GUEDES et al v. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, AND EXPLOSIVES et al
Filing
1
COMPLAINT against All Defendants ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0090-5846088) filed by FIREARMS POLICY FOUNDATION, FIREARMS POLICY COALITION, INC., DAMIEN GUEDES, MADISON SOCIETY FOUNDATION, INC.. (Attachments: #1 Notice of Exhibits, #2 Exhibit A Part I, #3 Exhibit A Part II, #4 Corporate Disclosure Statement, #5 Civil Cover Sheet, #6 Summons, #7 Executed Final Rule)(Kraut, Adam)
(Billing Code: 4410-FY-P)
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
27 CFR Parts 447,478, and 479
[Docket No. 2018R-22F; AG Order No.
RIN 1140-AA52
Bump-Stock-Type Devices
AGENCY: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; Department of
Justice
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: The Department of Justice is amending the regulations of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) to clarify that bump-stock-type
devices-meaning "bump fire" stocks, slide-fire devices, and devices with certain similar
characteristics-are "machineguns" as defined by the National Firearms Act of 1934 and
the Gun Control Act of 1968 because such devices allow a shooter of a semiautomatic
firearm to initiate a continuous firing cycle with a single pull of the trigger. Specifically,
these devices convert an otherwise semiautomatic firearm into a machinegun by
functioning as a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that harnesses the recoil energy
of the semiautomatic firearm in a manner that allows the trigger to reset and continue
firing without additional physical manipulation of the trigger by the shooter. Hence, a
semiautomatic firearm to which a bump-stock-type device is attached is able to produce
automatic fire with a single pull of the trigger. With limited exceptions, the Gun Control
Act, as amended, makes it unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun
unless it was lawfully possessed prior to the effective date of the statute. The bumpstock-type devices covered by this final rule were not in existence prior to the effective
date of the statute, and therefore will be prohibited when this rule becomes effective.
Consequently, under the final rule, current possessors of these devices will be required to
destroy the devices or abandon them at an ATF office prior to the effective date of the
rule.
DATES: This rule is effective [INSERT DATE THAT IS 90 DAYS AFTER
PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER].
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Vivian Chu, Office of Regulatory
Affairs, Enforcement Programs and Services, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives, U.S. Department of Justice, 99 New York Ave. NE, Washington, DC 20226;
telephone: (202) 648-7070.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Executive Summary
A. Summary of the Regulatory Action
B. Summary of Costs and Benefits
II. Background
A. Regulatory Context
B. Las Vegas Shooting
C. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
III. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
A. Prior Interpretations of"Single Function of the Trigger" and "Automatically"
B. Re-evaluation of Bump-Stock-Type Devices
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C. Proposed Definition of"Single Function of the Trigger"
D. Proposed Definition of"Automatically"
E. Proposed Clarification That the Definition of "Machinegun" Includes BumpStock-Type Devices
F. Amendment of27 CFR Part 479.11
G. Amendment of27 CFR Part 478.11
H. Amendment of27 CFR Part 447.11
IV. Analysis of Comments and Department Responses for Proposed Rule
A. Comments Generally Supporting the Rule
B. Particular Reasons Raised in Support of the Rule
C. Comments Generally Opposing the Rule
D. Specific Issues Raised in Opposition to the Rule
E. A TF Suggested Alternatives
F. Other Alternatives
G. Proposed Rule's Statutory and Executive Order Review
H. Affected Population
I. Costs and Benefits
J. Regulatory Flexibility Act
K. Miscellaneous Comments
L. Comments on the Rulemaking Process
V. Final Rule
VI. Statutory and Executive Order Review
A. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 13771
B. Executive Order 13132
C. Executive Order 12988
D. Regulatory Flexibility Act
E. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
F. Congressional Review Act
G. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
H. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
I. Executive Summary
A. Summary of the Regulatory Action
The current regulations at sections 447.11, 478.11, and 479.11 oftitle 27, Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR), contain definitions for the term "machinegun." 1 The
definitions used in 27 CFR 478.11 and 479.11 match the statutory definition of
"machinegun" in the National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA), as amended, and the Gun
1 Regulations implementing the relevant statutes spell the term "machine gun" rather than "machinegun."
E.g., 27 CFR 478.11, 479.11. Fm· convenience, this notice uses "machinegun" except when quoting a
source to the contrary.
3
Control Act of 1968 (GCA), as amended. Under the NFA, the term "machinegun" means
"any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot,
automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the
trigger." 26 U.S.C. 5845(b). The term "machinegun" also includes "the frame or
receiver of any such weapon" or any part or combination of parts designed and intended
"for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun," and "any combination of parts from
which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the
control ofa person." Id This definition uses the key terms "single function of the
trigger" and "automatically," but these terms are not defined in the statutory text.
The definition of "machinegun" in 27 CFR 447 .11, promulgated pursuant to the
portion of section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (22 U.S.C. 2778)
delegated to the Attorney General by section l(n)(ii) of Executive Order 13637 (78 FR
16129), is similar. Currently, the definition of"machinegun" in§ 447.11 provides that a
'"machinegun', 'machine pistol', 'submachinegun', or 'automatic rifle' is a firearm
originally designed to fire, or capable of being fired fully automatically by a single pull of
the trigger."
In 2006, ATF concluded that certain bump-stock-type devices qualified as
machineguns under the NFA and GCA. Specifically, ATF concluded that a device
attached to a semiautomatic firearm that uses an internal spring to harness the force of a
firearm's recoil so that the firearm shoots more than one shot with a single pull of the
trigger is a machinegun. Between 2008 and 2017, however, ATF also issued
classification decisions concluding that other bump-stock-type devices were not
machineguns, primarily because the devices did not rely on internal springs or similar
4
mechanical parts to channel recoil energy. Decisions issued during that time did not
include extensive legal analysis relating to the definition of"machinegun." ATF
undertook a review of its past classifications and determined that those conclusions did
not reflect the best interpretation of "machinegun" under the NFA and GCA.
ATF decided to promulgate a rule that would bring clarity to the definition of
"machinegun"-specifically with respect to the terms "automatically" and "single
function of the trigger," as those terms are used to define "machinegun." As an initial
step in the process of promulgating a rule, on December 26, 2017, the Department of
Justice (Department) published in the Federal Register an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking titled "Application of the Definition ofMachinegun to 'Bump Fire' Stocks
and Other Similar Devices." 82 FR 60929. Subsequently, on March 29, 2018, the
Department published in the Federal Register a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
titled "Bump-Stock-Type Devices." 83 FR 13442.
The NPRM proposed to amend the regulations at 27 CFR 447.11, 478.11, and
479.11 to clarify that bump-stock-type devices are "machineguns" as defined by the NFA
and GCA because such devices allow a shooter of a semiautomatic firearm to initiate a
continuous firing cycle with a single pull of the trigger. Specifically, these devices
convert an otherwise semiautomatic firearm into a machinegun by functioning as a selfacting or self-regulating mechanism that harnesses the recoil energy of the semiautomatic
firearm in a manner that allows the trigger to reset and continue firing without additional
physical manipulation of the trigger by the shooter. Hence, a semiautomatic firearm to
which a bump-stock-type device is attached is able to produce automatic fire with a
single pull of the trigger. 83 FR at 13447-48.
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The NPRM proposed regulatory definitions for the statutory terms "single
function of the trigger" and "automatically," and amendments of the regulatory definition
of"machinegun" for purposes of clarity. Specifically, the NPRM proposed to amend the
definitions of"machinegun" in§§ 478.11 and 479.11, define the term "single function of
the trigger" to mean "single pull of the trigger," and define the term "automatically" to
mean "as the result of a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that allows the firing of
multiple rounds through a single pull of the trigger." 83 FR at 13447-48. The NPRM
also proposed to clarify that the definition of"machinegun" includes a device that allows
a semiautomatic firearm to shoot more than one shot with a single pull of the trigger by
harnessing the recoil energy of the semiautomatic firearm to which it is affixed so that the
trigger resets and continues firing without additional physical manipulation of the trigger
by the shooter (commonly known as bump-stock-type devices). Id. at 13447. Finally,
the NPRM proposed to harmonize the definition of "machinegun" in § 44 7 .11 with the
definitions in 27 CPR parts 478 and 479, as those definitions would be amended. Id. at
13448.
The goal of this final rule is to amend the relevant regulatory definitions as
described above. The Department, however, has revised the definition of"single
function of the trigger" to mean "single pull of the trigger" and analogous motions, taking
into account that there are other methods of initiating an automatic firing sequence that
do not require a pull. This final rule also informs current possessors of bump-stock-type
devices of the proper methods of disposal, including destruction by the owner or
abandonment to ATF.
B. Summary o_[Costs and Benefits
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ATF estimates the total undiscounted cost of this rule at $312.1 million over 10
years. The total 7% discount cost is estimated at $245.5 million, and the discounted costs
would be $32.8 million and $35.0 million, annualized at 3% and 7% respectively. The
estimate includes costs to the public for loss of property ($ 102.5 million); costs of
forgone future production and sales ($198.9 million); costs of disposal ($9.4 million); and
government costs ($1.3 million). Unquantified costs include potential loss of wages for
employees of bump-stock-type device manufacturers, notification to bump-stock-type
device owners of the need to destroy the devices, and loss of future usage by the owners
of bump-stock-type devices. A TF did not calculate any cost savings for this final rule.
This final rule clarifies that bump-stock-type devices are machineguns that are
subject to the NFA and GCA. The provisions of those statutes addressing machineguns
are designed to increase public safety by, among other things, limiting legal access to
them. Consistent with the NFA and GCA, therefore, a desired outcome of this final rule
is increased public safety.
II. Background
A. Regulatory Context
The Attorney General is responsible for enforcing the NFA, as amended, and the
GCA, as amended. 2 This responsibility includes the authority to promulgate regulations
. necessary to enforce the provisions of the NFA and GCA. See 18 U.S.C. 926(a); 26
U.S.C. 7801(a)(2)(A), 7805(a). The Attorney General has delegated the responsibility for
2
NFA provisions still refer to the "Secretary of the Treasury." 26 U.S.C. ch. 53. However, the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, transferred the functions of ATF from the
Department of the Treasury to the Depattment of Justice, under the general authority ofthe Attorney
General. 26 U.S.C. 780l(a)(2); 28 U.S.C. 599A(c)(I). Thus, for ease of reference, this notice refers to the
Attomey General.
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administering and enforcing the NFA and GCA to the Director of ATF, subject to the
direction of the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General. See 28 CFR
0.130(a)(l) (2). Accordingly, the Department and ATF have promulgated regulations
0
implementing both the NFA and the GCA. See 27 CFR pts. 478,479. In particular, ATF
for decades promulgated rules governing "the procedural and substantive requirements
relative to the importation, manufacture, making, exportation, identification and
registration of, and the dealing in, machine guns." 27 CFR 479.1; see, e.g., United States
v. Dodson, 519 F. App'x 344, 348-49 & n.4 (6th Cir. 2013) (acknowledging ATF's role
in interpreting the NF A's definition of"machinegun"); F.J. Vollmer Co. v. Higgins, 23
F.3d 448, 449-51 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding an ATF determination regarding
machinegun receivers). Courts have recognized ATF's leading regulatory role with
respect to firearms, including in the specific context of classifying devices as
machineguns under the NFA. See, e.g., Yorkv. Sec'y a/Treasury, 774 F.2d 417, 419-20
( I 0th Cir. I 985).
The GCA defines "machinegun" by referring to the NFA definition, 3 which
includes "any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to
shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function
of the trigger." 26 U.S.C. 5845(b). The term "machinegun" also includes "the frame or
receiver of any such weapon" or any part, or combination of parts, designed and intended
"for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun," and any combination of parts from
which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the
3
18 U.S.C. 92l(a)(23).
8
control of a person. Id. With limited exceptions, the GCA prohibits the transfer or
possession ofmachineguns under 18 U.S.C. 922(0).
In 1986, Congress passed the Firearms Owners' Protection Act (FOPA), Pub. L.
99-308, 100 Stat. 449, which included a provision that effectively froze the number of
legally transferrable machineguns to those that were registered before the effective date
of the statute. 18 U.S.C. 922(0). Due to the fixed universe of"pre-1986" machineguns
that may be lawfully transferred by nongovernmental entities, the value of those
machineguns has steadily increased over time. This price premium on automatic
weapons has spurred inventors and manufacturers to develop firearms, triggers, and other
devices that permit shooters to use semiautomatic rifles to replicate automatic fire
without converting these rifles into "machineguns" under the NFA and GCA. ATF began
receiving classification requests for such firearms, triggers, and other devices that
replicate automatic fire beginning in 1988. ATF has noted a significant increase in such
requests since 2004, often in connection with rifle models that were, until 2004, defined
as "semiautomatic assault weapons" and prohibited under the Public Safety and
Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 92l(a)(30) (sunset effective Sept.
13, 2004).
ATF received classification requests pertaining to bump-stock-type devices.
Shooters use bump-stock-type devices with semiautomatic firearms to accelerate the
firearms' cyclic firing rate to mimic automatic fire. These devices replace a rifle's
standard stock and free the weapon to slide back and forth rapidly, harnessing the energy
from the firearm's recoil either through a mechanism like an internal spring or in
conjunction with the shooter's maintenance of pressure (typically constant forward
9
pressure with the non-trigger hand on the barrel-shroud or fore-grip of the rifle, and
constant rearward pressure on the device's extension ledge with the shooter's trigger
finger).
In 2006, ATF concluded that certain bump-stock-type devices qualified as
machineguns under the NFA and GCA. Specifically, ATF concluded that devices
attached to semiautomatic firearms that use an internal spring to harness the force of the
recoil so that the firearm shoots more than one shot with a single pull of the trigger are
machineguns. Between 2008 and 2017, however, ATF also issued classification
decisions concluding that other bump-stock-type devices were not machineguns,
including a device submitted by the manufacturer of the bump-stock-type devices used in
the 2017 Las Vegas shooting discussed below. Those decisions indicated that
semiautomatic firearms modified with these bump-stock-type devices did not fire
"automatically," and thus were not "machineguns," because the devices did not rely on
internal springs or similar mechanical parts to channel recoil energy. (For further
discussion of ATF's prior interpretations, see Part III.A.) Because ATF has not regulated
these certain types of bump-stock-type devices as machineguns under the NFA or GCA,
they have not been marked with a serial number or other identification markings.
Individuals, therefore, have been able to legally purchase these devices without
undergoing background checks or complying with any other Federal regulations
applicable to firearms.
B. Las Vegas Shooting
On October 1, 2017, a shooter attacked a large crowd attending an outdoor
concert in Las Vegas, Nevada. By using several AR-type rifles with attached bump-
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stock-type devices, the shooter was able to fire several hundred rounds of ammunition in
a short period of time, killing 58 people and wounding approximately 500. The bumpstock-type devices recovered from the scene included two distinct, but functionally
equivalent, model variations from the same manufacturer. These types of devices were
readily available in the commercial marketplace through online sales directly from the
manufacturer, and through multiple retailers.
The Las Vegas bump-stock-type devices, as well as other bump-stock-type
devices available on the market, all utilize essentially the same functional design. They
are designed to be affixed to a semiautomatic long gun (most commonly an AR-type rifle
or an AK-type rifle) in place of a standard, stationary rifle stock, for the express purpose
of allowing "rapid fire" operation of the semiautomatic firearm to which they are affixed.
They are configured with a sliding shoulder stock molded (or otherwise attached) to a
pistol-grip/handle (or "chassis") that includes an extension ledge (or "finger rest") on
which the shooter places the trigger finger while shooting the firearm. The devices also
generally include a detachable rectangular receiver module (or "bearing interface") that is
placed in the receiver well of the device's pistol-grip/handle to assist in guiding and
1"egulating the recoil of the firearm when fired. Bump-stock-type devices, including those
with the aforementioned characteristics, are generally designed to channel recoil energy
to increase the rate of fire of a semiautomatic firearm from a single trigger pull.
Accordingly, when a bump-stock-type device is affixed to a semiautomatic firearm, the
device harnesses and directs the firearm's recoil energy to slide the firearm back and
forth so that the trigger automatically re-engages by "bumping" the shooter's stationary
finger without additional physical manipulation of the trigger by the shooter.
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Following the mass shooting in Las Vegas, ATF received correspondence from
members of the United States Congress, as well as nongovernmental organizations,
requesting that ATF examine its past classifications and determine whether bump-stocktype devices available on the market constitute machineguns under the statutory
definition. Consistent with its authority to "reconsider and rectify" potential
classification errors, Akins v. United States, 312 F. App 'x I 97, 200 (11th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam), ATF reviewed its earlier determinations for bump-stock-type devices issued
between 2008 and 2017 and concluded that those determinations did not include
extensive legal analysis of the statutory terms "automatically" or "single function of the
trigger." The Department decided to move forward with the rulemaking process to
clarify the meaning of these terms, which are used in the NFA's statutory definition of
"machinegun."
C. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
On December 26, 2017, the Department, as an initial step in the process of
promulgating a Federal regulation interpreting the definition of"machinegun" with
respect to bump-stock-type devices, published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking
(ANPRM) in the Federal Register. Application of the Definition ofMachincgun to
"Bump Fire" Stocks and Other Similar Devices, 82 FR 60929. The ANPRM solicited
comments concerning the market for bump-stock-type devices and manufacturer and
retailer data. Specifically, the Department asked a series of questions of consumers,
retailers, and manufacturers of bump-stock-type devices regarding the cost of bumpstock-type devices, average gross receipts of sales, and the volume and cost of
manufacturing, as well as input on the potential effect of a rulemaking affecting bump-
12
stock-type devices, including viable markets or the cost of disposing of inventory. Public
comment on the ANPRM concluded on January 25, 2018. While ATF received over
115,000 comments, the vast majority of these comments were not responsive to the
ANPRM.
On February 20, 2018, the President issued a memorandum to the Attorney
General concerning "bump fire" stocks and similar devices. Application of the
Definition ofMachinegun to "Bump Fire" Stocks and Other Similar Devices, 83 FR
7949. The memorandum noted that the Department of Justice had already "started the
process of promulgating a Federal regulation interpreting the definition of 'machinegun'
under Federal law to clarify whether certain bump stock type devices should be illegal."
Id. The President then directed the Department of Justice, working within established
legal protocols, "to dedicate all available resources to complete the review of the
comments received [in response to the ANPRM], and, as expeditiously as possible, to
propose for notice and comment a rule banning all devices that turn legal weapons into
machineguns." Id.
III. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
On March 29, 2018, the Department published in the Federal Register a notice of
proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled "Bump-Stock-Type Devices," 83 FR 13442 (ATF
Docket No. 2017R-22), proposing changes to the regulations in 27 CFR 447.11, 478.11,
and 479.11. The comment period for the proposed rule concluded on June 27, 2018.
A. Prior Inte1pretations of "Single Function of the Trigger" and "Automatically"
In the NPRM, the Department reviewed ATF's history of classifying bump-stocktype devices through agency rulings and relevant litigation. In particular, it described
13
how ATP published ATP Ruling 2006-2, "Classification of Devices Exclusively
Designed to Increase the Rate of Fire of a Semiautomatic Firearm." The ruling explained
that ATP had received requests from "several members of the firearms industry to
classify devices that are exclusively designed to increase the rate of fire of a
semiautomatic firearm." ATP Ruling 2006-2, at I. Prior to issuing ATP Ruling 2006-2,
ATP had examined a device called the "Akins Accelerator." To operate the device, the
shooter initiated an automatic firing sequence by pulling the trigger one time, which in
turn caused the rifle to recoil within the stock, permitting the trigger to lose contact with
the finger and manually reset. Springs in the Akins Accelerator then forced the rifle
forward, forcing the trigger against the finger, which caused the weapon to discharge the
ammunition. The recoil and the spring-powered device thus caused the firearm to cycle
back and forth, impacting the trigger finger without further input by the shooter while the
firearm discharged multiple shots. The device was advertised as able to fire
approximately 650 rounds per minute. See id at 2.
ATP initially reviewed the Akins Accelerator in 2002 and determined it not to be
a machinegun because ATP interpreted the statutory term "single function of the trigger"
to refer to a single movement of the trigger. But ATP undertook further review of the
device based on how it actually functioned when sold and later determined that the Akins
Accelerator should be classified as a machinegun. ATP reached that conclusion because
the best interpretation of the phrase "single function of the trigger" includes a "single pull
of the trigger." The Akins Accelerator qualified as a machinegun because ATP
determined through testing that when the device was installed on a semiautomatic rifle
(specifically a Ruger Model I 0-22), it resulted in a weapon that "[with] a single pull of
14
the trigger initiates an automatic firing cycle that continues until the finger is released, the
weapon malfunctions, or the ammunition supply is exhausted." Akins v. United States,
No. 8:08-cv-988, slip op. at 5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
When issuing A TF Ruling 2006-2, ATF set forth a detailed description of the
components and functionality of the Akins Accelerator and devices with similar designs.
The ruling determined that the phrase "single function of the trigger" in the statutory
definition of"machinegun" was best interpreted to mean a "single pull of the trigger."
ATF Ruling 2006-2, at 2 (citing National Firearms Act: Hearings Before the Comm. on
Ways and Means, House ofRepresentatives, Second Session on HR. 9066, 73rd Cong., at
40 ( 1934)). A TF further indicated that this interpretation would apply when the agency
classified devices designed to increase the rate of fire of semiautomatic firearms. Thus,
ATF concluded in ATF Ruling 2006-2 that devices exclusively designed to increase the
rate of fire of semiautomatic firearms were machineguns if, "when activated by a single
pull of the trigger, [such devices] initiate[] an automatic firing cycle that continues until
either the finger is released or the ammunition supply is exhausted." Id at 3. Finally,
because the "single pull of the trigger" interpretation constituted a change from ATF's
prior interpretations of the phrase "single function of the trigger," ATF Ruling 2006-2
concluded that "[t]o the extent previous ATF rulings are inconsistent with this
determination, they are hereby overruled." Id.
Following its reclassification of the Akins Accelerator as a machinegun, ATF
determined and advised owners of Akins Accelerator devices that removal and disposal
of the internal spring-the component that caused the rifle to slide forward in the stock-
15
would render the device a non-machinegun under the statutory definition. Thus, a
possessor could retain the device by removing and disposing of the spring, in lieu of
destroying or surrendering the device.
In May 2008, the inventor of the Akins Accelerator filed a lawsuit challenging
ATF's classification of his device as a machinegun, claiming the agency's decision was
arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Akins v. United
States, No. 8:08-cv-988, slip op. at 7-8 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2008). The United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected the plaintiffs challenge, holding
that ATF was within its authority to reconsider and change its interpretation of the phrase
"single function of the trigger" in the NFA's statutory definition of"machinegun." Id. at
14. The court further held that the language of the statute and the legislative history
supported ATF's interpretation of the statutory phrase "single function of the trigger" as
synonymous with "single pull of the trigger." Id. at 11-12. The court concluded that in
A TF Ruling 2006-2, ATF had set forth a "reasoned analysis" for the application of that
new interpretation to the Akins Accelerator and similar devices, including the need to
"protect the public from dangerous firearms." Id. at 12.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision, holding that "[t]he interpretation by the Bureau that the phrase 'single
function of the trigger' means a 'single pull of the trigger' is consonant with the statute
and its legislative history." Akins, 312 F. App'x at 200. The Eleventh Circuit further
concluded that "[b]ased on the operation of the Accelerator, the Bureau had the authority
to 'reconsider and rectify' what it considered to be a classification error." Id.
16
In ten letter rulings between 2008 and 2017, ATF applied the "single pull of the
trigger" interpretation to other bump-stock-type devices. Like the Akins Accelerator,
these other bump-stock-type devices allowed the shooter to fire more than one shot with a
single pull of the trigger. However, ATF ultimately concluded that these devices did not
qualify as machineguns because, in ATF's view, they did not "automatically" shoot more
than one shot with a single pull of the trigger. ATF also applied its "single pull of the
trigger" interpretation to other trigger actuators, two-stage triggers, and other devices
submitted to ATF for classification. Depending on the method of operation, some such
devices were classified to be machineguns that were required to be registered in the
National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record (NFRTR) and could not be
transferred or possessed, except in limited circumstances, under 18 U.S.C. 922(o). 4
4
Examples of recent ATF classification letters relying on the "single pull of the trigger" interpretation to
classify submitted devices as machineguns include the following:
•
•
On April 13, 2015, ATF issued a classification letter regarding a device characterized as a
"positive reset trigger," designed to be used on a semiautomatic AR-style rifle. The device
consisted of a support/stock, secondaiy trigger, secondary trigger link, pivot toggle, shuttle link,
and shuttle. ATF determined that, after a single pull of the trigger, the device utilized recoil
energy generated from firing a projectile to fire a subsequent projectile. ATF noted that "a 'single
function of the trigger' is a single pull," and that the device utilized a "single function of the
trigger" because the shooter need not release the trigger to fire a subsequent projectile, and instead
"can maintain constant pressure through a single function of the trigger."
On October 7, 2016, ATF issued a classification letter regarding two devices described as "LV-15
Trigger Reset Devices." The devices, which were designed to be used on an AR-type rifle, were
essentially identical in design and function and were submitted by the same requester (per the
requester, the second device included "small improvements that have come as the result of further
development since the original submission"). The devices were each powered by a rechargeable
batte1y and included the following components: a self-contained trigger mechanism with an
electrical connection, a modified two-position semiautomatic AR-15 type selector lever, a
rechargeable battery pack, a grip assembly/trigger guard with electrical connections, and a piston
that projected forward through the lower rear portion of the trigger guard and pushed the trigger
forward as the firearm cycled. ATF held that "to initiate the firing ... a shooter must simply pull
the trigger." It explained that although the mechanism pushed the trigger forward, "the shooter
never releases the trigger. Consistent with [the requester's] explanation, ATF demonstrated that
the device fired multiple projectiles with a "single function of the trigger" because a single pull
was all that was required to initiate and maintain a firing sequence.
17
In the NPRM, the Department also noted that prior ATF rulings concerning
bump-stock-type devices did not provide substantial or consistent legal analysis regarding
the meaning of the term "automatically," as it is used in the NFA and GCA. For
example, A TF Ruling 2006-2 concluded that devices like the Akins Accelerator initiated
an "automatic" firing cycle because, once initiated by a single pull of the trigger, "the
automatic firing cycle continues until the finger is released or the ammunition supply is
exhausted." ATF Ruling 2006-2, at I. In contrast, other ATF letter rulings between 2008
and 2017 concluded that bump-stock-type devices that enable a semiautomatic firearm to
shoot more than one shot with a single function of the trigger by harnessing a
combination of the recoil and the maintenance of pressure by the shooter do not fire
"automatically." Of the rulings issued between 2008 and 2017, A TF provided different
explanations for why certain bump-stock-type devices were not machineguns, but none of
them extensively examined the meaning of"automatically." For instance, some letter
rulings concluded that certain devices were not machineguns because they did not
"initiate[] an automatic firing cycle that continues until either the finger is released or the
ammunition supply is exhausted," without further defining the term "automatically."
E.g., Letter for Michael Smith from ATF's Firearm Technology Branch Chicf(April 2,
2012). Other letter rulings concluded that certain bump-stock-type devices were not
machineguns because they lacked any "automatically functioning mechanical parts or
springs and perform[ ed] no mechanical function[ s] when installed," again without further
defining the term "automatically" in this context. E.g., Letter for David Compton from
ATF's Firearm Technology Branch Chief(June 7, 2010).
B. Re-evaluation of Bump-Stock-Type Devices
18
In the NPRM, the Department reviewed the functioning of semiautomatic
firearms, describing that ordinarily, to operate a semiautomatic firearm, the shooter must
repeatedly pull and release the trigger to allow it to reset, so that only one shot is fired
with each pull of the trigger. 83 FR at 13443. It then explained that bump-stock-type
devices, like the ones used in Las Vegas, are designed to channel recoil energy to
increase the rate of fire of semiautomatic firearms from a single trigger pull. Id.
Shooters can maintain a continuous firing cycle after a single pull of the trigger by
directing the recoil energy of the discharged rounds into the space created by the sliding
stock.(approximately 1.5 inches) in constrained linear rearward and forward paths. Id
These bump-stock-type devices are generally designed to operate with the shooter
shouldering the stock of the device (in essentially the same manner a shooter would use
an unmodified semiautomatic shoulder stock), maintaining constant forward pressure
with the non-trigger hand on the barrel-shroud or fore-grip of the rifle, and maintaining
the trigger finger on the device's ledge with constant rearward pressure. Id. The device
itself then harnesses the recoil energy of the firearm, providing the primary impetus for
automatic fire. Id
In light of its reassessment of the relevant statutory terms "single· function of the
trigger" and "automatically," the NPRM stated ATF's conclusion that bump-stock-type
devices are "machineguns" as defined in the NF A because they convert an otherwise
semiautomatic firearm into a machinegun by functioning as a self-acting or selfregulating mechanism that, after a single pull of the trigger, harnesses the recoil energy of
the semiautomatic firearm in a manner that allows the trigger to reset and continue firing
without additional physical manipulation of the trigger by the shooter. Hence, a
19
semiautomatic firearm to which a bump-stock-type device is attached is able to produce
automatic fire with a single pull of the trigger.
C. Proposed Definition of "Single Function of the Trigger"
The Department proposed to interpret the phrase "single function of the trigger"
to mean "a single pull of the trigger," as it considered it the best interpretation of the
statute and because it reflected ATF's position since 2006. The Supreme Court in Staples
v. United States, 511 U.S. 600,602 n.1 (1994), indicated that a machinegun within the
NFA "fires repeatedly with a single pull of the trigger." This interpretation is also
consistent with how the phrase "single function of the trigger" was understood at the time
of the NF A's enactment in 1934. For instance, in a congressional hearing leading up to
the NFA's enactment, the National Rifle Association's then-president testified that a gun
"which is capable of firing more than one shot by a single pull of the trigger, a single
function of the trigger, is properly regarded, in my opinion, as a machine gun." National
Firearms Act: Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means, HR. 9066, 73rd
Cong., 2nd Sess., at 40 (1934). Furthermore, and as noted above, the Eleventh Circuit in
Akins concluded that ATF's interpretation of"single function of the trigger" to mean a
"single pull of the trigger" "is consonant with the statute and its legislative history." 312
F. App'x at 200. No other court has held otherwise. 5
5
The NPRM also explained that the term "pull" can be analogized to "push" and other terms that describe
activation of a trigger. For instance, ATF used the term "pull" in classifying the Akins Accelerator
because that was the manner in which the firearm's trigger was activated with the device. But the courts
have made clear that whether a trigger is operated through a "pull," "push," or some other action such as a
flipping a switch, does not change the analysis of the functionality ofa firearm. For example, in United
States v. Fleischli, 305 F.3d 643, 655-56 (7th Cir. 2002), the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that a
switch did not constitute a trigger for purposes of assessing whether a firearm was a machinegun under the
NFA, because such an interpretation of the statute would lead to "the absurd result of enabling persons to
avoid the NF A simply by using weapons that employ a button or switch mechanism for firing." See also
United States v. Camp, 343 F.3d 743, 745 (5th Cir. 2003) ('"To construe "trigger" to mean only a small
20
D. Proposed Definition of "Automatically"
The Department also proposed to interpret the term "automatically" to mean "as
the result of a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that allows the firing of multiple
rounds through a single pull of the trigger." That interpretation reflects the ordinary
meaning of that term at the time of the NFA's enactment in 1934. The word
"automatically" is the adverbial form of "automatic," meaning "[h]aving a self-acting or
self-regulating mechanism that performs a required act at a predetermined point in an
operation[.]" Webster's New International Dictionary 187 (2d ed. 1934); see also I
Oxford English Dictionary 574 (I 933) (defining "Automatic" as "[s]elf-acting under
conditions fixed for it, going of itself."),
Relying on these definitions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit interpreted the term "automatically" as used in the NFA as "delineat[ing] how the
discharge of multiple rounds from a weapon occurs: as the result of a self-acting
mechanism ... set in motion by a single function of the trigger and ... accomplished
without manual reloading." United States v. Olofson, 563 F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir. 2009).
So long as the firearm is capable of producing multiple rounds with a single pull of the
Lrigger until the trigger finger is removed, the ammunition supply is exhausted, or the
firearm malfunctions, the firearm shoots "automatically" irrespective of why the firing
sequence ultimately ends. Id. ("[T]he reason a weapon ceased firing is not a matter with
which§ 5845(b) is concerned."). Olo/iYm thus requires only that the weapon shoot
lever moved by a finger would be to impute to Congress the intent to restrict the term to apply only to one
kind of trigger, albeit a very common kind. The language [in 18 U.S.C. 922(0)] implies no intent to so
restrict the meaning[.]'" (quoting United States v. Joke/, 969 F.2d 132, 135 (5th Cir. 1992) (emphasis
removed))). Examples ofmachineguns that operate through a trigger activated by a push include the
Browning design, M2 .50 caliber, the Vickers, the Maxim, and the Ml34 hand-fired Minigun.
21
multiple rounds with a single function of the trigger "as the result of a self-acting
mechanism," not that the self-acting mechanism produces the firing sequence without any
additional action by the shooter. This definition accordingly requires that the self-acting
or self-regulating mechanism allows the firing of multiple rounds through a single
function of the trigger.
E. Proposed Clarification That the D~finition of "Machinegun" Includes Bump-Stock-
Type Devices
The Department also proposed, based on the interpretations discussed above, to
clarify that the term "machinegun" includes a device that allows a semiautomatic firearm
to shoot more than one shot with a single pull of the trigger by harnessing the recoil
energy of the semiautomatic firearm to which it is affixed so that the trigger resets and
continues firing without additional physical manipulation of the trigger by the shooter.
The Department explained that when a shooter who has affixed a bump-stock-type device
to a semiautomatic firearm pulls the trigger, that movement initiates a firing sequence
that produces more than one shot. And that firing sequence is "automatic" because the
device harnesses the firearm's recoil energy in a continuous back-and-forth cycle that
allows the shooter to attain continuous firing after a single pull of the trigger, so long as
the trigger finger remains stationary on the device's ledge (as designed). Accordingly,
these devices are included under the definition of "machinegun" and, therefore, come
within the purview of the NFA.
F Amendment o/27 CFR 479.11
The regulatory definition of"machine gun" in 27 CFR 479.11 matches the
statutory definition of "machinegun" in the NFA. The definition includes the terms
22
"single function of the trigger" and "automatically," but those terms are not defined in the
statutory text. The NPRM proposed to define these terms in order to clarify the meaning
of"machinegun." Specifically, the Department proposed to amend the definition of
"machine gun" in 27 CFR 479.11 by:
I. defining the term "single function of the trigger" to mean "single pull of the
trigger";
2. defining the term "automatically" to mean "as the result of a self-acting or selfregulating mechanism that allows the firing of multiple rounds through a single pull of
the trigger"; and
3. adding a sentence to clarify that a "machine gun" includes a device that allows
a semiautomatic firearm to shoot more than one shot with a single pull of the trigger by
harnessing the recoil energy of the semiautomatic firearm to which it is affixed so that the
trigger resets and continues firing without additional physical manipulation of the trigger
by the shooter (commonly known as a bump-stock-type device).
G. Amendment o.f27 CFR 478.11
The GCA and its implementing regulations in 27 CFR part 4 78 reference the
NFA's definition ofmachinegun. Accordingly, the NPRM proposed to make the san1e
amendments in 27 CFR 478.11 that were proposed for§ 479.11.
H Amendment o.f 27 CFR 447.11
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended, does not define the term
"machinegun" in its key provision, 22 U.S.C. 2778. 6 However, regulations in 27 CFR
6 Under the AECA, the President has the authority to designate which items are controlled as defense
articles for purposes of importation and exportation. 22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(I). The President has, in turn,
delegated to the Attorney General the authority to promulgate regulations designating the defense articles
controlled for permanent importation, including machineguns.
23
part 44 7 that implement the AECA include a similar definition of "machinegun," and
explain that machineguns, submachineguns, machine pistols, and fully automatic rifles
fall within Category I(b) of the U.S. Munitions Import List when those defense articles
are permanently imported. See 27 CFR 447.11, 447.21. Currently, the definition of
"machinegun" in§ 447.11 provides that "[a] 'machinegun', 'machine pistol',
'submachinegun', or 'automatic rifle' is a firearm originally designed to fire, or capable
of being fired fully automatically by a single pull of the trigger." The NPRM proposed to
harmonize the AECA's regulatory definition ofmachinegun with the definitions in 27
CFR parts 478 and 479, as those definitions would be amended by the proposed rule.
IV. Analysis of Comments and Department Responses for Proposed Rule
In response to the NPRM, A TF received over 186,000 comments. Submissions
came from individuals, including foreign nationals, lawyers, and government officials, as
well as various interest groups. Overall, 119,264 comments expressed support for the
proposed rule, 66,182 comments expressed opposition, and for 657 comments? the
commenter's position could not be determined. The commenters' grounds for support
and opposition, along with specific concerns and suggestions, are discussed below.
A. Comments Generally Supporting the Rule
Comments Received
Of the 119,264 comments received in support of the rule, 14,618 used one form
letter in support of the proposed rule; 51,454 were petitions or petition signatures
compiled by an organization and individuals; and 53,192 were unique comments. Many
of the 53,192 unique comments used repetitious declarations of support or a single
sentence or phrase, declaring, in essence, (I) ban bump stocks now or I support a ban; (2)
24
common sense gun reform or gun control now; (3) bump stocks should be outlawed; or
(4) I fully support this proposed rule. Others supporting the rule expressed disbelief as to
how such devices were legal and that it seemed to be a "no brainer," especially after Las
Vegas, to prevent anyone from possessing an item that allows the shooter to inflict mass
carnage. Several commenters stated that they were present at or knew people who were
directly affected by the Las Vegas shooting and urged finalization of the proposed rule on
bump-stock-type devices. Some commenters identified as active or former military,
while other individuals noted their support for a prohibition on bump-stock-type devices
while identifying as gun owners and gun enthusiasts, strong supporters of the Second
Amendment, or members of a particular pro-gun interest group. For instance, one
commenter wrote, "As an FFL [Federal firearms license] dealer, gun owner and collector,
I am writing to support the ban on the sale of bump stocks." Another explained that he
has been a member of the National Rifle Association (NRA) for over 30 years and loves
hunting and shooting but believes "there is zero justification for bump stocks," because
the "only thing bump stocks are good for is creating a kill zone."
Department Response
The Department acknowledges the commentcrs' support for the proposed rule.
\
The rule clarifies the regulatory definition of "machinegun" to include bump-stock-type
devices, and, therefore, snbjects them to the restrictions imposed by the NFA and GCA.
As 18 U.S.C. 922(0), with limited exceptions, prohibits the possession ofmachineguns
that were not lawfully possessed before the effective date of the statute, current
possessors of bump-stock-type devices will be obligated to cease possessing these
devices.
25
B. Particular Reasons Raised in Support of the Rule
I. Threat to Public Safety
Comments Received
Over 36,000 of the supporting comments expressly cited public safety, saving
lives (or specifically children's lives), reducing gun deaths and future mass shootings, or
protecting law enforcement as the reason for supporting a rule that would restrict
possession of bump-stock-type devices. A majority of these comments, including
submissions from professional medical associations, declared that allowing persons to
modify semiautomatic rifles with bump-stock-type devices so that they operate with a
similar rate of fire as fully automatic rifles poses a substantial risk to public safety and
that the continued presence of these devices puts all communities at risk. Some
commenters said that research shows that nations that have reasonable gun restrictions
experience fewer mass shootings. Additionally, many students and numerous individuals
identified as former or current teachers expressed support for the rule, with some citing
fear that their school could be the next site of a mass shooting or stating that they do not
want to continue seeing their students in constant fear of the next active shooter.
Several conunenters also noted that bump-stock-type devices arc a danger to
police forces, with one commenter, a retired Jaw enforcement officer, declaring that
regulating bump-stock-type devices is an issue of public safety and will save the lives of
those who are in law enforcement. Similarly, other commenters, including a former
military physician, stated that the rapid fire enabled by bump-stock-type devices
significantly increases the casualties in an attack and puts police officers who respond at
greater risk. In light of the Las Vegas shooting, many commenters argued that, given that
26
bump-stock-type devices are easily attainable and inexpensive items, prohibiting these
devices is a needed step to reduce gun deaths or prevent future mass shootings. Many
individuals, including several State and local government officials and gun safety or
public health groups, expressed the urgent need for ATP to finalize the proposed rule in
order to protect the public and children, especially given the frequency of mass shootings
in recent months and the likelihood that a potential perpetrator will seek out these
devices.
Department Response
The Department acknowledges that a bump-stock-type device combined with a
semiautomatic firearm can empower a single individual to take many lives in a single
incident. The reason for the Department's classification change is that ATP, upon review
,'
(discussed in Part III), believes that bump-stock-type devices must be regulated because
they satisfy the statutory definition of "machinegun" in the NFA and GCA. By making
clear that these devices are subject to the restrictions that the NFA and GCA place on
machineguns, this rule reflects the public safety goals of those statutes. Indeed, the
NPRM stated that the Las Vegas tragedy made "individuals aware that these devices
exist-potentially including persons with criminal or terrorist intentions-and made their
potential to threaten public safety obvious." 83 FR at 13447. For further discussion of
benefits, see Part VI.A.
2. Unnecessary for Civilians to Own
Comments Received
Of the total supporting comments, at least 25,135 of the commenters opined that
bump-stock-type devices have no place in civil society and are unnecessary for ordinary
27
persons to own. One of the primary reasons thousands expressed support for the
regulation was their view that bump-stock-type devices have no legitimate uses for
hunting or sporting purposes, target shooting, or self-protection. Many of these
commenters emphasized that the devices cause a decrease in shooter accuracy, and
therefore are not useful for hunting and target shooting, and are inappropriate for use in
self or home defense. For example, one commenter rhetorically stated, "(W]hat law
abiding gun owner who is responsible for every bullet they shoot would want to reduce
their accuracy?" Some of these comm enters further asserted that because the devices
enable rapid but inaccurate fire, they pose a particular risk to large-scale public events,
such as the Las Vegas concert. Many commenters, including those identifying as former
or active military members, commented that only the military or law enforcement should
have access to bump-stock-type devices or that there was no need for civilians to have
access to them.
Department Response
The Department acknowledges supporters' comments on limiting the possession
of bump-stock-type devices to military or law enforcement. Such a limitation is
consistent with the Firearms Owners' Protection Act (FOPA), Pub. L. 99-308, 100 Stat.
449, which makes it unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun that was
not lawfully possessed before the effective date of the statute. FOPA made an exception
for governmental entities, allowing for the "transfer to or by, or possession by or under
the authority of, the United States or any department or agency thereof or a State, or a
department, agency, or political subdivision thereof." 18 U.S.C. 922(o)(2)(A). Congress
provided this exemption because it recognized the necessity for the military and law
28
enforcement to continue to use and possess these types of weapons. This final rule is
consistent with implementing the requirements of the NFA and GCA provisions that
regulate possession of machineguns.
3. Consistent with the Intent of the National Firearms Act
Comments Received
More than 27,000 of the supporting comments urged issuance of the final rule
because bump-stock-type devices and other similar conversion devices were meant to
circumvent the restrictions of the NFA and GCA, as bump-stock-type devices enable
shooters to transform their guns into automatic weapons. Some commenters asserted that
it is useless to have a law against automatic weapons yet allow manufacturers to legally
produce and sell an item with the sole purpose of turning a firearm into an automatic
weapon. Many of these commenters also stated that bump-stock-type devices violate the
spirit of the law and that this loophole should be closed by ATF as quickly as possible.
Further, at least I ,675 of the supporting comments stated that the proposed rule is
consistent with the purposes of the NFA and the intent of Congress. Specifically, these
commenters opined that the regulation "enforces machine gun laws that date back many
decades" and that "it will have the same dramatic benefit originally intended by those
foundational laws."
Department Response
The Department acknowledges supporters' comments that bump-stock-type
devices were meant to circumvent the restrictions of the NFA and GCA. Prior to this
rule, ATF issued classification letters that determined that some bump-stock-type devices
were not "machineguns" as defined by the NFA. Those decisions, however, did not
29
include extensive legal analysis, as described in Part III. Upon reexamining these
classifications, this final rule promulgates definitions for the terms "single function of the
trigger" and "automatically" as those terms are used in the statutory definition of
"machinegun." ATF believes these definitions represent the best interpretation of the
statute. Therefore, recognizing that a bump-stock-type device used with a semiautomatic
firearm enables a shooter to shoot automatically more than one shot by a single function
of the trigger, the purpose of this rule is to clarify that such devices are machineguns
under the NFA.
4 .. Constitutional Under the Second Amendment
Comments Received
More than 2,100 commenters in support of the rule argued that a rule prohibiting
possession of bump-stock-type devices does not conflict with the Second Amendment.
Many opined that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend for these types of
devices, which can inflict mass carnage, to. be protected by the Second Amendment.
Commenters expressed the view that because persons living in the 18th century used
muskets capable of firing only one shot before requiring a long reloading process, our
forefathers would nol have wanted bump-stock-type devices to be readily available.
Other commenters, including those who declared themselves to be strong supporters of
the Second Amendment, stated that prohibiting bump-stock-type devices was consistent
with the Second Amendment.
Several comm enters noted language from the majority opinion in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). There, the Supreme Court declared that the
Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms for traditional lawful
30
purposes such as self-defense and hunting. However, the Court also stated, "Like most
rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone
through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the
right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever
and for whatever purpose." Id. at 626. Commenters further summarized the Court's
conclusions that limitations on the right to keep and carry arms are supported by the
historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of"dangerous and unusual weapons." Id.
at 627. Commenters argued that the Supreme Court's Second Amendment decisions
support the proposed rule.
Department Response
The Department acknowledges supporters' concerns and agrees that regulation of
bump-stock-type devices is permissible under the Second Amendment. For discussion of
the Department's position on the constitutionality of this final rule under the Second
Amendment, see Part IV.D. l.a.
5. Absence of Congressional Action
Comments Received
Over 1,500 comments in support urged action on this final rule by invoking
popular support for responsible gun limitations. Many of these commenters stated this
measure would be a sensible first step for gun safety and that ATF should act where
Congress has not acted. One gun safety organization noted that while congressional
measures have stalled, ATF is doing what it can to refine rules. At least 1,300
commenters indicated that ATF should choose saving children and the public welfare
over the interests of the gun industry and pro-gun organizations, naming in particular the
31
NRA. One commenter wrote, "It's time we quit cow-towing [sic] to the NRA and
considered all the rest of us and our children especially. Being afraid to go to school is
unAmerican which is what the insistence by the NRA on no gun control is unAmerican." Many supporting commenters echoed these sentiments.
Department Response
In light of the legal analysis of the term "machinegun" set forth above, the
Department agrees with commenters that it is necessary to clarify that the term
"machinegun" includes bump-stock-type devices. Congress granted the Attorney
General authority to issue rules to administer the NFA and GCA, and the Attorney
General has delegated to ATF the authority to administer and enforce these statutes and
to implement the related regulations accordingly. The Department and ATF have
initiated this rulemaking to clarify the regulatory interpretation of the NFA and GCA.
C. Comments Generally Opposing the Rule
Comments Received
A total of 66,182 comments were received that opposed the rule. Approximately
40,806 of those comments were form submissions by the National Association for Gun
Rights (NAGR) on behalf of its members, with 25,874 submitted on paper petitions and
14,932 submitted by facsimile. The remaining 25,376 opposing comments were
individually submitted. Many of the commenters identified as lawyers, judges, industry
groups, or members of law enforcement or the military. There were several commenters
who stated they did not own or had no interest in owning a bump-stock-type device but
still objected to the rule on various grounds, including that it is unconstitutional and only
punishes law-abiding owners of bump-stock-type devices. Of the 25,376 comments
32
individually submitted, 12,636 used one of three form letters; the remaining 12,740 were
unique comments. A majority of these commenters raised specific, detailed objections to
the agency's proposal and the premise upon which the regulation is based, whereas
several hundred of the unique comments were limited to a few sentences opposing the
regulation without further detail. For example, these types of comments simply declared,
in essence, (I) no ban, or a ban is unnecessary; (2) individuals' Second Amendment
rights should not be infringed; or (3) I oppose any additional gun regulations.
Department Response
The Department acknowledges the commenters' objections to the proposed rule
but disagrees with assertions that the rule infringes on the constitutional right to keep and
bear arms and punishes law-abiding gun owners. The Department believes that bumpstock-type devices satisfy the definition of"machinegun" under the NFA and GCA and
that this final rule reflects the public safety goals of the NFA and GCA. The Department
thoroughly considered the various issues raised in opposition to the rule, which are
discussed below.
D. Spec/fie Issues Raised in Opposition to the Rule
1. Constitutional and Statutory Arguments
a. Violates the Second Amendment
Comments Received
A total of 16,051 of the commenters opposed the rule on the ground that it
violates the Second Amendment. Of these, 11,753 used a form letter stating that the
"regulations dismiss Second Amendment protections, by appealing to the Heller court
decision. But the Constitution trumps the Supreme Court -- so when the Second
33
Amendment says the right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, any limitation of
the right for law-abiding citizens should be treated as unconstitutional[.]" Many
commenters, including those identifying as former or active law enforcement or military
members, echoed these sentiments by declaring that the proposed rule infringes on the
rights oflaw-abiding gun owners, and that the phrasing of the Second Amendment"shall not be infringed"-strictly limits or negates the ability of Government to impose
any regulations on firearms. One commenter, for instance, argued that the Second
Amendment's reference to a "well-regulated Militia" includes unorganized militia, which
•
the commenter interpreted to mean any person who owns a gun. Because the military has
automatic weapons, the commenter reasoned that the people-as the unorganized
militia-are likewise constitutionally entitled to access such weapons.
Numerous commenters cited the Supreme Court's decision in Heller, 554 U.S.
570, which declared that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear
arms. Commenters also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Caetano v.
Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (per curiam), stating that this decision makes clear
that weapons in "common use" cannot be banned. One commenter pointed out that if
bump-stock-type devices are now machineguns, then there are an additional 519,927
machineguns that are currently owned typically by law-abiding citizens for lawful
purposes. This amount, the commenter argued, surpasses the 200,000 stun guns found to
trigger a "common use" analysis in Caetano, meaning that such items cannot be banned
unless they are both dangerous and unusual. Further, commenters said that Caetano
stands for the proposition that any advancement in weaponry is still protected under the
Second Amendment. They argued that the Court declared "the Second Amendment
34
extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were
not in existence at the time of the founding" and that its protection is not limited to only
those weapons useful in warfare. Id. at I 027 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Department Response
The Department does not believe that the proposed regulation violates the Second
Amendment. The Supreme Court has indicated, and several lower courts have squarely
held, that the Second Amendment does not protect a right to possess a machinegun.
Because bump-stock-type devices are machinegun conversion devices that qualify as
"machineguns" under Federal law, see supra Part III.E., prohibiting them does not violate
the Second Amendment.
"Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited."
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; accord McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010). In
Heller, for example, the Supreme Court recognized an "important limitation on the right
to keep and carry arms": "the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of'dangerous
and unusual weapons."' 554 U.S. at 627. More specifically, and importantly for
purposes of this rulemaking, the Court explicitly described machine guns as the kind of
dangerous and unusual weapons not protected by the Second Amendment. In the course
of explaining the Court's holding in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)
(upholding Federal prohibition of short-barreled shotguns), the Court noted that a portion
of Miller could be "(r]ead in isolation" to "mean that only those weapons useful in
warfare are protected" by the Second Amendment. Heller, 554 U.S. at 624. But "[t]hat
would be a startling reading of the opinion," the Court continued, "since it would mean
that the National Firearms Act's restrictions on machineguns ... might be
35
unconstitutional, machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939." Id Heller thus made
clear that machineguns, like short-barreled shotguns, are "weapons not typically
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes," and thus fall outside the scope of
the Second Amendment as historically understood. Id at 625; see also id at 627
(accepting that M-16 rifles are dangerous and unusual weapons that may be banned).
In the decade since Heller was decided, lower courts have consistently upheld
prohibitions ofmachineguns. Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436,451 (5th Cir. 2016)
(upholding Federal statute banning possession ofmachineguns because they are
"dangerous and unusual and therefore not in common use"); United States ,v. Henry, 688
F.3d 637,640 (9th Cir. 2012); Hamblen v. United States, 591 F.3d 471,472,474 (6th Cir.
2009); United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Heller v.
Dist. o_[Columbia (Heller JI), 670 F.3d 1244, 1270 (D.C. Cir.2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) ("fully automatic weapons, also known as machine guns, have traditionally
been banned and may continue to be banned after Heller"); United States v. Marzzarella,
614 F.3d 85, 94-95 (3d Cir. 2010) ("the Supreme Court has made clear the Second
Amendment does not protect" machineguns and short-barreled shotguns).
This body of precedent, in addition to Heller, strongly supports the Department's
view that a bump-stock-type device, as a machinegun conversion device qualifying as a
"machinegun" under Federal law, is not protected by the Second Amendment. What
makes a machinegun a "dangerous and unusual weapon" unprotected by the Second
Amendment is its capacity to fire automatically, see, e.g., Henry, 688 F.3d at 640, which
"puts the machine gun on a different plane" than other firearms, United States v. Kirk,
105 F.3d 997, 1002 (5th Cir. 1997) (en bane) (opinion of Higginbotham, J.). Bump-
36
stock-type devices qualify as machineguns, as discussed above, because they enable an
otherwise semiautomatic firearm to fire automatically. Since they bear the same key
characteristic that makes traditional machineguns "dangerous and unusual," bump-stocktype devices are unprotected by the Second Amendment for the same reason.
This conclusion is fully consistent with Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct.
1027. In Caetano, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had upheld a State
prohibition of stun guns on the grounds that stun guns were not in common use when the
Second Amendment was ratified and are not useful in military operations. See id at
1027-28. The Supreme Court summarily vacated this ruling because neither of the State
court's premises was valid: Heller made a "clear statement that the Second Amendment
'extends ... to ... arms ... that were not in existence at the time of the founding,"' and
"rejected the proposition 'that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected."' Id
at 1028 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582, 624-25). The Department's conclusion in this
rulemaking that the Second Amendment does not protect bump-stock-type devices rests
on neither of the propositions rejected by Caetano. As discussed above, the Department
believes that this rule comports with the Second Amendment because bump-stock-type
devices qualify as machineguns, which are not constitutionally protected-not because
bump-stock-type devices did not exist in 1791 or are not useful in warfare. Moreover,
although the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ultimately held that stun guns are
protected under the Second Amendment in Ramirez v. Commonwealth, 94 N.E.3d 809
(2018), the court did not suggest that more dangerous weapons, like machineguns and
machinegun conversion devices, are also protected. The court acknowledged that a stun
37
gun is even "less lethal than a handgun," id at 817, the weapon that the Supreme Court
expressly held to be protected in Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
b. Violates the Fifth Amendment
i. Violates Due Process Clause - Entrapment
Comments Received
At least one commenter, a gun-rights nonprofit organization, argued that ATF's
change of position constitutes unconstitutional entrapment. It maintained that ATF's past
classification letters, which informed the public that certain bump-stock-type devices
were not subject to the NFA or GCA, invited the public to rely on its consistent decisions
and acquire such items. With the sudden change of position, the organization asserted,
ATF seeks to entrap citizens who have simply purchased a federally approved firearm
accessory. Citing Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 367, 376 (1958), the organization
argued that it is "unconstitutional for the Government to beguile an individual 'into
committing crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted."' Further, it argued
that at least some 520,000 law-abiding citizens could be criminals who could face up to
ten years' imprisonment "without even receiving individual notice of ATF's reversal of
position."
Department Response
The Department disagrees that the final rule amounts to entrapment. Entrapment
is a complete defense to a criminal charge on the theory that "Government agents may
not originate a criminal design, implant in an innocent person's mind the disposition to
commit a criminal act, and then induce commission of the crime so that the Government
may prosecute." Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548 (1992). A valid
38
entrapment defense has two related elements: (I) government inducement of the crime,
and (2) the defendant's lack of predisposition to engage in the criminal conduct.
Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988).
As described above, ATF has now concluded that it misclassified some bumpstock-type devices and therefore initiated this rulemaking pursuant to the requirements of
the APA. An agency is entitled to correct its mistakes. See Williams Gas Processing-
Gulf Coast Co. v. FERC, 475 F.3d 319,326 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("[I]t is well understood that
[a]n agency is free to discard precedents or practices it no longer believes correct. Indeed
we expect that an[ ] agency may well change its past practices with advances in
knowledge in its given field or as its relevant experience and expertise expands. If an
agency decides to change course, however, we require it to supply a reasoned analysis
indicating that prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually
ignored."). This rulemaking procedure is specifically designed to notify the public about
changes in ATF's interpretation of the NFA and GCA and to help the public avoid the
unlawful possession of a machinegun. It is important to note that at no time did A TF
induce any member of the public to commit a crime. The ANPRM, NPRM, and this final
rule have followed the statutory process for ensuring that the public is aware of the
correct classification of bump-stock-type devices under the law, and that continued
possession of such devices is prohibited. Anyone currently in possession of a bumpstock-type device is not acting unlawfully unless they fail to relinquish or destroy their
device after the effective date of this regulation.
39
ii. Violates Takings Clause and Due Process Clause
Comments Received
Over 1,200 commenters objected that the rule will violate the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, which provides "private property [shall not] be taken for public
use, without just compensation." Some commenters said that the Takings Clause requires
the Government to compensate manufacturers for their present and future loss of
revenues. Many other commenters further indicated that the Government would owe
compensation to owners of bump-stock-type devices because the Government would
effectively be taking personal property for public safety, which is a form of public use.
They cited Horne v. Department ofAgriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2015), for the
proposition that mandating relinquishment of property constitutes a physical taking and
requires compensation. One commenter contrasted this rule with the regulation at issue
in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), which prohibited the commercial sale of eagle
body parts gathered before 1940. The commenter observed that the Supreme Court held
the eagle-part regulation was not a regulatory taking because it did not compel the
surrender of the body parts and imposed no physical invasion or restraint upon them. Id
at 65-66. By contrast, the commenter noted, owners of bump-stock-type devices under
the regulation would be compelled to surrender their devices or face criminal penalties.
Several commenters also stated that "for this regulation to be Constitutional each
and every owner of a bump stock, or other devices captured in this regulation not yet
named, must be given their day in court to present evidence and an argument as to why
their property shouldn't be taken without compensation at a minimum."
40
Many commenters separately opined that the Department did not include the cost
of compensation in its cost-benefit analysis and several proposed estimated costs of such
compensation. Those comments are addressed in Part IV.I.I.
Department Response
The Department does not agree that classifying bump-stock-type devices as
machineguns results in the unlawful taking of property "for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V. It is well established that "the nature of the
[government's] action is critical in takings analysis." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,488 (1987); accord Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City ofNew
York, 438 U.S. I 04, 124 (1978) ("character of the government action" has "particular
significance"). The Department's action here, classifying bump-stock-type devices as
machineguns subject to the NFA and GCA, does not have the nature of a taking.
A restriction on "contraband or noxious goods" and dangerous articles by the
government to protect public safety and welfare "has not been regarded as a taking for
public use for which compensation must be paid." Acadia Tech., Inc. v. United States,
458 F.3d 1327, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also United States v. $7,990.00 in US.
Currency, 170 F.3d 843, 845 (8th Cir. 1999) ("forfeiture of contraband is an exercise of
the government's police power" and does not qualify as a taking). 7 The Takings Clause
was "not intended as a limitation of the exercise of those police powers which are
necessary to the tranquility of every well-ordered community, nor of that general power
7
In the takings context, the use of the term "police power" in connection with Federal regulation does not
posit the existence of a "plenary police power" at the Federal level. Cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 566 (1995). Rather, it refers to "the power of the federal government to engage," pursuant to one or
more of its enumerated powers, "in activities not unlike those engaged in by the states under their inherent
sovereign powers" to protect the public welfare. Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d !560,
1568 n.17 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
41
over private property which is necessary for the orderly existence of all governments. It
has always been held that the legislature may make police regulations, although they may
interfere with the full enjoyment of private property, and though no compensation is
given." Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561,594 (1906) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Holliday Amusement Co. of Charleston v. South
Carolina, 493 F.3d 404, 409-1 I (4th Cir. 2007) (upholding State prohibition of video
gaming machines without compensation).
In Mug/er v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887), for example, the Supreme
Court rejected a distiller's argument that a State constitutional amendment prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors was an unconstitutional taking. The Court
explained that the government's power to prohibit the "use by individuals of their
property, as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is not,
and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be, burdened
with the condition that the state must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary
losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their
property, to inflict injury upon the community." Id at 669. Similarly, the Supreme Court
held in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (I 928), that Virginia was not required to
compensate owners of red cedar trees for the value of trees that the State had ordered
destroyed to prevent the spread of a disease that threatened local apple orchards.
"[W]here the public interest is involved," the Court observed, "preferment of that interest
over the property interest of the individual, to the extent even of its destruction, is one of
the distinguishing characteristics of every exercise of the police power which affects
property." Id at 279-80. Lower courts have likewise deemed the Takings Clause
42
inapplicable to governmental regulation of dangerous personal property for public-safety
reasons. See, e.g., Garcia v. Vil!. of Tijeras, 767 P.2d 355 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (village
ordinance banning possession of pit bulls was "a proper exercise of the Village's police
power" and not a taking).
Consistent with these cases, courts have rejected arguments that restrictions on the
possession of dangerous firearms, like machineguns, are takings requiring just
compensation. In Akins v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 619 (2008), for example, the Court
of Federal Claims held that ATF's ultimate classification of the Akins Accelerator as a
machinegun, see supra Part III, was not a taking. The court reasoned that ATF had acted
"pursuant to the police power conferred on it by Congress" rather than by exercising
eminent domain, and that the plaintiff lacked a sufficient property interest because he had
"voluntarily entered an area subject to pervasive federal regulation-the manufacture and
sale of firearms." Id. at 623-24; see also Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442,452 (1996)
("The government may not be required to compensate an owner for property which it has
already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmental authority other than the
power of eminent domain."). Similar reasoning led the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals lo hold that a D.C. law prohibiting machineguns and requiring their disposal or
removal was not a taking. Fesjian v. Jefferson, 399 A.2d 861, 865-66 (1979). These
precedents support the Department's conclusion that the prohibition of bump-stock-type
devices as machineguns does not have the character of a compensable taking within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
The Department acknowledges that a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit recently upheld a preliminary injunction against the Attorney General of
43
California that relied in part on the Takings Clause in prohibiting the State from
implementing restrictions on firearm magazines that hold more than 10 rounds. Duncan
v. Becerra, No. 17-56081, 2018 WL 3433828 (9th Cir. July 17, 2018). The Ninth
Circuit's order essentially adopted the district court's analysis of the Takings Clause
question. See id. at *3. The district court's reasoning on the takings question was closely
intertwined with the Second Amendment inquiry, and rested on the conclusion that it was
"dubious" for California to deem large-capacity magazines a public nuisance given the
Supreme Court's observation that "[g]uns in general are not deleterious devices or
products or obnoxious waste materials." Duncan v. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1137
(S.D. Cal. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Staples v. United States, 511
U.S. 600,610 (1994)). But regulation of bump-stock-type devices is fundamentally
distinguishable from California's prohibition on possessing such magazines. As
discussed, and as Heller indicates, dangerous and unusual weapons are not entitled to
Second Amendment protection, and may indeed qualify as deleterious devices or
contraband. Other district courts have followed the reasoning of cases like Akins and
Fesjian and rejected takings challenges to California firearm restrictions. See Rupp v.
Becerra, 2018 WL 2138452, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2018) (restrictions on "assault
weapons"); Wiese v. Becerra, 263 F. Supp. 3d 986, 995 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (prohibition of
large-capacity gun magazines).
Finally, the Department does not agree that each owner of a bump-stock-type
device has a due-process right to a hearing in connection with the promulgation of this
rule. The rule clarifies the scope of the NFA and GCA, general legislative enactments,
with respect to bump-stock-type devices. "Official action that is legislative in nature is
44
not subject to the notice and hearing requirements of the due process clause." Interport
Pilots Agency, Inc. v. Sammis, 14 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 1994); see also, e.g., Bi-Metallic
Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441,445 (1915) ("General statutes within
the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to
the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard."). Furthermore, the
Department's conclusion that bump-stock-type devices are machineguns under the NFA
and GCA means that owners lack a cognizable property interest in these devices for dueprocess purposes. As the Fifth Circuit held in Cooper v. City of Greenwood, firearms
covered by the NFA are "contraband per se," and "[c]ourts will not entertain a claim
contesting the confiscation of contraband per se because one cannot have a property right
in that which is not subject to legal possession." 904 F.2d 302, 305 (1990).
c. Violates Ex Post Facto Clause and Bill of Attainder Clause
Comments Received
Numerous commenters asserted that the proposed rule would violate article I,
section 9, clause 3 of the Constitution, which states, "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
Law shall be passed." One gun-rights nonprofit organization, quoting United States v.
0 'Neal, 180 F.3d 115, 122 (4th Cir. 1999), stated that even though this is a regulatory
action, the "sanction or disability it imposes is 'so punitive in fact' that the law 'may not
legitimately be viewed as civil in nature."'
Another commenter, the Maryland Shall Issue organization, argued that ATF's
reliance on 18 U.S.C. 922(0) creates an impermissible ex post facto law because current
owners and manufacturers of bump-stock-type devices "became felons as of the date and
time they took possession of a bump stock, even though such possession and manufacture
45
was then expressly permitted by prior ATF interpretations." The commenter cited Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,390 (1798), and Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530
(2013), to support its arguments. It argued that the ex post facto issue can be avoided by
holding that the exemption in 18 U.S.C. 922(o)(2)(A) applies where bump-stock-type
devices are possessed under "the authority" of prior ATF rulings. Furthermore, the
commenter, citing Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204,208 (1988),
stated that the Supreme Court has held that an agency cannot engage in retroactive
rulemaking without specific congressional authorization. Relying on Fernandez-Vargas
v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 36 (2006), the commenter stated there is no question that the
proposed rule has a retroactive effect because the rule would "affect" existing rights and
impose new liabilities on the past and continued possession of bump-stock-type devices.
At least one commenter argued the rule is an unconstitutional bill of attainder
because the rule restricts particular brands of stocks, per the Department's definition,
while not at the same time restricting all brands of stocks. Similarly, another commenter
stated the regulation appears punitive in nature, and abusively narrow in targeting Slide
Fire, a seller of bump-stock-type devices that has already announced the close of its
business.
Department Response
The Department disagrees that the proposed rule violates the Ex Post Facto or Bill
of Attainder Clauses. The rule would criminalize only future conduct, not past
possession of bump-stock-type devices that ceases by the effective date of this rule. In
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), the Supreme Court set out four types oflaws
that violate the Ex Post Facto Clause:
46
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law,
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.
2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts
a greater punishment, than the Jaw annexed to the crime, when committed.
4th. Every Jaw that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives Jess, or
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission
of the offence, in order to convict the offender.
Id. at 390. Citing Calder, the Supreme Court has explained that "[t]o fall within the ex
post facto prohibition, a law must be retrospective-that is, it must apply to events
occurring before its enactment-·and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it by
altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime."
Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433,441 (1997) (emphasis added; citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). The Federal courts have thus been careful to distinguish
statutes and regulations that violate the Ex Post Facto Clause from those that criminalize
only future conduct and are therefore not "retrospective," including in the firearms
possession context. For example, following passage of the Lautenberg Amendment (18
U.S.C. 922(g)(9)), which made it unlawful for persons convicted of a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence to possess a firearm, several defendants argued that the law violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause. One defendant argued that he had a prior conviction for a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, but lawfully possessed a firearm before 18
U.S.C. 922(g)(9) became law. United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2000).
The defendant argued that, as applied to him, the statute violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause because the new law penalized him for his previous domestic violence conviction.
However, the Fourth Circuit disagreed, noting that "[i]t is immaterial that Mitchell's
firearm purchase and domestic violence conviction occurred prior to § 922(g)(9)'s
enactment because the conduct prohibited by § 922(g)(9) is the possession of a firearm."
47
Id at 322; see also United States v. Pfeifer, 371 F.3d 430, 436-37 (8th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Meade, 986 F. Supp. 66, 69 (D. Mass. 1997), qff'd, I 75 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. I 999);
United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 290-91 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Gillies, 851
F.2d 492, 495-96 (1st Cir. 1988) (Breyer, J.); United States v. D'Angelo, 819 F.2d 1062,
1065-66 (I I th Cir. 1987).
This rule brings clarity to the meaning of"machinegun," and makes clear that
individuals are subject to criminal liability only for possessing bump-stock-type devices
qfier the effective date of regulation, not for possession before that date. No action taken
before the effective date of the regulation is affected under the rule. Although regulating
past possession of a firearm may implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause, regulating the
continued or future possession of a firearm that is already possessed does not. See
Benedetto v. Sessions, No. CCB-17-0058; 2017 WL 4310089, at *5 (D. Md. Sept. 27,
2017) ("Whether a gun was purchased before the challenged law was enacted ... is
immaterial to whether the challenged law regulates conduct that occurred before or after
its enactment."); see also Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188, 193 (1925) (rejecting Ex
Post Facto Clause challenge to statute that prohibited the post-enactment possession of
intoxicating liquor, even when the liquor was lawfully acquired before the statute's
enactment). For this reason, the Department disagrees with commenters' assertions that
the rule violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Relatedly, the Department also disagrees with the view that 18 U.S.C.
922(o)(2)(A) provides the authority to permit continued possession of bump-stock-type
devices "under the authority" of prior ATF rulings. Section 922( o)(2)(A) is inapplicable
because, among other reasons, ATF's letter rulings regarding bump-stock-type devices
48
did not purpo1t to authorize the possession of devices qualifying as machineguns under
section 922(0)(!); instead, ATF advised individuals that certain devices did not qualify as
machineguns in the first place, a position that ATF has now reconsidered. Furthermore,
section 922(o )(2)(A) does not empower ATF to freely grant exemptions from section
922's general prohibition ofmachineguns.
The Department also disagrees that the proposed rule c6nstitutes a bill of
attainder. The Supreme Court has highlighted the fact that the Bill of Attainder Clause
applies only to Congress, noting that "[t]he distinguishing feature of a bill of attainder is
the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt." De Veau v.
Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (emphasis added). The Court has also described a bill
of attainder as "a Jaw that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an
identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial." Nixon v.
Adm 'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Bill
of Attainder Clause does not apply "to regulations promulgated by an executive agency."
Paradissiotis v. Rubin, 171 F.3d 983, 988-89 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Walmer v. US. Dep't
of D~fense, 52 F.3d 851, 855 (I 0th Cir. 1995) ("The bulk of authority suggests that the
conslilulional prohibition against bills of attainder applies to legislative acts, not to
regulatory actions of administrative agencies.")); see also Korte v. Office of Personnel
Mgmt, 797 F.2d 967,972 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Marshall v. Sawyer, 365 F.2d 105, 111 (9th
Cir. 1966). Even if the proposed rule were subject to the Bill of Attainder Clause, it
would pass constitutional muster. The fact that Slide Fire announced the close of its
business does not make this rule a bill of attainder; that company is not being singled out,
as the proposed rule applies to all similar devices. Further, the regulation of all
49
I
.
I
machineguns of this type is not a "punishment" as is required for an enactment to be
unlawful bill of attainder. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473.
d. Violates Fourth Amendment
Comments Received
Many commenters also raised objections on grounds that the proposed rule
violates the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Commenters believed that because bump-stock-type devices essentially would become
contraband under the rule, "mandating [their] surrender to authorities would violate the
4th Amendment protection from seizure without due process."
Department Response
Although commenters cite the Fourth Amendment, it is unclear how a "search" or
"seizure" would result from this rule. The Department is unaware of any precedent
supporting the view that a general regulatory prohibition of possession of certain
contraband can violate the Fourth Amendment. A seizure in "[v ]iolation of the Fourth
Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control," Brower v. Cty. of
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989), and the final rule makes clear that current possessors of
bump-stock-type devices are not required to smrnnder the devices to the authorities.
Instead, current possessors may lawfully dispose of their devices in other ways, as
discussed below in Part IV.D.7.
e. Violates Ninth and Tenth Amendments
Comments Received
Various commenters opposed to the rule stated that it would violate the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments of the Constitution. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The
50
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." One commenter said, "The
BATF is another agency whose existence violates the 10th Amendment." Another
commenter argued, "as an accessory, the federal government cannot ban [bump-stocktype devices], because only the states can ban them." A handful of other commenters .
stated that the rule violates States' rights under the Tenth Amendment because it violates
the "right to keep and bear arms" provisions of 44 State constitutions.
Department Response
The Department disagrees that the proposed rule violates the commenters' rights
under the Ninth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment "does not confer substantive rights
in addition to those conferred by other portions of our governing law. The Ninth
Amendment 'was added to the Bill of Rights to ensure that the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius would not be used at a later time to deny fundamental rights merely
because they were not specifically enumerated in the Constitution."' Gibson v.
Matthews, 926 F.2d 532,537 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Charles v. Brown, 495 F. Supp. 862,
863-64 (N.D. Ala. 1980)). Federal "circuit courts across the country have consistently
held that the Ninth Amendment does not impinge upon Congress's authority to restrict
firearm ownership." United States v. Finnell, 256 F. Supp. 2d 493,498 (E.D. Va. 2003).
The Department also disagrees that the rule violates the Tenth Amendment.
Commenters seemingly argued that the powers exercised by the Department in issuing
the rule were "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
51
prohibited by it to the States." However, Federal courts have long held that the NFA,
GCA, and implementing regulations do not violate the Tenth Amendment. The NFA
does not "usurp[] police power reserved to the States." United States v. Miller, 307 U.S.
174, 176 (1939). Further, "[b ]ecause § 922(0) was a proper exercise of Congress's
enumerated authority under the Commerce Clause, and because it does not compel, let
alone commandeer, the states to do anything, the statute does not violate the Tenth
Amendment." United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 891 (7th Cir. 1996).
f. Lack of Statutory Authority
Comments Received
A total of 47,863 commenters, most of whom sent form submissions opposed to
the proposed rule, argued that ATF lacks statutory authority to regulate bump-stock-type
devices. Many commenters said that ATF, by its own admission, repeatedly stated it
could not regulate such devices. Commenters generally expressed the view that because
bump-stock-type devices are not firearms, ATF has no authority under the NFA or GCA
to regulate them. Some commenters contended that 6 U.S.C. 531 gives ATF only narrow
statutory authority and does not provide ATF general authority to regulate the safety of
firearms, accessories, or parts.
In addition, numerous commenters argued that, as the term "machinegun" is
already clearly defined in the NFA, only Congress can make changes to the definition
and regulate bump-stock-type devices. Furthermore, commenters stated that the agency's
interpretation of the term "machinegun" would not be entitled to deference under
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
52
Department Response
The Attorney General is responsible for enforcing the NFA, as amended, and the
GCA, as amended. This includes the authority to promulgate regulations necessary to
enforce the provisions of these statutes. See 18 U.S.C. 926(a); 26 U.S.C. 7801(a)(2)(A),
7805(a). The statutory provision cited by some commenters, 6 U.S.C. 531, is the
provision of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, that
transferred the powers the Secretary of the Treasury had with respect to ATF to the
Attorney General when ATF was transferred to the Department of Justice. Accordingly,
the Attorney General is now responsible for enforcing the NFA and GCA, and he has
delegated the responsibility for administering and enforcing the NFA and GCA to the
Director of ATF, subject to the direction of the Attorney General and the Deputy
Attorney General. See 28 CFR 0.130(a)(l)-(2).
"Because § 926 authorizes the [Attorney General] to promulgate those regulations
which are 'necessary,' it almost inevitably confers some measure of discretion to
determine what regulations are in fact 'necessary."' Nat'! Rifle Ass'n v. Brady, 914 F.2d
475,479 (4th Cir. 1990). In the original GCA implementing regulations, ATF provided
regulatory definitions of the terms that Congress did not define in the statute. 33 FR
18555 (Dec. 14, 1968). Since 1968, ATF has occasionally added definitions to the
implementing regulations. See, e.g., 63 FR 35520 (June 30, 1998). Similarly, 26 U.S.C.
7805(a) states that "the [Attorney General] shall prescribe all needful rules and
regulations for the enforcement of this title." As is the case with the GCA, ATF has
provided regulatory definitions for terms in the NF A that Congress did not define, such
as "frame or receiver" and "manual reloading." See, e.g., 81 FR 2658 (Jan. 15, 2016).
53
These definitions were necessary to explain and implement the statute, and do not
contradict the statute. Federal courts have recognized ATF's authority to classify devices
as "firearms" under Federal law. See, e.g., Demko v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 83, 93
(1999) (destructive device); Akins v. United States, 312 F. App'x 197 (11th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam) (machinegun).
This rule is based upon this authority. Further, A TF has provided technical and
legal reasons why bump-stock-type devices enable automatic fire by a single function of
the trigger, and thus qualify as machinegun conversion devices, not mere "accessories."
ATF has regularly classified items as machinegun "conversion devices" or "combinations
of parts," including auto sears (ATF Ruling 81-4) and the Akins Accelerator (ATF Ruling
2006-2).
The Department agrees that regulatory agencies may not promulgate rules that
conflict with statutes. However, the Department disagrees that the rule conflicts with the
statutes or is in contravention of administrative-law principles. The rule merely defines
terms used in the definition of "machinegun" that Congress did not-the terms
"automatically" and "single function of the trigger"-as part of implementing the
provisions of the NF A and GCA.
When a court is called upon to review an agency's construction of the statute it
administers, the court looks to the framework set forth in Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). The first step of the
Chevron review is to ask "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue." Id at 842. "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
54
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue .... the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id at 842-43 (footnote omitted).
The Department believes that this rule's interpretations of"automatically" and "single
function of the trigger" in the statutory definition of"machinegun" accord with the plain
meaning of those terms. Moreover, even if those terms are ambiguous, this rule rests on
a reasonable construction of them. Although Congress defined "machinegun" in the
NFA, 26 U.S.C. 5845(b), it did not further define the components of that definition. See,
e.g., United States v. One TRW, Model Ml4, 7.62 Caliber Rifle, 441 F.3d 416,419 (6th
Cir. 2006) (noting that the NFA does not define the phrases "designed to shoot" or "can
be readily restored" in the definition of "machinegun"). Congress thus implicitly left it to
the Department to define "automatically" and "single function of the trigger" in the event
those terms are ambiguous. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. Courts have appropriately
recognized that the Department has the authority to interpret elements of the definition of
"machinegun" like "automatically" and "single function of the trigger." See York v.
Sec'y of Treasury, 774 F.2d 417, 419-20 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Dodson, 519
F. App'x 344, 348049 & n.4 (6th Cir. 2013); cf, e.g., Firearms Import/Export Roundtable
Trade Grp. v. Jones, 854 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2012) (upholding ATF's
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 925(d) to ban importation of certain firearm parts under
Chevron "step one"); Modern Muzzleloading, Inc. v. Magaw, 18 F. Supp. 2d 29, 35-36
(D.D.C. l 998) ("since the ATF's classification of[a firearm as not antique] 'amounts to
or involves its interpretation' of the GCA, a statute administered by the ATF, we review
that interpretation under the deferential standard announced in Chevron").
55
Second, the Department's construction of those terms is reasonable under
Chevron. As explained in more detail in Part III, the Department is clarifying its
regulatory definition of "automatically" to conform to how that word was understood and
used when the NFA was enacted in 1934. See Olofson, 563 F.3d at 658. And the
Department is reaffirming that a single pull of the trigger is a single function of the
trigger, consistent with the NFA's legislative history, ATF's previons determinations, and
judicial precedent. See, e.g., Akins, 312 F. App'x at 200. This rule is therefore lawful
under the NFA and GCA even if the operative statutory terms are ambiguous.
g. Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
Comments Received
A few commenters indicated that bump-stock-type devices are assistive devices
for people with nerve damage or a physical disability. A few comm enters further stated
that the regulation could be a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42
U.S.C. ch. 126. In particular, one commenter claimed that under the ADA, an individual
can establish coverage under the law by "showing that he or she has been subjected to an
action prohibited under the Act because of an actual or perceived physical [condition]
that is not transitory and minor." The commenter asserted that this regulation constitutes
such "an action" and would violate the civil rights of a diverse group of persons with
disabilities, including homeowners, veterans, target shooters, and hunters.
Department Response
The Department disagrees with commenters that the final rule would violate the
ADA. While the ADA applies to State and local governments, it does not apply to the
Executive Branch of the Federal Government. See 42 U.S.C. 12131(1) (defining "public
56
entity" as any State or local government; any department, agency, special purpose
district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority). Accordingly, because
ATF is a Federal agency that is not subject to the ADA, the commenters' assertion that
ATF's regulation would violate the ADA is incorrect.
While not mentioned by commenters, ATF is covered by section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits discrimination, solely by reason of disability,
in Federally conducted programs and activities. 29 U.S.C. 794(a) (stating that "[n]o
otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under ... any program or activity conducted by any Executive
agency"). As detailed above, the sole purpose of this rulemaking is to clarify that bumpstock-type devices satisfy the statutory definition of"machinegun," as defined by
Congress in the NFA and GCA. While a few commenters made general assertions that
bump-stock-type devices can be used as assistive devices for people with disabilities,
none submitted any specific information to suggest that this rule would cause qualified
individuals with disabilities, solely by reason of their disability, to be excluded from the
participation in, subjected to discrimination under, or denied the benefits of any program
or activity of ATF. Accordingly, there is nothing in the record to suggest that this rule
would raise concerns under the Rehabilitation Act.
57
2. Politically Motivated and Emotional Response
Comments Received
At least 41,954 commenters opposed to the rule, including the 40,806 comments
submitted through the NAGR petition, asserted that the proposed rule is a political or
knee-jerk response to a tragic incident. Many commenters suggested that the proposed
rule reflected political pressure and would be a hasty response that would not achieve real
benefits and could lead to confiscating all guns. A handful of commenters even asserted
they would support the elimination of A TF. Petitions submitted through NAGR portray
the rule as a response to "the anti-gun left ... so they can turn millions of commonly
owned firearms into 'illegal guns' with the stroke ofa pen." They cautioned that this rule
unfairly capitalizes on the misfortunes of others to push political agendas and that facts
should not be thrown aside. Another commenter said that this rule will be tainted
because from the beginning the President made clear he had no intention of instructing
the Department to abide by the public comments, having declared that bump-stock-type
devices "will soon be out" after the "mandated comment period" notwithstanding
possible congressional action.
Department Response
While the Las Vegas tragedy brought attention to bump-stock-type devices and
requests from Congress and nongovernmental organizations prompted ATF to review its
classification of bump-stock-type devices, the Department disagrees that this rulemaking
is an unreasoned reaction to recent events. As discussed in the NPRM, see Part III above,
ATF recognized that its prior classifications determining only some bump-stock-type
devices to be machineguns did not include extensive legal analysis of certain terms that
58
are significant to defining "machinegun" under the NFA and were not always consistent.
This final rule defines the terms "automatically" and "single function of the trigger" to
clarify the meaning ofmachinegun and to make clear that bump-stock-type devices are
machineguns under the meaning of the statute. The Department further notes that the
President specifically directed it to clarify the legal status of bump-stock-type devices
through the administrative "procedures the law prescribes," including notice and
comment. 83 FR 7949 (Feb. 23, 2018).
3. Not Used in Criminal Activity
Comments Received
Numerous commenters expressed that besides the shooting in Las Vegas, there is
no evidence that bump-stock-type devices have been used in the commission of crimes.
Several commenters stated that, pursuant to a Freedom oflnformation Act request, they
asked ATF and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for any records on whether
bump-stock-type devices have been used in crimes and that they received no
confirmation affirming the existence of any such records. Moreover, some commenters
stated that ATF provided no evidence or justification that bump-stock-type devices will
be used more frequently in future crimes. They argued that if the agency cannot show
what materials it relied on to regulate bump-stock-type devices for purposes of public
safety, then the rulemaking is arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Commenters cited
judicial decisions such as Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass 'n v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983), in which the Supreme Court held that
when an agency rescinds or changes its stance on a regulation, it must explain the
59
evidence underlying its decision and offer a rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.
Many commenters also noted that there is still no confirmation or documentation,
despite requests, from Federal agencies confirming that bump-stock-type devices were
actually used in the Las Vegas incident, and that ATF has not issued a "Report of
Technical Examination" (A TF Form 3311.2) for any of the firearms used in the incident.
With questions remaining about the Las Vegas criminal investigation and doubts as to
whether bump-stock-type devices were actually used, commenters argued that A TF has
no basis to promulgate a regulation that, as A TF declared in the NPRM, "would affect the
criminal use of bump-stock-type devices in mass shootings, such as the Las Vegas
shooting incident." 83 FR at 13454.
These arguments were frequently raised alongside concerns that the cost-benefit
analysis did not address the fact that there would be few benefits to the rule given that
bump-stock-type devices have supposedly been used in only one crime. These concerns
are addressed in Part IV .I.5.
Department Response
The Department disagrees that ATF seeks to regulate bump-stock-type devices
merely because they were, or have the potential to be, used in crime. The NPRM stated
that the Las Vegas shooting made "individuals aware that these devices existpotentially including persons with criminal or terrorist intentions-and made their
potential to threaten public safety obvious." 83 FR at 13447. But the NRPM also
provided a detailed analysis explaining that bump-stock-type devices must be regulated
60
---------------------------·-·--·-~~---~--·-··
because they satisfy the statutory definition of"machinegun" as it is defined in the NFA
and GCA. Id at 13447-48.
Comm enters conflate the legal basis for ATF' s regulation of bump-stock-type
devices with the background information that was provided as context for the reason ATF
revisited its previous classifications. In the NPRM, ATF explained that the tragedy in
Las Vegas gave rise to requests from Congress and nongovernmental organizations that
ATF examine its past classifications and determine whether bump-stock-type devices
currently on the market constitute machineguns under the statutory definition. Id. at
13446. While part of the Department's mission is to enhance public safety, the impetus
for the change in classification was not, as commenters argued, that the device may
potentially pose a public safety threat but because, upon review, ATF believes that it
satisfies the statutory definition of"machinegun." This rule reflects the public safety
objectives of the NFA and GCA, but the materials and evidence of public safety
implications that commenters seek have no bearing on whether these devices are
appropriately considered machineguns based on the statutory definition.
In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass 'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), the Supreme Court wrote that an "agency must
examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including
a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made."' Id. at 43 (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, I 68 (1962)). However, that
case involved a Federal agency that rescinded a final rule-based on data and policy
choices-sho1tly after publication, arguing that that rule was no longer necessary for a
multitude of reasons, including that the costs outweighed the safety benefits. See id. at
61
38-39. The Supreme Cou1i recognized that any change requires a reasoned basis, noting
that "[i]f Congress established a presumption from which judicial review should start,
that presumption-contrary to petitioners' views-is not against safety regulation, but
against changes in current policy that are not justified by the rulemaking record." Id at
42. However, the revocation in that case involved a discretionary policy decision, and
did not depend solely upon statutory construction. The bump-stock-type device rule is
not a discretionary policy decision based upon a myriad of factors that the agency must
weigh, but is instead based only upon the functioning of the device and the application of
the relevant statutory definition. Therefore, the Department does not believe that this rule
conflicts with State Farm.
4. Will Not Enhance Public Safety
Comments Received
More than 1,100 commenters indicated that a regulation on bump-stock-type
devices would have no measurable effect on the current rate of crime or enhance public
safety. One commenter argued that the use of bump-stock-type devices by mass shooters
might actually save lives based on his experience that using the device can result in a rifle
jamming, misfee
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