Huon v. Breaking Media et al

Filing 194

RESPONSE by Meanith Huonin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants John Lerner, Breaking Media, Breaking Media, LLC, David Lat, Breaking Media, Inc., David Minkin, Elie Mystal to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Amended Complaint 178 WITH EXHIBITS A TO J (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A1, # 2 Exhibit A2, # 3 Exhibit A3, # 4 Exhibit A4, # 5 Exhibit A5, # 6 Exhibit A6, # 7 Exhibit B, # 8 Exhibit C, # 9 Exhibit D, # 10 Exhibit E1, # 11 Exhibit E2, # 12 Exhibit E3, # 13 Exhibit F, # 14 Exhibit G, # 15 Exhibit H, # 16 Exhibit I, # 17 Exhibit J)(Huon, Meanith) (Attachment 15 Exhibit H replaced on 3/19/2013 pursuant to Judge's order of 3/18/2013) (tg, ).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MEANITH HUON,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID LAT, et. al.,
Defendants

)
)
) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1: 11-cv-3054
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF, MEANITH HUON’S RESPONSE TO THE
THE ABOVE THE LAW DEFENDANTS’ FRCP 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... ii
INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................................1
STANDARD OF REVIEW……...................................................................................................2
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................3
I. THE FAIR REPORTING PRIVILEGE DOES NOT APPLY…………………………….3
A. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE ARE NOT MET………….3
B. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT JOURNALISTS OR REPORTERS………..................................4
C. THE PRIVILEGE DOES NOT APPLY TO AN INACCURATE ACCOUNT………………7
D. THE STATEMENTS FALLS OUTSIDE THE PRIVILEGE………………...………….…..9
E. THE POST WAS NOT A FAIR SUMMARY OF ANY PROCEEDINGS..............................9
F. THE PRIVILEGE DOES NOT APPLY TO FABRICATED EVIDENCE……………...…..10
G. DEFENDANTS’ CITED CASES DO NOT APPLY………………………………………..12
II. DEPICTING MR. HUON AS A REPEATED SEX OFFENDER OF MULTIPLE CRIMES
AGAINST MULTIPLE FEMALE VICTIMS IS NOT AN OPINION……………………….…13

i

A.
THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT HAS HELD THAT ACCUSING SOMEONE OF
COMMITTING A CRIME IS AN ASSERTION OF A FACT………………………………..13
B. THE US SUPREME COURT AND THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT HAVE REJECTED
THE ARGUMENTS THAT OPINIONS ARE NOT ACTIONABLE………………………….14
C. DEFENDANTS’ CASES DO NOT APPLY OR SUPPORT MR. HUON’S POSITION…..15
III.
THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT HAS REJECTED SIMILARLY STRAINED
ATTEMPTS TO FIND UNNATURAL BUT INNOCENT MEANINGS………………..…16
IV. THE POST IS DEFAMATORY PER SE…………………………….…………………..18
A. Mr. HUON HAS STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION PER SE…..….18
B. DEFENDANTS’ CASES ON DEFAMATION PER SE DO NOT APPLY OR THE CASES
SUPPORT MR. HUON’S POSITION…………………………………………………………..20
C. MR. HUON HAS STATED A CLAIM FOR DEFAMATION PER QUOD………..…….…21
D. DEFENDANTS’ CASES ON DEFAMATION PER QUOD DO NOT APPLY……………22
E. THE POST DOES REFER TO MR. HUON’S BY NAME………….………………………22
VI. MR. HUON HAS STATED A CLAIM FOR FALSE LIGHT………………………….25
VII. MR. HUON HAS STATED A CLAIM FOR UNREASONABLE INTRUSION INTO
THE SECLUSION OF OTHERS……………………………………………………………..26
VIII. MR. HUON HAS STATED A CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS………………………………………………………………….…27
IX. MR. HUON HAS STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION OF TORTIOUS
INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE………………...28
X. MR. HUON STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CIVIL CONSPIRACY……….....29
XI. THE COURT SHOULD ALLOW A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
CYBERBULLYING AND/OR CYBERSTALKING………………………………………...30
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………….………...…30
EXHIBITS A to J.

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Action Repair, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
776 F.2d 143, 149 (7th Cir. Ill. 1985)……………………………………………….…….3
Barry Harlem Corp. v. Kraff,
273 Ill. App. 3d 388, 391-92……………………………………………………….……22
Beauharnais v. People of State of Ill.,
343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725 U.S. (1952)…………………………………………………19
Belden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc.,
90 Ill. App. 3d 547, 551, 413 N.E.2d 98, 101, 45 Ill. Dec. 765 (1980)…………………29
Berkos v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc.,
161 Ill.App.3d 476, (1st Dist.,1987)………………………………………………..…...28
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson,
713 F.2d 262, 272 (7th Cir. 1983)…………………..………………………………..12, 22
Bryson v. News America Publication,
174 Ill. 2d 77 (Ill. 1996). )………………..…………………………………..…14, 15, 28
Busse v. Motorola, Inc.,
351 Ill. App. 3d 67, 72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004)……………………………………26
Catalano v. Pechous,
83 Ill. 2d 146. (1980)………………..…………………………………………..…4, 12-13
Chapski v. Copley Press,
92 Ill. 2d 350-352, (1982)………………………………………………………….……16
Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co.,
639 F.2d 54, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1980)……………………………………………..….4, 12-14
Cobbs v. Chicago Defender
308 Ill. App. 55, 59, 31 N.E.2d 323(1941)……………………………………….……….4
Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc.,
536 F.Supp.2d 380, 397 (S.D.N.Y.,2008)…………………………………….…………..5
Cook v. Winfrey,
141 F.3d 322, 330-31 (7th Cir. 1998)…………………………………………….……12
ii

Cooper v. Dupnik,
924 F.2d 1520 (9th Cir. 1991)…………………………………………………………..19
Continental Nut Co. v. Robert L. Berner Co.,
345 F.2d 395, 397 (7th Cir. Ill. 1965)……………………………………………….….21
Cunningham v. UTi Integrated Logistics,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38493 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2010)………………………………20.
Edwards v. Paddock Publ’ns, Inc.,
327 Ill. App. 3d 553 (1st Dist. 2001)................................................................................ 12
Fleck Bros. Co. v. Sullivan,
385 F.2d 223, 225 (7th Cir. Ill. 1967)…………………………………………….……21
Gertz v. Robert Welch,
418 U.S. 323 (U.S. 1974)…………..................................................................................14
Gist v. Macon County Sheriff's Dep't
284 Ill. App. 3d 367, 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1996)………………………………..20
Hale v. Scott,
371 F.3d 917, 919 (7th Cir. Ill. 2004)…………………………………………………4, 5
Hahn v Konstanty,
257 A.D.2d 799, (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.,1999)……………………………………..………20
Hatfill v. New York Times Co.,
416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005)……………………………………………………………..27
Hoover v. Peerless Publications, Inc.,
461 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (E.D.Pa.1978)…………………………………………………12
Horowitz v. Baker,
168 Ill. App. 3d 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1988)......................................................13, 15
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876 (U.S.Va.,1988)……………………………………………...27
In Coursey v. Greater Niles Tp. Pub. Corp,
82 Ill.App.2d 76, 227 N.E.2d 164 (1st Dist. 1967),
aff’d, 40 Ill.2d 257, 267 (Ill. 1968)…………………………………………….……..8, 18
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller,
438 F.3d 1141, 1156-1157 (Concurring opinion) (D.C. 2006)…………………………..4
iii

In re Thompson,
162 B.R. 748 (E.D.Mich.,1993).…………………………………………………….…19
J. Eck & Sons, Inc. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp.,
213 Ill. App. 3d 510, 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991)………………………….…28, 29
Kelly v. Blum,
2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 31, 69-70 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010)……………………………..15
Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp.,
154 Ill.2d 1, (Ill.,1992)………………………………………………………………….27
Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank,
126 Ill. 2d 411 (Ill. 1989)………………………………………………………………25
Lowe v. Rockford Newspaper, Inc.
179 Ill.App.3d 592, 597 (2nd Dist. 1989)………………………………………….……8
Maple Lanes, Inc. v. News Media Corp.,
322 Ill.App.3d 842 (2nd Dist. 2011).………………………………………………...…12
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,
497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990).…………………………………..………………………………15
Moss v. Wallace,
2009 WL 4683553 (Conn.Super.,2009). ………………………………………………...27
Muzikowski v. Paramount Pic. Corp.,
322 F.3d 918, 926 (7th Cir. 2003)……………………………………………….…..20, 23
Myers v. The Telegraph,
332 Ill.App.3d 917, 922 (5th Dist. 2002)……………………………………………….7,8
O’Donnell v. Field Enters., Inc.,
145 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1036 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1986) ............................................15
Olinger v. American Savings and Loan Assoc.,
1133 U.S. App. D.C. 107, 409 F.2d 142, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1969)…………………………….4, 12
Owens v. CBS, Inc.,
173 Ill. App. 3d 977, 992-993 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1988)……………..…….4, 5, 16-17
Parker v. House O'Lite Corp.—
324 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1026 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2001)…………………….……23, 24
iv

People v. Defrates,
33 Ill. 2d 190, 194 (Ill. 1965)…………………………………………..………………..8
Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc.,
842 P.2d 896 (Utah,1992)………………………………………………………………27
Schaefer v. Hearst Corp.,
5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1734, 1736 (Md. Super. Ct. 1979)…………………………….20
Snitowsky v. NBC Subsidiary (WMAQ-TV), Inc.,
297 Ill.App.3d 304. 310 (1st Dist. 1988)………………………………………………4, 10
Schaffer v. Zekman,
196 Ill. App. 3d 727, 733 (1st Dist. 1990)………………………………………...……..22
Soderlund Brothers, Inc. v. Carrier Corp.,
278 Ill. App. 3d 606, 663 N.E.2d 1, 215 Ill. Dec. 251 (1995)……………………...……29
Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Pub. Co.,
221 Ill.2d 558, 588 (Ill. 2006)………………………………………………………3, 9, 18
Spelson v. CBS, Inc.,
581 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1984)………………………………………………………22
Strosberg v. Brauvin Realty Servs.,
295 Ill. App. 3d 17, 34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998)…………………………………….29
Time Savers, Inc. v. LaSalle Bank, N.A.,
371 Ill.App.3d 759, 309 Ill.Dec. 259, 863 N.E.2d 1156 (2nd Dist. 2007)………….…..29
Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale,
206 N.J. 209, 242 (N.J. 2011)………………………………………………………….4, 5
Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale,
413 N.J.Super. 135, 160 (N.J.Super.A.D.,2010), aff’d, 206 N.J. 209 (N.J.,2011)………5
Tuite v. Corbitt,
224 Ill. 2d 490, 503 (Ill. 2007).…………………………….…………..…..….……16,20
Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
673 F.3d 547, 555 (7th Cir. Ill. 2012).…………………………….…………..……..2, 11

v

STATUTES AND RULES
§ 735 ILCS 5/8-901……………………………………………………………..….….…....…..5
FRCP 7.1………………………………………………………………………………….……22
FRCP 8(a)(2). ……………………………………………………………..….…………….......2
FRCP12(b)(6) . ……………………………………………………………………….…….2, 12
Local Rule 3.2………………………………………………………………………………….22
Ala. Code § 12-21-142. ……………………………………………………………….………..5
Alaska Stat. § 09.25.300. ………………………………………………………………….……5
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2237. ……………………………………………………………………...5
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-85-510. ……………………………………………………………..……5
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10 § 4320. . ……………………………………………………………..…..5
OTHER AUTHORITIES

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 571, Comment c, at 187 (1977)………………………………4
Restatement, Second, Torts § 578 (1977)………………………………………………………..4
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611, Comment f, at 300 (1977)……………………………….9

vi

Plaintiff, Meanith Huon, responds to the FRCP 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss and
Memorandum of Defendants, Breaking Media, Inc., Breaking Media, LLC, David Lat, Elie
Mystal, John Lerner, and David Minkin (“ATL Defendants” or “Defendants”), as follows:
INTRODUCTION
On or after the day that Meanith Huon was acquitted of sexual assault on May 6, 2010,
the ATL Defendants posted the headline “Rape Potpourri” and “breaking rape coverage ”.
Defendants posted a rape story on its blog accusing Mr. Huon of being, a rapist, an attorney
rapist near you, a serial sex offender who had victimized multiple women. However, Mr. Huon
was acquitted of sexual assault in the original proceedings and he was never called a “rapist.”
Nothing in the original proceedings and nothing in the news articles mentioned the existence of
multiple female victims of Mr. Huon.

Defendants invented the fiction that Mr. Huon was

charged with “rape”, when he had been acquitted of sexual assault of “Jane Doe”.1 Defendants
invented the fiction that there was more than one female victim of Mr. Huon. Defendants knew
there was only a single complainant.
Defendants did not quote a Belleville News Democrat (“BND”) article in its rape story
post, and Defendants do not even contend that BND news article existed that reported that Mr.
Huon victimized or raped several women. The quote in the 2010 ATL rape story on Mr. Huon is
from a 2008 Madison County Record post on the blog MadisonRecord.com. A copy of the ATL
story with the citation to the Madison County Record post is attached as Exhibit “A”. The edits
or markings on the copy of the ATL article attached to Defendants’ Response brief hides that the
source of the rape story post is the 2008 Madison County Record post. The word “Madison

1

County Record” in red is blocked by the markings. See Exhibit “A”. A copy of the ATL story
attached to Defendants’ Memorandum is also attached here as Exhibit “B” because that copy
contains the story about a pedophile immediately before Mr. Huon’s story.

A copy of the entire

2008 Madison County Record cited by Defendants is attached as Exhibit “C”.
The 2008 Madison County Record post quoted by the Defendants in their 2010 rape
story about other so-called female victims of Mr. Huon is the very same article about the same
Jane Doe that the Defendants cited to in a 2008 post on Abovethelaw.com when they called Mr.
Huon “Lawyer of the Day”. Exhibit “D”. Second, Defendants argue that they commented on a
BND article that has never been produced and that is not quoted anywhere in the rape story post
of 2010. Exhibit “A”. Defendants, bloggers, cannot argue with a straight face that they were
reporting four day old news—opening statement. Four day old news is not even “news” in print
journalism. Furthermore, nothing in opening statement refers to Mr. Huon as a serial rapist or as
someone with a history of victimizing several women.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
All factual allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true. Wigod v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 555 (7th Cir. Ill. 2012). A complaint must contain only a "short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FRCP 8(a)(2).
Judging how the public would interpret nebulous verbiage is difficult. Thus, doubts as to
whether a statement has a potentially defamatory meaning should not be resolved in favor of the
moving party at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Dismissal at the summary judgment stage, after
discovery, is more appropriate. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts should not make "judgment

1

Mr. Huon filed a motion to strike an exhibit revealing the name and hometown of the complaining woman in case
no. 2008 CF 1496, because she was the complainant in a sexual assault case. Docket No. 50.

2

calls" about the defamatory capacity of allegedly libelous statements at issue. Action Repair,
Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 776 F.2d 143, 149 (7th Cir. Ill. 1985).
ARGUMENT
I. THE FAIR REPORTING PRIVILEGE DOES NOT APPLY.
A. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE ARE NOT MET.
The fair report privilege has two requirements: (1) the report must be of an official
proceeding; and (2) the report must be complete and accurate or a fair abridgement of the official
proceeding. Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Pub. Co., 221 Ill.2d 558, 588 (Ill. 2006).
Defendants did not report on an official proceedings or make a fair abridgment of the official
proceeding. Defendants are bloggers or website operators who contend that they commented on
a news article, which has never been produced.2
More importantly, Defendants cannot cite to any news article calling Mr. Huon a rapist or
a serial rapist. Defendants cannot cite to a news article about multiple female victims who were
victimized by Mr. Huon.

There are no original proceedings or transcript where Mr. Huon is

called a rapist or a serial rapist or where he was charged with sexually assaulting or sexually
abusing multiple female victims. Opening statements did not refer to multiple female victims or
multiple sex crimes committed by Mr. Huon. Defendants’ Memorandum does not even
address the issue that Defendants depicted Mr. Huon as a sex offender who preyed on multiple
female victims.3

2

Defendants have never produced a copy of the BND article, and the link is a broken hyperlink that does not
redirect the reader to the BND article. Furthermore, Defendant does not contend that the BND article accuses Mr.
Huon of sexually assaulting or sexually abusing or raping multiple female victims .
3

Mr. Huon alleges in the Fourth Amended Complaint that:
72.

Defendants intentionally omitted, among other things, the following facts:

3

Assuming arguendo that there was a BND news article, the ATL Defendants re-published
a defamatory statement-- this is not a report of an official proceeding. It is a re-publication of a
defamatory statement in a news article, which is defamation. Snitowsky v. NBC Subsidiary
(WMAQ-TV), Inc., 297 Ill.App.3d 304. 310 (1st Dist. 1988).4 Under common law, a person who
republished a defamatory statement made by another was himself liable for defamation even
though he gave the name of the originator. Hale v. Scott, 371 F.3d 917, 919 (7th Cir. Ill. 2004);
Catalano v. Pechous, 83 Ill. 2d 146. (1980); Olinger v. American Savings and Loan Assoc., 133
U.S. App. D.C. 107, 409 F.2d 142, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., 639
F.2d 54, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1980); Owens v. CBS, Inc., 173 Ill. App. 3d 977, 992-993 (Ill. App. Ct.
5th Dist. 1988); Cobbs v. Chicago Defender (1941), 308 Ill. App. 55, 59, 31 N.E.2d 323.
B. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT JOURNALISTS OR REPORTERS.
The fair report privilege does not extend to the stereotypical “blogger” sitting in his
pajamas at his computer posting on the Internet or a self-appointed journalist who blogs on a
website.

In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1156-1157 (Concurring

opinion) (D.C. 2006); Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 206 N.J. 209, 242 (N.J. 2011). If that

a.
*

The complainant that is the subject of all the news articles is the same woman.
*

*

85.
The Abovethelaw Defendants falsely stated or intimated that there were other women victims that
Mr. Huon allegedly had raped but did not explain that the same woman is the subject of all news stories or
blog posts and that Mr. Huon was acquitted of sexual assault.
Defendant acted with malice because they knew that Mr. Huon had been arrested in 2008. In 2008
Defendant posted a link to the very same Madison County article. Defendants do not even attempt to
address paragraph 85 separately.
4

Even repeating a defamatory statement made by a third person is defamation. Restatement (Second) of Torts §
571, Comment c, at 187 (1977); Restatement, Second, Torts § 578 (1977).

4

were the case, “anyone with a Facebook account, could try to assert the privilege.” Too Much
Media, LLC 206 N.J. at 242. Bloggers exhibit none of the recognized characteristics
traditionally associated with the news process, nor do website operators demonstrate an
established affiliation with any news entity so as to allow it to claim any privileges. Too Much
Media, LLC v. Hale, 413 N.J.Super. 135, 160 (N.J.Super.A.D.,2010), aff’d, 206 N.J. 209
(N.J.,2011). A blogger merely comments on the writings of others on and creates no
independent product of its own nor makes a material substantive contribution . Id at 159.
The Illinois legislature has codified a privilege for reporters by specifically using the
word “reporter”, not “blogger” or “self-appointed journalist”. § 735 ILCS 5/8-901.5
Certain national journalism organizations have formulated codes of ethics or “canons of
journalism.” Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F.Supp.2d 380, 397 (S.D.N.Y.,2008).6
The neutral reportage doctrine does not apply when someone who could not be regarded
as responsible prominent persons makes serious charges against a private individual and those
charges are not reported in an accurate and disinterested manner. The doctrine does not protect
gossip or defamatory speech. Owens,173 Ill. App. 3d at 995; Hale, 371 F.3d at 919.
The ATL Defendants are not reporters or journalists—the established press-- whose
conduct are governed by a code of ethics in news gathering and reporting. Defendants operate
websites, including a blog called “Above The Law” that generates advertising dollars from
Internet traffic. That traffic is generated by posting rumors, making false accusations, and
5

Several state laws provide that a reporter’s privilege only extends to the established press. Ala. Code § 12-21-142;
Alaska Stat. § 09.25.300; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2237; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-85-510; Del. Code Ann. tit. 10 § 4320.
6

The Society of Professional Journalist Code of Ethics. http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp. News organizations
like the New York Times and Business Week have a code of ethics. http://www.nytco.com/press/ethics.html and
http://www.businessweek.com/ethics.htm.

5

defaming lawyers, judges, law students, and law professors about their private lives under the
guise of “news”.7 The more sordid, sexual, private and perverse the content, the more web
traffic is generated, and, thus, the more advertising dollars is generated. This is not reporting
news, much less making a report of an official proceeding.
On the date of his acquittal, the ATL Defendants posted a “breaking rape coverage”
and rape story depicting Mr. Huon as serial sex offender with multiple female victims. There
was no news article hyperlinked calling Mr. Huon a serial rapist–he had been acquitted. No
news article existed accusing Mr. Huon of being charged with sexually assaulting or sexually
abusing multiple female victims. Besides the Madison County Record, Defendants also quoted a
post from a gossip blog site called Lawyergossip.com, which falsely posted that Mr. Huon had
sexually assaulted or sexually abused multiple female victims. 8 Lawyergossip.com hyperlinked
its post to a 2009 article in The Alton Telegraph. But the Alton Telegraph article clearly
identifies the same woman in both the 2008 and 2009 Madison County criminal cases that are
discussed in the article.
Meanith Huon, 39, was charged this week in Madison County Circuit Court with
harassment of a witness and cyber stalking.
He is accused of contacting his alleged victim of last year via the Internet and
communicating indirectly with her in such a way as to cause her emotional distress
(emphasis added). 9
7

See posts by Defendants, including “Judge of the Day: From the Bench to the Big House?”, “Manhattan Lawyer
Happy To Help Out Brother-in-Law By Banging His Wife”, “UVA Law Grad Charged With Forcible Sodomy
Allegedly Sodomized Second Victim During 1L Year”, “Judge of the Day: A State Judge’s Alleged Affair and Baby
Mama Drama Exposed — Via Incriminating Texts”, “‘Well-Dressed’ Alleged Groper Is A Lawyer Without A Job”,
“A New York Prosecutor Admits to a Very Porny Past — And May Be Forced to Resign Over It,” “The Departing
Skadden Partner, His Ex-Wife, And The Substance Of African-Americans”, “Florida Prosecutor Who Used Badge
For Strip Club Perks Is Stripped Of His Job”, and others. http://abovethelaw.com/ Exhibit “E”.
8

Exhibit “F”

9

The Alton Telegraph article is attached as Exhibit “G”. The ATL Defendants brag about the power of Google: had

6

The blogger on Lawyergossip.com had an axe to grind against Mr. Huon and had contacted the
prosecutor in Madison County to try to get Mr. Huon’s bond revoked.10
As previously explained, the other source quoted in the Defendants’ post is a post from
the Madison County Record blog, Madisonrecord.com. This is a 2008 post about Mr. Huon
initial arrest in the Madison County criminal case involving Jane Doe. But, this 2008 post never
accused Mr. Huon of sexually assaulting or abusing multiple female victims.11 Worse, the ATL
Defendants cited to the same 2008 Madison County Record article involving a single
complainant, Jane Doe, when Defendants made fun of Mr. Huon by calling him “Lawyer of the
Day” in 2008 and when Defendants accused Mr. Huon of having a history of victimizing
multiple women in the “breaking rape coverage” story in 2010. Mr. Huon even emailed
Defendant, David Lat, about the “Lawyer of the Day” post. 12 Under the cloak of “reporting”,
the ATL Defendants’ engages in unfettered and offensive cyber bulling by stalking and defaming
individuals like Mr. Huon.
C. THE PRIVILEGE DOES NOT APPLY TO AN INACCURATE ACCOUNT.
In deciding if the fair report privilege applies, the court compares “the official report with
the news media account . . . If the defamatory matter does not appear in the official record or
proceedings, the privilege of fair and accurate reporting does not apply. Myers v. The

Defendants Googled Mr. Huon, Defendants would have found the 2009 Alton Telegraph stating that the same
woman made the complaint against Mr. Huon in 2008 and 2009. The Alton Telegraph article was still searchable
on the Internet in July of 2011 when the screenshot was made.
10

See Chris Hoell’s Answer to Interrogatory No. 11 in 11-cv-3054, Exhibit “D” and emails from
Lawyergossip.com, Exhibit “H”.
11

Exhibit “C”

12

Exhibit “I”

7

Telegraph, 332 Ill.App.3d 917, 922 (5th Dist. 2002). The test is not comparing a blog post with
a news story that Defendants or comparing a blog post to a truncated trial transcript that
Defendants searched for after the fact.

Lowe v. Rockford Newspaper, Inc. held that the

privilege did not apply, because the defamatory statements did not appear in the police report.
Lowe, 179 Ill.App.3d 592, 597 (2nd Dist. 1989). In Myers v. The Telegraph, a newspaper story
mistakenly reported that a criminal pled guilty to a felony, rather than a misdemeanor. The Fifth
District held that the news report was defamatory per se. The privilege does not apply if “the
defendants published what turned out to be an inaccurate account of the proceedings” In
Coursey v. Greater Niles Tp. Pub. Corp, plaintiff was found guilty of 4 out of 5 charges. But the
newspaper reported that plaintiff was found guilty of all charges. The Illinois Supreme Court
held the newspaper’s false reporting was sufficient to overcome the privilege. Coursey ,82
Ill.App.2d 76, 227 N.E.2d 164 (1st Dist. 1967), aff’d, 40 Ill.2d 257, 267 (Ill. 1968).
Here, where in the original proceedings is Mr. Huon called a rapist, a serial rapist? Where
in the original proceedings are references to multiple female victims of Mr. Huon, or to Mr.
Huon posing as a talent scout? Indeed, Mr. Huon was not charged with “rape”. 13 Defendants
invented facts that were not in the original proceedings. Where in the original proceedings does
it state that Mr. Huon “came up with an excellent little game to meet women” or that “Meanith
Huon allegedly listed Craigslist ads” or that “he claimed to be a talent scout for models.” Where
in the original proceedings does it state that a “Craigslist ad [was]posted by Huon in late June,
seeking promotional models”?

13

“Rape” is defined as forcible vaginal intercourse. People v. Defrates, 33 Ill. 2d 190, 194 (Ill. 1965). It is not oral
sex. The FBI changed its definition in 2012. http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/attorney-general-ericholder-announces-revisions-to-the-uniform-crime-reports-definition-of-rape

8

D. THE STATEMENTS FALLS OUTSIDE THE PRIVILEGE.
Statements charging a person with unfair business practices, impugning his integrity,
prejudicing his practice of law, and/or implying that he committed a crime fall within several of
the recognized categories of defamation per se. Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Pub. Co.,
221 Ill.2d 558, 590 (Ill. 2006). These type of defamatory statements are not a fair abridgement
of the proceedings and fall outside the privilege. Solaia Technology, LLC,221 Ill.2d 558 at 590592. Here, Defendants charged Mr. Huon of committing fraud by pretending to be a talent scout,
a supervisor for a company that sells alcohol, a promoter seeking promotional models. All these
accusations are self-contradictory: Mr. Huon can’t pretend to be 3 different people. Worse, the
ATL Defendants accused Mr. Huon of being a rapist, a serial rapist, a stalker, someone who has
a history of victimizing multiple women in “breaking rape coverage”.
E. THE POST WAS NOT A FAIR SUMMARY OF ANY PROCEEDINGS.
For the privilege to apply, a new media’s summary must be “fair” for the privilege to
apply. A fair abridgment means that the report must convey to readers “a substantially correct
account.” Solaia Technology, LLC, 221 Ill.2d at 589-590.14 The reporter cannot make additions.
In this case, the ATL Defendants omitted significant facts, invented facts, conveyed
erroneous impressions to its readers, and imputed deviant motives to Mr. Huon. Accusing
someone of being a rapist is not a fair summary of the acquittal of sexual assault. Inventing facts

14

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611, Comment f, at 300 (1977). Comment f of the second Restatement states:
“[I]t is necessary that nothing be omitted or misplaced in such a manner as to convey an erroneous
impression to those who hear or read it * * *. The reporter is not privileged under this Section to make
additions of his own that would convey a defamatory impression, nor to impute corrupt motives to any one,
nor to indict expressly or by innuendo the veracity or integrity of any of the parties.” Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 611, Comment f, at 300-01 (1977).

9

that Mr. Huon sexually assaulted or sexually abused multiple female victims is not a fair
summary of Mr. Huon being charged with allegedly forcing one woman to perform oral sex and
being acquitted. Defendants described its post as “breaking rape coverage” on the date that
Mr. Huon was acquitted. Making things worse, the ATL Defendants wrote about a 15 year old
girl being raped immediately prior to the post about Mr. Huon posing as a talent scout to rape
bubblegum princesses. Defendants write: “Our next story from the files of the wanton and
depraved is a little more in our wheelhouse.” What is more wanton and depraved than raping a
15 year old girl? Jane Doe was 26 years old.15
F. THE PRIVILEGE DOES NOT APPLY TO FABRICATED EVIDENCE.
The privilege does not permit the expansion of the official report by the addition of
fabricated evidence designed to improve the credibility of the defamation. Snitowsky v. NBC
Subsidiary (WMAQ-TV), Inc., 297 Ill.App.3d 314, 310 (1st Dist. 1988). In Snitowsky, NBC
reported that a school principal charged one of the teachers with criminal misconduct. The news
media provided none of the background needed for the audience to doubt the principal's
accusations. Snitowsky held that without further context, the audience has no basis to conclude
that the principal had ulterior motives for lying and, thus, the statements were defamation per se.
Snitowsky held that the fair report privilege did not protect NBC, because the news media did
not simply abridge the statements made to police but reported evidence not found in the report.
NBC reported that a security guard witnessed the beating, although the police report never
mentioned a witness. By inventing facts beyond the official report to make the charges more
credible, NBC abandoned the fair report privilege.
15

The first sentence of the prosecutor’s opening statement is: “In the summer of 2008 [complainant] was not unlike
most women in their mid 20s.” Page 14 of Exhibit “B” to the ATL’s Memorandum. Compare that to Exhibit “B”
where the rape story on Mr. Huon follows the story of a pedophile.

10

In this case, the ATL Defendants abandoned any fair report privilege when it invented
facts about other female victims of Mr. Huon who he had allegedly sexually assaulted, abused, or
stalked. Defendants’ invention of other female victims lends credibility to the rape accusation.
Defendants’ posted that had the complainant Googled Mr. Huon, she would have found a story
that Mr. Huon had sexually assaulted, sexually abused, or stalked other women—without stating
that the same woman, Jane Doe, is the subject of all these news articles and posts.
Defendants invented the fiction that the jury was allowed to consider the consent defense
and posted a proposed consent form. Defendants omitted that the consent defense was never
submitted to the jury.16 Defendants invented the fiction that Mr. Huon “ came up with an
excellent little game to meet women” and “that the alleged victim had responded to a Craigslist
ad that Plaintiff posted seeking promotional models”. There is no evidence in the original
proceedings about an excellent little game to meet women or that Mr. Huon posed as a talent
scout. The transcript states that the complaining witness responded to a substantial amount of
Craigslist ads every month, giving out her telephone number to 30 to 40 strangers a month.
There was no evidence that Mr. Huon posted a Craigslist ad seeking promotional models or that
the telephone call he had with the complaining witness was connected to an ad for a job.17 Jane
Doe testified she went drinking or bar hopping on a Sunday with Mr. Huon.

16

Defendants have refused to produce the entire trial transcript and have not responded to Mr. Huon’s requests for a
quote for costs of a copy. The District Court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint. Wigod v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 555 (7th Cir. Ill. 2012). Mr. Huon alleges that:
72(b).

Defendants intentionally omitted, among other things, the following facts:
b.
The jury was not allowed to consider the consent defense, because Mr. Huon did not testify and
the trial judge barred the consent defense before closing arguments. Thus, the jury had to have found that
no sexual contact took place.

17

Pages 262 and 263 of Exhibit “B” of the ATL Defendants’ Memorandum.

11

G. DEFENDANTS’ CITED CASES DO NOT APPLY.
Defendant’s cases do not apply. The statements in Edwards v. Paddock Publ’ns, Inc. that
the news media republished were Illinois State Police data sheets--the original proceedings.
Here, Defendants wrote a story about a news article. Nothing in Mr. Huon’s original
proceedings referred to him sexually assaulting or abusing multiple victims. Mr. Huon had been
acquitted.
It is the "black-letter rule that one who republishes a libel is subject to liability just as if
he had published it originally, even though he attributes the libelous statement to the original
publisher, and even though he expressly disavows the truth of the statement." Hoover v. Peerless
Publications, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (E.D.Pa.1978); Olinger v. American Savings and
Loan Assoc., 133 U.S. App. D.C. 107, 409 F.2d 142, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Cianci v. New
Times Pub. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1980); Catalano v. Pechous, 83 Ill. 2d 146.
H. WHETHER THE PRIVILEGE HAS BEEN ABUSED IS FOR A JURY.
Both the Seventh Circuit and Illinois courts have held that it is question of fact for a jury
as to whether the fair reporting privilege was abused. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 272 (7th Cir. 1983); Maple Lanes, Inc. v. News Media Corp., 322
Ill.App.3d 842 (2nd Dist. 2011).

18

Cook v. Winfrey, held that the District Court committed

reversible error by, because “the conclusion that the privilege applied to the allegedly defamatory
statements in this case required the district court to resolve factual issues that should not be
reached on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” 141 F.3d 322, 330-31 (7th Cir. 1998).

.
18

In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., plaintiff sued CBS and a reporter over a broadcast on cigarette
advertising strategy. Defendants argued that the libel was privileged as a fair and accurate summary of the Federal
Trade Commission staff's report on cigarette advertising. The Seventh Circuit held that “this is a question of fact”

12

II. DEPICTING MR. HUON AS A REPEATED SEX OFFENDER OF MULTIPLE
CRIMES AGAINST MULTIPLE FEMALE VICTIMS IS NOT AN OPINION.
A.
THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT HAS HELD THAT ACCUSING
SOMEONE OF COMMITTING A CRIME IS AN ASSERTION OF A FACT.
The Illinois Supreme Court has already resolved the issue that when someone is charged
with committing a crime, that statement is a fact, not an opinion. Catalano v. Pechous, 83 Ill. 2d
146, 159-161 (Ill. 1980).

In Catalano, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that an

accusation of a specific criminal behavior is a statement of fact and not a constitutionally
protected expression of opinion.

83 Ill. 2d at 162. The accusations need not charge the

criminal offense with the precision of an indictment. Catalano, 83 Ill. 2d at 156; Horowitz, 168
Ill. App. 3d at 608. In Catalano , a city clerk stated "(t)wo hundred forty pieces of silver changed
hands -- thirty for each alderman." The Illinois Supreme Court stated that the charge of bribery
made by the city clerk informed his audience of a criminal act of which the audience was
unaware had been committed by the aldermen. Catalano, 83 Ill. 2d at 162. As the Illinois
Supreme Court explained:
So stated, the contention that Pechous' statement was not defamatory reduces to the claim
that when a charge of crime is based only on an inference drawn by the speaker, it must
be treated as no more than an expression of opinion and thus ceases to be defamatory. We
do not believe that such a position is supported by the language from Gertz on which the
defendants rely . . .
The argument made here would give a defendant in a defamation suit an absolute
immunity rather than the limited immunity conferred by New York Times on a person
whose defamatory statement was made without actual malice. Catalano v. Pechous, 83
Ill. 2d 146, 159-161 (Ill. 1980).
The Illinois Supreme Court relied on Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co. (2d Cir. 1980),
639 F.2d 54. There, a former mayor had been accused some 12 years previously of committing a

and that “the question is whether this would save the defamation count if the jury found that the broadcast was a fair
summary after all.” 713 F.2d at 271-273.

13

rape.19 The Second Circuit held that “Accusations of criminal activity, even in the form of
opinion, are not constitutionally protected. . . .No First Amendment protection enfolds false
charges of criminal behavior.” Cianci, 639 F.2d at 63-64 (2d Cir. 1980).20
In this case, Defendants’ statements are worse than the rape statements in Cianci, because
Defendants’ accused Mr. Huon of having committed crimes against multiple victims, including
rape, stalking, harassment. Defendant called Mr. Huon a “rapist”, a serial rapist, a potential
rapist, a depraved and wanton individual and described him as someone who has committed
multiple sex crimes against multiple female victims. Defendants wrote “it seems to me that there
is entirely too much (alleged) raping going on in this country.” A rape or an alleged rape is an
assertion of fact that was proven false at trial—Mr. Huon was acquitted.
B. THE US SUPREME COURT AND THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT HAVE
REJECTED THE ARGUMENTS THAT OPINIONS ARE NOT ACTIONABLE.
The U.S. Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court have rejected the argument that
opinions are not actionable under the First Amendment. Bryson v. News America Publication,
174 Ill. 2d 77 (Ill. 1996). As the U.S. Supreme Court explained, there is no additional First
Amendment protection of opinion, because “it would ignore the fact that expressions of

19

In Cianci, the cover of the July 24, 1978 issue of New Times bore a photograph identified as "Vincent "Buddy'
Cianci Mayor of Providence, R.I." and a legend reading:
Was this man accused of raping a woman at gunpoint 12 years ago? The article itself carried a headline in large and
heavily blacked type:
BUDDY WE HARDLY KNEW YA
followed by five lines, also in bold face and larger than normal type:
Twelve years ago, in a suburb of Milwaukee a law student was accused of raping a woman at
gunpoint. After receiving a $ 3,000 settlement, she dropped the charges and the incident was nearly
forgotten. That student, Vincent "Buddy" Cianci, Jr., is now the mayor of Providence, Rhode
Island. Cianci, 639 F.2d at 56.
20

The Second Circuit noted that the alleged libels in Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (U.S. 1974), included an
"implication that petitioner had a criminal record" and charges that he was a "Leninist" or "Communist-frontier".
639 F.2d at 61-62.

14

‘opinion’ may often imply an assertion of objective fact.” Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497
U.S. 1, 18 (1990). “[T]he test to determine whether a defamatory statement is constitutionally
protected is a restrictive one”. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 99-100. A statement is constitutionally
protected under the first amendment only if it cannot be “reasonably interpreted as stating actual
facts.” Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 100; Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
The assertions that Mr. Huon was charged with sexually assaulting, sexually abusing,
raping, or stalking multiple female victims are capable of proven true or false. Defendants
cannot prove that there were multiple female victims, because the subject of the posts was the
same woman. Nothing in the original proceedings or a news article states that Mr. Huon has
sexually assaulted or sexually abused multiple female victims. Nothing in the original
proceedings called Mr. Huon a “rapist”. He had been acquitted and was not charged with “rape.”
The statements that Mr. Huon “came up with an excellent little game to meet women”, “listed
Craigslist ads where he claimed to be a talent scout for models”, told lies that “turned dastardly,
pretty quickly”, is an “attorney rapist near you”, is a “rapist”, is a “depraved dude”, “forced her
to perform oral sex”, lied to someone about his job and intentions “to get her into the car” are all
assertions of fact that are susceptible to being proven true or false.
C. DEFENDANTS’ CASES DO NOT APPLY OR SUPPORT MR. HUON’S POSITION.
O'Donnell v. Field Enters and Horowitz v. Baker-- cases cited by Defendants—was
decided before Bryson and Milkovich. Kelly v. Blum, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 31, 69-70 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 24, 2010). Solaia Tech., LLC actually supports Mr. Huon. The Illinois Supreme
Court held that the statement that an attorney, was filing infringement claims for a worthless
patent to make a lot of money is not an opinion and directly impugned the plaintiffs' integrity

15

by questioning the validity of the patent and infringement claim. 221 Ill. 2d at 584-585.
III. THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT HAS REJECTED SIMILARLY
STRAINED ATTEMPTS TO FIND UNNATURAL BUT INNOCENT MEANINGS.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Chapski v. Copley Press, warned against the lower courts
“generally strain[ing] to find unnatural but possibly innocent meanings of words where such
construction is clearly unreasonable and a defamatory meaning is more probable” 92 Ill. 2d 350352, (1982); Tuite v. Corbitt, 224 Ill. 2d 490, 503 (Ill. 2007). The innocent construction rule
does not require courts to strain to find an unnatural innocent meaning for a statement when a
defamatory meaning is far more reasonable. Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 505. In applying the rule,
courts must give the alleged defamatory words their natural and obvious meaning. Id. Courts
must interpret the alleged defamatory words as they appeared to have been used and according to
the idea they were intended to convey to the reasonable reader.
In Owens v. CBS, Inc., 173 Ill. App. 3d 977, 978-980 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1988),
someone claiming to be Michael Brown of Centreville, Illinois, sent a letter to the White House
threatening Ronald Reagan, the President of the United States, with assassination. The U.S.
Secret Service initiated an investigation of the matter. The Secret Service investigation was
reported a television station located in St. Louis, Missouri, and owned by defendant CBS, Inc.
(CBS), in news broadcasts which aired at 5, 6, and 10 p.m. on November 23, 1983. During the
course of the 6 and 10 p.m. broadcasts, CBS repeated accusations by defendant Delores Brown,
sister of Michael Brown, that the letter had actually been written by plaintiff, Carolyn Owens.
Those accusations were false, and plaintiff subsequently sued both Brown and CBS for libel.
CBS argued that it could not be liable because under the so-called "innocent
construction" rule, its 6 and 10 p.m. newscasts must be interpreted as not having libeled plaintiff
16

and the "gist" or "sting" of the 6 and 10 p.m. newscasts was true . CBS argued that the 6 and 10
p.m. newscasts set forth the particulars of the Secret Service investigation and explained why the
Browns and plaintiff were involved in it. Because the newscasts point out that three people were
being investigated, that the investigation was continuing, that no one had been charged or
arrested, and that the statements made by Delores Brown which implicated plaintiff were
presented as mere allegations, CBS argued that the newscasts do not necessarily suggest that
plaintiff was the guilty party and are susceptible of an innocent construction.
The Illinois Appellate Court Fifth District rejected CBS’s arguments. The defect in
CBS's analysis, said the Illinois Appellate Court, is that it misperceived the nature of plaintiff's
cause of action. Plaintiff does not seek to impose liability on CBS based upon any direct
accusations made by CBS itself. Rather, the gravamen of plaintiff's cause of action against CBS
is that it should be held liable because it republished a defamatory statement made by defendant
Delores Brown. Owens, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 990-991. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected the
argument that Delores’ Brown’s statements were an opinion. The Illinois Appellate Court stated
that under common law, a person who republished a defamatory statement made by another was
himself liable for defamation even though he gave the name of the originator. Owens, 173 Ill.
App. 3d at 992-994.
Defendant CBS argued it could not be held liable because the contents of the 6 and 10
p.m. newscasts were true. The gist of its argument was that it should be protected from liability
because it reported the Browns' accusations and the details of the Secret Service investigation
accurately. The Illinois Appellate Court held that this argument is completely without merit,
because the law in Illinois remains that the republisher of a defamatory statement made by

17

another is himself liable for defamation even though he gives the originator's name. Indeed, a
faithful retelling of a defamatory statement may be the most damning kind.” Owens,173 Ill.
App. 3d at 992-996 . The Illinois Appellate Court noted that the CBS reporter responsible for
the stories, appeared to have violated the standards for reporters. Reporters should refrain from
"explicit fingering and identification of the alleged criminal by name" where a crime has been
committed but there is "no warrant or arrest or indictment for any particular person." Owens,173
Ill. App. 3d at 992-996 .
In Mr. Huon’s case, the ATL Defendants falsely accused Mr. Huon of committing crimes
against multiple female victims who did not exist. There was no evidence of such crimes in any
original proceedings. Defendants invented the facts. The Defendants accused Mr. Huon of
“rape” when he had been acquitted. Defendants’ faithful retelling of Lawyergossip.com rumors
may be the most damning kind.
IV. THE POST IS DEFAMATORY PER SE.
A. Mr. HUON HAS STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION PER SE.
Statements impugning a person’s integrity, prejudicing his practice of law, and/or
implying that he committed a crime are defamatory per se. Solaia Technology, LLC , 221 Ill.2d
at 590; Myers, 332 Ill.App.3d at 922; Coursey v. Greater Niles Tp. Pub. Corp., 40 Ill.2d 257 at
239. On the date that Mr. Huon was acquitted of rape, the ATL Defendants posted a “breaking
rape coverage” story that Mr. Huon, an attorney rapist near you and a wanton and depraved
individual, posed as a talent scout and forced a woman to perform oral sex and that there were
other sex crimes against several female victims. Before the Huon story, Defendants wrote about
a 15 year old girl being raped. Then Defendants wrote that the next story—the Huon story—was
about the “wanton and the depraved”. What is more wanton and depraved than raping a 15 year
18

old girl? Defendants compared Mr. Huon’s “victim” to a “bubblegum princess”. Defendants
imputed that Mr. Huon committed a crime, he lacks integrity by lying, he fornicates with several
women, that he is an “attorney rapists near you”, that he is a pedophile who preys on princesses.
These statements would fall into all the categories of defamation per se: "(1) words that
impute a person has committed a crime; (2) words that impute a person is infected with a
loathsome communicable disease; (3) words that impute a person is unable to perform or lacks
integrity in performing her or his employment duties; (4) words that impute a person lacks ability
or otherwise prejudices that person in her or his profession; and (5) words that impute a person
has engaged in adultery or fornication." Solaia, 221 Ill. 2d at 579-80. The hyperlinks to the
defamatory statements of Lawyergossip.com were republication of additional defamatory
statements, adding credibility to the lies about Mr. Huon.
It is well established that it is defamatory to call or imply that someone is a “rapist”. As
the U.S. Supreme Court stated, No one will deny “that it is libelous falsely to charge another
with being a rapist”. Beauharnais v. People of State of Ill., 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725 U.S.
(1952); Cooper v. Dupnik924 F.2d 1520 (9th Cir. 1991); In re Thompson, 162 B.R. 748
(E.D.Mich.,1993). The facts here are more egregious: Mr. Huon was called a rapist after he was
acquitted by a jury of his peers and he was called a serial rapist and stalker. Defendants call Mr.
Huon “a potential rapist” and one of the “depraved dudes walking around out there that are
potential rapists”. Worse, Defendants invented the fact that there were more victims out there.
Because Mr. Huon has alleged defamation per se, he does not have to allege special
damages. Defendants cite to no case law that there is a heightened pleading standard for
defamation per se cases. Damages are presumed in a defamation per se case. While Illinois
19

does require a heightened pleading standard for defamation per se claims, that procedural
standard "does not apply in federal court." Muzikowski v. Paramount Pic. Corp., 322 F.3d 918,
926 (7th Cir. 2003); Cunningham v. UTi Integrated Logistics, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38493
(S.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2010). In a defamation per se action, injury to the plaintiff's reputation may be
presumed. Tuite v. Corbitt, 224 Ill. 2d 490, 866 N.E.2d 114, 2006 Ill. LEXIS 1668, 310 Ill.
Dec. 303, 2006 WL 3742112 (Ill. Dec. 21, 2006; Muzikowski, 477 F.3d at 903-904.
B. DEFENDANTS’ CASES ON DEFAMATION PER SE DO NOT APPLY OR THE
CASES SUPPORT MR. HUON’S POSITION.
Defendants’ cases do not apply. Hahn v Konstanty 257 A.D.2d 799, (N.Y.A.D. 3
Dept.,1999), involved a newspaper article stating that plaintiff was charged with disorderly
conduct but that the charges were dismissed on certain conditions when, in fact, there were no
conditions of the dismissal. In this case, Defendants’ did not omit some minor “condition”. Mr.
Huon was acquitted of sexual assault—he had not even been charged with “rape.” He most
certainly was not accused of victimizing other women. No news story reported other female
victims. and Defendants posted a “breaking rape coverage” that called him a rapist. Worse,
Defendants accused Mr. Huon of raping multiple women and of being a con artist who lured
women with lies to get them into his car. Defendants compared Mr. Huon to a pedophile.
Gist v. Macon County Sheriff's Dep't is an unpublished Rule 23 order in part 284 Ill.
App. 3d 367, 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1996) and should not be cited. 21 Schaefer v. Hearst
21

There, the plaintiff was wanted on an arrest warrant as of October 6, 1994, for burglary to a motor vehicle, which
is entirely true. The Court held that the Crime Stoppers flyer stating that plaintiff "might possibly be armed” or
"should be considered dangerous" or was a "most wanted" fugitive--to the extent the statements can even be
considered as applying to plaintiff or asserting facts about him-- are all secondary details, immaterial to the truth of
the Crime Stoppers flyer that the plaintiff was wanted on an arrest warrant as of October 6, 1994, for burglary to a
motor vehicle. Gist v. Macon County Sheriff's Dep't, 284 Ill. App. 3d 367, 371-372 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1996).
In Mr. Huon’s case, he was NOT wanted for raping multiple victims or even one victim—He was not wanted for
any crime. He was acquitted. Defendants described him as an attorney rapist near you who had a history of

20

Corp., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1734, 1736 (Md. Super. Ct. 1979) is not even a published opinion
that is available on the LexisNexis AllStates Database. Defendants cited a Maryland Superior
Court decision that is not even readily accessible.
In this case, Defendants got everything wrong. On the day Mr. Huon was acquitted,
Defendants posted on the Internet “breaking rape coverage” that Mr. Huon was a rapist who had
rape or victimized before.
C. MR. HUON HAS STATED A CLAIM FOR DEFAMATION PER QUOD.
Mr. Huon has stated a claim for defamation per quod. The Seventh Circuit has explained
the requirements for pleading special damages:
The amended complaint alleged an immediate decrease in plaintiff's gross sales of Brazil
nuts and of all other nuts following the publication of the letter. Although not naming the
particular customers it lost, plaintiff listed specific figures of its gross sales before and
after the publication and averred that the decrease in sales was the 'natural and proximate
result' of the letter. Continental Nut Co. v. Robert L. Berner Co., 345 F.2d 395, 397 (7th
Cir. Ill. 1965).
In another case, the Seventh Circuit explained:
Although the complaint made general (and insufficient) claims of loss of reputation, it
also averred that as a result of the letter plaintiff "has been and is still being refused
normal credit terms by its suppliers" and has expended time, money, and effort to
reestablish its credit. In our opinion, these averments sufficiently notify defendants of
plaintiff's claim that it has suffered monetary loss as a result of refusals of credit,
stemming in turn from the statement in defendants' letter. Procedures are available by
which defendants can learn the names, circumstances, and amounts, and the details need
not be pleaded. Fleck Bros. Co. v. Sullivan, 385 F.2d 223, 225 (7th Cir. Ill. 1967).
Mr. Huon has alleged special damages—he has alleged a decreased in business revenue.22

committing violent sexual assaults against other female victims on multiple occasions.
22
Mr. Huon alleges:
186.
The actionable and offensive statements published by Defendants, and each of them, have directly and
proximately caused harm to Plaintiff’s professional standing amongst lawyers and businessmen and has damaged
Plaintiff’s reputation for honesty and integrity, and has caused injury to Plaintiff’s legal practice, business operations
and good will and have negatively impacted the public’s confidence in Plaintiff.

21

The posting of the ATL story led to the Gawker Defendants reposting the same ATL story. Mr.
Huon adopts his arguments in his Response brief to the Gawker Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
D. DEFENDANTS’ CASES ON DEFAMATION PER QUOD DO NOT APPLY.
Schaffer v. Zekman, 196 Ill. App. 3d 727, 733 (1st Dist. 1990), was questioned by the
Seventh Circuit. Spelson v. CBS, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1984) was decided on a
motion for summary judgment. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, cited by
Defendants, said “But Brown & Williamson must be allowed to plead over (unless the dismissal
of the complaint can be upheld on other grounds).” 713 F.2d 262, 270 (7th Cir. Ill. 1983).
Mr. Huon should be given leave to replead this count. Mr. Huon can plead that he had to
expend monies as a result of the defamatory statements.23
E. THE POST DOES REFER TO MR. HUON’S BY NAME.
Defendants argue that the defamatory statements statement has to name the Plaintiff,
citing Barry Harlem Corp. v. Kraff, 273 Ill. App. 3d 388, 391-92. This argument was rejected by

197.
As a legal result of the intentional and malicious conduct of the Defendants, and
each of them, jointly and severally, Mr. Huon has suffered damage to business, trade, profession and occupation, all
to Mr. Huon’s special damages in a sum to be determined at time of trial.
201.
Mr. Huon sustained special harm as a result of the publication of the erroneous and inflammatory
communications by Defendants, including, but not limited to, the loss of his professional reputation.
202.
Moreover, as the result of the defamatory publication referred to herein, Mr. Huon
has sustained irreparable harm to his reputation, emotional distress and loss of standing in the community.
204.
Plaintiff has, and will suffer, special damages and pecuniary loss directly from a loss of clients in his legal
practice and the loss of profit from business deals and interactions in an amount well in excess of Seventy-Five
Thousand ($75,000.00).
23

The complaint has never been dismissed on the merits. The prior amendments were voluntarily made by Mr.
Huon. The First Amended Complaint was filed to add more allegations against the ATL Defendants and to add the
Jezebel Defendants. The Second Amended Complaint was filed after Mr. Huon voluntarily dismissed certain
defendants. The Third and Fourth Amended Complaint were filed, because the Court on its own motion raised the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction, after the motions to dismiss were fully briefed but before the Court ruled on the
motions. Mr. Huon contends the subject matter jurisdictional defects were caused in part by Defendants’ failure to
disclose their affiliates as required under FRCP 7.1 and Local Rule 3.2.

22

the Seventh Circuit and the Illinois Supreme Court. Simply because the story is labeled “fiction”
and, therefore, does not purport to describe any real person” does not mean that it may not be
defamatory per se. Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 322 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 2003). In
Bryson v. News America Publication , plaintiff alleged that she was the fictional character who
was referred to as a Aslut@ in a short story written and published by defendants. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that the clear implication of the word Aslut@ was that the plaintiff was in fact
sexually promiscuous and that the article did not have to refer to her by name. 174 Ill. 2d 77,
672 N.E.2d 1207 (Ill. 1996).
In this case, Defendants entire article is about “Meanith Huon”, not Jackie Chan or Mr.
Chow from “Hangover”. Here, Defendant did not produce a Jet Li movie in which the character
plays a lawyer accused of raping a woman from St Louis, after repeatedly committing sexual
assaults against other women.

Defendant called “Meanith Huon” a rapist and a serial rapist.

Defendants cannot argue with a straight face that the disparaging statements are about someone
other than Mr. Huon. “Meanith Huon” does not have to appear in every sentence. The “attorney
rapists near you” and “the files of the wanton and depraved “ introduces the story on Mr. Huon.
The sentence “lot of depraved dudes walking around out there that are potential rapists” is
inserted between the paragraphs specifically referring to Mr. Huon by name is talking about Mr.
Huon. Defendants strain to find an unnatural meaning. 24 Bryon held the innocent construction
rule does not apply simply because defamatory words are "capable" of an innocent construction.”

24

Parker v. House O'Lite Corp.—cited by Defendants--was decided on a motion for summary
judgment and actually support Mr. Huon. There, the First District held that “We are not required
to strain to find an unnatural but possibly innocent meaning for words where the defamatory
meaning is far more reasonable. 324 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1026 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2001).
23

174 Ill. 2d at 93.
Defendants argue that many of the statements are not defamatory by straining to find an
unnatural meaning—even going so far as to create a chart lifting words and sentences out of
context. Defendants invented fiction and passed them off as facts to lend credibility to the rape
story. The statements regarding the testimony of “Plaintiff’s alleged victim” lends credibility to
the rape story, because it adds support to the allegations that Mr. Huon made up a story about
promotional models who never existed to lure and rape the complaining witness into his car:
“But the next day, the victim was running late and called Huon. He told her to meet him at
another bar, but when she got there, he told her the other promotional models left, and so he was
going to interview her, the victim said”.25 The natural meaning is that had the complainant
Googled Mr. Huon, she would have found a story that Mr. Huon had posed as a supervisor for a
company that sets up promotions of alcohol to sexually assault women in the past and she would
never have gotten into Mr. Huon’s car. The statements made by Defendants made the story
worse. The text was about Mr. Huon telling the complainant that the promotional models had
left. The gist of Defendants’ statements is that Mr. Huon’s modus operandi was luring women to
interviews for promotional modeling where no other models were present for the purposes of

25

Here is the actual text:
But the next day, the victim was running late and called Huon. He told her to meet him at another bar, but
when she got there, he told her the other promotional models left, and so he was going to interview her, the
victim said.
And this people, is why God invented Google. Had the victim Googled Huon, she would have found stories
like this, from the Madison County Record:
A Chicago attorney who was posing as a supervisor for a company that sets up promotions for alcohol sales
at area bars was charged in Madison County July 2, with two counts of criminal sexual assault, two counts
of criminal sexual abuse and one count of unlawful restraint.

24

sexually assaulting them. Worse, Defendants do not explain that the same woman is the subject
of all the articles. The woman that was running late is also the same Jane Doe that is the subject
of all the news articles. The gist of Defendants’ statements is that Mr. Huon is a serial rapist.
Without identifying a single statement, Defendants assert that many of the statements
would not tend to cause such harm to Plaintiff’s reputation . Which ones? The one where
Defendants call Mr. Huon an attorney rapist? Posing as a supervisor? Someone who sees things
differently when charged with rape? Someone who fondles a woman without her consent?
Someone who forces someone to perform oral sex in his car? “Rape” has no innocent meaning.
VI. MR. HUON HAS STATED A CLAIM FOR FALSE LIGHT.
Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank, 126 Ill. 2d 411 (Ill. 1989)—cited by Defendants—
support Mr. Huon’s claim. The elements of false light are one who gives publicity to a matter
concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to
the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be
placed." (Citing Restatement (Second) of Torts); 126 Ill. 2d 411, 418 (Ill. 1989)).
In this case, calling Mr. Huon a rapist and a serial rapist would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person. Defendants acted with reckless disregard because Mr. Huon was never called
a “rapist” or a serial rapist in the original proceedings. No evidence of multiple female victims
of sexual abuse or sexual assault was introduced at trial. Defendants, Elie Mystal and David
Lat, are Harvard-educated attorneys who should have been able to read a newspaper at the 6th
grade level. Defendants bragged about the power of Google and blogging yet posted four day
25

old news on the day that Mr. Huon was acquitted and called it “breaking rape coverage,” in a
world where news are posted in real time. Defendants knew that the same woman was the
subject of all the news articles, because Defendants cited the same the Madison County Record
twice—once in 2008 when they called Mr. Huon “Lawyer of the Day” and the second time in
2010 when they called him a serial rapist. Defendants never did the minimum fact checking that
a reporter would have done by calling Mr. Huon. Defendants invented facts that were so
compelling that David Feige, the attorney for the Gawker Defendants, argued that Mr. Huon
needs to be tracked like a registered sex offender, relying on the false assumption that there were
multiple victims. For this section, Mr. Huon adopts his above response to Defendants’
arguments regarding his defamation claims.
VII. MR. HUON HAS STATED A CLAIM FOR UNREASONABLE INTRUSION INTO
THE SECLUSION OF OTHERS.
Busse v. Motorola, Inc., 351 Ill. App. 3d 67, 72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004)—cited by
Defendants and decided on a summary judgment motion—actually support Mr. Huon’s claim:
Private facts were at issue and clearly alleged in Johnson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 578-79.
There, defendant K mart hired private investigators to pose as employees at K mart's
warehouse to monitor suspected acts of theft, vandalism and drug use by employees.
Johnson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 575. The investigators gathered and reported personal
information about employees, including family problems, romantic interests, sex lives,
health problems, future work plans and criticism of K mart. Busse v. Motorola, Inc., 351
Ill. App. 3d 67, 72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004).
In this case, Defendants did not just intrude on Mr. Huon’s life by disclosing private facts
about his romantic interest or sex life or private life. They made things up private facts for him:
Mr. Huon invented a game to meet women, he victimized multiple women, he is a rapist, he
posted Craigslist ads, he posed as a talent scout.

26

VIII. MR. HUON HAS STATED A CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
The publication of a defamatory statement constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct.
Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill.2d 1, (Ill.,1992); Hatfill v. New York Times Co.,
416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005); Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896 (Utah,1992);
Moss v. Wallace, 2009 WL 4683553 (Conn.Super.,2009). In Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting
Corp., defendants, radio disc jockeys, made defamatory statements about the plaintiff, who was
organizing a festival to benefit “Elephant Man” disease. Defendants said on the air that plaintiff
was “not for real” and was just “scamming” them and that there was “no such show as the classic
cartoon festival”. The Illinois Supreme Court held that these statements supported a claim for
extreme and outrageous conduct, because defendants “had access to channels of communication”
and “the power of the media cannot be denied but the plaintiffs had no similar access to the
public . . .” Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp.,154 Ill.2d at 22.
In this case, Defendants called Mr. Huon a rapist or sex offender who came up with a
game to lure women into his car and sexually assault or abuse them. The allegations accused him
of a crimes and impugned his integrity and are extreme and outrageous. More powerful than
radio, Defendants’ websites get almost 2 million visitors a month.26 The Abovethelaw.com site
is ranked no. 1 or 2 for law blogs. http://www.invesp.com/blog-rank/Law. Mr. Huon has no
similar access, much less a forum to rebut the outrageous conduct. Out of 30 million websites,
Abovethelaw.com ranks no. 6,379 in the US. http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/abovethelaw.com#.
Defendants’ cited case law do not apply or support Mr. Huon’s position. Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876 (U.S.Va.,1988), has been called into
26

Exhibit “J”.

27

doubt. Bryson, 174 Ill.2d 77 (Ill. 1996). Berkos v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc.,161
Ill.App.3d 476, (1st Dist.,1987), held that a judge stated a cause of action for defamation and
false light against NBC for identifying him as involved in judicial corruption under investigation
in Operation Greylord. In this case, Mr. Huon was not under investigation for being a serial
rapist and a sex offender with multiple female victims. He was acquitted and he was never
accused of victimizing multiple women.
IX. MR. HUON HAS STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION OF TORTIOUS
INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE.
J. Eck & Sons, Inc. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 213 Ill. App. 3d 510, 515 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1st Dist. 1991) supports Mr. Huon’s claim. There, the First District held that the key issue in
the tort of interference with a party's prospective economic advantage is intent. Plaintiff in
J. Eck & Sons, Inc. had to (but did not) allege that defendant knew that it’s refusal to publish his
Yellow Page ad would cause him economic damage and that defendant acted despite the
knowledge. In this case, defamation is an intentional tort. Defendants knew that Mr. Huon, as
an attorney, depended on his reputation to maintain existing business and develop new economic
relations. Defendants decided to call Mr. Huon a rapist and a serial rapist and disparage him on a
blog where the audience is the legal community.
Mr. Huon has pled the elements of the tort: (1) he has have a reasonable expectancy of
entering into a valid business relationship with clients and prospective clients; (2) defendants
knew he was an attorney and Mr. Mystal and Mr. Lat, as attorneys themselves, know about this
expectancy (3) Defendants intentionally interfered with Mr. Huon’s expectancy preventing the
expectancy from ripening into a valid business relationship when they called him a rapist—who
wants to hire an “attorney rapist near you”? and (4) Defendant’s intentional injured Mr. Huon in
28

his ability to maintain and find business relationships.” J. Eck & Sons, Inc., 213 Ill. App. 3d at
513-14 (1st Dist. 1991).27 Defendant’s post is analogous to posting on a billboard next to a
superhighway lane just for lawyers, judges, law students, clients calling Mr. Huon a rapist .
With so much business coming from the Internet as a source or clients and employers using
Google to perform background checks, how can Defendants with a straight face argue that they
did not damage Mr. Huon? As bloggers, Defendants should appreciate the power of social
media in maintaining and preserving existing businesses and relationships.
X. MR. HUON STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CIVIL CONSPIRACY.
To state a claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege the agreement and also a
tortious act committed in furtherance of that agreement.” He has alleged the elements of
civil conspiracy. Time Savers, Inc. v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 371 Ill.App.3d 759, 309 Ill.Dec. 259,
863 N.E.2d 1156 (2nd Dist. 2007). Mr. Huon alleges that Defendants, writer Elie Mystal, his
editor David Lat, publisher David Minkin, CEO John Lerner, Breaking Media, Inc. f/k/a
Breaking Media, LLC, for the purpose of publishing a defamatory post on the World Wide Web,
defamed Mr. Huon by creating and publishing the post and allowing it to be republished. Mr.
Huon alleges that one of the conspirators, Mr. Mystal, engaged in an unlawful act by defaming
him by writing the post. Mr. Lat defamed Mr. Huon by refusing to remove the defamatory post
and by editing the website Abovethelaw.com on which the post appeared. Mr. Minkin published
the post on the website Abovethelaw.com. Defendants shaped the content of the ATL blog,
including the comments of the John Does. Mr. Huon adopts and incorporates his argument in his

27

Where recovery for intentional interference with a prospective business relation or economic advantage is sought,
the plaintiff need not prove breach of contract. See generally Soderlund Brothers, Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 278 Ill.
App. 3d 606, 663 N.E.2d 1, 215 Ill. Dec. 251 (1995). See also Belden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 547,
551, 413 N.E.2d 98, 101, 45 Ill. Dec. 765 (1980). Strosberg v. Brauvin Realty Servs., 295 Ill. App. 3d 17, 34 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998).

29

Response to the Gawker Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
The case cited by Defendant does not apply because the Court held that the underlying
tort for defamation was not properly pled and, thus, the civil conspiracy count must fail. That is
not the case here. Here, Defendants are on notice that the underlying tort is defamation, false
light, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress and Mr. Huon’s right
to relief is more than speculative.
XI. THE COURT SHOULD ALLOW A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
CYBERBULLYING AND/OR CYBERSTALKING.
For sake of brevity, Mr. Huon adopts and incorporates his argument in his Response to
Gawker’s Motion to Dismiss.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Meanith Huon, requests that this Honorable Court deny The
Above the Law Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
/s/Meanith Huon
Meanith Huon
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Under penalties of law, I attest the following documents or items have been or are being
electronically served on all counsel of record for all parties on March 12, 2013
MEANITH HUON’S RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE THE LAW DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS
/s/ Meanith Huon
Meanith Huon
The Huon Law Firm
PO Box 441
Chicago, Illinois 60690
Phone: [phone]
E-mail: [e-mail]
IL ARDC. No.: 6230996
30