Lluberes et al v. City of Troy et al

Filing 76

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER granting in part and denying in part 60 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 62 Motion for Summary Judgment. ORDERED that plaintiffs' 62 motion for summary judgment is DENIED in its entirety. It is further ORDERED that defendants' 60 motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. ORDERED that all claims against Anderson, Castle, Dean, Hoffman, Pirro, Negron, Evangelista, Salvatore, Sarris, Tutunjian, Troy PD, John and Jane Doe defendants, and individual defendants in their official capacities be dismissed from this action. ORDERED that Gillette's trial will proceed as scheduled on 4/28/2014 at 9:30 a.m. Upon the conclusion of that trial, the Court will set a dat e for Llubere's trial. Signed by Magistrate Judge Christian F. Hummel on 3/21/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O) (dpk)

Magnotta v. Putnam County Sheriff, Slip Copy (2014)

2014 WL 705281
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
S.D. New York.
Maurizio MAGNOTTA, Plaintiff,
v.
PUTNAM COUNTY SHERIFF, et al., Defendants.
No. 13 Civ. 2752(GBD)(GWG).

|

Feb. 24, 2014.

Opinion
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN, United States Magistrate
Judge.
*1 Maurizio Magnotta, currently an inmate at the Coxsackie
Correctional Facility in Coxsackie, New York, brings this
pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 alleging
constitutional violations against a host of defendants who
appear to have been involved in his criminal prosecution.
All defendants have moved to dismiss. For the reasons that
follow, the motions should be granted.

I. BACKGROUND
Magnotta filed the complaint in this action on April 10,
2013, in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York. See Complaint, filed Apr. 10, 2013
(Docket # 1). The case was transferred to this district. See
Order, dated Apr. 22, 2013 (Docket # 5). The Court then
issued an order dismissing the following named defendants
on grounds of immunity: “N.Y. S. Police Lab”; “NY State
Police Laboratory”; “Town of Kent Court Judge Collins”;
and “Putnam County DA.” See Order, dated May 22,
2013 (Docket # 12). Magnotta filed an amended complaint
on July 17, 2013. See Amended Civil Action Complaint,
filed July 17, 2013 (Docket # 38) (the “complaint” or
“Am. Compl.”). The complaint asserts claims against the
following defendants: “Putnam County Sheriff's Office”;
“Putnam County”; “Dutchess County”; “Duchess County
Sheriff”; “Town of Kent Police”; “Owens”; “Locascio”;
“Deperno”; “Nalbone”; “Tricinelli”; “Cuddeback”; “Haire”;
“Napolitano”; and “Amato.” See id. The complaint alleges
that defendants Deperno, Nalbone, Tricinelli, Amato, and
Napolitano “were employed under oath by the Putnam
County Sheriff['s] Department under the color of Putnam

County Government at the time of the incidents,” id. ¶ 4;
that defendants Cuddeback and Haire “were employed by the
Dutchess County Sheriff['s] Office under oath and color of
Dutchess County Government at the time of the incidents,” id.
¶ 5, and that defendants Locascio and Owens were employed
“under oath by the Town of Kent Police Department under
the color of Putnam County Government at the time of the
incidents,” id. ¶ 6.

A. Allegations in the Complaint
The following facts are taken from Magnotta's complaint. The
facts he alleges are accepted as true for purposes of deciding
these motions to dismiss. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
On April 15, 2010, five detectives from the Putnam
County Sheriff's Department and Dutchess County Sheriff's
Department “gain[ed] entry to [Magnotta's] home under
false pretenses, acting under affirmative, willful and official
misconduct.” Am. Compl. ¶ 11. The complaint refers to
this police conduct as a “conspiracy and malfeasance”
which was “premeditated” with the “sole purpose ... to
take a DNA sample from the bathroom at 10 Riverview
Rd. Brewster, NY.” Id. The detectives “forced the plaintiff
outside and kept the plaintiff out on the porch while
2[d]etectives stayed in the home [ ][and] went into the
bathroom to violate his [constitutional] rights by taking a
DNA sample without a[w]arrant.” Id. Additionally, Magnotta
“witnessed the trespass ab initio while being restrained and
trying to reenter his premises.” Id. These “intentional and
Constitutional torts were preformed [sic] while in full view
and knowledge of Superior Officer Nalbone” and there were
no “exigent circumstances or consent by plaintiff for the
illegal search.” Id.
*2 About a month later, on May 20, 2010, two detectives
approached Magnotta in his attached garage, entered the
garage, and handcuffed him before leading him to a police
car. Id. ¶ 12. The detectives “claimed to have a[w]arrant
for his arrest.” Id. The complaint also alleges that “Town
of Kent Police abused their power to arrest plaintiff under
false pretenses, all the while in collusion with the other
[d]etectives” and that they “used false statements to rouse
a[j]udge in their jurisdiction, who then opened a closed
courtroom to have an arraignment” which was part of a
“plot ... to have an unconstitutional bail set so [he] would
remain in jail.” Id. Additionally, the complaint alleges that
“[a]t no time during these arrests did any [d]etective have
or produce an arrest warrant, or have probable cause for

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Magnotta v. Putnam County Sheriff, Slip Copy (2014)

arrest other than which they created.” Id. ¶ 17. The bail was
“unreasonable for the crime [for which he] was charged.” Id.

is to disregard any conclusory statements in a complaint, id.
at 679.

Finally, “on or about the weekend” of September 11,
2010, corrections officers employed by the “Putnam County
Sheriff” and the “Putnam County Government” acted “in
collusion with an inmate at the Putnam County Jail” and
“conspired to have a weapon put in [Magnotta's] cell in the
West Housing unit of the jail.” Id. ¶ 13. This was done “to
cover up a hazing incident that had occurred on the weekend”
of September 11. Id.

*3 Next, a court must determine if a complaint contains
“sufficient factual matter” which, if accepted as true, states
a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Id. at 678 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Port Dock
& Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Ne., Inc., 507 F.3d 117, 121
(2d Cir.2007) (“[A] complaint must allege facts that are
not merely consistent with the conclusion that the defendant
violated the law, but which actively and plausibly suggest
that conclusion.”). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to
a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” a
complaint is insufficient under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) because it
has merely “alleged” but not “ ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’ “ Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

Magnotta alleges in the complaint that he has been “aggrieved
by these defendants,” id. ¶ 15, and he seeks “in lieu of punitive
damages, emotional distress and suffering from illegal arrests,
home invasion, theft of personal property, use of said property
for use in unwarranted scientific experiments, excessive,
unreasonable and unjustifiable force used against plaintiff and
his family” in the amount of $2,500,000, id. ¶ 19.

B. Procedural History
All defendants moved to dismiss Magnotta's complaint for
failure to state a claim. 1 Magnotta then filed a document
he entitled “Notice of Motion to Stay on Complaint.” See
Letter, filed Oct. 28, 2013 (Docket # 72) (“Pl.Opp.”). The
Court denied the motion but ordered all defendants to treat
the request as an opposition to their motions to dismiss. See
Memorandum Endorsement, dated Nov. 5, 2013 (Docket #
73).

II. STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO A MOTION TO
DISMISS
A party may move to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where the opposing party's
pleading “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). While a court must accept
as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint, that
principle does not apply to legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) ( “[A] plaintiff's obligation to
provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.”) (citation,
internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). In other
words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and thus a court's first task

In the case of pro se plaintiffs, “[a] document filed pro se is
to be liberally construed ... and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S.
at 94 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); accord
McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir.1999)
(a pro se party's pleadings should be construed liberally
and interpreted “ ‘to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest’ ”) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790
(2d Cir.1994)). However, even pro se pleadings must contain
factual allegations that “ ‘raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.’ “ Dawkins v. Gonyea, 646 F.Supp.2d 594,
603 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
While the defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6),
they have also submitted additional documentary evidence
in support of their motions. The Court is generally limited
to the pleadings when considering a motion made pursuant
to Rules 12(b)(6) or 12(c). However, in deciding a motion
to dismiss, a district court may also consider “matters of
which judicial notice may be taken.” Chambers v. Time
Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.2002); see also
Leonard F. v. Israel Discount Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99,
107 (2d Cir.1999) (citation omitted); Arrocha v. City Univ.

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Magnotta v. Putnam County Sheriff, Slip Copy (2014)

of N.Y., 878 F.Supp.2d 364, 368 (E.D.N.Y.2012). Each of the
defendants has annexed the following items to their affidavits
in support of their motions to dismiss the complaint: (1)
the minutes of Magnotta's guilty plea and (2) the Uniform
Sentence and Commitment form that states the crimes for
which Magnotta was convicted and the sentences imposed
by the Court for each conviction. See Dutchess Aff.; Putnam
Aff.; Kent Aff. 2 The Kent defendants have also attached a
copy of the True Bill of the indictment in Magnotta's case.
See True Bill, dated Feb. 11, 2011 (annexed to Kent Aff.)
(“True Bill”). The authenticity of these documents has not
been contested, and thus, the Court will take judicial notice of
them in deciding the motions to dismiss. See Shmueli v. City
of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 233 (2d Cir.2005) (“The ... [state]
prosecution of [an individual] is a matter of public record, of
which [a court may] take judicial notice .”); Wims v. N.Y.C.
Police Dep't, 2011 WL 2946369, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 20,
2011) (taking judicial notice of an individual's guilty plea);
S.E.C. v. Aragaon Capital Adv. LLC, 2011 WL 3278907, at
*10 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2011) (“A court ... may take judicial
notice of indisputable facts, such as a guilty plea.”); Marshall
v. City of New York, 2010 WL 4739810, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
17, 2010) (taking judicial notice of an individual's “conviction
by guilty plea”); Wingate v. Gives, 2008 WL 5649089, at *3
n. 7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2008) (noting that a court can “take
judicial notice of Plaintiff's conviction”).
*4 Accordingly, the Court accepts the following facts as
true. On September 22, 2011, Magnotta pled guilty one count
of criminal sexual act in the first degree for acts that occurred
on or about July 29, 2009. (Plea Tr. 26). He also pled guilty to
one count of burglary in the third degree for acts that occurred
on or about February 14, 2010, and to one count of burglary in
the third degree for acts that occurred on or about December
25, 2009. (Plea Tr. 26–27). Magnotta pled guilty to less than
all of the charges for which he was indicted. See True Bill; S
& C Form. Magnotta received a determinate sentence of 12
years imprisonment on the criminal sexual act charge, to be
followed by 8 years of post-release supervision. See S & C
Form. He also received indeterminate sentences of 2–1/3 to 7
years on each of the burglary charges, with these sentences to
run concurrently to the 12–year sentence. See id.

III. DISCUSSION
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
To state a claim under § 1983, Magnotta must show that he
was denied a constitutional or federal statutory right and that
the deprivation of that right occurred under color of state

law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988). Section 1983 does not itself create any substantive
rights but rather “provides only a procedure for redress for the
deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James,
13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir.1993) (citation omitted). To the
extent Magnotta relies on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we construe
the complaint as asserting the following claims: (a) false
arrest; (b) malicious prosecution; (c) unlawful search; and (d)
conspiracy to violate civil rights.
All defendants assert that the doctrine articulated in Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483–87 (1994), stands as a bar to
Magnotta's § 1983 claims. See Dutchess Br. at 5; Putnam Br.
at 6–7; Kent Br. at 6–8. Heck held that
in order to recover damages for [an]
allegedly unconstitutional conviction
or imprisonment, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence
invalid, ... a § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence
has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized
to make such determination, or called
into question by a federal court's
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,
28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for
damages bearing that relationship to
a conviction or sentence that has not
been so invalidated is not cognizable
under § 1983. Thus, when a state
prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983
suit, the district court must consider
whether a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence; if it would, the complaint
must be dismissed unless the plaintiff
can demonstrate that the conviction or
sentence has already been invalidated.
Heck, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994) (citations omitted).
Heck stands for “[t]he hoary principle that civil tort actions
are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of
outstanding criminal judgments.” Amaker v. Weiner, 179
F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Heck, 412 U.S. at 486).
“Disposition of the case on Heck grounds, however, warrants
only dismissal without prejudice, because the suit may be

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reinstituted should plaintiff's conviction be ‘expunged by
executive order, declared invalid ..., or called into question
by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.’
“ Amaker, 179 F.3d at 52 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487)
(emphasis omitted).
*5 We first examine whether any of Magnotta's claims,
if successful, would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction.” If any claim survives Heck, we also examine
other defenses that may be applicable to the claim.

1. False Arrest
Magnotta claims that on May 20, 2010, Town of Kent Police
arrested him “under false pretenses.” Am. Compl. ¶ 12. He
later alleges that at “no time during these arrests did any
Detective have or produce an arrest Warrant, or have probable
cause for arrest other than which they created.” Id. ¶ 17. “The
common-law rule, equally applicable to actions asserting
false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution,
was and is that the plaintiff can under no circumstances
recover if he was convicted of the offense for which he
was arrested” because “where law enforcement officers have
made an arrest, the resulting conviction is a defense to a
§ 1983 action asserting that the arrest was made without
probable cause.” Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380, 387–89
(2d Cir.1986) (internal citations omitted); see also Johnson v.
Pugh, 2013 WL 3013661, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2013) (“A
person who has been convicted of the crime for which he was
arrested cannot state a claim for false arrest....”); Subgidio v.
Graiani, 2006 WL 648229, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2006)
(concluding that “success on ... false arrest claim[ ] would
necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction” and granting
motion to dismiss pursuant to Heck); Duamutef v. Morris,
956 F.Supp. 1112, 1117 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (granting motion to
dismiss under Heck because false arrest claim “call[ed] into
question the validity of [plaintiff's] criminal conviction”).
It does not appear to be disputed by Magnotta that he was
actually convicted of at least some of the crimes for which he
was arrested on May 20, 2010. While Magnotta's conviction
came about because of his guilty plea, that does not change
the application of the Heck rule. See, e.g., Younger v. City of
New York, 480 F.Supp.2d 723, 730 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (finding
Heck bar where conviction was “pursuant to a guilty plea”);
Hernandez v. City of New York, 2004 WL 2624675, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2004) (“Since a guilty plea is the
equivalent of a conviction, a guilty plea will also bar a §
1983 false arrest claim.”) (internal citations omitted); Allison
v. Farrell, 2002 WL 88380, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002)

(“[I]t is of no moment that [plaintiff] pled guilty to a lesser
charge arising out of the events that took place on the day
of his arrest.”). Nor does the fact that Magnotta is actively
appealing his criminal conviction, see Pl. Opp., lift the Heck
bar inasmuch as the plaintiff in Heck itself was also pursuing
an appeal of his criminal conviction at the time he brought his
§ 1983 claims. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 478–79. Accordingly,
Magnotta's claim of false arrest must be dismissed, as success
on that claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the
conviction resulting from that arrest.

2. Malicious Prosecution
*6 Magnotta alleges that the “Detectives involved did
use their influence to coerce Judges, The New York State
Forensic Laboratory or acquaintances therin [sic] and the
Putnam County DA's office through fraud and misfeasance
to prosecute and incarcerate plaintiff .” Am. Compl. ¶ 18.
Construing these allegations as asserting a claim for malicious
prosecution, this claim too must be dismissed as barred
by Heck. In order to succeed on a malicious prosecution
claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish, inter alia,
“termination of the [criminal] proceeding in plaintiff's favor.”
Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir.2003); Bonide
Prod., Inc. v. Cahill, 223 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir.2000). The
Supreme Court specifically held in Heck that success on a
malicious prosecution claim necessarily implies the invalidity
of a plaintiff's conviction.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 485–87; accord
Subgidio, 2006 WL 648229, at *10. A guilty plea, even if it
was a plea to fewer than all the charges, does not satisfy the
“favorable” termination element of a malicious prosecution
claim. See, e.g., Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 196 (2d
Cir.2002) (“Where a prosecution did not result in an acquittal,
it is generally not deemed to have ended in favor of the
accused, for the purposes of a malicious prosecution claim,
unless its final disposition is such as to indicate the accused's
innocence.”); Posr v. Court Officer Shield # 207, 180 F.3d
409, 418 (2d Cir.1999) (“[I]f the outcome [of criminal
proceedings] was the result of a compromise to which the
accused agreed ... it is not a termination in favor of the accused
for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim.”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); Wims, 2011 WL 2946369,
at *3 (plaintiff's prior guilty plea to one count in satisfaction
of all charges was “not a favorable termination on the charge
dismissed as part of the plea deal”). Accordingly, to the extent
Magnotta asserts a claim for malicious prosecution, it must
be dismissed.

3. Unlawful Search

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Magnotta v. Putnam County Sheriff, Slip Copy (2014)

Magnotta's complaint alleges that on April 15, 2010, five
detectives “gain[ed] entry to the plaintiffs [sic] home under
false pretenses” and took a “DNA sample without a Warrant.”
Am. Compl. ¶ 11. We construe this as a claim of an unlawful
warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court stated in Heck that “a suit for damages
attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie
even if the challenged search produced evidence that was
introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983
plaintiff's still-outstanding conviction” as long as the suit
“would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff's conviction
was unlawful.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n. 7 (emphasis in
original). Thus, an example of a suit that would survive
the Heck bar would be “an unlawful search whose illegality
would not affect the validity of the conviction.” Woods v.
Candela, 47 F.3d 545, 546 (2d Cir.1995); accord Toliver
v. City of New York, 2011 WL 4964919, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 15, 2011) (“[W]here the plaintiff's ... conviction was not
dependent on the allegedly unconstitutional seizure, a § 1983
claim is not barred by Heck.”); Williams v. Ontario Cnty.
Sheriff's Dep't, 662 F.Supp.2d 321, 329 (W.D.N.Y.2009)
(“[A] federal court's finding of a Fourth Amendment violation
would not necessarily imply that a prior state conviction
was unlawful if, despite the constitutional violation, the
subject evidence was admissible based on such doctrines
as independent source, inevitable discovery, and harmless
error.”). The Second Circuit has noted that “[t]he inquiry as to
whether a recovery on [a] § 1983 ... claim ... would necessarily
imply the invalidity of any conviction ... is inherently a factual
one.” Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 122 (2d
Cir.1999).
*7 Here, there is no factual record whatsoever as to
the connection between Magnotta's conviction and DNA
evidence that he alleges was obtained illegally during the
search on April 15, 2010. See Am. Compl. ¶ 11. The
allegations in the complaint provide no information on
this point and defendants did not present any evidence to
the Court on this question as they might have done on
a motion for summary judgment. Instead, the defendants
merely assert the Heck bar without providing any support
for its applicability to the unlawful search claim. Thus,
this case stands in contrast to those cases that were able
to determine the relationship between claims made in a
civil suit and a challenged search. See, e.g., Bogle v.
Melamed, 2012 WL 1117411, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012)
(dismissing unlawful search claims where “[a] finding that
the searches pursuant to which [weapons] were procured
were unlawful would necessarily imply the invalidity of

the underlying conviction” on weapons possession charges);
Black v. Blackmun, 2011 WL 6019394, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
1, 2011) (“Because [plaintiff's] conviction hinged directly
on the weapons procured during this allegedly unlawful
search, an award of damages would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his state court conviction.”); Kaminski
v. Hayes, 2009 WL 3193621, at *6 (D.Conn. Sept. 30,
2009) (illegal search claim barred by Heck where it was
“apparent that the entire evidentiary basis for the charged
offenses ... derive[d] from a single search that [was] now
being challenged as part of a section 1983 action”); Clayton
v. City of Poughkeepsie, 2007 WL 2154196, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
June 21, 2007) (dismissing illegal search claim pursuant to
Heck where “the entire evidentiary basis for the charged
offense derive[d] from a single episode involving a single
search that [was] now being questioned as part of a § 1983
action”). Instead, this case is in the posture of those cases
that have found a dismissal under Heck to be improper
because it was not clear that a favorable determination on
the § 1983 claim would necessarily impugn the validity
of the plaintiff's criminal conviction. See, e.g., Covington,
171 F.3d at 123 (refusing to find Heck bar where the court
had “no information ... as to the nature of the evidence
which might have been available against [the plaintiff] in
those [criminal] proceedings”); accord Hughes v. Lott, 350
F.3d 1157, 1161 (11th Cir.2003) (“It was impossible ...
for the district court to determine that a successful §
1983 action for unreasonable search and seizure necessarily
implied the invalidity of [plaintiff's] convictions” where
“the circumstances surrounding [plaintiff's] convictions ...
[were] unknown from the record” prior to service of process)
(emphasis in original).
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of the Heck bar,
Magnotta's claim must be dismissed for an independent
reason: it fails to allege the personal involvement of the
individual defendants in the alleged constitutional violation.
“It is well settled that, in order to establish a defendant's
individual liability in a suit brought under § 1983, a plaintiff
must show, inter alia, the defendant's personal involvement
in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v. City of
New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138–39 (2d Cir.2013) (citations
omitted); accord Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free
Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 122 (2d Cir.2004) (“[I]n this Circuit
personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional
deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under
§ 1983.”) (citation omitted). “Likewise, a plaintiff must
establish a given defendant's personal involvement in the
claimed violation in order to hold that defendant liable in

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Magnotta v. Putnam County Sheriff, Slip Copy (2014)

his individual capacity under § 1983.” Patterson v. Cnty. of
Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 229 (2d Cir.2004) (citation omitted).
*8 Magnotta names a host of individual defendants in the
caption of his complaint, but the complaint itself provides no
indication as to which of the named individuals performed
any allegedly illegal acts and what precisely they did. “It is
well-settled that ‘where the complaint names a defendant in
the caption but contains no allegations indicating how the
defendant violated the law or injured the plaintiff, a motion
to dismiss the complaint in regard to that defendant should
be granted.’ “ Dove v. Fordham Univ., 56 F.Supp.2d 330,
335 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (quoting Morabito v. Blum, 528 F.Supp.
252, 262 (S.D.N.Y.1981)); accord Garcia v. Watts, 2009 WL
2777085, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2009) (citing cases).

4. Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights
To state a claim for a § 1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff must
allege: “(1) an agreement between two or more state actors or
between a state actor and a private entity; (2) to act in concert
to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done
in furtherance of that goal causing damages.” Pangburn v.
Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir.1999) (citations omitted).
Magnotta's complaint alleges that the April 15, 2010, search
of his home was part of a “conspiracy” to take a DNA sample
from his bathroom. See Am. Compl. ¶ 11. This claim as
to a conspiracy involving the search of his home must be
dismissed because it is utterly lacking in any factual details
and it is well settled that “conclusory or general allegations
are insufficient to state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983.”
Walker v. Jastremski, 430 F.3d 560, 564 n. 5 (2d Cir.2005);
Nealy v. Berger, 2009 WL 704804, at *5 (E.D.N.Y Mar. 16,
2009) (“The mere use of the term ‘conspiracy’ ... is clearly
insufficient to satisfy Rule 12(b) (6) in connection with a
Section 1983 conspiracy claim.”).
Magnotta's complaint also describes an alleged conspiracy
in which Putnam County Correction Officers, “in collusion
with an inmate at the Putnam County Jail, conspired to have
a weapon put in [his] cell” on or about the weekend of
September 11, 2010. Am. Compl. ¶ 13. He alleges that this
was “done to cover up a hazing incident” that had occurred
that weekend. Id. This claim too is conclusory as to the nature
of the alleged conspiracy and should be dismissed for this
reason alone. In addition, it fails to allege which defendants
were personally involved in this incident. See, e .g., Liner
v. Fischer, 2013 WL 4405539, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7,
2013) (“[Plaintiff's] conspiracy claims should be dismissed

because ... he has failed to allege the personal involvement”
of the named defendants.).

B. Claims Brought Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment
Magnotta's complaint indicates that he is bringing claims
pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 11. However, this
provision relates only to actions by the United States or
its agents, not by a State actor. See, e.g., Cassidy v.
Scoppetta, 365 F.Supp.2d 283, 286 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (the Fifth
Amendment “governs the conduct of the federal government
and federal employees, and does not regulate the activities of
state officials or state actors”) (emphases in original) (citation
omitted). Because Magnotta has not named any federal
defendants in this case, any claims purportedly brought under
the Fifth Amendment must be dismissed.

C. Claims Brought Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment
*9 Magnotta's complaint also indicates that he is bringing
claims pursuant to the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 12. The only apparent
factual allegation supporting such a claim is the assertion that
a Town of Kent judge set an “unconstitutional bail ... where it
was unreasonable for the crime [with which he] was charged.”
Id. ¶ 12. This judge is no longer a defendant in this case,
however, see Order, dated May 22, 2013 (Docket # 12), and
even if the judge were a defendant, any claim against the judge
would have to be dismissed based on the doctrine of judicial
immunity, see, e.g., Root v. Liston, 444 F.3d 127, 132 (2d
Cir.2006).

D. Claims Against Law Enforcement Agencies
Magnotta has named the Putnam County Sheriff's
Department, Dutchess County Sheriff's Department, and the
Town of Kent Police Department as defendants in this case.
See Am. Compl. “Courts look to state law when determining
whether a municipal agency may be sued.” Rogers v.
Cartagena, 2013 WL 1285169, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28,
2013) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b)(3)). “Under New York law,
a department of a municipal entity is merely a subdivision
of the municipality and has no separate legal existence.
Therefore, municipal departments ... are not amenable to
suit.” Hoisington v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 55 F.Supp.2d 212, 214
(S.D.N .Y.1999) (citations omitted). Accordingly, because
they are not suable entities and are merely departments
of their respective municipalities, all claims against these
defendants must be dismissed.

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not be held liable where there is no underlying constitutional
violation by a municipal official.”) (citation omitted).
E. Claims Against Municipal Defendants
Municipalities may be treated as “persons” for the purpose
of § 1983 claims “where ... the action that is alleged to be
unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by [the municipality's] officers.” Monell v. Dep't
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). A municipality may
not be held liable under § 1983, however, on the basis of
respondeat superior. Id. at 694–95; accord Roe v. City of
Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir.2008). “Rather, a plaintiff
must establish both a violation of his or her constitutional
rights and that the violation was caused by a municipal policy
or custom; that is, that the policy or custom was the actual
‘moving force’ behind the alleged wrongs.” Jouthe v. City of
New York, 2009 WL 701110, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2009)
(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694–95; Bd. of the Cnty. Comm'rs
v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997)).
Because Magnotta has not stated a claim for violation of
his constitutional rights, a fortiori, his Monell claims against
Putnam County and Dutchess County. 3 See, e.g., City of Los
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (“[None] of our
cases authorize[ ] the award of damages against a municipal
corporation based on the actions of one of its officers ... [i]f a
person has suffered no constitutional injury.... ”); Segal v. City
of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir.2006) (where “district
court properly found no underlying constitutional violation,”
it was not necessary to consider claims of municipal liability
under Monell); Pierre v. City of New York, 2014 WL 56923,
at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2014) (dismissing Monell claims
where plaintiff had not stated a claim for violation of his
constitutional rights); Levy v.. Alfano, 47 F.Supp.2d 488, 498
(S.D.N.Y.1999) (“It is well settled that a municipality may

IV. CONCLUSION
*10 For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motions to
dismiss (Docket46, 52, and 56) should be granted. Magnotta
should be given leave to file an amended complaint in the
event he is able to correct the deficiencies in the complaint.
See Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48
(2d Cir.1991) (“It is the usual practice upon granting a motion
to dismiss to allow leave to replead.”) (citations omitted).

PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO
THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have fourteen
(14) days including weekends and holidays from service
of this Report and Recommendation to serve and file
any objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (b), (d). Such
objections (and any responses to objections) shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Court, with copies sent to the Hon.
George Daniels, and to the undersigned, at 500 Pearl Street,
New York, New York 10007. Any request for an extension
of time to file objections must be directed to Judge Daniels.
If a party fails to file timely objections, that party will
not be permitted to raise any objections to this Report and
Recommendation on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins,
Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92
(2d Cir.2010).

Footnotes

1

2

See Notice of Motion, filed Sept. 12, 2013 (Docket # 46); Affidavit, filed Sept. 12, 2013 (Docket # 48) (“Dutchess Aff.”);
Defendant Dutchess County, Dutchess County Sheriff, Detective Cuddeback and Detective Haire's Memorandum of Law in Support
of Dismissal, filed Sept. 12, 2013 (Docket # 49) (“Dutchess Br.”); Notice of Motion, filed Sept. 13, 2013 (Docket # 52); Declaration,
filed Sept. 13, 2013 (Docket # 53) (“Kent Aff.”); Memorandum of Law in Support of Kent Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed Sept.
16, 2013 (Docket # 61) (“Kent Br.”); Notice of Motion, filed Sept. 13, 2013 (Docket # 56); Declaration in Support of the Putnam
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed Sept. 16, 2013 (Docket # 58) (“Putnam Aff.”); Memorandum of Law in Support of the Putnam
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed Sept. 16, 2013 (Docket # 59) (“Putnam Br.”); Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support
of Kent Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed Nov. 19, 2013 (Docket # 75); Defendant Dutchess County, Dutchess County Sheriff,
Detective Cuddeback and Detective Haire's Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Dismissal, filed Nov. 20, 2013 (Docket # 76);
Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of the Putnam Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed Nov. 20, 2013 (Docket # 78).
“Plea Tr.” refer to the plea transcript and “S & C Form” refers to the sentence and commitment form, both of which are attached
to the cited affidavits.

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3

Magnotta has not named the Town of Kent in the complaint but, to the extent he seeks to sue that entity, the claim would fail for
the same reasons.

End of Document

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