State of Hawaii v. Trump

Filing 369

MOTION for Leave to Proceed Under Psyeudonyms and for In Camera Review Neal Katyal appearing for Plaintiff State of Hawaii (Attachments: #1 Exhibit Proposed Order, #2 Certificate of Service)(Katyal, Neal)

DOUGLAS S. CHIN (Bar No. 6465)
Attorney General of the State of Hawaii
DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, STATE OF HAWAII
425 Queen Street
Honolulu, HI 96813
Telephone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Attorneys for Plaintiff, State of Hawaii

NEAL KUMAR KATYAL*
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20004
Telephone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
*Admitted Pro Hac Vice
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, State of
Hawaii and Ismail Elshikh, and
Prospective Plaintiffs John Does 1
& 2 and Muslim Association of
Hawaii, Inc.

(See Next Page For Additional Counsel)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

STATE OF HAWAII and ISMAIL ELSHIKH,
MOTION FOR LEAVE FOR
DOE PLAINTIFFS TO
PROCEED UNDER
v.
PSEUDONYM, AND FOR IN
DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as CAMERA REVIEW OF DOE
PLAINTIFFS’ AND DOE
President of the United States; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DECLARANTS’ SIGNED
STATEMENTS;
ELAINE DUKE, in her official capacity as
[PROPOSED] ORDER;
Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; U.S.
CERTIFICATE OF
DEPARTMENT OF STATE; REX
SERVICE
TILLERSON, in his official capacity as
Secretary of State; and the UNITED STATES
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-00050OF AMERICA,
DKW-KSC
Defendants.
Plaintiffs,

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL
CLYDE J. WADSWORTH (Bar No.
8495)
Solicitor General of the State of Hawaii
DEIRDRE MARIE-IHA (Bar No. 7923)
DONNA H. KALAMA (Bar No. 6051)
KIMBERLY T. GUIDRY (Bar No. 7813)
ROBERT T. NAKATSUJI (Bar No. 6743)
KALIKO‘ONALANI D. FERNANDES
(Bar. No. 9964)
KEVIN M. RICHARDSON (Bar No.
10224)
Deputy Attorneys General
DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, STATE OF HAWAII
425 Queen Street
Honolulu, HI 96813
Telephone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
Attorneys for Plaintiff, State of Hawaii

*Admitted Pro Hac Vice
**Pro Hac Vice Application Forthcoming
†
Admitted only in Maryland; supervised by
firm members
††
Admitted only in Virginia; supervised by
firm members

COLLEEN ROH SINZDAK*
MITCHELL P. REICH*
ELIZABETH HAGERTY*
YURI S. FUCHS**
SUNDEEP IYER**†
REEDY C. SWANSON**††
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20004
Telephone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
THOMAS P. SCHMIDT*
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
875 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
Telephone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
SARA SOLOW*
ALEXANDER B. BOWERMAN*
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
1735 Market St., 23rd Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Telephone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, State of
Hawaii and Ismail Elshikh, and
Prospective Plaintiffs John Does 1
& 2 and Muslim Association of
Hawaii, Inc.

MOTION FOR LEAVE FOR DOE PLAINTIFFS TO PROCEED UNDER
PSEUDONYM, AND FOR IN CAMERA REVIEW OF DOE PLAINTIFFS’
AND DOE DECLARANTS’ SIGNED STATEMENTS
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.6 for the United States District Court for the
District of Hawaii and Rules 7, 10, and 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Plaintiffs State of Hawaii (the “State”) and Dr. Ismail Elshikh, as well
as prospective Plaintiffs John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and the Muslim Association of
Hawaii, Inc,1 through their counsel, respectfully request leave for the Doe Plaintiffs
to proceed as parties under pseudonym in this action.
In addition, pursuant to Rules 1, 7(b), and 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Local Rules 6.2, 10.2(f), and 83.12, Plaintiffs respectfully request
that the Court review in camera Exhibits A, B, C, D, and E to the concurrentlyfiled Declaration of Deirdre Marie-Iha (the “Marie-Iha Declaration”), which is
submitted in support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO
Motion”) and the instant motion. Exhibits A-E to the Marie-Iha Declaration are
witness declarations submitted by the two Doe Plaintiffs as well as three Doe
Declarants—namely Declarants Jane Doe 3, John Doe 4, and John Doe 5 (the “Doe
Declarants”)—all of whom reasonably fear severe retaliation in the event that their
names are publicly disclosed. The Doe Plaintiffs and Doe Declarants intend to file
1

The Doe Plaintiffs and the Muslim Association of Hawaii, Inc. are named parties
to a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) that is the subject of Plaintiffs’
concurrently-filed Motion for Leave to file a Third Amended Complaint.
1

the substance of their declarations publicly, but request that the Court review
named and signed copies of their declarations in camera in order to protect their
identities from public disclosure. The only difference between the publicly filed
versions of the Doe declarations and the in camera versions of their declarations, is
that the latter contain the true names of the Doe Plaintiffs and Doe Declarants as
well as their signatures and places of signature, while the publicly filed versions
use “Doe” pseudonyms, redact the signatures, and redact the place of signature for
two of the declarations (Exhibits C and D).
In the event that this Court denies the motion for the Doe Plaintiffs to
proceed under pseudonym, Plaintiffs seek leave to file a revised version of the
proposed Third Amended Complaint to remove the Doe Plaintiffs. If the Court
denies the motion for in camera review of the declarations, Plaintiffs seek leave to
withdraw Exhibits A-E to the Marie-Iha Declaration under Local Rule 83.12.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.

CASE HISTORY
The Court is well familiar with the history of this case, which is set forth in

Plaintiffs’ TRO Motion and incorporated by reference herein. Briefly, Defendant
Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order No. 13,769 (“EO-1”) on January 27,
2017. 82 Fed. Reg. 8977. The State filed its Complaint challenging EO-1 on
February 3, 2017. Dkt. 1. The Complaint was accompanied by a motion for a
2

temporary restraining order. Dkt. 2. The State was the only plaintiff at that point
in the litigation, but current Plaintiff Dr. Elshikh, as well as prospective Plaintiffs
John Does 1 and 2, each filed declarations as witnesses in support of that initial
TRO Motion. See Dkt.10-1 (in camera declaration of John Doe 1); Dkt. 10-2 (in
camera declaration of John Doe 2); Dkt. 10-8 (declaration of Dr. Elshikh). Upon
motion by Plaintiff and for good cause shown, the Court agreed to review the
declarations of John Does 1 and 2, as well as of one additional witness, in camera.
See Dkt. 29.
Following legal proceedings, EO-1 was replaced by Executive Order No.
13,780 (“EO-2”) on March 6, 2017. 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209. The State and Dr.
Elshikh filed a Second Amended Complaint and motion for a temporary restraining
order against EO-2 on March 8, 2017. Dkts. 64, 65. On March 15, 2017, the
Court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting the implementation of
Sections 2 and 6 of EO-2. Dkt. 219. The Court converted the TRO to a
preliminary injunction on March 29, 2017. Dkt. 270. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the majority of the injunction on June 12, 2017. Dkt. 288.
The Government’s appeal of the Ninth Circuit’s order was pending before
the Supreme Court when President Trump issued his September 24, 2017
“Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for
Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public3

Safety Threats” (“EO-3”). Like EO-1 and EO-2, EO-3 blocks the entry of
nationals of six Muslim-majority countries. EO-3 is the subject of Plaintiffs’ TAC
and TRO Motion.
II.

THE DOE PLAINTIFFS AND DOE DECLARANTS
A. Plaintiff John Doe 1
Prospective Plaintiff John Doe 1 is a U.S. citizen who resides in Hawaii.

Marie-Iha Decl. Ex. A ¶ 1. He was born in Yemen and has lived in the United
States for nearly three decades. Id. ¶ 1. Doe 1’s wife and four children are also
U.S. citizens. Id. ¶ 2. His son-in-law is a national of Yemen and has a pending
application for an immigrant visa. Id. ¶¶ 4, 7.
Doe 1 has participated in this lawsuit since the State filed its original
Complaint and motion for a TRO. At that time, he allowed the general allegations
of his declaration to be described in public documents accompanying the filings,
see Dkts. 10, 10-1, 15, 15-1, but he requested that his full declaration be reviewed
in camera only, see Dkts. 10, 15. This Court granted the request for “good cause”
shown. Dkt. 29. Plaintiffs later moved to add Doe 1 as a party in the pending
Supreme Court proceedings. See Respondents’ Mot. for Leave to Add Party John
Doe, Trump, et al. v. State of Hawaii, et al., No. 16-1540 (filed August 7, 2017).
The Court deferred a ruling on that motion until the case is heard on the merits.
Order, Trump v. Hawaii, No. 16-1540 (U.S. Aug. 24, 2017). Now, Doe 1 is
4

prepared to join this case as a plaintiff and to have his full declaration be publicly
available, but—because of his profound fear of public reprisal and negative
consequences for his relative’s visa application—he is willing to do so only if his
name remains concealed. Marie-Iha Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 14.
B. Plaintiff John Doe 2
Prospective Plaintiff John Doe 2 is a legal permanent resident who resides in
Hawaii, teaches at the University of Hawaii, and is a national of Iran. Marie-Iha
Decl. Ex. B ¶¶ 1-3. Many of Doe 2’s family members, including his mother, are
nationals of Iran living in Iran. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. Doe 2’s mother and a few other close
relatives intend to visit Doe 2 in the United States, and have therefore applied for
tourist visas. Id. Doe 2 understands that if EO-3 is implemented, his mother and
other family members will not be able to obtain visas to visit him. Id. ¶¶ 6-7.
Like Doe 1, Doe 2 has participated in this case from the outset as a witness
declarant. When Plaintiffs filed their first Complaint and TRO motion, Doe 2 (like
Doe 1) allowed for the general allegations of his declaration to be described in
public documents, see Dkts. 10, 10-2, 15, 15-2, but requested that his full
declaration be reviewed in camera only, see Dkts. 10, 15. Now, Doe 2 is prepared
to join this case as a plaintiff, but—like Doe 1—Doe 2’s real fear of public
reprisals and negative consequences for his relatives’ visa applications mean that
he will only do so if his name remains concealed. Marie-Iha Decl. Ex. B ¶ 10.
5

C. Declarant Jane Doe 3
Declarant Jane Doe 3 is a naturalized U.S. citizen who teaches at a
university within the United States. Marie-Iha Decl. Ex. C ¶¶ 2-3. She is
originally from Iran. Id. ¶¶ 1-2. Last year, Doe 3’s husband developed a serious
health condition. Id. ¶ 9. Her parents are nationals of Iran living in Iran, and they
applied for tourist visas so they could come to the United States and support Doe 3
as she cares for her husband. Id. ¶¶ 9-12. EO-3 will block Doe 3’s parents from
entering the country. As a result, if EO-3 is implemented, Doe 3 will seriously
consider looking for work abroad. Id. ¶ 14. Doe 3 is filing her declaration in
support of Plaintiffs’ TRO Motion and wishes to proceed anonymously2 because of
her profound fear that she will be subject to public reprisals. Id. ¶ 17.
D. Declarant John Doe 4
Declarant John Doe 4 is a legal permanent resident who resides in the United
States, teaches at a university within the United States, and is a national of Iran.
Marie-Iha Decl. Ex. D ¶¶ 1, 2, 4. Doe 4’s parents are Iranian, and both have
pending tourist visa applications to visit Doe 4 in the United States. Id. ¶¶ 7-8.
Under EO-3, both will be blocked from coming to the United States. In addition,
Doe 4’s wife has a serious medical condition and cannot be left alone. Id. ¶¶ 132

Due to the small relevant communities, disclosing the locations where the
declarations of Jane Doe 3 and John Doe 4 were signed effectively would disclose
their identities. Unredacted, signed copies of their declarations with their locations
are being submitted to the Court for in camera review. See Marie-Iha Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.
6

14. This means that if Doe 4’s parents cannot visit him in the United States, he
will remain entirely cut off from his other family members. Id. ¶ 14. If EO-3 takes
effect, Doe 4 will seriously consider moving to another country. Id. ¶12. Doe 4 is
filing his declaration in support of Plaintiffs’ TRO Motion and wishes to proceed
anonymously because of his extreme fear that he will be subject to public reprisals,
and that his family’s pending applications may be compromised. Id. ¶ 16.
E. Declarant John Doe 5
Declarant John Doe 5 is a legal permanent resident who resides in Hawaii,
teaches at the University of Hawaii, and is a national of Iran. Marie-Iha Decl. Ex.
E ¶¶ 1-4. Doe 5 and his family abroad have cancelled or postponed trips because
of uncertainty created by EO-1, EO-2, and EO-3. Id. ¶ 9. Doe 5 has also been
affected by the travel bans in his professional capacity, as they have hurt his
department’s recruitment and competitiveness for research funding. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. If
EO-3 takes effect, Doe 5 intends to return to Canada. Id. ¶ 10. Doe 5 is filing his
declaration in support of Plaintiffs’ TRO Motion and wishes to proceed
anonymously to avoid the threat of public reprisals. Id. ¶ 11.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT SHOULD GRANT LEAVE FOR THE DOE
PLAINTIFFS TO PROCEED UNDER PSEUDONYM
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that the “title of the complaint

must name all parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). A plaintiff may preserve his or her
7

anonymity, however, under “special circumstances when the party’s need for
anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in
knowing the party’s identity.” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214
F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (district court abused its discretion in denying
plaintiffs’ motion for leave to proceed anonymously). In such cases, the district
court should “preserve the party’s anonymity to the greatest extent possible
without prejudicing the opposing party’s ability to litigate the case.” Id. at 1069.
In considering whether to permit plaintiffs to proceed anonymously, a Court
considers five factors: (1) the severity of the threatened harm; (2) the
reasonableness of the anonymous parties’ fears; (3) the anonymous parties’
vulnerability to retaliation; (4) the prejudice, if any, to the opposing party, and
whether it could be mitigated; and (5) the public’s interest in requiring the parties
to identify themselves by name. Id. Here, as in Advanced Textile, all of the factors
support and “[n]o factors weigh against concealing plaintiffs’ identities.” Id.
A. The Threatened Harms to the Doe Plaintiffs Are Severe.
Leave to proceed anonymously is appropriate where plaintiffs fear
“extraordinary retaliation, such as deportation, arrest, and imprisonment,” resulting
from their participation in litigation. Id. at 1071. John Does 1 and 2 fear exactly
that type of retaliation by the Government if they proceed as plaintiffs and their
names are disclosed. As described in their declarations, they worry that they or
8

their family members will be subjected to unwarranted scrutiny, deportation, or
denial of visa applications. These threatened harms are severe, and justify
permitting plaintiffs to proceed under pseudonym. See id. (granting anonymity to
foreign workers and noting the “extreme nature of the retaliation threatened”).
John Does 1 and 2 also fear significant “retaliation by third parties” if their
names are revealed. Id. at 1070. Both of their declarations refer to concerns about
public reprisals to themselves or to their children and families, providing another
reason they should be permitted to proceed anonymously. See id.; Lozano v. City
of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 195 (3d Cir. 2010) (granting anonymity where “ethnic
tensions had escalated” and plaintiffs would face a “risk of harassment, and even
physical danger, if their identities were revealed”); Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for
Choice Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 687 (11th Cir. 2011) (granting anonymity where subject
of case had “led to death, injury, harassment, [and] fear” previously).
B. The Doe Plaintiffs’ Fears are Reasonable.
In determining whether the Doe Plaintiffs’ fears are reasonable, the Court
“must consider the surrounding context.” Doe v. Kamehameha Schs./Bernice
Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010) (evaluating
surrounding circumstances including “random acts of racial violence”). Here, the
current political climate amply demonstrates the reasonableness of the Doe
Plaintiffs’ fears. According to recent reports, hate crimes against Muslim- and
9

Arab-Americans, as well as against immigrants, have spiked.3 Meanwhile, FBI
data indicates that “[t]he number of physical assaults against Muslims in the
United States reached 9/11-era levels last year.”4 This is the kind of “surrounding
context” that makes a plaintiff’s concern about public reprisal or harassment in
response to his participation in a lawsuit reasonable. See Lozano v. Hazleton, 496
F. Supp. 2d 477, 508-09 (M.D. Pa. 2007). Furthermore, the reasonableness of the
Doe Plaintiffs’ fears is compounded by the inability of post hoc remedies to protect
them and their family members. See Advanced Textile, 214 F.3d at 1071.
C. The Doe Plaintiffs are Vulnerable to Retaliation Due to Their Family
Members’ Immigration Statuses.
John Does 1 and 2 are also vulnerable to retaliation because their close
family members are currently seeking admission to the United States as
immigrants and non-immigrants. Like other courts, the Ninth Circuit has held that
sensitivity pertaining to immigration status can justify shielding a plaintiff’s
identity from disclosure, particularly where he might choose not to vindicate his
legal rights at all without the requested anonymity. See id. at 1169 (plaintiffs’
“highly vulnerable [immigration] status” favored proceeding using pseudonyms);

3

See, e.g., Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, CAIR Report Shows 2017 on Track
to Become One of Worst Years Ever for Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes (July 17, 2017),
available at https://goo.gl/gh9Ti2 (reporting dramatic increase in anti-Muslim hate
crimes during the first half of 2017, based on ethnicity or national origin).
4
See Pew Research Center, Anti-Muslim Assaults Reach 9/11-Era Levels, FBI
Data Show (Nov. 21, 2016), available at https://goo.gl/zGMqQ7.
10

see also, e.g., Keller v. City of Fremont, No. 8-10-cv-0270-LSC-FG3, 2011 WL
41902, at *2 (D. Neb. Jan. 5, 2011); Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 508-09.
D. Defendants Will Not Be Prejudiced if the Doe Plaintiffs Participate in
this Case Under Pseudonyms.
Defendants will not be prejudiced if the Doe Plaintiffs proceed
anonymously. This case turns on legal issues, not on the specific identities of the
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Doe v. State of Alaska, No. 96-35873, 1997 WL 547941, at *1
(9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1997) (potential prejudice is minimized when the “issues raised
are purely legal and do not depend on identifying the specific plaintiffs”). That
Defendants are governmental rather than private parties reinforces the lack of
prejudice. See, e g., Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 190 (2d
Cir. 2008) (considering, in addition to the Advanced Textile factors, whether
defendants are government or private parties); John Does 1-5 v. McCrory, No.
1:13-cv-711, 2014 WL 29352, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 3, 2014) (“Plaintiffs bring this
action against a governmental party, which weighs in favor of anonymity”).
Further, several suits challenging President Trump’s travel bans have involved
John or Jane Doe plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs are unaware of any instance in which the
Government has contended that this caused it prejudice. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017) (suit involved
three John and Jane Doe plaintiffs); Sarsour v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 719 (E.D.
Va. 2017) (similar).
11

E. Permitting the Doe Plaintiffs to Proceed Under Pseudonyms Will Not
Harm the Public Interest in Open Judicial Proceedings.
The public’s interest in this case—and in resolving its weighty legal issues—
can be satisfied without revealing the Doe Plaintiffs’ identities. See Advanced
Textile, 214 F.3d at 1069; see also Doe v. Barrow Cnty., Ga., 219 F.R.D. 189, 193
(N.D. Ga. 2003) (observing that the underlying constitutional issue would be
litigated in an open forum and “the only thing potentially being shielded from the
public is [the] plaintiff’s name”). Indeed, permitting the Doe Plaintiffs to proceed
anonymously will “serve the public’s interest in this lawsuit by enabling it to go
forward” with a larger group of plaintiffs that are severely harmed by the Order.
Advanced Textile, 214 F.3d at 1073.
II.

THE COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE DOE PLAINTIFFS’ AND
DOE DECLARANTS’ SIGNED DECLARATIONS IN CAMERA
The Doe Plaintiffs’ above-discussed fears of retaliation are also held by the

Doe Declarants. These fears provide good cause for this Court’s in camera review
of Exhibits A-E to the Marie-Iha Declaration. Those exhibits include declarations
submitted by the Doe Plaintiffs (Exhibits A-B) as well as by three Doe Declarants
(Exhibits C-E). The relief that the Doe Plaintiffs and Doe Declarants seek is
modest: they are prepared to publicly file the substance of their declarations under
Doe pseudonyms, and request only that copies of their declarations bearing their

12

names and signatures (and, in the cases of Jane Doe 3 and John Doe 4, signing
locations) be reviewed in camera by this Court.
Although the public should generally have an opportunity to inspect and
copy documents filed in judicial proceedings, courts maintain “broad discretion” to
order in camera review of evidence when in the interest of “safety and security.”
Robinson v. Adams, No. 1:08-cv-01380-AWI-BAM, 2012 WL 1027921, *2 (E.D.
Cal. Mar. 26, 2012) (citations omitted) (exercising “the discretion with which [the
court] has been vested” and granting a motion to compel subject to in camera
review, in the interest of “safety and security”); accord Nixon v. Warner Comm.,
Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978); Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1433-34
(9th Cir. 1995). For good cause shown, a court may issue an order “to protect a
party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense,” including by specifying terms for disclosure or requiring that documents
or information be filed “in sealed envelopes, to be opened as the court directs.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
Good cause exists to review the Doe Plaintiffs’ and Doe Declarants’ signed
declarations in camera, without disclosure of those signed declarations to
Defendants, their counsel, or the public. As set forth in the Marie-Iha Declaration,
Exhibits A-E to that Declaration, and supra, the Doe Declarants and Doe Plaintiffs
are reasonably fearful that the disclosure of their names could lead to negative
13

consequences to themselves or to their families. They fear retaliation by the
Government, as well as reprisals by the public in the form of violence or
harassment. These concerns are particularly understandable in light of several of
the Does’ family members’ sensitive immigration statuses—Does 1, 2, 3, and 4 all
have close family members with pending applications for immigrant or nonimmigrant visas—and in light of recent violence perpetrated against Arab- and
Muslim-Americans. See supra pp. 4-7, 9-10 & nn. 3-4; Marie-Iha Decl. ¶ 15 &
Exs. A-D.
As this Court previously held based on submissions of similar sensitivity,
there is good cause for the Court to review Exhibits A-E to the Marie-Iha
Declaration in camera. See Dkt. 29; see also Forgerson v. Cheeseburger Rests.,
Inc., No. 10-207 JMS-BMK, 2010 WL 3733019, *1 (D. Haw. Aug. 31, 2010);
Barnard v. State of Hawaii, No. 05-599 SPK-LEK, 2007 WL 954303, *4 (D. Haw.
Mar. 27, 2007); Buckley v. Alameida, No. 1:04-cv-05688-LJO-GBCPC, 2012 WL
6184970, *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2012) (granting in camera review of exhibit,
based on filer’s attestation that his “safety would be placed in serious jeopardy if
his identity were made known” through the exhibit).

14

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant
the Doe Plaintiffs leave to proceed under pseudonyms as parties to this case, and
review in camera Exhibits A-E to the concurrently-filed Marie-Iha Declaration.
DATED:

Washington, DC, October 10, 2017.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Neal K. Katyal

DOUGLAS S. CHIN (Bar No. 6465)
Attorney General of the State of Hawaii
CLYDE J. WADSWORTH (Bar No. 8495)
Solicitor General of the State of Hawaii
DEIRDRE MARIE-IHA (Bar No. 7923)
KIMBERLY T. GUIDRY (Bar No. 7813)
DONNA H. KALAMA (Bar No. 6051)
ROBERT T. NAKATSUJI (Bar No. 6743)
KALIKO‘ONALANI D. FERNANDES
(Bar No. 9964)
KEVIN M. RICHARDSON (Bar No.
10224)
Deputy Attorneys General
DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, STATE OF HAWAII
Attorneys for Plaintiff, State of Hawaii

NEAL K. KATYAL*
COLLEEN ROH SINZDAK*
THOMAS P. SCHMIDT*
SARA SOLOW*
MITCHELL P. REICH*
ELIZABETH HAGERTY*
ALEXANDER B. BOWERMAN*
YURI S. FUCHS**
SUNDEEP IYER**†
REEDY C. SWANSON**††
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
*Admitted Pro Hac Vice
**Pro Hac Vice Application
Forthcoming
†
Admitted only in Maryland;
supervised by firm members
††
Admitted only in Virginia;
supervised by firm members
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, State of
Hawaii and Ismail Elshikh, and
Prospective Plaintiffs John Does 1
& 2 and Muslim Association of
Hawaii, Inc.

15