IconFind, Inc. v. Google, Inc.

Filing 97

[DISREGARD - Attorney to Re-File per Judge's Request] BRIEF Opening Claim Construction Brief by Google, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Kenneth Maikish Declaration, # 2 Exhibit 1 to Maikish Declaration, # 3 Exhibit 2 to Maikish Declaration, # 4 Exhibit 3 to Maikish Declaration, # 5 Exhibit 4 to Maikish Declaration, # 6 Exhibit 5 to Maikish Declaration, # 7 Exhibit 6 to Maikish Declaration, # 8 Exhibit 7 to Maikish Declaration, # 9 Exhibit 8 to Maikish Declaration, # 10 Exhibit 9 to Maikish Declaration, # 11 Exhibit 10 to Maikish Declaration, # 12 Exhibit 11 to Maikish Declaration, # 13 Exhibit 12 to Maikish Declaration, # 14 Exhibit 13 to Maikish Declaration, # 15 Exhibit 14 to Maikish Declaration)(Maikish, Kenneth) Modified on 5/22/2012 (Michel, G).

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Michael J. Malecek (State Bar No. 171034) Email address: michael.malecek@kayescholer.com Kenneth M. Maikish (State Bar No. 267265) Email address: kenneth.maikish@kayescholer.com KAYE SCHOLER LLP Two Palo Alto Square, Suite 400 Palo Alto, California 94306 Telephone: (650) 319-4500 Facsimile: (650) 319-4700 Attorneys for Defendant GOOGLE INC. 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ICONFIND, INC., Plaintiff, 12 13 v. 14 GOOGLE INC., Defendant. 15 16 17 18 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM DEFENDANT GOOGLE INC.’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Date: July 23, 2012 Time: 9:00 a.m. Location: Courtroom 10 The Honorable Garland E. Burrell, Jr. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 3 II. FACTUAL AND TECHNICAL BACKGROUND ......................................................... 1 4 A. The State Of The Prior Art .................................................................................. 2 5 B. Overview Of The Patent ...................................................................................... 3 6 C. Prosecution History Of The Patent ...................................................................... 6 7 D. Prior Litigation.................................................................................................... 8 8 E. The Accused Products ......................................................................................... 9 9 III. THE LAW OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION .................................................................. 10 10 A. Intrinsic Evidence Is Preferred........................................................................... 10 11 B. Patent Claims May Be No Broader Than The Supporting Disclosure................. 10 12 C. The Inventor Must Convey That He Was In Possession Of The Invention And Enable A Skilled Artisan To Practice The Invention .................................. 11 D. The Patentee May Not Claim Subject Matter Surrendered During Prosecution ....................................................................................................... 11 E. Judge Shubb’s Claim Construction Order Is Binding On IconFind .................... 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 IV. THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT GOOGLE’S PROPOSED CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS................................................................................................................. 13 A. 1. 19 2. 20 21 “network page” (Claims 1-31) ........................................................................... 13 B. 22 23 “assigning said network page to one or more of [a plurality of] said list of categories” (Claim 1-29, 31) and “a set of categories and subcategories to which the network page is assigned” (Claim 30)................................................ 15 1. 24 2. 25 Google’s Construction Is Supported By Judge Shubb’s Claim Construction Order ................................................................................ 13 Google’s Construction Is Supported By The Specification And The Claims ................................................................................................... 14 26 3. 27 4. The Specification Demonstrates That The Creator Performs The Assigning .............................................................................................. 16 Google’s Construction Is Consistent With The Goals Of The ’459 Patent .................................................................................................... 18 Google’s Construction Is Consistent With Judge Shubb’s Claim Construction Order ................................................................................ 19 Plaintiff’s Construction Is Impermissibly Broad..................................... 20 28 i 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 C. 2 “categories related to public domain, fair use only, use with attribution, and permission of copyright owner needed” (Claims 6 and 31) ................................ 21 1. 2. 3. 4. 3 4 5 Google’s Construction Is Supported By The Claims .............................. 22 Google’s Construction Is Supported By The Specification ..................... 23 Google’s Construction Is Supported By The Prosecution History........... 25 Plaintiff’s Construction Ignores The Claim Language In Order To Fit Its Infringement Theory ......................................................................... 26 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ii 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Cases Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ..................................................................................... 12 Board of Regents of the University of Texas System v. BENQ America Corp., 533 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................11, 25 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964)...................................................................................................... 24 Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Z & J Techs., 563 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2007) ......................................................................... 12 Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ..................................................................................... 17 Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ................................................................................10, 20 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966) ....................................................................................................11, 26 Hologic, Inc. v. SenoRx, Inc., 639 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ..................................................................................... 17 Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Tranquil Prospects, Ltd., 401 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ..................................................................................... 19 Int’l Gamco v. Multimedia Games Inc., 732 F.Supp.2d 1082 (S.D. Cal. 2010)............................................................................ 12 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).................................................................................................10, 12 MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ................................................................................10, 19 Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 432 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ..................................................................................... 12 O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech., 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ....................................................................................... 1 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ..................................................................................... 10 Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ..................................................................................... 12 Robotic Vision Sys. v. View Eng’g Inc., 112 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ..................................................................................... 21 TM Patents, L.P. v. Int'l Business Machines Corp., 72 F.Supp.2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ............................................................................... 12 Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ................................................................................11, 20 28 iii 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ....................................................................................... 10 2 3 4 5 Statutes 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ................................................................................................................. 2, 7 35 U.S.C. § 103...................................................................................................................... 2, 7 35 U.S.C. § 112...................................................................................................................11, 20 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 iv 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 2 NOTES ON CITATIONS The following citation conventions are used in this brief: 3 4  Google = Google Inc. 5  IconFind = IconFind, Inc. 6  ’459 patent = the patent-in-suit, U.S. Patent No. 7,181,459, attached as Exhibit A to the Joint Claim Construction Statement (Dkt. 93) 8  XX:YY = column number: line number(s) of the ’459 patent 9  Pros. History = the prosecution history of the ’459 patent, attached as exhibit B to the Joint Claim Construction Statement (Dkt. 93), each citation to the prosecution history will contain the Bates number(s) of the page(s) being cited  The Yahoo! Case = IconFind Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc., Case No. 09-109 WBS JFM (E.D. Cal.)  Cl. Constr. = Memorandum And Order Re: Motion For Claim Construction in IconFind Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc., Case No. 09-109 WBS JFM (E.D. Cal.), attached as exhibit 1  Ex. = Exhibit 7 10 11 12 13 14 15 The following exhibits are attached to the Declaration of Kenneth M. Maikish in support of 16 Google’s Inc.’s Opening Claim Construction Brief: 17 18 Exhibit Description 19 1 Memorandum And Order Re: Motion For Claim Construction (Yahoo! Case, Dkt. 50) 2 Neil Randall and Dennis Jones, USING FRONTPAGE® 2000, 304-324, (Mark Taber, ed., Que 1999) 3 Selected screenshots from the Internet Archive’s archive of the SourceForge website, collected between June 20, 2000 and December 5, 2000 24 4 IconFind’s Objections and Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1-8 25 5 Excerpt from Reporter’s Transcript Of Proceedings, Defendant’s Motion For Claim Construction Monday, December 7, 2009 (Yahoo! case, Dkt. 54, pp. 71-76) 6 IconFind’s Ex Parte Application For Leave To File A Supplemental Response To The Court’s December 7, 2009 Question Regarding “Network Page” (Yahoo! case, Dkt. 49) 20 21 22 23 26 27 28 v 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 7 Order On IconFind’s Ex Parte Application For Leave To File A Supplemental Response To The Court’s December 7, 2009 Question Regarding “Network Page” (Yahoo! case, Dkt. 53) 8 Stipulated Order Of Dismissal (Yahoo! case, Dkt. 61) 9 A copy of the About page from Creative Commons’ website, available at http://creativecommons.org/about 10 A copy of the About The Licenses page from Creative Commons’ website, available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 11 A copy of the Our Supporters page from Creative Commons’ website, available at http://creativecommons.org/supporters/ 12 Plaintiff’s Response To Google Inc.’s First Set Of Requests For Admission 13 Deposition Transcript for Lee H. Grant, pp. 92-95 14 1 Joint Statement re Discovery Disagreement - Infringement Contentions (Dkt. 88) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 vi 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 I. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Google submits this claim construction brief to address the disputed terms of the claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,181,459. The parties agree that four claim terms should be construed exactly as Judge Shubb previously construed them in the Yahoo! Case. (Dkt. 93.) Plaintiff is now seeking to back away from its admission in the Yahoo! Case concerning a fifth term construed by Judge Shubb—an admission Judge Shubb relied upon in issuing his claim construction order. IconFind’s prior admission, and Judge Shubb’s reliance upon it, appeared to dispose of the Yahoo! Case. Three additional terms are in dispute. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 INTRODUCTION Pursuant to Federal Circuit claim construction principles, Google proposes constructions firmly rooted in the intrinsic record, including the specification and the prosecution history, as well as prior claim constructions. Google further relies on IconFind’s own admission in the Yahoo! Case concerning the proper scope of its claims. IconFind, by contrast, offers only vague constructions that improperly delegate the duty of construing the terms to the jury. See O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech., 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that where the parties raise an actual issue regarding the proper scope of a claim term, the court, not the jury, must resolve that dispute). And, contrary to the notions of both fairness and stare decisis, IconFind is further attempting to relitigate a matter that was settled in a prior claim construction proceeding involving the same patent. 19 20 21 II. FACTUAL AND TECHNICAL BACKGROUND The ’459 patent issued on February 20, 2007 from an application filed on February 22, 22 2002. On February 3, 2011, Plaintiff IconFind filed this lawsuit against Google for infringement of 23 the ’459 patent. 24 25 26 27 28 1 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 A. 2 As of August 9, 2001,1 methods of categorizing network pages (whether on the Internet or 3 internal networks) based on subject matter were well known. The background section of the ’459 4 patent acknowledges as much in its description of “directories” and the Dublin Core system. (1:38- 5 64.) Other well-known art was cited by the patent examiner in multiple rejections of the ’459 6 patent claims. (See Pros. History, IF000148-153 (rejecting the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as 7 being anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 5,933,827 (“Cole”)); Pros. History, IF000119-125 (rejecting 8 the claims under § 102(b) rejecting the claims under § 102(b) as being anticipated by Cole); Pros. 9 History, IF000083-92 (rejecting the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over 10 The State Of The Prior Art Cole)). 11 Also available prior to 2000, but not cited by the patentee or examiner, were systems that 12 allowed the creator of a network page to choose between categories for “corporate” pages and 13 categories for “discussion” pages, as well as mark the page(s) with a copyright status. For 14 example, Microsoft FrontPage® 2000 (“FrontPage”) was commercially available website design 15 software that allowed a creators to design and publish network pages. FrontPage allowed creators 16 to create network pages for a business using the “Corporate Presence Wizard.” (See Ex. 2 at 304- 17 14.) FrontPage also allowed creators to create network pages for posting and commenting on 18 articles using the “Discussion Web Wizard.” (See id. at 316-24.) FrontPage allowed creators to 19 choose a copyright status for their network pages. (See id. at 310, Fig. 13.6.) FrontPage then 20 created the website with code indicating the creator’s selections. (See id. at 304-24.) 21 Likewise, available prior to 2000, but not cited by the patentee or examiner, were systems 22 like SourceForge that allowed the creator of a software package (containing source code, text files, 23 images, and other files) to upload those files to a computer system. (See Ex. 3 at 1.) The creator 24 could choose a subject matter “Topic,” including “Education” and “Office/Business” for the files. 25 26 27 1 The filing date of Provisional Application No. 60/311,379 and IconFind’s claimed priority date. (Ex. 4, at 4.) 28 2 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 (Id. at 2.) The creator could then choose a copyright license to designate to his or her files. (Id. at 2 3.) The computer system would then allow other users to download the software package on a 3 page that displayed the subject matter as well as the license associated with the package. (Id. at 4, 4 highlighted in red.) 5 Nevertheless, IconFind purports to have invented a new system in which the creator of a 6 network page assigns that network page using a system that provides one of two sets of specific 7 categories: (1) a category for transacting business, a category for providing information, and a 8 category based on the copyright status of material on a page, (claims 1-30) or (2) categories related 9 to public domain, fair use only, use with attribution, and permission of copyright owner needed 10 (claim 31). 11 B. 12 The ’459 patent describes a computer-implemented method for categorizing network Overview Of The Patent 13 pages. The patent describes a computer system that provides four tiers of categories as illustrated 14 in Fig. 1 of the patent. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 (’459 patent, Fig. 1.) The “1st Tier” divides network pages into two broad but distinct categories 2 depending on the purpose of the network page. (4:60-5:9.) Pages that “have as a purpose 3 transacting business” are categorized as Commerce (co). (Cl. Const. at 13.) Pages that “have as a 4 purpose the provision of information, for example network pages that contain articles, journals, or 5 publications” are categorized as Information (in). (Cl. Const at 15.) The “2nd Tier” categorizes 6 pages into subject matter. (5:10-28.) The “3rd Tier” categorizes pages according to the types of 7 files associated with the page. (5:29-47.) The system also provides a “Copyright Status” tier 8 which contains categories based on the copyright status of material on a page. (5:48-58.) 9 The creator of a network page manually assigns the categories that characterize the 10 purpose(s), subject matter(s), file type(s), and copyright status of his or her network page. (6:12- 11 60; see also Cl. Constr. at 3.) An example used in the patent is a network page that contains 12 information about treating sports injuries where the creator wants to inform viewers that 13 permission from the owner is needed in order to reuse the content. (7:40-47.) The creator of that 14 page would assign the page to the Information (in), Medical (me), Sports & Recreation (sp), and 15 Permission of Copyright Owner Needed (04) categories by selecting the indicia for each of the 16 categories. (Id.) Then, once the creator has assigned the network page to certain categories, the 17 computer system provides the “categorization label” to the creator of the network page as shown 18 in Fig. 2 of the patent: 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 (’459 patent, Fig. 2.) As shown in Fig. 2, each of the selected categories is highlighted and the 16 computer system has created the categorization label “inmesp04” in the box near the bottom of 17 the Figure. The creator then either types or pastes the categorization label onto his or her network 18 page so that it can be read by a search engine “web crawler,” or communicates the assigned 19 categories directly to a search engine. (6:50-60; Cl. Const. at 3-4.) The specification further 20 states that: “By selecting one of the four copyright-status indicia and placing it on the end of the 21 categorization label, the creator adds the information governing the use of the material. For 22 instance, if the creator wants to inform viewers that the page is available for use as long as an 23 attribution is included, ‘03’ would be added to the end of the categorization label.” (7:31-37.) 24 The network page can then be found by a user searching the Internet for information. In this way, 25 the patent describes a method for categorizing and searching pages on the Internet. (1:22-25.) 26 27 28 5 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 2 Exemplary claim 1 reads: 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 C. Prosecution History Of The Patent 14 During prosecution, the Patent Office repeatedly rejected the claims of the ’459 patent in 15 light of prior art that disclosed categorizing web pages. As a result, IconFind’s patent issued with a 16 narrowed scope, claiming only systems that categorize network pages into one of two sets of 17 specific and narrow categories. Judge Shubb’s claim construction order confirms this reading of 18 the prosecution history. (Cl. Constr. at 4 (“During the prosecution of the ‘459 patent, the inventors 19 repeatedly had their patent rejected due to the prior art that disclosed categorizing web pages. 20 [Citations.] The inventors eventually narrowed the claims of their patent to claim a categorization 21 system which included at least the three categories of transacting business, providing information, 22 and copyright status.”).) 23 Originally, IconFind’s claim 1 recited: 24 25 26 27 28 6 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 (Pros. History, IF000255.) The Patent Office rejected all the claims under § 102(b) and § 103 in 2 multiple rounds of rejections because the prior art already taught how to categorize network pages. 3 To avoid the prior art, IconFind amended its claims three times to require specific categories and 4 additional steps: 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 (Pros. History, IF000063.) This version of claim 1 was later allowed in this substantially narrower version. (Pros. History, IF000023-26.) 17 18 19 IconFind’s original claim 51, which issued as claim 31, was also substantially narrowed during prosecution. Originally, claim 31 read: 20 21 22 23 24 25 (Pros. History, IF000144.) The Patent Office rejected this claim in light of the prior art: 26 27 28 7 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Pros. History, IF000123.) In response, IconFind narrowed its claim to include the specific copyright status categories recited below: 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 (Pros. History, IF000113.) This version of claim 31 was later allowed in this substantially 16 narrower version. (Pros. History, IF000023-26.) 17 D. Prior Litigation 18 IconFind filed suit against Yahoo! Inc. (“Yahoo!”) for infringement of the ’459 patent on 19 January 13, 2009. The Honorable William B. Shubb presided over the case. The accused product 20 in that case was Yahoo!’s photo sharing service, “Flickr,” which, similar to an accused product in 21 this case, allowed users to designate Creative Commons copyright licenses to uploaded photos. 22 At the claim construction hearing in front of Judge Shubb, Plaintiff made an important 23 concession with regard to the construction of the term “network page.” (Ex. 5.) After the hearing, 24 Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application For Leave To File A Supplemental Response To The 25 Court’s [] Question Regarding “Network Page.” (Ex. 6.) The application was denied. (Ex. 7.) 26 Judge Shubb incorporated Plaintiff’s concession into his claim construction order. (Cl. Constr. at 27 8.) Plaintiff did not appeal the claim construction order, and the order was never vacated. The 28 8 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 case settled several months after the claim construction order issued. (Ex. 8.) The Order Of 2 Dismissal states that the Claim Construction Order “remains in full force and effect.” (Id.) 3 E. 4 The accused products in this case are Google Knol, Google Books, and Google’s Picasa The Accused Products 5 Web Albums (“Picasa”). Each of these products allow users or publishers to upload and store 6 digital content on Google’s computer servers: Google Knol stores articles; Google Books stores 7 digital copies of print books; and Picasa stores images. 8 9 Each of these products allow Google users uploading content to choose licenses provided by Creative Commons to designate to their content. Creative Commons is a non-profit 10 organization that provides free, standard licenses that content creators may use to inform others of 11 the licensing restrictions associated with that content. (Ex. 9.) Creative Commons licenses are 12 described as “some rights reserved” because they fall in between the two extremes of copyright 13 licenses: “all rights reserved” and “public domain” (i.e., no rights reserved.) (See Exs. 9, 10.) 14 The purpose of Creative Commons licenses is to allow content creators to communicate to 15 others the rights the creator reserves in the work and the rights the creator waives for the benefit of 16 the public. By incorporating the use of Creative Commons licenses into these products, Google 17 and Creative Commons promote creativity, sharing, and innovation. (Ex. 9.) Creative Commons 18 is supported by The John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The William and Flora 19 Hewlett Foundation, The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, as well as many other corporations, 20 law firms, and individuals. (Ex. 11.) 21 IconFind alleges that Google’s products’ use of Creative Commons licenses infringes the 22 ’459 patent. However, none of these products incorporate any subject matter categories, let alone 23 categories for “transacting business” and “providing information,” as required by claims 1-30. 24 IconFind’s expansive reading of its claims would encompass any product that allows a content 25 creator to choose any copyright designation for digital content and display indicia of that copyright 26 designation along with the content. (See IconFind’s Infringement Contentions (Dkt. 88), at Ex. 1.) 27 28 9 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 III. THE LAW OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 2 A. 3 Construction of patent claims is a question of law to be decided by the Court. Markman v. 4 Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 371-73 (1996). “It is well-settled that, in interpreting an 5 asserted claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, 6 including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history. . . . Such 7 intrinsic evidence is the most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim 8 language.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citation 9 omitted). 10 Intrinsic Evidence Is Preferred The specification provides the context for the claim. “Importantly, the person of ordinary 11 skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in 12 which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the 13 specification.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The 14 claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.” Id. Indeed, the 15 specification “‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is 16 dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. “‘[T]he best source 17 for understanding a technical term is the specification from which it arose, informed, as needed, by 18 the prosecution history.’” Id. at 1315 (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 The purpose of the invention, as described in the specification, also instructs claim 20 construction. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated 21 and remanded on other grounds, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (relying on the purpose of the invention 22 stated in the specification of providing “a trusted network of consignment nodes” to construe the 23 term “auction” as requiring a process over a trusted network or with a trusted intermediary). 24 B. 25 A patentee is only entitled to claims that are as broad as his disclosure will allow. Gentry Patent Claims May Be No Broader Than The Supporting Disclosure 26 Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “[C]laims may be no 27 broader than the supporting disclosure, and therefore [] a narrow disclosure will limit claim 28 10 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 breadth.” Id. Claims that are broader than the supporting disclosure are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 2 112, ¶ 1 for failing the written description requirement. Id. at 1478-80. 3 The purpose of the written description requirement is to prevent the patentee from over- 4 reaching by claiming subject matter that he did not invent. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 5 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Adequate description of the invention guards against the inventor’s 6 overreaching by insisting that he recount his invention in such detail that his future claims can be 7 determined to be encompassed within his original creation.”) (citing Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. 8 Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981)). 9 C. 10 11 The Inventor Must Convey That He Was In Possession Of The Invention And Enable A Skilled Artisan To Practice The Invention The specification “must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that 12 [the inventor] invented what is claimed.” Id. at 1563. The often-cited Vas-Cath case makes clear 13 that “[t]he written description must communicate that which is needed to enable the skilled artisan 14 to make and use the claimed invention.” Id. 15 D. 16 It is well settled that when a patentee narrows a claim in response to an examiner's 17 rejection, the patentee will be bound by the surrender of subject matter it made in the amendment. 18 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 33 (1966) (“Here, the patentee obtained his 19 patent only by accepting the limitations imposed by the Examiner. The claims were carefully 20 drafted to reflect these limitations and [the patentee] is not now free to assert a broader view of 21 [the] invention.”). 22 The Patentee May Not Claim Subject Matter Surrendered During Prosecution The patentee may not attempt to reclaim, through the claim construction process, subject 23 matter that was surrendered during prosecution because the additional limitation must be viewed as 24 a disclaimer of the broader claim. Board of Regents of the University of Texas System v. BENQ 25 America Corp., 533 F.3d 1362, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that the Court could not 26 construe a claim term added during amendment as encompassing the very claim limitation that the 27 amendment was meant to narrow). This is true even if the examiner’s rejection was erroneous. 28 Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1572 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 11 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 1997). This is also true if the patentee surrendered more subject matter than necessary to overcome 2 the prior art. Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 432 F.3d 1356, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 3 E. 4 Judge Shubb issued a claim construction order in the Yahoo! case on December 14, 2009. Judge Shubb’s Claim Construction Order Is Binding On IconFind 5 That order is binding on IconFind under collateral estoppel. Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. 6 Z & J Techs., 563 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1121-22 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (ruling a plaintiff is bound by a 7 prior claim construction order issued by a Texas district court); Int’l Gamco v. Multimedia Games 8 Inc., 732 F.Supp.2d 1082, 1089-92 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (applying Ninth Circuit law in holding 9 collateral estoppel applies to bar plaintiff from challenging prior claim construction order). 10 Indeed, the aim of the landmark Markman v. Westview Instruments decision was to create 11 uniformity in the treatment of patents. 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996). A plaintiff should not be given a 12 second chance to litigate the construction of a claim term. TM Patents, L.P. v. Int'l Business 13 Machines Corp., 72 F.Supp.2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (emphasizing the promotion of uniformity in 14 construing a patent claim: “it is inconceivable that a fully-litigated determination after a first 15 Markman [claim construction] hearing would not be preclusive in subsequent actions involving the 16 same disputed claims under the same patent.”). 17 However, that order is not binding on Google because Google was not a party to the Yahoo! 18 Case. Due process requires that a newly accused infringer, not party to the prior action, must be 19 given an opportunity to argue for a different or more precise claim construction. Al-Site Corp. v. 20 VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 IV. THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT GOOGLE’S PROPOSED CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS A. “network page” (Claims 1-31) Google’s Construction Network Page: Page on the Internet, private corporate network, intranet, local area network or other network wherein an image on a page does not constitute a page. IconFind’s Construction Network Page: Page on the Internet, private corporate network, intranet, local area network or other network. Google’s construction of the term “network page” is entirely consistent with Judge Shubb’s claim construction order and is more precise than Plaintiff’s construction because it captures an important concession made by Plaintiff in the Yahoo! Case and explicitly adopted by Judge Shubb in construing the claims. 11 1. Google’s Construction Is Supported By Judge Shubb’s Claim Construction Order 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 In his claim construction order, Judge Shubb construed the term “network page” by construing only the term “network” and not the term “page.” The Court determined that “page” did not require construction because counsel for plaintiff conceded at oral argument that “an image on a ‘page’ did not constitute a ‘page’” thereby eliminating the dispute between Yahoo! and Plaintiff. (Cl. Constr. at 8.) The transcript from the claim construction hearing shows that Judge Shubb decided that “page” did not require construction because of Plaintiff’s concession: THE COURT: What's wrong with [Plaintiff’s position] since nobody is going to take the position that an image on a page is a page in and of itself? MS. KASH [for Defendant Yahoo!]: If that is an admission that we have from plaintiff and Your Honor is accepting of it, then network page is fine THE COURT: All right. Well, if you want to just -- we can put it on the record. You do not claim that an image which is on a page is a, quote, page, unquote, itself. MR. HAAN [for Plaintiff IconFind]: An image itself, in and of itself the image file is not a page. THE COURT: All right. MS. KASH: Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. MR. HAAN: So I guess I don't understand what the construction of this term is. There is no construction? 27 28 13 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 THE COURT: No, there will be a construction. But I don't think we need to define the word "page" because everybody understands what it means. It doesn't mean an image, it means a page. (Ex. 5, at 75 (emphasis added).) Judge Shubb’s construction includes the concession. (Cl. Constr. at 8 (“At oral argument, counsel for the plaintiff conceded that an image on a ‘page’ did not constitute a ‘page.’ The parties then agreed that the term ‘page’ did not need to be further defined.”).) Google does not seek a construction differing from Judge Shubb’s claim construction order. Google only seeks a construction that explicitly contains Judge Shubb’s reason for not separately construing “page.” If IconFind had not made this important concession, Judge Shubb would have been forced to construe the term “page” because the parties disagreed on its meaning. Therefore, Google’s construction of the term “network page” is more precise because it contains the Plaintiff’s concession that an image on a page does not constitute a page. And, for reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s concession and Judge Shubb’s construction reliance thereon, are entirely consistent with the intrinsic evidence. Simply put, IconFind was correct when it admitted “an image itself…is not a page.” Google has sought—and Plaintiff has refused to make—the same concession to Google in this case. (Ex. 12 (IconFind refused to admit that an image on a page is not a page in a Request For Admission served by Google in this case).) 19 2. 20 21 Google’s Construction Is Supported By The Specification And The Claims Google’s proposed construction is supported by the specification and the claims because the 22 specification and claims differentiate between the “page” and “material on the page.” In his 23 discussion of this claim term, Judge Shubb recognized that the patent claims themselves “clearly 24 distinguish ‘network page’ from ‘material on a page’ and ‘material on the network page.’” (Cl. 25 Constr. at 8 (citing claim 1 of the ’459 patent).) The specification also distinguishes between the 26 network page and material on the page. (3:47-50 (“It is also an object of the invention to provide a 27 28 14 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 method for categorizing a page on a network . . . according to the copyright status of the material 2 on the page.”) (emphasis added).) 3 The claims recite a method for categorizing network pages into categories. It is the 4 categories that are based on the copyright status of material that is on a page, for example, an 5 image. (12:24-38; Cl. Constr. at 3.) The drafters of the ’459 patent knew the difference between a 6 “page” and “material on the page” and drafted the claims with that distinction in mind. If the 7 drafters had meant an image or other material on a page to be the same as a “network page,” they 8 could have drafted the claims to do so. They did not. 9 Google’s construction of “network page” is consistent with Judge Shubb’s claim 10 construction order as well as the specification and claims of the ’459 patent. It is also more precise 11 than Plaintiff’s definition because it encompasses Judge Shubb’s reason for not separately 12 construing “page.” Without Plaintiff’s concession on the record in this case, Plaintiff’s proposed 13 construction does not solve the parties’ dispute with respect to the term “page.” Therefore, 14 Google’s construction should be adopted. 15 B. 16 “assigning said network page to one or more of [a plurality of] said list of categories” (Claim 1-29, 31) and “a set of categories and subcategories to which the network page is assigned” (Claim 30) 17 18 19 20 Google’s Construction Assigning said network page to one or more of [a plurality of] said list of categories: the creator of the web page choosing which one or more of [a plurality of] said list of categories characterize said network page 21 22 23 24 A set of categories and subcategories to which the network page is assigned: a set of categories and subcategories that were chosen by the creator of the web page as characterizing the network page IconFind’s Construction Assigning said network page to one or more of [a plurality of] said list of categories: This element need not be construed separately and should be given its plain and ordinary meaning in the context of the intrinsic record as understood by a person of skill at the time of the invention. If the Court deems a construction is necessary, IconFind proposes: Assigning the network page to at least one of the categories 25 A set of categories and subcategories to which the network page is assigned: This element need not be construed separately and should be given its plain and ordinary meaning in the context of 26 27 28 15 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM the intrinsic record as understood by a person of skill at the time of the invention. 1 2 If the Court deems a construction is necessary, IconFind proposes:7 A set of categories and subcategories to which the network page is assigned where subcategories are combinations of categories 3 4 5 6 7 The primary dispute between the parties is whether any entity may perform the assignment 8 or whether it must be performed by “the creator.” Google’s construction requires that the 9 assignment be performed by the creator and is consistent with the specification. Plaintiff’s 10 construction impermissibly broadens the scope of this claim to cover inventions outside the 11 specification’s disclosure. 12 1. 13 14 The Specification Demonstrates That The Creator Performs The Assigning Google’s construction is well-supported by the ’459 patent specification. The specification 15 repeatedly, consistently, and exclusively states that “the creator” of the network page assigns the 16 page to categories. (5:62-67; 6:12-16; 6:19-22; 6:31-33; 6:39-40; 6:43-44; 6:47-49; 6:50-60; 6:63- 17 7:3; 7:12-15; 7:66-8:9.) 18 The specification describes a system in which “the creator” uses a user interface (depicted 19 in Fig. 1) in order to choose the categories to assign to the network page. (6:12-60.) The user 20 interface then provides the “categorization label” to “the creator.” (7:40-47 (explaining that Fig. 2 21 provides the categorization label “inmesp04”).) The categorization label is preferably placed or 22 typed on the network page. (9:16-18.) Then, the label can be read by a computer program known 23 as a “web crawler” that reads pages on the Internet in order to aid search engines. (9:18-21.) The 24 assignment is not carried out by the web crawler. The assignment is performed by the creator 25 before the web crawler reads the labels. (Cl. Constr. at 4; 9:33-35 (“The categorization labels will 26 then be read [by the Web crawler] and each category assigned [by the creator] to the page 27 recognized by its two-letter or two-numeral indicium.”).) Alternatively, “the creator” may 28 16 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 communicate the assigned categories to the search engine directly without placing the 2 categorization label on the network page. (6:54-58 (“In addition, or alternatively, the creator may 3 communicate the categories to which the page is assigned to one or more search engines for the 4 purpose of allowing such search engines to locate or recognize the page, by its assigned categories, 5 in conducting a search.”).) 6 Throughout the ’459 patent, the creator assigns the network page. No other form of 7 assignment is described in the specification. Where a patent repeatedly and consistently describes 8 the invention in a certain manner, the proper construction of the claim terms must be consistent 9 with that description even if the claim term itself could be construed more broadly. See Hologic, 10 Inc. v. SenoRx, Inc., 639 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (limiting the construction of a term 11 where the specification disclosed only one embodiment, and “that is clearly what the inventors of 12 the ... patent conceived of”); Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1321-23, 1328-29 13 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court’s construction of the terms “document” and “file” as 14 limited to hard copy documents because the written description “repeatedly and consistently” 15 described the embodiments using hard copy documents, and affirming the district court’s 16 imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff for its “illogical” construction of its claims). 17 In Hologic, the claim term was a “radiation source [] asymmetrically located and arranged . 18 . . .” Hologic, 639 F.2d at 1331. The Federal Circuit held that even though the claim did not 19 specify a reference axis for the asymmetry, the claim required asymmetry about the longitudinal 20 axis because the specification limited its description and figures to that embodiment. Id. at 1338 21 (“Because the specification, including the figures, consistently and exclusively shows radiation 22 sources located asymmetrically about the longitudinal axis, and because that is clearly what the 23 inventors of the ’142 patent conceived of, claim 1 is properly construed as referencing radiation 24 sources that are [asymmetric about the longitudinal axis.]”). The same logic applies in this case. 25 The specification limited its description by consistently and exclusively describing a method where 26 the creator assigns the network pages. Therefore, the claims should be limited to that system. 27 28 17 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 2. Google’s Construction Is Consistent With The Goals Of The ’459 Patent 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The ’459 patent describes various prior art systems, such as directories, that categorized network pages. In a directory, the network pages are assigned to categories by directory editors or contributors. (1:52-55 (“Directories or indices are human-compiled databases of Web sites or pages. Most directories use editors to review and categorize Web sites. Some use contributions by their visitors.”).) Because the network pages were assigned to categories by editors or contributors, directories suffered from two drawbacks: (1) categorization was “haphazard,” and (2) directories tended to be small. (1:52-64.) The inventors set out to fix the small and haphazardly categorized Internet directories. The ’459 patent also describes the prior art Dublin Core system, which was a “cataloging system for the Internet.” (1:41-42.) The drawbacks of the Dublin Core system, according to the inventors, are that it “requir[es] a high degree of cataloging knowledge and [is] time-consuming and very expensive.” (1:44-46.) Because Dublin Core was complicated and required training, the inventors set out to create a system that was accessible to everyone. The specification states that “[t]he method for categorizing and retrieving network pages and sites of the present invention are adapted to overcome [the shortcomings described above.]” (3:8-10 (emphasis added).) The solution to these problems, according to the inventors, was a system that provided the creator an opportunity to assign his or her network page to the category of his or her choosing. First, if each creator assigned his or her own web pages, then the entire Internet could be categorized instead of only a small percentage. Second, if the assignment was carried out by the creator, the categorization would be more accurate than if it were carried out by a third-party because the creator knows which categories “best characterize” his or her network pages. (6:12-16. Ex. 13 at 95 (“The patent describes how the creator categorizes a web page.”).) Third, the assignment process was “simple,” as opposed to complicated like Dublin Core, because 26 27 28 18 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 the creator could just type or paste the label onto his or her network page.2 (7:5-7; 7:19-22.) Thus, 2 the inventors clearly contemplated a system where the creator of a web page must assign the page 3 to the categories. 4 Federal Circuit case law supports limiting a claim term by relying on the stated purpose of 5 the invention. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated 6 and remanded on other grounds, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (relying on the purpose of the invention 7 stated in the specification of providing “a trusted network of consignment nodes” to construe the 8 term “auction” as requiring a process over a trusted network or with a trusted intermediary); 9 Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Tranquil Prospects, Ltd., 401 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 10 (using purpose of the invention to construe a claim term). 11 3. 12 13 Google’s Construction Is Consistent With Judge Shubb’s Claim Construction Order Judge Shubb’s claim construction order is clear on this point: the creator assigns the 14 network pages. “In the preferred embodiment, a designer of a network page manually assigns the 15 page to appropriate categories by applying a ‘categorization code’ for each category to which the 16 page is assigned. The network designer then combines various ‘codes’ to form a ‘categorization 17 label’ that is placed on a network page.” (Cl. Constr. at 3-4.) “Categorization label” was 18 construed as a “label indicating a category or categories to which a page is assigned.” (Id. at 19.) 19 Judge Shubb’s claim construction order only discusses the creator (or “designer”) of the 20 network page assigning the network page. (E.g., id. at 18 (“A network page creator could assign a 21 network page two categorization labels, each indicating only some of the categories to which a 22 page is assigned.”).) 23 24 25 26 27 2 Of course, the inventors did not solve the problem of standardizing categorization codes across the Internet, but that is not relevant here. 28 19 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 4. Plaintiff’s Construction Is Impermissibly Broad 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 A patentee may not claim a system or method which he or she did not invent. In the landmark Gentry Gallery case, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the essential rule that patent claims may be no broader than the supporting disclosure. Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Case law “make[s] clear that claims may be no broader than the supporting disclosure, and therefore that a narrow disclosure will limit claim breadth.”). In Gentry, a claim for a sectional sofa with “a pair of control means” “mounted on the double reclining seat sofa section” was limited to control means mounted to the section between the reclining seat sofa sections, known as the console. Id. at 1475. The Federal Circuit held that because the patent’s disclosure did not support claims with the control means located anywhere else on the double reclining seat sofa section, the claim term must be limited. Id. at 1479. The panel found this narrower construction to be correct even though the claim language itself did not require the control means to be mounted to the console. Id. To rule otherwise, the panel found, would result in a claim that is not supported by the written description and would thus be invalid under § 112, ¶ 1. Id. The ’459 patent specification does not even suggest, much less support, a method in which a computer assigns network pages to categories. Therefore, IconFind’s construction is impermissibly broad because it suggests that any party or system could accomplish the assigning step. Gentry at 1479 (“No similar variation [of control means location] beyond the console is even suggested.”). Patentee IconFind did not invent or describe a system in which a computer assigns categories to network pages and therefore may not claim such a system. Id. To construe this term so that it encompasses a system in which a computer performs the assigning step would invalidate the claim under § 112, ¶ 1. “The written description must communicate that which is needed to enable the skilled artisan to make and use the claimed invention.” Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). Because the ’459 patent does not describe a system in which a computer performs the assigning step, a skilled artisan would not have been able to make the 20 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 invention perform in that manner. Therefore, IconFind’s construction is impermissibly broad. 2 Adequate written description is required so that the public knows the bounds of the claimed 3 invention. Id. at 1560-62 (discussing the policy reasons behind the written description 4 requirement). 5 “[T]he description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that 6 [he or she] invented what is claimed,” Id. at 1563 (citation omitted). If a patentee wishes to claim 7 a method carried out by software means, the patentee must, at least, disclose the functions that the 8 software would execute to meet the written description requirement. See Robotic Vision Sys. v. 9 View Eng’g Inc., 112 F.3d 1163, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen disclosure of software is required, 10 it is generally sufficient if the functions of the software are disclosed.”). Because the ’459 patent 11 does not disclose the functions of software that could assign network pages to categories, IconFind 12 may not claim a system where software assigns the network pages. 13 14 15 Google’s construction is consistent with the specification, the goals of the ’459 patent, as well as Judge Shubb’s claim construction order and should be adopted. C. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 “categories related to public domain, fair use only, use with attribution, and permission of copyright owner needed” (Claims 6 and 31) Google’s Construction Categories related to public domain, fair use only, use with attribution, and permission of copyright owner needed: categories that indicate that the network page may be subject to each of the following licensing restrictions: (1) the network page may be used by others without any restrictions; (2) the network page may only be used for fair uses; (3) the network page may be used if attribution to the copyright owner is given; and (4) the network page may be used only when permission is granted by the copyright owner. 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Construction Categories related to public domain, fair use only, use with attribution, and permission of copyright owner needed: This element need not be construed separately and should be given its plain and ordinary meaning in the context of the intrinsic record as understood by a person of skill at the time of the invention. If the Court deems a construction is necessary, IconFind proposes: Categories related to material that can be used freely without any restrictions, material meant to be used in accordance with accepted fair use guidelines, material accompanied by an attribution to the author or copyright owner, and material that cannot be used unless the copyright owner is first contacted for permission. 21 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 2 Claim 6, which depends on claim 1, and independent claim 31 require the method to 3 provide the categories recited in this claim element. This claim element contains four distinct 4 categories: (1) public domain, (2) fair use only, (3) use with attribution, and (4) permission of 5 copyright owner needed. The parties generally agree on the meaning of each of the four categories, 6 but differ on the construction in two respects. First, Google’s construction requires that the 7 copyright status category is applied to the network page. Plaintiff’s construction, by contrast, 8 states that the copyright status category is applied to material on the network page. Second, 9 Google’s construction requires that the method provide four mutually exclusive categories as the 10 claims require. By contrast, Plaintiff’s construction implies that a single copyright status category 11 could meet this claim limitation because it could be related to all four claimed categories. 12 Google’s construction is consistent with the claims, the specification and the prosecution history. 13 1. 14 15 Google’s Construction Is Supported By The Claims The claims of the ’459 patent are for a “method of categorizing a network page” by 16 “providing a list of categories” and assigning the network page to “one or more of the list of 17 categories.” (‘459 patent, claim 1.) The list of categories includes copyright status categories. 18 Therefore, it is the network page that is assigned to a copyright status category, not material on the 19 network page. (Cl. Constr. at 8 (the claims “clearly distinguish ‘network page’ from ‘material on a 20 page’ . . . .’”).) Therefore, the copyright status categories must indicate that the network page 21 (including all the material on the page) is subject to the recited copyright licenses. Plaintiff’s 22 construction suggests that some of the material may be subject to the copyright status category 23 while other material may not be. 24 Google’s construction is helpful to the jury because it provides the jury with clarity on this 25 point. Furthermore Google’s construction clarifies the fact that the four categories must be 26 mutually exclusive. This point is also supported by the claim language. 27 28 22 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 The words “related to” mean that each of the four copyright status categories must bear a 2 relation to the recited category. For example, a category that states “this page may be freely 3 copied” may be related to the public domain category because it conveys the same licensing 4 restriction. Further, a category that states “all rights reserved” may be related to the fair use only 5 category because both convey the same licensing restriction. 6 Plaintiff’s position is that “all that needs to be present [in order to meet this claim 7 limitation] are one or more categories that are related to either (1) public domain; (2) fair use only; 8 (3) use with attribution; or (4) permission of the copyright owner.” (Ex. 14 at 12.) To adopt 9 Plaintiff’s position would be to hold that any single copyright status category, such as “all rights 10 reserved”—a category that has been designated to digital content years before this patent was filed 11 (see, e.g., Ex. 2.)—would meet this limitation. Such a construction would read the limitation out 12 of the claim. 13 2. 14 15 Google’s Construction Is Supported By The Specification Google’s construction informs the jury that the four categories are mutually exclusive. This 16 construction is well-supported by the specification. The preferred embodiment of the invention 17 describes a four-tiered categorization system, depicted in the ’459 patent as Figure 1. (Cl. Constr. 18 at 3; ‘459 patent, Fig. 1.) In discussing the first three tiers of the invention, the specification states 19 that the creator may assign pages to multiple categories in each of the three tiers. (6:31-33 (“both 20 Commerce and Information”); 6:39-40 (“one or more of these twelve [subject matter] categories”); 21 6:43-44 (“one or more of the five file-type categories”).) But, when discussing assignment of a 22 network page to the copyright status categories, the specification states that the creator may assign 23 the page to only one of the categories. (6:48-49 (“The creator may assign the page to one of the 24 four copyright-status categories.”).) This distinction between the first three tiers and the copyright 25 status tier was deliberate and is logical. Pages may be assigned to more than one category in the 26 first three tiers because a page may fit more than one category (e.g., be related to more than one 27 second-tier subject matter, or include more than one third-tier file type). However, a network page 28 23 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 cannot have more than one copyright status. For example, a page cannot be in the public domain 2 and, at the same time, require attribution if reused. Further, a page cannot be reused in accordance 3 with fair use principles and, at the same time, require the permission of the copyright owner to 4 reuse. The proper construction of this term must include four mutually exclusive categories as 5 described in the specification. 6 Plaintiff’s position is that “a [single] category can be related both to public domain and fair 7 use only.” (Ex. 14 at 12.) This position is illogical. Content that is in the public domain is, by 8 definition, free to copy and therefore not restricted to only fair uses. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite 9 Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964). Plaintiff’s over reliance on the words “related to” 10 11 underscore the weakness of its position. To illustrate Plaintiff’s expansive reading of this claim, imagine the same claim language 12 with simpler categories. The claim would read: providing a list of categories, wherein said 13 categories include a category based on color, and wherein the color comprises categories related 14 to white, black, dark gray, and light gray. Under Plaintiff’s reading, providing a category for black 15 would meet this limitation. 16 The only section of the specification that discusses these categories states: “The set of 17 copyright-status categories 17 includes the following four categories. Public Domain is material 18 that is in the public domain and can be used freely without any restrictions. Fair Use Only is 19 material meant to be used in accordance with accepted fair use guidelines. Use with Attribution is 20 material that can be used as long as its use is accompanied by an attribution to the author or 21 copyright owner. Permission of Copyright Owner Needed is material that cannot be used unless 22 the copyright owner is first contacted for permission, which may or may not be granted and may 23 include fees and additional terms.” 5:48-58. There is no indication that more than one of these 24 categories may apply to a page at the same time. 25 Google’s construction also instructs the jury that the copyright status category is applied to 26 the network page. Beyond the fact that all the claims specifically claim a method for categorizing 27 network pages, as opposed to material on pages, the specification confirms that the copyright status 28 24 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 categories indicate the copyright status of the page. (6:50-54 (“After the creator decides to which 2 categories to assign the page, the creator may mark or tag the page as belonging in or within the 3 assigned categories by associating, with the page, the corresponding indicium for each assigned 4 category.”).) Categories may not be applied to some material on the page and not other material as 5 suggested by Plaintiff. 6 3. 7 Google’s Construction Is Supported By The Prosecution History 8 The patentee’s original claim 51 recited “a list of categories, wherein said categories 9 include a plurality of categories based on the copyright status of material on a page.” (Pros. 10 History, IF000144.) The Patent Office rejected this claim as anticipated by the prior art. (Pros. 11 History, IF000123.) The patentee added the limitation containing the four specific categories to 12 overcome this rejection. (Pros. History, IF000113.) Plaintiff is now attempting to recapture this 13 surrendered subject matter with its expansive reading of this claim term in violation of established 14 Federal Circuit precedent. See Board of Regents of the University of Texas System v. BENQ 15 America Corp., 533 F.3d 1362, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that the Court could not 16 construe a claim term added during amendment as encompassing the very claim limitation that the 17 amendment was meant to narrow). 18 Plaintiff’s position is that “all that needs to be present [in order to meet this claim 19 limitation] are one or more categories that are related to either (1) public domain; (2) fair use only; 20 (3) use with attribution; or (4) permission of the copyright owner.” (Ex. 14 at 12 (emphasis 21 added).) If a single category “related to” any one of these four recited categories meets this 22 limitation, then any single copyright status category meets this limitation because the recited 23 categories span the spectrum of copyright statuses. Thus, Plaintiff’s construction impermissibly 24 creates an amended claim that is actually broader than the claim that was rejected by the Patent 25 Office. 26 27 Plaintiff asserts that “[Google’s] ‘do not allow reuse (all rights reserved)’ is a category related to ‘permission of copyright owner needed’” and that this single category meets this claim 28 25 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 limitation. (Id. at 12-13.) But, that is precisely the subject matter that the patentee surrendered in 2 amending its claim from the broad “categories based on the copyright status of material on a page.” 3 (Pros. History, IF000144.) The amendment was made to overcome prior art recited by the Patent 4 Examiner. (Pros. History, IF000123.) Therefore, the issued claim cannot cover a broader scope 5 than the original, rejected, claim. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 33 (1966) 6 (“claims that have been narrowed in order to obtain the issuance of a patent by distinguishing prior 7 art cannot be sustained to cover that which was previously by limitation eliminated from the 8 patent”). 9 To return to our color example, it is as if Plaintiff attempted to claim providing a list of 10 categories, wherein said categories include a plurality of categories based on color. Then, after a 11 rejection by the Patent Office, Plaintiff amended its claim to read providing a list of categories, 12 wherein said categories include a category based on color, and wherein the color comprises 13 categories related to white, black, dark gray, and light gray. And, Plaintiff now attempts to argue 14 that providing a single category for black was not surrendered. 15 A construction that allows this claim element to be met by a single category runs contrary 16 to well-settled patent law. See id. Plaintiff attempted to claim providing a plurality of categories 17 based on copyright status and that claim was rejected. Plaintiff narrowed the claim in order to 18 overcome the rejection by reciting four categories. Now, Plaintiff asserts that this narrowed claim 19 is actually broader than the original claim by arguing that a single category based on copyright 20 status meets this limitation. Such a reading runs contrary to the prosecution history and Supreme 21 Court law. See id. (“Here, the patentee obtained his patent only by accepting the limitations 22 imposed by the Examiner. The claims were carefully drafted to reflect these limitations and [the 23 patentee] is not now free to assert a broader view of [the] invention.”). 24 4. 25 26 27 Plaintiff’s Construction Ignores The Claim Language In Order To Fit Its Infringement Theory Plaintiff attempts to fold all four categories of this limitation into one broad copyright status category so that any copyright status could meet this limitation. If a single copyright status 28 26 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM 1 category need only be related to any one of the four recited categories, then any copyright status 2 meet this limitation because the four recited categories span the entire range of copyright statuses. 3 Such a construction renders the recitation of the four categories in the claim meaningless as the 4 claim could just read “category based on the copyright status of material on a page” — just like 5 claims 1 and 30 (and the rejected original claim 51). Such a construction is illogical and is 6 contradicted by the prosecution history of the ’459 patent. 7 Google’s construction aids the jury by clearly stating that (1) the network page is subject to 8 the copyright licenses, and (2) the four copyright status categories must be four mutually exclusive 9 categories. This construction is consistent with the intrinsic evidence and should be adopted. 10 11 Dated: May 22, 2012 Respectfully submitted, 12 KAYE SCHOLER LLP 13 By: 14 15 /s/ Kenneth M. Maikish Michael J. Malecek Kenneth M. Maikish Attorneys for Defendant GOOGLE INC. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 27 60707412_3.DOCX GOOGLE'S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Case No. 2:11-CV-00319 GEB JFM

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