Flournoy, Michael v. Winnebago County Sheriff's Office et al
Filing
22
Transmission of Notice of Appeal, Docket Sheet and Judgment to Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals re 20 Notice of Appeal. (Attachments: # 1 Order, # 2 Judgment, # 3 Order, 3/27/15, # 4 Docket sheet) (jef),(ps)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
MICHAEL E. FLOURNOY,
v.
Plaintiff,
ORDER
14-cv-528-jdp
WINNEBAGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
ROBERT BOB BAUDELIO JUANEZ,
LARRY MARINO, DANIEL FREEDLUND,
PETER DALPRA, JOSEPH BOOMER,
BRAD KISER, IASPARRO DOMINC,
CUNNINGHAM NICK, JULIE DODD,
NEAL C. GRUHN, WAYNE JACKOWSKI,
CRAIG SMITH, ADAM KING,
JOHN D. RICHARDSON, and DAN IVANCICH,
Defendants.
Pro se prisoner Michael Flournoy filed a proposed complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
which he alleged that defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during
an investigation, arrest, and prosecution in Illinois state court. I screened plaintiff’s complaint
and dismissed it for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)’s requirement of
providing a short and plain statement of a claim, but I permitted plaintiff to amend his
complaint. Dkt. 11. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, Dkt. 14, which I again screened. I
concluded that under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the amended complaint had to be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Dkt. 15. Plaintiff has now moved for
reconsideration of the second screening order, and for an oral hearing. Dkt. 18. I will deny his
motion in full.
The earlier screening orders adequately summarize the factual background in this case,
and plaintiff does not allege any new facts in his motion for reconsideration. Instead, I
understand plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration to raise two issues with the screening order
that dismissed his complaint. First, plaintiff asserts that the Illinois state court’s dismissal of
criminal charges against him has preclusive effect on the question of probable cause. Plaintiff
asserts that “[a]s a matter of fact, Illinois did not find that the officers had probable cause,
rather the court ordered the matter dismissed in the preliminary hearing for probable cause,
which invalidated the arrest as well as actions leading up to it.” Id. at 2. Relying on Illinois
statutes and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, plaintiff contends that the federal district court in
which he was eventually convicted lacked jurisdiction to review the state court’s probable cause
determination. Plaintiff also implies that I, too, am bound by the state court’s decision, and
must therefore conclude that no probable cause existed for his arrest.
Plaintiff’s argument is a variation on his now-familiar theme: in this case, and in another
case that he filed in this court, plaintiff has asserted that the state court’s dismissal of the
criminal charges against him completely barred any subsequent prosecution for the same
conduct. But for reasons that I have already explained, plaintiff misunderstands the effect of the
state court’s order. See Flournoy v. McKenzie, No. 14-cv-554 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 26, 2015) (order
screening complaint); Flournoy v. McKenzie, No. 14-cv-554 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 10, 2015) (order
denying reconsideration). The state court judge merely dismissed plaintiff’s case on the
prosecutor’s motion. Dkt. 9-2. State prosecutors routinely drop their charges against defendants
who are charged with state drug crimes in favor of federal charges. That is what happened to
plaintiff. The state court judge did not make any finding relating to probable cause. But this
does not mean that he made a finding that there was no probable cause. Thus, there is nothing
in the order requiring me to conclude that officers lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff, and
the order does not provide a basis for reconsidering whether plaintiff’s amended complaint
states a claim for false arrest.
2
The second issue that plaintiff raises is that the screening order omitted factual
information that he presented in his proposed pleadings. Plaintiff contends that these
allegations demonstrate that he is entitled to relief on a claim for unlawful arrest. Dkt. 18, at 45. But the screening order did mention these facts. 1 See generally Dkt. 15. And I concluded that
these allegations, even if true, did not present “a basis from which to conclude that officers
lacked probable cause to arrest him [because] ‘[g]enerally, a controlled buy, when executed
properly, is a reliable indicator as to the presence of illegal drug activity.’” Id. at 4 (quoting
United States v. Sidwell, 440 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 2006)).
Plaintiff has consistently acknowledged that he was present at the scene of the controlled
buy, and that he interacted with the participants by retrieving a bag from one of them. Although
plaintiff has an innocent explanation for every aspect of his involvement, he has affirmatively
alleged facts that would support “a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in
the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit
an offense.” Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008). This is the test for probable
cause, and it was satisfied in this case. The existence of probable cause precludes a § 1983 suit
for false arrest, Morfin v. City of E. Chi., 349 F.3d 989, 997 (7th Cir. 2003), and so plaintiff’s
amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. I therefore
dismissed it under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
I will deny plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration because he has not identified any
appropriate grounds for revisiting my conclusion that his complaint fails to state a claim for false
arrest. I will also deny plaintiff’s request for an oral hearing on this motion because his filings
1
The screening order did not specifically state that plaintiff was in his car, driving away from
the scene when he was arrested. Instead, the order recounted plaintiff’s allegation that he
“returned to his car to exit the parting lot . . . when he was cut off by what appeared to be plain
clothes officers.” Dkt. 14, at 5.
3
adequately articulate his argument. I understand the points that plaintiff makes, but I conclude
that his arguments do not entitle him to the relief that he seeks.
Accordingly,
IT
IS ORDERED
that
plaintiff
Michael
Flournoy’s
motion
reconsideration and for an oral hearing, Dkt. 18, is DENIED.
Entered March 27, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge
4
for
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