Flournoy, Michael v. Winnebago County Sheriff's Office et al

Filing 22

Transmission of Notice of Appeal, Docket Sheet and Judgment to Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals re 20 Notice of Appeal. (Attachments: # 1 Order, # 2 Judgment, # 3 Order, 3/27/15, # 4 Docket sheet) (jef),(ps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

MICHAEL E. FLOURNOY,

v.

Plaintiff,

OPINION & ORDER
14-cv-528-jdp

WINNEBAGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
ROBERT BOB BAUDELIO JUANEZ,
LARRY MARINO, DANIEL FREEDLUND,
PETER DALPRA, JOSEPH BOOMER,
BRAD KISER, IASPARRO DOMINC,
CUNNINGHAM NICK, JULIE DODD,
NEAL C. GRUHN, WAYNE JACKOWSKI,
CRAIG SMITH, ADAM KING,
JOHN D. RICHARDSON, and DAN IVANCICH,
Defendants.

Pro se prisoner Michael Flournoy filed a proposed complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
which he alleged that defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth amendment rights during
an investigation, arrest, and prosecution in Illinois state court. I screened plaintiff’s complaint
and dismissed it for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)’s requirement of
a short and plain statement of a claim. Dkt. 11. I permitted plaintiff to amend his complaint to
allege facts which, if true, would show that officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. Id.
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of that decision, Dkt. 12, which I denied.
Plaintiff has now filed his amended complaint, Dkt. 14, which I must again screen,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. In screening any pro se litigant’s complaint, the
court must read the allegations of the complaint generously. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521
(1972). After reviewing the amended complaint with this principle in mind, I conclude that it
must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

ALLEGATIONS OF FACT
The factual background of this case has not changed since my January 22, 2015,
screening order. I will briefly summarize the pertinent facts.
After an undercover investigation, officers of the Winnebago County, Illinois, Sheriff’s
Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives conducted a controlled drug buy in Rockford, Illinois. Plaintiff alleges that
defendants arrested him at the controlled buy on July 30, 2012, seized his car and personal
property, and then held him for prosecution, all without probable cause. Plaintiff also alleges
that, in connection with his false arrest, defendants concealed evidence, submitted false
declarations, and pressured the State’s Attorney’s Office to bring charges.
In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges additional facts about his reasons for being in
Rockford on July 30 and about his post-arrest interrogation. According to the amended
complaint, plaintiff hired Jose Sanabria-Sanchez to complete a drywall project. Mr. SanabriaSanchez needed to obtain his identification card from his brother in Rockford, and so plaintiff
drove him there. Once in Rockford, plaintiff alleges that he drove Mr. Sanabria-Sanchez to
several locations looking for his brother. Their final stop was a parking lot—the location of the
controlled buy—and Mr. Sanabria-Sanchez got out of the car. Plaintiff alleges that he noticed
that Mr. Sanabria-Sanchez had taken plaintiff’s bag with him, and so plaintiff got out of the car
to follow Mr. Sanabria-Sanchez. When plaintiff returned to his car, he was cut off by plainclothes officers and arrested. It is unclear from plaintiff’s complaint whether he had recovered
his bag at this point, but booking forms from the Winnebago County Sheriff’s office indicate
that the bag contained “a large amount of [U.S. currency].” Dkt. 9-3, at 1.
Following his arrest, plaintiff alleges that he was interrogated for eight hours, asked to
sign an abandonment form for $190,000, asked to “set up some people” by making phone calls

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to order drugs, and asked to sign a written statement. Dkt. 14, ¶¶ 24-29. Plaintiff was initially
charged in Illinois state court, but those charges were dismissed in favor of federal charges.

ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. I
understand plaintiff to allege that defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by
unlawfully arresting him on July 30, 2012. To succeed on such a claim, plaintiff must prove that
defendants arrested him without probable cause. McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir.
2009). 1 Probable cause exists if, at the time of plaintiff’s arrest, “the facts and circumstances
within the [arresting] officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of
reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir.
2008). “It is a fluid concept that relies on the common-sense judgment of the officers based on
the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Reed, 443 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2006)
(citing United States v. Breit, 429 F.3d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 2005)). The existence of probable
cause precludes a § 1983 suit for false arrest. Morfin v. City of E. Chi., 349 F.3d 989, 997 (7th
Cir. 2003).
In the initial screening order, I noted that plaintiff had attached police reports and other
exhibits to his complaint that adequately articulated the officers’ probable cause for arresting
plaintiff. Dkt. 11, at 4-6. I indicated that plaintiff had failed to allege specific inaccuracies in the
1

I note that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), does not automatically bar plaintiff’s
unlawful arrest claim. The Seventh Circuit explains “that any § 1983 claim for damages
resulting from a false arrest is not barred by Heck and accrues immediately after the arrest,
because such alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment would not necessarily impugn the
validity of a conviction.” Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force, 239 F.3d 892, 897
(7th Cir. 2001). At this point in the case, the record is not developed enough to determine
whether plaintiff’s § 1983 claim would impugn the validity of his conviction.

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officers’ accounts of the controlled buy that, if true, would demonstrate a lack of probable cause.
Although plaintiff’s amended complaint describes his version of the events leading up to his
arrest, he does not dispute that he drove Mr. Sanabria-Sanchez to a controlled drug buy or that
he was in the immediate vicinity when the buy occurred and when officers appeared to make
arrests. Plaintiff vaguely alleges that two officers “prepared false ‘probable cause statement’ and
‘criminal complaint’ reports containing multiple and highly significant fabrications to justify the
warrantless search and seizure which they had conducted.” Dkt. 14, ¶ 31. But plaintiff does not
elaborate on what these fabrications were. Instead, plaintiff alludes to the fact that Mr.
Sanabria-Sanchez and his brother were part of a Mexican drug cartel and that officers could not
possibly believe that plaintiff, an African-American, would be welcome in such an organization.
Id. ¶ 35. 2
Accepting plaintiff’s allegations about his reasons for being in Rockford as true for
purposes of screening the amended complaint, he has not presented a basis from which to
conclude that officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. “Generally, a controlled buy, when
executed properly, is a reliable indicator as to the presence of illegal drug activity.” United States
v. Sidwell, 440 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Slone, 636 F.3d 845, 84950 (7th Cir. 2011). According to the amended complaint, plaintiff was not a direct participant
in the controlled buy. But he nevertheless drove a participant to the event and he had some
connection to the duffel bag in which officers found a large amount of currency. Even if
plaintiff’s assertions are true and accurately describe the full extent of his involvement, these
2

Plaintiff’s complaint also alleges that an Illinois state court “invalidated” his arrest when it
dismissed plaintiff’s state criminal case in favor of federal charges. Dkt. 14, ¶¶ 43-45. These
claims are part of a separate lawsuit that plaintiff has filed in this court, concerning what he
views as a violation of his rights under the full faith and credit clause. See Flournoy v. McKenzie,
No. 14-cv-554 (W.D. Wis. filed Aug. 11, 2014). That complaint has been dismissed for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

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facts were more than adequate to support a reasonably prudent person’s belief that plaintiff had
committed or was about to commit a crime. This is the conclusion that the Northern District of
Illinois reached in denying plaintiff’s motion to suppress. United States v. Sanabria-Sanchez, No.
12-cv-50044 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2013) (order denying motion to quash arrest and suppress
physical evidence) (“[I]t was abundantly reasonable to conclude that defendant was providing
the funds for the purchase of the cocaine when he dumped the money into [the undercover
officer’s] vehicle.”).
The existence of probable cause precludes a suit for false arrest under § 1983, and
plaintiff’s amended complaint affirmatively demonstrates that officers had probable cause to
arrest him. I must therefore dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff Michael Flournoy is DENIED leave to proceed on his Fourth Amendment
claim against defendants for false arrest, and the complaint is DISMISSED in its
entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
2. The clerk’s office is directed to close this case.
Entered March 10, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge

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