NOKIA CORPORATION v. APPLE INC.

Filing 1

MOTION to Quash (filing fee $39, receipt number 461603897) by APPLE INC. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Byron L. Pickard, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit 9, # 11 Exhibit 10, # 12 Exhibit 11, # 13 Exhibit 12, # 14 Exhibit 13, # 15 Exhibit 14, # 16 Exhibit 15, # 17 Exhibit 16, # 18 Exhibit 17, # 19 Exhibit 18, # 20 Exhibit 19)(smm) Modified on 5/20/2011 (smm).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

IN RE THIRD PARTY SUBPOENAS AD
TESTIFICANDUM

Case No.

Nokia Corporation,
Plaintiff,
Case No. District of Delaware
Civil Action No. 1 :09-cv-00791- GMS

V.

Apple Inc.,
Defendant.

NONPARTIES’ MOTION TO QUASH NOKIA SUBPOENAS AND FOR A
PROTECTIVE ORDER

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

Introduction .............................................................................................................................3

II.

Background and Summary of Argument.............................................................................3

III.

Legal Argument...................................................................................................................7

A.

The Shelton Standard for Deposing Opposing Party’s Counsel Applies Because the

Apple Attorneys Are Dealing with Invalidity Challenges in the Pending Reexaminations That
Are Also at Issue in the Litigation..............................................................................................8
B.

All Nonprivileged Information That Nokia Seeks Can Be Obtained from Other More-

Accessible and Less-Burdensome Sources.................................................................................9
C.

The Information Nokia Seeks Is Neither Relevant Nor Crucial ....................................11

D.

Nokia Will Encounter Privileged Information by Deposing the Apple Attorneys........12

IV.

Conclusion.........................................................................................................................13

-2-

I.

Introduction
Robert Greene Sterne, Glenn Perry, Rich Coller, and Salvador Bezos, of the law firm

Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C., (collectively, the "Apple Attorneys") move this Court
to quash deposition subpoenas ] served on them by Nokia and to enter a protective order,
pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, barring Nokia from further
attempts to discover information through the Apple Attorneys. This motion is necessary because
Nokia has subpoenaed the Apple Attorneys who are representing Apple in connection with the
very patents Apple has asserted against Nokia in the underlying litigation, pending in the District
Court for Delaware. The law prohibits a party from deposing its opponent’s lawyer if the
information it seeks to obtain is available through another source, and the information Nokia is
attempting to discover is available through other, non-attorney sources. Nokia has not attempted
to obtain the information through those sources and instead made its first and only attempt to
discover this information through the Apple Attorneys. And the information Nokia is seeking to
discover through the Apple Attorneys is irrelevant and largely protected from disclosure by
privilege. The Court should quash the subpoenas and issue a protective order.
II.

Background and Summary of Argument
Nokia sued Apple for patent infringement in the U.S. District Court for the District of

Delaware. See Nokia Corporation v. Apple Inc., Civil Action No. 1 :09-cv-00791-GMS. Apple
counterclaimed asserting that Nokia infringed nine of its patents. On April 28, 2010, an attorney

The subpoenas are attached here as Exhibits 1-4. These subpoenas also sought the
production of documents from the Apple Attorneys. All responsive, nonprivileged documents
have been produced.

-3-

from Brient IP Law filed ex parte reexamination requests on behalf of an anonymous requester
against all nine patents that Apple asserted in counterclaims against Nokia.
Nokia served deposition subpoenas on all of the Apple Attorneys, each of whom
represent Apple Inc. in the reexaminations of six of the nine the patents Apple asserted against
Nokia in the underlying litigation. 2 Four of these reexaminations are on-going, including one
reexamination which is still in the early stages of prosecution. 3 The Apple Attorneys’
prosecution of these patent reexaminations is closely tied to the issues in the underlying litigation
because the basis of the validity challenges to the patents are largely the same in both. A patent
reexamination is a challenge to the patentability of a patent before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (the "Office"). Because patent reexaminations provide accused patent
infringers two bites at the invalidity appleone in the District Court and the other at the
Officedefendants often request patent reexaminations of the patents-in-suit as a defense tactic
in patent litigations. This case is no different. Although the reexaminations handled by the
Apple Attorneys were anonymously requested, the evidence shows that Nokia likely requested
the reexaminations of the patents Apple asserted against Nokia as Nokia is the only counterclaim defendant for these patents.
The Court should quash these subpoenas and enter a protective order barring the
depositions. Nokia may depose the Apple Attorneys only if it can show (1) the information it

2

Those reexaminations are (1) Control No. 90/010,964, involving U.S. Patent No.
5,634,074; (2) Control No. 90/010,967, involving U.S. Patent No. 5,315,703; (3) Control No.
90/010,965, involving U.S. Patent No. 5,455,854; (4) Control No. 90/010,966, involving U.S.
Patent No. 6,239,795; (5) Control No. 90/010,970, involving U.S. Patent No. 6,189,034; and (6)
Control No. 90/010,969, involving U.S. Patent No. 7,383,453.
In three of the four pending reexaminations, the Reexam Certificate has not issued
although the Notice of Intent to Issue a Reexam Certificate has been mailed. Control Nos.
90/010,964; 90/010,967; and 90/010,969.

seeks can only be obtained by deposing the Apple Attorneys; (2) the information it seeks by
deposing the Apple Attorneys is both relevant and nonprivileged; and (3) the information it seeks
is crucial to the case. Nokia cannot satisfy any of these elements.
First, the prosecution of these reexaminations was done on the written record that is
found in the file histories of each reexamination. This written record includes the substance of
the in-person interviews held in each of the reexaminationsboth the examiner and Apple
submitted a written interview summary for each interview conducted in these reexaminations.
And, even assuming that this written record of the interviews was insufficient, Nokia can still
discover the substance of the interviews by deposing the examiner or inventors, who were also
present at the interviews. Nokia has also subpoenaed documents from the Apple Attorneys. In
response to those document subpoenas, the Apple Attorneys have provided all requested prior art
present in their files of these reexaminations.
Second, the only other information that Nokia seeks to discover from the Apple
Attorneys is protected from disclosure by the attorneyclient privilege or the work-product
doctrine. The only non-privileged information known by these attorneys is already in the public
domain in the file histories of the patents-in-suit and the file histories of the reexaminations. The
reason for that is simple: all prosecution of these patents is done on the written record. 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.2. The remaining communications and information, such as Apple Attorneys’ client
communications, internal communications, and mental impressions, are protected from
disclosure.
Third, any information outside the file histories of the patents in reexamination is not
relevant, let alone crucial, to this suit. Those file histories contain the complete record of the
Office’s determination as to the patentability of those patents. And, because Nokia has not

-5-

alleged inequitable conduct in this case, the mental impressions of the Apple Attorneys are not
relevant and would be protected as attorney-work product in any event. Indeed, Nokia has never
explained why the information it seeks is relevant to any claim or defense in this suit. The only
issue that Nokia has articulated as being nonprivileged is the substance of the interviews
conducted by the Apple Attorneys with the Office during the reexaminations of the patents-insuit, but Nokia has never explained why it needs any more than the interview summaries that are
publicly available.
Counsel for the Apple Attorneys objected to the subpoenas and explained to Nokia’s
counsel in follow-up communications that Nokia was not entitled to take the depositions.

4 The

Apple Attorneys also advised that the deposition dates noticed in the subpoenas conflicted with
each Apple Attorney’s calendar and they could not appear on the noticed dates in any event.
Nevertheless, counsel for the Apple Attorneys attempted a compromise on acceptable deposition
topics with Nokia’s counsel Hoping to avoid filing this motion, counsel for the Apple
. 5

Attorneys suggested that Nokia narrow the scope of the information on which it wanted to
conduct depositions and proposed that the parties proceed under Rule 30(b)(6), so that agreeable
deposition topics could be identified in advance of any deposition. Because Nokia refused these
suggestions and did not narrow the scope of its subpoenas, the Apple Attorneys and Nokia did
not identify new dates for the depositions that did not conflict with the Apple Attorney’s
schedules. 6

See Letter from Byron Pickard, Apple Attorneys’ counsel, to Rohan Kale, Nokia’s
counsel (April 8, 2011), attached hereto as Exhibit 5.
See Id.
6

See Emails between Rohan Kale, Nokia’s counsel, and Byron Pickard, Apple
Attorneys’ counsel, attached hereto as Exhibits 6 & 7.

S

III. LegalArgument

The Subpoenas should be quashed and a protective order should be entered because the
depositions sought are neither appropriate nor necessary. Although parties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to a party’s claim or defense, courts have
discretion to limit the scope of discovery when it is cumulative or can be obtained from other
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive sources. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l)-(2). The
Court may also limit discovery "for good cause" and "issue an order to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense," including
"forbidding the discovery." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
Deposing an opposing party’s attorney is disfavored.

See, e.g., Shelton v. Am. Motors

Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir. 1986); Evans v. Atwood, No. CIV.A. 96-2746, 1999 WL
1032811, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 1999) ("[A] party seeking to depose its adversary’s counsel
must demonstrate the propriety of and need for such a deposition.");

Corp. for Public Broad. v.

Am. Auto. Centennial Comm’n, No. 1:97CV01810, 1999 WL 1815561, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 2,
1999). The D.C. Circuit has not addressed what standard should be applied for depositions of
attorneys representing a party in reexaminations that are concurrent with a pending litigation, but
the standard for deposing opposing party’s counsel as articulated by the Eighth Circuit in Shelton
v. American Motors Corp. should be applied in this case and has been favorably applied or cited
by this Court in deciding similar issues. See, e.g., Corp. for Public Broad., 1999 WL 1815561, at
*1 ; Evans, 1999 WL 1032811, at *3; but see United States v. Philip Morris Inc., No. Civ. A. 992496, 209 F.R.D. 13, 16-18 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2002) (limiting the application of the

Shelton

factors to trial and litigation counsel or where there was a risk of exposing litigation strategy).

-7-

A.

The Shelton Standard for Deposing Opposing Party’s Counsel Applies Because
the Apple Attorneys Are Dealing with Invalidity Challenges in the Pending
Reexaminations That Are Also at Issue in the Litigation

The Shelton standard limits depositions of opposing party’s counsel to situations where
(1) the party seeking the deposition can only obtain the information by deposing the opposing
party’s counsel; (2) the information sought is relevant and nonprivileged; and (3) the information
is crucial to the case. Philip Morris, 203 F.R.D. at 15 (citing Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327).
The Shelton standard does not apply to all depositions of the opposing party’s counsel.
See Philip Morris, 209 F.R.D. at 15-18. In Philip Morris, this Court noted that "Shelton was not
intended to provide heightened protection to attorneys who represented a client in

a completed

case and then also happened to represent that same client in a pending case where the
information known only by the attorneys regarding the prior concluded case was crucial." Id. at
17 (quoting Pamida, Inc. v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 281 F.3d 726, 730-31 (8th Cir. 2002)). The
Philip Morris court concluded that Shelton should be limited to depositions of trial counsel or
counsel directly representing the party in the pending litigation and when the deposition would
reveal litigation strategy in the pending case. Id. at * 18.
Here, the Apple Attorneys directly represent Apple in four reexaminations that are ongoing and have not concluded. These reexaminations are an extension of the underlying
litigation and were likely initiated by Nokia. The harm to Apple from having its reexamination
counsel deposed is no less harmful than if the Apple Attorneys were litigation counsel in the
underlying litigation. Similar to Apple’s litigation counsel in the underlying litigation, the Apple
Attorneys advocate the validity of the patents-in-suit, except before the Office instead of the
Court. Many of the same validity issues raised during the reexaminations will be raised in the
underlying litigation. Effective prosecution of the reexaminations is an essential component to

the underlying litigation; if the patent is ultimately determined to be invalid, Apple cannot assert
that patent against any infringer, including Nokia.
Because the validity issues raised by patent reexaminations are largely the same as those
in the underlying litigation, Nokia will likely encounter issues common to the litigation during
the depositions of the Apple Attorneys, which could impermissibly allow Nokia to inquire into
Apple’s strategies regarding its patents. See Philip Morris, 209 F.R.D. at 17-18 ("The animating
concern of Shelton is that discovery rules must not be used-or abused-to ’enable a learned
profession to perform its functions. . . on wits borrowed from the adversary.")
Further, the Apple Attorneys are not the only source of any nonprivileged information
Nokia seeks. Such information is available through non-attorney witnesses, for example, the
examiners and the inventors, and from publically available sources such as the patent file
wrappers as further discussed below.
Thus, deposing the Apple Attorneys would result in the same kind of harassment and
prejudice as would result from deposing Apple’s litigation counsel, and thus the Shelton standard
should apply in this case. Applying the Shelton standard, the Subpoenas seeking the depositions
of the Apple Attorneys should be quashed and a protective order should be entered. The
information Nokia seeks can be obtained from other sources, the information Nokia seeks is
largely privileged and irrelevant, and the information is not crucial to any issue in this case.

B.

All Nonprivileged Information That Nokia Seeks Can Be Obtained from Other
More-Accessible and Less-Burdensome Sources

Under the Shelton standard, the party seeking to depose counsel first must show that the
information cannot be obtained through other sources. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327. Nokia cannot
make that showing because everything relevant to the reexamination of the patents-in-suit is

MOR

contained the publicly available file wrappers. Under the Patent Office’s rules, all business with
the Patent Office must be conducted in writing. 37 C.F.R. § 1.2. This requirement is significant;
everything relevant to patentability in these reexaminations must be and is in the file histories for
these patents. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.2 ("The action of the Patent and Trademark Office will be
based exclusively on the written record in the Office."); M.P.E.P § 2281.
The requirement that prosecution proceed on the written record applies to the interviews
as well. The Office cannot conduct business in writing as required under 37 C.F.R. § 1.2
regarding oral interviews unless the Office keeps records of the substance of the interviews.
M.P.E.P. § 713.04 ("The action of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office cannot be based
exclusively on the written record in the Office if that record is itself incomplete through the
failure to record the substance of interviews."). First, the Examiners must, and in these
reexaminations have, complete interview summaries identifying the substance discussed during
the interviews. M.P.E.P § 713.04; Ex Parte Reexamination Interview Summaries, attached
hereto as Exhibits 8-11. There is a similar requirement for the patent owner to submit an
interview summary, which Apple has filed in each of these cases. 37 C.F.R. § 1.560(b);
Statements of Substance of the Interviews, attached hereto as Exhibits 12-15. Further, the
Examiners must ensure that the patent owner’s statements of substance of the interview are
accurate, M.P.E.P. § 713.04, and the Examiners have not objected to or corrected the content of
Apple’s statements of substance of the interviews in any of the reexaminations. In addition to the
interview summary, the file wrappers in the Reexamination also contain the detailed slide

’ Interviews have not been conducted for reexaminations Control Nos. 90/010,969 and
90/010,970.

-10-

presentations, attached hereto as Exhibits 16-19, that were used during the interviews. And most
significantly, each interview was followed by Apple’s written Responses to the Office actions,
and it was these submissions to the Office that constitute Apple’s official, formal response to the
rejections raised by the Office in these reexaminations. 37 C.F.R. § 1.560(b) ("An interview does
not remove the necessity for response to Office actions as specified in § 1.111.").
Second, even assuming this written evidence of the interviews were insufficient, Nokia
can depose several non-attorneys who were present at the interviews, including the examiners
and the inventors, but Nokia has not done this.
In short, all nonprivileged information Nokia may contend it needs concerning the
reexaminations is already available in the file wrappers or through non-attorney witnesses.
Under the Shelton standard, Nokia is not entitled to depose the Apple Attorneys.
C.

The Information Nokia Seeks Is Neither Relevant Nor Crucial

To depose an opposing party’s counsel, the information sought must be both relevant and
crucial to the case. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327. Here, the information Nokia seeks to obtain from
the Apple Attorneys that is not already in the file wrappers of the patents is not relevant and,
thus, not crucial to Nokia’s case.
Nokia has not pled any inequitable-conduct defense in this case, so the mental
impressions of the Apple Attorneys are not relevant. See, e.g., ResQNet.com , Inc. v. Lansa, Inc.,
No. 01 Civ. 3578, 2004 WL 1627170, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2004) (finding that when the
plaintiff had not pled inequitable conduct and even alleged the prior art was concealed, the
plaintiff was not entitled to oppose plaintiffs counsel on the topic of inequitable conduct).
Indeed, the only area of inquiry that Nokia attorneys could identify as possibly relevant
and nonprivileged on which it wished to depose the Apple Attorneys was the communications
between the Apple Attorneys and the Office, including the substance of the in-person interviews.
- 11 -

As explained above, that information is already available through other sources, and any
information relevant to patentability is found in the file wrapper of the patents. Thus, because
Nokia has failed to identify any relevant topics, much less crucial topics, depositions of the
Apple Attorneys in the reexaminations are not appropriate under the Shelton standard.
D.

Nokia Will Encounter Privileged Information by Deposing the Apple Attorneys

Under the Shelton standard, a deposition of an opposing party’s counsel is appropriate
only when the information sought is nonprivileged.

Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327. There is a high

likelihood that Nokia will encounter privileged information if it deposes the Apple Attorneys.
Aside from the items in the file histories of the patents, nearly everything known by the Apple
Attorneys is protected by attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine. For example,
internal attorney-to-attorney discussions, draft papers, attorney’s mental impressions about the
patents and the prior art, and communications with the client are all clearly protected from
disclosure. Nokia will learn little, if any, information about the reexaminations through the
Apple Attorneys without running afoul of the attorney-client privilege or the work-product limits
on disclosure.
In sum, Nokia will encounter privileged information if it deposes Apple’s Counsel in the
reexaminations, and thus such depositions are not appropriate.

-12-

IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court quash the deposition

subpoenas of the Apples Attorneys and issue a protective order forbidding Nokia from deposing
the Apple Attorneys.

Respectfully Submitted,

Dated: May 17, 2011

Sterne
--Kessler, Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C.
David K.S. Cornwell (Bar ID: 431216)
Byron L. Pickard (Bar ID: 499545)
1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
202.371.2600
dcornwellskgf.com
bpickardskgf.com
Counsel for Apple Attorneys

-

13 -

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

IN RE THIRD PARTY SUBPOENAS AD
TESTIFICANDUM

Case No.

Nokia Corporation,
Plaintiff,
Case No. District of Delaware
Civil Action No. 1:09-cv-00791- GMS

V.

Apple Inc.,
Defendant.

Order

AND NOW, this _____ day of

20, upon consideration of

Nonparties’ Motion to Quash Nokia Subpoenas and for Protective Order, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the Nonparties’ Motion to Quash Nokia Subpoenas and for Protective
Order is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge