Code Revision Commission et al v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.

Filing 55

MOTION for Attorney Fees with Brief In Support by Code Revision Commission, State of Georgia. (Attachments: #1 Memorandum In Support, #2 Statement of Additional Undisputed Material Facts)(Askew, Anthony)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
CODE REVISION COMMISSION on
behalf of and for the benefit of THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
GEORGIA, and THE STATE OF
GEORGIA,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:15-CV-2594-RWS

PUBLIC RESOURCE.ORG, INC.
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’
FEES AND OTHER COSTS

Anthony B. Askew (G.A. Bar: 025300)
Lisa C. Pavento (G.A. Bar: 246698)
Warren Thomas (G.A. Bar: 164714)
Meunier Carlin & Curfman LLC
999 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 1300
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
Counsel for the Plaintiff, Code Revision
Commission on behalf of and for the benefit
of the General Assembly of Georgia, and the
State of Georgia

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
I.
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
II.
ARGUMENT AND CITATION TO AUTHORITIES ................................... 2
A.
Commission Is the Prevailing Party ...................................................... 2
B.
The Fogerty Factors Favor an Award of Attorneys’ Fees to
Commission ........................................................................................... 3
i.
Commission’s Claims of Copyright Infringement Were Not
Frivolous ..................................................................................... 5
ii.
Public Resource’s Motivation Was to Provoke the State to
Litigate ........................................................................................ 7
iii. Public Resource’s Legal Position Is Objectively
Unreasonable ............................................................................. 10
iv.
Compensation and Deterrence Are Necessary.......................... 13
v.
All Four Fogerty Factors Favor an Award of Attorneys’ Fees 15
III. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 16

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Am. Soc'y for Testing & Materials v. Public Resource.org, Inc.,
No. 13-CV-1215 (TSC), 2017 WL 473822 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2017) .................. 15
Am. Educational Research Assoc. v. Public Resource.org, Inc.,
No. 14-CV-0857 (TSC), 2017 WL 473822 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2017) .................. 15
Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co.,
112 F. Supp. 3d 31 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ................................................................. 16
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Evie's Tavern Ellenton, Inc.,
772 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014) .....................................................................3, 16
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Georgia Rib Co., Inc.,
166 F. Supp. 3d 1329 (N.D. Ga. 2014) .........................................................5, 16
Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human
Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001) .......................................................................... 2
Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc.,
902 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990) ...................................................................2, 8, 14
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,
510 U.S. 517 (1994) ..................................................................................3, 4, 13
Gonzales v. Transfer Techs., Inc.,
301 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2002) ............................................................................. 10
InDyne, Inc. v. Abacus Tech. Corp.,
587 F. App’x 552 (11th Cir. 2014) ...................................................................... 4
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
136 S. Ct. 1979 (2016) ........................................................................................ 4
Strategic Mktg., Inc. v. Great Blue Heron Software, LLC,
No. 15-CV-80032, 2017 WL 1284773 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2017)....................... 3
White v. Alcon Film Fund, LLC,
No. 1:13-CV-1163-TCB, 2015 WL 11199163 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2015) .....8, 13

ii 

Statutes
17 U.S.C. § 505 ....................................................................................................... 1

iii 

I.

INTRODUCTION
In its Order dated March 23, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment and denied Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. Dkt. No. 44. On April 7, 2017, the Court issued both a Permanent
Injunction Order enjoining Defendant’s unauthorized use of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated (OCGA) (Dkt. No. 46) and a Judgment dismissing the case
(Dkt. No. 52). Defendant has appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit. Dkt. No. 49.
In its discretion, and pursuant to Section 505 of the Copyright Act, the Court
may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party of this copyright
infringement action. 17 U.S.C. § 505. Section 505 states:
In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow
the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United
States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title,
the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing
party as part of the costs.
Plaintiff prevailed on all its claims in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
the Court entered a permanent injunction that encompasses unauthorized use of all
OCGA volumes and supplements, and final judgment has been entered. Having
completely prevailed, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant an award of reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs. Plaintiff’s fair estimate of the approximate amount of its
attorneys’ fees and costs to date is $250,000. Pursuant to LR 54.2(a)(2), and

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unless this Court prescribes otherwise, Plaintiff will file and serve a detailed
specification and itemization of the requested award and supporting documentation
and briefing demonstrating the reasonableness of the requested fees and costs
within thirty (30) days.
II.

ARGUMENT AND CITATION TO AUTHORITIES
Plaintiff and Counterclaim-Defendant the Code Revision Commission, on

behalf of and for the benefit of the General Assembly of Georgia, and the State of
Georgia (“Commission”) should be considered the prevailing party and entitled to
an award of its attorneys’ fees under § 505 of the Copyright Act.
A.

Commission Is the Prevailing Party

A prevailing party is “a party in whose favor a judgment is rendered,
regardless of the amount of damages awarded.” Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home,
Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603
(2001). The Eleventh Circuit has stated that the prevailing party is “the party
succeeding on a significant litigated issue that achieves some of the benefits sought
by that party in initiating the suit.” Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network
Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 853 (11th Cir. 1990)). The Court’s Orders dated March
23, 2017 and April 7, 2017 render judgment in favor of Commission. Dkt. Nos. 44,

2

46.1 The injunctive relief granted to Commission encompasses all of its claims of
copyright infringement against Defendant and Counterclaim-Plaintiff
Public.Resource.Org, Inc. (“Public Resource”) and achieved all the benefits the
Commission sought by bringing this action. Accordingly, Commission is the
prevailing party.
B.

The Fogerty Factors Favor an Award of Attorneys’ Fees to
Commission

In the Eleventh Circuit, “[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making [an
award of attorneys’ fees,] but instead equitable discretion should be exercised.”
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Evie's Tavern Ellenton, Inc., 772 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir.
2014) (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “In copyright cases, although attorneys' fees are awarded
in the trial court's discretion, they are the rule rather than the exception and should
be awarded routinely.” Strategic Mktg., Inc. v. Great Blue Heron Software, LLC,
No. 15-CV-80032, 2017 WL 1284773, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2017) (internal
quotations omitted).
Factors that are considered when deciding to award fees are derived from the
Supreme Court case of Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. and include “‘frivolousness,

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The Court also denied Public Resource’s motion for summary judgment, ruling
simultaneously on both motions that Public Resource’s defenses and arguments
were without merit.
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motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal
components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance
considerations of compensation and deterrence,’ if the application of those factors
furthers the purposes of the Copyright Act.” InDyne, Inc. v. Abacus Tech. Corp.,
587 F. App’x 552, 554 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534 n.19).
However, not all of the factors are given equal weight. The objective
unreasonableness of the losing party’s position is given substantial, but not
dispositive, weight in the analysis. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S.
Ct. 1979, 1983, 1987 (2016) (“Although objective reasonableness carries
significant weight, courts must view all the circumstances of a case on their own
terms, in light of the Copyright Act’s essential goals.”).
The circumstances of this case are unique and strongly support an award of
attorneys’ fees to Commission. Public Resource is a self-described “radical” that
has chosen to advance its “cause” through flagrant violation of the copyright laws
as a means to arrive at a judicial bully pulpit. As a part of this modus operandi,
Public Resource targeted Commission and the OCGA (as well as similar agencies
in other states such as Mississippi and Idaho), willfully infringing the
Commission’s copyrights in the OCGA in order to provoke this lawsuit. See
Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Dkt. No. 30-2 (SUMF1),
¶¶ 32–35, 37, 39–48, 55, 68, 75; Stipulation of Facts (Stip.), Dkt. No. 17, ¶¶ 34, 36,

4

38–41, 46, 48–50, 52, 54, 55, 63–65, 79; Howerton Dec., Dkt. No. 30-3, ¶ 18. 
Public Resource’s motivation was to challenge both the laws of the State of
Georgia and federal copyright law. However, those challenges were not based on
reasonable interpretations of federal or state law, but instead on Public Resource’s
own viewpoints of what the law should be.
Public Resource took a risk when it baited Commission into filing suit—a
risk that was quite high given the unreasonableness of its legal position. That risk
included the possibility of being liable for both statutory damages and attorneys’
fees if it was unsuccessful. Commission does not request statutory damages, but it
does request attorneys’ fees since those monies are derived from public dollars. It
is both fair and just for Public Resource to be required to reimburse Commission
for its attorneys’ fees, and such an award is supported by each of the Fogerty
factors and its furtherance of the Copyright Act’s essential goals.
i. Commission’s Claims of Copyright Infringement Were Not
Frivolous
In analyzing this Fogerty factor, this Court looks to whether a plaintiff’s
claims were frivolous even when the plaintiff is the prevailing party. Broad. Music,
Inc. v. Georgia Rib Co., Inc., 166 F. Supp. 3d 1329, 1334 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (finding
a prevailing plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims not frivolous).
Commission’s claims were not frivolous because this Court issued a permanent
injunction that encompasses all of Commission’s claims of copyright infringement
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and Commission had a fiduciary duty to defend the copyrights in the OCGA
works.
Public Resource deliberately copied and distributed the entirety of hundreds
of OCGA volumes and supplements, front and back covers included (“OCGA
Works”). SUMF1 ¶¶ 68, 32–35, 37, 39–48, 55; Stip. ¶¶ 34, 36, 38–41, 46, 48–50,
52, 54, 55, 63–65, 79. Public Resource admitted to posting these copies on two
websites, https://law.resource.org and www.archive.org, for the purpose of
facilitating, enabling, encouraging and inducing others to view, download, print,
copy and distribute those volumes and supplements of the OCGA. SUMF1 ¶¶ 40,
44; Stip. ¶¶ 48, 54. These internet postings by Public Resource resulted in several
thousand copies of the OCGA Works being made by members of the public.
SUMF1 ¶ 45; Stip. ¶ 55.
Public Resource infringed the OCGA Works in order to force Commission
to take action—either by filing suit against Public Resource or changing how the
State of Georgia publishes its laws. See supra section II.B.iii. Because of the
nature of Commission, it had a fiduciary duty to defend its copyrights in the
OCGA Works and would have been derelict in its duties had it not filed suit.
Further, it has been stipulated, and the Court has recognized, that prior to
commencement of this lawsuit, Commission had obtained certificates of copyright
registration for the majority of the OCGA volumes and supplements for which

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copyright was asserted. March 23, 2017 Order (S/J Order), Dkt. No. 44 at 9; Stip. ¶
17. Commission had also filed for copyright registrations for the remaining 2015
OCGA volumes and supplements prior to commencing the suite—those works
being added in an Amended Complaint because Public Resource purchased and
copied them subsequent to Commission’s filing of its initial Complaint. Id. This
Court has also held that the annotations of the OCGA are copyrightable. S/J Order
at 14.
Therefore, Commission’s claims of copyright infringement were based on
registered and applied-for works that have been held to be copyrightable, which
copyrights were willfully infringed by Public Resource. This Court validated
Commission’s claims of infringement in finding for Commission and granting a
permanent injunction against Public Resource. Commission’s claims of
infringement were not frivolous, and this Fogerty factor favors an award of fees to
Commission.
ii. Public Resource’s Motivation Was to Provoke the State to
Litigate
Given the non-frivolous nature of Commission’s claims of infringement, this
Court’s analysis of the parties’ motivations should focus on Public Resource’s
willful infringement as a means to provoke a lawsuit or force Commission to
capitulate and adopt Public Resource’s ideas.
Public Resource readily admitted to its deliberate copying and distribution of

7

the OCGA Works. See SUMF1 ¶¶ 39–45, 48, 54; Stip. ¶¶ 40, 44, 46–55; Def’s S/J
Brief at 17–18. An infringer’s willfulness weighs heavily in favor of an award of
fees to a prevailing plaintiff. Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc.,
902 F.2d 829, 854 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Furthermore, while willfulness does not
compel a fee award, it is an important factor in the district court’s discretionary
decision making.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); White v. Alcon Film Fund,
LLC, No. 1:13-CV-1163-TCB, 2015 WL 11199163, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2015)
(“And while courts have consistently held that the statute does not require
prevailing parties to establish bad faith, frivolity, unreasonableness or willful
wrongdoing, these considerations do weigh heavily in a court’s consideration of
the appropriateness of an award of attorney’s fees.”). Based on Public Resource’s
willfulness alone, the Fogerty factor relating to motivation favors an award of
attorneys’ fees to Commission.
Yet Public Resource went beyond willful infringement by planning and
soliciting funds for its infringement and then taunting Commission to file a lawsuit
by informing it of Public Resource’s infringement. See SUMF1 ¶¶ 49, 85–86; Stip.
¶¶ 66–69; Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Undisputed Material Facts In Support
of Plaintiff’s Motion For An Award Of Fees And Other Costs (SUMF2) ¶¶ 1, 2;
Stip. ¶¶ 61, 62. Following Public Resource’s copying of the OCGA, it sent a thumb
drive containing those copies to Honorable David Ralston, then Speaker of the

8

House, Georgia House of Representatives and Mr. Wayne Allen, Office of
Legislative Counsel. SUMF1 ¶ 46; Stip. ¶ 63. Correspondence that accompanied
the thumb drive stated, in part:
I am pleased to enclose for your consideration a George Washington
USB Thumb Drive containing a scanned version of the Official Code
of Georgia Annotated as well as XML-encoded version of the code. …
Access to the law is a fundamental aspect of our system of democracy,
an essential element of due process, equal protection, and access to
justice. …
....
I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have and look
forward to better access to the law by the citizens of Georgia.
SUMF ¶ 85; Stip. ¶ 67; Dkt. No. 17-3. Public Resource sent additional thumb
drives containing similar OCGA copies to at least eight institutions in and around
the state. SUMF1 ¶ 47; Stip. ¶ 64. In later correspondence, Public Resource refused
to cease its infringing activities. SUMF ¶ 86; Stip. ¶ 68; Dkt. No. 17-4.
Public Resource assumed the risk that it would be liable for both statutory
damages and attorneys’ fees when it planned and carried out its deliberate
infringement of the copyrights in the OCGA Works with a purpose of inciting
litigation against it. The risk was high due to the unreasonableness of Public
Resource’s legal positions. Yet it is likely that Public Resource also calculated that
Commission, a state actor, might not pursue either actual or statutory damages
against Public Resource despite those damages being large. Judge Posner of the
Seventh Circuit has posited that in these types of situations where infringement is
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willful and small amounts of damages are at issue, a prevailing plaintiff in a
copyright case “should have a presumptive entitlement to an award of attorneys’
fees.” Gonzales v. Transfer Techs., Inc., 301 F.3d 608, 609–10 (7th Cir. 2002)
(“[W]e go so far as to suggest, by way of refinement of the Fogerty standard, that
the prevailing party in a copyright case in which the monetary stakes are small
should have a presumptive entitlement to an award of attorneys’ fees”). Public
Resource’s actions go beyond mere willfulness, making Commission’s entitlement
to attorneys’ fees fall closer to a presumptive entitlement. At a minimum, a
consideration of motivation under Fogerty weighs heavily in favor of an award of
fees to Commission.
iii. Public Resource’s Legal Position Is Objectively Unreasonable
Public Resource has advanced a legal position unsupported by federal law
and directly contradictory to Georgia law and Copyright Office policies, making
that position objectively unreasonable. The overarching argument posited by
Public Resource in this case is that the entire OCGA is “the law” because it is an
“official document,” and therefore, the annotations within the OCGA are
uncopyrightable. See Def’s Memorandum Of Law in Support Of Motion for
Summary Judgment (Def’s S/J Brief), Dkt. No. 29-2, pp. 8–10. It would have been
a watershed holding for this Court to find that case law annotations have the force
of law, and any such holding would require ample and compelling support. Yet

10

Public Resource was unable to advance a single policy argument or analogous case
that would support such a holding.
More importantly, the Court has also recognized that Public Resource’s
arguments directly contradict both Georgia law and U.S. Copyright Office policies.
The Court noted in its decision that “a transformation of an annotation into one
uncopyrightable unit with the statutory text [of the OCGA] would be in direct
contradiction to current Georgia law.” S/J Order at 11. The Court pointed to three
different statutes passed by the Georgia Legislature making clear that the OCGA
contains both law and commentary and the “entire OCGA is not enacted into law
by the Georgia legislature and does not have the force of law.” Id. at 12. Since the
Copyright Office Compendium allows registration of annotations that summarize
or comment upon legal materials and only prohibits registration of government
edicts having the force of law, Public Resource’s arguments also directly
contradict Copyright Office policy as reflected in the Copyright Office
Compendium. See id. at 11.
Public Resource’s fair use arguments are also objectively unreasonable.
Public Resource not only copied 100% of each OCGA Work, but it also distributed
100% of each OCGA Work and actively encouraged the use and further
distribution of those copies. SUMF1 ¶ 32–37; Stip. ¶ 34, 36, 38, 39–41. These
uses, if performed by everyone, would clearly usurp Commission’s market in the

11

OCGA Works. See S/J Order at 21. Public Resource’s fair use defense hinged on
its alleged desire to teach the public about Commission’s copyrighted works,
making the use educational—and excused—according to Public Resource.
Similar to its copyrightability arguments, Public Resource’s fair use
arguments are entirely outside of established fair use jurisprudence and have no
objectively reasonable public policy basis. The fair use principles are not meant to
excuse 100% copying and distribution merely because the entity doing the copying
decides that the public needs to be “educated” about a copyrighted work. Asking
this Court to make such a holding was again tantamount to asking the Court to
make new law simply because Public Resource wants the right to freely copy and
distribute copyrighted works.
The true bases for Public Resource’s arguments were not legal and
administrative precedent, but instead its own theories about 1) what copyright law
should be, and 2) the format a sovereign state should use to publish its laws. See
Def’s S/J Brief at 2–4 (in part, arguing as justification for its actions that the state’s
current on-line publication via Lexis/Nexis might not be “as useful as . . . another
website that provides functionality different from the Lexis/Nexis website.”) A
legal position that a proponent’s own beliefs should replace established precedent
merely because the proponent believes them to be “better” is not an objectively
reasonable legal position. Those arguments are instead appropriate for legislative

12

advocacy, and Commission, an entity supported by taxpayer dollars, should not be
required to pay attorneys’ fees to defend such legislative advocacy arguments in a
judicial proceeding.
The objective unreasonableness Fogerty factor is most heavily weighted and
favors an award of attorneys’ fees to Commission.
iv. Compensation and Deterrence Are Necessary
The final consideration enumerated in Fogerty is “the need in particular
circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.”
Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534 n.19 (internal quotation marks omitted). Those
considerations are “inextricably intertwined with the reasonableness or
frivolousness of the [p]arties' positions, as well as their motivation in litigating the
dispute.” White v. Alcon Film Fund, LLC, No. 1:13-CV-1163-TCB, 2015 WL
11199163, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Commission’s claims of infringement have been validated by this Court and were
not frivolous, whereas Public Resource’s positions are objectively unreasonable.
Public Resource’s infringement was not only willful, but calculated to incite this
lawsuit as a part of its business operations. Public Resource is in the business of
challenging laws and targeting entities like the Commission, and, as this Court has
recognized, it profits from those challenges. See S/J Order at 18. Further, there is
no actual or statutory damage award being pursued that might otherwise deter

13

Public Resource or a similar entity.
There could be no greater need for deterrence than in the present case. The
Eleventh Circuit has recognized the importance of deterring willful copyright
infringers, stating that “defendants must not be able to sneer in the face of
copyright owners and copyright laws.” See Cable/Home Comm’n Corp. v. Network
Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 851 (11th Cir. 1990) (“When the infringement is
willful, deterrence of future violations is a legitimate consideration because
defendants must not be able to sneer in the face of copyright owners and copyright
laws.” (internal quotations omitted)). Public Resource not only sneers in the face
of copyright owners and copyright laws, but also benefits from it.
Without an award of attorneys’ fees, Public Resource, and third parties
similar to Public Resource, will be encouraged to flagrantly violate copyright laws
and incite further lawsuits simply because they believe that they “know better,”
and have failed in their administrative and legislative advocacy efforts. See
SUMF2 ¶¶ 3, 4; Stip. ¶¶ 59, 60 (stating that Carl Malamud tried unsuccessfully to
become the U.S. Public Printer and previously advocated for an amendment to the
U.S. Copyright Act making state and local official legal documents
uncopyrightable for reasons of public policy, but no such amendment has been
adopted by Congress). Public Resource also has a history of inciting copyright
litigation: it is currently a defendant in at least two other copyright infringement

14

lawsuits that it provoked via willful infringement of copyrighted standards. See
Am. Soc'y for Testing & Materials v. Public Resource.org, Inc., No. 13-CV-1215
(TSC), 2017 WL 473822 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2017); Am. Educational Research Assoc.
v. Public Resource.org, Inc., No. 14-CV-0857 (TSC), 2017 WL 473822 (D.D.C.
Feb. 2, 2017). Similar to this Court, the District Court for the District of Columbia
rejected Public Resource’s arguments, held that the standards at issue were not
uncopyrightable as the law, and enjoined the infringement of the asserted
copyrights. Id. at *15.
Public Resource will continue its business of willful copyright infringement
unless it is deterred by an award of attorneys’ fees. Commission deserves to be
made whole with a reimbursement of its attorneys’ fees because it was targeted by
Public Resource and forced into litigation—the taxpayers of Georgia should not be
victim to Public Resource’s radical methodologies.
v. All Four Fogerty Factors Favor an Award of Attorneys’ Fees
Commission should be granted an award of attorneys’ fees because its
claims of copyright infringement were not frivolous, Public Resource’s
infringement was willful and calculated, Public Resource’s legal positions were
objectively unreasonable, and there is an especially strong need for deterrence and
compensation in this case. Both this Court and the Eleventh Circuit have found it
appropriate to award fees to a prevailing plaintiff under arguably lesser

15

circumstances. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Georgia Rib Co., Inc., 166 F. Supp. 3d 1329,
1334 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (awarding fees to a prevailing plaintiff when defendant’s
infringement was willful); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Evie's Tavern Ellenton, Inc., 772
F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding the district court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees to a prevailing plaintiff when the
infringement was done with knowledge and defendant’s arguments were
unsuccessful). “Awarding such fees . . . serves to satisfy the Copyright Act's
purposes because it will encourage plaintiffs to litigate meritorious claims of
copyright infringement and, in turn, encourage the origination of creative works by
attaching enforceable rights to them.” Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 112 F.
Supp. 3d 31, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (internal citations omitted).
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Commission respectfully submits that it should be

named prevailing party and granted an award of its reasonable attorneys’ fees.

Respectfully submitted, this 21st day of April, 2017.
/s/Anthony B. Askew
Anthony B. Askew (G.A. Bar: 025300)
Lisa C. Pavento (G.A. Bar: 246698)
Warren Thomas (G.A. Bar: 164714)
Meunier Carlin & Curfman LLC
999 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 1300

16

Atlanta, Georgia 30309
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
Counsel for the Plaintiff, Code Revision
Commission on behalf of and for the
benefit of the General Assembly of
Georgia, and the State of Georgia

17

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that, pursuant to L.R. 5.1C and 7.1D of the Northern District
of Georgia, the foregoing PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IS SUPPORT OF ITS
MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND OTHER COSTS
complies with the font and point selections approved by the Court in L.R. 5.1C.
The foregoing pleading was prepared on a computer using 14-point Times New
Roman font.

/s/Anthony B. Askew
Anthony B. Askew (G.A. Bar: 025300)
Meunier Carlin & Curfman LLC
999 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 1300
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
Telephone: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]

18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on April 21, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing
PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND OTHER COSTS with the
Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which constitutes service of the filed
document on all counsel of record in this proceeding under LR 5.1(A)(3), N.D. Ga.

By:

/s/Anthony B. Askew
Anthony B. Askew (G.A. Bar: 025300)

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