Bedrock Computer Technologies, LLC v. Softlayer Technologies, Inc. et al

Filing 845

MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law Regarding Invalidity (Renewed) by Yahoo! Inc.. (Attachments: #1 Text of Proposed Order, #2 Exhibit 1 - Declaration of Alexey Kuznetsov - DX-48, #3 Exhibit 2 - Source Code - key.c - DX-37, #4 Exhibit 3 - U.S. Patent 5,121,495 - DX-65, #5 Exhibit 4 - Application Approval for Filing - DX-57, #6 Exhibit 5 - U. S. Patent 6,119,214 - DX101, #7 Exhibit 6 - U.S. Patent 4,996,663 - DX-64, #8 Exhibit 7 - Donald Knuth, Sorting and Searching, vol. 3, of The Art of Computer Programming - DX-98, #9 Exhibit 8 - Kruse, "Data Structures and Program Design" - DX-108, #10 Exhibit 9 - Daniel F. Stubbs and Neil W. Webre, Data Structures with Abstract Data Types and Pascal - DX-118, #11 Exhibit 10 - Kuznetsov email to Day re contact request - DX-436, #12 Exhibit 11 - Absher email to Kuznetsov re Linux route.c question - DX-440, #13 Exhibit 12 - Kuznetsov email to Absher re Linux route.c question - DX-441)(Doan, Jennifer)

Exhibit 2

9/28/1995

key.c
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The views and conclusions contained in the software and documentation
are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing
official policies, either expressed or implied, of the US Naval
Research Laboratory (NRL).

----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include

<sys/types.h>
<sys/param.h>
<sys/proc.h>
<sys/mbuf.h>
<sys/socket.h>
<sys/socketvar.h>
<sys/time.h>
<sys/kernel.h>
<net/raw cb.h>
<net/if.h>
<net/if types.h>
<net/if dl.h>
<net/route.h>
<netinet/in.h>
<netinet/in var.h>
<netinet/if_ether.h>

#include
#include
#include
#include
#include

<netinet6/in6.h>
<netinet6/in6 var.h>
<netinet6/ipsec.h>
<netinet6/key.h>
<netinet6/in6_debug.h>

#define MAXHASHKEYLEN (2 * sizeof(int) + 2 * sizeof(struct
sockaddr_in6) )

99

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/*
*

Not clear whether these values should be

* tweakable at kernel config time.
*/
#define KEYTBLSIZE 61
#define KEYALLOCTBLSIZE 61
#define S02SPITBL8IZE 61

/*
*
*

These values should be tweakable, ..
perhaps by using sysetl

*/
#define MAXLARVALTIME 240;
#define MAXKEYACQUIRE I i

/* Lifetime of a larval key table entry */
/* Max number of key acquire messages sent

*/
/*

115

per destination address

*/
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#define MAXACQUIRETIME 15;

/* Lifetime of acquire message */

/*
*

Key engine tables and global variables

*/
struct key tblnode key table [KEYTBLSIZE] ;
struct key allocnode keyalloctbl[KEYALLOCTBLSIZE];
struct key_so2spinode so2spitbl[S02SPITBLSIZE];
struct keyso cb key so cb;
struct key tblnode nullkeynode = { 0, 0, 0, 0,
struct key registry *keyregtable;
struct key acquirelist *key acquirelist;
u long maxlarvallifetime = MAXLARVALTIME;
int maxkeyacquire = MAXKEYACQUIRE;

0 }i

2

DEF00007943

key.c
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9/28/1995
u_long maxacquiretime = MAXACQUIRETIME;
extern void dump_secassoc();

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* (temporary) Dump a data buffer
----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/
void
dump buf(buf, len)
-char *buf;
int len;
int i;
printf("buf=Ox%x len=%d:\n", buf, len);
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
printf("Ox%x"
(u int8)*(buf+i));
}
printf("\n");

/*----------------------------------------------------------------------

* (temporary) Dump a key tblnode structrue
----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/
void
dump keytblnode(ktblnode)
-struct key_tblnode *ktblnode;
if

(!ktblnode) {
printf("NULL key table node pOinter!\n");
return;

}
printf("solist=Ox%x", ktblnode->solist);
printf("secassoc=Ox%x", ktblnode->secassoc)
printf("next=Ox%x\n", ktblnode->next);

i

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/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* key secassoc2msghdr() :
*
Copy info from a security association into a key message buffer.
*
Assume message buffer is sufficiently large to hold all security
*
association information including src, dst, from, key and iv.
----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

int
key secassoc2msghdr(secassoc, km, keyinfo)
- struct ipsec assoc *secassoc;
struct key msghdr *km;
struct key_msgdata *keyinfo;
char *cp;
DPRINTF(IDL_GROSS EVENT,
if ((km == 0)
return(-l);

II

("Entering key_secassoc2msghdr\n"))

II

(keyinfo == 0)

i

(secassoc == 0))

km->type = secassoc->type;
km->state = secassoc->statei
km->label = secassoc->label;
km->spi = secassoc->spi;
3

DEF00007944

key.c
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9/28/1995
km->key1en = secassoc->key1en;
km->iv1en = secassoc->ivlen;
km->a1gorithm = secassoc->algorithm;
km->lifetype = secassoc->lifetYP8;
km->lifetimel
secassoc->lifetimel;
km->lifetime2 = secassoc->lifetime2;

/*
* Stuff src/dst/from/key/iv in buffer after
* the message header.
*/
cp = (char *) (km + 1);
#define ROUNDUP (a) \
«a) > 0 ? (1 + « (a) - 1)
#define ADVANCE (x, n) \
{ x += ROUNDUP(n); }

(sizeof(long)

- 1)))

sizeof (long) )

DPRINTF(IDL FINISHED, ("sa2msghdr: l\n"));
keyinfo->src = (struct sockaddr *)cp,
if (secassoc->src.sin6 len) {
bcopy«char *)&(secassoc->src), cp, secassoc->src.sin6_len);
ADVANCE (cp, secassoc->src.sin6 len);
else f
bzero(cp, sizeof(struct sockaddr in6)),
ADVANCE (cp, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)),

}
DPRINTF(IDL_FINISHED,

("sa2msghdr: 2\n")),

keyinfo->dst = (struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->dst);
if (secassoc->dst.sin6 len) {
bcopy«char *)&(secassoc->dst), cp, secassoc->dst.sin6 len);
ADVANCE (cp, secassoc->dst.sin6 len);
else f
bzero(cp, sizeof(struct sockaddr in6));
ADVANCE (cp, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));

}
DPRINTF(IDL_FINISHED,

("sa2msghdr: 3\n"));

keyinfo->from = (struct sockaddr *)cp;
if (secassoc->from.sin6 len) f
bcopy«char *)&(secassoc->from), cp, secassoc->from.sin6 len);
ADVANCE (cp, secassoc->fr:om.sin6_len),
else {
bzero(cp, sizeof(struct sockaddr in6));
ADVANCE (cp, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));

}
DPRINTF(IDL_FINISHED,

("sa2msghdr: 4\n"));

keyinfo->key = cp;
keyinfo->keylen = secassoc->key18n;
if (secassoc->keylen) {
bcopy( (char *) (secassoc->key), cp, secassoc->key18n);
ADVANCE (cp, secassoc->keylen);
DPRINTF(IDL FINISHED, ("sa2msqhdr: 5\n"));
keyinfo- >i v - = cp,
keyinfo->ivlen = secassoc->ivlen;
if (secassoc->ivlen) {
bcopy( (char *) (secassoc->iv), cp, secassoc->ivlen);
ADVANCE (cp, secassoc->ivlen);
DDO(IDL FINISHED,printf("msgbuf(len=%d) :\n", (char *)cp - (char *)km));
DDO(IDL FINISHED,dump buf«char *)km, (char *)cp - (char *)km));
DPRINTF (IDL_FINISHED, - (" sa2msghdr:: 6\n")),
4

DEF00007945

key.c
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9/28/1995
return(O) i

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* key msghdr2secassoc() :
Copy info from a key message buffer into an ipsec_assoc
*
*
structure

----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

int
key msghdr2secassoc(secassoc, km, keyinfo)
- struct ipsec assoc *secassoci
struct key msghdr *km;
struct key_msgdata *keyinfoi
DPRINTF (IDL_GROSS_EVENT,
if

«krn == 0)
return (-1) ;

II

("Entering key _msghdr2secassoc\n") ) ;

(keyinfo == 0)

II

(secassoc == 0))

secassoc->len = sizeof(*secassoc);
secassoc->type = km->type;
secassoc->state = km->state;
secassoc->label = km->label;
secassoc->spi = km->spii
secassoc->keylen = km->keylen;
secassoc->ivlen = km->ivlen;
secassoc->algorithm = km->algorithm;
secassoc->lifetype = km->lifetype;
secassoc->lifetimel
km->lifetimel;
secassoc->lifetime2 = km->lifetime2i
if (keyinfo->src)
bcopy«char *) (keyinfo->src),
keyinfo->src->sa_len);

(char *)&(secassoc->src),

if (keyinfo->dst)
bcopy«char *) (keyinfo->dst),
keyinfo->dst->sa_len) ;

(char *)&(secassoc->dst),

if (keyinfo->from)
bcopy( (char *) (keyinfo->from),
keyinfo->from->sa_len) i

(char *) &(secassoc->from),

/*
*

Make copies of key and iv

*/
if (secassoc->ivlen) {
K Malloc(secassoc->iv, caddr_t, secassoc->ivlen);
i f (secassoc->iv == 0) {
DPRINTF(IDL CRITICAL, ("rnsGhdr2secassoc: can't allocate mem for
iv\n"));
return (-1) i

}
bcopy( (char *)keyinfo->iv,
else
secassoc->iv = NULL;

(char *)secassoc->iv, secassoc->ivlen);

if (secassoc->keylen) {
K Malloc(secassoc->key, caddr t, secassoc->keylen);
if (secassoc->key == 0) {
DPRINTF(IDL CRITICAL, ("msGhdr2secassoc: can't allocate mem for
key\n")); ~
if (secassoc->iv)
KFree(secassoc->iv) i
return(-l) ;
5

DEF00007946

key.c

9/28/1995

}
bcopy«char *)keyinfo->key.
secassoc->keylen) ;
else
secassoc->key = NULL;
return(O) ;

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(char *)secassoc->key.

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* addrpart equal():
*
Determine if the address portion of two sockaddrs are equal.
*
Currently handles only AF INET and AF INET6 address families.

----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/
int
addrpart equal(sa1, sa2)
struct sockaddr *sa1;
struct sockaddr *sa2;

if «sal->sa family == sa2->sa family»)
switch(sal->sa_family) {
case AF INET:
if «(struct sockaddr in *)sa1)->sin addr.s addr
«struct sockaddr in *)sa2) ->sin addr.s addr)
return(1) ;
-break;
case AF INET6:
if (IN6 ADDR EQUAL«(struct sockaddr in6 *)sa1)->sin6 addr.
«struct sockaddr in6 *)sa2)->sin6_addr))
return(1) ;
break;
}
return(O) ;

/*----------------------------------------------------------------------

* my addr() :
*
Determine if an address belongs to one of my configured
interfaces.
*
Currently handles only AF INET and AF INET6 addresses.
----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

int
my_addr(sa)
struct sockaddr *sa;
extern
extern
struct
struct

struct in6 ifaddr *in6 ifaddr;
struct in ifaddr *in ifaddr;
in6 ifaddr *i6a = 0;in_ifaddr *ia = 0;

switch(sa->sa family) {
case AF INET6:
for (i6a = in6 ifaddr; i6a; i6a = i6a->i6a next) {
if (IN6 ADDR EQUAL«(struct sockaddr in6-*)sa)->sin6_addr.
i6a->i6a addr.sin6 addr))
return(l) ;
}
break;
case AF INET:
for (ia = in ifaddr; ia; ia = ia->ia next) {
if «(struct sockaddr in *)sa)->sin addr.s addr
ia->ia addr.sin addr.s addr)
return(l);
6

DEF00007947

key.c

9/28/1995

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break;
}
return(O) ;

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/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* key inittables():
*
Allocate space and initialize key engine tables
----------------------------------------------------------------------*

401
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407

void
key inittables()
{ struct key tblnode *keynode;
int i;
-

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int
key_gethashval(buf, len, tblsize)
char *buf;
int len;
int tblsize;

/

K Malloc(keyregtable, struct key_registry * sizeof(struct
key registry));
408
if (keyregtable == 0)
409
panic("key inittables");
410
bzero((char *)keyregtable, sizeof(struct key registry));
411
K Malloc(key acquirelist, struct key acquirelist *
412-sizeof(struct key_acquirelist));
413
if (key acquirelist == 0)
414
panic ("key inittables");
415
bzero((char *)key acquirelist, sizeof(scruct key_acquirelist));
416
for (i = 0; i < KEYTBLSIZE; i++)
417
bzero((char *)&keytable[i], sizeof(struct key_tblnode));
418
for (i = 0; i < KEYALLOCTBLSIZE; i++)
419
bzero((char *)&keyalloctbl[i], sizeof(struct key allocnode));
420
for (i = 0; i < S02SPITBLSIZE; i++)
421
bzero((char *)&s02spitbl[i], sizeof(struct key_s02spinode));
422
423
424
425 /*---------------------------------------------------------------------426
* key gethashval():
427
*
Determine key table hash value.
428
----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

int i, j

= 0;

/*
* Todo: Use word size xor and check for alignment
*
and zero pad if necessary.
Need to also pick
*
a good hash function and table size.
*/
i f (len <= 0) {
DPRINTF(IDL_CRITICAL, ("key_gethashval got bogus len!\n"));
return(-l);
}
for(i = 0; i < len; i++)
jA
(u_int8) (*(buf + i));
}
return (j % tblsize);

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------7

DEF00007948

key.c
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9/28/1995
* key createkey() :
Create hash key for hash function
*
key is: type+src+dst if keytype = 1
*
type+src+dst+spi if keytype = 0
*
Uses only the address portion of the src and dst sockaddrs to
*
form key.
Currently handles only AF INET and AF INET6 sockaddrs
*

----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

int
key createkey(buf, type, src, dst, spi, keytype)
- char *buf;
u int type;
struct sockaddr *src;
struct sockaddr *dst;
u int32 spi;
u_int keytype;
char *cp, *p;
DPRINTF (IDL_FINISHED, ("Entering key _createkey\n") ) ;
if

(!buf II !src
return(-l) ;

II

!dst)

cp = buf;
bcopy((char *)&type, cp, sizeof(type));
cp += sizeof(type);

/*

* Assume only IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.

*/
#define ADDRPART(a) \
((a)->sa family ~= AF INET6) ? \
(char *)&(((struct sockaddr in6 *) (a))->sin6 addr)
(char *) &( ((struct sockaddr in *) (a)) ->sin_addr)
#define ADDRSIZE(a) \
((a)->sa family == AF INET6)
sizeof(struct in_addr)

\

? sizeof(struct in_addr6)

\

DPRINTF (IDL GROSS EVENT, (" src addr: \n" ) ) ;
DDO(IDL GROSS EVENT,dump smart sockaddr(src));
DPRINTF (IDL GROSS EVENT, (" ds t addr: \n" ) ) ;
DDO (IDL,_GROSS_EVENT, dump_smart_sockaddr (dst) ) ;
p = ADD RPART (src) ;
bcopy(p, cp, ADDRSIZE(src));
cp += ADDRSIZE(src);
p = ADDRPART(dst);
bcopy(p, cp, ADDRSIZE(dst));
cp += ADDRSIZE(dst);
#undef ADDRPART
#undef ADDRSIZE
if (keytype == 0) {
bcopy((char *)&spi, cp, sizeof(spi));
cp += sizeof(spi);
DPRINTF(IDL FINISHED, ("hash key:\n"));
DDO(IDL FINISHED, dump_buf(buf, cp - buf));
return(cp - buf);

8

DEF00007949

key.c
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9/28/1995
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* key sosearch() :
*
Search the s02spi table for the security association allocated
to
the socket. Returns pOinter to a struct key_so2spinode which
*
can
*
be used to locate the security association entry in the
key table.
----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

struct key s02spinode *
key_sosearch(type, src, dst, so)
u int type;
struct sockaddr *src;
struct sockaddr *dst;
struct socket *so;
struct key_s02spinode *np = 0;
if

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5G8

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(! (sre && dst)) {
DPRINTF(IDL CRITICAL, (lIkey_sosearch: got null src or dst
pointer!\n")) ;
return (NULL) ;

for (np = s02spitbl [( (u int32) so) % S02SPITBLSIZE) .next; np; np = np->
next) {
if «so == np->socket) && (type == np->keynode->secassoc->type)
&& addrpart equal (src,
(struct sockaddr *)&(np->keynode->secassoc->src))
&& addrpart equal (dst,
(struct sockaddr *)&(np->keynode->secassoc->dst)))
return (np) ;
}
return (NULL) ;

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* key sodelete() :
*
Delete entries from the s02spi table.
*
flag = 1 purge all entries
*
flag = 0 delete entries with socket pointer matching socket

----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

void
key sodelete(socket, flag)
- struct socket *socket;
int flag;
struct key s02spinode *prevnp, *np;
int s = splnet();
DPRINTF (IDL MAJOR EVENT, ("Entering keysodelete w!so=Ox%x flag=%d\n",
socket,flaq));
i f (flag) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < S02SPITBLSIZE; i++)
for(np = s02spitbl[i) .next; np; np
KFree (np) ;
}
splx(s) ;
return;

np->next) {

577

578

prevnp

&s02spitbl [( (u_int32) socket) % S02SPITBLSIZE) ;
9

DEF00007950

key.c

9/28/1995

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for(np = prevnp->next; np; np = np->next) {
if (np->socket == socket) {
struct socketlist *socklp, *prevsocklp;
(np->keynode->alloc_count)--;

/*
*
*
*
*

*/
if (np->keynode->secassoc->state & K UNIQUE)
if (key delete(np->keynode->secassoc) != 0)
panic ("key_sodelete") ;
np = prevnp;
continue;

}

596

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If this socket maps to a unique secassoc,
we go ahead and delete the secassoc, since it
can no longer be allocated or used by any other
socket.

/*
* We traverse the socketlist and remove the entry
* for this socket

*/
DPRINTF(IDL FINISHED, ("keysodelete: deleting from socklist ... "));
prevsocklp = np->keynode->solist;
for (socklp = prevsocklp->next; socklpi socklp = socklp->next) {
if (socklp->socket == socket) {
prevsocklp->next = socklp->next;
KFree (socklp) ;
break;

}
prevsocklp

}

= socklp;

DPRINTF(IDL FINISHED, ("done\n"));
prevnp->next = np->next;
KFree (np) ;
np = prevnp;
prevnp = np;

}
splx(s);

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* key deleteacquire() :
Delete an entry from the key acquirelist
*

----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

void
key_deleteacquire(type, target)
u int type;
struct sockaddr *target;
struct key_acquirelist *ap, *prev;
prev = key acquirelist;
for(ap = key acquirelist->next; ap; ap = ap->next) {
if (addrpart equal (target, (struct sockaddr *)&(ap->target)) &&
(type == ap->type)) {
DPRINTF(IDL MAJOR EVENT, ("Deleting entry from acquire list!\n"));
prev->next = ap->next;
KFree (ap) ;
ap
prev;
prev

ap;

10

DEF00007951

key.c
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657
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659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676

9/28/1995

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* key search():
*
Search the key table for an entry with same type, src addr, dest
*
addr, and spi. Returns a pointer to struct key tblnode i f found
*
else returns null.
----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

struct key tblnode *
key_search (type, src, dst, spi, indx, prevkeynode)
u int type;
struct sockaddr *src;
struct sockaddr *dst;
u int32 spi;
int indx;
struct key_tblnode **prevkeynode;
struct key_tblnode *keynode, *prevnode;
if (indx > KEYTBLSIZE I I indx < 0)
return (NULL) i
i f (! (&keytable [indx) ) )
return (NULL) i
#define
#define
#define
#define

sec type keynode->secassoc->type
sec spi keynode->secassoc->spi
sec src keynode->secassoc->src
sec_dst keynode->secassoc->dst

prevnode = &keytable[indx);
for (keynode ~ key table [indx) .next; keynode; keynode

keynode - >next)

{
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700

if ((type == sec type) && (spi == sec spi) &&
addrpart equal (src, (struct sockaddr *)&(sec src»
&& addrpart equal (dst, (struct sockaddr *)&(sec dst»)
break;
prevnode = keynode;
}
*prevkeynode = prevnode;
return (keynode) ;

/*----------------------------------------------------------------------

* key addnode() :
i\
*
Insert a key __ tblnode entry into the key table. Returns a
pointer
*
to the newly created key tblnode.
----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

struct key tblnode *
key addnode(indx, secassoc)
- int indx;
struct ipsec_assoc *secassoc;
struct key_tblnode *keynodei
DPRINTF (IDL GROSS EVENT, ("Entering key addnode w/indx=%d
secassoc=Ox%x\n", indx, (u_int32) secassoc) ) ;

701
702
if (! (&keytable[indx))
703
return (NULL) ;
704
i f (! secas soc) {
705
panic(flkey addnode: Someone passed in a null secassoc!\nfl);
706}
11

DEF00007952

key.c

9/28/1995

707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
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740
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746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765

766
767
768

K Malloc(keynode, struct key_tblnode * sizeof(struct key_tblnode));
if (keynode == 0)
return (NULL) ;
bzero( (char *)keynode, sizeof(struct key_tblnode));
K Malloc(keynode->solist, struct socketlist *, sizeof(struct
socketlist) ) ;
if (keynode->solist ;= 0)
KFree(keynode) ;
return (NULL) ;
}
bzero «char *) (keynode->solist), sizeof (struct socketlist));
keynode->secassoc = secassoc;
keynode->solist->next ; NULL;
keynode->next = key table [indx] .next;
key table [indx] .next ; keynode;
return (keynode) ;

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* key add () :
Add a new security association to the key table.
Caller is
*
*
responsible for allocating memory for the struct ipsec_assoc as

*
well as the buffer space for the key and iv.
security
*
association passed in is well-formed.

Assumes the

----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

int
key_add (secassoc)
struct ipsec_assoc *secassoc;
char buf[MAXHASHKEYLEN];
int len, indx;
int inbound = 0;
int outbound; 0;
struct key tblnode *keynode, *prevkeynode;
struct key allocnode *np;
int s;
DPRINTF(IDL GROSS EVENT,
secassoc)) ;if

}

(IJEntering key_add w/secassoc=Ox%x\n lJ

,

(l secassoc) {
panic(nkey add: who the hell is passing me a null pointer lJ ) ;
-

/*
*

*

For storage purposes, the two esp modes are
treated the same.

*/
if (secassoc->type
S8 ENCRYPTION NETWORK)
secassoc->type ; SS_ENCRYPTION_TRAN8PORT;

/*
* Should we allow a null key to be inserted into the table ?

*

or can we use null key to indicate some policy action ...

*/
/*
*

For esp using des-cbc or tripple-des we call

* des set odd parity.

*/

-

-

-

12

DEF00007953

key.c
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777

778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795

9/28/1995

if (secassoc->key && (secassoc->type == SS ENCRYPTION TRANSPORT) &&
((secassoc->algorithm == IPSEC ALGTYPE ESP DES CBC) I I
(secassoc->algorithm == IPSEC ALGTYPE ESP 3DES)))
des_set_oddyarity (secassoc->key) ;
--

/*
*

Check if secassoc with same spi exists before adding

*/
bzero((char *)&buf, sizeof(buf));
len = key_createkey((char *)&buf, secassoc->type,
(struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->src),
(struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->dst),
secassoc->spi, 0);
indx = key gethashval((char *)&buf, len, KEYTBLSIZE);
DPRINTF(IDL GROSS EVENT, (Ilkeyadd: keytbl hash position=%d\n ll , indx));
keynode
key search(secassoc->type, (struct sockaddr *) &(secassoc->
src) ,
(struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->dst),
secassoc->spi, indx, &prevkeynode);
if (keynode) {
DPRINTF (IDL MAJOR EVENT, (II keyadd: secas soc already exists! \n II) ) ;
return(-2) ;inbound = my addr((struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->dst));
outbound = my addr((struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->src));
DPRINTF (IDL_FINISHED, (" inbound=%d outbound=%d\n", inbound, outbound));

796

/*

797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810

*
*
*
*

We allocate mem for an allocation entry if needed.
This is done here instead of in the allocaton code
segment so that we can easily recover/cleanup from a
memory allocation error.

*/

if

(outbound I I (! inbound && ! outbound)) {
K Malloc(np, struct key allocnode *, sizeof(struct key_allocnode));
i f (np == 0) {
DPRINTF(IDL CRITICAL, (Ilkeyadd: can't allocate allocnode!\n ll ) ) ;
return (-1) ; -

s = splnet();

811

812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834

if

((keynode = key addnode(indx, secassoc)) == NULL) {
DPRINTF (IDL CRITICAL, ("lceyadd: key_addnode failed! \n") ) ;
i f (np)
KFree (np) ;
splx(s) ;
return(-l) ;

}
DPRINTF (IDL EVENT, (" Added new keynode: \n") ) ;
DDO(IDL GROSS EVENT, dump keytblnode(keynode));
DDO(IDL_GR088_EVENT, dump_secassoc(keynode->secassoc));

/*
*

*

*
*
*

*
*

We add an entry to the allocation table for
this secas soc if the interfaces are up and
the secassoc is outbound.
In the case
where the interfaces are not up, we go ahead
and do it anyways.
This wastes an allocation
entry if the secas soc later turned out to be
inbound when the interfaces are ifconfig up.

*/

if (outbound I I (!inbound && !outbound)) {
len = key createkey((char *)&buf, secassoc->type,
(struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->src),
13

DEF00007954

9/28/1995

key.c
(struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->dst),

835
836
837
838

0,

839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
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862
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865
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867
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872
873
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875
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877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896

1);

indx = key gethashval«char *)&buf, len, KEYALLOCTBLSIZE);
DPRINTF (IDL GROSS EVENT, ("keyadd: keyalloc hash position=%d\n",
indx)) i
np->keynode = keynodei
np->next = keyalloctbl[indx) .next;
keyalloctbl[indx) .next = np;

}
if (inbound)
secassoc->state 1= K_INBOUND;
i f (outbound)
secassoc->state 1= K_OUTBOUND;
key deleteacquire(secassoc->type,
*)&(secassoc->dst)) i

(struct sockaddr

splx(s);
return 0;

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* key get () :
*
Get a security association from the key table.

----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

int
key_get (type, src, dst, spit secassoc)
u int type;
struct sockaddr *srci
struct sockaddr *dst;
u int32 spi;
struct ipsec_assoc **secassoc;
char buf[MAX~~SHKEYLEN);
struct key tblnode *keynode, *prevkeynode;
int len, indx;

/*
*
*

For storage purposes, the two esp modes are
treated the same.

*/
.i. f

(type == 88 ENCRYPTION NETWORK)
type = SS_ENCRYPTION_TRANSPORTi

bzero(&buf, sizeof(buf));
*secassoc = NULL;
len = key createkey«char *)&buf, type, src, dst, spi, 0);
indx = key gethashval«char *)&buf, len, KEYTBLSIZE) i
DPRINTF (IDL GROSS EVENT, ("keyget: indx=iI>d\n", indx) ) ;
keynode = key search(type, src, dst, spi, indx, &prevkeynode) i
if (keynode) {
DPRINTF(IDL_EVENT, (IIkeyget: found it! keynode=Ox%x",keynode»);
*secassoc = keynode->secassoc;
return(O);
else
return(-l);
/* Not found */

/*----------------------------------------------------------------------

* key dump():
*
Dump all valid entries in the key table to a pf key socket. Each
*
security associaiton is sent one at a time in a pf_key message.

A

897

*

message with seqno = 0 signifies the end of the dump
14

DEF00007955

key.c
897
898

899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912

913
914
915

9/28/1995
transaction.

----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

int
key_dump (so)
struct socket *so;
int len. i;
int seq = 1;
struct mbuf *mi
struct key msgdata keyinfo;
struct key msghdr *km;
struct key tblnode *keynode;
extern struct sockaddr key srCi
extern struct sockaddr key_dst;

/*

* Routine to dump the key table to a routing socket
* Use for debugging only!

*/

916

917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928

929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960

DPRINTF(IDL GROSS EVENT. ("Entering key_dump() ")) ;
/*
-* We need to speed this up later. Fortunately. key dump
* messages are not sent often.
*/
for (i = 0; i < KEYTBLSIZE; itt) {
for (keynode = keytable[iJ .next; keynode; keynode = keynode->next)
/*

* We exclude dead/larval/zombie security associations for now
* but it may be useful to also send these up for debugging
purposes

*/

if (keynode->secassoc->state & (K_DEAD
continue;

K LARVAL

K_ZOMBIE))

len

= (sizeof(struct key msghdr) +
ROUNDUP(keynode->secassoc->src.sin6 len) t
ROUNDUP(keynode->secassoc->dst.sin6 len) +
ROUNDUP (keynode->secassoc->from. sin6_len) +
ROUNDUP (keynode->secassoc->keylen) +
ROUNDUP (keynode->secassoc->ivlen)) ;
K Malloc (km. struct key msghdr *. len);
i f (km == 0)
return (ENOBUFS) ;
if (key secassoc2msghdr(keynode->secassoe. km. &keyinfo)
panic ("key dump") i
km->key msglen = len;
km->key msgvers = KEY VERSION;
km->key msgtype = KEY DUMP;
km->key pid = eurproe->p_pid;
km->key seq = seq++;
km->key errno = 0;
MGETHDR(m. M WAIT. MT DATA) ;
m->m len = m->m pkthdr.len
0;
m->m next = 0; m->m nextpkt = 0;
m->m pkthdr.rcvif = 0;
m copyback(m. O. len. (caddr_t)l<m);
KFree (km) ;
if (sbappendaddr(&so->so rev. &key src. m. (struet mbuf
m free (m) ;
- else
sorwakeup(so);
}

!=

*) 0)

0)

0)

961

15

DEF00007956

key.c

9/28/1995

K Malloc(km, struct key msghdr *, sizeof(struct key_msghdr));
if (km == 0)
return (ENOBUFS) ;
bzero«char *)km, sizeof(struct key msghdr));
km->key msglen = sizeof (struct key_msghdr);
km->key msgvers = KEY VERSION;
km->key msgtype = KEY DUMP;
km->key pid = curproc->p pid;
km->key seq = 0;
km->key errno = 0;
MGETHDR(m, M WAIT, MT DATA) i
m->m len = m->m-pkthdr.len
0;
ffi->m next = 0;
m->m nextpkt = 0;
m->m pkthdr.rcvif = 0;
m copyback(m, 0, km->key msglen, (caddr t)km);
KFree (km) ;
if (sbappendaddr(&so->so_rcv, &key_src, m, (struct mbuf *)0)
fll free (m) ;
else
sorwakeup (so) ;
DPRINTF (IDL GROSS EVENT, ( II Leaving key_dump ( ) \n II) ) ;
return(O); -

962
963
964

965
966
967
968

969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990

0)

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* key delete():
*
Delete a security association from the key table.

----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004
1005
1006
1007
1008
1009
1010
1011
1012
1013
1014
1015
1016
1017
1018
1019
1020
1021
1022
1023
1024

int
key delete (secassoc)
- struct ipsec_assoc *secassoc;
char buf[MAXHASHKEYLEN];
int len, indx;
struct key tblnode *keynode = 0;
struct key tblnode *prevkeynode = 0;
struct socketlist *socklp, *deadsocklp;
struct key so2spinode *np, *prevnp;
struct key_allocnode *ap, *prevap;
int s;
DPRINTF(IDL GROSS EVENT, ("Entering key delete w/secassoc=Ox%x\n",
secassoc) ) ; if (secassoc->type == 8S ENCRYPTION NETWORK)
secas soc - >type = SSENCRYPTION_TRANSPORT;
bzero«char *)&buf, sizeof(buf));
len = key_createkey«char *)&buf, secassoc->type,
(struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->src),
(struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->dst),
secassoc->spi, 0);
indx = key gethashval«char *)&buf, len, KEYTBLSIZE);
DPRINTF(IDL_GROSS_EVENT, (Ilkeydelete: keytbl hash position=%d\n",
indx));
keynode
key_search (secassoc->type, (struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->
src) ,
(struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->dst) ,
secassoc->spi, indx, &prevkeynode);
if

(keynode) {
s = spInet () ;
DPRINTF(IDL EVENT, ("keydelete: found keynode to delete\n"));
keynode->secassoc->state 1= K_DEADi

16

DEF00007957

key.c
1025
1026
1027
1028
1029
1030
1031
1032
1033
1034
1035
1036
1037
1038
1039
1040
1041
1042
1043
1044
1045
1046
1047
1048
1049
1050
1051
1052
1053
1054
1055
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1057
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1062
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1064
1065
1066
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1068
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1070
1071
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1073
1074
1075
1076
1077
1078
1079
1080
1081
1082
1083
1084
1085
1086
1087
1088
1089

9/28/1995

if (keynode->ref count > 0) {
DPRINTF(IDL MAJOR EVENT, ("keydelete: secas soc still held, marking
for deletion only!\n"));
splx(s) ;
return (0) ;
prevkeynode->next = keynode->next;
/*
*
*
*

Walk the socket list and delete the
entries mapping sockets to this secas soc
from the so2spi table.

*/
DPRINTF (IDL GROSS EVENT, ("keydelete: deleting socklist ... ") ) ;
for(socklp = keynode->solist->next; socklpi ) f
prevnp = &S02spitbl [( (u int32) (socklp->socket)) % S02SPITBLSIZE) ;
for(np = prevnp->next; np; np = np->next) {
if ((np->socket == socklp->socket) && (np->keynode == keynode)) {
prevnp->next = np->next;
KFree (np) ;
break;
prevnp = np;
}
deadsocklp = socklPi
socklp = socklp->next;
KFree(deadsocklp) ;
}
DPRINTF (IDL GROSS EVENT, (" done \n" ) ) ;

/*

--

* If an allocation entry exist for this
* secassoc, delete it.
*/
bzero((char *)&buf, sizeof(buf));
len = key createkey((char *)&buf, secassoc->type,
(struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->src).
(struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->dst),
0,

1);

indx = key gethashval((char *)&buf, len, KEYALLOCTBLSIZE) i
DPRINTF(IDL GROSS EVENT, ("keydelete: alloctbl hash position=%d\n",
indx)) ;
prevap = &keyalloctbl[indx);
for (ap = prevap->next; ap; ap = ap->next) {
if (ap->keynode == keynode) {
prevap->next = ap->next;
KFree (ap) i
break;
}
prevap = ap;
if (keynode->secassoc->iv)
KFree(keynode->secassoc->iv);
if (keynode->secassoc->key)
KFree(keynode->secassoc->key) ;
KFree(keynode->secassoc) i
if (keynode->solist)
KFree(keynode->solist) ;
KFree(keynode);
splx(s) i
return(O) ;
}
return(-l) ;

17

DEF00007958

key.c
1090
1091
1092
1093
1094
1095
1096
1097
1098
1099
1100
1101
1102
1103
1104
1105
1106
1107
1108
1109
1110
1111
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116
1117
1118
1119
1120
1121
1122
1123
1124
1125
1126
1127
1128
1129
1130
1131
1132
1133
1134
1135
1136
1137
1138
1139
1140
1141
1142
1143
1144
1145
1146
1147
1148
1149
1150
1151
1152
1153

9/28/1995

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* key flush () ;
Delete all entries from the key table.
*

----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

void
key flush (void)

{

-

struct key_tblnode *keynode;
int i;

/*
* T.his is slow, but. simple.

*/

DPRINTF(IDL FINISHED, ("Flushing key table ... "»);
for (i = O;-i < KEYTBLSIZE; i++) f
while (keynode = keytable[il .next)
if (key delete (keynode- >secassoc) ! = 0)
panic ("key_flush") ;
}
DPRINTF(IDL_FINISHED, (fldone\n"»;

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* key getspi () :
Get a unique spi value for a key management daemon/program.
*

The

spi value, once assigned, cannot be assigned again.

*

----------------------------------------------------------------------*
/

int
key getspi(type, src, dst, spi)
- u int type;
struct sockaddr *src;
struct sockaddr *dst;
u_int32 *spi;

struct ipsec assoc *secassoc;
struct key tblnode *keynode, *prevkeynode;
int count ,-done , len, indx;
int maxcount = 1000;
u int32 val;
char buf[MAXHASHKEYLEN);
int S;
DPRINTF(IDL MAJOR EVENT, ("Entering getspi w/type=%d\n" ,type) );
i f (! (src && dst)
ret urn ( -1) ;

/*
*

For storage purposes, the two esp modes are
treated the same.

*

*/
if

(type == SS ENCRYPTION NETWORK)
type = SS_ENCRYPT I ON_TRANSPORT;

done = count = 0;
do {
count++;
/*
* Currently, valid spi values are 32 bits wide except for
* the value of zero. This need to change to take into
* account more restrictive spi ranges.

*

*

TODO:

Kebe says to allow key mgnt daemon to specify r:ange
18

DEF00007959

key.e
1154
1155
1156
1157
1158
1159
1160
1161
1162
1163
1164
1165
1166
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172
1173
1174
1175
1176
1177
1178
1179
1180
1181
1182
1183
1184
1185
1186
1187
1188
1189
1190
1191
1192
1193
1194
1195
1196
1197
1198
1199
1200
1201
1202
1203
1204
1205
1206
1207
1208
1209
1210
1211
1212
1213
1214
1215
1216
1217
1218

9/28/1995

*

of valid spi to get.

*/
val
random () ;
DPRINTF(IDL FINISHED, ("%u ",val»;
i f (val) { DPRINTF (IDL FINISHED, (" \n") ) ;
bzero(&buf,-sizeof(buf») ;
len = key ereatekey( (char *)&buf, type, sre, dst, val, 0);
indx = key gethashval((ehar *)&buf, len, KEYTBLSIZE);
if(!key search (type, sre, dst, val, indx, &prevkeynode»
s = spInet () ;
K Malloc(secassoc, struct ipsec as soc *, sizeof(struct
ipsec assoc»;
i f (secassoc == 0) {
DPRINTF(IDL CRITICAL, ("key getspi: can't allocate memory\n"»;
splx(s);
return (-1) ;

}
bzero((char *)secassoc, sizeof(struct ipsec_assoc»;
DPRINTF (IDL FINISHED, ("getspi: indx=%d\n", indx) ) ;
secassoc->len = sizeof(struct ipsec_assoc);
secassoc->type = type;
secassoc->spi = val;
secassoc->state 1= K LARVAL;
if (my addr((struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->dst»)
secassoc->state 1= K INBOu~D;
if (my addr((struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->src»)
secassoc->state 1= K_OUTBOUND;
bcopy((char *)src,
bcopy ((char *) dst,
secassoc->from.sin6
secassoc->from.sin6

(char *)&(secassoc->src), src->sa len);
(char *) &(secassoc->dst), dst->sa len);
family - AF INET6;
len
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);

/*
*
*
*
*
*

We need to add code to age these larval key table
entries so they don't linger forever waiting for
a KEY UPDATE message that may not come for various
reasons.
This is another task that key reaper can
do once we have it coded.
-

*/
secassoc->lifetime1
if

time.tv_sec + maxlarvallifetime;

(! (keynode = key addnode(indx, secassoc») {
DPRINTF(IDL CRITICAL, ("key getspi: can't add node\n"»;
splx(s);
return (-1) ;

}
DPRINTF (IDL_FINISHED, ("key_getspi: added node Ox%x\n",keynode»;
done++;
splx(s) ;
}

}
} whi le (( coun t < maxcount) && ! done) ;
DPRINTF(IDL FINISHED, (Ilgetspi returns
w/spi=%u,count=%d\n",val,count»;
i f (done) {
*spi = val;
return (0) ;
else {
*spi = 0;
return(-l) ;

19

DEF00007960

key.c
1219
1220
1221
1222
1223

9/28/1995

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* key update () :
*
Update a key table entry that has an spi value assigned but is
*
incomplete (e.g. no key/iv).

----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228
1229
1230
1231
1232
1233
1234
1235
1236
1237
1238
1239
1240
1241
1242
1243
1244
1245
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1247
1248
1249
1250
1251
1252
1253
1254
1255
1256
1257
1258
1259
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1261
1262
1263
1264
1265
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1267
1268
1269
1270
1271
1272
1273
1274
1275
1276
1277
1278
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284

int
key update (secassoc)
- struct ipsec_assoc *secassoc;
struct key tblnode *keynode, *prevkeynode;
struct key allocnode *np = OJ
1.1 int8 newstate;
int len, indx, inbound, outboundj
char buf[MAXHASHKEYLEN];
int Si

/*

"

"
*/
if

For storage purposes, the two esp modes are
treated the same.

(secassoc->type == SS ENCRYPTION NETWORK)
secassoc->type = SS_ENCRYPTION_TRANSPORTi

bzero(&buf, sizeof(buf));
len = key createkey«char *)&buf, secassoc->type,
(struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->src),
(struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->dst),
secassoc->spi, 0) i
indx = key gethashval«char *)&buf, len, KEYTBLSIZE};
if(! (keynode = key search(secassoc->type,
(struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->src),
(struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->dst),
secassoc->spi, indx, &prevkeynode)))
return (ESRCH) ;
}
if (keynode->secassoc->state & K_DEAD)
return (ESRCH) i
/* Should we also restrict updating of only LARVAL entries ? */
s

=

spInet () i

inbound = my addr«struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->dst));
outbound = my_addr«struct sockaddr ")&(secassoc->src)) i
newstate = keynode->secassoc->state;
news tate &= -K LARVAL;
i f ( inbound)
newstate 1= K_INBOUNDi
i f (outbound)
newstate 1= K_OUTBOUNDi
if

(outbound II (!inbound && !outbound)) {
K Malloc(np, struct key allocnode *, sizeof(struct key_allocnode));
i f (np == 0) {
DPRINTF(IDL CRITICAL, (Hkeyupdate: can't allocate allocnode!\nH));
splx(s);
return (ENOBUFS) i

/*
*
*
*

We now copy the secassoc over. We don't need to copy
the key and iv into new buffers since the calling routine
does that already.

*/
20

DEF00007961

9/28/1995

key.c
1285
1286
1287
1288
1289
1290
1291
1292
1293
1294
1295
1296
1297
1298
1299
1300
1301
1302
1303
1304
1305
1306
1307
1308
1309
1310

* (keynode->secassoc) = *secassoc;
keynode->secassoc->state = newstate;

/*
* Should we allow a null key to be inserted into the table ?
* or can we use null key to indicate some policy action ...

*/
if (keynode->secassoc->key &&
(keynode->secassoc->type == SS ENCRYPTION TRANSPORT) &&
«keynode->secassoc->algorithm-== IPSEC ALGTYPE ESP DES CBC)
(keynode->s8cassoc->algorithm == IPSEC ALGTYPE_ESP_3DES)))des_set_odd_parity(keynode->secassoc->key) ;

/*

*

1325
1326
1327
1328
1329
1330
1331
1332
1333
1334
1335
1336
1337
1338
1339
1340
1341
1342
1343
1344
1345
1346

We now add an entry to the allocation table for this
updated key table entry.

*

*/

if

(outbound II (! inbound && !outbound)) {
len = key createkey( (char *)&buf, secassoc->type,
(struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->src),
(struct sockaddr *)&(secassoc->dst),
0,

1) i

indx = key gethashval«char *)&buf, len, KEYALLOCTBLSIZE) i
DPRINTF(IDL FINISHED, ("keyupdate: keyalloc hash position=%d\n",
indx) ) ;
np->keynode = keynode;
np->next = keyalloctbl[indx) .next;
keyalloctbl[indx) .next = np;

1311
1312
1313
1314
1315
1316
1317
1318
1319
1320
1321
1322
1323
1324

II

key deleteacquire (secassoc- >type,
*)&(secassoc->dst)) ;

(struct sockaddr

splx(S) ;
return(O) ;

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* key register():
*
Register a socket as one capable of acquiring security
associations
*
for the kernel.

----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

int
key register (socket, type)
- struct socket *socket;
u_int type;
struct key registry *p, *new;
int s = splnet();
DPRINTF (IDL MAJOR EVENT, ( "Entering key_register w/so=Ox%x, type=%d\n",
socket,type));
if (! (keyregtable && socket))
panic ("key_register");

/*
* Make sure entry is not already in table

*/

for(p = keyregtable->next; Pi P = p->next) {
if «p->type == type) && (p->socket == socket))
splx(s) ;
return (EEXIST) ;
21

DEF00007962

key.c
1347
1348
1349
1350
1351
1352
1353
1354
1355
1356
1357
1358
1.359
1360
1361
1362
1363
1364
1365
1366
1367
1368
1369
1370
1371
1372
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1374
1375
1376
1377
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1381
1382
1383
1384
1385
1386
1387
1388
1389
1390
1391
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1395
1396
1397
1398
1399
1400
1401
1402
1403
1404
1405
1406
1407
1408
1409
1410

9/28/1995

K Malloc(new, struct key_registry *
(new == 0) {
splx(s) ;
return(ENOBUFS) ;

sizeof(struct key_registry));

if

new->type = type;
new->socket = socket;
new->next = keyregtable->next;
keyregtable->next = new;
sp1x (8) ;
return(O) ;

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* key unregister() :
*
Delete entries from the registry list.
*
a11f1ag = 1 : delete all entries with matching socket
*
allf1ag = 0 : delete only the entry matching socket and type

----------------------------------------------------------------------*
/

void
key unregister(socket, type, allflag)
- struct socket *socket;
u int type;
int allflag;
struct key registry *p, *prev;
int s = splnet();
DPRINTF (IDL Mll.JOR EVENT, ("Entering key unregister
w/so=Ox%x,type=%d,flag=%d\n",socket, type, allflag));
(1 (keyregtable && socket))
panic ("key register");
prey = keyregtable;
for(p = keyregtable->next; p; p = p->next) {
if «allflag && (p->socket == socket)) II
«p->type == type) && (p->socket == socket)))
prev->next = p->next;
KFree (p) ;
p = prey;

if

prey = p;

}
splx (s) ;

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* key acquire() :
*
Send a key acquire message to all registered key mgnt daemons
*
capable of acquire security association of type type.

*

*
*

Return: 0 if succesfully called key mgnt. daemon(s)
-1 if not successfull.

----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

int
key_acquire (type, src, dst)
u int type;
struct sockaddr *src;
struct sockaddr *dsti

{
struct key_registr"y *p;
22

DEF00007963

9/28/1995

key.c
1411
1412
1413
1414
1415
1416
1417
1418
1419
1420
1421
1422
1423
1424
1425
1426
1427
1428
1429
1430
1431
1432
1433
1434
1435
1436
1437
1438
1439
1440
1441
1442
1443
1444
1445
1446
1447
1448
1449
1450
1451
1452
1453

struct key acquirelist *ap, *prevap;
int success = 0, created = 0;
struct socket *last = 0;
struct mbuf *m = 0;
u int etype;
extern struct sockaddr key_src;
DPRINTF (IDL_MAJOR_EVENT, ( tlEntering key_acquire () \ntl) ) ;
if

(!keyregtable
return (-1);

1456
1457

1465

1466
1467
1468

II

!dst)

/*
* Since we're already looking at the list, we may as
* well delete expired entries as we scan through the list.
* This should really be done by a function like key reaper()
* but until we code key reaper(), this is a quick and dirty
* hack.
*/
DPRINTF(IDL MA.JOR EVENT, ("found an expired entry ... del.eting
it!\n tl )); prevap->next = ap->next;
KFree (ap) ;
ap = prevapi

1454

1460
1461
1462
1463
1464

!src

/*
* We first check the acquirelist to see if a key acquire
* message has been sent for this destination.
*/
etype = type;
if (etype == SS ENCRYPTION NETWORK)
etype = SS ENCRYPTION TRANSPORT;
prevap = key acquirelist;
for(ap = key acquirelist->next; ap; ap = ap->next) {
if (addrpart equal (dst, (struct sockaddr *)&(ap->target)) &&
(etype == ap->type)) {
DPRINTF(IDL MAJOR EVENT, (tlacquire message previously sent!\n tl ));
if (ap->expiretime < time.tv sec) {
DPRINTF(IDL MAJOR EVENT, (tlacquire message has expired!\n tl ));
ap->count =-0;
break;
}
if (ap->count < maxkeyacquire) {
DPRINTF(IDL MAJOR EVENT, ("max acquire messages not yet
exceeded!\n")); break;
}
return (0) ;
else if (ap->expiretime < time.tv_sec)

1455
1458
1459

II

prevap = ap;
/*
* Scan registry and send KEY ACQUIRE message to
* appropriate key management daemons.

*/
for(p = keyregtable->next; p; p
if (p->type != type)
continue;

=

p->next)

(! created) {
struct key msghdr *km;
int len; -

1469

if

1470
1471
1472
1473
1474
1475

len = sizeof(struct key_msghdr) + ROUNDUP (src->sa_len)
ROUNDUP(dst->sa len) ;
K_Malloc (km, st:ruct key_msghdr * len);

+

23

DEF00007964

key.c
1476
1477
1478
1479
1480
1481
1482
1483
1484
1485
1486
1487
J.488
1489
1490
1491
1492
1493
1494
1495
1496
1497
1498
1499
1500
1501
1502
1503
1504
1505
1506
J.507
1508
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1512
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1514
1515
1516
1517
1518
1519
1520
1521
1522
1523
1524
1525
1526
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1528
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153J.
1532
1533
1534
1535
1536
1537
1538
1539
1540
1541
1542

9/28/1995
i f (km == 0) {
DPRINTF(IDL CRITICAL, ("key acquire: no memory\n"»;
return ( -1) ; -

}

DPRINTF (IDL FINISHED, ("key acquire/created: 1 \n") ) ;
bzero((char-*)km, len);
km->key msglen = len;
km->key msgvers = KEY VERSION;
km->key msgtype = KEY ACQUIRE;
km->type = type;
DPRINTF (IDL FINISHED, ("key acquire/created: 2\n"»;
/*
* This is inefficient and slow.
*/
/*
* We zero out sin zero here for AF INET addresses because
* ip_output() currently does not do it for performance reasons.
*/
if (src->sa family == AF INET)
bzero((char *) (&((struct sockaddr in *)src)->sin zero),
sizeof(((struct sockaddr in-*)src)->sin zero»;
if (dst->sa family == AF INET)
bzero( (char *) (&( (struct sockaddr in *)dst) ->sin zero),
sizeof (( (struct sockaddr_in---*) dst) ->sin_zero»;
bcopy( (char *)src, (char *) (km + 1), src->sa len);
bcopy( (char *)dst, (char *) ((int) (km + 1) + ROUNDUP(src->sa_len»,
dst->sa len);
DPRINTF(IDL FINISHED, (Ilkey acquire/created: 3\n"»;
MGETHDR(m, M WAIT, MT DATA);
m->m len = m->m pkthdr.len = 0;
m->m next = 0; m->m nextpkt = 0;
m->m pkthdr.rcvif = 0;
m copyback(m, 0, len, (caddr t)km);
KFree (km) ;
DPRINTF(IDL FINISHED, ("key acquire/created: 4\n"»);
DDO(IDL FINISHED,dump mchain(m);
created++;
}

(last) {
stL'uct rnbuf -kn;
if (n = m copy(m, 0, (int)M COPYALL»
{
i f (sbappendaddr(&last->so rcv, &key_src, n, (struct mbuf *)0)
m freem (n) i
else {
sorwakeup(last) ;
success++;
} }
DPRINTF(IDL_FINISHED, ("key_acquire/last: l\n") i
if

last

=

0)

p->socket;

}
i f (last)

{
if (sbappendaddr(&last->so_rcv, &key_src, rn, (struct mbuf *)0) -= 0)
m freem (m) ;
else {
sorwakeup(last) ;
success++;
}
DPRINTF(IDL_FINISHED, ("key_acquire/last: 2\n"» i
else
m_freem (m) ;

/*
24

DEF00007965

key.c

9/28/1995

1543
1544
1545
1546
1547
1548

*

(success) {
(!ap) {
DPRINTF(IDL MAJOR EVENT, ("Adding new entry in acquirelist\n"));
K Malloc(ap, struct key acquirelist *, sizeof(struct
key acquirelist));
i f (ap == 0)
return(success ? 0 : -1);
bzero((char *)ap, sizeof(struct key acquirelist)) i
bcopy((char *)dst, (char *)&(ap->target), dst->sa_len)i
ap->type = etypei
ap->next = key acquireli.st->nexti
key_acquirelist->next = ap;
}
DPRINTF (IDL EVENT, ("Updating acquire counter and expiration
time\n") ); ap->count++;
ap->expiretime = time.tv sec + rnaxacquiretirnei

if

if

1549
1550
1551
1552
1553
1554
1555
1556
1557
1558
1559
1560
1561
1562
1563
1564
1565
1566
1567
1568
1569
1570
157l
1572
1573
1574
1575
1576
1577
1578
1579
1580
1581
1582
1583
1584
1585
1586
1587
1588
1589
1590
1591
1592
1593
1594
1595
1596
1597
1598
1599
1600
1601
1602
1603

Update the acquirelist

*/

}
DPRINTF (IDL MAJOR EVENT, (" key acquire: done! success=%d\n", success) ) ;
return(success ? 0 : -1) i
-

/*----------------------------------------------------------------------

* key alloc():
*
Allocate a security association to a socket. A socket
requesting
*
unique keying (per-socket keying) is assigned a security
assocation
*
exclusively for its use. Sockets not requiring unique keying
are
*
assigned the first security association which rnay or may not be
*
used by another socket.
----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

int
key alloc(type, src, dst, socket, unique_key, keynodep)
- u int type;
struct sockaddr *src;
struct sockaddr *dst;
struct socket *socket;
u int unique key;
struct key_tblnode **keynodep;
struct key tblnode *keynode;
char buf[M~~HASHKEYLENl;
struct key allocnode *np, *prevnp;
struct key so2spinode *nemlp;
int len; int indx;
DPRINTF (IDL GROSS EVENT, ("Entering key _alloc w/type=%u! \n", type) ) ;
i f (! (s rc && ds t)) {
DPRINTF(IDL CRITICAL, ("key alloc: received null src or dst!\n")) i
return(-I);-

/*
*
*

We treat esp-transport mode and esp-tunnel mode
as a single type in the key table.

*/
if (type == S8 ENCRYPTION NETWORK)
type = SS ENCRYPTION_TRANSPORT;

/*
* Sear'ch key allocation table
25

DEF00007966

9/28/1995

key.c

1604
1605
1606
1607
1608
1609
1610
1611
1612
1613
1614
1615
1616
1617
1618
1619
1620
1621
1622
1623
1624
1625
1626
1627
1628
1629
1630
1631
1632
1633
1634
1635
1636
1637
1638
1639
1640
1641
1642
1643
1644
1645
1646
1647
1648
1649
1650
1651
1652
1653
1654
1655
1656
1657
1658
1659
1660
1661
1662
1663
1664
1665
1666

*/
bzero((char *)&buf, sizeof(buf));
len = key createkey((char *)&buf, type, src, dst, 0, 1);
indx = key_gethashval((char *)&buf, len, KEYALLOCTBLSIZE);
#define
#define
#define
#define

np type np->keynode->secassoc->type
np state np->keynode->secassoc->state
np src (struct sockaddr *)&(np->keynode->secassoc->src)
np_dst (struct sockaddr *)&(np->keynode->secassoc->dst)

prevnp = &keyalloctbl[indx];
for (np = keyalloctbl[indx] .next; npi np = np->next) {
if ((type == np type) && addrpart_equal(src, np_src) &&
addrpart equal (dst, np dst) &&
! (np_state & (K LARVAL-, K_DEAD
K_UNIQUE)))
if (! (unique key))
break;
if (! (np state & K_USED))
breaki
-

}
prevnp
if

npi

(np) {
struct key s02spinode *newp;
struct socketlist *newsPi
int s = splnet();
DPRINTF(IDL MAJOR EVENT, ("keY alloc: found node to allocate\n"));
keynode = np->keynode;
K Malloc(newnp, struct key_so2spinode *, sizeof(struct
key so2spinode)) i
i f (newnp == 0) {
DPRINTF(IDL CRITICAL, ("key alIoc: Can't alloc mem for s02spi
node! \n") ) ; splx(s) ;
return (ENOBUFS) i

}
K Malloc(newsp, struct socketlist *, sizeof(struct socketlist));
if (newsp == 0) {
DPRINTF(IDL CRITICAL, ("key_alloc: Can't alloc mem for
socketlist!\n")) ;
if (newnp)
KFree (newnp) ;
splx(s);
return (ENOBUFS) ;

/*

*
*

Add a hash entry into the so2spi table to
map socket to allocated Eecassoc.

*/
DPRINTF(IDL GROSS EVENT, ("key alloc: adding entry to s02spi
table ... " ) ) ;
newnp->keynode = keynodei
newnp->socket = socket;
newnp->next = s02spitbl[((u int32) socket) % S02SPITBLSIZE] .next;
so2spitbl [( (u int32) socket) -% S02SPITBLSIZE] .next = newnPi
DPRINTF(IDL_GROSS_EVENT, ("done\n"));
if

(unique key)

/*

-

{

* Need to remove the allocation entry
* since the secas soc is now unique and
* can't be allocated to any other socket

*/
26

DEF00007967

9/28/1995

key.c
1667
1668
1669
1670
1671
1672
1673
1674
1675
1676
1677
1678
1679
1680
1681
1682
1683
1684
1685
1686
1687
1688
16.89
1690
1691
1692
1693
1694
1695
1696
1697
1698
1699
1700
1701
1702
1703

DPRINTF(IDL MAJOR EVENT, ("key alloc: making keynode unique ... "));
keynode->secassoc->state 1= K_UNIQUE;
prevnp->next = np->next;
KFree (np) i
DPRINTF (IDL_MAJOR_EVENT, ("done\n") ) ;

}
keynode->secassoc->state 1= K USED;
keynode->secassoc->state 1= K_OUTBOUND;
keynode->alloc_count++;

/*
* Add socket to list of socket using secassoc.

*/
DPRINTF(IDL GROSS EVENT, ("key alloc: adding so to solist ... "));
newsp->socket = socket;
newsp->next = keynode->solist->next;
keynode->solist->next = newsPi
DPRINTF (IDL GROSS EVENT, (" done \n" ) ) i
*keynodep =-keynode;
splx(s) ;
return(O) ;

}
*keynodep = NULL;
return(O) ;

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* key free():
*
Decrement the refcount for a key table entry.
If the entry is
*
marked dead, and the refcount is zero, we go ahead and delete
it.

----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

void
key free(keynode)
- struct key_tblnode *keynode;
DPRINTF (IDL MAJOR EVENT, ("Entering key_free
w/keynode=Ox%x\n",keynode)) ;
if (! keynode) {
DPRINTF(IDL_CRITICAL, ("Warning: key_free got null pointer\n"));
return;
}
(keynode->ref count)--;
if (keynode->ref count < 0) {
DPRINTF (IDL CRITICAL, ("Warning: key_free decremented refcount to
%d\n" , keynode->ref_count) ) ;
}
if «keynode->secassoc->state & K_DEAD) && (keynode->ref_count <= 0))

1704
1705
1706
1707
1708
1709
1710
1711
1712

{
1713
1714
1715
1716
1717
1718
1719
1720
1721
1722
1723
1724
1725
1726
1727

DPRINTF(IDL MAJOR EVENT, ("key free: calling key_delete\n"))
key_delete (keynode->secassoc) i

i

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* getassocbyspi():
*
Get a security association for a given type, src, dst, and spi.

*

*
*

Returns: 0 if sucessfull
-1 if error/not found

*
*

Caller must convert spi to host order.

*

in host order!

Function assumes spi is

----------------------------------------------------------------------*
27

DEF00007968

key.c
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9/28/1995

/

int
getassocbyspi(type, src, dst, spi, keyentry)
u int type;
struct sockaddr *src;
struct sockaddr *dst;
u int32 spi;
struct key_tblnode **keyentry;
char buf[MAXHASHKEYLEN];
int len, indx;
struct key_tblnode *keynode, *prevkeynode = 0;
DPRINTF (IDL GROSS EVENT, ("Entering getassocbyspi w/type=%u spi=%u\n",
type,spi);-

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/*

*
*

We treat esp-transport mode and esp-tunnel mode
as a single type in the key table.

*/
if (type == SS ENCRYPTION NETWORK)
type = SS_ENCRYPTION_TRANSPORT;
*keyentry = NULL;
bzero(&buf, sizeof(buf»;
len = key createkey((char *)&buf, type, src, dst, spi, 0);
indx = key gethashval((char *)&buf, len, KEYTBLSIZE);
DPRINTF (IDL FINISHED, ("getassocbyspi: indx=%d\n", indx» ;
DDO(IDL FINISHED,dump sockaddr(src);dump sockaddr(dst» i
keynode-= key search(type, src, dst, spi, indx, &prevkeynode);
DPRINTF (IDL GROSS EVENT, (ligetassocbyspi: keysearch
ret=Ox%x\n" ,keynode»;
i f (keynode && ! (keynode->secassoc->state & (K DEAD I K LARVAL»)
DPRINTF(IDL EVENT, ("getassocbyspi: found secassoc!\n"»;
(keynode->ref count)++;
*keyentry = keynode;
else {
DPRINTF(IDL MAJOR EVENT, ("getassocbyspi: secas soc not found!\n"»;
return (-1);
}
return(O) ;

/*---------------------------------------------------------------------* getassocbysocket():
*
Get a security association for a given type, src, dst, and
socket.
*
If not found, try to allocate one.
*
Returns: 0 if successfull
*
-, if error condition/secassoc not found (*keyentry
NULL)
1 if secassoc temporarily unavailable (*keynetry =
*
NULL)
(e.g., key mgnt. daemon(s) called)
*

----------------------------------------------------------------------*

/

int
getassocbysocket(type, src, dst, socket, unique_key, keyentry)
u int type;
struct sockaddr *src;
struct sockaddr *dst;
struct socket *socket;
u int uniq~e key;
struct key_tblnode **keyentry;
struct key_tblnode *keynode = 0;
28

DEF00007969

key.c
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9/28/1995

struct key s02spinode *np;
int len, indx;
u int32 spi;
u_int real type;
DPRINTF(IDL GROSS EVENT, ("Entering getassocbysocket w/type=%u
so=Ox%x\n",type,socket)) ;
/*

*

*

*
*

*

We treat esp-transport mode and esp-tunnel mode
as a single type in the key table. This has a side
effect that socket USing both esp-transport and
esp-tunnel will use the same security association
for both modes. Is this a problem?

*/
real type = type;
if (type == SS ENCRYPTION NETWORK)
type = SS_ENCRYPTION_TRANSPORT;

if (np = key sosearch(type, src, dst, socket)) {
if (np->keynode && np->keynode->secassoc &&
! (np->keynode->secassoc->state & (K DEAD I K LARVAL))) {
DPRINTF (IDL FINISHED, ("getassocbysocket: found secas soc ! \n") ) ;
(np->keynode->ref count)++;
*keyentry = np->keynode;
return (0) ;

/*

* No secassoc has been allocated to socket,
* so allocate one, if available

*/
DPRINTF (IDL EVENT, (" getassocbyso: can I t find it, trying to
allocate!\n")) i
i f (key alloc(realtype, src, dst, socket, unique_key, &keynode) == 0)
{
if (keynode) {
DPRINTF (IDL EVENT, ("getassocbyso: key_alloc found secas soc ! \n") ) ;
keynode->ref count++;
*keyentry = keynode;
return (0) ;
else {
/*
* Kick key mgnt. daemon(s)
* (this should be done in ipsec output policy() lnstead or
* selectively called based on a flag value)

*/

DPRINTF(IDL FINISHED, ("getassocbyso: calling key mgnt
daemons! \n") ) ;
*keyentry = NULL;
if (key acquire (realtype, src, dst) == 0)
return (1);
else
return(-l) ;
}
}
*keyentry
NULL;
return(-l) ;

29

DEF00007970