SCO Grp v. Novell Inc

Filing 627

MOTION in Limine No. 1 to Exclude Evidence and Argument Concerning Claims Not Included in SCO's Appeal or the Tenth Circuit's Limited Mandate filed by Defendant Novell, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1-Final Judgment, # 2 Exhibit 2-Tenth Circuit Opinion, # 3 Exhibit 3-SCO Appeal Brief, # 4 Exhibit 4-SCO Reply Brief, # 5 Exhibit 5-Ruling, # 6 Exhibit 6-Order)(Brennan, Sterling)

SCO Grp v. Novell Inc

Doc. 627 Att. 2

EXHIBIT 2

Dockets.Justia.com

SCO GROUP, INC. v. NOVELL, INC.
Cite as 578 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2009)

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The SCO GROUP, INC., Plaintiff­Appellant, v. NOVELL, INC., Defendant­Appellee. No. 08­4217. United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit. Aug. 24, 2009. Background: Buyer of computer operating system under asset purchase agreement brought action against seller for slander of title, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The United States District Court for the District of Utah, Dale A. Kimball, J., entered summary judgment in favor of seller, 2008 WL 2783523, and buyer appealed. Holdings: The Court of Appeals, McConnell, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) asset purchase agreement and amendment to that agreement were required to be read together as a unified document to determine whether seller transferred copyrights to buyer; (2) amended asset purchase agreement constituted a writing sufficient to transfer copyrights under federal copyright law; (3) genuine issue of material fact as to whether amended asset purchase agreement transferred copyrights in source code precluded summary judgment; (4) covenant of good faith and fair dealing applied to constrain seller's to waive or modify rights under existing licenses; and (5) seller was entitled to royalties from an amended licensing agreement subsequently entered into by buyer. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

1. Copyrights and Intellectual Property O47 Under California law, asset purchase agreement and amendment to that agreement were required to be read together as a unified document to determine whether seller transferred copyrights in computer operating system to buyer; although language of original agreement unambiguously excluded the transfer of copyrights by listing ``all copyrights'' in excluded asset schedule, amendment was designed to clarify parties' original intent as to the transfer of copyrights by revising excluded asset schedule, and seller agreed to the amendment for no additional consideration. 2. Evidence O397(1) California law generally prohibits the introduction of any extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written instrument. 3. Evidence O397(1) Under California's parol evidence rule, a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement may not be contradicted by even the most persuasive evidence of collateral agreements; such evidence is legally irrelevant. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 1856(a). 4. Evidence O452 Even if a contract appears unambiguous on its face, California law permits the use of extrinsic evidence to expose a latent ambiguity which reveals more than one possible meaning to which the language of the contract is yet reasonably susceptible. 5. Evidence O455 Under California law, the test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a

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meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible. 6. Evidence O448, 452 California law does not permit the use of extrinsic evidence to establish an ambiguity in the parties' intent independent from the terms of the contract; instead, it can only be used to expose or resolve a latent ambiguity in the language of the agreement itself. 7. Contracts O164 Under California law, multiple writings must be considered together when part of the same contract. West's Ann. Cal.Civ.Code § 1642. 8. Contracts O245(1) Where two contracts are made at different times, but where the later is not intended to entirely supersede the first, but only modify it in certain particulars, the two are to be construed as parts of one contract under California law, the later superseding the earlier one wherever it is inconsistent therewith. 9. Copyrights and Intellectual Property O45 Amended asset purchase agreement constituted a writing sufficient to transfer copyrights under federal copyright law, although it was ambiguous as to the copyrights transferred. 17 U.S.C.A. § 204(a). 10. Copyrights and Intellectual Property O45 Statute requiring a signed writing to transfer a copyright is intended to protect copyright holders from persons mistakenly or fraudulently claiming oral licenses or transfers. 17 U.S.C.A. § 204(a). 11. Copyrights and Intellectual Property O45 Writing requirement of statute requiring a signed writing to transfer a copyright is best understood as a means of ensuring that parties intend to transfer

copyrights themselves, as opposed to other categories of rights. 17 U.S.C.A. § 204(a). 12. Copyrights and Intellectual Property O45 Written amendment to asset purchase agreement that did not amend schedule of assets transferred but excised certain copyrights from original agreement's exclusion of copyrights satisfied the Copyright Act's writing requirement; any change to the set of excluded assets necessarily implicated those copyrights actually transferred. 17 U.S.C.A. § 204(a). 13. Copyrights and Intellectual Property O45 A written asset transfer agreement may satisfy statute requiring a signed writing to transfer a copyright even when it does not mention the word ``copyright'' itself. 17 U.S.C.A. § 204(a). 14. Copyrights and Intellectual Property O45 Copyright Act's signed writing requirement did not require a bill of sale to transfer a copyright. 17 U.S.C.A. § 204(a). 15. Contracts O176(1) In contract actions, the interpretation of a written agreement is a question of fact. 16. Federal Civil Procedure O2492 When a contract is ambiguous, and parties present conflicting evidence regarding their intent at the time of the agreement, a genuine issue of material fact exists which cannot be determined summarily by the court. 17. Federal Civil Procedure O2470.1, 2544 The party opposing summary judgment must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts; but so long as sufficient

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evidence could lead a rational trier of fact to resolve the dispute in favor of either party, granting either party's dueling motions for summary judgment would be inappropriate. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A. 18. Federal Civil Procedure O2492 When conflicting evidence is presented such that the ambiguities in a contract could legitimately be resolved in favor of either party, it is for the ultimate finder of fact, not the court on summary judgment, to interpret the contract. Fed.Rules Civ. Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A. 19. Federal Civil Procedure O2492 Genuine issue of material fact as to whether amended asset purchase agreement governing sale of computer operating system also transferred copyrights in the source code precluded summary judgment in buyer's action against seller for slander of title, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A. 20. Federal Civil Procedure O2545 Testimony from witnesses involved on both sides of business negotiations over asset purchase agreement was relevant summary judgment evidence in action for breach of amended agreement, although those witnesses were not involved in actual drafting of the contract, where it was possible that amendment to the agreement was designed to restore the language of the transaction to the parties' actual intent during the business negotiations. 21. Federal Civil Procedure O2470.2 If the evidence presented on a dispositive issue is subject to conflicting, reasonable interpretations, summary judgment is improper. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A. 22. Federal Civil Procedure O2492 Genuine issue of material fact regarding extent to which amended asset pur-

chase agreement governing sale of computer operating system gave seller right to waive or modify rights under existing licenses precluded summary judgment in buyer's action against seller for slander of title, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A. 23. Contracts O168 Under California law, every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement. 24. Contracts O168 The covenant of good faith under California law finds particular application in situations where one party is invested with a discretionary power affecting the rights of another. 25. Contracts O168 Scope of conduct prohibited by the covenant of good faith under California law is circumscribed by the purposes and express terms of the contract. 26. Copyrights and Intellectual Property O107 Under California law, covenant of good faith and fair dealing applied to constrain seller's rights under asset purchase agreement to waive or modify rights under existing licenses, where scope of seller's waiver rights was not clarified expressly by the contract. 27. Contracts O168 California recognizes at least two exceptional situations where the covenant of good faith may inform the interpretation of even an express grant of contractual authority: first, where the express discretion makes the contract, viewed as a whole, contradictory and ambiguous, the implied covenant may be applied to aid in construction; second, the covenant may aid in

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the interpretation of a contract seemingly expressly granting unbridled discretion in those relatively rare instances when reading the provision literally would, contrary to the parties' clear intention, result in an unenforceable, illusory agreement. 28. Copyrights and Intellectual Property O107 Under California law, seller of computer operating system under asset purchase agreement in which it retained right to license royalties was entitled to royalties from an amended licensing agreement subsequently entered into by buyer, where amendment to the asset purchase agreement gave buyer right to enter into new licenses. 29. Federal Courts O915 An issue or argument insufficiently raised in a party's opening brief is deemed waived. 30. Federal Courts O915 Generally, a party waives issues and arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. 31. Contracts O245(1) Under California law, when two contracts are made at different times, but where the later is not intended to entirely supersede the first, but only modify it in certain particulars, the two are to be construed as parts of one contract, the later superseding the earlier one wherever it is inconsistent therewith.

Michael Jacobs, Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco, CA (George C. Harris, Grant L. Kim, David E. Melaugh, Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco, CA; Thomas R. Karrenberg, Heather M. Sneddon, Anderson & Karrenberg, Salt Lake City, UT, with him on the briefs) for Defendant­Appellee. Before LUCERO, BALDOCK and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges. McCONNELL, Circuit Judge. This case primarily involves a dispute between SCO and Novell regarding the scope of intellectual property in certain UNIX and UnixWare technology and other rights retained by Novell following the sale of part of its UNIX business to Santa Cruz, a predecessor corporate entity to SCO, in the mid­1990s. Following competing motions for summary judgment, the district court issued a detailed opinion granting summary judgment to Novell on many of the key issues. We affirm the judgment of the district court in part, reverse in part, and remand for trial on the remaining issues. I. Background

We begin by laying out some of the basic facts underlying Novell's transfer of certain UNIX-related assets to Santa Cruz, as well as the background to the instant litigation. Other facts will be discussed as the issues require. A. The UNIX Business and the Sale to Santa Cruz

Stuart Singer, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Fort Lauderdale, FL (David Boies, Robert Silver, and Edward Normand, Boies Schiller & Flexner LLP, Armonk, NY; Brent O. Hatch, Mark F. James, Hatch, James & Dodge, PC, Salt Lake City, UT; Devan V. Padmanabhan, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, MN, with him on the briefs) for Plaintiff­Appellant.

UNIX is a computer operating system originally developed in the late 1960s at AT & T. By the 1980s, AT & T had developed UNIX System V (``SVRX''); it built a substantial business by licensing UNIX source code to a number of major computer manufacturers, including IBM, Sun, and Hewlett­Packard. These manu-

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facturers, in turn, would use the SVRX source code to develop their own individualized UNIX-derived ``flavors'' for use on their computer systems. Licensees could modify the source code and create derivative products mostly for internal use, but agreed to keep the UNIX source code confidential. In 1993, Novell paid over $300 million to purchase UNIX System Laboratories, the AT & T spin-off that owned the UNIX copyrights and licenses. Only two years later, however, Novell decided to sell its UNIX business. Although Novell may have initially intended ``to sell the complete UNIX business,'' both parties agree that Santa Cruz was either unwilling or unable to commit sufficient financial resources to purchase the entire UNIX business outright. App'x 8610; Aplt. Br. 8; Aple. Br. 5. The deal was therefore structured so that Novell would retain a 95% interest in SVRX license royalties, which had totaled $50 million in 1995. The transfer of Unix-related rights occurred pursuant to three documents: an asset purchase agreement (``APA'') executed on September 19, 1995; ``Amendment No. 1'' signed by the parties at the actual closing on December 6, 1995; and ``Amendment No. 2'' on October 16, 1996. The APA provided that: ``Buyer will purchase and acquire from Seller on the Closing Date TTT all of Seller's right, title, and interest in and to the assets and properties of Seller relating to the Business (collectively the ``Assets'') identified on Schedule 1.1(a). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Assets to be so purchased shall not include those assets (the ``Excluded Assets'') set forth on Schedule 1.1(b).'' Schedule 1.1(a) included within the list of ``Assets'' transferred, ``[a]ll rights and ownership of UNIX and UnixWare.'' App'x 313. Section V of the Asset Schedule, entitled ``Intellectual property'' provided

that Santa Cruz would obtain ``[t]rademarks UNIX and UnixWare as and to the extent held by Seller'' but did not explicitly mention copyrights. App'x 315. In contrast, Schedule 1.1(b), the list of assets excluded from the deal, did expressly speak to copyrights. Section V--``Intellectual Property''--explained that ``All copyrights and trademarks, except for the trademarks UNIX and UnixWare,'' as well as ``[a]ll [p]atents,'' were excluded from the deal. App'x 318 (emphasis added). Less than a year after the deal closed, the parties agreed to Amendment No. 2, which amended the APA's treatment of copyrights. Amendment No. 2 provided that: With respect to Schedule 1.1(b) of the Agreement, titled `Excluded Assets', Section V, Subsection A shall be revised to read: All copyrights and trademarks, except for the copyrights and trademarks owned by Novell as of the date of the Agreement required for SCO to exercise its rights with respect to the acquisition of UNIX and UnixWare technologies. However, in no event shall Novell be liable to SCO for any claim brought by any third party pertaining to said copyrights and trademarks. App'x 374. The APA separately purported to give Novell certain residual control over ``SVRX Licenses.'' Section 4.16(b) of the agreement provided that: Buyer shall not, and shall not have the authority to, amend, modify or waive any right under or assign any SVRX License without the prior written consent of Seller. In addition, at Seller's sole discretion and direction, Buyer shall amend, supplement, modify or waive any rights under, or shall assign any rights to, any SVRX License to the extent so

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directed in any manner or respect by Seller. The parties differ markedly in their characterization of the rights transferred to Santa Cruz and the value of the deal. According to SCO, Santa Cruz purchased the bulk of the business, including the core UNIX copyrights, for $250 million, but Novell retained a 95% interest in royalties as a ``financing device.'' According to Novell, SCO's $250 million figure improperly inflates the value of the deal, by accounting not only for the value of assets actually transferred by SCO to Novell, but including the share of the SVRX royalty stream retained by Novell. See Aple. Br. 5 n1. Novell calculates that it received only about $50 million in stock, as well as a promised share of the ``UnixWare'' revenue stream exceeding certain targets. Novell contends that it retained ownership of the UNIX copyrights, extending only an implied license to Santa Cruz to use the copyrights, for instance, to develop and distribute an improved version of Novell's ``UnixWare'' product. In support of its understanding of the transaction, SCO relies heavily on extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent at the time of the APA--including testimony from Novell's leadership at the time--suggesting that the parties' intent was to transfer the copyrights. For instance, Robert Frankenberg, then President and CEO of Novell, testified that it was his ``initial intent,'' his ``intent at the time when the APA was signed,'' and his ``intent when that transaction closed'' that ``Novell would transfer the copyrights to UNIX and UnixWare technology to Santa Cruz'' and that ``that intent never changed.'' App'x 8563. Similarly, Ed Chatlos, a Senior Director for UNIX Strategic Partnerships and Business Development within Novell's Strategic Relations and Mergers and Acquisitions organization, submitted an affidavit

affirming SCO's version of the facts. See App'x 8659­60: In or about June 1995, I became the lead negotiator for Novell in the negotiations with SCO and headed the day-today responsibility for the potential dealTTTT During these negotiations, I met regularly with SCO representativesTTTT Early in our discussions, it became apparent that SCO could not pay the full purchase price as contemplated by Novell. To bridge the price gap, it was ultimately agreed that Novell would retain certain binary royalty payments under UNIX licenses. It was my understanding and intent, on behalf of Novell--that the complete UNIX business would be transferred to SCO. Novell, in contrast, defends its interpretation of the transaction largely by pointing to the language of the contract itself, and by arguing that the witnesses put forward by SCO to offer extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent lacked any familiarity with the actual drafting of the APA's language or Amendment No. 2. See Aple. Br. 6­10. At oral argument, Novell suggested that whatever the intent of the business negotiators involved in the deal, it was superseded by the work of those lawyers who ultimately negotiated the language of the contract that governs the transaction. B. Proceedings Below

In May 2001, Santa Cruz sold its UNIX business to Caldera, the immediate predecessor to SCO. Santa Cruz purported to transfer its interest in the UNIX and UnixWare copyrights to Caldera/SCO. In 2002 and 2003, tensions increased between Novell and SCO. SCO asserted that users of Linux, an alternative to UNIX, might be infringing on SCO's UNIX-related intellectual property rights. See App'x 7178. It purported to offer Linux users the opportunity to purchase an intellectual property

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license in order to continue using Linux without infringing any of SCO's copyrights. See id.; Aple. Br. 13. In March 2003, SCO brought contract and copyright claims against IBM on the basis of SCO's alleged intellectual property rights in UNIX. Novell then directed SCO ``to waive any purported right SCO may claim to terminate [certain of] IBM's SVRX Licenses,'' on the basis of its aforementioned waiver rights, set out in Section 4.16 of the APA. After SCO refused, Novell ultimately claimed publicly that it--rather than SCO--maintained ownership over the UNIX copyrights. App'x 5875. SCO filed a slander of title action against Novell. Novell asserted counterclaims for slander of title, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. Both parties then proceeded to amend their pleadings to add additional claims and counterclaims. After the parties filed dueling motions for summary judgment, the United States District Court for the District of Utah issued a detailed memorandum decision and order on August 10, 2007. The district court first concluded that Novell is the owner of the UNIX and UnixWare copyrights. It reviewed the APA and Amendment No. 2 separately and sequentially. See Dist. Ct. Op. 45­46. The court found that the plain language of the APA indicated that the UNIX copyrights were not transferred to Santa Cruz. See Dist. Ct. Op. 52. The court also determined that Amendment No. 2 did not transfer ownership of the copyrights. See id. at 59. It reasoned that ``[u]nlike the APA, Amendment No. 2 was not accompanied by a separate `Bill of Sale' transferring any assets.'' Id. In addition, it found persuasive that Amendment No. 2 amended only the list of excluded assets from the transaction (Schedule 1.1(b)), but did not alter the language of the list of included assets (Schedule 1.1(a)). Finally, the court

determined that Amendment No. 2 did not sufficiently identify which copyrights were to change hands, and therefore failed to satisfy the requirements necessary to transfer ownership of a copyright under Section 204(a) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). Having found that SCO's assertions of copyright ownership were false, the court granted summary judgment to Novell on SCO's claims alleging slander of title and seeking specific performance of Novell's alleged duty to transfer ownership of the UNIX and UnixWare copyrights to SCO. See Dist. Ct. Op. 62. The court also rejected SCO's claims against Novell for unfair competition under Utah common law or statutory law, or for breach of the implied covenant of good faith under California law. See id. at 63. Next, the court reviewed the parties' competing cross motions regarding whether the APA authorized Novell to direct SCO to waive its claims against IBM and Sequent (which had been acquired by IBM in 1999) for alleged breach of their SVRX license agreements. The parties disputed both whether the IBM and Sequent Sublicensing Agreements were ``SVRX Licenses'' within the meaning of the APA, as well as the scope of provisions in the APA purportedly authorizing Novell to take action on SCO's behalf after SCO refused to waive the claims. See id. at 76. Although the district court agreed with SCO that ``there appears to be some ambiguity in the APA's attempt to define SVRX Licenses,'' id. at 78, it ultimately found ``no support in the language and structure of the APA for SCO's interpretation of SVRX License[s].'' Id. at 86. It therefore concluded that ``SVRX Licenses'' referred to the ``entire set of agreements relating to the licensing of SVRX code.'' Id. As a result, the court found that Novell ``was and is entitled, at its sole discretion, to

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direct SCO to waive its purported claims against IBM and Sequent, and [that] SCO is obligated to recognize Novell's waiver.'' Id. at 88. Having determined that SCO gave Novell the right to waive SCO's claims by virtue of ``an explicit grant of contractual authority,'' the court also concluded that California law precluded the application of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 87. Finally, the court addressed Novell's entitlement to royalties from certain licensing agreements entered into between SCO and Sun and Microsoft in 2003. The court found that SCO's duty to turn over revenue from SVRX licenses was not limited only to licenses existing at the time of the APA. See id. at 93. It also concluded that the Sun agreement represented an unauthorized amendment to an SVRX License, in violation of Section 4.16(b) of the APA. As a result, it concluded that ``SCO breached its fiduciary duties to Novell by failing to account for and remit the appropriate SVRX Royalty payments to Novell for the SVRX portions of the 2003 Sun and Microsoft Agreements.'' Id. at 96. After a later bench trial on the value of payments due to Novell, the district court awarded Novell judgment in the amount of $2,547,817. Findings of Fact, July 16, 2008 at 42.1 On appeal, SCO challenges various aspects of the decision below. It argues that the district court erred by concluding, as a matter of law, that (1) Santa Cruz did not obtain the UNIX and UnixWare copyrights from Novell, but instead acquired only an implied license; (2) SCO was not now entitled to specific performance--the transfer of any copyrights not transferred by the APA; (3) Novell has the right under the APA to force SCO to waive legal claims against IBM for its alleged breach
1. The district court also issued a number of rulings regarding specific arguments made in support of both parties' claims and counter-

of software and sublicensing agreements; (4) Novell did not have to comply with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in exercising any waiver rights; (5) Novell retained an interest in royalties from SCO's 2003 agreement with Sun Microsystems and other post-APA contracts related to SVRX technology. We address each argument in turn. II. The Ownership of UNIX and UnixWare Copyrights

We begin by reviewing the district court's decision to grant summary judgment to Novell with regard to SCO's claims of ownership in the UNIX and UnixWare copyrights. Summary judgment is appropriate only ``if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'' Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). ``When applying this standard, we view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'' Davidson v. America Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir.2003) (citation omitted). We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Id. SCO argues that the district court erred by interpreting the APA and Amendment No. 2 as separate and independent. It further contends that the text of the APA and Amendment No. 2 is at least ambiguous concerning whether the parties intended to transfer ownership of the copyrights, making it appropriate to consider extrinsic evidence. SCO asserts that a thorough review of extrinsic evidence makes summary judgment inappropriate on whether
claims. To the extent that those rulings do not directly affect the substance of this appeal, we do not address them.

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the copyrights were transferred by the transaction. Finally, SCO argues that the language in the APA and Amendment No. 2 was sufficient to meet the requirements to transfer ownership of a copyright under the Section 204(a) of the Copyright Act. Novell, in contrast, argues that we ought to consider the APA and Amendment No. 2 separately. It asserts that the plain language of the APA itself unambiguously did not transfer copyright ownership, making consideration of parol evidence inappropriate. As for Amendment No. 2, Novell contends that no admissible extrinsic evidence shows that it was intended to transfer copyright ownership. Additionally, Novell claims that ``SCO presented no evidence that copyright ownership was required to exercise its APA rights.'' Aple. Br. 33 (emphasis added). Because Amendment No. 2 revised the excluded assets schedule so as to allow only for transfer of those ``copyrights TTT owned by Novell as of the date of the Agreement required for SCO to exercise its rights with respect to the acquisition of UNIX and UnixWare technologies,'' Novell argues that SCO has failed to demonstrate that any copyrights were transferred. Finally, Novell argues that any purported transfer of copyrights did not meet the requirements for transfer of ownership under the Copyright Act. We will proceed in three steps, asking first, whether the APA and Amendment No. 2 should be considered separately or together; second, whether the APA and Amendment No. 2 satisfy any requirements imposed by the Copyright Act in order to effect a transfer of copyright ownership; and third, whether the district court erred by concluding, as a matter of law, that the transaction's language and any admissible extrinsic evidence could not support the conclusion that Novell and Santa Cruz intended the copyrights to transfer.

A.

Should We Consider APA and Amendment No. 2 Separately or Together?

[1] The parties initially contest whether Amendment No. 2 should be read separately from the APA or together with it, as a successive writing elucidating the parties' intent in the original document. As we explain below, our disposition on this point is important primarily because it operates to fix the scope of extrinsic evidence admissible to clarify the contract. [2, 3] California law ``generally prohibits the introduction of any extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written instrument.'' Gerdlund v. Elec. Dispensers Int'l, 190 Cal.App.3d 263, 270, 235 Cal.Rptr. 279 (Cal.Ct.App. 1987). California's parol evidence rule provides that ``[t]erms set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement TTT may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement.'' Cal.Code Civ. Proc. § 1856(a). Such a writing ``may not be contradicted by even the most persuasive evidence of collateral agreements. Such evidence is legally irrelevant.'' EPA Real Estate P'ship v. Kang, 12 Cal.App.4th 171, 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 209 (Cal.Ct.App.1992); see also Gerdlund, 190 Cal.App.3d at 270, 235 Cal.Rptr. 279 (Cal.Ct.App.1987) (although all parties testified that they shared same intent as to employment agreement, evidence was not admissible to prove meaning of contract where plain language of contract could not support that interpretation). The rule ``is based upon the premise that the written instrument is the agreement of the parties.'' Id. (citing Tahoe Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 4 Cal.3d 11, 22­23, 92 Cal.Rptr. 704, 480 P.2d 320 (Cal. 1971)). [4­6] On the other hand, ``[e]ven if a contract appears unambiguous on its face,

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California law permits the use of extrinsic evidence to expose ``a latent ambiguity TTT'' which reveals more than one possible meaning to which the language of the contract is yet reasonably susceptible.'' Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc., 39 Cal.4th 384, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 668, 139 P.3d 56, 60 (Cal. 2006) (emphasis added). ``The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.'' Id. (quoting Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal.2d 33, 69 Cal.Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal.1968)). Thus, California law does not permit the use of extrinsic evidence to establish an ambiguity in the parties' intent independent from the terms of the contract; instead, it can only be used to expose or resolve a latent ambiguity in the language of the agreement itself. If we were to interpret the contract based initially only on the APA itself-- without regard to Amendment No. 2--we agree that its language unambiguously excludes the transfer of copyrights. Although SCO argues that the asset schedule approves of the transfer of ``[a]ll rights and ownership of UNIX and UnixWare'' to SCO, this ignores that the APA explicitly provides that ``Notwithstanding [those assets listed on the Asset Schedule], the Assets to be so purchased shall not include those assets (the ``Excluded Assets'') set forth on Schedule 1.1(b).'' App'x 264­65. Schedule 1.1(b), in turn, explains straightforwardly that ``all copyrights'' were excluded from the transaction. App'x 318. None of SCO's extrinsic evidence explains how the actual language of the APA is ``reasonably susceptible'' to its interpretation of the transaction--namely, that all relevant copyrights were transferred (or in other words, the exact opposite of what the

APA's language suggests). See Dist. Ct. Op. 46­51 (explaining why the language of the APA itself cannot bear the interpretation that copyrights transferred to SCO). Novell argues, therefore, that we ought not consider any of SCO's extrinsic evidence bearing on the development of the APA itself, and limit any inquiry beyond the text of the agreement to the course of the parties' negotiations over Amendment No. 2. But if we understand Amendment No. 2 to clarify the parties' original intent as to the transfer of copyrights, SCO's extrinsic evidence concerning the business negotiations may be relevant to resolving ambiguity concerning the content of that original intent. Indeed, SCO argues that Amendment No. 2 was designed to bring the language of the transaction in line with the parties' original intent to transfer the copyrights. See Aplt. R. Br. 10 (``Amendment No. 2 clarified the APA to confirm that the copyrights had been transferred thereunder.'') Of course, Novell disputes this characterization of Amendment No. 2. But unlike the language of the APA itself, the contractual language of Amendment No. 2 concerning the transfer of copyrights is ambiguous. Amendment No. 2 revises the excluded asset schedule to limit those copyrights excluded from the transaction to ``[a]ll copyrights and trademarks, except for the copyrights and trademarks owned by Novell as of the date of the Agreement required for SCO to exercise its rights with respect to the acquisition of UNIX and UnixWare technologies.'' App'x 374 (emphasis added). Because what copyrights are ``required'' for SCO to exercise its rights under the agreement is not clear on its face, California law allows courts to consider extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity. See ASP Properties Group v. Fard, Inc., 133 Cal.App.4th 1257, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 343 (Cal.Ct.App.2005). Thus, to the extent that it is proper for us

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to read Amendment No. 2 as clarifying the APA, SCO's extrinsic evidence of the business negotiators' intent concerning the transaction ought to be admissible. [7, 8] Having closely considered the parties' arguments, as well as the district court's reasoning, we find that Amendment No. 2 must be considered together with the APA as a unified document. Under California law, ``[s]everal contracts relating to the same matters, between the same parties, and made as parts of substantially one transaction, are to be taken together.'' Cal. Civ.Code § 1642. ``[M]ultiple writings must be considered together when part of the same contract.'' Nish Noroian Farms v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 35 Cal.3d 726, 735, 201 Cal.Rptr. 1, 677 P.2d 1170 (Cal.1984). Even if we considered the language of the APA and Amendment No. 2 to be mutually antagonistic, California law still dictates that we construe them together, following Amendment No. 2 wherever its language contradicts the APA. Where ``two contracts are made at different times, [but where] the later is not intended to entirely supersede the first, but only modif[y] it in certain particulars[,][t]he two are to be construed as parts of one contract, the later superseding the earlier one wherever it is inconsistent therewith.'' Hawes v. Lux, 111 Cal.App. 21, 294 P. 1080, 1081 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1931); accord San Diego Const. Co. v. Mannix, 175 Cal. 548, 166 P. 325, 326 (Cal.1917). In so doing, we note that SCO paid no additional consideration for Novell's agreement to Amendment No. 2. That makes sense if Amendment No. 2 was a clarification of the agreement, to bring the language of the APA into line with the parties' intent. If Amendment No. 2 were a change in the agreement (and a commercially significant one, at that), it is hard to see why Novell would have agreed to it without compensation.

Therefore, we construe the contract and Amendment No. 2 together for the purpose of assessing any ambiguities in the contract. This means that extrinsic evidence regarding the parties' intent is relevant to our interpretation of the combined instrument. B. Does the Amended APA Satisfy the Requirements of the Copyright Act?

[9, 10] We next consider whether the amended APA constituted a writing sufficient to transfer copyrights under federal law. Under the Copyright Act, ``[a] transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent.'' 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). Section 204 is intended ``to protect copyright holders from persons mistakenly or fraudulently claiming oral licenses [or transfers].'' Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., Inc., 697 F.2d 27, 36 (2d Cir.1982). As a result, Section 204 ``enhances predictability and certainty of ownership--`Congress's paramount goal' when it revised the [Copyright] Act in 1976.'' Konigsberg Intern. Inc. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355, 357 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting Community for Creative Non­Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989)). Novell argues that the Copyright Act imposes not only the requirement that a copyright transfer be in writing, but also that it state with sufficient clarity the copyrights to be transferred. See Aple. Br. 25­26; 34. Novell contends that Amendment No. 2 fails this test because its language is ambiguous. Since it is not clearly apparent which copyrights are ``required for Novell to exercise its rights with respect to the acquisition of UNIX and UnixWare technologies,'' Novell as-

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serts that Amendment No. 2 was not a valid ``instrument of conveyance.'' As an initial matter, we note that the language of 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) does not readily lend itself to the construction Novell seeks to give it. Section 204(a), by its terms, imposes only the requirement that a copyright transfer be in writing and signed by the parties from whom the copyright is transferred; it does not on its face impose any heightened burden of clarity or particularity. Likewise, Novell points to nothing in the legislative history of Section 204 which suggests that Congress envisioned it to invalidate copyright transfer agreements carrying material language subject to multiple reasonable interpretations. Nonetheless, some courts have understood Section 204(a) to impose requirements similar to that necessary to satisfy the statute of frauds. They have found that a writing is insufficient to transfer copyrights unless (1) it reasonably identifies the subject matter of the agreement, (2) is sufficient to indicate that the parties have come to an agreement, and (3) states with reasonable certainty the essential terms of the agreement. Pamfiloff v. Giant Records, Inc., 794 F.Supp. 933, 936 (N.D.Cal.1992) (citing Restatement (2d) of Contracts § 131 (1981)). Novell argues that Section 204's writing requirement would disserve the goals of ``predictability and certainty of copyright ownership'' if parties could fulfill it without making clear what copyrights they intend to transfer. But it is hardly clear that imposing strict requirements of clarity in order to effect a copyright transfer will always aid ``predictability and certainty of copyright ownership.'' ``[A]mbiguities in copyright grants are anything but rare in the jurisprudence.'' 3 Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 10.08 (2009). ``The written memorialization of [an] agreement [transferring copyrights] inevitably fails to mandate only one

pellucid interpretation.'' Id. If every copyright transaction were vulnerable to challenge whenever a party is able to point out some ambiguity within the governing agreement, parties might be forced to engage in costly, protracted litigation to determine whether the transfer is valid, putting into doubt the proper holder of the copyright. In the absence of any support from the language or legislative history, we are unwilling to read into Section 204 such an onerous restraint on the alienability of copyrights. As the Second Circuit has commented, ``[t]he need for interpretation of a contract does not necessarily mean that there is a bona fide issue as to whether the contract is a writing for purposes of section 204(a). In most cases, there will be no doubt that the contract is a section 204(a) writing, and the only substantial issue will be contract interpretation.'' Jasper v. Bovina Music, 314 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir.2002). In copyright as elsewhere, ``[t]he making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs--not on the parties having meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing.'' Nimmer on Copyright, § 10.08 (quoting Tingley Sys. v. HealthLink, Inc., 509 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1216 (M.D.Fla.2007)). Where ambiguity persists in the language of a parties' shared agreement concerning a copyright transfer, the transfer is not invalidated; instead, we look to parol evidence to construe the terms of the agreement. See Nimmer on Copyright, § 10.08. [11] We think that Section 204's writing requirement is best understood as a means of ensuring that parties intend to transfer copyrights themselves, as opposed to other categories of rights. See, e.g., Papa's­June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F.Supp. 1154, 1158­59 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (al-

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though a writing need not explicitly mention ``copyright'' or ``exclusive rights'' to satisfy 204(a), the better practice is that it should). But when it is clear that the parties contemplated that copyrights transfer, we do not think that a linguistic ambiguity concerning which particular copyrights transferred creates an insuperable barrier invalidating the transaction. Thus, the majority of cases that Novell draws our attention to, in which alleged copyright transfers are found not to satisfy Section 204, involve transactions where it is not clear whether the parties intended that copyrights would transfer at all--not disputes over which specific copyrights were within the scope of an intended transfer. See, e.g., Radio Television Espanola S.A. v. New World Entertainment, Ltd., 183 F.3d 922, 927­28 (9th Cir.1999) (finding faxes referring to ongoing negotiations insufficient to confirm a finalized deal to transfer copyrights); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 564 (2d Cir.1995) (finding check legend allegedly purporting to recognize past ``assignment TTT of all rights, title and interest'' insufficient to transfer copyrights); Konigsberg Intern. Inc., 16 F.3d at 357 (letter written three and a half years after oral agreement did not constitute a writing sufficient to confirm parties' intent to transfer copyrights in earlier agreement). Notwithstanding the above, the district court found Amendment No. 2 insufficient to convey Novell's copyrights under Section 204 for several additional reasons. It first determined that Amendment No. 2 ``[did] not include any provision that purports to transfer ownership of copyrights.'' because it did not profess to ``amend Schedule 1.1(a),'' the Asset Schedule, and because ``[u]nlike the APA, Amendment No. 2 was not accompanied by a separate `Bill of Sale' transferring any assets.'' Dist. Ct. Op. 59. We are not persuaded that either prevents our recognition of a copyright transfer.

[12] Although Amendment No. 2 did not purport to amend Schedule 1.1(a), this does not mean that the balance of assets transferred to Santa Cruz remained unchanged. The transaction was structured such that Santa Cruz would acquire ``all of Seller's right, title and interest in and to the assets TTT identified on Schedule 1.1(a),'' but that ``the Assets to be so purchased not include those assets (the `Excluded Assets') set forth on Schedule 1.1(b).'' App'x 264­65. Schedule 1.1(a), in turn, provided that Santa Cruz would receive ``[a]ll rights and ownership of UNIX and UnixWare TTT including all source code,'' a broad set of assets limited only by Schedule 1.1(b). As a result, any change to the set of Excluded Assets in Schedule 1.1(b) necessarily implicated those copyrights actually transferred under Schedule 1.1(a). [13] Of course, it is not always the case that the absence of certain or all copyrights from an ``excluded asset'' schedule will suffice to indicate the inclusion of copyrights in the transaction. But a written asset transfer agreement may satisfy Section 204(a) even when it ``does not mention the word `copyright' '' itself. Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir.1992). And when a party acquires ``[a]ll rights and ownership'' in a set of items, as was the case here, courts have generally found such language sufficient to satisfy Section 204(a) in the absence of language excepting copyrights or other special circumstances. See ITOFCA, Inc. v. MegaTrans Logistics, Inc., 322 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir.2003) (written intent to transfer ``all assets'' can indicate intent to transfer copyrights); Shugrue v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 977 F.Supp. 280, 284­85 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (written agreement to transfer ``all right, title and interest'' in software indicated intent to transfer copyrights); Relational Design & Technology,

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Inc. v. Brock, No. 91­2452­EEO, 1993 WL 191323 at *6 (D.Kan. May 25, 1993) (transfer of ``all rights'' in software program included copyright). But see Playboy Enters. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 564 (2d Cir. 1995) (check legend indicating that payment was for past transfer of ``all right, title and interest'' was insufficient, by itself, to indicate a copyright transfer under Section 204). Of course, under the language of the original agreement, copyrights were expressly excluded from the assets transferred. But here, where a written agreement to the contract excised certain copyrights from that exclusion, we think the Copyright Act's writing requirement is satisfied. [14] We also do not see why the absence of a Bill of Sale is fatal to an alleged transfer under the Copyright Act. Section 204 makes clear that the writing requirement can be satisfied not only by ``an instrument of conveyance'' but also by ``a note or memorandum of the transfer.'' 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). Amendment No. 2 was a writing signed by both parties evincing a clear intent to revise or clarify the formal schedule of copyrights transferred by Novell to Santa Cruz. The Copyright Act did not require more. For similar reasons, we reject the significance that the district court attributed to the fact that Amendment No. 2 revised the APA ``[a]s of the 16th day of October, 1996'' as opposed to the date of the Bill of Sale. App'x 374. The Copyright Act does not require its writing requirement be fulfilled concur2. We think the parties' dispute over whether Amendment No. 2 retroactively changed the APA or affected a clarification as of October 16, 1996 is ultimately much ado about nothing. None of the claims in this litigation depend on the meaning of the APA during the time period prior to Amendment No. 2. Moreover, while both parties attribute different meanings to the APA and Amendment No. 2, neither party argues that Amendment No. 2 was meant to substantively change the intent

rently with the production of a Bill of Sale.2 Cf. Eden Toys, Inc., 697 F.2d at 36 (``the `note or memorandum of the transfer' need not be made at the time when the license is initiated; the requirement is satisfied by the copyright owner's later execution of a writing which confirms the agreement''). We therefore conclude that the APA, as revised by Amendment No. 2, satisfied the Copyright Act's writing requirement. C. Is Summary Judgment Appropriate on the Ownership of the Copyrights?

[15­17] We come finally to the question of whether the district court was correct to enter summary judgment on the issue of whether Novell or SCO owns the UNIX and UnixWare copyrights under the APA as revised by Amendment No. 2. In contract actions, the interpretation of a written agreement is a question of fact. See Gomez v. American Elec. Power Service Corp., 726 F.2d 649, 651 (10th Cir. 1984). When a contract is ambiguous, and parties present conflicting evidence regarding their intent at the time of the agreement, a genuine issue of material fact exists which cannot be determined summarily by the court. Id. Of course, the party opposing summary judgment ``must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'' Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586­ 87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
of the APA; both SCO and Novell agree that it merely clarified or affirmed the original intent of the transaction. Compare Aplt. R. Br. 10 (``Amendment No. 2 clarified the APA to confirm that the copyrights had been transferred thereunder.'') with Aple. Br. 40 (Amendment No. 2 merely ``affirm[ed] that Santa Cruz had a license under the original APA to use Novell's UNIX and UnixWare copyrighted works in its business'') (emphasis added).

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But so long as sufficient evidence could lead a rational trier of fact to resolve the dispute in favor of either party, granting either party's dueling motions for summary judgment would be inappropriate. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). [18, 19] This case, involving a complicated, multi-million dollar business transaction involving ambiguous language about which the parties offer dramatically different explanations, is particularly ill-suited to summary judgment. We recognize that Novell has powerful arguments to support its version of the transaction, and that, as the district court suggested, there may be reasons to discount the credibility, relevance, or persuasiveness of the extrinsic evidence that SCO presents. Moreover, we appreciate the difficulties that follow when the resolution of ambiguous language in a ten-year-old contract is left to trial. At trial in a case like this, the intention of the parties often ``must be divined from self-serving testimony offered by partisan witnesses whose recollection is hazy from passage of time and colored by their conflicting interests.'' Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir.1988). Even though the parties may have shared a common understanding of a transaction at the time of the deal, now that ``circumstances have changed and new financial incentives have arisen, one side may wish it had a different agreement.'' Nimmer on Copyright, § 10.08. Nevertheless, when conflicting evidence is presented such that the ambiguities in a contract could legitimately be resolved in favor of either party, it is for the ultimate finder of fact--not the court on summary judgment--to interpret the contract. As we now explain, Novell's arguments do not convince us that the admissible evidence concerning the ambiguous contract language concerning con-

tract ownership is so one-sided as to warrant summary judgment. Novell contends that SCO has failed to establish a disputed issue of material fact as to copyright ownership for several reasons. It first claims that SCO has failed to present any evidence to support that the APA, as revised by Amendment No. 2, clarified the agreement to indicate that SCO received ownership of some or all UNIX and UnixWare copyrights as a result of the transaction. In the alternative, it argues that SCO has failed to present any evidence to suggest that ownership of UNIX and UnixWare copyrights was ``required'' for Santa Cruz to exercise its rights under the APA. In support of its initial argument, Novell argues that it has introduced undisputed evidence that (1) Santa Cruz admitted that the initial APA excluded copyrights from the asset sale and that (2) Novell expressly rejected Santa Cruz's proposal to use Amendment No. 2 to transfer copyrights to Santa Cruz. See Aple. Br. 39­42. As to the first point, Santa Cruz's admission that the initial APA excluded copyrights is not inconsistent with SCO's position that this exclusion was a mistake and failed to reflect the parties' intent. Novell itself admits that the negotiations that led to the language of Amendment No. 2 concerning copyrights began when Santa Cruz's attorney contacted Novell, informing them that ``the Original APA explicitly excluded copyrights to UNIX and UnixWare as assets being sold by Novell to Santa Cruz and that it shouldn't have.'' App'x 6063. As to the second point, Novell directs us to various pieces of evidence supporting its claim that Amendment No. 2 was not intended to affirm that ownership of copyrights had transferred to Santa Cruz, but only ``to affirm that Santa Cruz had a license under the Original APA to use Novell's UNIX and UnixWare copyrighted works in its business.'' App'x 6064. No-

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vell primarily relies on evidence of the negotiations over Amendment No. 2. Santa Cruz initially proposed a draft of Amendment No. 2 that would have revised the Intellectual Property section of the Excluded Assets Schedule to read: All copyrights and trademarks, except for the copyrights and trademarks owned by Novell as of the date of this Amendment No. 2, which pertain to the UNIX and UnixWare technologies and which SCO has acquired hereunder. However, in no event shall Novell be liable to SCO for any claim brought by any third party pertaining to said copyrights and trademarks. App'x 6670. Novell rejected this language, and the final language of Amendment No. 2 instead reformed the Excluded Assets Schedule to read: All copyrights and trademarks, except for the copyrights owned by Novell as of the date of the Agreement required for SCO to exercise its rights with respect to the acquisition of UNIX and UnixWare technologies. However, in no event shall Novell be liable to SCO for any claim brought by any third party pertaining to said copyrights and trademarks. App'x 374. The revised language contains two relevant changes. Instead of excepting from the Excluded Assets Schedule ``the copyrights TTT which pertain to UNIX and UnixWare technologies'' the final language refers to ``the copyrights TTT required for SCO to exercise its rights with respect to the acquisition of UNIX and UnixWare technologies.'' In addition, instead of referring to ``the copyrights TTT owned by Novell as of the date of this Amendment No. 2 TTT and which SCO has acquired hereunder,'' the final language refers to ``the copyrights TTT owned by Novell as of the date of the Agreement.'' Novell contends that because it did not accept Santa Cruz's initial proposal, there

is no basis for construing Amendment No. 2 as SCO would--an affirmation of the transfer of all UNIX and UnixWare copyrights. See Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1440­41 (no basis for construing agreement in line with draft proposal rejected by one of the parties). It insists that the language reflects its explanation of Amendment No. 2 as a mere affirmation of Santa Cruz's implied license to use the copyrights. SCO, in contrast, claims that the final language of Amendment No. 2 only represented ``a different way'' of saying what its initial draft proposed--a clarification that the parties' had intended for ownership of the UNIX copyrights to transfer. Aplt. Br. 44­45. As an initial matter, we are skeptical of Novell's interpretation of the Amendment. Whatever the Amendment means, it refers to the ownership of copyrights, not to licenses. A rational trier of fact could surely find that Amendment No. 2 clarified the APA so as to indicate that at least some copyrights transferred to SCO. It is true that the final language of Amendment No. 2, by referring to ``required copyrights'' rather than ``copyrights that pertain to'' UNIX, is narrower than that initially proposed by Santa Cruz. But is it plausible to think that Santa Cruz would have found the final language equally sufficient for its purposes, given its insistence that all the UNIX copyrights were required for it to exercise its rights under the deal. See, e.g., Testimony of Steve Sabbath, Santa Cruz Attorney, App'x 10722 (``all of the [UNIX and UnixWare] copyrights'' were ``required'' for SCO to exercise its rights with respect to the acquisition of UNIX and UnixWare technologies.) Alternatively, the final language of Amendment No. 2 may have represented a compromise whereby Novell agreed to confirm that Santa Cruz obtained ownership only of those copyrights ``necessary'' for Santa Cruz to run its business.

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[20] Our conclusion that a rational trier of fact could find that Amendment No. 2 clarified the APA to affirm that the parties intended to transfer certain UNIX and UnixWare copyrights to Novell is bolstered by SCO's extrinsic evidence of the transaction. SCO presents testimony from a variety of witnesses involved in the business negotiations on both sides of the deal, which generally supports its version of the transaction. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. 13­ 15. It is true, as Novell points out, that many of these witnesses were involved in the business negotiations, as opposed to the actual drafting of the contract. But because we cannot exclude the possibility that Amendment No. 2 was designed to restore the language of the transaction to the parties' actual intent during the business negotiations over the deal, such testimony is not irrelevant. Cf. California Pac. Title Co., Sacramento Division v. Moore, 229 Cal.App.2d 114, 40 Cal.Rptr. 61, 63 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1964) (``A conflict in the evidence does not preclude a court from finding that the two parties had a common intent which was incorrectly reduced to writing.''). Moreover, SCO's extrinsic evidence extends not only to the business negotiations preceding the contract, but also to the parties' understanding of the contractual language itself. For instance, Novell points out that the Board resolution approving the transaction on its side of the deal stated that ``Novell will retain all of its patents, copyrights and trademarks.'' App'x 5192. But SCO notes that Mr. Frankenberg, then Novell's CEO, testified that he understood the Board resolution's reference to Novell's retention of copyrights to refer to Netware copyrights, as opposed to the core UNIX intellectual property. Aplt. R. Br. 14.
3. Although SCO claims that this was a ``joint press release,'' it provides no evidence to support this assertion. The district court reasonably cast doubt on whether the press release

Finally, SCO presents evidence of the parties' course of performance following the transaction. Under California law, ``course of performance'' evidence may be used to interpret an ambiguous contractual provision. Cal.Code Civ. Proc. § 1856. See also Universal Sales Corp. v. Cal. Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal.2d 751, 128 P.2d 665, 672 (Cal.1942) (``[P]ractical construction placed by the parties upon the instrument is the best evidence of their intention''). SCO points to a variety of steps taken by the parties following the signing of the APA and Amendment No. 2 that it claims supports its interpretation of the contract. These include Novell's modification of copyright notices on certain UnixWare source code, see App'x 10303­13, certain statements related to the transfer of intellectual property within transition documents following the deal, see, e.g., App'x 13362, and the publication of a press release in 1995 stating that ``SCO will acquire Novell's UnixWare business and UNIX intellectual property.'' 3 App'x 5626. Of course, such documents are not dispositive of the companies' intent at the time of the transaction. But they illustrate the difficulties with granting summary judgment here. Novell finally argues that SCO has failed to show what UNIX copyrights are ``required'' for Santa Cruz to exercise its rights under the APA. The parties each argue for plausible, but diametrically opposed, interpretations of the word ``required.'' SCO argues that the bulk of the UNIX and UnixWare copyrights are ``required'' in order for it to exercise its rights. For instance, the APA transferred to Santa Cruz ``all of [Novell's] claims arising after the Closing Date against any
cited to in the record is, in fact, a joint press release. In any case, it at least provides a contemporaneous view of Santa Cruz's view of the transaction.

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parties relating to any right, property or asset included in the Business.'' App'x 313. SCO argues that it could not defend any of its intellectual property against software piracy or other business harm without ownership of the copyrights. Indeed, a key reason why this litigation is so important to SCO is that it has claimed that other companies, including IBM, are infringing on the proprietary technology that it supposedly received through its transaction with Novell. Novell, in contrast, asserts that the class of ``required'' copyrights constitutes a null set. See Aple. Br. 40, 41 n.8 (arguing that Amendment No. 2 was not intended to transfer any copyright ownership, but merely to affirm its license to use certain copyrights). The district court agreed, noting amongst other things that ``Santa Cruz had been able to pursue its UNIX business from December 6, 1995 until October 16, 1996 [the date of Amendment No. 2] without any problems due to its [alleged] lack of ownership of the copyrights.'' Dist. Ct. Op. 61. But the fact that SCO did not need to assert ownership of the UNIX copyrights publicly following the closing of the transaction does not indicate that the UNIX copyrights are unnecessary to SCO's full exercise of its rights under the agreement. Indeed, it would seem that neither party asserted public ownership of the copyrights until the events leading to the instant litigation, almost a decade after the closing of the transaction. See, e.g., Aple. Br. 32 (noting that Novell and SCO did not file their competing copyright registrations until after this dispute arose in 2003).
4. For this reason, we fail to see why SCO's argument that copyright ownership would be necessary to bring ``claims'' under the agreement is ``circular,'' as Novell argues. Aple. Br. 47. SCO indisputably acquired certain assets under the APA. SCO's claim, as we understand it, is that copyrights are necessary to protect the value of the assets themselves,

[21] We need not determine at the summary judgment stage which copyrights were ``required.'' If the evidence presented on a dispositive issue is subject to conflicting, reasonable interpretations, summary judgment is improper. Archuleta v. Wal­Mart Stores, Inc., 543 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir.2008). Although the district court found that ``there is TTT significant evidence that Santa Cruz did not `require' the UNIX and UnixWare copyrights,'' we think SCO has presented sufficient evidence to create a triable fact as to whether at least some UNIX copyrights were required for it to exercise its rights under the agreement. Although the district court acknowledged that ``SCO has submitted testimony from witnesses stating generally that the copyrights were necessary to running a software business,'' it found that ``none of those witnesses give specific examples of how a lack of copyright ownership impeded Santa Cruz's ability to exercise its rights under the APA.'' Dist. Ct. Op. 61. But the documents detailing the actions of the transition team at least create ambiguity over whether the transfer of copyrights was required to support SCO's rights under the APA. See, e.g., App'x 13362 (``All of the technology and intellectual assets covered by the work outlined in this document will be transitioned to SCO after December 1, 1995''). And we think it a commonsense proposition that intellectual property at least may be required to protect the underlying assets in SCO software business should, for instance, a UNIX licensee have attempted to resell technology licensed from SCO.4
and are therefore necessary to prosecute seller's claims ``relating to any TTT asset'' included in the Business. Novell has not explained, for instance, what recourse SCO had under Novell's theory of the transaction if a third party had copied and attempted to resell the core UNIX assets Santa Cruz received in the deal.

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Because we conclude summary judgment is inappropr