Alexander/Ryahim v. Hobbs et al

Filing 7

ORDER re 6 MOTION for Service filed by Charles E Alexander/Ryahim, Jr and directing the Clerk to prepare summons and the U.S. Marshal to serve defts through the Compliance Division of the Arkansas Dept. of Correction, P.O. Box 20550, Pine Bluff, AR 71612, without prepayment of fees. Signed by Magistrate Judge Beth Deere on 7/6/11. (kpr) (Additional attachment(s) added on 7/6/2011: ) # 1 Main Document - Correct) (thd).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
PINE BLUFF DIVISION
CHARLES E. ALEXANDER/RYAHIM, JR.,
ADC # 111057
V.

PLAINTIFF

No. 5:11CV00133 DPM/BD

RAY HOBBS, et al.

DEFENDANTS

PARTIAL RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
I.

Procedures for Filing Objections:
The following Partial Recommended Disposition has been sent to United States

District Judge D.P. Marshall Jr. Any party may serve and file written objections to this
recommendation. Objections should be specific and should include the factual or legal
basis for the objection. If the objection is to a factual finding, specifically identify that
finding and the evidence that supports your objection. An original and one copy of your
objections must be received in the office of the United States District Court Clerk no later
than fourteen (14) days from the date of this recommendation. A copy will be furnished
to the opposing party. Failure to file timely objections may result in a waiver of the right
to appeal questions of fact.
Mail your objections and/or “statement of necessity” to:
Clerk, United States District Court
Eastern District of Arkansas
600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite A149
Little Rock, AR 72201-3325

II.

Background:
Plaintiff Charles Alexander/Ryahim, Jr., an Arkansas Department of Correction

inmate, filed this lawsuit pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants Hobbs,
Straughn, Manus, Woods, King, Campbell, and Brownlee retaliated against him for
exercising his first amendment rights. In addition, Mr. Alexander/Ryahim states that
Defendant Brownlee “is also being sued based on the claim of violation of usage of an
unconstitutional parole board through discriminatory acts.” (#1 at p.4)
The Court has determined that Mr. Alexander/Ryahim stated a retaliation claim
against Defendants Hobbs, Straughn, Manus, Woods, King, Campbell, and Brownlee.
His allegation, however, that Defendant Brownlee is liable based on the discriminatory
acts of the parole board does not state a claim for relief. Therefore, that claim should be
DISMISSED.
III.

Analysis:
Mr. Alexander/Ryahim seeks to hold Mr. Brownlee liable based on discriminatory

acts of the parole board and Mr. Brownlee’s failure to file an “Actual Innocence Post
Transfer Parole Board Application.” (#1 at p.12) The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
has consistently held that “parole board members are absolutely immune from suit when
considering and denying parole questions.” Figg v. Russell, 433 F.3d 593, 598 (8th Cir.
2006) (internal citation omitted). Mr. Alexander/Ryahim clearly and specifically

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challenges Mr. Brownlee’s conduct in refusing to file his Application before the parole
board. Because Mr. Brownlee is immune from liability, this claim should be dismissed.1
IV.

Conclusion:
The Court recommends that Mr. Alexander/Ryahim’s claim against Mr. Brownlee

be DISMISSED with prejudice.
DATED this 6th day of July, 2011.

___________________________________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1

Although Mr. Alexander/Ryahim states that this claim is “not a disguise postconviction attack,” he also explains that he was attempting to file his Application before
the parole board “in a last attempt to overturn an unlawful commitment.” (#1 at pp.9 &
13) Because the resolution of this issue could impact the lawfulness of the State’s
custody, such a claim must be asserted in a habeas action. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544
U.S. 74, 81, 125 S.Ct. 1242 (2005) (state prisoners may use only habeas remedies when
they seek to invalidate duration of confinement, either directly through injunction
compelling speedier release or indirectly through judicial determination that necessarily
implies unlawfulness of State’s custody).
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