All Defendants Panel 0.68 9 25,399 Pixar Other Total Adobe Apple Google Intel 5 655 669 0.00 0.45 0.75 0.15 0.00 340 0.00 1.18 0.88 0.59 0.00 35,375 0.20 0.42 0.51 0.05 0.11 0.02 Pixar Other Total Adobe Apple Google Intel 3 255 269 0.00 1.12 2.97 0.00 0.00 177 0.00 2.82 1.13 0.00 0.00 1.13 6 11,513 0.20 1.01 1.10 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.59 16 25,545 C 2005 2009 Next Separation Company Company Intel within 1 year Intuit Percentage of Lucasfilm Row Total Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 0 1 0 0 4 3 2 0 2 151 182 17 39 8 Adobe Apple Google Defendants Panel 5 70 Pixar All 3 329 35,858 0.75 0.04 D 2010 2012 Next Separation Company Company Intel within 1 year Intuit Percentage of Lucasfilm Row Total Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 0 Source 0 0 0 Defendants Note 8 This analysis 5 2 0 0 2 24 Pixar All 3 120 130 15 13 2 excludes separations Dr Leamer’s employee data that appear as immediately rehired by the same defendant 168 company 11,823 within one year 1.12 0.05 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 4 Filed10 07 13 Page27 of 73 Appendix 1C Analysis of Hires from Other DNCC Defendants AllSalaried Employee Class Panel A 2001 2012 Last Previous Company Hiring DNCC Defendant Company within 1 year Non DNCC Defendant Percentage of Row Total Non DNCCDefendant Total DNCC Defendant 1,369 1.17 98.83 1,367 1.54 98.46 91,971 0.79 99.21 Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit 16 Lucasfilm 21 Pixar All 1,353 Defendants Panel 91,246 B 2001 2004 Last Previous Company within 1 year Percentage of Row Total DNCC Defendant Non DNCC Defendant Total DNCC Defendant 4 Company Hiring 1,346 725 403 407 0.98 99.02 Non DNCCDefendant Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 7 All Defendants Panel 432 439 1.59 98.41 110 Pixar 23,071 23,181 0.47 99.53 C 2005 2009 Last Previous Company within 1 year Percentage of Row Total DNCC Defendant Non DNCC Defendant Total DNCC Defendant Lucasfilm 10 789 799 1.25 98.75 Pixar 10 664 674 1.48 98.52 346 43,723 44,069 0.79 99.21 Company Hiring Non DNCCDefendant Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit All Defendants Panel D 2010 2012 Last Previous Company within 1 year Percentage of Row Total DNCC Defendant Non DNCC Defendant Total DNCC Defendant Lucasfilm 2 161 163 1.23 98.77 Pixar 4 250 254 1.57 98.43 269 24,452 24,721 1.09 98.91 Company Hiring Non DNCCDefendant Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit All Defendants Notes This analysis excludes hires indicated as acquisitions and hires showing the same defendant company as year of the hiring Adobe Apple Google had DNCC agreements with Adobe Google allegedly Lucasfilm Source had DNCC agreements with Apple Google and Pixar had DNCC agreements with Apple and Google allegedly Pixar allegedly Dr Intel Intuit Lucasfilm had DNCC agreements with Apple Intel and Intuit allegedly Intel allegedly Intuit had a DNCC agreement with Apple allegedly allegedly had had DNCC agreements with Apple and Pixar DNCC agreements with Apple Intel and Lucasfilm Leamer’s employee data and Pixar their immediate previous employer within one Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 4 Filed10 07 13 Page28 of 73 Appendix 1D Analysis of Separations Going to Other DNCC Defendants AllSalaried Employee Class Panel A 2001 2012 Next Separation Company Company DNCC Defendant Non within 1 year Percentage of DNCCDefendant Total DNCC Defendant Row Total Non DNCCDefendant Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 21 Pixar 20 All Defendants Panel 1,506 712 1.38 72,514 73,226 97.34 0.97 752 98.62 2.66 1,527 732 99.03 B 2001 2004 Next Separation Company Company Non within 1 year Percentage of Row Total DNCCDefendant Total DNCC Defendant 582 DNCC Defendant 589 1.19 98.81 235 2.13 97.87 0.45 99.55 Non DNCCDefendant Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit 7 Lucasfilm 5 Pixar All Defendants Panel 230 116 25,429 25,545 C 2005 2009 Next Separation Company Company DNCC Defendant Non within 1 year Percentage of DNCCDefendant Total DNCC Defendant Row Total Non DNCCDefendant Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 8 661 669 1.20 98.80 Pixar 8 332 340 2.35 97.65 0.98 99.02 All Defendants Panel 350 35,508 35,858 D 2010 2012 Next Separation Company Company Non within 1 year Percentage of Row Total DNCCDefendant Total DNCC Defendant 263 DNCC Defendant 269 2.23 97.77 177 3.95 96.05 2.08 97.92 Non DNCCDefendant Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit 6 Lucasfilm 7 Pixar All Defendants 170 246 11,577 11,823 Notes This analysis Adobe Apple excludes separations had DNCC agreements with Apple Intel and Intuit allegedly Intel allegedly Intuit allegedly had DNCC agreements with Apple Google and Pixar had DNCC agreements with Apple Lucasfilm allegedly Pixar allegedly Source Dr rehired by the same had DNCC agreements with Adobe Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm allegedly Google that appear as immediately defendant had a DNCC agreement with Apple allegedly had and Google had DNCC agreements with Apple DNCC agreements with Apple Leamer’s employee data and Pixar Intel and Lucasfilm and Pixar company within one year Case5 11cv 02509 LHK Document5184 Filed1007 13 Page29 of 73 Appendix2A Analysis of Hires from Other Defendants Technical Creative and Panel Class A 2001 2012 Last Previous Company Company within 1 year Adobe Apple Lucasfilm 0 5 0 0 0 Pixar 2 7 3 1 2 159 150 29 191 59 24 Last Previous Company Percentage 8 Hiring RD Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm of Row Total Other Total Adobe Apple Google Intel 532 543 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 762 Pixar 785 0.25 0.89 0.38 0.13 0.25 1.02 53,747 0.30 0.28 0.05 0.36 0.11 0.04 Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit All Defendants Panel 6 25 0.05 B 2001 2004 Company within 1 year Adobe Apple Lucasfilm 0 0 0 0 0 Pixar 0 3 0 0 1 17 32 0 17 7 3 Last Previous Company Adobe Apple 0 5 Percentage 1 Hiring 53,110 1.10 Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm of Row Total Total Adobe Apple Google Intel 56 57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 234 Pixar 239 0.00 1.26 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.42 12,349 0.14 0.26 0.00 0.14 0.06 0.02 Other Total Adobe Apple Google Intel 387 397 0.00 1.26 0.00 0.00 Other Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit All Defendants Panel Hiring 1 2 12,271 1.75 0.02 C 2005 2009 Company Google Intel Intuit within 1 year Lucasfilm Percentage Pixar of Row Total Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 0 0 0 5 0 3 3 1 1 4 81 65 15 99 29 10 Last Previous Company Adobe Apple Google 0 0 Pixar All Defendants Panel Hiring 1.26 406 0.00 0.74 0.74 0.25 0.25 0.99 26,035 0.31 0.25 0.06 0.38 0.11 0.04 Other Total Adobe Apple Google Intel 89 89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 394 18 0.00 25,718 0.07 D 2010 2012 Company Intel Intuit within 1 year Lucasfilm Percentage Pixar of Row Total Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm Defendants Note Source 0 0 2 Pixar All 0 0 This analysis Dr 1 0 0 0 3 61 53 14 75 23 11 excludes hires indicated as acquisitions Leamer’s employee data and hires showing the same defendant 134 5 15,121 company as their 0.00 0.00 140 1.43 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.14 15,363 0.40 0.34 0.09 0.49 0.15 0.07 immediate previous employer within one year of the hiring 0.03 Case5 11cv 02509 LHK Document5184 Filed1007 13 Page30 of 73 Appendix 2B Analysis of Separations Going to Other Defendants Technical Creative and Panel RD Class A 2001 2012 Next Separation Company Adobe Apple Google Company Intel within 1 year Intuit Percentage of Row Total Pixar Other Total Adobe Apple Google Intel 5 Lucasfilm 333 349 0.00 0.86 2.01 0.29 0.00 378 397 0.00 1.76 1.26 0.50 0.00 1.26 0.20 0.60 0.70 0.06 0.10 0.02 Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 0 3 7 1 0 Pixar 0 7 5 2 0 5 74 223 259 23 37 9 All Defendants Panel 18 36,356 36,999 1.43 0.05 B 2001 2004 Next Separation Company Adobe Apple Google Company Intel within 1 year Intuit Percentage of Lucasfilm Total Total Adobe Apple Google Intel 7 7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 106 Pixar Other Row 111 0.00 0.90 0.90 0.00 0.00 2.70 0.19 0.23 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.03 Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 0 0 0 0 0 Pixar 0 1 1 0 0 3 21 25 12 1 11 3 Adobe Apple Google All Defendants Panel 0 0.00 3 11,001 Pixar Other Total Adobe Apple Google Intel 2 197 201 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 186 0.00 2.15 1.61 1.08 0.00 18,863 0.21 0.53 0.74 0.06 0.10 0.03 Pixar Other Total Adobe Apple Google Intel 3 129 141 0.00 2.13 4.26 0.00 0.00 100 0.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 1.43 1.55 0.15 0.09 0.00 0.03 1.08 9 11,077 C 2005 2009 Next Separation Company Company Intel within 1 year Intuit Percentage of Lucasfilm Row Total Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 0 1 0 0 4 3 2 0 2 102 143 12 20 6 Adobe Apple Google Defendants Panel 1 41 Pixar All 0 175 19,196 1.00 0.05 D 2010 2012 Next Separation Company Company Intel within 1 year Intuit Percentage of Lucasfilm Row Total Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 0 Source 0 0 0 Defendants Note 6 This analysis 2 1 0 0 0 12 Pixar All 3 96 104 10 6 0 excludes separations Dr Leamer’s employee data that appear as immediately rehired by the same defendant 97 6 company 6,492 within one year 6,726 2.13 0.09 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 4 Filed10 07 13 Page31 of 73 Appendix 2C Analysis of Hires from Other DNCC Defendants Technical Creative and Panel Class A 2001 2012 Company Last Previous DNCC Company Hiring RD within 1 year Percentage of Row Total DNCC Defendant Total DNCC Defendant 532 Non Defendant 543 2.03 97.97 785 2.04 97.96 0.90 99.10 Non DNCCDefendant Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit 11 Lucasfilm 16 All Defendants Panel 769 482 Pixar 53,265 B 2001 2004 Company Last Previous DNCC Company Hiring 53,747 Non Defendant within 1 year DNCC Defendant Percentage Total of DNCC Defendant Row Total Non DNCCDefendant Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 1 56 57 1.75 98.25 Pixar 4 235 239 1.67 98.33 61 12,288 0.49 99.51 All Defendants Panel C 2005 2009 Company Last Previous DNCC Company Hiring 12,349 Non Defendant within 1 year DNCC Defendant Percentage Total of DNCC Defendant Row Total Non DNCCDefendant Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit 10 387 397 2.52 97.48 8 398 406 1.97 98.03 228 Lucasfilm 25,807 0.88 99.12 Pixar All Defendants Panel D 2010 2012 Company Last Previous DNCC Company Hiring 26,035 Defendant Non within 1 year DNCC Defendant Percentage of Row Total Non DNCCDefendant Total DNCC Defendant 89 0.00 140 2.86 97.14 1.26 98.74 Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit 0 Lucasfilm 4 136 193 15,170 Pixar All 89 Defendants 15,363 100.00 Notes This analysis excludes hires indicated as acquisitions and hires showing the same defendant company one year of the hiring Adobe had a allegedly Intuit allegedly had allegedly had Source Adobe Google Intel Intuit DNCC agreements with Apple Google and Pixar had DNCC agreements with Apple and Google Lucasfilm allegedly Pixar with had DNCC agreements with Apple Intel and Intuit allegedly Intel allegedly agreement with Apple DNCC agreements Apple allegedly had Google DNCC had DNCC agreements with Apple and Pixar DNCC agreements Dr Leamer’s employee data with Apple Intel and Lucasfilm Lucasfilm and Pixar as their immediate previous employer within Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 4 Filed10 07 13 Page32 of 73 Appendix 2D Analysis of Separations Going to Other Technical Creative and Panel RD DNCC Defendants Class A 2001 2012 Next Company within 1 year Percentage of Row Total Total DNCC Defendant 8 Company DNCCDefendant 341 349 2.29 97.71 14 Separation 383 397 3.53 96.47 1.35 98.65 DNCC Defendant Non Non DNCCDefendant Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar All Defendants Panel 498 36,501 36,999 B 2001 2004 Next Separation Company Company Non within 1 year Percentage of Row Total DNCCDefendant Total DNCC Defendant 7 DNCC Defendant 7 0.00 100.00 111 3.60 96.40 0.55 99.45 Non DNCCDefendant Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit 0 Lucasfilm 4 Pixar All Defendants Panel 107 61 11,016 11,077 C 2005 2009 Next Separation Company Company DNCC Defendant Non within 1 year Percentage of DNCCDefendant Total DNCC Defendant Row Total Non DNCCDefendant Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 2 199 201 1.00 99.00 Pixar 8 178 186 4.30 95.70 1.29 98.71 All Defendants Panel 248 18,948 19,196 D 2010 2012 Next Separation Company Company Non within 1 year Percentage of Row Total DNCCDefendant Total DNCC Defendant 135 DNCC Defendant 141 4.26 95.74 100 2.00 98.00 2.81 97.19 Non DNCCDefendant Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit 6 Lucasfilm 2 Pixar All Defendants 98 189 6,537 6,726 Notes This analysis Adobe Apple excludes separations had DNCC agreements with Apple Intel and Intuit allegedly Intel allegedly Intuit allegedly had DNCC agreements with Apple Google and Pixar had DNCC agreements with Apple Lucasfilm allegedly Pixar allegedly Source Dr rehired by the same had DNCC agreements with Adobe Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm allegedly Google that appear as immediately defendant had a DNCC agreement with Apple allegedly had and Google had DNCC agreements with Apple DNCC agreements with Apple Leamer’s employee data and Pixar Intel and Lucasfilm and Pixar company within one year Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page33 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page34 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page35 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page36 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page37 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page38 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page39 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page40 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page41 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page42 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page43 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page44 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page45 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page46 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page47 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page48 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page49 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page50 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page51 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page52 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page53 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page54 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page55 of 73 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page56 of 73 Appendix 9A Dr Leamer’s Figure 20 RegressionIncluding Defendant Defendant Specific Specific Conduct Variables and Other Interactive Effects AllSalaried Employee Class Dependant Variable Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Variable ADOBE APPLE Conduct Conduct GOOGLE INTEL PIXAR Age Conduct LUCASFILM APPLE ADOBE APPLE GOOGLE INTEL Conduct INTUIT PIXAR ADOBE Log Number Log Number Conduct New of of New New New Log Number of Hires in the New Log Age ADOBE APPLE Log Age GOOGLE INTEL INTUIT PIXAR Log Age Log Age Log Age Log Age 3.52 0.0001 0.19 22.24 0.0250 12.57 of 0.3453 0.0061 56.20 0.0323 0.0020 16.45 0.0213 0.0127 1.67 0.1142 0.0342 3.34 0.0664 0.0169 3.92 0.0976 19.15 0.0549 13.46 0.0380 6.84 0.0132 1.81 0.0576 2.46 0.1164 0.24 0.1636 1.48 0.0056 125.95 0.0027 272.85 0.0017 294.66 0.0023 286.66 0.7202 0.0059 121.40 0.6619 0.0056 117.60 0.8067 0.0360 22.42 0.2868 0.0055 52.13 0.2828 0.0028 102.17 0.3466 0.0017 207.40 0.2964 0.0023 129.91 0.2541 0.0057 44.21 0.1743 2 0.0376 0.3141 0.6721 1 0.8370 0.5121 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 0.0001 0.7265 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 0.78 0.7079 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 2 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 APPLE 6.83 0.0000 0.2427 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI ADOBE 0.0000 0.0277 Conduct Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 3.44 0.1416 Conduct Conduct LUCASFILM 0.0000 0.0240 1 1 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 APPLE 5.58 0.2602 Hires in the Conduct ADOBE 1.26 0.0000 0.7391 of FirmNumber FirmNumber Conduct LUCASFILM 0.0000 Employees 0.0053 32.60 0.1922 0.0365 5.26 0.4727 0.2194 2.15 1.0913 0.1256 8.69 1.0010 0.1547 6.47 0.2981 0.0485 6.15 0.8571 0.1696 5.05 0.0441 0.4413 0.10 of of FirmNumber FirmNumber Hires in the Hires in the 1 1 Employees 1 Employees 0.37 1.8691 Hires in the Conduct INTUIT PIXAR of of Firm Number Firm Number Conduct GOOGLE INTEL Log Number Conduct Conduct LUCASFILM APPLE Log Number Conduct Hires in the Hires in the 0.0074 0.0000 New 3.59 0.0002 New 0.0042 0.0000 of 0.75 0.0000 of 5.78 0.0024 0.0001 Log Number 0.0006 0.0001 Log Number Conduct Conduct 3.38 0.0000 Conduct 0.0020 0.0027 Conduct 5.34 0.0152 Age 1.79 0.0015 0.0018 Age 0.0026 0.0032 Age Age 2 Age 2 GOOGLE Conduct Age 2 INTEL Conduct Age 2 INTUIT Conduct Age 2 PIXAR Conduct Age 2 LUCASFILM Conduct Age 2 ADOBE T Value 0.0067 Age Conduct Error 0.0079 Age Conduct St 0.0047 Age Conduct Conduct INTUIT Estimate 1 Employees 1 Employees 1 Employees of of Firm Number of Employees 1 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page57 of 73 Appendix 9A Log Age LUCASFILM 0.0240 0.8306 0.03 0.0695 0.0297 2.34 0.1235 0.0170 7.24 0.1483 0.0214 6.92 0.0348 0.0066 5.30 0.1010 0.0229 4.41 0.0166 0.0605 0.27 0.0085 0.1115 0.08 Log Company Tenure Months 0.0167 0.0050 3.36 Log Company Tenure 0.0017 0.0005 3.14 0.0025 0.0005 4.62 in San Jose 1.5574 0.0183 85.30 Among Defendants 0.0770 0.0018 42.53 0.0025 0.0003 7.90 0.0441 0.0095 4.63 0.0461 0.0066 6.94 0.2261 0.0026 0.0049 0.0013 0.0808 0.0046 0.1603 0.0308 0.0217 0.0154 0.2292 0.0026 89.66 0.0915 0.0043 21.15 0.1646 0.0033 50.39 APPLE 3.3227 0.4646 7.15 GOOGLE 0.0066 0.4898 0.01 INTEL 1.6772 0.4130 4.06 INTUIT 2.9576 0.5094 5.81 PIXAR 1.3942 0.9009 1.55 LUCASFILM 0.9044 1.5907 0.57 Log Age ADOBE Log Age APPLE 2 2 Log Age 2 GOOGLE Log Age 2 INTEL Log Age 2 INTUIT Log Age 2 PIXAR Log Age LUCASFILM 2 2 Male DLogInformation Log Total Number Year Sector Employment of Transfers trend ADOBE Log Number Log Number APPLE GOOGLE INTEL PIXAR of Log Number Log Number of New New Hires in the New of Log Firm Revenue Per EmployeeCPI DLogFirm Revenue State Location Per of of FirmNumber FirmNumber Hires in the Log Total Number of Firm Number FirmNumber Hires in the Hires in the of Firm Number Firm Number Hires in the Hires in the New Log Number LUCASFILM Hires in the New New of of New New of Log Number Log Number INTUIT of 1 Employees 1 Employees of 1 1 1 Employees 1 Employees of of Employees Employees Firm Number of Employees 1 Hires EmployeeCPI 1 1 YES Indicators YES Constant R Square 0.928 508,969 Observations Note Source Significant Dr at 1 level Significant at Leamer’s backup data and materials 5 level Pixar Significant revenue at 10 level data after 2005 are included 86.41 3.77 17.61 5.20 1.41 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page58 of 73 Appendix 9B Dr Leamer’s Figure 23 RegressionIncluding Defendant Defendant Specific RD APPLE Conduct Conduct GOOGLE INTEL PIXAR Age LUCASFILM APPLE APPLE GOOGLE INTEL Conduct INTUIT PIXAR ADOBE Log Number Log Number Conduct New of of New New New Log Number of Hires in the New Log Age ADOBE APPLE Log Age GOOGLE INTEL INTUIT PIXAR Log Age Log Age Log Age Log Age 1.92 0.0002 0.41 0.0345 of 0.3276 0.0088 37.18 0.0388 0.0026 14.83 0.0750 0.0194 3.87 0.0642 0.0440 1.46 0.0820 0.0276 2.97 0.1241 0.0747 5.79 0.0494 4.21 0.0185 2.97 0.0875 2.14 0.1508 1.37 0.3662 0.56 0.0075 89.78 0.0037 192.60 0.0022 207.91 0.0029 219.78 0.6772 0.0088 76.81 0.6202 0.0084 73.65 0.7676 0.0695 11.04 0.3112 0.0074 42.05 0.2864 0.0038 74.62 0.3478 0.0021 162.51 0.3113 0.0028 109.66 0.2930 0.0085 34.49 0.0956 2 0.0482 0.1272 0.6429 1 0.9854 0.4607 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 0.0001 0.7040 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 0.17 0.6754 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 2 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 APPLE 5.07 0.0000 0.2062 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI ADOBE 0.0000 0.2066 Conduct Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 3.01 0.1868 Conduct Conduct LUCASFILM 0.0000 0.0548 1 1 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 APPLE 4.65 0.2078 Hires in the Conduct ADOBE 1.37 0.0000 0.4323 of FirmNumber FirmNumber Conduct LUCASFILM 0.0000 Employees 0.0076 12.61 0.2340 0.0702 3.34 0.3557 0.2812 1.26 1.2304 0.1670 7.37 0.1880 0.1917 0.98 0.3725 0.0699 5.33 1.0874 0.2520 4.31 0.6246 0.5776 1.08 of of FirmNumber FirmNumber Hires in the Hires in the 1 1 Employees 1 Employees 0.20 2.2161 Hires in the Conduct INTUIT PIXAR of of Firm Number Firm Number Conduct GOOGLE INTEL Log Number Conduct Conduct LUCASFILM APPLE Log Number Conduct Hires in the 0.0182 0.0001 Hires in the 1.83 0.0001 New 0.0056 0.0000 New 0.29 0.0000 of 4.42 0.0037 0.0001 of 0.0008 0.0001 Log Number 2.93 0.0001 Log Number Conduct Conduct 0.0025 0.0036 Conduct 4.54 0.0102 Age 1.85 0.0020 0.0011 Age 0.0033 0.0035 Age Conduct ADOBE T Value 0.0074 Age 2 Age 2 GOOGLE Conduct Age 2 INTEL Conduct Age 2 INTUIT Conduct Age 2 PIXAR Conduct Age 2 LUCASFILM Conduct Age 2 ADOBE Error 0.0090 Age Conduct St 0.0062 Age Conduct Conduct Estimate Age Conduct Conduct INTUIT Class Variable Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Variable ADOBE Conduct Variables and Other Interactive Effects Technical Creative and Dependant Specific 1 Employees 1 Employees 1 Employees of of Firm Number of Employees 1 20.45 3.68 17.85 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page59 of 73 Appendix 9B Log Age LUCASFILM 0.4933 1.5449 0.32 0.0547 0.0381 1.43 0.1382 0.0228 6.07 0.0387 0.0265 1.46 0.0449 0.0095 4.73 0.1305 0.0342 3.82 0.0667 0.0793 0.84 0.0634 0.2101 0.30 Log Company Tenure Months 0.0021 0.0067 0.31 Log Company Tenure 0.0003 0.0007 0.47 0.0058 0.0008 7.21 in San Jose 1.6830 0.0250 67.20 Among Defendants 0.0854 0.0024 35.18 0.0004 0.0004 0.99 0.0497 0.0122 4.06 0.0349 0.0092 3.81 0.2318 0.0037 0.0041 0.0018 0.1109 0.0069 0.0495 0.0394 0.0296 0.0227 0.2643 0.0035 0.0435 0.0058 0.1532 0.0044 APPLE 3.4399 0.5998 5.73 GOOGLE 1.5131 0.6217 2.43 INTEL 1.6323 0.5322 3.07 INTUIT 3.2415 0.6919 4.68 PIXAR 0.8473 1.1715 0.72 LUCASFILM 1.4582 2.8740 0.51 Log Age ADOBE Log Age APPLE 2 2 Log Age 2 GOOGLE Log Age 2 INTEL Log Age 2 INTUIT Log Age 2 PIXAR Log Age LUCASFILM 2 2 Male DLogInformation Log Total Number Year Sector Employment of Transfers trend ADOBE Log Number Log Number APPLE GOOGLE INTEL PIXAR of Log Number Log Number of New New Hires in the New of Log Firm Revenue Per EmployeeCPI DLogFirm Revenue State Location Per of of FirmNumber FirmNumber Hires in the Log Total Number of Firm Number FirmNumber Hires in the Hires in the of Firm Number Firm Number Hires in the Hires in the New Log Number LUCASFILM Hires in the New New of of New New of Log Number Log Number INTUIT of 1 Employees 1 Employees of 1 1 1 Employees 1 Employees of of Employees Employees Firm Number of Employees 1 Hires EmployeeCPI 1 1 YES Indicators YES Constant R Square 0.879 295,136 Observations Note Source Significant Dr at 1 level Significant at Leamer’s backup data and materials 5 level Pixar Significant revenue at 10 level data after 2005 are included 63.00 2.34 16.17 1.26 1.31 76.33 7.45 35.02 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page60 of 73 Appendix 10A Dr Leamer’s Figure 20 RegressionUsing a Single Conduct Variable AllSalaried Employee Class Dependant Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Variable Variable Estimate Conduct St Error T Value 0.0344 0.0008 41.98 0.6978 0.0054 129.27 0.7416 0.0026 279.85 0.4943 0.0017 293.50 0.6687 0.0024 282.48 0.7117 0.0057 124.33 0.6961 0.0069 100.42 0.8118 0.0363 22.36 0.2934 0.0053 55.74 0.2595 0.0027 95.36 0.3734 0.0016 229.06 0.3005 0.0023 130.49 0.2522 0.0055 45.49 0.1992 0.0067 29.64 0.1798 0.0367 4.90 Log Age Years 0.0105 0.0328 0.32 Log Age 0.0076 0.0044 1.72 1 APPLE Log Total Annual CompensationCPI 1 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTUIT PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 ADOBE Log Total Annual CompensationCPI LogTotal LUCASFILM 1 Annual CompensationCPI 2 APPLE Log Total Annual CompensationCPI 2 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 ADOBE Log Total Annual CompensationCPI LogTotal LUCASFILM Annual CompensationCPI 2 2 Log Company Tenure Months 0.0083 0.0050 1.66 Log Company Tenure 2 0.0009 0.0006 1.66 0.0027 0.0005 5.02 San Jose 1.4135 0.0136 103.90 Among Defendants 0.0959 0.0015 63.66 0.0039 0.0003 14.53 0.0169 0.0008 21.61 0.2478 0.0021 116.78 0.1027 0.0034 30.20 0.2162 0.0033 66.49 APPLE 0.0607 0.0162 GOOGLE 1.0320 0.0174 59.42 INTEL 0.1516 0.0146 10.40 INTUIT 0.1473 0.0193 PIXAR 0.7075 0.0422 0.1256 0.0480 Male DLog Information Sector Employment Log Total Number Year of Transfers trend Log Number of New Hires In the New Log Total Number of Log Firm Revenue Per DLog in Firm Revenue Firm Number Employees 1 Hires EmployeeCPI Per of EmployeeCPI 1 1 LUCASFILM Location State Indicators YES Constant YES RSquare 0.926 504,897 Observations Note Source Significant Dr Leamer’s at 1 level Significant at backup data and materials 5 level Significant at 10 level 3.75 7.64 16.77 2.61 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page61 of 73 Appendix 10B Dr Leamer’s Figure 23 RegressionUsing a Single Conduct Variable Technical Creative and Dependant RD Class Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Variable Variable Estimate Conduct St Error T Value 0.0234 0.0011 20.94 0.6643 0.0072 91.76 0.7212 0.0037 197.36 0.4403 0.0022 203.78 0.6407 0.0030 215.53 0.6578 0.0084 78.28 0.6523 0.0106 61.69 0.8457 0.0692 12.21 0.3158 0.0071 44.58 0.2581 0.0038 68.54 0.3629 0.0021 173.68 0.3171 0.0029 110.18 0.2967 0.0081 36.48 0.1054 0.0097 10.89 0.1456 0.0694 2.10 Log Age Years 0.1807 0.0463 3.90 Log Age 0.0146 0.0063 2.32 1 APPLE Log Total Annual CompensationCPI 1 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTUIT PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 ADOBE Log Total Annual CompensationCPI LogTotal LUCASFILM 1 Annual CompensationCPI 2 APPLE Log Total Annual CompensationCPI 2 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 ADOBE Log Total Annual CompensationCPI LogTotal LUCASFILM Annual CompensationCPI 2 2 Log Company Tenure Months 0.0326 0.0068 4.78 Log Company Tenure 2 0.0028 0.0008 3.78 0.0065 0.0008 7.89 San Jose 1.5271 0.0189 80.81 Among Defendants 0.0983 0.0020 48.08 0.0009 0.0004 0.0154 0.0011 14.31 0.2724 0.0029 93.07 0.0811 0.0047 17.17 0.2127 0.0044 48.43 APPLE 0.1244 0.0245 GOOGLE 1.3816 0.0259 INTEL 0.1573 0.0219 INTUIT 0.1486 0.0315 PIXAR 1.5543 0.0771 0.0296 0.1038 Male DLog Information Sector Employment Log Total Number Year of Transfers trend Log Number of New Hires In the New Log Total Number of Log Firm Revenue Per DLog in Firm Revenue Firm Number Employees 1 Hires EmployeeCPI Per of EmployeeCPI 1 1 LUCASFILM Location State Indicators YES Constant YES RSquare 0.874 292,489 Observations Note Source Significant Dr Leamer’s at 1 level Significant at backup data and materials 5 level Significant at 10 level 2.52 5.08 53.33 7.19 4.71 20.17 0.29 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page62 of 73 Appendix 10C Undercompensation Estimates Using a Conduct Variable in Dr Leamer’s AllSalaried Year Adobe Apple Google 2005 1.72 1.72 1.72 2006 4.63 4.71 2007 7.17 2008 9.80 2009 9.80 10.28 vs Regression Figures Employee Class Apple Google 1.61 1.59 1.78 1.67 12.13 10.56 2006 4.28 4.43 4.44 4.70 14.63 12.44 14.00 2007 6.64 6.94 6.39 7.46 3.24 17.24 14.28 15.61 2008 9.08 9.56 8.40 10.05 5.64 19.94 15.76 14.52 2009 9.15 9.73 7.51 9.95 5.70 20.12 14.65 Pixar Year 1.72 11.95 10.29 2005 4.28 4.58 14.77 12.23 7.37 6.19 7.02 3.44 17.58 10.13 8.10 9.51 5.88 20.36 7.17 9.32 5.91 20.55 Intuit RD Adobe Apple Google 2005 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 2006 3.12 3.19 2.86 3.09 2007 4.78 4.94 4.03 4.69 2.34 2008 6.50 6.73 5.15 6.33 3.88 2009 6.42 6.71 4.31 6.13 3.83 Intel with age and hiring rate Intel Technical Creative and Lucasfilm Class 1.90 3.07 1.64 2006 4.29 4.96 7.23 3.06 14.77 10.47 2007 6.48 7.79 9.36 3.38 3.41 18.08 10.61 7.92 2008 8.80 10.64 11.20 4.76 5.21 20.44 11.87 6.54 2009 8.44 10.51 9.00 4.19 4.96 20.54 9.62 2005 6.85 12.27 7.45 14.22 14.40 interactions Pixar 1.56 6.08 8.33 RD Lucasfilm Google Year Adobe Intuit Apple Pixar 10.31 Intuit Leamer Figure 20 and 23 regressions excluding conduct Adobe Class Year 22 and 24 AllSalaried Employee Class Lucasfilm Intel Technical Creative and Source Undercompensation Estimates in Dr Leamer’s Single Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 10.80 Pixar 9.28 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 4 Filed10 07 13 Page63 of 73 Appendix 11A Dr Leamer’s Figure 20 RegressionIncluding Defendant Specific Conduct Variables AllSalaried Employee Class Variable Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Dependant Variable ADOBE Estimate Conduct St Error T Value 0.0053 0.0028 1.89 0.0139 0.0019 7.37 0.0969 0.0021 45.25 0.0304 0.0009 33.37 0.0600 0.0026 23.17 0.0396 0.0048 8.34 0.0000 0.0075 0.00 0.6855 0.0056 122.85 0.7361 0.0027 276.84 0.4858 0.0017 283.31 0.6721 0.0024 283.28 0.7173 0.0058 122.92 0.6857 0.0055 124.10 0.7984 0.0364 21.92 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 0.3056 0.0055 56.03 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 0.2645 0.0027 96.26 0.3741 0.0016 228.53 0.2976 0.0023 128.96 0.2466 0.0056 43.72 0.1758 0.0053 33.30 0.2003 0.0369 5.43 Log Age Years 0.0244 0.0327 0.75 Log Age APPLE Conduct GOOGLE Conduct Conduct INTEL Conduct INTUIT PIXAR Conduct LUCASFILM Conduct 1 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 1 2 2 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 ADOBE APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 2 0.0057 0.0044 1.28 Log Company Tenure Months 0.0128 0.0050 2.55 Log Company Tenure 2 0.0013 0.0006 2.42 0.0032 0.0005 1.4228 0.0136 104.42 0.0800 0.0015 53.90 0.0032 0.0003 12.13 0.0128 0.0008 16.20 0.2273 0.0021 108.21 0.0677 0.0033 20.55 0.1461 0.0029 50.95 APPLE 0.0492 0.0163 GOOGLE 1.0950 0.0176 62.24 INTEL 0.1587 0.0147 10.82 INTUIT 0.1818 0.0193 PIXAR 0.7905 0.0264 LUCASFILM 0.0271 0.0503 2 Male DLog Log Total Number Year of Transfers Among Defendants trend Log Number of New Hires In the New Log Total Number of Log Firm Revenue Per DLog in San Jose Information Sector Employment Firm Revenue State Location Firm Number Employees 1 Hires EmployeeCPI Per of EmployeeCPI 1 1 YES Indicators Constant YES R Square 0.926 Observations Note Source Significant Dr Leamer’s 508,969 at 1 level Significant backup data and materials at 5 Pixar level Significant revenue at 10 level data after 2005 are included 5.82 3.02 9.40 29.96 0.54 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 4 Filed10 07 13 Page64 of 73 Appendix 11B Dr Leamer’s Figure 23 RegressionIncluding Defendant Specific Conduct Variables Technical Creative and RD Variable Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Dependant Variable ADOBE Class Estimate Conduct St Error T Value 0.0175 0.0036 4.80 0.0227 0.0026 8.71 0.1219 0.0029 42.51 0.0124 0.0012 10.12 0.0512 0.0040 12.96 0.0800 0.0061 13.10 0.0204 0.0130 0.6517 0.0075 86.93 0.7204 0.0036 197.54 0.4279 0.0022 195.45 0.6449 0.0030 217.17 0.6682 0.0086 77.99 0.6623 0.0081 81.28 0.7861 0.0701 11.21 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 0.3285 0.0074 44.62 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 0.2566 0.0038 67.66 0.3684 0.0021 175.48 0.3140 0.0029 109.24 0.2870 0.0083 34.76 0.1014 0.0075 13.58 0.2148 0.0707 3.04 Log Age Years 0.2111 0.0461 4.58 Log Age APPLE Conduct GOOGLE Conduct Conduct INTEL Conduct INTUIT PIXAR Conduct LUCASFILM Conduct 1 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 1 2 2 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 ADOBE APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 2 1.57 0.0187 0.0063 2.99 Log Company Tenure Months 0.0011 0.0068 0.16 Log Company Tenure 2 0.0005 0.0008 0.73 0.0067 0.0008 1.5258 0.0189 80.88 0.0805 0.0020 40.21 0.0000 0.0004 0.0145 0.0011 13.40 0.2548 0.0029 88.38 0.0402 0.0045 0.1324 0.0038 APPLE 0.1309 0.0246 GOOGLE 1.4469 0.0261 INTEL 0.1653 0.0220 INTUIT 0.1840 0.0315 PIXAR 1.3668 0.0455 LUCASFILM 0.0872 0.1064 2 Male DLog Log Total Number Year of Transfers Among Defendants trend Log Number of New Hires In the New Log Total Number of Log Firm Revenue Per DLog in San Jose Information Sector Employment Firm Revenue State Location Firm Number Employees 1 Hires EmployeeCPI Per of EmployeeCPI 1 1 YES Indicators Constant YES R Square 0.874 Observations Note Source Significant Dr Leamer’s 295,136 at 1 level Significant backup data and materials at 5 Pixar level Significant revenue at 10 level data after 2005 are included 8.24 0.08 8.91 34.60 5.32 55.52 7.53 5.83 30.03 0.82 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 4 Filed1007 13 Page65 of 73 Appendix 11C Undercompensation Estimates Using Conduct Variables in AllSalaried Year Adobe Apple Google 2005 0.26 0.69 4.85 2006 0.71 1.90 2007 1.09 2008 1.49 2009 1.49 Dr Defendant vs Leamer’s Regression Figures Employee Class Apple Google 1.61 1.59 1.78 1.67 12.13 10.56 2006 4.28 4.43 4.44 4.70 14.63 12.44 15.21 2007 6.64 6.94 6.39 7.46 3.24 17.24 14.28 16.76 2008 9.08 9.56 8.40 10.05 5.64 19.94 15.76 2009 9.15 9.73 7.51 9.95 5.70 20.12 14.65 Pixar Year 1.52 0.01 11.48 2005 12.04 4.06 0.01 13.46 2.97 17.35 6.23 6.00 0.01 4.08 22.63 8.44 10.30 0.02 4.13 19.91 8.28 10.36 0.02 15.16 Intuit RD Adobe Apple Google 2005 0.87 1.13 6.09 0.62 2006 2.32 3.08 14.79 1.64 2007 3.55 4.78 20.76 2.50 5.12 2008 4.82 6.50 26.52 3.37 8.55 2009 4.74 6.47 22.04 3.27 8.46 Intel hiring rate and including company conduct data after 2005 are included 3.07 1.64 2006 4.29 4.96 7.23 3.06 14.77 10.47 2007 6.48 7.79 9.36 3.38 3.41 18.08 10.61 27.50 2008 8.80 10.64 11.20 4.76 5.21 20.44 11.87 22.83 2009 8.44 10.51 9.00 4.19 4.96 20.54 9.62 8.71 age and interactions Class 1.90 2005 23.69 10.39 25.82 12.08 12.24 with Pixar 1.56 21.01 interactions RD Lucasfilm Google Year Adobe Intuit Apple Pixar 7.02 Leamer Figure 20 and 23 regressions excluding conduct Intel Technical Creative and Lucasfilm Intuit Source Adobe Class Year 22 and 24 AllSalaried Employee Class Lucasfilm Intel Technical Creative and Pixar revenue Undercompensation Estimates in Dr Leamer’s Specific Intel Intuit Lucasfilm 10.80 Pixar 9.28 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 Filed10 07 13 4 Page66 of 73 Appendix 12A Dr Leamer’s Figure 20 RegressionUsing Employee Class AllSalaried Dependant Variable PreConduct Periodas Benchmark Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Variable Estimate St Error T Value Conduct Age 0.0056 0.0005 10.83 Conduct Age 2 0.0001 0.0000 11.78 Conduct Log Number 0.0391 0.0010 40.01 0.2432 0.0111 21.97 0.7667 0.0062 122.75 0.7374 0.0033 223.86 0.5619 0.0023 245.29 0.6743 0.0026 263.51 0.7086 0.0062 114.53 0.6957 0.0056 123.46 0.7392 0.0390 18.95 0.2167 0.0061 35.43 0.2637 0.0034 77.79 0.3504 0.0020 178.13 0.2932 0.0025 118.61 0.2459 0.0059 41.50 0.1477 0.0054 27.16 0.2434 0.0395 6.16 Log Age Years 0.4166 0.0537 7.75 Log Age 2 0.0498 0.0073 6.79 Log Company Tenure Months 0.0684 0.0057 12.04 Log Company Tenure 0.0068 0.0006 10.87 0.0030 0.0006 4.83 San Jose 1.2592 0.0166 75.70 Among Defendants 0.0789 0.0018 42.98 0.0105 0.0003 29.97 0.0197 0.0010 19.03 0.2174 0.0030 71.92 0.0928 0.0045 20.50 of New Hires In the Firm Number of Employees 1 Conduct 1 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 1 2 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 2 2 Male DLog Information Sector Employment Log Total Number Year of Transfers in trend Log Number of New Hires In the New Log Total Number of Log Firm Revenue Per DLog Firm Revenue Firm Number of Employees 1 Hires 1 EmployeeCPI 1 EmployeeCPI 0.1286 0.0033 38.95 APPLE 0.1111 0.0194 5.71 GOOGLE 0.6086 0.0217 28.00 INTEL 0.1019 0.0173 5.89 INTUIT 0.2270 0.0223 10.17 PIXAR 0.9625 0.0302 31.82 LUCASFILM 0.1298 0.0626 2.07 State Location Per YES Indicators Constant YES RSquare 0.924 Observations Note Source Significant Dr Leamer’s 381,288 at 1 level Significant at backup data and materials 5 level Pixar Significant revenue at 10 level data after 2005 are included Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 Filed10 07 13 4 Page67 of 73 Appendix 12B Dr Leamer’s Figure 23 RegressionUsing PreConduct Periodas Benchmark Technical Creative and Dependant Variable RD Class Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Variable Estimate St Error T Value Conduct Age 0.0061 0.0008 8.05 Conduct Age 2 0.0001 0.0000 8.90 Conduct Log Number 0.0546 0.0013 40.90 0.2967 0.0159 18.61 0.7426 0.0083 89.58 0.7137 0.0047 151.39 0.4868 0.0031 157.85 0.6285 0.0032 195.11 0.6641 0.0093 71.55 0.6794 0.0084 81.00 0.6826 0.0827 8.25 0.2307 0.0081 28.45 0.2675 0.0049 54.82 0.3341 0.0026 129.27 0.3232 0.0031 104.05 0.2842 0.0088 32.11 0.0644 0.0078 8.27 0.2566 0.0822 3.12 Log Age Years 0.5769 0.0798 7.23 Log Age 2 0.0720 0.0109 6.59 Log Company Tenure Months 0.0994 0.0079 12.64 Log Company Tenure 0.0093 0.0009 10.65 0.0065 0.0009 6.89 San Jose 1.1685 0.0234 49.89 Among Defendants 0.0782 0.0025 30.91 0.0042 0.0005 8.83 0.0239 0.0014 16.49 0.2084 0.0043 48.83 0.1131 0.0062 18.39 of New Hires In the Firm Number of Employees 1 Conduct 1 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 1 2 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 2 2 Male DLog Information Sector Employment Log Total Number Year of Transfers in trend Log Number of New Hires In the New Log Total Number of Log Firm Revenue Per DLog Firm Revenue Firm Number of Employees 1 Hires 1 EmployeeCPI 1 EmployeeCPI 0.1164 0.0044 26.21 APPLE 0.0573 0.0292 1.96 GOOGLE 1.1501 0.0330 34.87 INTEL 0.1375 0.0256 5.38 INTUIT 0.2064 0.0364 5.67 PIXAR 1.5840 0.0521 30.41 LUCASFILM 0.0853 0.1652 0.52 State Location Per YES Indicators Constant YES RSquare 0.866 Observations Note Source Significant Dr Leamer’s 216,253 at 1 level Significant at backup data and materials 5 level Pixar Significant revenue at 10 level data after 2005 are included Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 Filed10 07 13 4 Page68 of 73 Appendix 12C Dr Leamer’s Figure 20 RegressionUsing Post Conduct Period as Benchmark Employee Class AllSalaried Dependant Variable Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Variable Estimate St Error T Value Conduct Age 0.0078 0.0006 13.85 Conduct Age 2 0.0001 0.0000 13.31 Conduct Log Number 0.0114 0.0009 12.67 0.0973 0.0121 0.7630 0.0069 110.30 0.7349 0.0029 250.23 0.5002 0.0018 277.95 0.6763 0.0034 200.70 0.8207 0.0103 79.39 0.7036 0.0058 122.35 0.8750 0.0378 23.12 0.2528 0.0070 36.11 0.2602 0.0031 85.08 0.3684 0.0017 213.20 0.3235 0.0034 95.84 0.1548 0.0104 14.95 0.1769 0.0055 32.24 0.1143 0.0382 2.99 Log Age Years 0.6760 0.0560 12.08 Log Age 2 0.0797 0.0076 10.55 Log Company Tenure Months 0.0254 0.0058 4.39 Log Company Tenure 0.0020 0.0006 3.21 0.0021 0.0006 3.34 San Jose 0.8493 0.0541 15.70 Among Defendants 0.0287 0.0019 15.14 0.0113 0.0005 23.30 0.0325 0.0012 26.15 0.0683 0.0059 11.64 0.0268 0.0040 6.61 of New Hires In the Firm Number of Employees 1 Conduct 1 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 1 2 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 2 2 Male DLog Information Sector Employment Log Total Number Year of Transfers in trend Log Number of New Hires In the New Log Total Number of Log Firm Revenue Per DLog Firm Revenue Firm Number of Employees 1 Hires 1 EmployeeCPI 1 EmployeeCPI 8.06 0.1248 0.0032 39.43 APPLE 0.2203 0.0187 11.80 GOOGLE 1.1437 0.0196 58.31 INTEL 0.0757 0.0169 4.47 INTUIT 0.2278 0.0247 9.23 PIXAR 0.8522 0.0283 30.13 LUCASFILM 0.1705 0.0507 3.36 State Location Per YES Indicators Constant YES RSquare 0.922 Observations Note Source Significant Dr Leamer’s 399,299 at 1 level Significant at backup data and materials 5 level Pixar Significant revenue at 10 level data after 2005 are included Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 Filed10 07 13 4 Page69 of 73 Appendix 12D Dr Leamer’s Figure 23 RegressionUsing Post Conduct Period as Benchmark Technical Creative and Dependant Variable RD Class Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Variable Estimate St Error T Value Conduct Age 0.0096 0.0008 12.31 Conduct Age 2 0.0001 0.0000 11.96 Conduct Log Number 0.0008 0.0012 0.70 0.1544 0.0165 9.37 0.7523 0.0092 81.89 0.7161 0.0039 181.32 0.4438 0.0023 193.37 0.6464 0.0041 156.05 0.7732 0.0151 51.22 0.7071 0.0085 83.39 0.9511 0.0719 13.24 0.2530 0.0094 26.98 0.2581 0.0041 62.57 0.3655 0.0022 165.61 0.3478 0.0041 84.01 0.1837 0.0151 12.18 0.1052 0.0078 13.57 0.0413 0.0720 0.57 Log Age Years 0.9447 0.0755 12.51 Log Age 2 0.1145 0.0102 11.21 Log Company Tenure Months 0.0094 0.0078 1.21 Log Company Tenure 0.0008 0.0009 0.98 0.0065 0.0009 6.91 San Jose 0.9430 0.0718 Among Defendants 0.0088 0.0026 3.41 0.0148 0.0006 22.84 0.0367 0.0017 21.93 0.0834 0.0078 10.64 0.0112 0.0054 2.05 of New Hires In the Firm Number of Employees 1 Conduct 1 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 1 2 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 2 2 Male DLog Information Sector Employment Log Total Number Year of Transfers in trend Log Number of New Hires In the New Log Total Number of Log Firm Revenue Per DLog Firm Revenue Firm Number of Employees 1 Hires 1 EmployeeCPI 1 EmployeeCPI 13.14 0.1110 0.0042 26.40 APPLE 0.2949 0.0283 10.42 GOOGLE 1.4735 0.0292 50.43 INTEL 0.0390 0.0255 1.53 INTUIT 0.2932 0.0406 7.21 PIXAR 1.2492 0.0487 25.67 LUCASFILM 0.0692 0.1083 0.64 State Location Per YES Indicators Constant YES RSquare 0.869 Observations Note Source Significant Dr Leamer’s 236,748 at 1 level Significant at backup data and materials 5 level Pixar Significant revenue at 10 level data after 2005 are included Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 Filed1007 13 4 Page70 of 73 Appendix 13A Dr Leamer’s Figure 20 RegressionEstimated Using Variable Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Variable ADOBE Period Data Employee Class AllSalaried Dependant Non Conduct Estimate 1 1 CPI 1 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI St Error T Value 0.6108 0.0072 84.47 0.7408 0.0036 205.55 0.4578 0.0026 175.14 0.6685 0.0034 196.94 0.7266 0.0063 115.16 0.8377 0.0219 38.18 0.9990 0.0845 11.82 0.3441 0.0067 51.72 0.2708 0.0036 74.65 0.3957 0.0028 141.55 0.2620 0.0032 81.66 0.2413 0.0060 40.26 0.1329 0.0201 6.60 0.0161 0.0856 0.19 Log Age Years 0.0292 0.0436 0.67 Log Age 2 0.0122 0.0059 2.07 Log Company Tenure Months 0.0613 0.0071 8.59 Log Company Tenure 0.0064 0.0008 8.21 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI APPLE GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation Log Total Annual Compensation CPI INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI INTUIT Log Total Annual CompensationCPI PIXAR 1 1 1 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 1 2 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI INTUIT Log Total Annual CompensationCPI PIXAR 2 2 2 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 2 2 Male 0.0041 0.0007 5.58 San Jose 1.3739 0.0252 54.58 Among Defendants 0.0610 0.0027 22.79 0.0028 0.0007 3.93 0.0365 0.0013 27.33 0.2303 0.0053 43.47 0.0961 0.0048 19.94 0.0715 0.0062 11.50 APPLE 0.2454 0.0216 11.37 GOOGLE 0.8453 0.0233 36.31 INTEL 0.1981 0.0195 10.18 INTUIT 0.0736 0.0242 3.04 PIXAR 0.0559 0.0473 1.18 0.2748 0.0708 3.88 DLogInformation Log Total Number Year Sector Employment of Transfers in trend Log Number of New Hires In the New Log Total Number of Log Firm Revenue Per DLogFirm Revenue Firm Number EmployeeCPI Per of Employees 1 Hires EmployeeCPI 1 1 LUCASFILM State Indicators Location YES YES Constant R Square 0.937 237,351 Observations Note Source Significant Dr at 1 level Significant Leamer’s backup data and materials at 5 level Pixar Significant revenue data at after 10 level 2005 are included Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document518 Filed1007 13 4 Page71 of 73 Appendix 13B Dr Leamer’s Figure 23 RegressionEstimated Using Technical Creative and Dependant Variable RD Non Conduct Class Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Variable ADOBE Period Data Estimate 1 1 CPI 1 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI St Error T Value 0.5929 0.0100 59.23 0.7428 0.0049 151.07 0.4205 0.0033 129.36 0.6526 0.0043 153.41 0.7101 0.0092 76.79 0.9381 0.0359 26.12 0.9713 0.1224 7.94 0.3475 0.0092 37.69 0.2392 0.0050 48.28 0.3895 0.0036 108.96 0.2660 0.0040 66.55 0.2593 0.0087 29.69 0.0343 0.0307 1.12 0.0629 0.1247 0.50 Log Age Years 0.2740 0.0614 4.46 Log Age 2 0.0282 0.0083 3.38 Log Company Tenure Months 0.0758 0.0096 7.89 Log Company Tenure 0.0086 0.0011 8.09 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI APPLE GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation Log Total Annual Compensation CPI INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI INTUIT Log Total Annual CompensationCPI PIXAR 1 1 1 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 1 2 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI INTUIT Log Total Annual CompensationCPI PIXAR 2 2 2 Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 2 2 Male 0.0071 0.0011 6.43 San Jose 1.3635 0.0362 37.70 Among Defendants 0.0650 0.0038 17.33 0.0034 0.0011 3.16 0.0495 0.0018 26.92 0.2480 0.0078 31.98 0.0458 0.0067 6.82 0.0388 0.0086 4.51 APPLE 0.1750 0.0326 5.37 GOOGLE 0.9977 0.0343 29.13 INTEL 0.2041 0.0293 6.96 INTUIT 0.1603 0.0388 4.13 PIXAR 0.1585 0.0893 1.77 0.5484 0.1265 4.34 DLogInformation Log Total Number Year Sector Employment of Transfers in trend Log Number of New Hires In the New Log Total Number of Log Firm Revenue Per DLogFirm Revenue Firm Number EmployeeCPI Per of Employees 1 Hires EmployeeCPI 1 1 LUCASFILM State Indicators Location YES YES Constant R Square 0.895 137,271 Observations Note Source Significant Dr at 1 level Significant Leamer’s backup data and materials at 5 level Pixar Significant revenue data at after 10 level 2005 are included Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 Filed10 07 13 4 Page72 of 73 Appendix 14A Dr Leamer’s Figure 20 RegressionIncluding Change Variable SP 500 Employee Class AllSalaried Dependant in Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Variable Estimate St Error T Value Conduct Age 0.0066 0.0005 13.98 Conduct Age 2 0.0001 0.0000 13.83 Conduct Log Number 0.0043 0.0008 5.54 0.1309 0.0100 13.04 0.6894 0.0054 126.98 0.7449 0.0027 280.12 0.4988 0.0017 293.05 0.6678 0.0024 282.12 0.7070 0.0058 122.77 0.6943 0.0069 100.22 0.8204 0.0363 22.62 0.3023 0.0053 57.04 0.2581 0.0027 94.33 0.3694 0.0016 225.49 0.3012 0.0023 130.80 0.2567 0.0056 46.04 0.1985 0.0067 29.56 0.1737 0.0366 4.74 Log Age Years 0.3495 0.0415 8.42 Log Age 2 0.0380 0.0056 6.74 Log Company Tenure Months 0.0039 0.0050 0.78 Log Company Tenure 0.0005 0.0006 0.92 0.0027 0.0005 4.93 San Jose 1.5373 0.0151 101.59 Among Defendants 0.0566 0.0020 27.69 0.0656 0.0023 28.72 0.0026 0.0003 7.45 0.0135 0.0009 14.55 0.2182 0.0024 92.01 0.1319 0.0037 36.14 0.2371 0.0033 70.97 APPLE 0.0747 0.0162 4.62 GOOGLE 1.0592 0.0174 60.95 INTEL 0.1542 0.0146 10.59 INTUIT 0.1485 0.0193 7.71 PIXAR 0.7001 0.0422 16.60 0.1483 0.0480 3.09 of New Hires In the Firm Number of Employees 1 Conduct 1 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 1 2 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 2 2 Male DLog Information Sector Employment Log Total Number DLog SP 500 Net Year of Transfers in trend Log Number of Total Return Index CPI New Hires In the New Log Total Number of Log Firm Revenue Per DLog Firm Revenue Firm Number Employees 1 Hires EmployeeCPI Per of EmployeeCPI 1 1 LUCASFILM State Location YES Indicators Constant YES RSquare 0.926 Observations Note Source Significant Dr Leamer’s 504,897 at 1 level Significant at backup data and materials 5 level Significant at 10 level Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document518 Filed10 07 13 4 Page73 of 73 Appendix 14B Dr Leamer’s Figure 23 RegressionIncluding Change Technical Creative and Dependant Variable RD in SP 500 Class Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Variable Estimate St Error T Value Conduct Age 0.0077 0.0007 11.44 Conduct Age 2 0.0001 0.0000 11.18 Conduct Log Number 0.0099 0.0010 9.44 0.1717 0.0141 12.16 0.6662 0.0073 91.42 0.7299 0.0037 199.33 0.4425 0.0022 202.73 0.6405 0.0030 215.77 0.6672 0.0085 78.91 0.6508 0.0106 61.63 0.8548 0.0691 12.37 0.3141 0.0071 44.00 0.2505 0.0038 66.22 0.3607 0.0021 171.44 0.3177 0.0029 110.53 0.2888 0.0082 35.32 0.1053 0.0097 10.90 0.1398 0.0692 2.02 Log Age Years 0.5757 0.0587 9.80 Log Age 2 0.0676 0.0080 8.46 Log Company Tenure Months 0.0204 0.0068 3.00 Log Company Tenure 0.0016 0.0008 2.14 0.0064 0.0008 7.86 San Jose 1.5716 0.0209 75.07 Among Defendants 0.0443 0.0028 16.05 0.0881 0.0031 28.55 0.0078 0.0005 16.67 0.0213 0.0013 16.62 0.2308 0.0033 70.79 0.1028 0.0051 20.31 0.2359 0.0045 52.12 APPLE 0.1328 0.0244 5.44 GOOGLE 1.4013 0.0259 54.09 INTEL 0.1574 0.0218 7.20 INTUIT 0.1378 0.0315 4.38 PIXAR 1.5355 0.0770 19.94 0.0399 0.1036 0.38 of New Hires In the Firm Number of Employees 1 Conduct 1 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 1 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 1 2 APPLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 GOOGLE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTEL Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 INTUIT Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 PIXAR Log Total Annual Compensation CPI 2 ADOBE Log Total Annual Compensation CPI Log Total Annual Compensation CPI LUCASFILM 2 2 Male DLog Information Sector Employment Log Total Number DLog SP 500 Net Year of Transfers in trend Log Number of Total Return Index CPI New Hires In the New Log Total Number of Log Firm Revenue Per DLog Firm Revenue Firm Number Employees 1 Hires EmployeeCPI Per of EmployeeCPI 1 1 LUCASFILM State Location YES Indicators Constant YES RSquare 0.875 Observations Note Source Significant Dr Leamer’s 292,489 at 1 level Significant at backup data and materials 5 level Significant at 10 level 4 Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document424 2 Filed05 17 13 Page1 of 62 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION CONFIDENTIAL TO BE FILED SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE IN RE HIGH TECH EMPLOYEES ANTITRUST LITIGATION THIS UNDER SEAL ORDER No 11 CV2509LHK DOCUMENT RELATES TO ALL ACTIONS SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT REPORT OF EDWARD May E LEAMER PH D 10 2013 REDACTED Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document424 Filed05 17 13 2 Page2 of 62 TABLE OF CONTENTS I Introduction Assignment and II Defendants Use III Empirical Methodologies for Exploring the of Summary of Conclusions 1 4 Compensation Structures Somewhat Rigid Salary Structure A B C IV 6 6 VI of Regression Analysis of Compensation byTitle Correlation Analysis Title byTitle 7 Structure 7 Multiple Regressions of Compensation 10 Structure 14 Based Correlations and Multiple Regressions 18 Decile Based Correlation Analysis 18 Decile Based Multiple Regression Results 20 Additional Exploration of 1 2 3 4 VII Structure Based Correlations and Multiple Regressions 10 Title Decile A B Compensation Correlation Analysis Results of Title A B V Choice of Aggregation Level Adobe Adobe Correlations 22 22 Correlation Results Headcount Matters for Interpreting 24 Correlations Correlations 25 Outliers 26 29 Internal Versus External Forces i Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer Ph D Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document424 Filed05 17 13 2 Page3 62 of 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL I Summary Introduction Assignment and 1 been asked by counsel I have my RD and 2 my 1 job somewhat titles structure would be to require p283 the parallel movementsof orderly and prices move in parallel compensation rigid that of For for so for these firms studies vast also evidence compensation I found same group from two This again is zinc I Class forces are that the not that this dictated so do not normally with a somewhat compensation me and found I have titles and the the the internal forces compared also empirical to separate that in all average non technical employees compensation curves of these two firms move in a compensation curves for much more disparate are evident but the external to detect present correlations To allow parallel while the different that movementsof role in determining Class of highly average compensation of each Technical parallel I typically are not copper and silver saying that the internal forces more difficult In this Report forces for the Technical groups within each firm are 4 have added I should Markets titles models estimated regression for all the defendants forces are what specifically in favor of the hypothesis played an important are evident but the external way to In this report I confirm this opinion with two additional I have of a the existence Could a nonrigid wage not only to be consistent contributions of internal and external the Class employees in market conditions which labor numbers of titles Creative report lines I responded reason I regard the many my initial could it example gold that wage structure but internal equity Yes with unusual external highly been asked to focus I have Defendant asked in the deposition a hypothetical in to the can be analysis that over time further confirming each at respond proposed Technical to the structure as you’ve defined it lead to parallel thought further compensation of Technical total move together pay Answer When the and in this case data Classidentified Technical Does rigid available prior analysis the employees belonging Class Question specific 3 on response Conclusions for Class Plaintiffs in this matter to following questions regarding conducted based on the of title accommodate that compare the movement over time of the with the average compensation of the firms titles that cannot be accessed on a by title Page 1 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document424 Filed05 17 13 2 Page4 62 of 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL title due to basis insufficient titles but representing just analyzed correlations of data approximately 63 percent of Technical 6 percent relatively of Class Period narrow groups computed are of employees each Class employees of that approximately a tenth of the Technical correlations employee years for all titles not just 20 They reveal Class I also comprising firm These that there is topdown amount large co movement of among most of compensation Class titles of each defendant These correlations method in which budgeting receive a common compensation and possibly by The evident substantial what membersof title I previously the firm in any given year called a is depending common firmwide with a are consistent increment which within the individual what creates all of the Technical adjusted on by title circumstances specific component somewhat somewhat of compensation is rigid salary structure which allows the effects of the anti cold calling conspiracy to spread broadly across each firm 5 2 Do Question partly drove as internal equity opposed to only 6 Answer I the data show additional external have analyzed a model of sharing bytitle title relatively compensation of the year byyear I report increases explanatory variables the previous years average title Technical below estimated in of Technical other Technical that titles title by Class cannot be accessed Class titles but representing 1 increases in multiple the regression models that explain title average Technical ratio of average Technical 3 the previous title against Class employees average compensation at the revenue divided by the average in movementsof narrow groups of employees overall compensation software jobs of compensation effects of Class Period employee years I also analyzed the compensation of Specifically compensation structures as Again to accommodate approximately 70 percent just 8.4 percent such market forces employees compensation 7 the Defendants within Defendant firms relative to title evidence that internal factors level in terms of four Class compensation 2 Class compensation divided by the years compensation ratio of firmwide average 4 the percent change in the San Jose Sunnyvale Santa Clara Metropolitan Area hereafter San Jose the Statistical MSA Page 2 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document424 Filed05 17 13 2 Page5 of 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL 8 the vast majority of individuals I find that 1 positive within fall contemporaneous sharing of compensation across time that would spread gains in compensation This is with consistent my previous opinion that employees would have been impacted Furthermore the an 9 3 Do No Answer do not agreements the existence of member compensation of large groups would not have been harmed by necessarily I have performed the above mentioned find persuasive evidence compensation structure The this regard roles a The show ripple analysis shows case bycase basis the collection it is of other they differ in the job 4 Question job titles Answer based No correlations on there are sizeable groups whose be candidates statistically titles among positive An each of these positive vast rigid performed in across employees in very different title or group Technical statistical is separately on studied how much titles variability statistical many strong positive exhibit One Class there certainly are exceptions with the overall correlations of Class relationships from the class However the thousands corrected estimated of correlative majority of titles Technical some even the true correlations if all negative for this kind of data when this is done the of these negatives is Class this is not justified can cause model pooling of evidence across titles and that analysis I to identify and exclude from the Technical with negative appropriate and regression somewhat I they contain are found to be tied closely together for exclusion because estimates when from Defendants or groups All these groups no matter with the overall titles analyses statistical found that compensation almost always moves with titles a lack on to suggest that spillover effects possible it a restriction grouped by compensation level correlation that Although the might consider to Is and of class of employees compensation might have been disconnected 12 Defendants all indicates of class the data show the existence for distinct subgroups separately 11 titles coldcalling memberswho 10 2 sharing market forces than only external Question or almost non compete the structure and effects across other job of gains over time strongly sharing internal sharing force driving rather by the all show or groups that titles correlation allows are some analysis indicates positive In other words Page 3 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document424 Filed05 17 13 2 Page6 of 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL matters for interpreting the evidence about each it estimated correlations 13 In sum the statistical and econometric of a somewhat are positive analysis I evidence conduct herein my original in rigid pay structure at II Most provide them information about finding each Defendant that would have broadly including throughout subscribe to services market prices the imminent threat opportunities with or without However these external relevance and the offer of loss of is jobs Such an employee suggest with the information conveyed That can ring off a loud alarm that to averages with limited Regardless of what these services compare are intended in line with the external sources provide broad industry reliability information cannot that for various information helps them keep compensation packages outside my original Compensation Structures of not all of these defendants if with the economic Class Defendants Use 14 conjunction reports supports transmitted the effects of the agreements Technical the vast majority of that title heard all their by an actual way up the to the CEO 15 The information by an outside offer or even a cold by management A affected that chain of individual threat move against that threat similar employees compensation action aware by an compensation to salary increases for a First when one for also of the implicit competitive may increase Though directly opportunity outside the feel in wise to it make a compensation market does for these not require a until they actually receive an can minimizethe disruption to employee might occur when an employee discovers unfairly undercompensated analogous individual bump in for these similar individuals offer preemptive loyalty that attractive and management to similar individuals bump in the specific can transmit a may make management newlythreatened outside similarities becomes aware of an this preemptive much beyond broadly across a firm for two reasons single individual management can go a response can stimulate call A broad preemptive that he or she had been response is completely that are tied to information provided by Page 4 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document424 Filed05 17 13 2 Page7 62 of 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL employment These responses 16 Similarity in broad and not are worth is a bump in compensation individual jobs can be broad productivity employees who are any to treat employees individual until are likely to have an perceive that compared Fairness some with is feels their is salary employees equivalent As doesnt actually increases own views in their productivity it is essential for an require increase in but the force materializes compensation adversely above a In addition affected similarity if they unfairly high compensation are receiving reflect and there really is reason no sure way to know who got care The title that why companies bump in and grade managements views of what is fair and employee of structure it may fairness beliefs tend to follow guidelines laid out in terms of ranges so employees can be assured reasonable high contented of job and performance the perception of similarity that determines the come from discussed in the paragraph threat to the employee who doesnt compensation may This encourage that them compensation and influence outside a matter of personal opinion who policies and commitment fairly preemptive and these employees can have exactly HR salaried range of achieved levels of productivity the contentment fairness can necessitate employees 17 yet the market view of employee compensation salary of of highest can be worker in most of each is committed to the mission of the enterprise In order to maintain or to increase management with accuracy Fairness marketbased problem with Firms need to use The levels of productivity A critical tied together for a single individual that the productivity to determine is difficult strictly is can be salaries compensation transmitted broadly across a firm based necessarily individual one reason why why the second reason market regarding the compensation offered by the services that their compensation falls within range of their colleagues Page 5 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document424 Filed05 17 13 2 Page8 of 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL III Somewhat Empirical Methodologies for Exploring the Rigid Salary Structure A Choice of Aggregation 18 The data set explore I on individuals composed title Based on of compensation records of salaried of the Defendants the payrolls the Defendants by by grade is Level and some for These of the Defendants 19 the the including have chosen I data individual the individual at the individual studied more aggregated groups because is likely titles are grouped the title in the been have that level work to at first level or with the title to be dominated by forces which can make level titles grouped by Class titles 1 as Technical These data could be the are from counsel regarding the employees instructions Class except for Lucasfilm I limit the inquiry to the identified individuals it difficult averages that operate at the firm wide effects to detect spread of the anti cold calling agreements some broadly across the titlelevel firms Averaging across individuals in a title more transparent thus making the firmwide effects effects documentary evidence shows Defendants 20 I have internal equity discovered there are some that titles individual estimate adequate The title and which behavior still for the statistical Because Lucasfilm inquiry is expanded meaning Technical Class for did the data analysis works briefly and well for effect many but not plentiful not provide title statisticians the idiosyncratic that Titles that call for Apple which had I am seeking to statistically data prior to 2006 there are insufficient all Defendants expect Lucasfilm for whom it applies all in This is 2005 and of data unless the presented below to annual insignificant estimates years is have fewer a title restructuring Lucasfilm employees Hence the analysis cover but titles are other titles that there sets are too small to yield accurate to all many employees employees masks the firmwide work the structures data set contains only eleven annual observations which particularly troublesome 1 In addition a used to manage their seem much influenced by that observations tend to produce what results their were used only that are sparsely populated among bytitle the individual perspective on the compensation analysis provides a clearer and maintain can average out the is limited to employees Page 6 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11 cv 02509 LHK Document424 Filed05 17 13 2 Page9 62 of 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL which did not provide for Lucasfilm include few a just and furthermore individuals for sparsely populated 21 To of the much from data the the individual with highly titles title across compensation come and go I give and headcounts variable that titles averaging the of the titlebytitle data I also include limitations work but applied statistical In addition median ages variable deal with 2006 can vary wildly as individuals Adobe of prior to not benefit unlike titles some examples below highly may individuals titles the ten groups of titles to ten groups by ordering the of titles titles the same type firm in each I have formed by average base compensation and employeeyears then the splitting into titles ten deciles based on the number of 2 B 22 Correlation Analysis of Economists often look closely different The relationship question move compensation 23 There are to correlation move variables from 0 absolute value to sign in the Compensation Structure together 1 One indicates on the correlation same direction structures two types of and correlations Correlation coefficients perfect indicates I begin how range in correlation zero indicates whether or not the my analysis no series in Defendant of correlations relevant for determining if the of compensation series are similar correlation of compensation changes The correlations the levels of compensation emphasize longer run movements correlations statistically with compensation correlations compensation movementsof two levels to measure coefficients of the log of and the of the change in the log of the levels focus on year byyear movements C Regression 24 Analysis of compensation and For several number of title sharing 2 Correlation of but could effects Defendants certain large Compensation Structure titles also made class come from splits into ten compensation could come from third variables that groups impractical In operate on both those cases a smaller groups was used Page 7 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page10 62 of 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL title and class compensation of a somewhat confirm the existence my correlation analysis I model which forces the an explanation of title This regression 25 model compensation the class equation increases two 26 The regression class effect one the variable includes title a they and for the other sense the second move apart sharing variable which in the previous year the in closely If the the ratio of is While the two compensation coefficient which the is on positive is levels action first move taken at this class average abnormally high compared tends to get a special increase in the coefficient two would be the extent to which corrective is If variables effect compensation company setting the extent to which market forces in that that following periods in at the regression after controlling for increase encompasses the In the multiple measures the extent to which means it compensation title model company when as then the employee would inherit 100 percent sharing first the second measures together variables By including the at a particular defendant after controlling the compensation to sharing regression average real inflation adjusted regression variables of the class compensation changes is a multiple in class average real total move together were equal to This title variables 3 equation the in the in particular tied together in one of four explanatory compensation of this variable revealed by structure compete with other to the increase includes allows us to determine this variable and compensation class analysis of these correlation compensation rigid market forces To example examine company by company explains compensation in class title as for compensation compensation and total same time at the with the compensation to bring it back title the in line with the class 27 The regression against model is divided by the average For each title title both two other determinants of these other variables 3 requires regression I of these sharing title compensation the previous years ratio of title compensation exclude from the class average variables to at company firm wide This variable real total the compete One of average revenue allows us to determine compensation the compensation of the itself Page 8 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page11 62 of 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL which that titles on 28 share increases and firms fourth variable the percent is workers there are general 2 other Technical increase in coefficients with this the firm and ones are the may It who would title increases a title that Figure in software jobs in the which 1 as for the is intended effect two sharing in the compensation received variables a move how hot a relatively small percent company years This indicates last year sharing in a fashion that helps align workers meaning increase if 1 Class titles increase and at relative to tend to receive will a positive In this are positive of other Technical or MSA title 4 compensation MSA San Jose to reflect estimated for one Intel can expect to receive Class titles at the in subsequent forces have revenue have an accentuated effect Both the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients equity might be expected job market generally not just in the San Jose this regression example the two that growth job market variable cold was the technical I illustrate workers overall success This the external 29 creative in firm revenue with their firms since they relationships the The any technical critical sharing if a larger internal equity suggest that internal compensation together with that of employees in other roles at the firm 4 As mentioned afford before this regression a sufficient Estimated and are number excluded of is estimated separately observations from the 6 observations coefficient for or distribution each title 7 consecutive calculations and company Titles that years are treated as do not Not presented in this report Page 9 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page12 of 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL Figure 1 Example of Compensation Illustrative Intel Named Plaintiff Title Sharing Variable RD Total Average Annual 0.784 0.064 12.238 0.000 1 0.251 0.098 2.562 0.051 1 0.032 0.094 0.346 0.743 Employment 0.092 0.126 0.731 0.498 0.541 0.411 0.698 Compensation Total Compensation 1 Avg Annual Total Comp Avg Annual Title Total Compensation Forces Variables Log Firm Revenue Avg Annual Title DLog San Information Jose 1 Per Employee Total Compensation Sector Constant Observations 10 Rsquared 1 2 3 0.986 Significant Title RD 1 at All Compensation Defendants A Titleby is is computed employee are 5 level Significant computed as the average of over all Technical title Creative and 10 level RD total compensation employees other than the tilte itself Adjusted Inflation compensation data Title Correlation Analysis of for all Defendants Exhibit 2 other Defendants but here it is 3 which indicate enough to at the Below between of titles title Compensation Structure are reported in Exhibit I will summarize the the fractions correlations compensation at employee’s annual Based Correlations and Multiple Regressions correlations positive at Significant Variables Results of Title The level Average Compensation Avg Total Comp Source 30 5 Variable Effect Log IV 4 Variable Effect RD DLog Note Pvalue value 3 0.223 Average Annual Title Contemporaneous External T 2 Variable DLog Lagged 7 Std Error Coefficient 1 Dependant Model Regression SOFTWARE ENGINEER discuss overall the 1 Adobe and results in detail results with Figure weighted 2 and Figure by employee years with compensation and Technical same firm restricted Adobe to titles with six Class or more annual Page 10 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page13 of 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL The observations Although there that among 32 are error which thousands the Moreover statistical that of titles enough produce some to included even if all of cases the true correlations for each Once title toward this shrinkage is is strong support Share are formal on will all the titles the results indicate that which for be positive strengthening the movementswith the class overall Change Correlations Change of Compensation mean across the done the corrected results that all titles in the class share 2 Large were positive based titles with estimates There are positive mean probably have similar correlations These methods estimates of these negatives negative are positive allow pooling of results across titles computed are true correlations that of course positive Figure large is all the would shrink the conclusion These estimates are negative that methods assumption many estimated correlations that does not negative the fact that the vast majority for the conclusion is some any true correlations statistical more extreme of correlations distribution 31 with five or fewer tend to produce a titles Correlation by Titles are Positive 100 80 60 Share 40 20 0 ADOBE GOOGLE APPLE INTEL Negative Source Note Distribution of Defendant growth in Employee Positive Compensation avg compensation Weighted by class PIXAR INTUIT correlation period Data over employee Correlation titles with Analysis six or more years of data years Page 11 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page14 62 of 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL Figure 3 Large Share of Level Compensation Correlations Correlation by are Positive Titles 100 80 60 Share 40 20 0 ADOBE GOOGLE APPLE INTEL INTUIT Negative Source Note Distribution Defendant of log avg Weighted 33 It is not just statistical Positive Employee Compensation compensation variability correlation by class period that Data over with the class overall examination of correlations some of the with six Adobe Analysis or more years of data years can explain the negative or small of employees within a employees come and go can cause changes close Correlation titles employee correlations Changes in the composition normal correlation PIXAR in title that as compensation and mask the I will illustrate titles title this point below with a have low or negative with the class Page 12 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 2 Filed0517 13 Page15 of 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL Figure 4 Summary of Compensation Change Positive Employer Sign Not Significant Percent Negative Significant Sign Not Significant Percent Correlation Percent Significant Percent Total Percent ADOBE 67 32 0 0 100 APPLE 54 35 1 10 100 GOOGLE 76 22 0 2 100 INTEL 94 6 0 1 100 INTUIT 81 14 0 5 100 PIXAR 86 13 0 1 100 Source Defendants Note Distribution of growth in employee compensation data Correlation Analysis compensation over correlation titles by class period employee Weighted with six or more years of data years Figure 5 Summary of Compensation Level Positive Employer Sign Not Significant Percent Correlation Negative Significant Not Significant Percent Sign Significant Percent Percent Total Percent ADOBE 92 5 0 3 APPLE 78 16 1 5 100 GOOGLE 83 16 0 1 100 INTEL 85 14 0 1 100 INTUIT 45 40 2 12 100 PIXAR 84 15 0 0 100 Source Defendants Note Distribution of log avg employee compensation Weighted compensation correlation 100 data Correlation Analysis over titles by class period employee with six or more yearsof data years Page 13 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page16 of 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL B 34 Titleby Title Multiple Regressions As above described compensation that I also analyzed a multiple the year byyear increases explains Class compensation average Technical 1 increases jobs in the San Jose The data set many is title words 36 seven least 6 and observations Those results positive show sharing relationship significant for statistical Figure Second of titles If This model is completely appropriate on the other hand title A if only to would yield a small largely determined by variability in compensation estimating makes it and probably insignificant less likely effect of force title all of majority these are To not more likely to find a sharing titles by sharing body of relationships significant across class overall attempt to link a are statistically in the context of statistically came from the B Class or the lagged relationship all In sum Class titles equally A to across all at a titles the class overall unless the variability in compensation title with at have titles a small fraction supported my Technical wins employee years results occur B then In other titles of The 5 effects class wide results for is for internal relationships the sharing were connected results are particularly it contemporaneous Many of statistically that First the vast relationship a heavy is sharing their Class Period a general is 2011 and significant coefficients of those that are negative this analysis provides support 5 in software revenue sharing approximately 30 percent Third even these negative majority the significance 7 below in either the regression insignificant statistically the following effect evidence that there for the vast statistically more and more than 91 percent of 37 change number of in the market effects and have in the competition I present in Figure title average revenue percent the four variable reflected is The prevalent for the external variables A observations coefficients two sharing firm wide observations from 2001 to limited to eleven annual burden with such data which insignificant 4 compensation ratio of years firmdivided by the average the at average in MSA have fewer titles 2 the previous previous years ratio of divided by the average 35 firm Class compensation 3 The compensation the at compensation in average at the title level in terms of four explanatory variables Technical model of regression of the class were put this in simple terms the model that I am effect Page 14 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page17 of 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL firm that would tend to make impact agreements of the common to all Class members 38 Thus the vast majority relationship is 6 Large my to support non compete common across Figure titles with other Technical of these results alleged of these Share of a positive Class titles at internal equity the same firm previous conclusion agreements the Technical have would be The sharing implication that the impact common across of the the class and Class employees in particular Contemporaneous Contemporaneous Coefficients Coefficient by are Positive Titles 100 80 60 Share 40 20 0 ADOBE GOOGLE APPLE INTEL Negative Source Note Distribution of Defendant estimated Employee PIXAR INTUIT Positive Compensation Data Regression Analysis contemporaneous coefficient over titles with seven Weighted by class period employee years or more years of data Page 15 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page18 of 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL Figure 7 Large Share of Lagged Lagged Coefficients are Positive by Coefficient Titles 100 80 60 Share 40 20 0 ADOBE GOOGLE APPLE INTEL Negative Source Note Distribution Employee Defendant of estimated lagged PIXAR INTUIT Positive Compensation coefficient Weighted by class over period Data titles Regression with employee seven Analysis or more years of data years Figure 8 Summary of Contemporaneous and Lagged Net Positive Employer Sign Not Significant Percent Negative Significant Percent Sign Not Significant Effect Percent Total Significant Percent Percent ADOBE 22 75 0 3 100 APPLE 23 62 0 14 100 GOOGLE 12 69 2 17 100 INTEL 88 11 0 1 100 INTUIT PIXAR 73 23 0 4 100 60 39 0 0 100 Source Note Distribution of Defendants the employee compensation sum of estimated contemporaneous Weighted data Regression Analysis and lagged coefficients by class period employee over titles with six or more years of data years Page 16 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page19 62 of 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL 39 It may be important relationships Adobe many that parameters with separately 40 The regression all much results for 1 Adobe The but instead titles relevant here because regression coefficients first a titles t statistic in data it is 18 in excess of excess of 2 has a tvalue above this would yield a small the R Among the Column 15 The has one negative title A 2 only 4 of 41 and no information about of correlations Column 9 which compensation is is together in Section said to 4 is produce for a sharing were connected force fit sq in the and probably insignificant effect of titles B Column market variable variable tstats The significant B then unless tstatistics more and the revenue results are of observations diminishes comes from the title reason with eleven years of titles external number title that my class overall equally A to attempt to link the variability in The model that I across all the class compensation of the class am makes estimating it effect of the model associated last that only to For than the class wide positive into the table as the not more likely to find a sharing The increment in the comparing 7 by conventional standards were largely determined by variability in compensation 7 not of the estimated regression 7 part in absolute value Column 16 variable in excess of model looks on the other hand less likely title wide variables6 by the are sorted in average real is each is far regressions are reported to their right in Section are highlighted effect more mixed deeper noted 2 corrective Column 17 overall descriptive of the four variables are collected significant estimate contemporaneous If The Adobe the two sharing variables that jump out with high often the As I which connecting Column this correlation require tstatistics statistically titles would or more years of data are two Sections give tstatistics 3 and the corresponding 6 this with the with seven titles between the percent change the correlation Roughly with other For example with 101 titles simpler structure the log levels of average real compensation 41 by the conspiracy more observations the data and the two correlations These The a matrix of sharing to estimate with only eleven years of data of the other reported in Exhibit more is the estimation of a 101 by 101 matrix of connections have estimated have a I there in principle directly affected titles in the class with six or titles potentially too connect that that are tied together with these affected that titles to understand with the column with the squared last three explanatory variables can be found by of the correlation Page 17 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page20 62 of 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL 42 This confirms the titles The summaryabove almost always positive to the lagged ratio of indicates that the if title V Decile 43 equal variable compensation in the title from its normal relationship with taken to either raise or lower compensation in Based Correlations and Multiple Regressions titlebased groups of titles regressions form the ten deciles based A Decile The To on which I split each groups these to conduct the Defendants I ranked correlation correlation on the study analysis I have formed and the multiple To Class titles into ten groups Technical basis of average lifetime of the title analysis of the ten groups Class employees ten groups that had positive for the levels correlation inflation adjusted and then divided these up shows both immediate structures yields strong evidence for each into correlations its firms and longrun with and supports of both short subgroup of the Defendants Figure 9 and Figure 10 indicate with the Technical and 10 out of 10 every group shares in consistent in this that are Correlation Analysis and long run compensation Thus titles titles on employee years 8 Based Technical titles excludes necessity include compensation over the total by study just described populated infrequently is departs corrective title The 44 is the relative to title compensation action on coefficients compensation the class then corrective the providing direct evidence of sharing across for the percent the numbers of the Class 10 out of 10 change correlations compensation structure Every group correlation my conclusion structure that for every group This the Defendants compensation was semirigid 8 Since Lucasfilm Although I did not provide title data individuals were ranked attempted to break the firms up into 10 equal sized in groups a similar fashion equal for Lucasfilm based on employee years some groups end up being larger than others because of some big titles Page 18 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 2 Filed0517 13 Page21 of 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL Figure 9 Large Share of Change Compensation Change Correlations Correlation are Positive by Deciles 100 80 60 Share 40 20 0 ADOBE GOOGLE APPLE INTEL INTUIT Negative Source Note Distribution Defendant of growth in Employee LUCASFILM PIXAR Positive Compensation avg compensation correlation Data Correlation by class weighted Analysis period employee years Figure 10 Large Share of Level Correlations are Positive Compensation by Deciles Correlation 100 80 60 Share 40 20 0 ADOBE GOOGLE APPLE INTEL INTUIT Negative Source Note Distribution Defendant of log avg Employee compensation LUCASFILM PIXAR Positive Compensation correlation Data weighted Correlation by Analysis class period employee years Page 19 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 2 Filed0517 13 Page22 45 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL B of Decile Based Multiple Regression Results have Multiple regressions summarized in Figure contemporaneous and also been estimated with these 11 and Figure laggedare 12 below the positive decile data As sharing effects both rule Figure 11 Large Share of Contemporaneous Coefficients are Positive Contemporaneous Coefficient by Deciles 100 80 60 Share 40 20 0 ADOBE APPLE GOOGLE INTEL INTUIT Negative Source Note Distribution Defendant of estimated Employee LUCASFILM PIXAR Positive Compensation contemporaneous coefficient Data Regression weighted by class Analysis period employee years Page 20 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page23 of 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL Figure 12 Large Share of Lagged Coefficients are Positive Lagged by Deciles Coefficient 100 80 60 Share 40 20 0 ADOBE GOOGLE APPLE INTEL Negative Source Note 46 The Employee Defendant Distribution of almost always positive indicate that the if title Compensation Data Regression by class weighted on the coefficients compensation of Analysis period employee years corrective a decile departs with the class then corrective relationship PIXAR Positive lagged coefficient estimated LUCASFILM INTUIT action is variable from in Figure 12 normal its taken to either or lower raise classwide compensation impact in the decile suppressing wages in The cold some calling conspiracy titles would have some effect averages which in turn would suppress compensation the 47 titles are several important in either the Second those things to note contemporaneous group Many of these are of positive statistically support for internal relationships impact common to of negative First every group relationship are not statistically that are negative in the context of evidence make in all direct on the or almost all of in the class Figure 11 and Figure 12 contain a few instances effect would have that sharing across all has a positive There sharing or the lagged relationship significant relationships significant estimates In Third these occur for almost every sum this analysis provides these groups that would tend to each Page 21 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page24 62 of 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL 48 Here I want to issue another coefficients It is important the changing composition number of adding a compensation workers impact To into account test this opinion Adobe dataset as set examined the any of the 51 Adobe The have forth for each closely conclusion I previously statistical which the reported 10 in their headcounts in Class and outputs for the correlation my view confirm that the title is consistent title I find nothing have similarly in that data to that the movement Class with the compensation of a in the rest of the Technical and the class have with sharing Common Factors characteristics compare movement of the Analysis moves in a way A that Class thus supporting the coordinated compensation that compensation individual characteristics title title title levels a of gains and broad impact of the anti cold on measured within a of real Class overall but excluding the selected means but also depends in the Technical confirmation that at least some individual changes in the individual the correlation demonstrated with the on examined the below They title in compensation similar to any year depends for titles with just a find no compelling reason from the Technical of the other defendants numerical correlations high positive 9 of individual large changes10 I the Adobe Correlations compensation of the Technical fact average company and variability of these data titles For instance titles be a bigger problem to 9 Correlation Results compensation is title by to the question of whether Idiosyncratic experience the limitations I can be affected this conclusion contradict 1 data going title is Additional Exploration of 50 within each workers might bring down the for titles that this analysis to exclude VI of the workforce of the unlawful agreements within a of negative to realize that these coefficients or vice versa for reasons unrelated few employees and Taking about misinterpretation share broadly in things such as the gains of the characteristics 49 junior warning matter can cause changes at characteristics in the individual including level in age This is and this raises the possibility that title compensation that can mask firmwide common component Though a stable headcount can come from equal numbers of departures and new arrivals Page 22 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page25 of 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL whether calling conspiracy the Technical 52 directly affects it on 5 correlations based The sorted to 6 and is first shaded Technical 53 The This first is in green they are populated title Titles with the weakest since 6 or more years shaded statistically in insignificant Class overall with the Technical statistical The was populated from 11 with the Technical correlation statistical are in of years the title of the Class at correlation Adobe with the yellow in Exhibit 1 has the first year of data for each title the early years from 2001 to 2003 had a sharp decline Class compensation for It under study or the rest of observations are often by the number column of numbers early years thus are together or fewer Adobe Class at important Technical if then by the correlation Titles with the strongest are title Class Titles are included in the table table the an important would not be Adobe test surprising in Figure as illustrated bed for identifying which weaker to find statistically in 13 and these titles moved results if these years are not included Figure 13 Class Average Total Compensation Technical Compensation Adobe Total Average Source Note Inflation Defendant adjusted average Employee Compensation compensation with Data 2011 as base year Page 23 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page26 62 of 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL 54 The second column populated This the reports number of also important is since the during which the years truncated this table the number at For that 6 or more of years equal to reason I have since with 5 or fewer years populated 55 are estimated with greater statistical The number 2 56 It third column measures Headcount Matters is my view that title structure and personal characteristics consequently some changes go variability titles in average may have as which masks is and comes from employees come and unusual employee substantially a close fully tenure on compensation of employees lose or gain a large fraction that company at the title level of employee characteristics that structure but not age experience compensation in compensation of these characteristics like title have an impact have just a few employees and characteristics Variables to error Correlations influenced by the are likely of the change in the distribution Titles that is the cases of employee years for Interpreting compensation by the determined the was accuracy of the estimate of statistical depends on the number of observations correlation title connection influenced by may have variability with the Technical Class overall 57 The Technical Figure may 14 Class overall are losing gaining may have a rising headcounts employee headcount as illustrated similar to the Technical characteristics while in Class titles that workers much more rapidly than the Technical average compensation histories different Class not because employees in similar movementsin workers or Class overall Technical movement Titles with experience has experienced there in the title is changing is from the no sharing but because the group of enough to mask the sharing Page 24 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page27 62 of 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL Figure 14 Adobe Class Average Headcount Technical per Title 40 30 Title 20 Employees 10 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Source 3 58 2006 2007 Employee Defendant Compensation 2009 2010 2011 Data Correlations As described determining correlations above if the there are two types of correlations movementsof Section compensation 2 the in Exhibit in the title two third change in the logarithm of average real total Technical The for are relevant The first column 1 compares the logarithm of average The Class which series are similar and the logarithm of average of the rest of the Technical 59 2008 real total of total real compensation column of Section 2 compares the compensation of the title with the Class excluding the title tstatistics corresponding for these correlations are reported immediately tstatistics following each correlation greater than years in which the two title is and the are statistically shaded populated The significant correlations table is sorted first and second by the by correlation the with number of between the log levels 60 The statistically from the longest most significant time series with correlations all with the shaded tstatistics come eleven years of data populated That is a Page 25 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 2 Filed0517 13 Page28 of 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL of any feature significant statistically 61 There are no negative populated These statistically 4 62 exercise statistical is time series the more the are the findings correlations positive significant the longer in for the correlations 41 titles with all eleven years larger than zero are statistically 39 out of the 41 cases Outliers To fully these correlations and the significance understand anomalies it may be 16 have the average employees helpful real to look at some Class overall Figure 15 eleven years of data that are most highly correlated overall and Figure 16 has the least correlated together which is The title with the lowest correlation different but not dramatically of the data displays Figure 15 and Figure compensation for ten Adobe in the Technical not or titles is titles and illustrates for the the five with the Technical All these titles Adobe titles with Class move TECHNICALWRITER 2 so Page 26 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page29 of 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL Figure 15 Selected Adobe Titles with a Full 11 years of Data Most Correlated Average Total Compensation Compensation Titles Total Average Source Note Titles Defendant with Inflation highest adjusted Employee Compensation Data Correlation Analysis log compensation correlation among fully populated average total compensation with 2011 as base year titles Figure 16 Compensation Correlated Titles Average Total Compensation Compensation Least Total Total Average Average Source Note Titles Defendant with highest Inflation adjusted Employee log Compensation compensation average total Data correlation compensation Correlation among with fully Analysis populated 2011 as base titles year Page 27 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page30 62 of 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL 63 However as noted above when may change characteristics with the lowest correlation change headcounts too The substantially are illustrated is for the two headcounts in Figure 17 The headcount very volatile with a standard the percent change equal to 72 percent compared benchmark of 11 percent away compared with the Technical with an average annual percent Class benchmark 17 Headcounts Least with the Technical of for of Class basically 12 percent of increase titles deviation title is withering Figure employee substantially 5 percent Least Correlated Titles Correlated Titles Headcount 12 10 8 Headcount 6 Title 4 2 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 Source Note 64 The variability problem It Titles 2005 Defendant with lowest 2006 2008 Employee Compensation Data Correlation Analysis compensation correlation among fully populated for these substantially two to the smooth elevation of age of compensation titles not just a hypothetical Class overall jump upward is disconnect in the Technical 2011 titles which in Figure 18 are In of the median age of the class the median age has a big contribute to the apparent titles is 2010 the median ages for these contrasted with the median age of the Technical contrast 2009 log in the headcounts has affected 2007 in 2006 and highly volatile These between compensation Class overall And in any the median facts surely in these titles event these and results Page 28 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page31 of 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL offer no reason pay structure my conclusion to question that applied to all these titles I offer these two presence of a few outlier titles how conclusions about its let been harmed examples simply to in the analyses rigid in the point that the illustrate our does not challenge basic these companies pay their employees which are also alone convincing evidence 18 Median ages Least Correlated I have not seen any any of these that by the anti competitive behavior Figure a somewhat exhibits employees including those salaried by economic theory and the evidentiary supported evidence of Adobe that I titles would not have have studied Least Correlated Titles Titles Median Age 45 40 Age Median 35 30 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Technical Source Note VII Titles Defendant with Employee Compensation Data Correlation Analysis compensation correlation among fully populated lowest log 2011 Class titles Internal Versus External Forces 65 The regression are generally forces I analysis reported more detectable expand on above indicates generally this finding in this section correlation or the external Class employees and the within firms between effects market with an examination of the Class employees of each of the defendants more the internal sharing than either revenue sharing average real compensation for the Technical Technical that I show non here that there is these two groups than between Page 29 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 2 Filed0517 13 Page32 62 of 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL firms for either group Thus again very evident while the external 66 Figure 19 below for the Technical compensation average that For most defendants closely tracks compensation total than between RD and is firms In other to detect non Technical for the these two subgroups should It much more generally forces are the average total compensation one another words more difficult are defendant Class employees the internal sharing that market forces for each illustrates NRD employees I observe also Class have total be evident similar within each that firm the internal sharing forces dominate and keep the compensation of the Technical Class employees and the non Technical Class employees closely aligned 67 This visual observation numerically by the computation of the confirmed is over time of the change correlations in logarithms of the average total compensation between these fourteen groups of employees reported The boxes down Correlations in excess of 0.9 are shaded RD and NRD the within firm correlations between boxes refer to comparisons between firms Four out of boxes and are in these correlations correlation of 0.86 correlation in every row and column making by very contaminated it hard to estimate large bonuses in five of the Google has an the percent and 1 these shaded internal is the largest Lucasfilm has a very change The correlation for producers Table Correlations outside except for Lucasfilm little variability in the diagonal contain Furthermore the within firm correlation short time series with very compensation in addition real in Pixar directors data are in 2002 and 2006 68 Table 2 has the levels correlations that capture the longer term of the compensation series These confirm the importance forces compared with the external forces sense that the within firm correlation column except because the for Lucasfilm Lucasfilm data compensation at is is forces for all of the internal but Lucasfilm the largest correlation Lucasfilm and Intel appear to confined co movements in every move in the row and together only to a brief period of stable growth of both firms Page 30 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 2 Filed0517 13 Page33 of 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL Figure 19 Defendant RD vs NRD Average Total Compensation Page 31 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 2 Filed0517 13 Page34 of 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL Table Correlations of Changes in 1 Defendants Average Total Compensation 2001 2011 Adobe Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar NRD RD NRD RD NRD RD NRD RD NRD RD NRD RD NRD RD NRD 1.00 0.94 0.66 0.56 0.17 0.16 0.47 0.60 0.63 0.60 0.19 0.62 0.53 0.53 RD 0.94 1.00 0.64 0.65 0.13 0.24 0.34 0.45 0.53 0.51 0.12 0.67 0.51 0.37 NRD 0.66 0.64 1.00 0.93 0.48 0.17 0.02 0.16 0.85 0.73 0.08 0.87 0.56 0.16 RD 0.56 0.65 0.93 1.00 0.42 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.77 0.63 0.11 0.83 0.45 0.05 NRD 0.17 0.13 0.48 0.42 1.00 0.86 0.51 0.39 0.20 0.17 0.49 0.89 0.62 0.21 RD 0.16 0.24 0.17 0.07 0.86 1.00 0.53 0.50 0.09 0.06 0.68 0.83 0.50 0.19 NRD 0.47 0.34 0.02 0.12 0.51 0.53 1.00 0.97 0.31 0.30 0.01 0.92 0.00 0.89 RD 0.60 0.45 0.16 0.00 0.39 0.50 0.97 1.00 0.38 0.33 0.23 0.70 0.03 0.89 NRD 0.63 0.53 0.85 0.77 0.20 0.09 0.31 0.38 1.00 0.91 0.15 0.17 0.43 0.28 RD 0.60 0.51 0.73 0.63 0.17 0.06 0.30 0.33 0.91 1.00 0.51 0.55 0.63 0.34 NRD 0.19 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.49 0.68 0.01 0.23 0.15 0.51 1.00 0.24 0.03 0.38 RD 0.62 0.67 0.87 0.83 0.89 0.83 0.92 0.70 0.17 0.55 0.24 1.00 0.58 0.29 NRD Adobe 0.53 0.51 0.56 0.45 0.62 0.50 0.00 0.03 0.43 0.63 0.03 0.58 1.00 0.29 RD 0.53 0.37 0.16 0.05 0.21 0.19 0.89 0.89 0.28 0.34 0.38 0.29 0.29 1.00 Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Note Values above 0.9 shaded Source Defendants employee compensation data Page 32 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 2 Filed0517 13 Page35 of 62 5 10 2013 CONFIDENTIAL Table Correlations of 2 Defendants Average Total Compensation 2001 2011 Adobe NRD RD Apple NRD RD Google Intel NRD RD NRD RD Lucasfilm Intuit NRD RD NRD RD Pixar NRD RD NRD 1.00 0.88 0.17 0.17 0.43 0.73 0.18 0.58 0.50 0.41 0.15 0.04 0.33 0.38 RD 0.88 1.00 0.24 0.27 0.05 0.63 0.47 0.72 0.69 0.61 0.40 0.32 0.48 0.51 NRD 0.17 0.24 1.00 0.99 0.91 0.38 0.65 0.33 0.64 0.68 0.74 0.58 0.48 0.39 RD 0.17 0.27 0.99 1.00 0.90 0.33 0.69 0.37 0.64 0.66 0.83 0.72 0.46 0.40 NRD 0.43 0.05 0.91 0.90 1.00 0.67 0.53 0.13 0.36 0.44 0.81 0.59 0.46 0.28 RD 0.73 0.63 0.38 0.33 0.67 1.00 0.05 0.44 0.20 0.08 0.47 0.04 0.22 0.12 NRD 0.18 0.47 0.65 0.69 0.53 0.05 1.00 0.87 0.64 0.66 0.93 0.98 0.54 0.86 RD 0.58 0.72 0.33 0.37 0.13 0.44 0.87 1.00 0.65 0.62 0.91 0.96 0.48 0.90 NRD 0.50 0.69 0.64 0.64 0.36 0.20 0.64 0.65 1.00 0.94 0.63 0.54 0.55 0.54 RD 0.41 0.61 0.68 0.66 0.44 0.08 0.66 0.62 0.94 1.00 0.78 0.91 0.72 0.62 NRD 0.15 0.40 0.74 0.83 0.81 0.47 0.93 0.91 0.63 0.78 1.00 0.88 0.63 0.83 RD 0.04 0.32 0.58 0.72 0.59 0.04 0.98 0.96 0.54 0.91 0.88 1.00 0.62 0.86 NRD Adobe 0.33 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.22 0.54 0.48 0.55 0.72 0.63 0.62 1.00 0.65 RD 0.38 0.51 0.39 0.40 0.28 0.12 0.86 0.90 0.54 0.62 0.83 0.86 0.65 1.00 Apple Google Intel Intuit Lucasfilm Pixar Note Values above 0.9 shaded Source Defendants employee compensation data Page 33 Supplemental Expert Report of Edward E Leamer PhD Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 2 Filed0517 13 Page36 of 62 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 2 Filed0517 13 Exhibit 1 Page37 of 62 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Exhibit 2 Filed0517 13 Page38 62 of 1 Adobe Section First Job Title Year 1 Years of 1 Section Total Emp Data 2 Level Years 3 Avg Emp 4 dlog Avg 5 dlog Std Dev 6 Correlation Coeff 7 T Stat 8 2 Section Change Correlation Regression 9 T Stat Contemp 10 Coeff 11 Lagged 12 3 Section Coefficients Revenue Regression SJ 13 Emp 14 Contemp 15 Lagged 16 4 T Section Net Stats Revenue SJ 17 Emp 18 C L 19 5 Section 6 Effect T Stat Obs r2 20 21 22 2001 11 170 15 0.27 0.34 0.90 6.07 0.89 5.55 1.18 1.04 0.12 0.02 5.15 6.71 1.77 0.07 2.22 8.15 10 0.98 2001 11 311 28 0.05 0.19 0.89 5.89 0.78 3.55 1.07 1.18 0.09 0.31 0.67 1.38 0.25 0.25 2.25 1.66 10 0.74 2001 11 371 34 0.11 0.16 0.89 5.73 0.79 3.59 0.67 1.33 0.12 0.34 0.66 1.95 0.45 0.36 2.01 1.99 10 0.81 2001 11 29 3 0.16 0.65 0.87 5.37 0.78 3.56 2.67 1.08 0.33 0.48 1.49 1.80 0.80 0.32 3.75 2.24 10 0.79 2001 11 82 7 0.10 0.25 0.85 4.87 0.72 2.97 0.89 1.09 0.46 0.58 0.65 1.99 1.23 0.39 1.97 1.39 10 0.77 2001 11 108 10 0.03 0.40 0.84 4.73 0.82 4.08 0.93 0.88 0.04 0.51 2.43 3.32 0.37 1.38 1.81 3.34 10 0.94 2001 11 96 9 0.12 0.37 0.84 4.65 0.85 4.56 0.80 0.59 0.05 0.84 1.93 2.68 0.45 1.89 1.38 2.66 10 0.95 2001 11 250 23 0.04 0.16 0.84 4.60 0.85 4.47 1.28 0.97 0.08 0.19 2.60 3.59 0.47 0.37 2.25 3.83 10 0.93 2001 11 559 51 0.11 0.20 0.83 4.53 0.88 5.31 0.94 0.80 0.21 0.04 2.27 2.28 1.45 0.08 1.74 3.24 10 0.92 2001 11 93 8 0.11 0.26 0.81 4.19 0.67 2.54 3.21 0.89 0.24 1.55 1.03 0.75 0.30 0.62 4.10 1.49 10 0.63 2001 11 14 1 0.00 0.45 0.80 3.97 0.63 2.29 2.50 0.06 0.51 0.17 0.50 0.04 0.40 0.04 2.57 0.56 10 0.57 2001 11 152 14 0.28 0.15 0.78 3.74 0.72 2.96 0.54 0.65 0.13 0.54 0.98 1.60 0.89 1.07 1.18 1.43 10 0.81 2001 11 202 18 0.06 0.25 0.78 3.74 0.70 2.78 0.68 1.24 0.21 0.34 1.30 4.27 1.40 0.67 1.91 3.24 10 0.92 2001 11 550 50 0.06 0.18 0.78 3.70 0.95 8.29 0.99 0.15 0.06 0.43 2.87 0.54 0.47 0.94 1.14 2.66 10 0.94 2001 11 234 21 0.07 0.22 0.78 3.68 0.73 2.98 0.97 1.14 0.12 0.29 1.56 2.19 0.43 0.48 2.11 2.22 10 0.82 2001 11 273 25 0.17 0.19 0.77 3.60 0.74 3.11 0.34 1.32 0.23 0.33 0.60 2.67 1.59 0.66 1.66 2.77 10 0.86 2001 11 327 30 0.11 0.14 0.74 3.34 0.82 4.00 0.66 0.40 0.11 0.19 1.39 1.12 0.74 0.38 1.06 1.67 10 0.78 2001 11 434 39 0.07 0.18 0.74 3.29 0.65 2.39 0.72 1.09 0.21 0.30 1.29 2.84 1.33 0.56 1.82 2.39 10 0.84 2001 11 196 18 0.13 0.24 0.74 3.27 0.82 4.06 1.23 0.57 0.09 0.02 1.48 1.38 0.29 0.02 1.80 1.87 10 0.78 2001 11 353 32 0.06 0.19 0.73 3.23 0.56 1.91 0.81 1.43 0.17 0.44 1.59 4.09 1.21 0.94 2.23 3.21 10 0.87 2001 11 309 28 0.08 0.23 0.71 3.03 0.61 2.20 0.96 1.13 0.06 0.24 1.27 2.23 0.24 0.34 2.09 1.95 10 0.73 2001 11 94 9 0.08 0.27 0.71 3.03 0.62 2.25 0.65 1.02 0.11 0.58 0.89 2.65 0.49 0.79 1.68 1.74 10 0.83 2001 11 2095 190 0.05 0.13 0.70 2.91 0.69 2.68 0.26 0.49 0.12 0.35 0.60 1.35 0.88 0.79 0.75 1.25 10 0.72 2001 11 514 47 0.08 0.22 0.70 2.90 0.63 2.27 0.71 0.97 0.08 0.45 0.91 2.30 0.29 0.57 1.68 1.66 10 0.77 2001 11 35 3 0.00 0.32 0.69 2.90 0.53 1.75 0.58 1.09 0.15 0.15 0.45 2.12 0.47 0.09 1.67 1.05 10 0.81 2001 11 215 20 0.07 0.53 0.69 2.88 0.46 1.48 0.35 1.26 0.07 0.47 0.51 3.49 0.39 0.69 1.61 1.88 10 0.82 2001 11 496 45 0.05 0.20 0.67 2.74 0.75 3.18 0.08 0.47 0.14 0.56 0.17 1.29 0.89 0.91 0.56 0.87 10 0.83 2001 11 466 42 0.06 0.11 0.67 2.74 0.69 2.71 0.27 0.62 0.10 0.27 0.49 1.62 0.59 0.48 0.89 1.33 10 0.71 2001 11 234 21 0.09 0.33 0.67 2.71 0.77 3.39 0.10 0.27 0.17 1.23 0.21 1.12 1.01 2.21 0.38 0.63 10 0.87 2001 11 1441 131 0.06 0.19 0.65 2.55 0.48 1.56 0.24 0.71 0.11 0.54 0.35 1.51 0.58 0.89 0.94 0.98 10 0.61 2001 11 302 27 0.00 0.21 0.64 2.49 0.91 6.03 0.62 0.10 0.17 0.94 2.20 0.67 1.72 2.57 0.72 2.18 10 0.95 2001 11 222 20 0.09 0.15 0.63 2.44 0.62 2.22 0.05 0.45 0.11 0.75 0.07 1.04 0.51 0.95 0.50 0.52 10 0.70 2001 11 975 89 0.12 0.23 0.63 2.42 0.48 1.55 0.24 0.49 0.00 0.40 0.39 1.05 0.01 0.71 0.73 0.86 10 0.42 2001 11 2041 186 0.05 0.20 0.61 2.33 0.57 1.94 0.07 0.43 0.14 0.55 0.14 1.04 0.80 1.04 0.50 0.67 10 0.62 2001 11 56 0.03 0.54 0.61 2.32 0.52 1.70 0.27 1.04 0.08 1.06 0.36 2.96 0.39 1.55 1.30 1.43 10 0.83 2001 11 2064 0.05 0.08 0.61 2.29 0.52 1.71 0.07 0.44 0.13 0.65 0.14 1.13 0.82 1.29 0.37 0.52 10 0.66 2001 11 100 9 0.09 0.31 0.60 2.27 0.61 2.20 1.92 0.91 0.00 3.12 1.44 1.96 0.00 2.95 2.83 2.36 10 0.86 2001 11 1008 92 0.06 0.27 0.59 2.17 0.56 1.91 0.36 0.56 0.26 0.29 0.57 1.18 1.41 0.48 0.91 1.09 10 0.62 2001 11 41 0.59 0.58 2.11 0.34 1.02 0.41 1.61 0.19 0.56 0.42 2.35 0.55 0.42 2.01 1.37 10 0.71 11 66 4 6 0.00 2001 0.06 0.72 0.51 1.77 0.37 1.13 1.62 0.86 0.57 1.57 4.28 3.06 4.84 5.82 2.48 3.98 10 0.91 5 188 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Exhibit 2 Filed0517 13 Page39 62 of 1 Adobe Section First Job Title Year 1 Years of 1 Section Total Emp Data 2 Level Years Avg 3 Emp 4 dlog Avg 5 dlog Std Dev 6 Correlation Coeff 7 T Stat 8 2 Section Change Correlation Regression 9 T Stat Contemp 10 Coeff 11 Lagged 12 3 Section Coefficients Revenue Regression SJ 13 Emp 14 Contemp 15 Lagged 16 4 T Section Net Stats Revenue SJ 17 Emp 18 C L 19 5 Section 6 Effect T Stat Obs r2 20 21 22 2005 7 22 3 0.18 0.41 0.76 2.64 0.15 0.31 0.14 0.93 0.38 0.36 0.11 1.48 0.68 0.21 1.07 0.60 6 0.91 2001 7 42 6 0.27 0.76 0.57 1.56 0.39 0.84 3.13 2.20 0.57 3.68 2.63 2.79 1.65 2.92 0.93 1.11 6 0.93 2001 7 88 13 0.41 0.33 0.53 1.38 0.38 0.82 3.36 5.49 1.61 7.47 4.12 6.77 4.51 5.53 2.13 6 1.00 2001 7 17 2 0.00 0.36 0.48 1.21 0.93 4.88 0.58 0.42 0.13 0.77 0.54 0.84 0.54 0.89 1.00 0.71 6 0.95 2005 7 93 13 0.00 0.27 0.40 0.98 0.97 7.56 1.30 0.10 0.07 0.02 2.06 0.28 0.24 0.03 1.40 1.76 6 0.94 2005 7 59 8 0.05 0.36 0.08 0.18 0.52 1.21 0.49 0.70 0.24 0.26 0.34 0.76 0.40 0.13 1.19 0.61 6 0.73 2001 6 46 8 0.14 0.21 0.98 0.90 3.49 2001 6 25 4 0.36 0.95 0.97 8.18 0.86 2.98 2001 6 19 3 0.06 0.45 0.96 7.28 0.93 4.41 2001 6 87 15 0.03 0.12 0.96 6.72 0.83 2.55 2001 6 13 2 0.28 1.05 0.94 5.50 0.94 4.92 2001 6 89 15 0.11 0.43 0.94 5.29 0.82 2.47 2001 6 108 18 0.01 0.23 0.93 5.23 0.74 1.90 2001 6 20 3 0.00 0.20 0.93 5.11 0.78 2.17 2001 6 16 3 0.06 0.70 0.92 4.77 0.58 1.23 2001 6 33 6 0.08 0.33 0.92 4.62 0.66 1.52 2001 6 22 4 0.03 0.74 0.89 3.99 0.94 4.80 2001 6 23 4 0.22 0.49 0.89 3.90 0.67 1.54 2001 6 35 6 0.09 0.26 0.89 3.87 0.91 3.90 2001 6 57 10 0.06 0.53 0.88 3.77 0.47 0.91 2001 6 10 2 0.22 0.32 0.88 3.74 0.50 1.00 2001 6 24 4 0.25 1.15 0.88 3.70 0.83 2.11 2001 6 21 4 0.36 0.59 0.88 3.66 0.49 0.97 2001 6 92 15 0.19 0.16 0.87 3.60 0.78 2.16 2001 6 68 11 0.00 0.21 0.86 3.44 0.66 1.51 2001 6 13 2 0.00 0.29 0.86 3.43 0.59 1.28 2001 6 27 5 0.42 0.63 0.86 3.38 0.74 1.92 2001 6 8 1 0.00 0.49 0.85 3.28 0.93 4.31 2001 6 15 3 0.08 0.34 0.85 3.18 0.27 0.49 2001 6 26 4 0.04 0.41 0.82 2.84 0.76 2.03 2006 6 7 1 0.14 0.31 0.81 2.81 0.85 2.85 2001 6 18 3 0.00 0.51 0.67 1.79 0.43 0.82 2001 6 105 18 0.04 0.36 0.66 1.74 0.68 1.59 2006 6 27 5 0.14 0.46 0.62 1.57 0.61 1.34 2006 6 19 3 0.08 0.52 0.61 1.55 0.54 1.11 2001 6 15 3 0.14 0.90 0.61 1.54 0.14 0.24 2001 6 12 2 0.22 0.32 0.57 1.39 0.76 2.05 2001 6 15 3 0.22 0.32 0.57 1.38 0.56 1.17 2006 6 19 0.53 0.34 0.72 0.21 0.38 6 6 3 1 0.28 2004 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.26 0.28 0.50 10.31 10.60 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 2 Filed0517 13 Exhibit 2 Page40 of 62 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page41 62 of Exhibit 2 Apple Section Years Job Title of 1 Section Total Level Emp Years Data T Coeff 2 Section Change Correlation Correlation T Coeff Stat 3 Section Regression Stat Contemp Coefficients Lagged Revenue Regression SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 Section T Stats Net Revenue SJ Emp C 5 Section T Stat L 6 Effect r2 11 294 0.98 13.53 0.74 3.11 0.80 0.04 0.34 0.06 1.64 0.05 0.81 0.13 0.84 0.76 0.71 11 501 0.98 13.42 0.87 4.91 2.46 1.09 0.70 0.67 5.33 1.71 1.82 1.18 3.56 4.85 0.92 11 229 0.98 13.33 0.65 2.41 1.15 0.97 0.09 0.08 2.58 1.52 0.26 0.19 2.12 2.15 0.73 11 169 0.97 12.72 0.70 2.79 1.29 1.49 0.57 0.28 2.17 1.67 1.00 0.46 2.78 2.20 0.72 11 352 0.95 9.16 0.71 2.82 0.92 0.22 0.76 0.16 1.56 0.39 1.55 0.26 0.71 0.72 0.78 11 189 0.93 7.38 0.84 4.39 1.68 0.36 0.20 0.87 1.81 0.38 0.26 0.87 2.04 1.39 0.82 11 428 0.91 6.72 0.65 2.45 0.51 4.63 2.48 1.62 0.53 2.82 2.28 1.57 5.14 2.93 0.82 11 156 0.88 5.54 0.39 1.21 0.71 0.25 0.28 0.62 0.95 0.38 0.40 0.67 0.96 0.77 0.29 11 118 0.68 2.82 0.36 1.09 0.58 0.17 0.11 0.23 0.86 0.31 0.16 0.24 0.75 0.70 0.16 11 686 0.49 1.69 0.43 1.33 0.66 0.47 0.15 0.49 0.68 0.60 0.18 0.40 1.13 0.73 0.52 11 58 0.50 1.71 0.07 0.20 0.03 0.11 0.21 0.27 0.05 0.28 0.49 0.47 0.09 0.11 0.10 10 82 0.67 2.52 0.03 0.08 0.38 0.08 0.18 0.01 0.39 0.10 0.22 0.01 0.30 0.19 0.34 10 184 0.81 3.84 0.25 0.68 0.17 0.08 0.18 0.91 0.20 0.11 0.24 0.81 0.09 0.07 0.40 10 110 0.81 3.93 0.71 2.64 0.69 0.07 0.04 0.53 2.98 0.36 0.18 1.86 0.76 2.06 0.75 10 66 0.89 5.57 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.20 1.03 0.53 0.47 1.12 0.20 0.92 0.36 0.85 4.33 0.55 1.59 0.43 0.03 0.14 0.95 1.37 0.14 0.54 1.36 0.39 0.79 0.83 11.69 0.59 1.27 1.84 3.27 2.40 1.69 9 116 8 44 0.98 8 35 0.97 9.97 0.78 2.48 0.30 0.21 1.02 0.21 1.13 0.37 3.49 0.93 0.50 0.73 0.99 8 19 0.76 2.89 0.62 1.78 0.16 0.16 0.02 0.78 0.78 0.97 0.13 1.91 0.00 0.01 0.86 8 52 0.82 3.57 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.50 0.28 0.51 0.36 0.22 0.40 0.57 8 13 0.96 7.90 0.24 0.55 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.22 0.84 0.50 0.27 0.69 0.14 0.78 0.51 7 71 0.99 22.21 0.95 5.95 0.54 0.46 0.07 0.06 1.39 0.22 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.94 7 193 0.99 20.45 0.95 6.20 1.49 1.49 0.41 0.82 12.36 3.86 2.99 1.89 2.98 6.80 1.00 7 626 0.99 16.77 0.94 5.77 1.41 1.40 0.29 0.07 30.92 4.57 3.71 0.27 2.82 8.34 1.00 7 184 0.99 16.70 0.96 6.91 1.16 1.48 0.31 0.23 3.69 0.99 0.69 0.27 2.64 1.81 0.97 0.99 14.96 0.92 4.55 0.88 0.60 0.16 0.65 10.23 3.85 1.64 3.23 1.48 7.27 0.99 0.99 13.76 0.81 2.81 0.24 0.38 0.08 0.22 0.48 0.29 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.80 7 7 2566 29 7 253 0.98 12.12 0.92 4.72 0.76 1.16 0.20 0.64 1.85 1.01 0.73 0.66 1.92 1.84 0.95 7 130 0.98 10.75 0.89 3.94 0.47 5.06 1.65 5.63 0.64 1.93 1.97 1.78 4.59 2.36 0.97 7 447 0.98 10.68 0.95 6.15 1.48 0.65 0.02 0.45 2.89 0.47 0.04 0.35 2.12 1.64 0.96 7 244 0.98 10.66 0.88 3.63 0.18 4.02 1.70 0.93 0.73 3.21 3.80 7.34 4.20 2.81 1.00 7 125 0.98 9.93 0.86 3.39 0.99 1.14 0.05 0.09 4.26 3.10 0.20 0.19 2.14 5.47 0.98 0.98 9.91 0.93 4.96 0.85 0.41 0.34 1.08 5.64 1.91 2.09 2.89 1.26 4.61 0.99 0.97 9.77 0.81 2.81 1.59 2.35 1.09 2.20 5.11 4.37 4.08 2.80 3.94 6.55 0.98 7 7 1364 54 7 236 0.97 9.58 0.97 7.42 0.99 0.57 0.28 0.18 2.55 1.16 0.76 0.24 1.56 3.63 0.97 7 475 0.97 9.33 0.84 3.04 0.55 0.80 0.42 1.16 2.01 1.71 1.67 1.34 1.35 2.55 0.95 0.97 9.17 0.81 2.81 0.66 0.37 0.03 0.87 9.39 3.50 0.50 5.68 1.03 6.50 0.99 4.22 3.00 79.73 1.00 7.66 1.52 14.05 1.00 7 1304 7 110 0.97 8.72 0.95 6.06 1.93 1.07 0.23 0.24 108.02 31.38 7 902 0.97 8.62 0.82 2.84 0.83 0.68 0.49 1.09 13.99 9.36 14.63 7.98 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page42 62 of Exhibit 2 Apple Section Years Job Title of 1 Section Total Level Emp Years Data 7 17 T Coeff 2 Section Change Correlation Correlation T Coeff Stat 3 Section Regression Stat Contemp Coefficients Lagged Revenue Regression SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 Section T Stats Net Revenue 0.95 7.08 0.71 2.01 1.88 6.66 3.36 7.09 7.10 9.22 8.26 SJ Emp 6.61 16.05 C 5 Section T Stat L 6 Effect r2 10.88 1.00 0.75 7.07 1.00 8.54 7 127 0.95 6.94 0.52 1.21 0.56 0.19 0.28 1.66 15.61 2.26 7.87 7 142 0.95 6.80 0.83 2.99 0.30 3.49 0.40 0.56 0.28 2.08 0.91 0.41 3.19 2.94 0.95 1.09 2.55 0.84 2.00 2.49 4.60 2.54 2.18 3.64 5.17 0.98 2.37 0.57 0.11 0.28 3.89 0.73 0.43 0.38 1.80 3.15 0.98 7 63 0.95 6.73 0.69 1.92 7 45 0.95 6.73 0.99 12.42 7 98 0.95 6.52 0.84 3.11 0.42 0.03 0.15 0.86 2.29 0.16 0.60 1.47 0.39 1.18 0.93 7 70 0.94 6.46 0.88 3.72 1.03 3.36 0.26 1.34 1.02 0.65 0.33 0.29 4.39 1.02 0.95 0.94 6.42 0.96 7.04 1.85 0.66 0.02 0.43 20.57 4.80 0.28 1.92 2.51 19.20 1.00 0.94 6.33 0.60 1.52 0.75 0.73 0.18 0.36 3.05 2.18 0.96 0.70 1.48 2.83 0.92 7 7 182 2915 7 134 0.94 6.30 0.66 1.76 0.94 1.02 0.16 0.07 8.01 7.07 1.52 0.25 1.97 9.04 0.99 7 143 0.94 6.27 0.48 1.10 0.38 0.26 0.73 1.64 0.87 0.46 1.94 1.39 0.64 0.68 0.84 7 476 0.94 6.23 0.91 4.31 3.20 2.66 1.18 5.55 2.00 1.31 1.16 1.44 0.53 0.75 0.96 0.94 6.18 0.79 2.54 1.14 0.91 0.12 0.64 3.07 1.95 0.41 0.78 2.05 3.12 0.98 7 53 7 275 0.94 6.09 0.70 1.97 0.82 0.80 0.45 1.06 2.39 1.55 1.68 1.39 1.62 2.24 0.97 7 255 0.93 5.78 0.74 2.21 0.07 2.18 0.57 1.09 0.15 4.59 2.06 1.39 2.11 4.69 0.98 7 300 0.93 5.69 0.38 0.82 0.33 0.33 0.09 0.42 1.51 1.22 0.67 1.12 0.66 1.43 0.82 7 125 0.93 5.69 0.79 2.56 0.64 1.88 0.06 0.58 5.01 16.56 0.79 2.97 2.52 18.16 1.00 7 262 0.93 5.65 0.51 1.18 0.99 1.54 0.46 0.24 4.29 4.47 2.58 0.49 2.53 5.03 0.97 0.93 5.63 0.72 2.10 1.20 1.08 0.14 0.10 2.30 1.36 0.24 0.08 2.28 2.10 0.97 0.93 5.58 0.27 0.57 0.71 0.94 0.29 1.78 0.41 0.33 0.52 1.46 1.65 0.36 0.76 6.30 4.69 2.75 12.46 1.00 7 7 16 115 7 33 0.93 5.56 0.55 1.31 1.06 1.69 0.48 0.89 11.73 10.86 7 16 0.93 5.55 0.47 1.06 2.57 3.07 1.01 2.89 2.51 2.15 1.27 1.18 5.64 2.42 0.92 7 35 0.93 5.46 0.68 1.85 0.43 0.40 0.43 1.40 0.92 0.30 0.85 1.10 0.83 0.53 0.92 0.92 5.42 0.84 3.04 0.57 1.74 0.21 0.65 0.73 2.15 0.46 0.55 2.30 2.76 0.95 7 297 7 57 0.92 5.39 0.72 2.05 0.69 0.70 0.36 0.74 2.04 2.46 0.95 0.86 1.39 2.85 0.94 7 58 0.92 5.35 0.78 2.48 0.81 0.46 0.29 0.50 3.21 2.06 0.77 0.78 1.28 3.10 0.94 7 26 0.92 5.30 0.67 1.80 2.23 2.43 1.17 0.57 5.76 2.33 1.86 0.37 4.66 3.32 1.00 58.99 1.00 7 115 0.92 5.30 0.64 1.68 0.86 0.53 0.05 1.73 81.85 34.93 6.57 83.66 7 103 0.92 5.23 0.35 0.74 0.71 2.91 1.10 0.68 1.67 3.08 2.22 0.72 3.62 3.03 0.94 1.39 7 35 0.92 5.21 0.59 1.45 0.67 4.66 1.96 0.59 1.56 5.68 4.15 0.64 5.33 5.82 0.99 7 49 0.92 5.14 0.67 1.79 1.20 0.72 0.03 2.50 2.41 0.57 0.03 1.91 1.92 1.15 0.98 7 23 0.92 5.12 0.89 3.94 1.50 0.38 0.73 0.15 3.16 0.60 1.79 0.15 1.12 1.44 0.98 0.91 5.03 0.24 0.50 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.41 0.10 0.09 0.19 0.45 0.01 0.01 0.23 0.31 2.38 6.99 3.91 0.96 9.56 1.00 35.05 1.00 0.84 0.79 24.05 1.00 225.62 1.00 7 431 7 21 0.91 4.94 0.54 1.30 3.18 3.81 0.09 4.43 4.28 3.52 7 64 0.91 4.93 0.33 0.71 0.14 0.85 0.65 1.56 2.39 11.13 11.42 6.65 0.99 7 56 0.91 4.86 0.93 4.90 3.28 0.05 0.48 3.16 26.16 0.30 13.49 7.06 3.23 7 14 0.91 4.86 0.40 0.86 0.07 0.01 0.16 0.43 1.14 0.23 1.66 0.08 7 59 0.91 4.83 0.88 3.68 1.77 1.31 0.18 0.90 13.53 9.61 7 48 0.90 4.69 0.20 0.42 0.20 0.71 0.09 0.37 102.47 285.17 1.50 1.45 64.33 2.78 73.80 3.09 0.91 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page43 62 of Exhibit 2 Apple Section Years Job Title of 1 Section Total Level Emp Years Data T Coeff 2 Section Change Correlation Correlation T Coeff Stat 3 Section Regression Stat Contemp Coefficients Lagged Revenue Regression SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 Section T Stats Net Revenue SJ Emp C 5 Section T Stat L 6 Effect r2 7 37 0.88 4.25 0.04 0.07 0.57 0.88 0.53 0.36 1.77 2.44 2.49 0.57 1.45 2.29 0.89 7 34 0.88 4.25 0.15 0.30 1.13 2.90 1.26 0.78 2.87 5.65 3.68 0.93 4.03 5.04 0.98 7 8 0.88 4.20 0.89 3.94 1.47 0.70 0.91 1.65 9.23 2.78 5.87 4.83 0.78 2.62 1.00 0.88 4.17 0.40 0.87 0.34 0.62 0.43 0.72 1.28 1.65 1.75 1.23 0.96 1.71 0.99 7 103 7 7 0.88 4.15 0.72 2.05 0.53 0.22 0.32 0.27 3.42 1.74 1.18 0.56 0.75 3.01 0.94 7 8 0.88 4.11 0.04 0.09 0.44 1.15 0.14 0.78 0.71 1.55 0.31 0.53 1.58 1.29 0.81 7 28 0.88 4.08 0.45 1.02 0.07 3.01 0.73 2.35 0.56 12.67 6.31 6.82 3.09 11.64 1.00 7 61 0.88 4.08 0.26 0.55 1.31 2.69 1.24 1.51 3.08 3.00 2.32 2.70 4.00 3.06 0.99 7 25 0.87 4.01 0.59 1.45 0.28 3.71 1.43 0.39 8.63 82.49 54.77 6.26 3.99 78.44 1.00 7 7 0.87 3.98 0.26 0.53 1.98 2.62 1.42 5.06 1.68 2.14 1.30 1.91 4.61 2.14 0.98 0.87 3.94 0.85 3.21 3.43 3.62 0.07 5.76 2.07 1.57 0.14 1.48 0.19 0.18 0.94 0.87 3.94 0.61 1.53 0.61 1.04 0.29 1.97 1.40 2.07 0.84 1.88 1.64 2.22 0.93 0.87 3.93 0.50 1.16 0.27 0.05 0.31 0.87 0.23 0.04 0.66 0.51 0.22 0.10 0.51 0.87 3.91 0.49 1.14 0.28 2.39 0.62 0.66 0.16 0.99 0.48 0.16 2.11 0.87 0.81 2.27 0.94 7 7 7 7 501 74 192 11 7 116 0.87 3.89 0.21 0.43 6.50 7.89 2.48 6.52 2.32 2.22 1.95 1.50 14.39 7 239 0.87 3.89 0.89 3.90 0.95 0.13 0.56 0.89 1.43 0.16 1.08 0.59 0.82 0.81 0.90 7 10 0.86 3.83 0.54 1.30 4.35 6.24 1.52 7.36 0.67 0.87 0.63 0.57 1.89 0.66 0.80 7 44 0.86 3.78 0.52 1.22 0.32 0.27 0.00 0.96 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.74 0.59 0.21 0.54 7 21 0.86 3.69 0.69 1.91 0.77 0.40 0.84 1.36 0.94 0.44 1.35 0.74 0.37 0.30 0.95 7 17 0.85 3.65 0.68 1.84 1.99 1.43 0.04 0.81 2.93 1.69 0.07 0.45 3.42 2.63 0.97 0.85 3.60 0.92 4.56 1.94 0.26 0.17 0.60 0.89 0.17 0.12 0.17 1.68 1.12 0.84 7 563 7 12 0.85 3.58 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.26 0.46 0.51 0.68 1.37 0.74 0.25 0.65 0.79 7 57 0.85 3.58 0.46 1.03 0.26 1.45 0.06 1.52 0.14 1.18 0.06 0.40 1.19 0.60 0.89 0.85 3.57 0.90 4.16 1.96 0.40 0.23 2.66 15.41 5.76 2.47 9.44 1.55 13.27 1.00 0.85 3.55 0.04 0.07 0.55 0.93 0.28 2.78 0.76 0.91 0.66 3.50 1.48 0.86 0.95 7 7 145 33 7 131 0.85 3.55 0.76 2.36 0.54 0.17 0.73 1.81 1.90 0.72 2.37 2.35 0.71 1.63 0.96 7 267 0.84 3.52 0.16 0.32 0.22 0.30 1.27 2.14 0.14 0.19 0.35 0.20 0.51 0.17 0.51 7 47 0.84 3.43 0.29 0.60 0.83 1.09 0.45 1.22 1.10 1.76 0.48 0.69 1.91 1.62 0.85 7 60 0.84 3.42 0.52 1.21 0.83 0.25 0.30 0.36 0.54 0.17 0.26 0.29 1.09 0.41 0.36 7 8 0.84 3.40 0.06 0.12 0.13 3.20 1.30 2.42 0.36 3.70 2.62 2.29 3.33 3.00 0.97 7 50 0.83 3.35 0.61 1.56 0.65 0.05 0.93 1.56 4.31 0.32 7.83 4.65 0.70 2.62 1.00 7 57 0.83 3.34 0.11 0.22 0.25 0.75 0.33 0.60 0.87 2.96 1.13 0.67 1.00 2.18 0.95 7 20 0.83 3.33 0.35 0.75 0.24 0.46 0.59 1.46 0.59 1.17 1.77 1.65 0.70 1.04 0.99 7 20 0.83 3.32 0.38 0.83 0.34 1.47 0.20 0.34 2.79 7.80 1.91 1.02 1.14 3.94 1.00 7 40 0.82 3.24 0.94 5.74 1.96 0.82 0.43 0.51 3.60 1.74 1.46 0.51 1.14 2.01 0.98 0.82 3.24 0.91 4.27 1.43 0.33 0.57 0.59 1.18 0.30 0.81 0.26 1.11 0.79 0.89 1.37 5.78 2.74 18.75 0.55 1.16 1.17 1.69 7.16 0.96 0.99 7 144 7 23 0.82 3.21 0.55 1.31 7 72 0.82 3.17 0.01 0.02 0.59 0.65 1.04 2.39 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.44 1.24 0.49 0.22 7 47 0.81 3.07 0.71 2.01 1.22 0.50 0.87 1.01 2.88 1.31 2.57 1.08 1.72 2.53 0.98 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page44 62 of Exhibit 2 Apple Section Years Job Title of 1 Section Total Level Emp Years Data T Coeff 2 Section Change Correlation Correlation T Coeff Stat 3 Section Regression Stat Contemp Coefficients Lagged Revenue Regression SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 Section T Stats Net Revenue SJ Emp 7 26 0.70 2.22 0.23 0.48 0.23 0.43 0.86 0.85 15.24 28.90 49.37 7 25 0.70 2.20 0.68 1.86 0.94 0.69 0.33 3.50 0.89 0.45 0.39 1.53 7 38 0.70 2.20 0.79 2.56 9.17 2.35 7.19 19.15 1.03 2.58 0.73 0.53 7 18 0.66 1.95 0.11 0.22 2.32 2.16 0.46 7.71 1.39 1.67 0.35 1.99 7 58 0.66 1.95 0.07 0.15 0.76 0.61 1.32 2.62 1.44 1.90 2.40 7 26 0.65 1.90 0.43 0.95 1.80 1.36 0.95 0.78 1.91 1.85 7 13 0.65 1.90 0.51 1.18 1.56 2.39 0.40 6.21 0.64 7 51 0.64 1.88 0.23 0.47 1.80 1.79 0.28 0.82 7 14 0.64 1.87 0.38 0.82 0.56 0.52 0.89 7 57 0.64 1.86 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.08 7 11 0.63 1.82 0.45 1.01 1.68 7 24 0.63 1.80 0.57 1.40 0.62 1.79 0.04 7 127 12.29 C 5 Section T Stat L 6 Effect r2 25.59 1.00 0.82 0.88 1.20 0.97 4.48 1.69 0.93 1.36 0.14 0.20 0.97 0.84 0.32 3.16 2.12 0.83 1.99 0.29 1.79 0.83 0.26 0.97 1.11 1.29 0.21 0.21 3.59 1.32 0.74 4.00 1.07 1.02 2.18 3.39 1.08 1.20 0.97 1.16 3.51 2.94 2.71 47.78 0.01 0.26 1.00 1.26 0.17 1.18 3.40 3.03 0.42 1.01 2.93 3.65 0.97 0.12 7.51 4.87 14.39 0.13 2.03 2.22 3.54 7.63 1.69 0.99 0.08 2.05 1.96 4.08 9.17 7.13 7.37 9.16 8.99 4.01 7.51 0.99 40.82 0.66 1.62 11.52 7 45 0.62 1.79 0.82 2.90 1.18 0.46 0.62 0.77 1.08 0.92 0.50 0.58 1.64 1.07 0.97 7 36 0.58 1.58 0.86 3.38 3.09 0.55 1.14 3.47 0.92 0.56 0.39 0.63 3.64 0.88 0.87 7 52 0.57 1.57 0.56 1.34 0.91 0.24 2.01 5.19 0.41 0.17 1.13 1.29 0.67 0.21 0.91 0.56 1.51 0.25 0.51 0.93 0.88 0.89 1.03 2.28 2.86 1.87 1.16 1.81 2.82 0.94 7 137 7 18 0.55 1.49 0.33 0.69 0.11 0.48 2.73 0.70 0.25 1.33 3.40 0.55 0.59 0.78 0.98 7 13 0.55 1.48 0.52 1.23 0.42 1.07 2.09 2.76 0.47 1.46 3.04 1.39 0.65 0.46 0.97 7 59 0.55 1.46 0.06 0.12 0.37 0.17 0.75 5.12 0.25 0.10 0.87 2.95 0.54 0.18 0.93 7 16 0.54 1.45 0.47 1.07 3.59 2.10 0.38 3.17 2.25 1.44 0.44 0.55 5.69 1.95 0.93 7 34 0.54 1.42 0.41 0.90 0.50 0.48 1.73 2.69 1.25 1.52 5.22 2.97 0.01 0.02 0.98 7 35 0.53 1.39 0.50 1.17 0.35 0.64 1.85 0.64 0.37 0.92 2.26 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.94 7 41 0.53 1.38 0.52 1.21 0.82 0.14 0.66 1.97 1.45 0.32 0.93 1.55 0.96 1.08 0.86 7 46 0.52 1.36 0.33 0.69 1.08 1.05 0.12 0.61 6.60 8.54 0.68 1.70 2.13 8.30 1.00 7 15 0.52 1.35 0.73 2.16 0.40 0.56 0.89 2.38 0.20 0.51 0.62 0.68 0.96 0.38 0.84 0.52 1.35 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.16 0.08 0.05 2.19 2.67 0.66 0.17 0.33 2.68 0.95 7 646 7 14 0.51 1.33 0.20 0.41 0.55 0.31 1.05 0.73 0.34 0.25 0.34 0.15 0.86 0.37 0.55 7 47 0.51 1.31 0.96 6.64 1.90 0.37 0.00 0.63 3.25 1.24 0.00 0.50 1.53 2.14 0.97 7 27 0.50 1.30 0.11 0.23 1.00 1.69 0.29 2.35 5.14 10.67 1.89 4.56 0.69 2.25 1.00 7 17 0.49 1.25 0.19 0.38 0.61 0.30 1.50 1.86 1.24 0.79 3.44 1.64 0.91 1.17 0.98 7 13 0.49 1.24 0.72 2.07 2.54 2.26 1.08 0.56 0.86 0.91 0.51 0.10 0.28 0.06 0.95 7 63 0.47 1.20 0.14 0.29 0.42 0.43 1.07 1.20 0.49 0.68 1.03 0.38 0.01 0.01 0.91 7 85 0.47 1.18 0.43 0.96 0.01 0.28 1.09 0.67 0.01 0.41 0.72 0.15 0.27 0.14 0.90 7 60 0.45 1.11 0.74 2.18 0.54 0.10 0.20 0.50 1.72 0.44 0.46 0.35 0.64 1.31 0.88 7 19 0.44 1.10 0.46 1.03 0.96 1.03 1.13 5.03 2.16 3.27 4.56 5.89 1.98 2.79 1.00 7 10 0.44 1.08 0.78 2.50 5.10 0.41 0.38 7.95 0.71 0.11 0.12 0.81 4.69 0.46 0.79 7 69 0.42 1.04 0.10 0.20 0.58 2.48 1.20 12.14 0.30 0.89 1.11 0.64 3.06 1.33 0.87 7 36 0.42 1.03 0.34 0.73 0.26 0.23 0.76 0.15 1.39 1.93 2.82 0.32 0.03 0.10 0.94 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page45 62 of Exhibit 2 Apple Section Years Job Title of 1 Section Total Level Emp Years Data 7 7 T Coeff 29 117 2 Section Change Correlation Correlation T Coeff Stat 3 Section Regression Stat Contemp Coefficients Lagged Revenue Regression SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 Section T Stats Net Revenue SJ Emp C 5 Section T Stat L 6 Effect r2 0.08 0.18 0.33 0.70 0.04 0.09 1.00 2.10 0.04 0.12 0.78 0.64 0.13 0.08 0.73 0.04 0.08 0.26 0.55 0.56 1.36 6.15 1.05 1.15 3.45 3.63 0.97 0.80 1.44 0.96 7 26 0.04 0.08 0.21 0.43 0.76 0.43 1.14 2.09 0.93 0.73 1.69 1.20 0.34 0.26 0.99 7 22 0.04 0.10 0.17 0.34 4.02 1.91 5.35 23.44 2.41 1.95 2.23 2.84 5.94 2.26 0.97 7 31 0.07 0.16 0.29 0.62 0.47 1.28 2.00 1.97 0.26 0.93 1.01 0.32 1.74 0.61 0.64 7 11 0.27 0.63 0.23 0.48 0.75 0.14 0.01 0.87 0.25 0.05 0.00 0.37 0.89 0.17 0.21 7 46 0.28 0.66 0.02 0.03 2.17 1.69 6.68 6.27 1.26 1.10 1.77 1.60 0.48 0.21 0.82 7 52 0.36 0.87 0.37 0.79 1.19 0.84 0.81 2.05 2.75 2.07 1.17 2.10 2.04 2.78 0.95 7 50 0.43 1.06 0.96 6.86 0.30 0.06 0.07 0.09 6.12 1.64 0.89 0.54 0.24 3.24 0.99 7 49 0.48 1.23 0.27 0.57 0.03 0.11 0.46 1.13 0.06 0.26 0.43 0.48 0.14 0.18 0.55 0.49 1.25 0.44 0.97 0.12 0.34 0.76 0.70 1.22 3.94 3.94 2.00 0.22 1.43 0.96 7 166 7 36 0.50 1.29 0.05 0.10 1.28 3.22 5.96 8.31 0.99 1.06 0.97 1.00 4.50 1.10 0.61 7 21 0.54 1.42 0.80 2.66 1.42 0.36 0.68 1.28 6.57 1.85 1.97 2.37 1.77 4.71 0.99 7 59 0.62 1.79 0.31 0.65 0.43 0.52 0.51 0.18 0.46 0.58 0.70 0.24 0.94 0.59 0.48 7 40 0.65 1.92 0.35 0.74 0.75 0.85 0.63 0.30 0.43 0.46 0.41 0.22 1.61 0.50 0.32 6 16 0.98 9.32 0.93 4.31 6 19 0.96 7.34 0.85 2.85 6 54 0.96 7.16 0.89 3.46 6 48 0.93 4.91 0.94 4.62 6 44 0.87 3.58 0.64 1.18 6 20 0.87 3.48 0.45 0.72 6 73 0.85 3.24 0.41 0.78 6 19 0.77 2.41 0.51 1.03 6 6 0.76 2.35 0.46 0.91 6 15 0.76 2.31 0.90 3.49 6 24 0.75 2.27 0.08 0.12 6 6 0.75 2.26 0.53 1.07 6 57 0.73 2.13 0.47 0.92 6 8 0.72 2.05 0.36 0.55 6 10 0.71 2.04 0.55 1.14 6 6 0.67 1.81 0.59 1.26 6 6 0.63 1.61 0.81 1.95 6 8 0.63 1.61 0.82 2.00 6 11 0.60 1.49 0.83 2.59 6 19 0.59 1.45 0.05 0.08 6 12 0.48 1.08 0.06 0.09 6 19 0.47 1.07 0.04 0.07 18 0.42 0.93 0.61 1.09 0.42 0.92 0.55 1.14 6 6 166 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page46 62 of Exhibit 2 Apple Section Years Job Title of 1 Section Total Level Emp Years Data T Coeff 2 Section Change Correlation Correlation T Coeff Stat Stat 6 17 0.16 0.32 0.07 0.13 6 16 0.29 0.60 0.78 2.16 6 6 0.30 0.62 0.55 1.13 6 40 0.31 0.65 0.11 0.19 6 6 0.45 1.02 0.84 2.67 0.65 1.70 0.32 0.59 6 1398 3 Regression 6 15 0.76 2.36 0.93 4.48 6 19 0.85 3.22 0.43 0.83 Contemp Lagged Revenue Section Coefficients Regression SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 Section T Stats Revenue Net SJ Emp C L 5 Section Effect T Stat r2 6 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 2 Filed0517 13 Page47 of 62 Exhibit 2 Google Section Years Job Title of Data 1 Section Total Emp Years Level Correlation T Coeff 2 Change Section T Coeff Stat Regression Correlation Contemp Stat Lagged 3 Section Regression Coefficients Revenue SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 T Section 5 Section 6 Net Effect Stats Revenue SJ Emp C T L Stat r2 0.94 8.15 0.89 5.63 0.08 0.07 1.36 2.10 0.45 0.26 3.49 3.85 0.15 0.37 0.96 0.91 6.58 0.88 5.21 0.26 0.10 0.73 0.87 1.01 0.27 1.53 1.28 0.36 0.62 0.91 0.91 6.51 0.83 4.27 0.80 0.26 0.48 1.30 0.87 0.13 0.35 0.64 1.06 0.37 0.88 0.86 5.00 0.76 3.30 0.16 0.08 0.70 1.49 0.40 0.14 0.89 1.13 0.24 0.26 0.75 0.82 4.29 0.82 4.05 0.08 1.78 2.60 0.26 0.11 1.70 2.30 0.15 1.86 1.10 0.89 0.79 3.89 0.78 3.55 0.21 1.42 2.46 2.14 0.56 2.52 4.01 2.41 1.63 1.80 0.94 0.79 3.86 0.75 3.22 0.45 0.57 0.45 2.87 0.99 0.55 0.79 1.95 1.02 0.69 0.77 0.79 3.83 0.61 2.21 0.27 0.71 2.24 3.07 0.83 1.34 4.09 3.87 0.98 1.19 0.95 0.79 3.82 0.84 4.31 0.61 0.50 0.12 1.31 1.49 0.56 0.20 1.16 1.11 0.87 0.79 0.78 3.75 0.82 4.01 0.38 0.24 0.53 2.31 1.00 0.27 0.99 1.54 0.62 0.50 0.80 0.74 3.33 0.75 3.24 0.64 0.88 0.45 0.85 2.62 1.79 1.17 0.82 1.52 2.14 0.74 0.71 3.05 0.72 2.91 0.30 2.66 3.51 1.03 0.32 1.73 2.31 0.42 2.97 1.23 0.86 0.71 3.01 0.83 4.25 0.68 0.53 0.03 1.25 1.35 0.47 0.04 0.83 1.21 0.75 0.75 0.70 2.90 0.70 2.78 0.29 1.04 1.65 1.88 0.93 2.14 2.97 1.92 1.33 1.73 0.84 0.67 2.68 0.50 1.64 0.72 1.63 2.36 3.79 2.59 3.56 4.96 5.62 2.35 3.28 0.91 0.62 2.39 0.47 1.52 0.27 0.41 0.37 1.40 0.48 0.50 0.37 0.72 0.68 0.51 0.59 0.59 2.20 0.55 1.84 1.63 4.50 5.16 4.24 1.47 2.51 2.86 1.61 6.13 2.16 0.82 0.56 2.05 0.53 1.77 2.49 7.13 7.79 5.04 2.28 3.94 4.41 1.94 9.62 3.40 0.91 0.51 1.78 0.23 0.66 1.01 1.63 2.56 2.55 1.52 1.63 2.14 1.56 2.64 1.62 0.68 0.48 1.63 0.39 1.21 0.98 2.45 3.07 5.23 0.85 1.26 1.94 2.93 3.43 1.12 0.83 0.27 0.84 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.67 0.31 4.53 0.32 0.91 0.40 3.20 0.82 0.70 0.75 0.81 3.90 0.77 3.21 0.35 0.43 0.23 2.19 1.13 0.64 0.53 1.75 0.78 0.81 0.77 0.80 3.75 0.72 2.51 0.11 0.45 1.71 3.16 0.14 0.24 1.71 2.76 0.56 0.21 0.90 0.75 3.16 0.85 4.29 1.58 2.53 1.92 2.75 3.14 2.44 2.19 1.43 4.11 2.77 0.92 0.71 2.82 0.47 1.42 1.78 3.60 2.30 0.40 2.18 2.42 1.61 0.12 5.38 2.41 0.86 0.66 2.47 0.50 1.53 1.25 1.78 1.19 1.94 3.31 3.15 1.67 1.23 3.03 3.39 0.89 0.52 1.74 0.62 2.09 0.46 0.10 0.22 1.96 0.71 0.09 0.15 1.13 0.56 0.33 0.63 0.32 0.95 0.68 2.45 1.20 1.43 0.38 3.13 1.21 0.71 0.24 1.47 2.62 0.89 0.77 0.84 4.08 0.82 3.45 1.37 2.09 0.38 0.78 4.96 3.34 0.84 0.51 3.46 4.07 0.97 0.78 3.27 0.77 2.94 0.96 1.43 0.46 1.25 5.78 3.93 1.70 1.37 2.40 4.80 0.96 0.73 2.80 0.80 3.23 1.06 1.36 0.75 0.45 2.63 1.44 1.12 0.23 2.42 1.86 0.82 0.71 2.63 0.70 2.43 1.73 2.75 2.01 1.05 7.82 6.48 5.33 0.90 4.48 7.35 0.97 0.67 2.38 0.71 2.45 0.80 0.83 0.13 0.74 2.41 1.03 0.21 0.54 1.62 1.47 0.93 0.64 2.18 0.60 1.84 0.28 0.10 0.34 0.24 0.63 0.10 0.55 0.18 0.38 0.27 0.80 0.56 1.79 0.83 3.70 0.12 0.02 1.64 0.59 0.18 0.03 1.22 0.27 0.14 0.11 0.92 0.44 1.28 0.63 2.00 2.00 0.63 0.47 0.85 0.89 0.16 0.13 0.07 2.63 0.45 0.77 0.34 0.95 0.18 0.46 1.05 1.92 0.72 0.01 1.31 1.32 0.55 0.00 2.97 1.39 0.63 0.31 0.86 0.54 1.58 0.17 0.39 2.01 1.80 0.23 0.39 1.39 0.70 0.56 0.34 0.85 0.26 0.72 0.45 1.12 0.44 0.25 0.04 1.69 0.59 0.24 0.03 0.85 0.69 0.39 0.60 0.22 0.59 0.30 0.77 0.23 1.16 2.30 0.22 0.78 2.06 4.60 0.12 1.39 1.72 0.97 0.09 0.23 0.11 0.27 0.35 0.55 0.79 2.64 1.22 1.12 0.93 1.48 0.91 1.23 0.74 0.06 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.56 1.41 0.72 1.11 1.04 1.55 0.68 0.37 1.96 1.43 0.74 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 2 Filed0517 13 Page48 of 62 Exhibit 2 Google Section Years Job Title of Data 1 Section Total Emp Years Level Correlation T Coeff 2 Section Change T Coeff Stat Regression Correlation Contemp Stat Lagged 3 Section Regression Coefficients Revenue SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 T Section 5 Section 6 Net Effect Stats Revenue SJ Emp C T L Stat r2 0.11 0.26 0.05 0.12 1.78 4.82 3.95 8.75 0.53 0.77 0.59 0.38 6.61 0.72 0.69 0.10 0.25 0.40 0.98 0.64 1.19 2.95 1.74 0.96 1.03 2.17 0.98 1.83 1.01 0.98 0.09 0.22 0.47 1.20 0.22 0.67 2.13 1.85 0.22 0.39 1.04 0.85 0.89 0.33 0.96 0.08 0.19 0.61 1.74 0.11 0.73 1.64 0.18 0.35 1.26 2.37 0.16 0.84 0.97 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.54 1.44 0.19 1.04 2.39 4.19 0.27 0.75 1.17 1.85 1.24 0.59 0.95 0.19 0.47 0.36 0.87 0.44 1.21 2.37 2.43 0.85 1.21 2.05 1.36 1.66 1.10 0.94 0.94 6.31 0.98 0.92 0.44 0.15 1.14 1.60 0.34 0.13 0.94 1.36 0.76 0.99 0.88 4.22 0.98 9.66 1.71 1.08 1.17 1.74 2.76 0.95 0.95 1.42 2.78 1.63 0.99 0.81 3.05 0.93 5.04 2.09 1.73 1.40 4.09 5.52 4.20 3.82 7.88 1.00 0.80 2.97 0.89 3.87 1.89 2.59 2.38 0.19 1.24 0.96 0.73 0.07 4.48 1.07 0.91 0.78 2.79 0.92 4.85 0.04 1.56 2.30 0.05 0.07 1.45 2.12 0.04 1.60 0.99 0.99 0.77 2.68 0.87 3.50 0.01 0.93 1.40 1.72 0.03 1.46 2.31 2.49 0.94 1.01 0.99 0.76 2.60 0.79 2.55 2.08 3.14 6.08 2.19 1.36 1.38 1.95 0.97 5.22 1.38 0.98 0.73 2.36 0.77 2.38 0.48 1.11 2.62 0.84 6.23 8.70 7.53 1.59 7.81 1.00 0.72 2.31 0.73 2.15 2.48 6.19 6.26 2.27 3.18 3.57 2.61 8.67 3.46 1.00 0.70 2.22 0.77 2.40 0.78 1.84 3.07 1.89 9.88 0.69 2.14 0.75 2.28 0.69 2.40 3.41 7.95 0.25 0.42 0.61 1.33 3.09 0.37 0.93 0.67 2.00 0.86 3.38 1.48 1.36 0.94 2.69 0.97 0.51 0.33 0.73 2.85 0.69 0.94 0.64 1.87 0.87 3.48 0.04 0.79 1.30 0.83 0.15 1.63 2.67 1.56 0.83 1.15 0.99 0.63 1.80 0.55 1.14 0.39 0.10 2.24 0.62 1.76 0.63 1.61 0.92 2.25 3.15 0.31 4.54 5.33 8.35 0.79 3.17 5.10 1.00 0.61 1.74 0.68 1.83 0.01 0.21 1.26 0.28 0.02 0.15 0.74 0.18 0.20 0.09 0.89 0.60 1.68 0.64 1.66 0.89 1.99 3.14 0.82 5.88 6.81 2.59 2.88 6.54 1.00 0.60 1.67 0.75 2.29 0.41 0.22 0.58 1.15 0.85 0.25 0.60 1.23 0.64 0.47 0.99 0.57 1.56 0.90 4.02 0.15 0.71 1.44 1.90 0.22 0.49 1.27 1.40 0.56 0.26 0.97 0.56 1.52 0.76 2.33 0.78 0.82 0.11 0.71 1.67 0.94 0.12 0.79 1.60 1.20 0.99 0.50 1.29 0.39 0.83 4.23 8.54 8.63 7.90 1.16 1.18 1.07 1.13 0.49 1.26 0.67 1.78 1.37 4.14 4.70 0.11 0.20 0.22 0.91 0.47 1.20 0.38 0.82 0.80 1.63 2.83 2.19 3.13 3.15 6.13 0.44 1.11 0.37 0.81 1.66 2.94 4.48 6.60 0.97 0.89 1.31 0.44 1.09 0.42 0.92 0.82 1.60 2.92 2.97 0.73 0.68 0.43 1.06 0.45 0.99 0.65 1.18 2.15 1.97 0.59 0.57 0.41 1.02 0.49 0.79 1.37 2.80 2.02 0.00 0.40 0.97 0.54 1.30 5.72 5.70 1.24 0.23 0.53 0.45 1.01 0.28 0.43 0.82 0.22 0.38 0.22 0.51 0.16 0.22 2.68 4.65 1.97 0.00 0.21 0.49 0.41 0.90 0.83 3.92 4.02 7.39 2.91 0.18 0.41 0.31 0.66 0.20 0.67 2.19 2.29 0.92 0.13 0.29 0.00 0.01 0.36 0.84 1.88 1.39 0.30 0.69 0.11 0.22 3.76 6.86 6.03 0.30 0.69 0.60 1.51 1.75 2.91 2.70 0.94 5.52 0.96 5.86 10.15 13.34 10.00 11.51 12.40 18.00 4.53 19.74 10.69 11.61 2.62 11.63 1.00 12.58 10.24 1.17 0.85 2.77 0.08 0.84 4.50 2.43 3.16 0.99 1.73 4.59 0.92 0.93 1.34 1.06 2.42 0.70 0.88 0.99 0.91 1.83 0.58 0.98 1.29 1.52 1.11 1.27 0.94 0.26 0.38 0.10 0.71 0.30 1.00 5.34 6.73 2.49 4.76 4.89 0.99 1.76 4.10 1.40 0.87 1.55 0.98 1.32 1.38 3.83 0.58 1.20 1.43 0.99 2.52 6.36 5.97 5.30 2.11 1.26 2.35 2.34 2.92 1.03 24.13 12.77 19.06 10.62 4.65 6.14 1.00 2.36 0.94 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 2 Filed0517 13 Page49 of 62 Exhibit 2 Google Section Years Job Title of Data 1 Section Total Emp Years Level Correlation T Coeff 2 Section Change T Coeff Stat Regression Correlation Contemp Stat 0.44 0.99 0.60 1.32 0.42 0.93 0.50 0.99 0.38 0.83 0.42 0.81 0.35 0.74 0.27 0.49 0.34 0.72 0.64 1.45 0.30 0.63 0.95 3.20 0.30 0.63 0.18 0.32 0.29 0.61 0.17 0.30 0.25 0.51 0.18 0.32 0.22 0.45 0.08 0.14 0.19 0.39 0.55 1.13 0.15 0.31 0.30 0.45 0.14 0.29 0.37 0.69 0.12 0.23 0.15 0.27 0.10 0.20 0.58 1.24 0.09 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.37 0.69 0.05 0.11 0.28 0.51 0.24 0.48 0.60 1.31 Lagged 3 Section Regression Coefficients Revenue SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 T Section Revenue 5 Section Net Effect Stats SJ Emp C L T Stat r2 6 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page50 of 62 Exhibit 2 Intel Section Years Job Title of 1 Section Total Level Emp Years Data T 2 Section Change Correlation Coeff Stat Correlation T Coeff 3 Section Regression Contemp Stat Coefficients Lagged Revenue Regression SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 T Section Net Stats Revenue SJ Emp C L 5 Section 6 Effect T Stat r2 11 432 0.96 10.82 0.95 8.41 2.03 0.51 0.64 0.34 6.11 0.78 1.25 0.76 1.52 1.78 0.95 11 1501 0.96 9.78 0.94 7.56 1.56 0.30 0.32 0.54 6.76 0.36 0.73 1.63 1.86 2.07 0.96 11 233 0.94 8.46 0.91 6.14 1.47 1.33 0.23 0.09 4.71 0.74 0.25 0.15 2.80 1.46 0.92 11 3042 0.94 8.03 0.89 5.67 0.61 0.39 0.20 0.31 7.76 2.09 1.33 1.93 1.00 4.39 0.95 11 5042 0.92 7.30 0.91 6.21 0.81 2.22 0.06 0.63 3.59 2.93 0.23 2.53 3.03 4.40 0.96 11 293 0.91 6.73 0.89 5.46 2.30 0.95 0.19 0.45 4.05 0.63 0.18 0.54 3.25 1.88 0.88 11 724 0.88 5.65 0.94 8.07 1.43 0.58 0.19 0.55 1.48 0.38 0.39 1.04 2.00 2.26 0.91 11 59 0.88 5.56 0.72 2.91 1.12 0.73 0.22 0.33 2.35 0.84 0.37 0.49 1.85 1.54 0.81 11 394 0.88 5.52 0.88 5.34 0.63 0.35 0.13 0.06 4.97 1.77 0.54 0.30 0.98 3.77 0.87 11 3991 0.88 5.51 0.96 9.32 1.21 0.07 0.45 0.45 5.45 0.12 2.00 1.73 1.28 2.52 0.97 11 715 0.86 4.96 0.96 9.29 1.41 0.28 0.49 0.32 4.26 0.51 1.60 0.87 1.13 2.18 0.95 11 437 0.85 4.85 0.84 4.41 0.76 0.75 0.30 0.49 4.90 1.85 1.46 2.05 1.51 3.13 0.95 11 6082 0.85 4.85 0.94 7.51 0.81 0.45 0.34 0.48 6.95 1.58 2.34 2.61 1.27 4.17 0.97 11 912 0.85 4.76 0.94 7.60 0.95 0.69 0.20 0.59 3.95 1.52 0.76 1.49 1.64 3.53 0.94 11 31 0.84 4.74 0.82 4.00 0.59 0.35 0.44 0.13 3.17 0.95 1.78 0.52 0.94 2.06 0.91 11 216 0.83 4.50 0.83 4.23 0.66 0.62 0.09 0.03 4.10 2.02 0.34 0.08 1.28 3.57 0.93 11 1681 0.83 4.45 0.92 6.69 0.78 0.39 0.30 0.37 5.05 1.16 1.60 1.35 1.17 3.20 0.96 11 103 0.81 4.17 0.87 4.91 0.76 0.70 0.09 0.30 4.60 2.74 0.41 1.11 1.46 4.40 0.93 11 2903 0.81 4.12 0.95 8.50 0.92 0.20 0.32 0.30 8.74 0.80 2.51 1.67 1.12 4.24 0.98 11 413 0.81 4.11 0.95 8.85 0.88 0.38 0.07 0.09 5.34 1.23 0.34 0.31 1.26 3.91 0.95 11 1438 0.81 4.08 0.93 7.04 0.96 0.63 0.02 0.19 3.97 1.40 0.08 0.43 1.58 3.38 0.92 11 2235 0.80 4.01 0.89 5.55 0.73 0.22 0.42 0.36 7.48 1.12 3.34 2.29 0.95 4.04 0.98 11 4821 0.80 4.00 0.96 9.45 0.80 0.19 0.27 0.26 1.28 3.21 2.23 1.00 5.90 0.99 11 638 0.80 3.98 0.91 6.09 0.77 0.53 0.13 0.22 4.39 1.74 0.59 0.74 1.31 3.66 0.94 11 760 0.80 3.97 0.93 7.45 0.94 0.34 0.23 0.29 5.66 1.03 1.16 1.11 1.28 3.47 0.96 11 501 0.79 3.91 0.88 5.24 0.75 0.24 0.46 0.50 4.67 0.68 2.22 1.90 0.99 2.42 0.96 11 1538 0.79 3.90 0.91 6.15 0.78 0.20 0.22 0.05 3.77 0.59 0.79 0.17 0.98 2.32 0.90 11 292 0.79 3.89 0.82 4.10 0.70 0.83 0.05 0.23 3.30 2.23 0.16 0.52 1.53 3.43 0.85 11 528 0.79 3.81 0.75 3.23 0.84 1.07 0.36 0.95 4.51 2.41 1.37 3.86 1.91 3.58 0.96 11 75 0.78 3.80 0.81 3.88 2.04 0.36 0.21 0.24 3.00 0.25 0.19 0.23 2.40 1.22 0.83 11 244 0.78 3.78 0.90 5.76 0.68 0.61 0.06 0.23 9.04 4.38 0.55 1.62 1.29 7.24 0.97 11 5735 0.78 3.75 0.91 6.32 0.76 0.29 0.30 0.31 6.40 1.23 2.00 1.53 1.06 3.83 0.97 11 2120 0.78 3.72 0.95 9.08 0.74 0.29 0.11 0.08 2.62 1.25 0.67 1.03 7.72 0.99 11 328 0.77 3.66 0.77 3.41 0.75 0.71 0.38 0.88 4.32 2.20 1.67 3.46 1.46 3.53 0.93 11 1011 0.77 3.64 0.91 6.37 0.74 0.36 0.06 0.16 6.31 1.72 0.35 0.66 1.09 4.25 0.95 11 811 0.77 3.62 0.84 4.31 0.67 0.44 0.10 0.20 3.33 1.31 0.35 0.63 1.11 2.49 0.81 11 262 0.77 3.61 0.91 6.02 0.75 0.54 0.02 0.17 4.38 2.21 0.07 0.64 1.28 4.18 0.92 11 1332 0.77 3.61 0.92 6.65 0.79 0.51 0.18 0.35 4.64 1.60 0.85 1.17 1.30 3.57 0.94 11 104 0.77 3.57 0.84 4.35 0.53 0.19 0.54 0.50 4.55 0.98 3.37 2.61 0.72 2.80 0.96 11 91 0.76 3.52 0.89 5.55 1.09 0.23 0.37 0.29 3.84 0.37 0.82 0.50 1.32 2.15 0.83 11 127 0.75 3.44 0.90 6.00 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.08 3.84 0.02 0.00 0.63 0.35 1.75 0.86 12.44 11.59 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page51 of 62 Exhibit 2 Intel Section Years Job Title of 1 Section Total Level Emp Years Data T 2 Section Change Correlation Coeff Stat Correlation T Coeff 3 Section Regression Contemp Stat Coefficients Lagged Revenue Regression SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 T Section Net Stats Revenue SJ Emp C L 5 Section 6 Effect T Stat r2 11 1906 0.71 3.04 0.97 0.85 0.22 0.13 0.14 9.03 1.52 1.05 0.83 1.07 6.07 0.98 11 3531 0.71 3.03 0.89 5.61 0.72 0.21 0.33 0.26 7.95 1.32 2.79 1.66 0.93 4.71 0.98 11 934 0.71 3.03 0.92 6.73 0.72 0.36 0.04 0.02 7.71 2.74 0.33 0.10 1.08 6.22 0.98 11 1873 0.71 3.02 0.96 9.25 0.85 0.36 0.21 0.43 9.91 2.60 2.01 2.80 1.21 7.24 0.99 11 130 0.71 2.99 0.90 5.77 0.86 0.03 0.42 0.38 3.38 0.07 1.28 0.96 0.89 1.59 0.89 11 2037 0.70 2.98 0.92 6.42 0.63 0.23 0.18 0.11 8.43 1.93 1.78 0.85 0.86 5.50 0.98 11 88 0.70 2.98 0.91 6.08 0.69 0.06 0.27 0.13 3.97 0.21 1.20 0.54 0.75 2.06 0.91 11 366 0.70 2.95 0.95 8.65 0.67 0.18 0.16 0.11 2.16 2.20 1.16 0.85 8.03 0.99 11 137 0.70 2.94 0.67 2.53 0.71 0.37 0.76 0.67 3.37 1.01 2.72 2.35 1.08 2.16 0.96 11 828 0.70 2.92 0.93 7.12 0.63 0.27 0.10 0.06 5.89 1.78 0.60 0.37 0.89 4.25 0.92 11 969 0.70 2.91 0.91 6.08 0.66 0.35 0.18 0.26 6.39 2.57 1.14 1.47 1.01 5.16 0.94 11 87 0.69 2.89 0.75 3.25 0.92 1.57 0.16 0.84 4.41 3.84 0.58 2.69 2.49 5.00 0.93 11 179 0.69 2.87 0.87 5.06 0.64 0.05 0.57 0.77 5.02 0.28 3.39 4.03 0.69 2.74 0.96 11 8983 0.69 2.87 0.96 9.77 0.78 0.25 0.03 0.09 12.24 2.56 0.35 0.73 1.03 8.27 0.99 11 934 0.69 2.86 0.96 0.83 0.15 0.12 0.04 12.79 1.57 1.42 0.31 0.98 8.03 0.99 11 1049 0.69 2.85 0.89 5.67 0.68 0.28 0.40 0.60 4.91 1.15 2.29 2.62 0.96 3.24 0.96 11 146 0.69 2.84 0.65 2.41 0.39 0.43 0.29 0.16 1.82 1.34 1.00 0.52 0.82 1.81 0.84 11 509 0.69 2.84 0.89 5.51 0.70 0.18 0.30 0.17 4.88 0.78 1.58 0.74 0.88 2.97 0.95 11 1402 0.69 2.83 0.94 7.53 0.77 0.19 0.26 0.34 4.41 0.81 1.16 1.27 0.96 3.11 0.94 11 2097 0.68 2.81 0.97 0.78 0.15 0.07 0.02 1.65 0.91 0.15 0.93 8.04 0.99 11 268 0.68 2.77 0.95 8.82 0.83 0.00 0.24 0.10 0.01 1.66 0.55 0.83 3.85 0.97 11 546 0.68 2.76 0.94 7.55 0.72 0.29 0.07 0.04 10.66 2.99 0.76 0.29 1.01 7.77 0.99 11 12004 0.68 2.75 0.95 8.95 0.76 0.28 0.02 0.07 16.18 4.10 0.24 0.81 1.04 11 577 0.67 2.74 0.96 9.51 0.82 0.18 0.02 0.02 6.42 1.06 0.12 0.08 1.00 4.25 0.95 11 50 0.67 2.72 0.45 1.42 1.17 0.66 0.28 0.65 1.34 0.35 0.19 0.47 1.83 0.73 0.66 11 358 0.67 2.72 0.85 4.50 0.58 0.40 0.23 0.30 4.89 2.47 1.27 1.51 0.98 4.17 0.90 11 753 0.67 2.70 0.97 0.91 0.20 0.12 0.25 2.81 1.70 2.54 1.11 11 517 0.67 2.69 0.84 4.39 0.49 0.28 0.06 0.02 3.39 1.48 0.26 0.07 0.77 2.76 0.87 11 547 0.67 2.68 0.95 9.06 0.78 0.29 0.08 0.16 9.05 2.41 0.68 1.08 1.07 6.51 0.98 11 834 0.66 2.67 0.94 7.57 0.81 0.02 0.36 0.27 8.80 0.16 3.17 1.75 0.83 4.89 0.99 11 556 0.66 2.66 0.89 5.49 0.73 0.28 0.05 0.02 3.34 1.08 0.15 0.07 1.00 2.64 0.84 11 361 0.66 2.65 0.55 1.88 1.08 1.40 0.82 0.92 4.01 3.26 2.79 2.83 2.48 3.84 0.79 11 955 0.66 2.65 0.95 8.72 0.67 0.22 0.09 0.12 6.90 1.62 0.63 0.72 0.89 4.72 0.95 11 188 0.66 2.64 0.88 5.23 0.67 0.43 0.06 0.11 7.43 3.15 0.46 0.60 1.09 5.97 0.97 11 169 0.66 2.63 0.92 6.63 0.78 0.01 0.43 0.34 4.71 0.04 2.09 1.30 0.77 2.49 0.96 11 91 0.66 2.62 0.84 4.34 1.85 0.51 0.49 0.64 3.26 0.37 0.49 0.66 2.36 1.55 0.91 11 94 0.66 2.60 0.84 4.32 0.61 0.00 0.79 0.89 1.50 0.00 1.68 1.45 0.61 0.89 0.87 11 59 0.65 2.59 0.81 3.93 0.97 0.78 0.29 0.10 2.52 1.75 0.57 0.15 1.75 2.67 0.82 11 537 0.65 2.59 0.97 0.81 0.20 0.12 0.17 2.35 1.33 1.54 1.01 8.64 0.99 11 249 0.65 2.59 0.78 3.47 0.69 0.54 0.26 0.23 3.24 1.77 0.82 0.62 1.23 2.81 0.77 11 557 0.65 2.58 0.90 5.76 0.61 0.06 0.35 0.26 4.22 0.27 1.84 1.16 0.67 2.34 0.94 10.58 10.05 11.50 11.28 11.61 13.19 13.52 7.42 18.00 12.42 11.58 11.93 0.99 0.99 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page52 of 62 Exhibit 2 Intel Section Years Job Title of 1 Section Total Level Emp Years Data T 2 Section Change Correlation Coeff Stat Correlation T Coeff 3 Section Regression Contemp Stat Coefficients Lagged Revenue Regression SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 T Section Net Stats Revenue SJ Emp C L 5 Section 6 Effect T Stat r2 11 283 0.62 2.37 0.94 7.52 0.65 0.05 0.30 0.25 7.48 0.42 2.54 1.81 0.71 4.13 0.98 11 142 0.62 2.37 0.83 4.28 0.72 0.31 0.18 0.06 8.01 2.32 1.48 0.33 1.03 5.73 0.99 11 2959 0.62 2.36 0.92 6.75 0.72 0.20 0.13 0.05 8.49 1.69 1.18 0.35 0.92 5.64 0.98 11 880 0.62 2.36 0.93 7.34 0.70 0.32 0.11 0.18 5.74 1.75 2.20 1.03 11 202 0.61 2.34 0.85 4.49 0.77 0.28 0.22 0.61 5.44 1.53 1.16 2.85 1.05 3.95 0.94 11 1662 0.61 2.32 0.91 6.38 0.61 0.23 0.05 0.04 6.83 1.91 0.38 0.23 0.85 4.89 0.97 11 731 0.61 2.29 0.94 7.46 0.95 0.31 0.11 0.18 5.47 1.49 0.46 0.60 1.26 4.15 0.94 11 2205 0.61 2.29 0.68 2.62 0.68 0.79 0.41 0.54 4.01 2.68 2.34 2.66 1.47 3.36 0.81 11 2086 0.61 2.29 0.95 8.39 0.76 0.23 0.10 0.10 2.61 1.13 0.81 0.99 8.19 0.99 11 1156 0.61 2.29 0.71 2.86 0.74 0.86 0.51 0.62 6.12 4.08 4.06 4.03 1.60 5.14 0.91 11 91 0.61 2.29 0.64 2.33 0.90 1.18 0.26 1.23 2.02 1.38 0.41 2.07 2.07 1.92 0.87 11 1393 0.60 2.26 0.84 4.44 0.72 0.19 0.02 0.05 2.62 0.50 0.06 0.13 0.90 1.70 0.74 11 96 0.60 2.26 0.84 4.38 0.60 0.15 0.30 0.21 2.16 0.44 0.84 0.51 0.75 1.50 0.84 11 281 0.60 2.25 0.80 3.74 0.73 0.65 0.11 0.15 3.57 2.18 0.38 0.43 1.37 3.32 0.84 11 128 0.60 2.24 0.94 7.89 0.75 0.26 0.11 0.04 6.10 1.57 0.60 0.20 1.01 4.27 0.93 11 601 0.60 2.23 0.91 6.20 0.57 0.17 0.08 0.06 7.66 1.70 0.72 0.46 0.74 5.09 0.97 11 303 0.60 2.23 0.55 1.87 0.48 0.48 0.59 0.82 1.84 1.14 1.74 2.12 0.96 1.62 0.90 11 147 0.59 2.21 0.85 4.64 0.47 0.12 0.26 0.16 5.01 0.93 2.02 1.06 0.59 3.12 0.96 11 261 0.59 2.20 0.68 2.60 0.63 0.93 0.49 1.91 1.52 1.85 1.07 3.78 1.56 2.22 0.93 11 282 0.59 2.19 0.68 2.59 0.54 0.63 0.41 0.42 4.24 3.97 1.95 1.85 1.18 4.79 0.89 11 223 0.59 2.18 0.88 5.13 0.59 0.14 0.15 0.09 2.98 0.53 0.52 0.31 0.72 1.93 0.83 11 5107 0.59 2.18 0.95 8.21 0.84 0.24 0.15 0.28 5.52 1.16 0.75 1.03 1.08 3.87 0.95 11 213 0.59 2.18 0.82 4.07 0.45 0.03 0.45 0.36 2.95 0.14 2.19 1.50 0.48 1.57 0.92 11 347 0.58 2.15 0.93 6.90 0.76 0.02 0.21 0.24 3.83 0.08 0.78 0.66 0.79 1.98 0.88 11 135 0.58 2.15 0.76 3.34 0.38 0.13 0.15 0.03 2.29 0.56 0.61 0.13 0.50 1.49 0.80 11 1471 0.58 2.13 0.93 7.06 0.65 0.32 0.21 0.23 8.65 3.35 1.84 1.76 0.97 6.81 0.96 11 2090 0.58 2.13 0.95 9.03 0.60 0.18 0.03 0.01 8.79 1.97 0.27 0.07 0.79 5.91 0.97 11 197 0.58 2.13 0.91 6.18 0.77 0.16 0.05 0.05 3.57 0.62 0.15 0.13 0.94 2.36 0.86 11 35 0.58 2.12 0.76 3.32 0.76 0.57 0.11 0.36 1.09 0.86 0.14 0.34 1.33 1.21 0.72 11 159 0.57 2.11 0.85 4.48 0.98 0.74 0.47 0.30 4.51 2.97 1.57 0.79 1.72 4.57 0.90 11 126 0.57 2.10 0.69 2.71 1.14 1.07 0.90 0.54 4.38 3.53 2.14 1.07 2.21 4.76 0.86 11 223 0.57 2.09 0.95 8.28 0.68 0.18 0.13 0.18 6.80 1.40 0.96 1.01 0.86 4.66 0.97 11 934 0.57 2.08 0.91 6.20 0.82 0.33 0.01 0.06 6.86 2.24 0.05 0.28 1.15 5.30 0.97 11 403 0.57 2.07 0.87 4.91 0.55 0.13 0.29 0.30 3.25 0.58 1.23 1.05 0.68 2.07 0.89 11 1801 0.57 2.06 0.96 9.45 0.70 0.22 0.06 0.09 3.09 0.78 0.93 0.91 9.09 0.99 11 400 0.57 2.06 0.85 4.49 0.67 0.45 0.41 0.40 5.67 2.89 2.06 1.68 1.11 4.91 0.90 11 390 0.57 2.06 0.88 5.26 0.57 0.16 0.17 0.11 3.80 0.78 0.81 0.43 0.73 2.48 0.91 11 115 0.56 2.04 0.57 1.97 0.29 0.20 0.31 0.21 1.24 0.60 0.89 0.54 0.49 1.00 0.64 11 556 0.56 2.03 0.95 8.49 0.65 0.18 0.00 0.02 6.90 1.45 0.01 0.13 0.84 4.56 0.95 11 120 0.56 2.03 0.62 2.25 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.07 1.78 0.90 0.00 0.15 0.83 1.46 0.50 11 5274 0.56 2.02 0.92 6.52 0.60 0.23 0.29 0.32 6.74 1.85 2.08 2.13 0.83 4.58 0.93 16.35 11.64 13.13 12.77 0.99 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page53 of 62 Exhibit 2 Intel Section Years Job Title of 1 Section Total Level Emp Years Data T 2 Section Change Correlation Coeff Stat Correlation T Coeff 3 Section Regression Contemp Stat Coefficients Lagged Revenue Regression SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 T Section Net Stats Revenue SJ Emp C L 5 Section 6 Effect T Stat r2 11 147 0.51 1.78 0.54 1.81 1.24 1.41 0.21 0.81 1.90 1.26 0.23 0.75 2.66 1.76 0.77 11 86 0.51 1.77 0.79 3.65 1.01 0.67 0.58 0.49 3.20 1.85 1.27 1.00 1.68 2.97 0.78 11 102 0.50 1.75 0.81 3.91 0.54 0.33 0.22 0.52 3.49 1.69 0.97 1.88 0.87 2.97 0.90 11 4667 0.50 1.75 0.98 0.61 0.16 0.13 0.18 23.02 4.67 3.16 3.88 0.77 11 1283 0.50 1.74 0.96 9.47 0.92 0.32 0.18 0.20 11.04 3.34 1.57 1.40 1.24 8.41 0.98 11 54 0.50 1.74 0.57 1.94 0.57 0.03 0.42 0.12 0.99 0.03 0.60 0.17 0.54 0.38 0.54 11 222 0.49 1.67 0.70 2.76 0.62 0.56 0.36 0.29 2.67 1.82 0.99 0.69 1.18 2.61 0.70 11 43 0.48 1.66 0.60 2.11 0.79 1.05 0.64 0.46 2.16 2.61 1.17 0.66 1.84 2.77 0.79 11 56 0.47 1.62 0.76 3.30 0.53 0.16 0.41 0.70 1.48 0.37 0.91 1.23 0.70 1.05 0.81 11 536 0.46 1.56 0.88 5.16 0.70 0.04 0.16 0.24 3.19 0.13 0.51 0.82 0.66 1.60 0.81 11 7841 0.46 1.55 0.94 7.67 0.82 0.32 0.37 0.32 9.49 2.99 2.82 2.15 1.14 7.10 0.96 11 325 0.46 1.55 0.68 2.65 0.21 0.18 0.74 0.69 1.37 0.86 3.29 2.77 0.04 0.12 0.89 11 249 0.46 1.54 0.53 1.79 1.23 1.07 0.31 0.93 1.94 0.98 0.36 0.84 2.29 1.50 0.62 11 666 0.46 1.54 0.96 9.70 0.68 0.13 0.01 0.03 6.56 1.02 0.06 0.15 0.81 4.14 0.94 11 150 0.46 1.54 0.91 6.38 0.52 0.03 0.28 0.35 6.29 0.24 2.44 2.80 0.55 3.42 0.96 11 106 0.44 1.49 0.78 3.50 0.66 0.53 0.14 0.07 2.86 2.01 0.44 0.16 1.19 2.82 0.87 11 101 0.44 1.46 0.72 2.94 0.57 0.04 0.50 0.56 1.39 0.07 0.93 0.89 0.62 0.76 0.76 11 1976 0.44 1.46 0.83 4.16 0.68 0.48 0.47 0.38 6.73 3.82 2.95 2.20 1.16 5.99 0.92 11 353 0.43 1.43 0.82 4.00 0.71 0.28 0.25 0.20 2.97 0.92 0.68 0.53 0.99 2.16 0.72 11 56 0.43 1.42 0.49 1.57 1.04 1.39 0.40 0.48 1.87 1.86 0.52 0.57 2.43 2.24 0.67 11 137 0.43 1.42 0.87 4.89 0.81 0.36 0.30 0.35 3.47 1.33 0.87 0.85 1.18 2.78 0.83 11 105 0.42 1.38 0.86 4.75 0.84 0.39 0.31 0.05 6.05 2.44 1.50 0.24 1.23 4.84 0.92 11 125 0.41 1.34 0.58 2.03 0.57 0.70 0.34 0.12 2.36 2.39 0.99 0.34 1.27 2.77 0.77 11 117 0.41 1.33 0.58 2.03 0.53 0.23 0.87 1.07 0.83 0.25 1.07 1.28 0.30 0.24 0.67 11 65 0.40 1.32 0.02 0.07 0.48 1.30 0.35 0.08 1.01 2.07 0.47 0.10 1.78 1.85 0.59 11 156 0.38 1.22 0.74 3.13 0.60 0.32 0.49 0.61 3.02 1.23 1.54 1.64 0.92 2.34 0.73 11 35 0.35 1.14 0.59 2.08 0.13 0.31 0.80 0.34 0.31 0.61 1.51 0.55 0.18 0.23 0.82 11 98 0.35 1.12 0.57 1.97 0.63 0.55 0.53 0.51 1.92 1.28 1.03 0.93 1.18 1.83 0.50 11 225 0.34 1.10 0.71 2.82 0.58 0.08 0.58 0.82 1.30 0.14 0.92 1.07 0.50 0.59 0.67 11 171 0.34 1.08 0.80 3.76 0.70 0.12 0.43 0.34 3.96 0.49 1.54 1.13 0.82 2.35 0.78 11 45 0.34 1.08 0.50 1.62 0.09 0.43 1.15 1.06 0.44 1.56 3.87 3.50 0.34 0.82 0.87 11 533 0.34 1.07 0.41 1.28 1.15 1.12 0.12 1.23 1.70 1.00 0.13 1.01 2.27 1.42 0.66 11 243 0.33 1.05 0.86 4.84 0.61 0.24 0.31 0.42 4.09 1.26 1.28 1.53 0.85 2.92 0.85 11 774 0.33 1.04 0.83 4.27 0.45 0.16 0.02 0.16 3.29 0.89 0.08 0.75 0.60 2.26 0.86 11 47 0.29 0.92 0.73 3.05 0.47 0.13 0.47 0.46 1.38 0.30 1.06 0.98 0.34 0.53 0.69 11 199 0.27 0.84 0.60 2.10 0.44 0.37 0.19 0.36 1.43 0.96 0.38 0.55 0.81 1.32 0.68 11 111 0.25 0.76 0.48 1.56 0.31 0.18 0.21 0.29 1.00 0.46 0.51 0.68 0.49 0.81 0.53 11 30 0.21 0.64 0.09 0.25 0.14 0.54 0.12 0.12 0.33 0.99 0.19 0.19 0.68 0.80 0.43 11 31 0.17 0.52 0.66 2.46 0.23 0.65 0.88 0.73 0.98 1.97 2.75 2.07 0.42 0.85 0.79 11 361 0.12 0.38 0.79 3.70 0.59 0.11 0.24 0.14 3.26 0.46 0.90 0.50 0.70 1.96 0.71 11 734 0.03 0.08 0.47 1.51 0.65 0.02 0.22 0.63 3.20 0.07 0.77 2.03 0.63 1.49 0.84 12.47 14.83 0.99 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page54 of 62 Exhibit 2 Intel Section Years Job Title of 1 Section Total Level Emp Years Data T 2 Section Change Correlation Coeff Stat Correlation T Coeff 3 Section Regression Contemp Stat Coefficients Lagged Revenue Regression SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 T Section Net Stats Revenue SJ Emp C L 5 Section 6 Effect T Stat r2 10 149 0.69 2.70 0.84 3.75 0.24 1.11 0.15 0.83 0.32 2.13 0.30 1.34 1.35 1.70 0.92 10 1401 0.68 2.61 0.96 9.53 0.72 0.27 0.06 0.09 9.38 2.52 0.50 0.62 0.99 6.88 0.98 10 81 0.68 2.61 0.75 2.96 1.20 1.12 0.39 0.27 2.19 1.58 0.57 0.35 2.31 2.29 0.76 10 1872 0.63 2.29 0.95 8.08 0.69 0.29 0.05 0.06 8.10 2.53 0.42 0.42 0.98 6.08 0.97 10 53 0.62 2.26 0.46 1.25 0.68 0.75 0.23 0.32 5.31 4.85 1.71 1.26 1.42 5.73 0.97 10 31 0.61 2.20 0.94 7.06 1.28 0.42 0.82 1.13 5.65 1.31 2.71 3.26 0.86 2.03 0.98 10 40 0.60 2.09 0.89 5.10 1.03 0.47 0.29 0.81 2.39 0.97 0.62 1.30 1.50 2.17 0.90 10 951 0.59 2.06 0.93 6.70 0.62 0.30 0.24 0.25 3.72 2.57 2.31 0.92 7.78 0.97 10 20 0.58 2.04 0.56 1.66 0.30 0.27 0.47 0.38 1.05 0.68 1.35 0.78 0.03 0.04 0.87 10 37 0.58 2.04 0.89 4.84 1.29 0.23 0.09 0.05 2.39 0.41 0.19 0.08 1.51 2.05 0.90 10 113 0.57 1.98 0.73 2.61 0.21 0.27 0.20 0.09 0.34 0.52 0.37 0.15 0.48 0.52 0.81 10 464 0.57 1.97 0.82 3.86 0.84 0.93 0.34 0.18 1.89 1.44 0.72 0.27 1.77 2.36 0.95 10 86 0.55 1.88 0.56 1.64 1.30 2.76 0.18 0.29 2.28 1.89 0.22 0.34 4.05 2.12 0.73 10 29 0.48 1.55 0.90 5.35 0.63 0.27 0.06 0.22 4.22 1.40 0.28 0.76 0.90 3.16 0.90 10 107 0.48 1.54 0.78 3.31 0.67 0.81 0.22 0.33 3.00 3.39 0.89 0.77 1.48 4.16 0.98 10 878 0.47 1.52 0.92 6.26 0.96 0.40 0.12 0.15 4.86 1.53 0.43 0.32 1.37 3.79 0.93 10 42 0.46 1.45 0.87 4.28 0.72 0.53 0.35 0.76 0.50 0.79 0.45 1.06 1.24 0.73 0.95 10 281 0.45 1.42 0.66 2.34 0.30 0.20 0.23 0.09 1.79 0.88 0.85 0.28 0.50 1.48 0.78 10 49 0.37 1.13 0.94 7.27 0.64 0.15 0.13 0.28 5.60 0.83 0.83 1.38 0.49 2.03 0.93 10 340 0.34 1.02 0.92 6.08 0.52 0.16 0.11 0.21 6.64 1.52 0.96 1.61 0.68 4.43 0.96 10 44 0.26 0.78 0.91 5.82 1.04 0.03 0.32 0.06 3.33 0.08 0.84 0.10 1.01 1.83 0.91 10 42 0.26 0.76 0.79 3.13 3.52 1.68 0.54 1.64 6.75 2.12 0.79 1.94 5.21 4.68 0.97 10 157 0.23 0.68 0.40 1.17 0.28 0.30 0.16 0.07 0.52 0.43 0.22 0.09 0.58 0.54 0.43 10 20 0.28 0.83 0.32 0.88 0.07 0.37 0.13 1.18 0.16 0.68 0.21 1.75 0.44 0.52 0.68 10 40 0.34 1.02 0.48 1.45 0.16 0.33 0.16 1.00 0.30 0.52 0.25 1.38 0.17 0.16 0.68 9 72 0.84 4.12 0.73 2.59 2.09 0.76 0.09 1.59 1.57 0.30 0.04 0.56 2.86 0.82 0.81 9 46 0.78 3.34 0.77 2.94 1.06 0.67 0.54 0.76 1.37 0.24 0.30 0.43 1.73 0.56 0.81 105 0.78 3.31 0.79 3.13 1.15 0.86 0.01 0.49 9.29 0.16 3.20 2.02 9 18 0.77 3.16 0.75 2.57 0.57 0.15 0.76 0.64 0.99 0.19 1.43 0.64 0.72 0.80 0.89 9 50 0.75 3.01 0.85 3.89 0.77 0.92 0.37 1.82 0.50 0.82 0.35 0.91 1.69 0.90 0.87 9 64 0.75 2.98 0.92 4.79 3.72 0.33 1.05 1.80 1.60 0.23 0.69 0.79 4.05 1.75 0.92 172 0.72 2.73 0.85 3.92 0.82 0.28 0.19 0.33 1.36 0.33 0.19 0.26 1.10 0.91 0.75 9 50 0.61 2.03 0.70 2.19 0.92 0.94 0.21 0.16 3.01 1.38 0.49 0.26 1.86 2.00 0.97 9 67 0.43 1.26 0.21 0.49 0.05 0.30 0.88 0.96 0.13 0.54 1.61 1.59 0.26 0.31 0.71 9 17 0.36 1.01 0.55 1.31 5.91 3.81 2.42 0.48 2.49 2.36 2.09 0.41 9.72 3.51 0.96 9 13 0.17 0.46 0.58 1.41 0.10 0.15 0.52 0.29 0.10 0.12 0.49 0.29 0.05 0.02 0.79 9 52 0.08 0.22 0.60 1.81 1.09 0.34 0.38 0.65 3.50 1.05 1.09 0.99 1.43 2.58 0.95 8 283 0.99 17.90 0.97 9.74 0.86 0.01 0.14 0.01 6.72 0.02 1.05 0.05 0.85 1.38 0.97 8 864 0.98 12.28 0.98 9.96 0.75 0.36 0.18 0.24 1.90 2.63 1.88 1.12 5.69 0.99 8 1526 0.98 11.20 0.96 7.28 0.74 0.02 0.19 0.29 4.74 0.04 1.16 0.93 0.72 1.51 0.95 8 50 0.97 10.69 0.96 7.81 0.91 0.17 0.09 0.12 4.85 0.29 0.41 0.31 1.08 1.69 0.94 9 9 10.29 16.00 12.01 14.45 0.99 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page55 of 62 Exhibit 2 Intel Section Years Job Title of 1 Section Total Level Emp Years Data T 2 Section Change Correlation Coeff Stat Correlation T Coeff 3 Section Regression Contemp Stat Coefficients Lagged Revenue Regression SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 T Section Net Stats Revenue SJ Emp C L 5 Section 6 Effect T Stat r2 8 359 0.91 5.42 0.84 3.53 0.59 0.10 0.50 0.47 4.46 0.38 3.44 1.76 0.49 1.50 0.97 8 152 0.91 5.32 0.67 2.01 0.43 0.75 0.12 0.29 3.08 3.03 0.66 1.03 1.18 3.69 0.92 98 0.90 5.00 0.94 6.09 1.44 0.21 0.34 0.88 2.61 0.25 0.71 0.98 1.65 2.00 0.94 8 374 0.90 4.94 0.70 2.19 0.58 0.04 0.53 0.61 1.66 0.04 1.49 1.07 0.62 0.51 0.92 8 689 0.90 4.92 0.94 6.39 0.87 1.50 0.11 0.83 1.67 1.34 0.30 1.87 2.37 3.38 0.99 8 203 0.88 4.53 0.95 6.80 2.06 0.25 0.42 0.73 2.43 7.04 9.31 2.32 8 291 0.87 4.41 0.94 6.05 0.64 0.46 0.13 0.17 7.62 3.81 1.42 1.07 1.10 7.90 0.99 65 0.86 4.07 0.65 1.90 1.50 0.76 1.51 1.81 3.06 1.28 1.46 3.42 2.26 5.65 0.95 318 0.84 3.77 0.91 4.83 0.65 0.35 0.12 0.06 4.53 1.09 0.46 0.15 1.00 2.51 0.98 24 0.83 3.68 0.74 2.49 0.68 2.29 0.04 3.04 1.06 2.31 0.04 1.88 2.97 2.25 0.94 8 217 0.82 3.50 0.96 7.70 0.63 0.17 0.21 0.27 6.94 8.81 6.75 0.80 8 201 0.82 3.49 0.84 3.43 0.54 0.30 0.04 0.29 3.36 1.40 0.22 0.89 0.84 2.75 0.88 8 214 0.81 3.36 0.94 6.24 0.62 0.24 0.01 0.06 5.00 1.47 0.07 0.25 0.86 3.82 0.96 8 304 0.81 3.36 0.52 1.37 0.23 0.07 0.37 0.43 0.84 0.18 1.44 0.91 0.16 0.25 0.72 8 266 0.80 3.32 0.91 4.94 0.48 0.43 0.41 0.06 4.05 1.36 2.10 0.27 0.05 0.12 0.98 8 116 0.80 3.30 0.91 4.95 0.62 0.34 0.34 0.76 6.72 2.40 3.96 4.87 0.95 6.30 0.99 8 180 0.78 3.03 0.88 4.13 0.40 0.16 0.13 0.04 2.75 0.51 0.48 0.12 0.56 1.37 0.94 8 1077 0.77 2.97 0.92 5.43 0.57 0.26 0.09 0.20 5.81 2.02 0.83 1.08 0.83 4.79 0.98 8 155 0.77 2.92 0.95 6.98 0.93 0.43 0.15 0.20 9.92 4.50 1.94 1.44 1.36 8 57 0.76 2.91 0.54 1.45 1.12 1.05 0.14 1.02 2.78 1.86 0.43 1.65 2.17 2.40 0.80 8 48 0.76 2.90 0.40 0.99 0.70 0.73 0.12 0.95 4.75 3.51 0.65 3.27 1.44 4.66 0.95 8 64 0.76 2.90 0.56 1.52 0.81 1.22 0.14 0.05 1.51 1.36 0.12 0.04 2.02 1.58 0.70 8 246 0.76 2.87 0.93 5.66 0.99 0.13 0.37 0.25 6.76 0.56 2.17 0.84 0.86 3.16 0.97 8 157 0.75 2.81 0.88 4.13 0.60 0.45 0.59 0.51 1.01 0.65 1.45 0.67 1.06 1.60 0.94 8 33 0.75 2.81 0.83 3.26 2.33 0.41 1.63 0.25 2.80 0.74 2.32 0.76 2.74 6.78 0.98 8 41 0.75 2.81 0.39 0.95 0.84 0.76 0.40 0.84 2.52 1.52 1.13 1.30 1.60 2.23 0.90 8 87 0.75 2.79 0.11 0.24 0.77 1.02 0.04 0.44 1.60 1.67 0.10 0.68 1.79 1.75 0.62 8 62 0.75 2.77 0.94 6.08 0.71 0.47 0.37 0.27 1.17 129.23 1.00 8 72 0.75 2.75 0.37 0.89 0.42 0.15 0.43 0.35 0.63 0.13 0.81 0.32 0.57 0.33 0.67 8 69 0.72 2.56 0.20 0.46 0.04 0.06 0.24 0.32 0.34 0.35 1.65 1.25 0.10 0.41 0.76 8 10 0.72 2.51 0.15 0.34 0.79 1.77 0.84 0.75 0.58 1.22 0.48 0.26 2.56 1.06 0.64 460 0.71 2.50 0.91 5.04 0.53 0.31 0.03 0.20 8.28 3.96 0.37 1.66 0.84 7.81 0.99 8 29 0.71 2.44 0.29 0.67 0.18 0.87 0.37 1.00 0.59 1.92 1.14 1.66 1.05 1.65 0.93 8 53 0.70 2.38 0.41 1.00 0.47 0.78 0.27 0.65 0.89 1.19 0.45 0.62 1.25 1.31 0.74 102 0.69 2.34 0.66 1.76 1.06 2.22 0.21 0.04 3.56 2.14 0.18 0.03 3.28 2.68 0.95 33 0.69 2.32 0.74 2.47 1.60 0.84 1.27 1.94 8.75 5.92 5.09 5.55 2.44 324 0.67 2.23 0.58 1.60 0.29 0.18 0.23 0.05 2.30 1.15 1.57 0.20 0.47 2.02 0.90 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 43.99 32.69 85.90 58.69 59.28 22.97 23.84 22.98 12.17 10.41 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 14 0.67 2.20 0.55 1.48 1.25 0.61 0.13 1.89 6.47 2.56 0.58 4.51 1.86 5.42 0.98 132 0.65 2.11 0.94 5.98 0.89 0.41 0.13 0.37 5.32 2.31 0.80 1.43 1.30 5.86 0.98 8 34 0.65 2.10 0.52 1.38 0.59 0.38 0.09 0.89 5.92 1.33 7.48 0.96 8 79 0.65 2.08 0.85 3.63 0.62 0.05 0.59 1.07 0.11 1.98 1.94 0.57 8 8 10.55 1.95 10.05 1.11 0.99 0.95 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page56 of 62 Exhibit 2 Intel Section Years Job Title of 1 Section Total Level Emp Years Data T 2 Section Change Correlation Coeff Stat Correlation T Coeff 3 Section Regression Contemp Stat Coefficients Lagged Revenue Regression SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 T Section Net Stats Revenue SJ Emp C L 5 Section 6 Effect T Stat r2 17 0.09 0.23 0.04 0.10 0.56 0.38 1.10 1.61 0.55 0.23 0.59 0.80 0.94 0.37 0.70 7 104 0.99 14.44 0.82 2.85 1.14 1.18 0.09 0.01 1.48 1.03 0.25 0.01 2.32 1.59 0.85 7 163 0.99 13.23 0.85 3.20 0.57 0.15 0.26 0.17 0.71 117.74 1.00 7 283 0.98 10.30 0.90 4.19 0.89 0.35 0.06 0.14 2.34 1.14 0.36 0.51 1.24 1.91 0.97 7 245 0.97 9.67 0.79 2.57 1.32 0.61 0.15 0.49 3.19 2.10 0.84 1.67 1.94 2.94 0.95 7 236 0.97 8.77 0.68 1.87 1.14 0.88 0.17 0.10 6.89 2.33 2.02 7 18 0.96 8.21 0.38 0.82 0.14 0.87 0.01 0.31 0.12 1.14 0.02 0.36 0.73 0.49 0.87 7 43 0.95 7.10 0.23 0.47 0.31 0.93 0.23 0.25 0.21 0.95 0.33 0.22 1.24 0.59 0.60 7 26 0.95 6.90 0.26 0.53 0.70 0.15 0.73 1.01 0.49 0.12 1.14 1.09 0.55 0.21 0.84 116 0.95 6.82 0.67 1.83 0.38 0.04 0.24 0.10 2.45 0.44 4.00 1.02 0.42 1.74 0.99 38 0.95 6.61 0.71 2.03 0.38 0.23 0.56 0.87 0.16 0.16 0.55 0.48 0.61 0.19 0.77 7 118 0.94 6.35 0.25 0.52 0.97 1.19 0.03 0.07 3.96 6.27 0.33 0.46 2.16 5.16 0.99 7 331 0.94 6.31 0.74 2.23 0.48 1.24 0.22 0.07 0.32 0.76 0.30 0.05 1.72 0.69 0.87 7 23 0.94 6.28 0.30 0.64 1.69 1.01 0.35 1.06 8.89 8.16 3.65 7.14 2.70 9.52 0.99 7 47 0.94 6.16 0.04 0.08 0.69 0.12 0.28 1.02 4.52 0.77 3.15 7.38 0.81 3.08 0.99 7 58 0.94 6.02 0.84 3.08 0.65 0.16 0.42 0.70 0.37 0.12 0.54 0.54 0.81 0.32 0.84 7 389 0.93 5.80 0.58 1.41 0.81 0.37 0.06 0.32 1.48 1.15 0.25 0.87 1.19 1.41 0.83 7 8 7 7 170.84 17.95 47.89 15.99 194.68 80.66 18.15 1.00 114 0.92 5.11 0.86 3.44 0.98 1.26 0.50 0.28 9.71 4.95 2.37 1.04 2.24 7.23 0.99 7 78 0.91 4.78 0.84 3.06 0.64 0.46 0.57 0.63 3.30 1.03 1.65 1.35 1.10 1.96 0.98 7 11 0.91 4.77 0.56 1.36 0.52 0.56 0.59 0.99 0.18 0.33 0.46 0.38 1.09 0.28 0.74 7 10 0.90 4.64 0.21 0.43 0.52 0.03 0.29 0.55 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.17 0.48 0.09 0.38 154 0.90 4.59 0.89 3.86 0.70 0.35 0.38 0.27 0.72 0.53 0.94 0.44 0.34 0.22 0.92 7 38 0.89 4.28 0.91 4.34 2.43 1.12 0.12 0.31 1.55 1.02 0.19 0.28 3.56 1.80 0.95 7 57 0.88 4.22 0.01 0.03 0.30 1.33 0.01 0.44 0.14 0.80 0.01 0.23 1.63 0.45 0.68 7 14 0.88 4.19 0.79 2.58 1.41 1.63 0.08 0.17 3.38 1.26 0.13 0.20 3.04 1.94 0.96 7 93 0.88 4.10 0.51 1.17 0.39 0.53 0.14 0.10 0.19 0.43 0.15 0.07 0.91 0.31 0.54 7 12 0.87 3.95 0.28 0.59 1.73 1.98 0.00 0.02 0.38 3.81 3.72 205.65 1.00 7 61 0.86 3.80 0.51 1.18 2.12 1.62 1.89 2.71 2.11 1.70 3.49 4.25 3.75 1.93 0.99 7 40 0.86 3.79 0.46 1.03 0.91 0.00 0.55 0.22 0.56 0.00 0.99 0.23 0.91 0.33 0.75 7 70 0.86 3.74 0.39 0.84 0.20 0.03 0.30 1.19 0.15 0.03 0.65 1.40 0.23 0.11 0.92 7 81 0.86 3.72 0.78 2.53 1.55 1.09 1.49 0.68 2.23 2.74 5.13 1.23 0.46 0.53 1.00 7 45 0.86 3.70 0.69 1.91 1.92 1.03 0.04 0.46 1.64 1.63 0.07 0.53 2.95 1.79 0.93 7 35 0.85 3.68 0.64 1.66 0.36 0.35 0.80 1.47 0.46 0.60 2.23 2.45 0.71 0.54 0.97 7 8 0.85 3.62 0.43 0.95 3.96 4.09 3.34 7.26 2.93 3.93 4.56 5.07 8.05 3.88 0.98 7 90 0.85 3.55 0.67 1.79 1.34 0.61 0.07 0.26 6.07 4.89 0.77 1.70 1.94 5.87 0.99 7 82 0.84 3.43 0.15 0.31 2.16 1.13 0.81 1.24 2.08 1.99 1.91 1.82 3.29 2.12 0.83 7 31 0.84 3.42 0.72 2.06 1.23 1.76 0.59 0.20 0.98 0.50 0.27 0.13 2.99 0.65 0.75 7 155.52 275.61 569 0.83 3.32 0.32 0.67 0.93 0.64 0.26 0.11 1.39 1.68 0.95 0.23 1.57 1.55 0.89 7 15 0.82 3.24 0.74 2.23 2.26 1.27 0.47 0.09 0.83 0.48 0.55 0.07 3.53 0.67 0.78 7 17 0.82 3.23 0.32 0.69 0.87 2.52 0.26 1.72 0.39 1.54 0.33 0.81 3.38 0.89 0.95 7 39 0.82 3.22 0.14 0.27 5.32 2.53 3.26 4.08 1.61 1.16 1.98 1.77 7.85 1.51 0.91 7 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Filed0517 13 2 Page57 of 62 Exhibit 2 Intel Section Years Job Title of 1 Section Total Level Emp Years Data T 2 Section Change Correlation Coeff Stat Correlation T Coeff 3 Section Regression Contemp Stat Coefficients Lagged Revenue Regression SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 T Section Net Stats Revenue SJ Emp C L 5 Section 6 Effect T Stat r2 7 12 0.60 1.69 0.69 1.90 1.46 4.18 1.01 6.31 1.14 1.33 0.55 2.46 5.64 1.53 0.99 7 16 0.60 1.67 0.68 1.85 0.81 0.54 0.75 0.35 0.11 0.15 0.24 0.07 1.35 0.14 0.82 224 0.59 1.64 0.33 0.70 1.58 0.63 0.86 0.91 1.44 1.03 2.22 1.42 2.21 1.32 0.87 7 27 0.59 1.62 0.59 1.47 2.44 0.08 0.44 1.28 0.37 0.02 0.24 0.25 2.36 0.24 0.75 7 52 0.58 1.59 0.79 2.62 0.26 0.23 0.06 0.07 0.49 0.88 0.33 0.20 0.03 0.04 0.92 7 31 0.54 1.45 0.67 1.83 2.56 0.74 0.13 0.92 0.54 0.30 0.06 0.26 3.30 0.50 0.76 878 0.50 1.31 0.59 1.48 1.85 0.75 0.70 0.51 7 88 0.49 1.27 0.79 2.57 0.24 0.32 0.37 0.19 7 9 0.49 1.26 0.61 1.34 2.99 4.04 3.39 3.51 7 14 0.42 1.04 0.60 1.48 5.60 3.82 2.25 7 15 0.39 0.95 0.62 1.59 7.30 2.86 2.56 7 68 0.38 0.91 0.51 1.17 4.24 1.64 7 34 0.36 0.85 0.62 1.57 0.33 7 11 0.34 0.81 0.14 0.27 3.17 7 12 0.31 0.74 0.60 1.29 8.69 7 47 0.24 0.55 0.29 0.61 2.29 1.15 0.73 0.52 7 24 0.12 0.26 0.09 0.17 4.06 2.08 1.49 2.58 7 7 46.85 35.03 2.49 6.95 1.36 2.90 3.35 5.09 1.33 1.91 0.65 0.02 2.67 1.80 11.14 12.08 45.73 19.62 11.05 3.14 2.25 2.54 0.88 4.58 3.84 3.05 0.76 0.62 0.88 0.79 0.24 0.27 1.18 0.05 1.00 0.34 0.63 0.44 2.60 43.87 1.00 0.08 0.54 1.00 9.42 3.07 0.96 5.44 0.97 5.88 0.72 0.64 0.27 0.32 0.19 0.93 0.15 5.84 0.45 0.55 0.29 3.44 0.65 0.46 10.16 6.51 0.66 18.07 0.61 20.25 0.66 14.21 15.65 6.14 19.43 1.00 14 0.08 0.17 0.24 0.50 0.71 0.45 0.92 0.81 0.43 0.54 1.27 0.70 0.27 0.11 0.95 187 0.08 0.17 0.37 0.78 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.82 0.08 0.12 0.24 0.97 0.18 0.10 0.77 7 10 0.18 0.42 0.29 0.62 5.13 4.95 4.84 5.17 5.01 0.98 7 15 0.22 0.50 0.53 1.26 1.02 0.23 0.62 0.63 0.20 0.09 0.27 0.16 0.79 0.10 0.56 7 17 0.43 1.07 0.48 1.10 5.55 2.37 2.37 1.63 3.35 2.98 3.45 1.37 7.92 3.33 0.96 201 0.97 7.68 0.90 3.51 6 98 0.96 7.13 0.97 6.67 6 8 0.96 6.83 0.92 4.03 6 222 0.95 5.98 0.92 4.09 6 8 0.95 5.93 0.72 1.48 6 28 0.93 5.17 0.09 0.15 6 72 0.92 4.79 0.48 0.95 6 17 0.92 4.72 0.83 2.13 6 25 0.91 4.36 0.24 0.35 131 0.91 4.26 0.91 3.08 6 12 0.90 4.06 0.78 1.78 6 18 0.90 4.03 0.86 2.35 402 0.89 3.99 0.79 2.26 6 41 0.89 3.96 0.90 2.05 6 77 0.89 3.95 0.77 2.12 6 12 0.88 3.76 0.76 1.68 6 36 0.88 3.74 0.03 0.05 6 8 0.87 3.57 0.13 0.22 6 93 0.87 3.55 0.56 1.16 7 7 6 6 6 15.96 30.79 17.07 35.69 46.74 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 2 Filed0517 13 Page58 of 62 Exhibit 2 Intel Section Years Job Title of 1 Section Total Level Emp Years Data T 2 Section Change Correlation Coeff Stat Correlation T Coeff 149 0.71 2.03 0.98 7.11 6 22 0.68 1.86 0.36 0.66 6 10 0.61 1.56 0.98 8.07 6 8 0.55 1.32 0.12 0.18 6 14 0.52 1.20 0.93 2.58 6 10 0.51 1.19 0.65 1.47 6 34 0.51 1.18 0.76 1.67 6 15 0.49 1.14 0.50 0.99 6 9 0.42 0.93 0.35 0.52 6 31 0.41 0.90 0.16 0.16 6 12 0.27 0.55 0.80 2.34 6 8 0.24 0.49 0.33 0.61 6 13 0.23 0.47 0.89 2.81 6 10 0.21 0.42 0.67 1.28 6 40 0.18 0.37 0.60 1.29 6 24 0.09 0.18 0.42 0.65 6 11 0.02 0.04 0.58 1.23 10 0.41 0.90 0.20 0.20 170 0.74 2.21 0.06 0.10 6 6 6 3 Regression Contemp Stat Revenue Section Coefficients Lagged Regression SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 T Section Net Stats Revenue SJ Emp C L 5 Section Effect T Stat r2 6 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Exhibit Filed0517 13 2 Page59 62 of 2 Intuit Section Job Title of 1 Section Total Years Emp Data Level Years T Coeff 11 2981 11 2 Section Change Correlation T Coeff Stat 0.60 2.26 0.97 597 0.59 2.18 0.95 11 293 0.54 1.91 0.97 11 150 0.40 1.29 11 140 0.26 10 170 10 1571 10 69 10 194 9 9 57 1073 Correlation 3 Section Regression Contemp Stat Coefficients Lagged Revenue Regression SJ Emp 12.05 1.50 1.01 0.26 0.34 8.57 1.13 1.33 0.48 0.04 11.05 1.50 1.17 0.49 0.76 3.31 2.01 1.70 0.81 0.05 0.13 0.69 0.78 3.55 0.98 10.93 0.55 1.85 0.79 0.49 1.60 0.40 Contemp 10.44 Lagged 4 T Section Net Stats Revenue SJ Emp C 5 T L Section 6 Effect Stat r2 2.21 1.05 1.42 2.51 4.97 0.99 8.97 3.99 3.14 0.29 2.46 5.57 0.98 0.08 8.38 2.13 1.64 0.29 2.67 3.97 0.97 0.80 0.27 4.41 1.72 1.21 0.33 3.71 2.77 0.87 1.28 0.43 1.77 1.41 2.27 0.74 2.01 1.97 2.14 0.71 1.08 0.18 0.15 0.12 4.91 0.37 0.47 0.23 0.89 1.50 0.97 3.16 1.34 1.01 0.36 0.02 6.15 3.76 0.14 2.35 0.30 0.78 0.19 0.68 0.18 0.15 0.28 1.47 0.42 0.17 0.50 0.57 0.52 1.25 0.76 2.86 1.39 1.36 0.33 0.44 1.89 0.78 0.27 0.43 2.75 1.12 0.94 0.67 2.39 0.08 0.21 0.62 0.82 0.05 0.38 0.53 0.91 0.07 0.24 1.44 0.92 0.40 0.64 2.22 0.69 2.34 1.15 0.25 0.30 0.41 3.94 0.68 1.77 0.85 1.40 2.74 0.89 13.75 11.01 0.99 9 94 0.59 1.94 0.57 1.56 1.10 0.36 0.01 1.56 2.52 0.28 0.01 2.86 1.47 1.11 0.90 9 81 0.54 1.70 0.77 2.94 1.63 1.09 0.15 0.23 4.23 1.86 0.49 0.46 2.71 4.12 0.92 0.53 1.67 0.68 2.05 0.34 0.90 0.56 0.09 0.33 0.28 0.37 0.02 0.56 0.14 0.51 0.17 0.46 0.74 2.70 2.01 0.71 0.11 0.23 2.20 0.66 0.16 0.18 2.73 2.07 0.75 9 9 758 46 9 486 0.01 0.02 0.46 1.28 1.34 1.60 0.55 0.31 4.91 3.62 2.13 0.90 2.94 4.97 0.94 8 113 0.80 3.25 0.91 4.90 0.44 0.22 1.21 2.04 1.78 0.33 2.25 5.15 0.66 0.73 1.00 8 24 0.68 2.25 0.72 2.32 1.52 2.13 0.81 0.39 0.39 0.24 0.10 0.06 3.65 0.29 0.83 8 29 0.61 1.87 0.76 2.62 2.07 2.81 1.72 0.60 1.19 0.79 0.53 0.22 4.88 0.93 0.83 0.46 1.25 0.81 3.08 1.40 1.62 1.07 0.50 0.84 0.48 0.34 0.17 3.01 0.61 0.74 0.33 0.87 0.04 0.10 0.37 0.68 0.51 1.04 0.95 0.84 0.41 0.53 1.05 0.99 0.97 8 8 114 22 8 177 0.33 0.85 0.94 5.94 2.15 2.42 2.11 1.22 2.70 1.46 1.39 0.96 4.57 1.88 0.95 8 206 0.63 2.00 0.13 0.30 1.48 5.60 4.14 2.16 1.84 1.56 1.55 1.36 7.08 1.74 0.93 7 48 0.82 3.26 0.65 1.73 2.10 0.32 0.98 3.09 6.73 1.26 4.45 4.93 2.42 8.37 0.99 7 22 0.74 2.48 0.87 3.60 2.05 1.38 0.10 0.31 1.40 1.17 0.13 0.20 3.43 2.57 0.93 7 7 0.72 2.33 0.86 3.41 3.15 0.40 0.59 0.24 1.69 0.08 0.14 0.08 3.54 0.77 0.95 7 43 0.70 2.17 0.54 1.28 0.89 1.50 0.51 0.15 2.01 1.58 1.42 0.52 2.39 1.78 0.82 0.65 1.93 0.79 2.61 1.31 2.39 0.84 0.14 6.24 3.53 3.28 0.44 3.70 5.12 0.98 0.62 1.75 0.71 2.01 0.76 3.57 1.38 2.21 0.73 1.19 0.94 1.30 4.33 1.71 0.87 7 7 354 58 7 110 0.31 0.72 0.45 1.01 0.86 1.35 0.69 2.45 2.20 2.04 1.87 3.56 0.49 0.54 0.99 7 143 0.21 0.48 0.90 4.19 1.05 0.28 0.30 0.40 5.44 0.61 1.27 1.51 0.77 1.34 0.98 0.04 0.10 0.21 0.43 1.11 1.49 0.29 2.38 0.35 0.28 0.06 0.55 2.60 0.31 0.83 0.10 0.23 0.09 0.18 1.45 2.96 1.25 0.62 2.56 3.71 3.39 1.23 4.41 3.45 0.93 0.33 0.78 0.12 0.25 0.39 1.05 1.03 0.99 0.83 1.32 2.01 2.15 0.66 0.61 0.96 0.55 1.49 0.73 2.11 1.15 4.61 3.16 0.29 1.93 1.31 1.27 0.30 5.76 1.56 0.86 7 7 7 7 26 136 16 378 7 25 0.73 2.36 0.14 0.28 0.19 0.70 0.18 0.23 0.04 0.23 0.07 0.03 0.52 0.08 0.62 7 15 0.83 3.37 0.60 1.52 0.27 0.93 0.52 2.08 0.62 1.93 1.36 4.48 1.20 1.59 0.98 6 16 0.95 6.25 0.98 8.84 0.93 5.09 0.93 4.44 6 180 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Exhibit Filed0517 13 2 Page60 62 of 2 Intuit Section Job Title of 1 Section Total Years Emp Data Level Years T Coeff 2 Section Change Correlation T Coeff Stat Correlation Contemp Stat 6 96 0.71 2.02 0.95 5.47 6 39 0.71 2.01 0.74 1.93 6 91 0.71 2.00 0.49 0.97 6 8 0.69 1.92 0.68 1.62 6 26 0.67 1.81 0.19 0.33 6 26 0.58 1.41 0.28 0.51 6 31 0.57 1.39 0.77 2.08 6 9 0.54 1.27 0.38 0.71 6 8 0.52 1.22 0.78 2.14 6 405 0.46 1.02 0.60 1.30 6 230 0.43 0.96 0.69 1.63 6 14 0.42 0.93 0.36 0.67 6 23 0.41 0.91 0.09 0.15 6 15 0.40 0.88 0.17 0.30 6 8 0.38 0.82 0.03 0.06 6 12 0.38 0.81 0.44 0.85 6 18 0.35 0.75 0.27 0.49 6 78 0.33 0.70 0.38 0.70 6 38 0.33 0.69 0.85 2.82 0.29 0.60 0.09 0.15 0.28 0.58 0.59 1.27 0.23 0.48 0.66 1.51 6 6 6 115 37 102 6 74 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.09 6 24 0.05 0.10 0.48 0.94 0.01 0.01 0.43 0.82 6 338 6 17 0.00 0.01 0.30 0.55 6 6 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.23 6 16 0.09 0.17 0.15 0.26 6 54 0.12 0.25 0.93 4.33 6 98 0.13 0.27 0.81 2.40 0.24 0.50 0.34 0.63 6 179 3 Regression 6 23 0.26 0.54 0.09 0.16 6 19 0.29 0.61 0.07 0.13 6 35 0.36 0.78 0.83 2.61 6 18 0.38 0.83 0.22 0.40 6 15 0.40 0.87 0.53 1.08 6 16 0.46 1.02 0.80 2.29 6 10 0.47 1.06 0.69 1.36 6 38 0.85 3.22 0.92 3.98 Lagged Revenue Section Coefficients Regression SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 T Section Net Stats Revenue SJ Emp C L 5 Section Effect T Stat r2 6 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Exhibit Filed0517 13 2 Page61 62 of 2 Pixar Section Job of Title 1 Section Total Years Level Emp Years Data T Coeff 2 Section Change Correlation Correlation T Coeff Stat 3 Section Regression Stat Contemp Coefficients Lagged Revenue Regression SJ Emp Contemp Lagged 4 Section T Stats Net Revenue SJ Emp C L 5 Section 6 Effect T Stat r2 TECHNICAL DIRECTOR 11 1872 0.94 8.31 0.89 5.65 0.55 0.31 0.03 0.02 3.08 0.63 0.60 0.06 0.86 1.32 0.82 ARTIST SKETCH 11 141 0.91 6.64 0.82 4.06 1.29 1.53 0.12 0.18 7.17 4.44 1.77 0.40 2.82 6.78 0.94 ENGINEER SOFTWARE 11 503 0.91 6.41 0.93 7.25 0.95 0.70 0.01 0.25 6.38 1.64 0.14 0.62 1.65 3.78 0.91 ANIMATOR SUPERVISING 11 70 0.82 4.35 0.89 5.41 0.23 2.42 0.22 2.26 0.18 1.94 1.18 1.85 2.65 5.34 0.89 11 772 0.81 4.21 0.78 3.53 0.55 0.48 0.06 0.82 5.27 1.97 1.47 3.57 1.03 3.32 0.92 11 44 0.77 3.57 0.89 5.59 1.79 3.71 0.06 2.65 1.16 2.92 0.44 2.22 1.92 3.94 0.92 11 129 0.75 3.37 0.79 3.68 0.91 1.27 0.15 0.47 3.97 3.23 1.90 0.79 2.18 5.50 0.92 ANIMATOR ANIMATOR LAYOUT DIRECTING ARTIST ENGINEER SR SOFTWARE 11 53 0.74 3.31 0.79 3.59 0.70 1.61 0.00 0.79 1.75 2.89 0.03 1.11 2.32 5.27 0.89 DESIGNER PRODUCTION 11 62 0.73 3.20 0.86 4.86 0.52 2.50 0.22 3.16 0.22 1.55 0.97 1.44 1.98 2.14 0.83 11 73 0.72 3.10 0.75 3.21 0.53 1.60 0.05 0.10 0.86 2.81 0.33 0.10 2.12 4.47 0.83 ART DIRECTOR 11 70 0.70 2.95 0.76 3.26 1.18 0.70 0.04 1.55 4.33 1.74 0.33 1.81 1.89 3.36 0.83 ENGINEER 11 54 0.58 2.16 0.82 4.06 0.72 1.11 0.24 0.86 1.07 1.77 1.00 0.75 1.83 3.79 0.80 11 91 0.56 2.04 0.81 3.97 1.07 0.56 0.12 0.70 5.49 2.03 1.65 1.48 1.63 4.81 0.90 11 247 0.55 1.98 0.46 1.48 1.27 1.09 0.01 0.41 2.96 2.26 0.07 0.43 2.36 2.98 0.70 11 11 0.51 1.79 0.81 3.89 1.08 0.42 0.01 1.19 4.76 1.69 0.09 1.88 1.50 4.24 0.86 SYSTEMS ADMINISTRATOR 11 133 0.50 1.75 0.29 0.86 0.74 1.15 0.06 0.16 1.93 2.43 0.51 0.20 1.89 2.50 0.62 SCIENTIST 11 62 0.50 1.74 0.39 1.21 1.06 1.26 0.09 0.07 2.05 2.72 0.49 0.06 2.31 2.91 0.68 ANIMATOR FIX QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEMS ADMINISTRATOR SR ARTIST STORY MGR DESKTOP SYSTEMS SR TECH DIRECTOR SUPERVISING 11 70 0.49 1.67 0.72 2.95 1.91 0.66 0.15 3.54 4.54 1.97 0.89 3.08 2.56 4.81 0.87 MGR FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 11 11 0.43 1.41 0.84 4.41 0.91 0.34 0.00 0.90 5.48 1.95 0.03 2.06 1.24 4.99 0.88 MANAGER 11 11 0.42 1.38 0.83 4.20 0.88 0.24 0.08 0.56 4.82 1.10 1.22 1.12 1.12 3.60 0.86 11 11 0.42 1.38 0.88 5.34 0.84 0.21 0.04 0.53 5.76 1.20 0.67 1.39 1.05 4.31 0.88 11 42 0.42 1.37 0.63 2.29 1.15 0.84 0.08 1.67 3.63 2.51 0.76 1.85 1.98 3.68 0.79 11 24 0.38 1.22 0.86 4.72 0.60 0.02 0.09 0.13 4.06 0.10 1.73 0.36 0.62 2.11 0.84 SVCS 11 11 0.34 1.09 0.84 4.35 0.95 0.24 0.06 0.73 4.89 1.21 0.87 1.37 1.19 4.01 0.86 PRODUCTS 11 11 0.21 0.63 0.79 3.66 1.01 0.25 0.03 1.20 4.52 1.44 0.42 2.01 1.25 4.30 0.85 11 44 0.19 0.59 0.26 0.75 0.57 0.92 0.18 1.39 2.12 3.91 1.80 1.63 1.49 3.88 0.85 11 22 0.17 0.52 0.41 1.29 0.84 0.35 0.07 1.70 4.85 2.20 1.10 4.11 1.19 4.57 0.92 11 35 0.12 0.36 0.12 0.35 0.77 0.92 0.01 1.08 1.17 1.57 0.04 0.60 1.69 1.58 0.39 10 35 0.50 1.62 0.71 2.65 1.47 0.68 0.03 4.53 2.67 2.62 0.15 2.08 2.15 3.58 0.85 MGR SYSTEMS 10 10 0.41 1.28 0.74 2.66 1.03 0.40 0.20 2.10 3.42 1.19 0.93 1.93 1.44 2.70 0.81 ENGINEER 10 15 0.28 0.83 0.68 2.45 1.10 0.49 0.02 0.34 2.08 1.33 0.06 0.13 1.59 2.68 0.67 VP SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 10 12 0.26 0.76 0.56 1.79 3.29 0.66 0.72 9.33 2.20 1.19 1.18 2.35 3.95 2.37 0.89 USER INTERFACE DESIGNER 10 20 0.14 0.40 0.66 2.35 0.65 0.35 0.02 0.43 1.94 1.17 0.19 0.35 0.99 2.17 0.61 9 9 0.34 0.95 0.78 3.01 1.66 0.14 0.12 2.32 3.77 0.40 0.55 1.91 1.80 3.41 0.88 9 15 0.17 0.45 0.43 1.07 1.85 1.06 0.30 1.74 5.23 12.17 6.25 4.55 2.92 7.02 0.99 8 25 0.58 1.73 0.73 2.36 0.34 1.69 0.31 2.68 0.22 2.03 0.66 1.00 1.35 1.15 0.85 8 13 0.35 0.92 0.63 1.60 0.56 0.96 0.85 6.04 17.44 10.07 16.87 1.52 8 8 0.34 0.89 0.81 3.05 1.03 0.02 0.22 2.32 6.00 0.08 2.32 3.35 1.05 3.89 0.97 8 20 0.27 0.70 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.57 0.11 1.05 0.10 2.80 0.51 0.29 0.52 0.90 0.86 ENGINEERING ENGINEER ARTIST ASSOCIATE GRAPHIC TECH DEPT TECH DIRECTOR LEAD CRTV ADMINISTRATOR DEVELOPER RENDERMAN TECH DIRECTOR CRTV SVCS SCULPTOR ENGINEER PROJECT PRODUCTION MGR STUDIO TOOLS OPERATIONS RENDERMAN SUPPORT DIR RENDERMAN DESIGNER SUPPORT PRODUCT DEV ENVIRONMENTAL ARTIST AFTER EFFECTS TECHNICAL WRITER TECHNICAL LEAD RENDERING ARTIST STORY DEVELOPMENT 11.18 20.27 1.00 Case5 11cv 02509LHK Document424 Exhibit Filed0517 13 2 Page62 62 of 2 Pixar Section Job of Title ENGINEER SOFTWARE ENGINEER IMAGE TECHSUPPORT 1 Section Total Years Level Emp Years Data T Coeff 2 Section Change Correlation Correlation T Coeff Stat Stat 7 7 0.86 3.77 0.01 0.03 6 8 0.92 4.74 0.54 1.13 6 6 0.92 4.65 0.75 1.97 6 6 0.88 3.76 0.79 2.24 6 6 0.88 3.69 0.78 2.18 6 65 0.74 2.20 0.53 1.07 6 6 0.60 1.50 0.76 2.00 6 6 0.52 1.22 0.57 0.98 FINANCIAL APPS DEVELOPER 6 6 0.46 1.03 0.80 2.31 MGR SR PROJECT 6 6 0.46 1.03 0.21 0.31 6 6 0.42 0.93 0.27 0.49 6 8 0.12 0.24 0.35 0.66 TECHNICAL ENGINEER LEAD TELECOM ROOM SCREENING MGR IMAGE CGI MASTERING MASTERING PAINTER DESIGNER CAMERA ENGINEER APPLICATIONS STUDIO TOOLS LAYOUT ARTIST LEAD MEDIA SYSTEMS COORDINATOR 3 Section Regression Contemp 0.51 Coefficients Lagged Revenue 0.02 0.01 Regression SJ Emp 2.20 Contemp 0.63 Lagged 0.07 4 Section T Stats Net Revenue 0.03 SJ Emp 1.07 C L 0.49 5 Section 6 Effect T Stat 0.55 r2 0.58

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?