Schoolcraft v. The City Of New York et al

Filing 400

FILING ERROR - DUPLICATE DOCKET ENTRY - DECLARATION of NATHANIEL B. SMITH in Opposition re: 297 MOTION for Summary Judgment .. Document filed by Adrian Schoolcraft. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit POX 36, # 2 Exhibit POX 37, # 3 Exhibit POX 38, # 4 Exhibit POX 39)(Smith, Nathaniel) Modified on 2/17/2015 (db).

The City of New York
Commission to Investigate Allegatio1,s
of Police Corruption and the
Anti-Corruption Procedures of the
Police Department

.._ OMMISSION
EPORT
Milton Mollen
Chair

. Joseph P. Armao
Chief Counsel

Harold Beer, Jr.
tlerberf Evans
Roderick C. Lankier
Harold R. Tyler. Jr.

. .·.Leslie U. Cornfeld
.
[

·· Deputy Chief Counsel

July 7, 1994

ANATOMY OF FAILURE: A PATH FOR SUCCESS

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Commission~ work reflects the combined efforts of a great many people. Our
findings, conclusions, and recommendations are the result of intensive investigations,
countl~ss interviews, painstaking collection and analysis of evidence, and ID3.II}' hours of
writing and editing. So many people have so generously given us their time and expertise,
it is impossible to recognize them all. Nevertheless, we must single out certain individuals ·
and agencies for their special contribution to our work.
The people who conducted the daily work of the Commission were, of course, the
very able full-time staff, headed by our chief counse~ Joseph P. Armao,
deputy chief counse~ Leslie U. Comfeld, and chief investigator, Brian M. Carroll. They
provided outstanding skill and dedication inAeading our investigative efforts, systems
analysis, and the public hearings. We wish particularly to thank Mr. Armao and Ms.
Comfeld for applying their considerable talents over countless hours to the creation of this
Report. We are grateful to the distinguished law firms of Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent,
Sheinfeld & Sorkin, and ~ Weiss, Rifltind, Wharton & Garrison for their support of Mr.
Armao and Ms. Comfeld in performing this important public service.
Commission~

Our investigators and analysts, whose tireless efforts, under the supervision of Mr.
Carroll, generated many of the witnesses and much of the evidence underlying our findings
and conclusions, were deputy chief investigators Frank O'Hara and Robert Machado, who
were a constant source of insight and inspiration; investigators and analysts Frances
Alexander, Marilyn Coleman, Marcia DeLeon, Alfred Fernandez, Brian T. Kelly, Samuel
Nieves, Jody Pugach, Charmaine Raphae~ Dorice J. Shea, and Gregory Thomas.
In addition, four of the Commission's investigators were loaned to us by federal and

state agencies. The Commission is deeply indebted to Ronald Goldstock, the Director of
the New York State Organized Crime Task Force, for loaning us the expen services of our
deputy chief investigator Frank O'Hara. The Commission is also similarly indebted to the
Regional inspector of the Inspection Service of the Internal Revenue Service, William Gill
and his predecessor J osepb Reinbold, for loaning us two of the Service~ best agents,
Thomas Hopkins and Frank Luce. We also wish to thank especially the New York Office
of the Drug Enforcement Administration and its former and current Special Agents in
Charge, Robert A Bryden and Carlo Boccia, for providing us the valuable services of
Intelligence Analyst Jose Guzman.
Commission attorneys, whose many functions included supervising investigations.
interviewing witnesses, and preparing the hearings, were David A Burns, Edward
Cunningham, and Charles Gur:ia. Special Counsels Jonny J. Frank and William Goodstein
provided us and our staff with constant advice and guidance that were eritical to the success
of our projects. We are indeed grateful to former United States Attorney Andrew Maloney

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and to United States Attorneys Mary Jo White and Zachary Carter for continuing Mr.
Frank's assignment tom. The Commission also received able assistance from two part-time
volunteer attorneys, Charles King of the firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson,
and Thomas Obermaier of the firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Hom. In
particular, we thank Jeffrey Zimmerman, who served the Commission diligently for over
three months as an assistant counse~ and to the law fum of Patterson, Belknap, Webb &
Tyler for providing Mr. Zimmemtan's valuable services to us pro bono.
We are also indebted to Professor Mark H. Moore and Mr. David M. Kennedy of ·
the Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government who acted as consultants
to the Commission. Their wisdom, experience, and judgment guided many aspects of our
work.
The members of the Commission's support staff, Anne Sherlock, Nancy Levine, and
Lourdes Sinisterra, supported the Commission in all phases of our endeavors. We thank
them (and their families) for the many nights and weekends dedicated to helping us
accomplish our tasks. In particular, we thank our public information director, Tom KeUy,
for his dedication, professionalism, and expertise in coordinating the Commission's public

information.
Many law enforcement officials and agencies gave us extraordinary assistance and
cooperation. In particular, we would like to extend our warm thanks to the Honorable Mary
Jo White and the staff of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of
New York; the Honorable Robert M Motgenthau and the staff of the District Attorney of
New York County; the Honorable Charles J. Hynes and the staff of the District Attorney
of Kings County; the Honorable Richard A Brown and the staff of the District Attorney of
Queens County; the Honorable Robert Johnson and the staff of the District Attorney of
Bronx County; and the Honorable William Murphy and the staff of the District Attorney
of Richmond County; the Honorables Andrew Maloney and Zachary Carter and the staff
of the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York; and the
Honorable James Catterson, the District Attorney of Suffolk County. We also wish to
extend special thanks to Thomas A Coughlin III, the Commissioner of the New York State
Department of Correctional Services, and his Inspector Gene~ Brian F. Malone, who were
a constant source of important assistance. In addition, we thank Mr. Joseph Yanish, the
Regional Inspector General of the United States Department of Agriculture, Supervisory
Special Agent Richard Gallo, and Special Agent Micitael Pagliugbi for their important
assistance.
We are especially grateful to United States Attorney White and Assistant United
States Attorneys Michael Horowitz, Sarah Chapman, and MicheUe Hirschmann for their
guidance and direction in our investigation of the 30th Precinct. Similarly, we express our
gratitude to District Attorney Hynes and Assistant District Attorneys Dennis Hawkins and
Wanda LucibeUo for their assistance and guidance in the course of our 73rd Precinct

ii

investigation, as well as United States Attorney Carter and Assistant United States Attorney
Charles Gerbc.t.

Others to whom the Commission is indebted for valuable cooperation, assistance, and
advice are former Police Commissioners Patrick V. Murphy, Raymond W. Kelly, Robert J.
McGuire, and Richard Condon, and former officers of the Department Joseph Trimboli,
John Guido, Aaron Rosenthal, and Daniel Heggarty; James Fox, William Doran, Mark
Codd, John O'Connor, and Roger Viadero of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Judge
John Keenan and Judge Whitman Knapp of the Southern District of New York; Michael
F. Armstrong, former Chief Couose~ Knapp Commission; Richard Girgenti, Commissioner
of the State Division of Criminal Justice Services, Gerald W. Lynch, president of John Jey
College of Criminal Justice; Professor Lawrence W. Sherman; Paul Schechtntan, Chief of
the Criminal Division, United States Attorney's Office; Helene Gurian, chief counsel to the
State Investigation Conunission; Thomas A. Reppetto, president of the Citizens' Crime
Commission; former lieutenant David Durk; Edward T. Mechmann, former Assistant
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York; Laurence A. Levy of the
Office of the Corporation Counse~ and Grace de Fries and Mark MeCreery of the Office
of the Meyer.

The Commission worked in cooperation with and received much help from officials
of the New York City Police Department In particular, we thank Police Conunissioner
William J. Bratton, First Deputy Conunissioner David Scott, Deputy Commissioner John E.
Maple, Deputy Conunissioner Walter Mack, Deputy Conunissioner Elsie Scott, Chief o.f
Personnel Michael Julian, Deputy Chief William Casey, Deputy Chief Joseph Ragusa, and
Inspector Charles Campisi We should particularly note the outstanding cooperation given
the Commission by former Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly, Police CommissioDer
Bratton, Deputy Conunissioner Mack and Deputy Chief Casey in the course of the 30th
Precinct investigation.
Special thanks are due to the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation and the New York
Conununity Trust for their generosity in providing critical funds to support the Conunission~
work. We also wish to thank The Acom Group, Ltd. for their excellent and generous
services in preparing our public hearing exhibits and assisting in reproducing them in this
Report
We should particularly note the outstanding cooperation of the former Meyer of the
City of New York, the Honorable David N. Dinkins, for his unwavering support and for the
freedom he afforded the Commission to fulfill its mandate. We further express our deep
appreciation to the Honorable Rudolph W. Giuliani, the Meyer of the City of New York,
for the support and valuable insights be provided to us since the date of his election to the

completion of our endeavors.

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Last, but never least,

many police officers and citizens of New York
City and elsewhere who wrote or telephoned to express their support and encouragement
for our often difficult work. In particular, many thanks go to the many committed and
courageous members of the Police Department who came forward to provide this
we thank the

Commission with invaluable information, direction, and insigbt to guide our inquiries. Mucb

of the Com.m.ission's work could not have been accomplished without these individuals, who
cboose not to be named. It was their commitment that confirmed for us early in our tenure
how fortunate this City is to be served by the fine men and women who comprise the
overwhelming majority of the finest Police Department in the world.

lV

Commission To Investigate Allegations of Polic:e Corruption
And The Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Polic:e Department
Commjssjoners
Milton Mullen, Chair
Roderick C. Lankier
Harold Tyler

Harold Baer, Jr.
Herbert Evans
Commjssion Staff

Joseph P.Pulnao
Chief Counsel

Leslie U. Cornfeld
Deputy Chief Counsel

Brian Carroll
Director of Investigations
Robert A Machado
Frank O'Hara
Deputy Chief Investigators
Counsel

lnvesti~ators

David A Burns
Edward Cunningham
Charles M Guria
Jeffrey Zimmerman

Frances Alexander
Marilyn Coleman
Marcia DeLeon
AJfredFernandez
Jose Guzman
Thomas Hopkins
Brian T. Kelly
Frank Luce
Samuel Nieves
Jody Pugach
Charmaine Raphael
Dorice J. Shea
Gregory A Thomas

Director of Media Relations
Tom Kelly
Support Staff

Nancy Levine
Anne Sherlock
Lourdes Sinisterra

and Analysts

Special Counsel

Jenny J. Frank

William Goodstein
Volunteer Attorneys

Charles King

Thoiil.aS M. Obermaier

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE -AN OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY OF
TilE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I

CHAPTER TWO - TilE STATE OF MODERN POLICE
CORRUPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

L TilE COMMISSION'S INVESTIGATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

II. TilE NEW NATIJRE OF CORRUPTION: AN OVERVJEW . . . . . . . . . .

15

Corruption and Drugs . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The New Character of Police Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"Crew" Corruption: The New Otganization of Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Methods to Create Corruption Opportunities . • . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Methods To Escape Detection • . • . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Profile of Today's Corrupt Cop: The Erosion Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Mixed Motives Behind Corruption: A New Framework
for Analyzing Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15
16
17
19
19
20

IlL PATTERNS OF CORRUPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2!

SECTION 1: COPS COMMITTING TIIEFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

Thefts From Street Dealers: "Shake Dowrs" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thefts From Radio Runs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Theft From Unlawful Searches and Seizures:
·.
"R3.1"ds," "D omg D oars, " "B oommg D oars " . . . . . . . . . . . ....... .
.
.
Thefts From Lawful Searches and Seizures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thefts From Car Stops and Drug Couriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Off-Duty Robberies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22
23
25
28
29
30

SECTION 2: COPS PROJECTING AND ASSISTING
NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

SECTION 3: COPS AS DRUG DEALERS AND USERS DISTRIBUTING AND USING DRUGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

SECTION 4: PERJURY AND FALSIFYING DOCUMENTS . . . . . . . . . .

36

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21

1m
SECTION 5: POUCE VIOLENCE AND BRUTAUTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

The Unk Between Brutality and Acts of Corruption . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Unk Between Brutality And Police CUlture • . • • . • • • . . . • • . . • . . . . .

45
47

CHAPTER THREE - POUCE CUU'URE AND CORRUPTION . . . . . . . 51 The Code of Silence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"Us vs. Them" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Erosion Of Values And Pride . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Police Cynicism • • • • • • • • • . . • . • • • • . • . • • • • . . • . . . . . . . . .
Moral Character and Fitness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Police Unions ...••.............. ·. . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.........
.. .... ..
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...•.....

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Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53
58
60
63
65
66
68

CHAPTER FOUR - 1HE COLLAPSE OF TIIE DEPARTMENT'S
CORRUPTION CONTROLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
I. TilE CREATION AND CORRUPTION OF TilE DEPARTMENTS
INTEGRITY SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73

Spreading Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The New Anti-Corruption Apparatus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74
76

II. TilE COlLAPSE OF COMMAND ACCOUNTABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

ill. INEFFECTIVE FIELD SUPERVISION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

Willful Blindness ........................................ _ . . .
Performance Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Resource and Management Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Integrity Control Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80
81

82
84

IV. TilE DETERIORATION OF TilE INVESTIGATIVE STRUCI1JRE:
TilE COlLAPSE OF lAD AND TilE F!AUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

The Internal Affairs Division . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Field Internal Affairs Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85
89

vii

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V. FRAGMENTING, MINIMIZING AND CONCEAilNG
POUCE CORRUPTION CASES .. .. . . .. . .. .. .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . .

90

Minimizing Corruption Through Investigations • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Michael DOHd/lSth Prec:ina Investigation . • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . • . . •
The N'uzth Precinct Case .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . .
Concealing Corruption Through Filing and Oassification Systems . . . . . . . .

90
91
92
95

1'/U, Tzckler File .. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . . . .. .. .. . . . . . .. .. . . .. ..
Other CllSes Not SenJ to Prosecutor.! or Not OjJicialJy Recorded . . . . . . . .

95

98
Favoritism Toward High-Ranking Officers _______ ...... - - - - - . . . . . . . . 99
Scalabrino Case.·----· ..... ·----· .... -·.·--·-· ........... 99
SimonetdCase ---·-··--··-----···-··---·-······· .. ··-··· 100
VI. TIIE DEPAIU'MENTS FlAWED INVESTIGATIVE AND
JNTElllGENCE-GATHERING EFFORI'S - - . - - - ...... - . . . . . . . . . . . 101
The Failure to Employ Pro-Active Techniques .... ___ . _........ - - . . . . 101
Failed Undercover Programs: Field Associates and Undercover Operatives _ 102
The lAD "Action Desk" .. _ .. _ . . . . . . _. __ ..... _ . . . . . . . . . . . 103

V1L TIIE DEPARTMENT ABANDONED ITS RESPONSIBiliTY TO
CHANGE TIIE CUU1JRE OF CORRUPTION .. __ ........ _ . . . . . . . 107

CHAPTER FIVE- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM OF THE
DEPARTMENT'S CORRUPTION CONTROL POUCIES AND
PROCEDURES . - .... - - - - - - - . - - - ... - - - - - - - ....... - - ....... - . - - . . 110
I. POUCE CUU1JRE AND MANAGEMENT . - . - - ........ - - . . . . . . . . 112

Commitment to Integrity _ .. __ .. _ . _ . __ ..................... __ ..
Recruitinent and Screening .................................... .
Recruit Aod In-Service Performance Evaluations .. __ .. __ ......... _ ..
Integrity Training - - .... - - ... - .. - ......... - . - - - .............. .
Police Personnel Management ................................. .
Police Unions .............................................. .

112
112
118
119

123
125

Drug Testing .............................................. . 127
New· York Oty Residency Requirement . _ . ___ ....... _ .. _..... ___ . _ . 128

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IT. COMMAND ACCOUNTABlllTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Enforcement of Command Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Supervision . . . . . . . . . . . • • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . 133

ill. IN1ERNAL INVESTIGATIONS . . • . • . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Internal Affairs Operations .................................... . 136
Recruitment of Qualified Investigators ...........•................
Intelligence-Gathering Operations ...........••..................
Investigative Approach .....•..................................
0'l!anizational Structure ...............•....••.................
Command liaisons ...............-........................... .
. .
Civil Rigb ts lnvestigan.ons ..................................... .

138
139
140
141
142
142

N. SANCTIONS AND DE1ERRENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
D!Scpline . • . . . • • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Disability Pension Abuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

V. COMMUNTIY OUTREACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Community Policing and Community Outreach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

CHAPTER SIX - HELPING THE POUCE TO POUCE
TIIEMSELVES: THE NEED FOR INDEPENDENT, EXTERNAL
OVERSIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

I. DEFICIENCIES OF TilE OFFICE OF TilE STA1E
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
II. DEFICIENCIES OF TilE INSPECTOR GENERAL MODEL . . . . . . . . . . 151

ill. TilE COMMISSION'S PROPOSED INDEPENDENT
OVERSIGHT MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . !52
Monitoring
Monitoring
Monitoring
Conclusion

Performance of Anti-Corruption Systems ................. _
Cultural Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corruption Trends .... - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.................................................

ix

154
156
!57
157

APPENDIX
Exhibit One
Executive On:ler No. 42 issued by The Honorable David N. Dinkins,
Mayor of the City of New York, on July 24, 1992,

Appointing the Commission to Investigate
Allegations of Police Corruption and the
Anti-Corruption Procedures of the New York
City Police Department

Exhibilllw
Opening Statement by The Honorable Milton Mollen,
Commission Public Hearings, September 27, 1993

Exhibit 'I'bree
Mid·Hearings Statement by The Honorable Milton Mollen,
Commission Public Hearings, October 4, 1993

Exhibit Four

Exhibits presented at the Commission Public Hearings.
September 27, 1993 through October 7, 1993
Exhibit Five

Letter dated December 27, 1993 to Mayor David N. Dinkins

from The Honorable Milton Mollen
Exhibit Six
Commissions Interim Report and Principal Recommendations,
dated December 27, 1993

Exhibit Se..,
New York City Police Department, Map of Patrol Precincts

X

Exhibit Eight

The Failure to Apprehend Michael Dowd: The Dowd Case Revisited

o

The Failure to Apprehend Michael Dowd
Sel!leant Trimboli and the Brooklyn North FIAU
Trimboli and the 75th Precinct
The R&T Grocery Store Robbery
Corruption in the 75th Precinct
The Trimboli Investigation
The Pro-Active Plan
The 79th Precinct Investigation
The Yurkiw Investigation
Final Developments

•

Comments

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o
o
o

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o
o

xi

CHAPI'ER ONE

AN OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY OF THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS
This Commission has spent the past twenty-two months investigating the nature,
extent and causes of police corruption today and the New York City Police Department's.

competence and commitment to prevent and detect it When the Commission was created
in July 1992 by Executive Order of Meyer David N. Dinkins we were given a three·fold ·
mandate: to investiga.te the nature and extent of corruption in the Department; to evaluate
the Department~ procedures for preventing and deteeting eorruption; and to recommend
changes and improvements in those procedures. What follows is the Commission's Report
on the state of eorruption we observed, the Department~ ability and willingness to deal with
it in recent years, and our reeommendations for lasting change.
Part of what we found was uplifting, part was disheartening. But our fundamental
conclusion is that this City has cause for faith in the future of our police departmenL
Unlike the situation a generation ago, this Commission can eonfidently report that the vast
majority of New York City police officers are honest and hard-working, and serve this City
with skill and dedication each day. It also appears that the work of this Commission and
the attitude of the Department~ current leadership has resulted in a determined
commitment to fighting police corruption. This is a citical achievement for the Department
and the people of our Oty. Without such a commitment, no efforts to combat corruption
will succeed. This Report is intended to help the Department maintain and carry out that
commitment - both today and in generations to come.
Despite our overall cause for optimism, we found that police corruption is a serious
problem confronting our City. Our findings raise significant concerns about the nature of

corruption today, the eonditions that fuel i~ the Department's willingness to confront and
fight it and, perhaps most troubling, the potential for these problems to grow without
sustained vigilance and oversighL
What we found is that the problem of police eorruption extends far beyond the
corrupt cop. It is a multi-faceted problem that has flourished in parts of our City not only
because of opportunity and greed, but because of a police culture that exalts loyalty over
integrity; because of the silence of honest officers who fear the consequences of "ratting'"
on another cop no matter how grave the crime; because of willfully blind supervisors who
fear the consequences of a conuption scandal more than oonuption itself; because of the
demise of the principle of accountability that makes all eommanders responsible for fighting
corruption in their eommands; because of a hostility and alienation between the police and
community in certain precincts which breeds an "Us versus Them'" mentality; and because

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for years the New York City Police Department abandoned its responsibility to insure the
integrity of its members.
All these factors contributed to the state of corruption we uncovered. While the

systemic and institutionalized bribery schemes that plagued the Department a generation
ago no longer exist, a new and often more invidious form of corruption has infected parts
of this City, especially in high-crime precincts with an active narcotics trade. Its most
prevalent form is not police taking money to accommodate aiminals by closing their eyes
to illegal activities such as bookmaking, as was the case twenty years ago, but police acting
as criminals, especially in connection with the drug trade. Cormption occurred not only
because of fortuitous opponunities and the frailties of human nature, but often because of
created opportunities and premeditated, organized group effort.
Former police officer Michael Dowel, for example, did not just take bribes from drug
traffickers to turn his head; he became a drug dealer himself and actually assisted and
protected major drug operations. Former police officer Kevin Hembury did not only steal
drugs, guns and money in the course of a series of unlawful searches; he was pan of a gang
of cops that raided drug locations almost daily for the sole purpose of lining their pockets
with cash. Former police officer Bernard Cawley - nicknamed "the Mechanic" by his
sergeant because he so openly and frequently "tuned people up, • or beat them - not only
used iniormants to identify drug locations for robberies, but beat people indiscriminately in
crime-iniested housing projects in his precinct. And it is alleged that former police officer
Alfonso Compres, one of the fourteen officers arrested thus far in the Comm..ission's yearlong 30th Precinct investigation, did not just steal from drug dealers on the streets; he
demanded regular payments to allow them to operate freely in his precinct and robbed those
who did not pay - he even used his service revolver to shoot a dealer while stealing a
package of cocaine while in uniform. To cover up their corruption, officers created even
more: they falsified official reports and perjured themselves to conceal their misdeeds.
Thus, while more limited in extent, police corruption has become more serious and
threatening than ever before.

In the face of this problem, the Department allowed its systems for fighting
corruption virtually to collapse. It had become more concerned about the bad publicity that
corruption disclosures generate than the devastating consequences of corruption itself. As
a result, its corruption controls minimized, ignored and at times concealed corruption rather
than rooting it out Such an institutional reluctance to uncover corruption is not surprising.
No institution wants its reputation tainted- especially a Department that needs the public's

confidence and partnership to be effective. A weak and poorly resourced anti-corruption
apparatus minimizes the likelihood of such taint, embarrassment and potential harm to
careers. Thus there was a strong institutional incentive to allow corruption efforts to fray

and lose priority - which is exactly what this Commission uncovered. This reluctance
manifested itself in every component of the Department's corruption controls from

2

command accountability and supervision, to investigations, police culture, training and
recruitment.

For at least the past decade, the system desigoed to protect the Department from
corruption minimized the likelihood of uncovering iL In a Department with a budget of
over one billion dollars, the basic equipment and resources needed to investigate corruption
successfully were routinely denied to corruption investigators; internal investigations were
prematurely closed and fragmented and taJgeted petty misconduct more than serious
corruption; intelligen~·gathering was minimal; integrity training was antiquated and often
non-existent; Internal Affairs undercover officers were often placed in precincts where
corruption was least ·prevalent; reliable information from field associates was ignored;
supervisors and commanders were not held accountable for corruption in their commands;
and corruption investigators often lacked investigative experience and almost half had never
taken the Department's "mandatory• basic (nvestigative training course. Most Internal
Affairs investigators and supervisors embraced a work ethic more dedicated to closing
corruption cases than to investigating them. Most volunteered for Internal Affairs to get on
a quick promotion track rather than to get cormpt cops off the job. Indeed, a survey of
Internal Affairs investigators we conducted tbrougb an Internal Affairs "insider" revealed
that over 50 percent of Internal Affairs investigators' time was spent on non-investigatory
matters. And no one said a word about this state of affairs until this Commission
commenced its investigations.

This was no accidenL Weak corruption controls reduced the cbances of uncovering
serious corruption and protected police commanders' careers. Since no entity outside the
Department was responsible for reviewing the Department's success in policing itself, years
of self-protection continued unabated until this Commission commenced its independent
.inquiries.
This abandonment of effecti.e anti-corruption efforts did more than avoid public
exposure of corruption, it fueled it It sent a message throughout the Department that
integrity was not a higb priority and that Department bosses did not really want to know
about corruptioiL In short, it gave everyone in the Department an excuse for doing what
was easiest: shutting their eyes to corruption around them.
And that is precisely what happened. The principle of command accountability,
whicb holds commanders responsible for figbting corruption, completely collapsed.
Supervisors and oommanding officers were laigely complacent about maintaining integrity.
Few were concerned with corruption on their watch - unless it exploded into an
embarrassing corruption W~ndal. One officer in a higb-crime precinct related bow his
commanding officer went so far as to announce at roll call that he knew his officers were
committing acts of corruption, and gave them this bit of advice: if you get caugbt, keep your
mouth shuL Obviously, any officer who hears that message will conclude that his bosses are
content to let corruption continue - despite the Department~ rhetoric to the contrary.

3

....

--

--

--· - -

···-~-

Patrol officers, too, shut their eyes to corruption. Officers from >arious commands
told this Commission that they would never report even serious conuption because they
feared the consequence of being labeled a "'rat'" and lacked confidence in the Department's
commitment to uncover corruption and maintain confidentiality. Indeed, so powerful is this
code of silence that in dozens of Commission interviews and in recent group discussions held
by the Departmen~ police officers admitted that they would not openly report an officer as
corrupt as Michael Dowd - though almost all of them would silently hope that he would be .
artested and remored from the DepartmenL

Even corruption imestigators understood that avoiding scandal was often more
important than uncovering corruption. As one Internal Affairs detective testified at a
private hearing:
They [lAD~ commanders] didn~·want us to be effective ....
They didn' want us to uncover any serious misconduct or largescale or any kind of misconduct that would bring bad press to

the Department or would cause embarrassment •• • [serious]
cases were not aggressively pursued Then: was no aggressive
posture taken when it could have a potential to develop into
something that vrould cause embarrassment to the Department.

This attitude began at the top. At the Commission~ public hearings. Daniel F. Sullivan,
the veteran chief of the Department!; Inspectional Services Bureau - and the Department~
top uniformed commander of its corruption controls - testified about the Department's view
of corruption investigations:

The Department [was] paranoid over bad press .... There was
a message that went out to the field that maybe we shouldn"t be
so aggressive in fighting [police] corruption because the
Department just does not want bad press. (Tr. 25) 1

1bis attitude is no secret in the crime-ridden. narcotics-infested communities where
police corruption is most prevalent. Numerous residents and leaders of these communities
told us that they often do not know whom to suspect more: the cops or the criminals. Few
civilians would ever tum to the Department to repon corruption- because they believe the
Department will in>ariahly support even corrupt cops more than the public. They believe
that no one with the same uniform really cares what cops do on the drug-ridden streets of
North Brooklyn. Upper Manhattan, or the streets of any ghetto of this City. Regardless of
the truth of this perception, it is the perception that often matters. And this perception
poisons relations between the community and the police, compromising the credibility of the
1

Throughout this Report, references to "Tr. • indicate pages in the transcript of the
public hearings, held from September 27, 1993 through October 7, 1993.

Commission~

4

wst majority of honest and dedicated cops who need the collllllWiity's cooperation to carry
out their difficult jobs effectively.
The Department also failed - or refused - to recognize that police corruption is a
multi-dimensional problem that cannot be oven:ome by focusing solely on the corrupt cop
and inadequate imcstigations. In so doing, the Department failed to insure that corruption
controls operated on a variety of fronts and in the daily operations of the Department,
including: recruitment, screening, integrity training, supervision, deterrence, accountability
and police culture. Because of that failure, the Department abandoned some of its best

tools for conquering corruption: tho honest cop and the community.
Enlisting the suppon of the honest cop who comprises the bulk of the Department
is critical to effective integrity controls. First, most corrupt officers start off as honest and
idealistic. The focus must be on keeping them honest. We found that over time the
constant and repeated exposure to cenain conditions and temptations - especially those in
high-crime and drug-ridden precincts - erodes the wlues and principles of many officers.
This makes them more suscepllble to corruption and to a culture that accepts and protects
il Second, it is honest cops who, by their silence, allow corruption to continue. Reforms
must focus on making honest officers feel respoDSlble for keeping their fellow officers
honest, and ridding themselves of corrupt ones. Despite this, until recently no effon was
made to encourage the honest cop to become part of the solution to com.1ption. To the
contrary, honest cops, like the collllllWiity. were often discouraged from doing so. Scores
of officers told us that they believed the Depanment did not want them to repon
corruption, that such information was often ignored, and that their careers would be ruined
if they did so. The evidence shows that this belief was not unfounded.
Convincing honest cops to help fight corruption will not be easy. The culture of
group loyalty and protection is powerful - as it should be. It bolsters morale and is vital
to successful policing. But too often an officer's loyalty to fellow officers - even corrupt
ones - exceeds his loyalty to the Department and the law. The challenge is to redirect
those otherwise admirable wlues away from cops who have tarnished the badge, and toward

all those who honor it daily. We are convinced such a transformation is possible.
There is a strong basis for our optimism First, history shows that a Department-wide
tolerance for corruption can be turned into corruption intolerance with proper leadership
and commitment. After the Knapp Commission~ revelations of widespread police
corruption. former Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy made integrity a centerpiece of
his administration and held police commanders and supervisors personally accountable for
combatting corruption. It worked. Successful integrity controls swiftly eliminated much of
the corruption that had plagued the Department and a new code of ethics arose among the

troops. That commitment eventually eroded because no mechanism was ever implemented
to sustain iL But the point is that former Commissioner Murphy demonstrated that a

5

- -------,----------

-

- - -···---

corruption-infested Department with a corruption-tolerant culture changed because of
aggressive leadership and unwavering commitment
An even more important basis for our sense of optimism is the essential values of the
hundreds of honest officers of all ranks we interviewed over the past months. While they
may yet be reluctant to turn in fellow officers who dishonor their badges, they silently hope
that such officers are removed from the job. They despise corrupt cops and want the
Department to root them out of their patrol cars and from their precincts. Their attitude
gives rise to much hope. It shows us that the battle to change police culture is aiready half
won. It shows us that the wall of silence is far from impenetrable and that the beginnings
of widespread intolerance for corruption already exist

We belie.e the Department has the leadership and commitment needed to transform
the Department once again. We are confident.. that the current Police Commissioner has
the skills and insights to accomplish his mission of driving corruption from the ranks of his
Department We have seen what appears to be a new era in the fight against police
corruption. The Department, in partnership with this Commission, has begun to implement
many of the reforms set forth in this Report Much time, effort and resources have been
devoted to strengthening corruption controls, signalling the Department~ genuine
commitment to fighting police corruption.
The challenge we face is to maintain that commitment long after this Commissioner
departs and the glare of public scrutiny subsides. We believe the Department cannot
maintain that commitment alone. If history proves anything, it is thar when the glare of
scrutiny shines on the Department, it can and will successfully police itself. But history also
proves that left to its own devices the Department will backslide, and its commitment to
integrity will erode. It is no coincidence that the only two times in the past 1\renty years
that fighting corruption has been a priority in the Department was when an independent
commission publicly reviewed and disclosed the Department~ failures to keep its own house
in order. This is because, in the words of former Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly and
former Chief of Inspectional Services Daniel Sullivan, outside oversight "keeps the
Department's feet to the fire. Indeed, law enforcement officials unanimously to1d us that
the Department~ heightened commitment and vigilance began only after the creation of this
independent oversight Commission. Only a nuly independent body, working with the
Department but beyond its contro~ can sustain this commitment - and make the fear of
failed corruption controls more powerful than the fear of corruption's disclosure.
II

There is another benefit to outside oversight It will provide assurance to the public,
when justified, that the Department is using its best efforts in the fight against corruption.
Often, the public Incorrectly views the Department~ success in uncovering corruption as
evidence of widespread management and integrity failures. As happened in the wake of the
recent 30th Precinct case, an independent monitor can tell the public when the arrests of
police officers is evidence not of the Department'S failure to fight corruption but of its

6

successful commianent to rooting it out It can help tum what has been traditionally a
matter of shame for the Department, into a cause for pride. It can help reduce the pain of
corruption disclosures - and thus the Department's reluctance to uncover it.
For these reasons, we recommend the establishment of a permanent independent
oversight body so that the vigilance and determination to light the police corruption we see
in our City today does not again evaporate when public attention and political concerns rum
eLsewhere.
But independent oversight alone will not do the trick. The primary responsibility for
combatting police corruption should and must remain with the Deparanent We are
confident that the Department possesses the skills and the ability to fight corruption

effectively. There are, however, numerous internal reforms and a new orientation to the
approach of fighting corruption that must be adopted. We have recommended a wide-range
of internal reforms and a new approach to combatting corruption that focuses on
strengtheoing corruption detection and prevention, as well as on the conditions that nurrure

corruption and its tolerance. These include:
•
•

improving screening and recruitment;
improving recruit education and in-service integrity training;

•
•
•
•

strengtheoing first-line supervision;
reiiiventing the enforcement of command accountability;
attacking corruption and brutality tolerance;
challenging other aspects of police culture and conditions that breed
corruption and brutality;

•

enhancing sanctions and disincentives for corruption and brutality;

•

strengthening intelligence-gathdring efforts;

•
•

preventing and detecting drug abuse;
soliciting police union support for anti-corruption efforts;

•
•

minimizing the corruption hazards of community policing; and
legislative reforms.

External independent oversight will help insure that these reform efforts succeed.
Ultimately, however, it is the Department~ own officers, supervisors and commaoders who
will determine whether the battle is won or lost - whether a culture that tolerates

corruption can be transformed into one that drives it ouL Therefore, it is imperative that
both these elements are present to devise effective reforms: successful internal Department
controls coupled with an independent outside entity to insure their lasting success .

•

•

•

To reach the conclusions and recommendations in this Report, the Commission
sought information from a wide variety of sources. We reviewed thonsands of Deparanent

7

documents and c:ase files; interviewed a lllllllber of conupt officers who agreed to cooperate
with the Commission; conducted hundreds of private hearings and interviews of former and
current police office~> of all ranks; audited, investigated and conducted performance tests
of the principal components of the Department~ anti-corruption systems; conducted
unannounced on-site systems inspections; conducted an anonymous survey of Internal Affairs
investigations with the assistance of an Internal Affairs "insider"; analyzed hundreds of
investigative and personnel files; interviewed private citizens, criminal defense attorney>,
alleged victims of conuption and criminal informants; conducted an exteusive literature

review on police corruption and prevention; and held a series of roundtable discussions and
other meerings with a variety of police management and corruption experts including local,
state and federal law enforcement officials, prosecutors, former and current police chiefs and.
commissioners. inspectors general, academics and police union officials.
We also undenook a lllllllber of special projects and conducted a series of private
hearings on various critical aspects of corruption centro~ including Internal Affairs'
operations and performance, recruitment and screening. training, supervision and command
accountability, integrity control officers, police peijury and falsifications, as well as an
empirical studY of the connection between brutality and corruption.

The Commission also initiated a number of its own field investigations in various
precincts in the City, sometimes in conjunction with local and federal prosecutors, targeting
areas where our analysis suggested police corruption existed. We were aided in all of our
efforts by former and current membei> of the Department of all ranks who came forward
to offer their assistance and insights about the state of corruption and corruption controls
in the Department.
From September Zl, through October 7, 1993, the Commission held two weeks of
public hearings to present much of the information we had uncovered in the three primary

areas of our mandate.

•

•

•

It was these investigations, audits and analyses that led to the conclusions presented
in this Report. We believe that our findings and recommendations will strengthen the
Department~ ability and desire to fight corruption, not only today but in the future. We are
not so naive as to believe that corruption can ever be completely eliminated among police
officers, or in any other profession. Arrj occupation comprising large numbers will haYe
some corruption. More than any other profession, however, the police face seductive
oppornutities to turn corrupL Today, many neighborhoods of New York City are awash with
drugs, money and guns, and our police are on the front lines. Potential for the misuse of
power and strong temptations challenge many of our police officers to abandon their oaths
every day. Given such circumstances, in a police department whose numbei> will soon

8

CHAPTER THREE

POUCE CUIJ'URE AND CORRUPTION
''We must create an atmosphere in which the dishonest officer
fears the honest one, and not the other way around."
- Detective Frank Serpico,
Testifying before the
Knapp Commission, December 1971
More than twenty years after Frank Serpico's testimony, this Commission found that
the dishonest officers in the New York City Police Department still do not fear their honest

colleagues. And for good reason. The vast majority of honest officers still protect the
minority of corrupt officers through a code of silence few dare to break. The Knapp
Commission predicted that the impact of their revelations would signillcantly weaken the
characteristics of police culture that foster corruption. In particular, they hoped that their
success in persuading a number of corrupt police officers to testify publicly about corruption
would forever undermine the code of silence, the unwritten rule that an officer never
incriminates a fellow officer. Unfortunately, their hope never became reality.

Police culnrre - the attitudes and values that shape officers' behavior - is a critical
component of the problem of police corruption today. This Commission, therefore, was not
satisfied simply to examine the types of police corruption we found to exist. The more
difficult question we asked is why such corruption exists, what are the root causes and
prevailing conditions that nurture and protect it. and hD'N they can be effectively addressed.
Only by examining the variety of influences and attitudes that contribute to corruption, can
we assess and formulate strategies to stop it
The code of silence and other attitudes of police officers that existed at the time of
the Knapp Commission continue to nurture police corruption and impede efforts at
corruption control. Scores of officers of every rank told the Comm.ission that the code of
silence pervades the Department and influences the vast majority of honest and corrupt
officers alike. Although police officers who look the other way while colleagues steal
property, sell drugs. or abuse citizens' civil rights may not be directly involved in corruption.
they nonetheless suppon and perpetuate it by abandoning their professional obligations.
These aspects of police culture facilitate corruption primarily in two ways. First, they
encourage corruption by setting a standard that nothing is more important than the
unswerving loyalty of officers to one another - not even stopping the most serious forms of
corruption. This emboldens corrupt cops and those susceptible to cormption. Second, these
attitudes thwart efforts to control corruption. They lead officers to protect or cover up for

51

others' crimes - even crimes of which they heartily disapprove. They lead to officers
flooding Department radio channels with warnings when Internal Affairs investigators
appear at precincts, and refusing to provide information about serious corruption in their
commands. Changing these aspects of police culture must be a central task if corruption
controls are ever tO succeed.
The realities of police work bolster these corruptive features of police culture. As
a society, we expect more of police officers than aiiy other public servants. We call upon
them daily to accomplish a variety of competing resporuibilities. We expect them to be
daring crime fighters as well as patient mediators. We call upon them to stop crime in our
neighborhoods, to resolve our domestic disputes, and to act as obedient members of a
paramilitary organization. Most of all, we expect them to confront physical danger and risk
their lives to protect our lives and property. After a time, particularly in high-crime areas,
they begin to identify the criminals they must confront every day with the community they
must serve. They begin to close ranks against what they perceive as a hostile environment.
Coruequently, many officers lose sight of the majority of law-abiding citizeru who live in
their precincts. When this happens, corruption becomes easier to commit and to tolerate.
Citizeru often return this hostility. With crime, drugs, and guru rampant in parts of
our City, the public incorrectly faults the police. When incidents of police corruption are
disclosed, the community incorrectly assumes that this is the norm. When police officers
interfere with citizens" activities, the public often resents it. Police officers feel this
resentment. What the Knapp Commission observed in its time is just as applicable today:
Nobody, whether a burglar or a Sunday motorist, likes to have
his activities interfered with. As a result most citizens, at one
time or another, regard the police with varying degrees of
hostility. The policeman feels, and naturally often returns, the
hostility.'
Faced with this resentment, the dangers of their work, and their dependence on other
officers for their mutual safety, police officers naturally band together. Often to such a
degree that officers become isolated from the outside world. They socialize with and
depend upon fellow officers not only on the job, but off. An intense group loyalty, fostered
by shared experiences and the need to rely on each other in times of crisis, emerges as a
predominant ethic of police culture.

8

City of New York, Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and
the City's Anti-CUrruption Procedures, Commission Report (New York: December 26, !972),
p. 6.

52

This loyalty ethic itself is not corruptive. l.oy.llty and trust are vital attributes that

promote effective and safe policing. We cannot ask police officers to abandon their loyalty
to each other while simultaneously demanding that they confront danger for us.
But group loyalty often flourishes at the expense of an officer's swam duty. It makes
allegiance to feUow officers - even corrupt ones - more important than allegiance to the
Department and the community. When this happens, loyalty itself becomes corrupt and
erects the strongest barriers to corruption control: the code of silence and the "'Us vs.
Them" mentality.
The Code or Silence
The perwsiveness of the code of silence is itself alarming. But what we found
particularly troubling is that it often appears to be strongest where corruption is most
frequent This is because the loyalty ethic is particularly powerful in crime-ridden precincts
where officers most depend upon each other for their safety each day - and where fear and
alienation from the community are most rampanL Thus, the code of silence influences

honest officers in the very precincts where their assistance is needed mosl
The pervasiveness of the code of silence is bolstered by the grave consequences for
violating it: Officers who report misconduct are ostracized and harassed; become targets
of complaints and even physical threats; aod are made to fear that they will be left alone
on the streets in a time of crisis. This draconian enforcement of the code of silence fuels
corruption because it makes corrupt cops feel protected and invulnerable. As former police
officer Bernard Cawley testified at the public hearings:
Question:

Were you ever afraid that one of your fellow
officers might turn you in?

Answer:

Never.

Question:

Wby not?

Answer:

Because it was the Blue Wall of Silence. Cops
don't tell on cops. And if they did tell on them,
just say if a cop decided to tell on me, his
career's ruined. He> going to be labeled as a rat
So if he> got fifteen more years to go on the job,
he's going to be miserable because it follows you
wherever you go. And he could be in a precinct,
he's going to have nobody to work with. And

53

chances are if it comes down to it, they're going
to let him get bun. (Tr. 138)
In his public hearing testimony, another corrupt officer, Kevin Hembwy, concurred:
If you're labeled a rat, espec:ially early in your career, you're
going to have a difficult time for the temainder of your career
in the New York City Police DepartmenL You do not want to
be. labeled a raL You will be the recipient of bad practical
jokes, even things more seriow; than practical jokes. Then. to
leave or request to leave the environment that you were in,
wouldn't be the end of this labeling that you had. Phone calls
would be made to wherever your final destination was in the
DepanmenL Your name traveled with yoiL It was something
you couldn\ shake. (Tr. 87)

Dozens of honest officers similarly told the Commission about their fears of breaking
the code of silence. Lieutenant Robert McKenna, a highly decorated Lieutenant with
twenty years experience in the Department. testified about this view at our public hearings:
Question:

What is the consequence of breaking this silence?

McKenn.a:

The cops are ostracized at times. They're held
away. They're pushed off to one side. They're
kept away from the rest of the group. I could
almost say it'd be like the effects of a divorce.
You're separated from your family. You're alone
over here. Your family, the cops, are over there.
(Tr. 80)

The Commission interviewed a number of officers who suffered the penalties of being
labeled a rat. Their names will be withheld for obvious reasoru. A captain we interviewed
spent thirteen years as a police supervisor, a Field Internal Affairs Unit investigator, and a
duty captain, or "shoefly," in Brook!JIL He was a stern disciplinarian who often disciplined
his subordinates for misconduct and reponed allegations of corruption to Internal Affairs.
During the course of his career, he was assigned to thirty~eight different commands
throughout the City. In almost every case, on the very day he arrived to report for duty at
his new command, he found evidence that his reputation had preceded him. AI one
command, his locker was burned; at another, his car tires were slashed; at another, he
received threats of physical harm.
In another case, a detective who served in Internal Affairs was transferred to a
precinct detective squad In his first week, his new colleagues made sure he knew that he

54

would be alone on the street They placed dead rats on his car windsltield, stole or
destroyed his personal property, and told him directly that he could not count on them in
times of danger. The constant harassment eventually led the detective to seek psychological
counseling and restricted duty.
The inculcation of police culture begins early in police officers' careers, as early as
the Police Academy. Police Officer "Otto, • an officer assigned to a ltigh-crime precinct who
agreed to testify publicly before the Commission only in disguise because of the code of
silence, told us that he learned about the code of silence while he was still a recruit at the
Police Academy:
Question:

How do police officers learn about this wall or
code of silence?

Otto:

It starts in the Police Academy, and it just
develops from there. . . . It starts with the
instructors telling you never to be a rat, never
give up your fellow officer. It starts with other
recruits telling you they'll never give you up, and
it just goes on down the line as you go through
N.S.U. [Neighborhood Stabilization Units] and
into a precinct. (Tr. 14)

And. while still recruits, police officers learn the harsh lessons of violating the code
of silence. One former recruit told us that while in training at the Academy, she made a
complaint to Internal Affairs about the lewd remarks an Academy instructor constantly
made to her and other women recruits. Despite assurances of confidentiality, Internal
Affairs informed Academy supervisors of her complaint. Within days, she was ostracized
by her fellow recruits (even those who had been her friends) and Academy personoel. Her
isolation was made so complete that she was forced to finish her Academy training on her
mvn.. When she graduated, the Department assigned her to Internal Affairs becalL'ie it was
unlikely she would be accepted anywhere else in the Department. Her dream to become
a cop became a nightmare because she made a single complaint about a fellow cop. Within
a year, she resigned from the Department

The fear of violating the code of silence can even lead an officer to accept the blame
and punishment for the acts of a fellow officer. Hembury testified to an incident when, still
a rookie, he and a partner stopped a motorcycle for a number of traffic violations. Because
the driver became irate, Hembury's partner thought he would teach him a lesson by
removing a spark plug coil to disable the engine. Eventually charges for damagiDg the
motorcycle were wrongly brought against Hembury, not his partner. But the code of silence
compelled Hembury to accept the punishment - a loss of fifteen vacation days - for

55

something be did not do. Hembury knew that the punishment for breaking his silence
would be far worse than the punishment for police misconduct:
Hem bury:

... And the spark plug I had nothing to do with.
But yet these charges were brought against me.
I took the hit [punishment], lost my fifteen days,
and that was the end of iL

Question:

So you took a fifteen day hit all because you just
could not be labeled a rat and tell the truth
about who was really responsible for damaging
the motorcycle?

Hembury:

That~

correcL (Tr. 89)

There is a tragic irony to the code of silence which provides both the greatest
challenge - and hope - in combatting COITUption. Although most honest cops will not
report serious corruption, they despise corrupt cops and silently hope that they will be
removed from the ranks. Recently, the Internal Affairs Bureau\; CoiTUption Prevention and
Analysis Unit shared with the Commission the results of a series of enlightening discussions
conducted with groups of police officers about their perception of police values and
corruption. Remarkably, although patrol officers openly expressed disgust over coiTUption
and hoped coiTUpt officers would be fired, they nonetheless are highly reluctant to report
corruption, even if it involves drugs and weapons. The Internal Affairs repon states:

Extremely serious allegations including drugs and weapons were
not viewed differently by most of the participants. Members
were consistent in their reluctance to officially report these
transgressions. Officers were of the opinion that the discovery
and the official reporting of criminal allegations and serious
misconduct would not elew.te them in the eyes of their peers.
These officers believed they would be perceived as 'rats,' not
to be trusted. The consensus was that if an individual reported
serious matters they would likely report minor infractions as
well. The fear of being labeled a 'rat' and subsequently
divorced from police culture bas a seemingly powerful, negative
impact on reporting corruption. This reveals a whole new
dimension to the code of silence: it does not always reflect
solely tolerance for corruption or a misplaced group loyalty. In

many instances it is motivated purely by self-interest and selfprotection: a fear of the consequence of breaking the norms of
loyalty and silence.

56

Thus the most deYliStating consequence of the code of silence is that it prevents the
vast majority of honest officers from doing what they inwardly want to do: help keep their

Depamnent corruption free. It is not surprising that the honest cop wants corrupt cops off
the job. The consequences of comJption for honest cops are grave: it taints their
reputations, destroys their morale, and, most irnponant, jeopardizes their very safety.
What is surprising is that despite these devastating consequences, honest cops refuse
to help eliminate corrupt cops from their Department, even though they are the principal
victims of police corruption. Again, Police Officer Otto, like scores of his colleagues, made
this point clear:

Question:

What is the impact of corruption on honest cops?

Otto:

It hurts them. It disheartens them.
them not want to work.

Question:

Do you believe that it endangers their safety on
the street?

Otto:

Well. put it this way. I wouldn~ want to run
across a drug dealer who's been ripped off one

It makes

time too many.
Despite corruption's threat to their safety and their genuine desire to work in a corruptionfree Department, officers view reporting corruption as an offense more heinous and
dangerous than the corruption itself.
Honest officers who know about or suspect corruption among their colleagues,
therefore, face an exasperating dilemma. They perceive that they must either turn a blind
eye to the corruption they deplore, or risk the dreadful consequences of reponing it. The
Commission's inquiries reveal that the overwhelming majority of officers choose to live with
the corruption.
And they have not been reluctant to admit this to the Commission. Indeed, the facts
bear out what officers have been telling us for the past twenty-two months: despite years
of open and frequent corruption by officers like Michael Dowd, Bernard Cawley and others,
virtually none of their colleagues or supervisors reponed this corruption to Internal Affairs.
If the Department ever hopes to make lasting improvements in corruption control.
it mwt do something it bas failed to do in recent history: acknowledge that the code of

silence exists and take steps to overcome iL It must rescue its members from the grip of
their self-created predicamenL From first-line supervisors to Internal Affairs, it must
provide constant support and recognition to officers who, by reporting corruption, choose

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to do what is right rather than what their culture expects of them. The Police Commissioner
must make it clear that those who expose corruption will be rewarded, and those who help
conceal it punished.

Finally, the Department must provide the same confidentiality protections to officers
who report other officers, as it does to civilians who provide information about criminals.
There is a widespread perception among officers that this is not the case. Many officers told
us that they "WOuld not report corruption because the Department does not provide the same
basic protections to officers as it does to civilians assisting the Deparnnent This
communicates a powerful message: that the Department is not really interested in enlisting
the police in the fight against corruption. Until this changes, no reforms will ever change
the attitudes that underlie the code of silence .
.. Us vs. Them"
The code of the "blue fraternity" extends beyond the "blue" and into the
communities they police. The loyalty ethic and insularity that breed the code of silence that
protects officers from other officers also erects protective barriers between the police and
the public. Far too many officers see the public as a source of trouble rather than as the
people they are swom to serve. Particularly in precincts overtaken with crime, officers
sometimes view the public as the "enemy." Officer Otto explained:

Question:

Is there an attitude prevalent among police
officers that ... protects them against other
people who might report corruption on their

part?
Otto:

Yes. It's an 'Us vs. Them' mentality. See, we're
all blue, and that we're in this together and we
have to protect each other no matter what.

Question:

And I suppose what you're saying is the police
officers are the 'us,' and who is the 'them'?

Otto:

Everybody else.

While the "Us vs. Them .. mentality is most powerful in crime-ridden precincts, often
with large minority populations, it is not confined to these precincts. We found that this
attitude exists, in varying degrees, in many precincts in the City - and begins to develop
early in an officer's career. The Commission's inquiries show that. like the code of silence,
the "Us vs. Them'" mentality starts when impressionable recruits and rookies are led to
believe by veteran officers that the ordinary citizen fails to appreciate the police and that

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