Schoolcraft v. The City Of New York et al

Filing 400

FILING ERROR - DUPLICATE DOCKET ENTRY - DECLARATION of NATHANIEL B. SMITH in Opposition re: 297 MOTION for Summary Judgment .. Document filed by Adrian Schoolcraft. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit POX 36, # 2 Exhibit POX 37, # 3 Exhibit POX 38, # 4 Exhibit POX 39)(Smith, Nathaniel) Modified on 2/17/2015 (db).

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William J. Bratton
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,. c OB1BHSSIOner
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David W. Scott
First Deputy Commissioner

\"Valter Mack
Deputy Commissioner
. Ih ~e•·n a I Aff•> irs
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A~LYSIS iJNrr

Inspector
Commanding Officer

Sgt. Vincent Henry
OMAP

Sgt. Leopold Poje
P.O. Derrick Pervis

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUBJECT
EXECUTIVE

1

SUM1~.A.RY

INTRODUCTION

14

METHODOLOGY

18

CHANGES WITHIN THE DEP.li.RTMENT {ISSUE

DEPARTl·:ENT VALUES

(ISSUE

#

#

1)

2)

26

31

DEPARTMENT DRUG TESTING POLICY (ISSUE # 3)

33

DEFINING CORRUPTION (ISSUE # 4)

38

INTEGRITY TESTING (ISSUE # 5)

41

REPORTING CORRUPTION (ISSUE # 6)

43

SUPERVISORY T'RAINING ISSUES (ISSUE # 7)

52

CORRUPTION TRAINING (ISSUE # 8)

54

ANCILLARY ISSUES (ISSUE # 9)

56

CONCLUSION

61

SUMHARY OF RECO!olMENDATIONS

{ATTACHMENT "A")

64

FOCUS GROUP OUTLINES (ATTACHMENT "B")
BIBLIOGRAPHY

'

66

68

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
At the direction of Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly,
the
Internal Affairs Bureau's Corruption Prevention and Analysis Unit
(CPAU)
initiated a series of Focus Groups in order to identify
and explore some of the prevailing attitudes,
perceptions and
ooinions existing among members of the Department toward a range
o~ integrity related
issues.
This research project, which
commenced in early August and concluded in late December,
1993
ultimately involved twenty three (23) groups of officers of
various ranks and assignments withi"n the agency,
and a total of
over three hundred (300) members participated in the Focus
Groups.
The project :,.;us ur:.dertaker1 in r.ecognition of the fact that
informal demands and constraints of the police occupational
culture often impact as potently upon police discretionary
behavior as the formal policies and procedures promulgated by the
agency . . While the literature of policing and of police deviance
have lorig emphasized the importance of cultural factors in
determining police behavior, a great deal of that research on
police culture is dated,
and therefore of dubious value.
In
order to gain a more comprehensive and contemporary understanding
of the attitudes,
perceptions and belief systems which are
subsumed by the police subculture,
and to provide this data to
the Police- Commissioner in order to better inform his policy
decisions, the research team adopted a Focus Group methodology,
~ne

Focus Groups involve interactive directed interviews of
small groups of individuals of similar backgrounds,
in order to
develop
information and to reach conclusions about
other
individuals and groups possessed of similar characteristics.
Focus Group methodology was deemed a viable and appropriate
format for eliciting data relative to integrity issues, since the
enduring potential for police corruption appears inevitably to
exist within the nexus of discretionary behavior,
formal control
policies,
and the occupational culture's tolerance for members'
deviance.
Consistent with accepted practices of Focus Group
research,
each group was comprised of approximately fifteen (15)
members,
and twenty (20) of the twenty three (23) groups were
randomly selected by computer from the population of officers
possessing similar background characteristics.
The relevant
background characteristics, which included rank,
tenure in the
agency,
type of assignment (i.e.,
patrol, Community Pol~cing
Unit,
Field Training Unit, Police Academy recruits,
supervisors
and middle managers), and in some cases the platoon to wl1icl1 the
officers were steadily assignedr were selected because these
easily-operationalized variables appear most likely to play a
powerful role in determining work-related attitudes and beliefs.

'

(2)

Thus,
each of the officers attending a particular Focus Group
session had a comparable career profile,
and would therefore be
expected to have similar attitudes.
By eliminating selection
bias through randomization techniques, by ensuring that all
members
of a oarticular Focus Group sl1ared the same
or
essentially simiiar backgrounds and work experiences, and by
probi11g deeply into the attitudinal data they elicited,
the
project staff are confident i!1 generalizi~g these findings to
other similarly situated groups and individuals within the
Department.
This level of confidence was further enhanced by
slightly altering the selection criteria of successive groups,
and by observing the slight differences in the beliefs and
convictions espoused by those. groups. The scope and duration of
the project also permitted the research team to accumulate a
wealth of general and specific data concerning officers'
belief
systems,
as ·...;ell as to discern many of the subtler and more
nuanced dynamics of their self-reported behavior.
Each of the
Focus Groups was conducted in a "round-table 11 format,
and
participants were asked to respond to an identical series of open
ended questions related to integrity and corruption.
In order to
ensure the reliability of the data,
the facilitators refrained
from introducing their own opinions, and made every effort to
encourage candid discussion among participants.
To that end,
participants were assured that although notes would be taken by
one member of the project staff, no names or identities would be
recorded;
at the end of each session, participants were asked to
review the written notes to guarantee accuracy and anonymity.
It
should be ernphasized that the facilitators encountered little
reluctance on the part of officers to discuss the issues and
questions posed to them.
Indeed,
the vast majority
of
participants see~ed to appre~iate the opportunity to share their
views and opinions with the project staff,
in apparent hope that
their input would result in substantive and positive changes to
Department policies and practices.
The following questions were posed to the Focus Group
participants:
1.
HoN has the job of Police Officer changed in the past
years?
2.
Are the Department values reasOJlable or unreasonable?
3. ·What
is·
reasonable and
unreasonable
about
the
Department's Drug Testing policy and procedure?
4.
How do Police Officers define corruption?
5.
What role do integrity tests play in the Department's
anti-corruption efforts?
6.
How do we encourage the reporting of corruption?
7.
What
are
the
training
needs
for
police
supervisors? (question posed to supervisory- groups)

8.

How effective is corruption training?

i-

I 3)

As noted,
participants'
responses to these questions
resulted in the compilation of an abundant base of diverse data
concerning the depth,
dimensions and prevalence of particular
attitudes toward integrity and corruption within the agency and
within specific populations of its personnel.
The extensive and
intricate nature of this data set, in fact, presented the project
staff with some difficulty in distilling and condensing it to a
format suitable for this report. Based upon the raw data

obtained, however, the project staff have developed a host of
findings and conclusions relative to the dynamics of the police
culture and the level of integrity within this Department. These
data
have also resulted in a number of specific
policy
recommendations.
While
the bulk of these
findings
and
reCOIT'u'Tiendations ere contained within the body of this report,
some of the principal critical findings are summarized below.
It should be noted tl1at wherever possible the project staff have
attempted to capture,
in this Summary and in the report,
tl1e
typical
language
and connotations used
by
Focus
Group
participants.
ISSUE #1 How has the iob of Police Officer changed?
This
initial 11 icc-breaker 11
question was intended
to
stimulate discussion among participants and to identify broad
issues and trends wl1ich concern officers.
In raising these
issues e.arly in the Focus Group process, project staff were able
not only to gain insight into the general level of morale, but to
prevent these issues from later intruding upon and distracting
from discussions of integrity-specific issues.
In virtually all
of the groups,
a similar set of perceptions and themes emerged;
their recurring nature is evidence of their pervasiveness and of
the fact that the culture holds them UDquestionably as valid
truths.
Among those in the Police Officer rank, Sergeants were
roundly
criticized for an increasing lack of
interactive
communication skills and job knowledge, as well as for their lack
of impartiality and their poor decision-making skills.
These
sentiments were echoed by Captains as well.
Increasir1gly, Sergeants are young and inexperienced, and
their practice of socializir1g off-duty with subordinates is
detrimental to their on-duty command and control.
Precinct-based Field Training Units (FTU's) were harshly
criticized for failing to adequately school rookie officers in
the reality of police h'Ork.
The now-defunct Neighborhood
Stabilization Units (NSU's) are regarded as a more effective
field training strategy in which senior patrol officers teach a
common sense approach to police Hork, rather than the 11 by the

book"

style

evident

among

Sergeants.

The FTU concept stifles

(4I

initiative and maturity,
as a

1

and is almost universally characterized

'summons detail'' designed primarily to generate revenue.

The steady tour concept has had a divisive and deleterious
impact,
fractionalizing each precinct into '''four· separate
commands" in which officers have no relationships,
interactions 1
or affinity for officers assigned to other platoons. The concept
is
"destl:oying the job''
and creating conflict because officers
have few inhibitio.-.s about "d'-!m[Jing jobs'' en the following tour.

Officers

miss the informal camaraderie and locker

and numerous cliques have formed.

room

banter,

Cliques facilitate misconduct

and
corruption by eroding positive peer pressure and
by
intensifying in-group loyalty bonds.
Great
tension and. al,imosity exists between
Community
Policing Unit (CPU) and sector officers.
The perception is that
CPU Officers spend their time unsupervised,
socializing with
residents while patrol officers do the bulk of police work. They
do not respond to culls for service 1 especially gun runs and
arrest situations.
CPU Officers constitute a privileged classj
they benefit from the 11 dial-a-tour 11 concel?t,
their requests for
days off are more frequently granted, and they do not 11 fly 11 to
details or backfill sectors. CPU Officers do not dispute many of
these claims.
Recruitment and hiring standards have fallen dramatically,
and officers are outraged at the number of new hires who have had
felony arrests with misdemeanor convictions.
Many
patrol
officers questioned the integrity and tl1e character of rookies,
and are relucta11t to work with them for this reason.
Applicant
investigators are seen as processors of paperwork,
rather than
investigators who conduct credible backaround and character
investigations.
~
Participants' Recommendations:
Revise the Basic Management Orientation course
to
emphasize
communication skills,
leadership,
and
personnel
management.
Impose a higher years-of-service requirement for
promotion to Sergeant.
Abandon the PTU concept in favor of the NSU training
concept.
Utilize the talents of senior patrol officers to mentor
rookies.
Give rookies more t·ealistic 11 hands-on 11 training in
11
"real pol ice 1-Jork.
Re-introduce a scooter chart or some other rotating tour
system, particularly for rookie officers.
Recruitment and hiring standards must be raised, and the
applicant's character must be of primary concern.
Applicant

investigators must conduct actual investigations, unhampered by

(5 )

quotas or other hiring mandates.
ISSUE #2: Are the Department values reasonable or unreasonable?

Many officers were completely unaware of the Department
values,
to the extent that project staff felt it necessary to
bring a copy of the Values to group sessions as an examplar.
Many of those 1.,oho were aware derided the values
as
platitudes or a public relations gimmick, frequently stating that
the Department itself does not uphold them. In practice, overtime
concerns determine how aggressively violators will be pursued and
arrested; the agency shows little respect for the dignity of its
members;
politics override impartiality in enforcing lawsi
i~tegrity
is expected of officers, but ranking officers aasily
receive disability pensions.
Values cannot be learned through public s ta tern en ts, or
taught to those who do not possess them prior to joining the
Department.
Other than Police Academy recruits,
few believe that the
Values statement, per se, is of any practical use or that it
informs their every-day decisions.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, members almost universally
agreed that the values were reasonable standards of conduct.
ISSUE #3: Are the Department's drug testing policies reasonable?
Numerous misconceptions and a great deal of misinformation
regarding drug testing policies and procedures were discerned, to

the

extent

that project staff felt compelled

to

preface

this

question
with
an explanation of laboratory
testing
and
chain-of-custody procedures.
Most notably,
the true randomness
of the .random selection process is doubted.
Every Focus Group displayed a complete intolerance for drug
use by MOS.
Older officers of all ranks tended to favor
retention of pension rights for vested employees, but overall
most supported the policy of immediate termination with loss of
all pension rights.
A few favored drug rehabilitation prior to
termination, and only a handful stated that drug users merit a
second chance.
~1embers
were highly supportive of increased random drug
testing, despite their confusion about the administration of
tests. With the exception of the participants from the Guardians

(6 I
AssocJaU.on,

virtually all were satisfied with the

"for

cause"

testing procedures as well.
Participants' Recommendations:
Increase the number and percentage of members randomly
tested, and consider random field tests of large groups of
officers, e.g., at the outdoor range.
Police applicants should also be subject to random drug
testing, since the current practice of schedllling medicals in
"clean
up"
advance
may
afford them the opportunity to
temporarily.

Project Staff's Recommendations:
The Department should initiate a formal campaign to dispel
misconceptions about Dole Testing,
including a brief
film
depicting the actual process from generation of daily random
testing lists through laboratory testing.
This film should be
viewed by members selected for testing 1
and incorporated into
Precinct Level Training.
Given the acceptance of Random Dole Testing among officers
and their lack of tolerance for members using drugs 1
the
Department should consider increasing the nu~ber and percentage
of members tested.
ISSUE #4 How do Police Officers define corruption?
Although
participants experience great
difficulty
in
articulating a precise definition of corruption 1 project ~taff
obtained a fairly detailed understanding of the types of behavior
officers consider corrupt.
A criminal act 1
the active pursuit or solicitation of a
benefit
for
personal
gain,
accepting
money
under
any
circumstances, or tl1e explicit expectation of a benefit as the
result of one 1 s duties as a Police Officer clearly fell within
the realm of corruption.
Free coffee 1 and to a lesser extent, discounted meals, were
not generally considered to be corrupt when no implicit or
explicit expectation of reciprocity exists.
Officers
are

confident that they can distinguish situations where such

(7

I

expectations exist.
Officers had some difficulty in comprehending

the

current

Board of Ethics ruling's distinction between accepting a light
repast in a social or non-social setting, and many were unaware

of tl1e ruling itself.

Overwhelmingly,

participants

voiced a

favorable

attitude

toward a strong rntcrnal Affairs function which would concentrate
on ''real corruption" rather than the petty,
''1-,ohi te socks''
infractions upon which it has previously focused.
Concurrently,

participants had a highly negative opinion of the Internal
Affairs function as it has operated to date.
rnter~el
Affairs investigators, as a group, are seen as
poorly skilled and inexperienced investigators who possess little
knowledge of or empathy foi.· ~ractical policing or for other
off:i_cers, and ~1ho a1·e more content to field 11 ground ball 11 cases
1-lhich result in easy numbers
than to do real investigations of
truly corrupt cops.
11

11

Participants' Recommendations:
The Department should foster and facilitate candid and open
discussions of corruption problems and issues,
in order to
inform, educate and sensitize officers..
Such dialogue, in
itself,
may act as a deterrent to corruption if the 11 Slippery
11
Slope hypothesis is correct.
Proiect .Staff's Recommendation:
The Board of Ethics should meet to discuss and clarify the
Department's Policy regarding the acceptance of a light repast in
a social setting.
Examples should be provided to avoid further
confusion.
This ruling should then be disseminated to all
members of the service and incorl,)orated into the training
curriculum.
ISSUE #5 1-lhat role do Integrity Tests play in
anti-corruotion efforts?

the

Department• s

( 8)

Targeted

integrity

tests,

carefully

administered

directed toward officers who are reasonably suspected of

and

serious

misconduct or corruption, were seen as a legitimate investigative
tool.
Reservations were expressed about non-suspect officers
"being in the wrong place at the ,.,.rang tili1e, 11 and tests focusing

on administrative errors and minor misconduct.
Concerns about random testing typically involved

anecdotes

about tests unfairly administered by Internal Affairs,

or

those

in
which officers were punisl1ed for minor·
administrative
violations. While random tests may deter some members from minor
acts

of

corruption,

hard-core corrupt

officers

will

not

be

deterred.
Few officers trusted the integrity of the random
tests themselves, and the issue of entrapment was frequently
raised.
Some officers, i11cluding most of the Guardians Focus
Group, believed that tl1e tests have been directed against
particular individuals {or groups} under the guise of ranGcm~ess.
A handful of officers believed that the tests imputed a lack of
trust for an officer's integrity, and they stated they would be
offended if they knew they were tested.
Participants' Recommendations:
If random or directed integrity tests are used by the
Department, special pains mtJSt be taken to ensure that they are
fairly administered and carefully controlled.
They should
address serious corruption only, and any minor administrative
violations discovered should not result in disciplinary action.
Officers who pass a random or directed integrity test should
be notified of that fact, and mention of successfully passing a
random test should be included in a members' personnel and CPI
files.
ISSUE #6 How can the reporting of corruption be encouraged?·
Those in the Police Officer rank evinced great reluctance to
report acts of misconduct or corruption among their peers.
Only
the most egregious cases, e.g., an officer stealing or selling
drugs, would typically result in an officer coming forward; even
in tl1ose cases, officers are reluctant to report corruption and
Hould prefer to make their reports anonymously.
Police Officers
stated that ·they risked the ostracism of their peers and a

( s}

reputation as a "rat,'' and that they would be suspected of having
reported minor misconduct as well. Some officers stated outright
that
they would be afraid of physical reprisals
against
themselves and their families by corrupt officers or by drug
dealers, and fear that even honest officers would not back them
up on jobs.
Somewhat anomalously, several officers including all of the
PEA delegates stated that they would have no hesitation in
reporting serious corruption, and would have no fear of physical
or social repercussions.
A few officers even stated that they
would personally effect an arrest rather than to make a report to
the Internal Affairs Bureau.
Project staff noted that these
officers appeared to be the most self-confident of participants,
as well as those with the highest status.
Participants were generally skeptical of IAB's capacity to
ensure confidentiality, with several suggesting that IAB would
not be averse to ''burning" an informant officer.
They also
believe that the Action Desk uses ''Caller ID'' and voice analysis.
Few ·..:ere familiar with the corruption hotline- 212-CORRUPT.
Participants contemptuously characterized Internal Affairs
as a "white socks and no hats outfit.' 1 ·To maintain their batting
average,
investigators
issue
Command
Disciplines
for
adfi'linistrative violations and close out allegations as "Other
Hisconduct Noted" or "Unsubstantiated" rather than completing a
full investigation which would result in exoneration.
Officers
are concerned that these notations remaill on their Central
Personnel Index files and may be used to unfairly deny them
detail assignments or promotions. They remain skeptical about
the restructured lAB's new image.
Sergeants were generally split on their reporting
of
corruption.
Approximately half indicated they would openly
report corruption while the other half stated they would only
report corruption anonymously.
In sharp contrast to the Police Officers' self-reported
attitudes and behaviors, Lieutenants as a group believed that tl1e
Police Officers they supervise 1vould have little reluctance to
report corruption and serious misconduct.
They appeared very
confident that officers would come forward, either openly or
anonymously, if they knew of corruptiori.
Captains, however,
believed it highly unlikely that Police Officers would come
forward, even in serious cases.

( 1 0)

Participants' Recommendations:
Information about the corruption hotlj,ne should be \·ddely
disseminated throughout the agency,
and the notion that IAB
be
utilizes technology to. identify anonymous callers must.
be assured
dispelled. Absolute confidentiality or anonymity must
to officers who report corruption.
11

If IAB is to gain credibility it must change its
White
socks 11 image and concentrate only on serious misconduct and
corruption.
IAB personnel must be experienced investigators.
'lh,3 practice of closing cases through ''Unsubstantiated'' or
11
and
0ther Misconduct Noted'' classifications must be curtailed,
an attempt must be made to fully investigate and exonerate
officers when possible.
IAB should be solely concerned with
serious
misconduct and corruption;
minor
misconduct
and
administrative violations should not be within lAB 1 s purview 1 nor
should !AB issue Command Disciplines ·for minor matters.
The quality and reputation of IAB investigators must be
improved if the Bureau is to l1ave credibility and gain the
cooperation of officers.
Investigators must be aggressive in
identifying and arresting corrupt cops 1 but only corrupt cops.
An on-going precinct dialogue program with members of lAB
should be initiated, as a means to sensitize both groups to the
objectives and goals of the other 1 and to change the negative
image of lAB.

I Ss UE # 7 "W"-h'-'a'-t!,_,.-"al.!rc\e'-c--bt'-'h-"e'-'to!r'-'a"-1""'unl.i.!Jnc,gun;;e,_,e,d""-s_;,ouf~s"-"u"p"e'-'r"'v'"l'-'s"-"o"'r-'s'-'-?
Sergeants and Lieutenants only)

(Asked

of

Sergeants and Lieutenants were dismissive of the Basic
Management Orientation Course (BMOC) and Lieutenants Orientation
Course (LOC) 1
1.,hich they characterized as a Patrol Guide
refresher.
These courses consist primarily of a series of
11
talking heads 11 who discuss the operations of their various
units, and little effort is expended to impart leadership and
effective management and supervisory skills.
The content of the
training
modules
1.,ere
also criticized
for
failing
to
realistically address the practical issues facing supervisors
today/
and participants strongly emphasized the need
for
11
11
hands-on and interactive methods of instruction.
Police Academy staff in general, and BMOC/LOC instructors in
particular,
were
criticized for their
mediocre
teaching

abilities, their lack of practical experience, and their lack of

overall credibility.
Police Academy staff have little interest
or aptitude in conveying the course material, and far too many
breaks were given to students.
The courses tl1emselves were
characterized as a waste of time,
and specific modules (e.g.,
computer training,
report writing,
leadership workshops) were
either under-resourced or completely inadequate.
?a~ticipants
believe that the BMOC/LOC courses are given
primarily to allay the Department's training liability, rather
than to actually provide supervisors with useful realistic
training.
Supervisors also complained about an unmanageable span of
control,
statincr that they are often responsible for supervising
an entire precin~t and are too frequently assigned to cover more
than one precinct.
Particularly in the high crime precincts
where effective supervision is most critical 1 they are frequently
dispatched to handle 911 jobs during periods of b~cklcg,
in
addition to their ordinary supervisory duties. They complain
that despite their high level of accountability for the actions
of suboLdinates, these factors preclude effective supervision.
"The more tenured supervisors also chided younger Sergeants
for becoming overly friendly with subordinates off-duty and on.
This issue should be addressed by training, since it jeopardizes
their
own position of authority and reduces respect
for
supervisors in general.
Lieutenants in the !CO group claimed to have received no
training in their duties, much less in investigative techniques.
They are oven~·helmed with papenwrk and under-resourced.
They
are not apprised of any internal investigations taking place
within their commands,
and believe that their knowledge could be
of great assista·nce to such internal investigations.
The reo
position is the least desirable or remunerative Lieutenant
position in a precinct, and is consequently giVen to the least
experienced Lieutenant.
Participants' Recommendations:
The BMOC and LOC courses require extensive revision in order
to provide adequate i11struction in practical issues faced by
supervisors.
Lieutenant !CO's should receive special training in their
particular duties and should receive the personnel and other
resources they needi an incentive or reward system should be
incorporated.
IAB should make fuller use of their knowledge and
talents.

( 12)

The role of the Precinct/Unit ICO needs to be reviewed.
An
in-depth analysis of current duties and responsibilities should
be conducted and a clear set of guidelines should be promulgated.

ISSUE #8 AllCillary Issues
During
fr~quently

the course of the
arose l.,ohich,
while

Focus Group sessions,
issues
not directly related to the

project's goals and objectives, nevertheless merit mention.
Officers characterized the Department's pol icy on wearing
hats as irrelevant,
draconian and petty.
They re~ated frequent
anecdotes
concerning officers on emergency runs who
were

disciplined for not wearing hats.
It should be noted that a
change in Department policy regarding hats during the course of
the project may render this issue moot.
The
Police Department is entirely too responsive
to
political pressures,
despite its rhetoric about
impartial
enforcement of the law.
They argue forcefully that
the
Department and its officers should be j,nsulated from such
pressures, and that its actions should be directed at serving the
needs of the entire citizenry rather than the needs and whims of
special interest groups.
The agency's policies are increasingly
shaped by external political agendas, rather than by the needs of
communities.
Community Policing has dangerously extended and
enhanced this political c.ontrol.
Participants were highly
resentful and cynical about the politicization of the agency,
characterizing it as pervasive 1 counter-productive, and contrary
to the ideals that they and the Department espouse.
Several
participants equated this politicization with corruption, and
quite a few opined that politicization fosters and protects
police corruption.
Officers have little hope that this trend in
politicization will be reversed.
Participants in tl1e Brooklyn North Focus Group asserted that
their entire Patrol Borough and.nearly all the precincts within
it are regarded as ' 1dumping grounds" populated by misfits,
malingerers and incompetents. They take a perverse pride in this
deviant identity. They reiterated a belief that ranking officers
and internal investigators are afraid to venture into the
11
Shithouse 11 precincts 1 and that they receive less external
su!?ervi:3ion.
Overwhelmingly, participants believed that the Department's
recruitment
and hiring practices
have declined, and they

( 1 3)

articulated
l.fany

a

connection between this decline

individuals arrested for felony crimes have

and

corruption.

become

Police

Officers, as have many others with questionable backgrounds.
Participants believe that political pressures to hire large
numbers
of officers militate against
thorou~h
background
investigations and disqualification of unsuitable
officers.
Participants are highly distrustful of younger officers. Several
participants claimed to l1ave personally arrested individuals who

are now Police Officers.
Participants were not optimistic that
the Department will soon change its recruitment and hiring
practices.

Participants' Recommendations:
The Department must resist external political pressures and
focus upon the ideals of impartiality and fairness.
Steps to
limit politicization occurring as
the result of
Co~~unity
Policing must be taken.
Brc·oklyn North should be used as a training ground, not a
dumping ground.
More stringent background investigations must be conducted
on all applicants,
and those with questionable backgrounds must
be eliminated.
Individuals with a criminal history should
receive the greatest scrutiny; the Department should not bear the
burden
of disqualifying such applicants,
but rather
the
individual should bear· the burden of proving his/her
own
suitability.
Project Staffs' Recommendation:
The Department must take immediate affirmative steps
change the deviant identity of Brooklyn Nortl1 officers.

to

I "

~

I

\ 1 ... 1

POLICE CORRUPTION AND

ClJUI'lJRE:

A FOCUS GROUP METHODOLOGY

ItiTRODUC'l'I ON

At
the direction of the Police
commissioner,
the
Corruption Prevention and Analysis Unit (CPAU) of the Internal
Affairs Bureau recently convened a series of twenty-three (23)
Focus Groups to identify and explore some of tl1e prevailing
attitudes, perceptions and opinions of Police Officers toward a
range of integrity-related issues. This research project was
undertaken in recognition of the fact that a great deal of
discretionary police behavior is sl1aped and determined both by
the formal rules and policy directions promulgated by the
organization and by the less formal but perhaps equally potent
demands and constraints of tl1e police occupational culture. In
liaht of the fact that a great deal of police work is not
su6ject to direct supervision and takes place in ambiguous
circumstances, or in situations which may seem to present
ccrr1pelling legitimate cause to deviate from formal policy, an
understanding of police behavior must take these informal
factors into account.
When such behaviors fall within the
realm of ethical conduct, where pressures to deviate from
policy may be magnified, the subcultural determinants of police
behavior take on an increased salience.
While an agency 1 s formal written policies or directives
are
easily discerned and articulated/
the subtler
and
infinitely more complex dynamics of the police subculture are
less amenable to quantification and
comprehension.
Focus
Groups provide an appropriate and viable research methodology
with which to seek a more comprehensive understanding of the
complex determinants of police behavior, espec{ally with regard
to integrity and corruption.
For several decades, Focus Groups have been Hidely used in
the social sciences and in market research to explore, to
describe, and to explain attitudes and behavioral dynamics
which
defy simple quantification.
Focus Groups
are
a
particularly effective research methodology when complex or
multifaceted attitudes and behaviors are the subject
of
inquiry.
Morgan (1988, p. 12) notes, for example, that the
sociologist Robert Merton initially developed Focus Groups as a
means of probing the practical impact and effect of wartime
domestic propaganda efforts upon behavior.
Focus Group methodology entails the formation of a group
typically consisting of twelve (12) to fifteen (15) members
who share some common and relevant attribute(s), and involves a
process of guided group discussion aimed at producing the type
of data and insights which might not be accessed without the

( 15 )
type of interaction found in a group setting.
These
discussions afford
participants
an
opportunity

group
to
respond 1 both individually and as a group, to focused questions
posed by the facilitator/moderator.
Based
UlJOn
these
responses
the
facilitator will frequently refine his/her
questions
to probe more deeply into the issues and opinions
raised,
and to explore their origins and intensity. The group
dynamic also permits participants to question the responses of
others,
or to add important details and clarification to their
own or another's response.
Focus Groups permit the facilitator
to glimpse many of the subtleties and emotional substance which
underlies
specific responses,
and to
draw
appropriate
inferences from them.
As a restJlt,
the facilitator/moderator
is provided with a richer and more refined set of data.
In pointing out the advantages of Focus Group methodology,
Earl Babbie (1992) asserts that the technique is a flexible and
relatively inexpensive means of capturing real-life data about
social behavior,
and that its results have a high degree of
face validity (p.
255).
A guiding principle in social science
research is that data may be considered reliable when 1~ has
both face validity and empirical validity;
the results must
logically appear to make sense without a great deal of
explanation or elaboration,
and essentially similar results
must be obtained from successive groups.
As will be discussed
more fully below,
the data obtained from this series of Focus
Groups meet both these criteria,
and can therefore
be
considered reliable.
Focus Groul? methodology has in recent years come to be
adal?ted for and extensively used in American industry, as well
as
in the public sector,
particularly in
service
of
participative management programs.
These groups, which have
also variously been referred to in the literature as 11 quality
11
circles and 11 ad hoc task forces, 11 have been widely utilized in
Japanese industry, where tl1e remarkable gains made in producing
high quality goods is widely attributed to their use.
Within
the past decade, participative management initiatives in a host
of ~merican police agencies have incorporated .focus groups or
qual1ty circles to improve service delivery,
to streamline
administrative tasks and procedures,
to gather
relevant
information from and stimulate communication among employees,
and to establish cogent practical policies (FBI Bulletin;
Brown, page 18, August 1993).
I t must be emphasized that this series of Focus Groui?S
were not designed or intended to produce specific factual data

( 1 6)

concerning individuals or acts of corruption and misconduct.
Rather,
their
intended goal was to probe the prevalent
att!tude·s t01•1ard corruption within the police occupational
culture and to solicit viable solutions to tl1e integrity
problems
faced by this agency.
The project sought to

capitalize

upon

the

experiences

and

expertise

of

Police

Officers and to determine their perceptions of the Department
and its policies regarding corruption,
as well as their
attitudes and perceptions of other members of the service.
Specifically, the research mandate concerned the identification
of those organizational policies, procedures,
and conditions,

as

~all

as aspects of the police occupational culture which:
facilitate corruption;
inllibit discovery of corrupt activity; or
create opportunities for corruption.

Further, the project sought insight into the prevailing
attitudes, belief systems and behavioral norms which constitute
the contemporary police culture in New York City, in order to
provide the Police Commissioner with accurate current data
which would inform his policy decisions and enhance his
capacity to manage the culture.
Various academic researchers
have studied and expounded upon the critical and pervasive
features of 11 the police culture, 11 to the extent that the term
has teken on a generic quality which assumes that an identical
or highly similar occupational culture characterizes most or
all of American policing.
It must be acknowledged, however,
11
that "the police culture is not a singular or a static entity.
Rather, the occupational culture varies somewhat from agency to
agency, and moreover, the occupational culture within an agency
is in a state of constant evolution as it responds to an
interplay of innumerable factors and forces within the agency
as well as outside it.
Substantive changes in Department
policy, in training and promotional practices 1 and in the work
environment 1 for example, will impact the individual and shared
attitudes of employees.
Similarly 1 a great many of the
attitudes held and shared by officers are reflective of, and
emanate from,
the dominant larger culture 1 s value system.
In
this respect, the admixture of new officers into the agency
will impart to the occupational culture a set of new 1 and
potentially conflicting/
preexisting attitudes and belief
systems.
Although these attitudes and perceptions of the
occupa tiona! culture tend to be quite durable, they are
mediated and modified by their contact and conflict with the
existing attitudes and perceptions of the occupational culture.
The introduction of new or different values \~ill create culture

( 17 )

conflict,

res~lting

in a dialectic process of redefinition and

the emerge11ce of a somewhat different sl1ared value system.
summary,

In

the police occupational culture in a given agency is a

vibrant and vital culture whicl1 responds to a myriad of
and overt forces and pressures.

subtle

Two (2) conclusions emerge from this recognition of
the transitory nature of an agency's occupational culture.
First,
management of the dyna1nics which shape the occupational
culture are within the control of the police executive, holding
open the potential for the executive to shape and direct the
culture's de·..relop:~~cn t.
Recognition must be given to the fact

that virtually every alteration in the work environment will
inevitably
give rise to a corresponding change in
the
occupation~!
culture.
The establishment of the steady tours
concept, for example, to some extent caused officers of similar
backgrounds
and
interests to choose
particular
tours,
concurrently limiting their interaction (and their exposure to
differing attitudes and opinions) with other officers.
As was
evidenced by the stated opinions of successive focus groups, as
well as by the perceptions of the project staff, the Police
Department's
occupational
culture
has
been
somewhat
fractionalized by steady tours - officers simply do not have
the opportunity to interact with members assigned to other
tours, and to some extent each tour with.in a precinct has
developed its own identity.
In time, and under certain
conditions, this isolation may result in the emergence of
separate and quite disparate cultures within the system.
Secondly, we may conclude that much of the research and
conventional wisdom regarding the dimensions and features of
the occupational culture may no longer be valid.
Much of the
academic research concerning police culture, particularly that
body of work relating culture to corruption, was conducted in
the early 1970's.
l<le must acknowledge the tremendous changes
which have taken place since that research was conducted, · and
may need to reconsider some of the assumptions we make
concerning the relationship between culture and corruption.

( 1 8)

i1ETHODOLOGY
Decisions concerning the methodology utilized in the
present research were shaped in response to several operant
constraints and logistic issues.
One of the most salient
issues was the p~oblem of selecting participants wl1o would
reflect a fairly broad range of perspectives and attitudes, at
the same tir.-:e they would provide the project staff with
meaningful and useful information. The project staff were
therefore less concerned ~·;ith achieving a truly random sample
of the entire Department tl1an with obtaining
pertinent
information.
This decision was shaped by the recognition or
ca~eat
that in an empirical sense,
the limited number of
potential Focus Groups would preclude generalizing our findings
and results to the entire population of the agency.
As Morgan
(1988) notes,
the empirical issue of concern in
large
organizations is
sample bias, not generalizability: 40 or so participants
are
never going to be representative of
a
large
population.
This is especially important when one's
research goal is not to test hypotheses but to learn about
others' experiences and perspectives.
Using Focus Groups
to
learn about the full range of
experience
and
perspectives in a broad population can be a fool 1 s errand
(pp.

44-45).

Rather than attempting to discern or measure the full
range of· altitudes and opinions existing within the entire
agency;
including each of its operational,
administrative and
investigative functions 1 project staff narrowed the selection
criterfa to choose subgroups which would be likely to provide
the information most pertinent to our research
attitudes
concerning integrity and corruption within the patrol force.
DEcisions concerning the optimal size of the groups were
again made in light of several logistical and practical
considerations.
According to !·!organ (1988), smaller groups
generally provide greater depth of information and insight, but
overall they tend to be less productive and more costly.
Larger groups pose problems of discussion management and group
control for the facilitator, and important information can also
be lost when participants become distracted by the comments of
others.
Combining
both
practical
and
substantive
considerations, Morgan (1988, pp. 43-44) recommends that groups
not generally exceed twelve
(12)
members,
but that the
moderators over-recruit by about 20% to account for no-shows.

I 19l
A bifurcated methodology,

Groups would be conducted,

in Hhich two ( 2) rounds of Focus

was devised in order to refine both

the dynamics of the process and the collection of data.
Project staff were aware that the advent of steady tours and
the establishment of precinct Community Pol.icing Units in the
past several years !1ave resulted in the formation of four (4)
separate work groups - and to some extent,
perhaps four {4)
separate occupational cultures - in each patrol command. Prior
to the establishment of these concepts, officers assigned to
rotating tours presumably interacted more frequently, if less
intensely, with a larger number of officers, and inevitably the
differential effects of these interactions must have an impact
upon the attitudes and behavioral norms of the work group
subculture.
In order to discern the potential differences in
attitudes among these four (4) subcultures,
four (4) separate
Focus Groups were conducted during the first round - one (1 )
for each of the three (3) platoons, and 011e (1) for co~~unity
Policing Unit officers.
In the first round of Focus Groups,
two ( 2) participants were chosen, in the manner described
below, from each of the seven (7) Patrol Boroughs, as well as
ti"I'O (2) participants from the Detective Bureau.
Thus four (4)
Focus Groups of sixteen (16) participants were scheduled in the
first round.
Participants for the second round of Focus Groups were.
chosen from within the same Patrol Borough, in order to ensure
that each precinct had representation. A total of ten (10)
Focus Groups were held in the second round, one (1) for each of
the
seven ( 7) Patrol Boroughs,
one ( 1 ) cons is l:ing
of
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association delegates, and two { 2)
consisting of Patrol Sergeants. (Note: Patrol Sergeants were
selected in the same manner as the first round of Focus Groups
with two (2) Sergeants selected from each of the seven {7)
Patrol Boroughs).
As noted,
the project staff was less concerned with
achieving a valid statistical sample of the entire Department
than with obtaining useful i11formation.
To that end, several
decisions
were
made concerning selection
criteria
for
participation.
Project staff were concerned that participants
had sufficient ex~erience and familiarity with De~artment
policies and procedures, as well as knowledge of the police
culture and the informal values, attitudes and practices that
culture entails.
Research,
initially and most
notably
conducted by Niederhoffer (1967) and by others who have mor.e
recently replicated or expanded upon his work, indicates that
the attitudes of Police Officers
form in a process of

( 20)

socialization lasting about five (S) years,
and that these
attitudes remain fairly consistent until about the twelfth to

fifteenth

year

recognized

that

of

service:.
the

Moreover,

socialization

the

process

project
for

staff

officers

recruited in the early 1980's was significantly different than
tor those hired prior to the fiscal crisis of the 1970's, and
that the vast majority of Police Officers currently assigned to
patrol fall into the post-1981 hiring cohort.
_In order to
measure,
albeit to a limited extent,
the att1tudes extant

within

the

detective

subculture, the project staff

expanded

the selection criteria to include similarly qualified Detective
r~vestigetors

assigned to Precinct Detective Squads.
Each of
the officers selected to participate therefore met each of the
following criteria:
1.

they were either Police Officers or Detective
Investigators;
2. they were assigned to patrol precincts or Precinct
Detective Squads;
3. they had a minimum of five (5) and a maximum of
twelve (12) years of service in the agency. *(Due to a
notification error made ·by the precinct 1 s roll call clerk, one
officer with only two and one-half years of service, less than
the required minimum, -...·as sent in place of he.r partner, who had
received an unexpected court appearance not~fication).
A last group consisting of Sergeants assigned to Patrol
Services Bureau were randomly selected from all Patrol Boroughs
with no criteria to time in service or rank being considered.
To eliminate sample bias, a pool of approximately one
hundred (100) members who conformed to these criteria were
drawn from the Department's personnel database using a version
of the computer program used to select officers for the Random
Dole Testing program,
adapted to consider the selection
criteria fields. This randomly generated list included members
of each of the seven (7) Patrol Boroughs. Telephone calls were
placed to each Police Officer's command to ascertain assignment
(radio motor patrol or Community Policing Unit, and/or steady
platoon), and to each Detective's squad to ascertain his or her
schedulEd appearance days.
From this master list,
four
(4) separate lists were compiled - one (1) for each of the
three (3) platoons anq. one (1) for the Community Policing Unit
officers. Each list was consulted and two (2) members, either
two (2) Police Officers or a Police Officer and a Detective
Investigator, from each of the seven (7) Patrol Boroughs were

arbitrarily

designated

to appear at the scheduled Focus Group

( 21 )

meeting.
A total of fifty five (55) participants were present
at the following Focus Group meetings:
ROUND 1

Group #

1
2
3
4

u

Date

"

partici~ants

i 4
15
13

08/10/93
08/12/93
08/17/93
08/20/93

.u
55

Male/Female Platoon Bora

10/4
9/6
9/4
1 2/1
40/15

all
all
all
all

CPU
2nd
3rd
lsl:.

A total of ten (10) additional Focus Group meetings took
place during the second round.
Selection criteria
and
selection method (i.e., use of the adapted Random Dole computer
program) remained consistent, however 1 these groups were each
comprised of members from the same Patrol Borough.
As noted,
this process ensured that each of the seventy five (75) patrol
precincts were represented.
In addition,
a Focus Group
comprised of seven (7) PBA Delegates was held,
its members
selected by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association. A total of
one hundred twenty-six (126) participants were _present at the
follOI·.dng Focus Group meetings:

ROUND 2

Group #
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
*13
*14

Date
9/22/93
9/24/93
9/29/93
10/1/93
10/6/93
10/7/93
10/8/93
10/12/93
10/22/93
12/3/93

# participants Male/Female Platoon
13
11
16
10
13
1

16
13
13

--.1..±
126

Bora

2nd
PBBX
7/4
2nd
PBSI
1 3/3
CPU
PBBS
8/2
1st
PBfiS
9/4
3rd
PBMN
7/0 PBA delegates ALL
13/3
1st
PBQ
7/6
3rd
PBBN
2nd
1 1I 2
ALL
1 2 L1 2
2ND
ALL
95/41
8/S

*
(As mentioned previously, a group of randomly selected
Sergeants assigned to the Patrol Services Bureau were assigned
to two (2) additional Focus Groups.
They were from all Patrol
Boroughs and assigned to the second platoon).

( 2 2)

At the direction of the Police Commissioner,
and in order
to gain a more comprehensive and inclusive perspective on the
dynamics of the police culture, a
third round of Focus Groups
was conducted.
'I'hese groups consisted of t1-1o {2)
panels of

fourteen
and two

members assigned to Field Training Units
(2) groups of twelve (12) members assigned

{14)

(FTU's)
to the

Police Academy Recruit Training Section {PARTS),
(Group # 17
consisted of eleven (11) members),
and the findings derived

from these groups are incorporated throughout the body of
report.
(51)

this

A total of four {4) Focus Group meetings with fifty-one
pat·ticipants tr.=ere conducted during the third round.

Selection criteria and selection method (i.e.,
use
of the
adapted Random Dole computer programs) remained consistent
for groups #15 and #16.
Each of these two (2) groups had two
(2) representatives from each of the seven (7) Patrol Boroughs.
Groups #17 and #18 were randomly selected (using a table of
random numbers) by the Police Academy Administrative Unit.
ROUND 3

Group #

Date

15
16
17
18

11/3/93
11/5/93
11/16/93
11/22/93

# participants Male/Female Platoon

14
14
11
11.
51

1 2/2
10/4
11/0

.1.1LJ.

FTU
FTU

P.A .
P.A.

Boro
ALL
ALL
N/A
N/A

44/7

In order to gain insight concerning the perceptions and
attitudes of middle managers within the Department, a series of
Focus Groups consisting of Lieutenants and Captains were
incorporated into a fourth round.
A total of three (3) Focus
Group
meetings with forty-eight (48)
participants
were
conducted during this round.
A
group comprised of thirteen (13) Integrity Control
Officers (!CO's), twelve (12) Lieutenants and one (1) Sergeant
representing the seven (7) Patrol Boroughs was
randomly
selected using a list of !CO's maintained at the Internal
Affairs Bureau.
This group ~-.·as presented with the same issues
as previous groups and also queried about the problems and
conditions indigenous to the position of Integrity cOntrol
Off:i.cer ..

( 2 3)

A Focus Group consisting of twelve (12) Captains assigned
to patrol commands was also conducted.
The members of these
groups were,
predictably, somewhat older and more tenured than
the average participants
in
previous
groups.
Their

perceptions and attit~des tended to generally mirror those of
previous groups, with several exceptions. 1'hese exceptions are
noted throughout this report, under the appropriate issue
selections.
the

A total of thirteen (13) Lieutenarits, representing each of
seven (7) Patrol Boroughs, participated in a Focus Group

session

at which they discussed each of the issues

and

items

presented
to
earlier
groups of
various
ranks.
The
computer-generated random selection method used to choose
participants in previous groups was also used to select these
Lieutenants.
ROUND 4

Groqp ff

Date

ff participants

19

11129193
1217193
12115193

13
13

20

21

_u
48

Hale/Female Platoon Boro

1 2I 1
1 2I 1

.l1Ll

!CO's ALL
Lt' s
ALL
Ca!?t's ALL

3513

A special Focus Group consisting of members of the
Guardians Association was conducted in order to ascertain
whether African-American officers' attitudes and perceptions of
integrity issues differed significantly from those of the
predominantly white focus groups previously held. It should be
noted that in contrast to the random sampling selection method
used to generate participant lists for l:he previous Focus
Groups, these participants were identified and selected by the
Guardians Association's president.
As a r1~sult,
the project
staff cannot conclude with a high degree of certainty that the
attitudes
and perceptions discerned in tl1is sample
are
generally rep·resentative o4 the entire population of AfricanAmerican officers.
A second special Focus Group consisting of members of the
Policewomen's Endowment Association (PEA) was conducted in
order to ascertain whether female officers' attitudes and
perceptions of integrity issues differed significantly from
those of the predominantly male Focus Groups previously held.

It should

be noted that participants were selected by the PEA,

( 24 )

and as with the Guardians Association,
project staff cannot
conclude that the attitudes and perceptions discerned in this
sample are generally representative of the entire population of
female officers.

A total of two (2) Focus Group meetings with

twenty-three

( 23) participants were conducted during the fifth round.
ROUND 5

22
23

"

Date

# participants

12/20/93
12/22/93

14

6/8

__9_

0/9

23

Group

6/17

Male/Female

Group
Gua-cdians

PBA

Boro
All
All

A grand total of three hundred and thirteen (313) members
of the service participated during five (5) rounds of Focus
Groups.
The
actual Focus Group
meetings
followed
a
standardized format designed to elicit comments on a successive
series of issues. A copy of the meeting outline is included as
an Appendix to this report,
and the standardized format
addressed, seriatim, the following issues:
ISSUE
#1
#2
#3
#4
#5
#6
#7
#8
#9

How has the job of Police Officer changed in the past
years?
Are the Department Values reasonable or unreasonable?
What is reasonable and unreasonable about the Department's
Drug Testing policy and procedure?
How do Police Officers define corruption?
What role do integrity tests play in the Department's
anti-corruption efforts?
How do w~ encourage the reporting of corruption?
What are the training needs for police supervisors?
(Question posed to Supervisory Groups)
How effective is corruption training?
Ancillary issues

At each session,
the group facilitator introduced himself
and
gave a brief overview of the project's goals
and
objectives,
stressing the confidentiality of participants'
responses and emphasizing the fact that only one member of the
project staff would be taking notes during the session.
These
notes were made available to the participants after the

I 25 l
meeting,
accuracy

and they were encouraged to scrutinize them for
and for the fact that no identities were mentioned.

Concurrently, the participants were assured that their comments
would be ~assed along to the Police Commissioner as accurately
as possible.
E~ch
participant
was asked
to
briefly
introduce
himself/herself to the group by first name and command, ana co
provide a brief summary of their tenure and experience in the
Department.
As an 1'icebreaker 11 exercise, each participant was

asked to address the question,

11

How has the job changed

since

11

you
began your career?
This relatively ambiguous
and
Ol?en-ended ice-breaker question had a dual purpose:
i 1: set
a
tone of non-tlneatening self-disclosure,
and it b>ermitted
project staff to gather and begin to assess general background
information concerning the overall attitudes and perceptions of
individuals and of tl1e group as a whole.
Following this
initial discussion,
and having set a
positive and relatively trusting tone,
the remaining more
substantive issues were raised and addressed in the order
indicated in the appended outline.

( 26)

ISSUE # 1 Changes within the

Dep~rtment

As an initial 11 icebreaker 11 question, the particiQants 1·1ere
asked to discuss their perceptions of how the job of Police

Officer had changed during their tenure with the Department.
As intended, the open-ended and somewhat ambiguous nature of
this question elicited a broad range of responses relating to
various types and aspects of change the participants had
observed in both the subcultural and task
environments.
Questions were relayed so they addressed both the changes in
the everyday tasks the participants perform and in
the
individuals •t~ith \·lhom they work.
It should also be noted that

despite the range of responses generated 1

several patterns

of

perceptions and attitudes were discerned.
In virtually every
group, the participants identified a similar sat of perceptions
and issues.
The pervasive and- recurring nature of these
patterns across each of the Focus Groups, as well as the
vehemence with which they were expressed, lends credence to the
argument that these perceptions surpass mere opinion:
they
have,
in the participants'
belief system 1
the full weight of
objective reality.
Regardless of the perceptions 1 objective
and
factual
basis,
the
police
occupational
culture
unquestioningly holds them to be true and valid.
One such pattern of perceptions conce·l-ned supervisors 1 and
in particular Sergeants 1 who were frequently seen as lacking fn
interactive communication skills as well as job knowledge.
Supervisors were also criticized for their lack of impartiality
in dealing with subordinates and their poor decision making
skills.
The participants related the paucity of supervisory
skills to several factors 1 including the poor training they
receive at the Police Academy 1 s Basic Management Orientation
Course and the fact that many Sergeants are promoted to their
rank with little street experience.
Many Sergeants were seen
as lacking in the type of maturity \~hich police experience and
general life experience bJ~ings 1 and many officers voiced
resentment at Sergeantsr
failure to treat them as adults.
At
the same time, many of the younger Sergeants were seen as
overly friendly tm.;ard "rookie 11 officers 1 and as catering to
the rookies 1 1'childish and petty 11 requests. Participants noted
that rookies frequently complain about being assigned to a foot
post or assigned to a DOA, and that a supervisor Hill often
accede to these complaints by changing their assignment. These
changes
are often made without regard to seniority
or
experience.
The participants noted that the policy
of
transferring Sergeants after their initial six months is an

( 27}

inadequate period for Sergeants to become comfortable with
knowledgeable about the command and its officers.

of the Sergeants are younger and less experienced than some
the officers they supervise 1

and

Because many

of

they neither appreciate nor honor

various informal Department traditions 1 leading to resentment
among the more tenured officers.
The examples they cited
ranged from the fact that Sergeants often ignore seniority when
assigning officers to sectors

ot·

to "fly 11

to details,

to

the

fact that they permit Police Officers to indiscriminately come
behind the desk. Several Detectives noted that Sergeants often
unnecessarily
exert their authority in a
manner
which
interferes with Detective responsibilities at crime scenes.
Overall,
the participants felt that Sergeants are ove~ly
solicitous to rookies, who have not earned the right to special
favors, and that this has a negative impact on senior officers'
morale.
It should be noted that these perceptions were
particularly apparent among participants assigned to the busier
high crime precincts, where supervisory skills are perhaps most
critical.
It is also note\'/Orthy that the Focus Group of
Sergeants reiterated these same beliefs and
perceptions.
(Discussed further in Issue# 7).
Proposed solutions to the problems with Sergeants included
revision of the Basic Management Orientation Course (which is
viewed as a Patrol Guide refresher course) and the Lieutenants
Orientation Course,
especially ·.-~ith regard to developing
communication skills, leadershir training, and proper procedure
at police incidents.
Participants also recommended raising the
years of service requirement for promotion so that Sergeants
can gain some practical street experience.
Another source of criticism concerned the activities of
precinct Field Training Units.
The general consensus was that
the now-defunct Neighborhood Stabilization Units (NSU 1 s) were
more effective in tra-ining rookies 1
since training
was
conducted by veteran Detective/Field Training Officers. Unlike
the FTU Sergeants,
whose supervisory role demands that they
train rookies solely 11 by the book 11 ,
the Detectives were guided
by experience and expedience,
teaching rookie officers to use
common sense and to handle jobs 11 the right way".
Other
criticisms concerned the fact that currently the Training RMP
is not part of the 911 run-down, so the Sergeants pick and
choose the jobs they want to handle.
In the NSU concept, each
RMP was assigned as a precinct sector, permitting officers to
experience a full range of calls for service.
The FTU system
is seen as stifling the maturity of rookies and preventing them
from having 11 hands-on' 1 experience.
Participants recommended

(28)

eliminating the present FTU system in favor
scheme modeled after the NSU's.

of

a

training

The vast majority of participants were of the opinion that
the

steady

tour

concept

has had

a

severely

negative

and

divisive impact upon their relationships with other officers,
to the extent that four (4) separate precincts (each of the
three (3) platoons and the CPU) have been created in every
command.
Depending upon precinct policy,
CPU Officers may or
may not be used to backfill vacancies in patrol sectors,
exacerbating the existing tensions between patrol officers and
CPU memters.
Patrol officers are resentful of that fact that
they are often in a backlog '..Jhile CPU Officers 11 hc.ve coffee

neighborhood residents, 11 and that CPU Officers often do
not back them up on such dangerous assignments as 11 gun runs. 11
Many patrol officers believed that CPU Officers constitute a
privileged class - their requests for days off or lost time are
more frequently approved, for example, and they are exempted
from 11 flying 11 to details. This sense of privilege is reputedly
being cultivated at the Police Academy, where recruits are told
(reportedly by instructors who are themselves 11 inexperienced
rookies 11 ) both to ignore the advice of veteran officers ( 11 the
veterans only want to get you into trouble 11 ) and that patrol is
not as valuable as the Community Policing Unit. The antagonism
is especially apparent toward rookies in the CPU, whose
requests for days off - particularly holidays - are granted
without regard for seniority.
Patrol officers feel that they
are doing the vast majority of the \'/Ork, and the most dangerous
kind of •~ark.
\dth

Participants also felt that the steady tour concept 11 is
destroying the Job. 11
They no longer see or work with officers
assigned to other tours, and a potent form of social control 11
peer pressure- has been lost. The old adage,
leave it for
11
the four-to-twelve
has become a modus vivendi - because they
no longer see or know the officers on the following tour, many
cops have no regard for the officers on the other tours and
will no longer go out of their way for them.
Prior to steady
tours,
for example, the prospect of working with an officer
from another squad at some future date deterred many minor
transgressions, such as failing to clean out the back seat of
the radio car. The positive aspects of peer pressure have been
lost due to a much smaller work group and the distinct
improbability of having contact with officers from other squads
during the work day.
Otl1er features of this fractionalization
within the commands include the fact that officers miss the
informal locker-room banter and camaraderie they once shared,

(29)

that many small cliques {often revolving

around common age

or

ethnic identity) have emerged, and the fact that fewer officer-s

attend
precinct
parties,
or other
functions.
several
participants suggested that this fractionalization has impacted
officer safety, since an off-duty officer may not be recognized
officers
within his or her O'n'n
commond.
several
participants also suggested that the steady tour concept may
facilitate corruption,
since work groups are smaller and
11
tighter 11 1
and
therefore less amenable
to
supe,rvisory

by

intervention and the detection of misconduct. The emergence of
cliques may also facilitate corruption and inhibit
its discovery by fostering secrecy and creating an implicit or
explicit expectation of protection by other clique members. In
general, the paL·ticipants reported a deep divisiveness within
the culture, and widespread dissatisfaction with the impact
the steady tour concept has had upon the cultural environment.
close-knit

Although the participants voiced dissatisfaction with the
impact of the steady tour concept,
they also agreed that their
private
lives were impacted in a positive
way.
They
recommended that some alternative to the steady tour concept be
implemented.
In particular, they recommended that a ''scooter
chart 11 be available but emphasized that it should be "on a
voluntary basis''.
The Captains were asked to describe the most significant
change occurring within the Department d~ring the course of
their c"areers.
They responded with a variety of trends and
issues 1 including the fact that younger officers today have
less loyalty to the Department and that they do not feel that
they should have to 11 pay their dues" before attaining a choice
assignment.
The Captains saw a general decline in the level
and quality of first-l~ne supervision, a fact they attributed
largely to younger and less experienced Sergeants who lack the
capacity or interest to enforce discipline. The Captains, like
other groups before them, believed that many Sergeants have
become overly friendly with the officers they supervise, to the
detriment
of the Department and its overall
level
of
discipline. Further, they felt that the first-line supervisors
are
relieved
of a great deal
of
responsibility
and
decisfon-making by procedures which require the Duty Captain to
respond to situations which should be handled by the supervisor
at the scene.
The on-scene supervisor should make the
decisions in most of these instances, and he/she should be held
accountable
for
them.
'l'he
trend
to
increase
the
responsibilities of Duty Captains has relieved Sergeants of a
great deal of accountability, placing it instead upon Captains.

(30)

one

Captain

stated

that officers

lack

the

sense

of

humor required to be an effective cop, and that they do not
enjoy their work.
Police work, he said, is supposed to be fun.
Several Captains believed that the implementation of Community
Policing occurred too rapidly, and without proper planning. At
p~esent,
CPU officers reap all the rewards, while officers

assigned to sectors are being

~eglected

and overworked.

One Captain suggested that officers applying for Narcotics
Division undercover positions should first be assigned to
precinct SNEU units for ninety (90) days,
and evaluated there.
SNEU Sergeant~ should also receive OCCB training.

( 31 )

ISSUE # 2 Department Values
Questions were designed to elicit responses concerning the
Department values.
Participants were asked about
their
knoHledge of Department Values, applicability of the values in

the daily performance of their duty, and whether it was
reasonable to expect Police Officers to adhere to these ·values.
It
h'as quite disconcerting to find out that
many
participants were ignorant of the Department Values.
There
were other participants.who indicated a vague recollection that
a Values statement was posted in various Department facilities,
and only a fev1 •,·:ere actually aware of the contents of the
statement.
Even officers stating that they are preparing for

the Sergeants exam generally were unaware of the Department
Values.
In every session it was necessary to restate the
Values and in later sessions to post a sample of the Values in
order to stimulate discussion on this topic.
It should be
noted that groups in Round Three (3) (Police Officers assigned
to FTU' s and the Police Academy) were knowledgeable
of
Department Values.
In fact, the two (2) groups from the Police
Academy relate that Department Values are recited each day at
the beginning of the gym period.
Once the Department Values ·..;ere stated,
each group
concluded that it was reasonable to expect every member of the
service to adhere to them.
Many participants felt
these
Values
were imparted to them early in their developmental
stages by parents 1 teachers, religious leaders and others. The
groups also believed that the vast majority of Police Officers
entered the profession \~ith these values intact, while a few
members entered the Department with a complete lack of values.
The groups unanimously felt that Police Academy training cannot
instill values that are not present in the individual prior to
hire.
Police Academy training was seen as perfunctory. in
regards to ethics related topics;
yet,
the participants
indicated their belief that training cannot develop values
where none previously existed.
There were some members who questioned the purpose of
stating and posting Department Values.
Many participants
believed that the Department Values statement is an extension
of a public relations campaign designed to address community
concerns.
These same officers concluded that the Department
Values have little meaning in their decision making process.

(32 )

Controversy

and

criticism concerning

Department

Values

arose when some participants expressed what they believed to be
contradictions between policy and practice.
While Department
Values state ·that we will '' ... aggressively pursue violators of
the law,'' in [)ractice, selective enforcement curtails what are
generally
considered aggressive law enforcement
efforts.
References to overtime constraints were used to illustrate a

perceived notion that an aggressive law enforcement policy
secOndary to monetary considerations.

is

The majority opinion was that the public is unaware of the
complexities of policing in New York City and expressed the
need for public education on this
issue.
Generally,
the
participants were supportive of the Department's ''NEW YORK CITY
COPS CARE" advertising campaign and expect it will have long
term positive effects.

(33)

ISSUE # 3 Department Drug Testing Policy
In discussing the Department's
questions 1.,rere pr:epared that would

underlying

drug testing
policy,
assist in determining

feelings concerning the administration of the

Dole

Test.
Participants were asked about their knowledge
of
Department procedures,
the reasonableness of the current
policy,
their satisfaction with safeguards ond their opinions

concerning entry tests, tests for cause, and random tests.
In the early stages of each Focus Group discussion it was
evident
that there were many
misconceptions about
the
Oepartment 1 s drug testing policy.
Participants did
not
11
understand
terms
such
as "random 11
and
for
cause. 11
t-1isinformation about laboratory procedures and handling of
evidence clouded the discussion.
A brief synopsis of the
Department's policy v1as p~·esented to clarify issues and move
the discussion along.
Each of the Focus Groups displayed an intolerance of drug
use by members of the service.
Their position was strongly
stated that the Department should do all it can to seek out
members who use drugs and remove them from police service.
Their positions were firm on terminating any member, regardless
of reason and seniority 1 who uses drugs.
Some members believe
that the Department, prior to termination,
should offer
rehabilitation to any member using drugs.
Upon completion of a
program,
however,
the member's services should be terminated.
A small minority of participants suggested that pension rights
should be preserved for members so qualified.
A.
Entry Level Tests - Drug screening tests for police
applicants was overwhelmingly accepted by each Focus Group_
Participants felt that applicants should be subjected to
multiple random tests prior to being hired.
The current
procedure \'/here an applicant is notified weeks in advance that
he/she is scheduled for a medical examination which includeS a
drug screening test was criticized.
Many participants felt
that prior recreational drug use should automatically preclude
an applicant from being hired.
Drug screening tests used as a prelude to promotion or
entry into a specialized unit was also widely accepted as
members continued to Voice opposition with working with anyone
who uses illegal drugs. This opposition to drug use by other
members derived both from individual safety concerns 1 as well
as from the frequently stated position that Police Officers

(34)
should be a

11

CUt

above 11

the general public,

who are viewed as

immersed in the drug culture.
B.
For Cause Tests - Drug screening tests for cause met 1.,.ith
unanimous approval by each of the Focus Groups.
While some
group members stated that a level of proof less than reasonable
suspicion should be used to order a test,
other mernbers were
concerned about the violation of individual rights.
Although
the protection of Police Officers' rights was an issue it
seemed that the group's hard stance of 11 zero tolerance 11

outweighed

their concern about a violation of an

individual's

rights.
There
were a few
instances,
however,
where
participants felt that an unchecked system of 11 for cause 11
testing would lead to other violations of individual rights by
the Department.

c.

Random Tests - Their misinterpretation of the random
testing procedures not withstanding, each group supported
random drug screening tests.
Group concerns were centered on
the possibility of human error and false positives in the
testing process.
Those members who have been subjected to
random testing all stated they were satisfied with
the
Department's efforts to maintain proper custody and handling of
samples.
Labor a tory procedures however, Here questioned and
confidence in lab technicians were at the heart of their
concern.
An on-site lab test with rapid results was suggested
by a few group members.
The individual would be informed of
the results and if there were any problems (a claim of a false
positive) additional tests could be performed to resolve the
issue.
Each group suggested an increase in the number of
random
tests.
The suggested increase ranged from
25%
(currently the Department tests 20%) to 100%.

Suggestions were made to conduct random testing in the
field rather than at Health Services.
The suggestion was for
Health Services to randomly select a command and a platoon
within that command for testing.
Personnel would be tested
during
roll call with a minimum disruption
of
patrol
capabilities.
Although these suggestions must be evaluated against many
different standards, the strong stance against drug use and the
suggestions to increase the number of random tests is more
significant than the m·ethods suggested.
It is recommended that
information concerning the randomness of j:.esting,
the chain of
custody and testing procedures, and the results of drug tests
be more widely disseminated throughout the Department. To

( 35 )
allay the Police Officers'
suspicions about the accuracy of
laboratory
testing and the potential for
misidentifying
samples,
a brief video presentation should be viewed by all
Police Officers.
The
presentation
can
be
made
at
Borough Based
training and can be repeated at Health

Services prior to the administration of a drug screening

test.

The video should contain up-to-date information about drug
screening tests and can be used in conjunction with other
training currently being considered by the Drug Prevention Task
Force.
To a greater extent than had been found in
comprised
of
less-tenured
officers,
the

Lieutenants

were

of the strong opinion

tl1at

Focus Groups
participating

pension

rights

should be preserved for those members with twenty (20) years of
service who test positive in the random drug testing program.
Moreover,
several participants were of the opinion that a drug
rehabilitation program,
similar to the programs currently
available to members who abuse alcohol,
should be available to
drug
users.
Regardless of whether these
members
are
subsequently
dismissed or retained,
several
Lieutenants
believed that drug rehabilitation should be made available.
Their opinion regarding the preservation of pension rights
seems to be reflective of a general trend among more-tenured
officers regardless of ranK:
perhaps because they have a
greater investment in their pension and their career,
both
financially and in terms of their years of service, older
officers tend to be more concerned with the possibility of
losing their vested pension rights.
As a corollary,
the older
officers concurrently articulate less faith in the potential
deterrent effect of harsh sanctions for drug abuse than do
younger officers.
With regard to the Department 1 s drug testing policies, all
the participants of the Captains Focus Group agreed that the
process was basically sound, but most indicated that the number
or percentage of officers tested under the random procedure
should be increased.
Several participants also favored the
development of a drug rehabilitation policy prior to dismissal,
and a few indicated that members should be given one chance to
enter a rehabilitation program and remain in the employ of the
De(.Jartment.
No second chance should be afforded to drug
users.
Consistent with their tenure and the trend observed
among other tenured officers,
several members of this group
also tended to favor a guarantee of pension rights, although
others in the group were in adamant opposition to
pension
retention.
They appeared to be about equally divided on this

'

( 3 6)

issue.
The participants also indicated
that
increased
unannounced random screening of candidates should take place
during,the applicant investigation process;

they observed that

the cuirent practice of scheduling medical exams up to one

{1)

month
in
advance might permit some
candidates
enough
forewarning to 11 clean themselves up" prior to the test.
The
Captains also proposed that large groups of officers be
randomly tested en masse, perhaps testing entire platoons

within
They

a. precinct or while officers attend the Outdoor
evinced

no

concern 1

cynicism or

difficulty

Range.

with

the

procedural aspects of the current policy.
The Focus Group consisting of members of the Guardians was
also queried as to their opinions regarding the reasonableness
of the Department's drug testing procedures.
The participants
generally agreed that office:rs who are detected using drugs
should ·be terminated, regardless of the seniority or prior
disciplinary
record.
About one quarter· { 1 /4)
of
the
participants in this group stated that notwithstanding the
termination policy,
the pension rights of members who had
achieved twenty {20) years tenure in the agency should be
preserved.
The participants voiced numerous concerns that the
Department does not follow its own procedures in many drug
testing cases,
specifically in regard ·to the chain of custody
for urine samples.
Participants recounted incidents in which
they alleged that urine samples had been left unattended for
several hours on a window sill,
and female officers who were
permitted to provide their sample while unobs·erved.
Other
participants stated that the Organized Crime Control Bureau did
not always adhere to its own detoxification and sick leave
policies regarding undercover officers who were forced to
ingest a controlled substance. These. officers were allegedly
told to continue in their undercover activities so that
on-going cases 'muld not be compromised,
and it was alleged
that at least one (1) such undercover officer was subsequently
fired for drug use after having been initially
refused
detoxification treatment by the De~artment.
It must. be
em~hasized
that with the exception of general concerns about
chain of custody 1 previous Focus Groups raised none of these
issues.
The participants also contended that the random drug
testing procedures are not truly random,
and asserted that
minority individuals have been singled out for testing without
cause, under ·the guise of random selection. Participants also
evinced a belief that ,.,hite superior officers have been
notified in advance of an impending random test, and have been
permitted to quietly retire prior to testing.
In general,
the
~articipants
appeared to believe that both the random and

'

I 37 l
for cause 11 drug testing policies are regularly used l.:.o target
minorities, and that a tacit double standard exists.
11

Members of the Policewomen 1 s End01'o'ment Association Focus
Group concurred with members of previous Focus Groups in
asserting that the use of illicit drugs by rnembers of the
service cannot be condoned or tolerated,
and l:.hat
the
Depart-ment's current dl-ug testing pclic'l requires little or no
modification.
Several members of the group indicated a belief

that the current policy does not adequately address the problem
of anabolic steroid use,
and they believed that alcohol abuse
is a far greater and more pervasive problem than drug abuse.
As a group,
they maintained that the number or percentage of
members tested urlder ll1e Random Dole Testing prccedure should
be increased,
and that the Department sl1ould test for steroid
use as
""'ell as for cne more COtrtmon narcotic drugs.
In
particular,
this group felt that younger officers should be
tested more frequently during their probationary ~eriod.
To a
greater extent than was evident in other groups,
these
participants tended to suQport the concept of providing drug
rehabilitation for members prior to termination for drug abuse.
This group did not raise the issue of forced ingestion of
narcotics among members assigned to OCCB as the Guardians 1
Focus Group had,
but upon the project staff 1 s
inquiry they
stated that in such situations some women may be reluctant to
report forced
ingestion for fear that they would lose their
hard-won OCCB assignment.

(38)

ISSUE # 4

Definin~orruption

Focus
Group
participants had
some
difficulty
in
articulating a precise definition of police corruption.
This
difficulty arose primarily from the fact that 11 Corruption 11 is a
fairly ambiguous term which can be used in several contexts 1

has multicle co~nctations, and is often mistakenly equated with
misconduct 1 as well as from the fact that it deals with ethical
issues which
are often not easily
articulated.
After
carefully guiding and structuring the questions posed to the
group,
the facilitators were able to obtain a fairly detailed

understanding of the types of behavior Police Officers consider
to be corrupt.

To achieve this understanding, the participants

\.,ere asked to provide examples of behavior that \Yould and would
not constitute police corruption.
Virtually all of the participants agreed that a Police
Officer 1 S commission of a criminal act, as defined in the Penal
Law 1 constitutes corruption.
Further, they stated that any
behavior in which a Police Officer actively seeks a specific
personal gain or benefit by virtue of the fact that he/she is a
Police Officer- clearly constitutes corruption. Officers tended
to
agree that the implicit or explicit expectation
of
reciprocity
the quid pro quo - is a critical factor in
determining whether an act is corrupt. Participants were quick
to address the issue of corruption by unanimously pointing out
that they do not believe the acceptance of a free or discounted
meal is cm:ruption.
In the case of a free cup of coffee,
officers strongly agreed that a cup of coffee ''freely given and
freely taken'' is not corruption. \'?hen
however
the officer
believes that the benefit is accompanied by some overt or
unstated expectation of reciprocity - that he/she will or will
not do their job in return for the benefit
it becomes
corrupt.
The participants
cited
the
scenario
of an
officer entering an establishment witl1 no intention of paying
as an example of corruption, but were less adamant about
receiving a discount they had not expected or demanded.
It is
well worth noting that the participants evinced a strong belief
that they were capable of comprehending when an implicit
expectation occur.red, and stated lhat they would not accept any
benefit under such circumstances.
1

1

Participants had great difficulty separating an offer of
free coffee (or other repast) in a social setting and a
non-social setting.
Officers were unable to clearly see the
difference
between
the
two
settings.
References
to

( 39 )
''friendships"

established over a period or c.1me were

illustrate the belief that free
offered and accepted unencumbered.

or

discounted

used

meals

to

were

It is also worth noting that most of the participants were
unaware

of tl1e Board of Ethics ruling regarding a free cup of
coffee 11 and light repast'' in a social setting.
They agreed
that this and any subsequent rulings should be vigorously
disseminated to members of the service.
The participaJlts also
stated that the Internal Affairs Bureau should not be concerned
with these and other "minor" infractions, t·!hich clearly fall
outside their definition of corruption.
Although they were
skeptical of the abilities and the motivations of Internal
Affairs Bureau investigators,
the participants seemed to favor
the notion of a strong ar.d effective Internal Affairs function
1--1hich would concentrate on 11 real 11 corruption, rather than the
petty infractions which they believed \·:ere the rnain focus of
concern.
In their view, Internal Affairs Bureau investigators
have poor investigative skills and little experience or regard
for officers on the street.
In terms of providing an operational definition
of
corruption,
the participants in the ICO Focus Group generally
agreed with members of previous groups in asserting that Police
Officers can be considered corrupt when they commit criminal
acts or use their positions and powers as Police Officers to
obtain some substantive personal benefit. T~ey did not consider
such minor acts of deviance as accepting a free cup of coffee
to constitute a corrupt act, although they agreed that such
behavior was a violation and might, in some circumstances,
constitute corruption. As was evident in previous groups, the
ICO's believe that the individual officer's intent in accepting
free coffee is a critical factor in their definition of
corruption: they consider officers who actively pursue or
solicit free coffee or free or discounted meals to be ethically
compromised and perhaps, in a technical sense,
corrupt.
Nevertheless, they do not aQpear to feel that such ethical or
legal violations are particularly egregious offenses.
The Captains broadly defined corruption in terms of an
officer taking something to which they are not entitled, and
they favored a
fairly subjective standard in evaluating
whether an act such as free coffee is corrupt.
Each incident
should be judged, they said, on its individual merits and the
factual circumstances surrounding the situation,
and the
specific intent of the officer should be assessed in ~aking

( 40 i

this determination.
They felt that free coffee and small
amounts of food (i.e., "a light repast 11 ) have historically been
seen as a form of social interaction, and would be more
acceptable than the acceptance of free merchandise or non-food
items, irrespective of their cost.
concurrently, though, they
called for a more definitive and less ambiguous response on the

part

of

the

agency to acts which are

deemed

corruption

or

mi.scc.1.d~•ct.

One Ca!?i:.ain stated,
and the others concur-red 1
that the
Department's policies toward corruption are not in synch with
some of its other policies.
He stated,
for example,
that the
D~?~rtment
requires precinct commanders to convene an annual

Fellowship Breakfast, providing about $360.00 for this event,
an entirely insufficient amount in some commands.
Commanders
are constrained to rely upon the good graces of local caterers
or meeting halls to provide a suitable venue, and they must do
the best they can to provide a breakfast meal.
Consequently,
the commanders have little credibility when they admonish their
officers not .to accept free or discounted meals, coffee or
other favors from local businesses or residents. Such policies
breed cynicism and foster the perception of a double standard
for superior officers.
The opinions and attitudes of the Guardians Focus Group
members, as they specifically relate to the definition of
corrupt activitY: did not differ markedly from the opinions
expressed in other groups.
As in other groups, these participants had difficulty in
offering
a
precise
definition
of
police
corruption.
Involvement with drugs and drug trafficking, as well as the
receipt of bribes and gratuities, were certainly seen as
corrupt activities.
Some debate surrounded the question of
free coffee and/or doughnuts as corrupt activity.
The members of the PoliceHomen' s Endo·...·r.-.ent Association
Focus Group were no I"ess able to offer a clear operational
definition of cor~uption than were previous groups.
In
general, they felt that ·the theft of anything of value, the use
of police poHers or authority to realize a personal gain, or
the
commission of an illegal act can be construed
as
corruption.
They did state, though, that a 11 free cup of
coffee 11
is
acceptable so long as no
ex!:)ectations
of
preferential treatment accompany it. The PEA Focus Group
members Here also of the opinion that dxug abuse by a member is
likely to lead to further corruption.

l4 1 ).

ISSUE # 5 Intearity Testing

Random

and targeted integrity tests were

discussed

with

each group.
ouestions were geared to determine if integrity
tests were pe;ceived as reasonable or unreasonable.
The
Department's right to conduct tests and the level of intrusion
was also discussed with each group.

A. Targeted Tests.
Targeted integrity tests were widely
accepted by each group as a legitimate investigative tool.
Participants were sup\?ortive of ''sting" operations designed to
catch individuals who the Department "reasonably suspects" to
bs involved in ccrru~t activities.
A few members expressed
conce.r:n cbout being "in the ·.-~rong place" when a targeted
individual was tested and questioned whether they would be
subjected to sweeping disciplinary action for minor violations
{SCAN
[Stop
Corrupt
Activities
Now,
an
aggressive
anti-corruption program that resulted in numerous Command
Disciplines for minor administrative infractions} activities
were cited).
Other participants felt that if an entire
precif1.ct o.r command \>./ere targeted many 11 good 11 Police Officers
would be subjected to disciplinary action even if they were not
involved in corrupt activity.
There \o.~as some concern about being present during a
''test'', observing a violation and not reporting the violation
to the Internal Affairs Bureau.
Some offic.ers expressed great
reluctance to report deficiencies, even serious ones (this
topic will be· discussed at greater length in Issue #6). There
were some officers who complained that integrity tests made
Police Officers suspicious of each other and hindered them in
the performance of their duty, while other officers viewed
integrity tests as a method of keeping everyone ' 1 on their
toes 11 •
After discussing several different tests each group
favored an increase in targeted testing to catch
those
individuals who engaged in criminal conduct.

B. Random Tests - Participants were split on their opinions ·of
random integrity tesl:s.
'I-he majority opinion -was favorable
with officers relaying numerous personal and second hand tales
of Internal Affairs Bureau tests (many reported tests are not
substantia ted in Department records) . These officers felt that
random tests v10uld deter some members of the service from
ignoring Department procedures and taking short cuts.
Random
tests ho\o.~ever, \o.~ere not considered to be a deterrent for hardcore corrupt cops.
The minority opinion revolved around the issue of lack of
trust. These participants felt that random tests questioned

.,

( 4 2)

their

integrity

and

were

therefore insulting.

Some members

expressed concern at being ''entrapped'' by random tests while
others complained of being taken off patrol to process false
calls
for service.
Even officers expressing the minority
opinion concluded that random tests r~ight be necessary to keep
some officers honest and most agreed that continued testing is

a ''necessary evil''.

Virtually

all of the Captains agreed that the

Department

should pursue some form of random and directed inte.gri.ty
testing,
but feelings were mixed regarding the advisability of
a tangible re~tard system for those members who pass such random

tests.
Tl1ey were less opposed to including mention of having
passed an integrity test in an officer's Confidential Personnel
Index (CPI) file,
or a letter to that effect in the officer's
personnel folder.
Members of the Guardians Focus Group were also surveyed
regarding their opinions of the role of integrity tests in the
Department's
overall
anti-corruption
strategy.
The
participants agreed that targeted tests used to investigate
specific allegations of corruption are useful and appropriate.
Only
two (2) participants approved of random tests,
with the
remainder objecting on the grounds that such tests Nere
insulting and a waste of ti1ne.
All participants related
concerns that both random and targeted integrity tests may be
used to unfairly target minority members.
Members of the Policewomen 1 s Endowment Association Focus
Group stated that integrity tests are a positive and useful
strategy for the Department to pursue 1 so long as the tests do
not focus on minor misconduct and petty issues.
They compared
the need for integrity tests with the need for Random Dole
Testing, asserting that they are necessary and worthwhile, and
participants stated that they would not be insulted if they
learned that they had been the subject of a random or directed
integrity test.
The participants raised the notion that s·ome
members may appreciate knowing that they had been tested,
if
such notification takes the form of a 11 pat on the back.''
They
indicated a belief that officers will perform better if the
Department shows
them respect and re;-,ards
them for proper
performance of their duties,
and they believed that the
favorable results of random integrity tests should be placed in
members' CPI files in order to offset some of the predominately
negative data which· currently comprises those files.
The
members of thiS Focus Group also recommended that the Internal
Affairs Bureau track those individuals who make
chronic
corruption complaints against officers.

'

( 43)

ISSUE # 6

Reporting Corruption

Within any organization, occupation or profession,
the
individual ethical decision whether or not to officially report
misconduct or corruption is constrained by a variety of
factors, inclu~ing the potential for social ostracism, personal

reluctance to breach ()t:ganizational or cultural norms against
disclosure, and in some cases, fear for oner s personal safety.
In the subculture of policing,
these contraints may be
magnified by its members'
high need for group identity and
affiliation, by. tha strength of the culture 1 s disclosure norms,
and by cne inherent dangers of police work which create a
compelling need for
l:.he support and trust of one's fellow
cfficers.
These and other factors in the police occupational
culture,
taKen os a whole, are frequently and generically
referred to in the common vernacular as 11 the blue wall of
silence.'' This term is ty!?ically used in a disparaging manner,
especially by those critics who lack a firm understanding of
the forces and pressures which create and shape it, as well as
of its extent and dimensions. As was evidenced by the comments
of Focus Group participants, t.he 11 blue woll 11 is not an entirely
i~surmountable
or monolithic impediment to the disclosure of
organizational deviance, but rather it has many intricate
cracKs and gaps.

The consensus of opinion in most of the Focus Groups was
that officers are highly reluctant- to report acts of corruption
or misconduct.
In the more egregious cases,
for example an
officer engaged in stealing or selling drugs, most participants
related that if they would report these instances they would
only do so anonymously.
One (1) group,
(PBA delegates)
however, stated somewhat anomalously that they would not
hesitate to identify themselves in reporting a rogue officer
for 11 serious'' corruption - a cop who sells drugs,
they said,
"is a perp,
not a CO!?, and deserves to be collared."
Interestingly,
several participants stated that if
they
observed such c:ciminality they ;.:ould make an arrest themselves
rather than notify the Internal Affairs Bureau,
and that by
taking this action they would encounter less risk of ostracism
than if their anonymous report were somehow made public
knowledge.
Within the police culture,
it appears that the
cloak
of
anonymity connotes venality and
deceit,
b1o
(2 )attributes which are anathema to the culture.
Officers 'tlho
are ' 1 up front 11 in their actions may be less likely to incur the
wrath of others, or may encounter a lesser degree of ostracism.
In less serious instances, though (for example, free meals),

'

(44)

participants

stated that by identifying tl1emselves they ran

a

risk of ostracism and in some cases reprisals from other
officers.
Interestingly 1
the project staff noted that those
officers \·1ho stated most vocally that the prospect of ex[?osure
would not deter them from reporting corruption or from taking
individual action,
concurrently appeared to be tne most
self-confident of t!1e parti~ipants, and those with the greatest
status in their groups.
If the project staff's perception is
accurate,
and if these high status officers can be encouraged

to speak out on corruption 1
terms
of
attitudes.

shaping

the

significant inroads can be made in

occupational

cultures 1

prevailing

Extremely serious allegations including drugs and weapons
not viewed differently by most of the participants.
M~mbers
were consistent in their reluctance to officially
report these transgressions. Officers were of the opinion that
the
discovery
and the official reporting
of
criminal
allegations and serious misconduct would not elevate them in
tile eyes of their peers. These officers believed they would be
perceived as 11 rats 11 , not to be trusted. The consensus was that
if an individual re~orted serious matters they would likely
report minor infractions as well.
The fear of being labeled a
11
rat" and subsequently divorced from the police culture has a
seemingly pm.,.erful, negative impact upon report.ing corruption.
~ere

Physical fear surfaced several times during the discussion
on reporting corruption.
There were numerous references made
about rogue Police Officers (Michael Dowd in particular) having
contacts Ytith violent drug gangs and other organized crime
figures
and having access to confidential and
personal
information.
It is this combination that caused concern among
many of the officers who raised this point.
Some officers were
not necessarily concerned with their own safety,
but they were
concerned for the well being of their family.
The Focus Group of Patrol Sergeants were split on their
responscis to report corru~lion.
Half of the group indicated
they
would report corruption (criminal acts or
serious
misconduct} while the ot.her half of the group indicated they
would only report corruption anonymously.
It is interesting to
point out that Patrol Sergeants share the Police Officers
definition of corruption (see Issue# 4}.
Participants also spoke of the fact that the Department,
and in particular, the Internal Affairs Bureau 1
frustrate them
from being as honest as they would like to be. If they fail to

( 45 )
report corruption 1 or if corruption occurs around them, it is
not because they approve of it or are ambivalent to it. Ratl1er,
the potential costs of 11 going public 11 1 even in regard to

egregious offenses, are too high. They are afraid of being seen
as having cast their lot with the Internal Affairs Bureau 1 an
insidious enemy which lacks credibility and which treats even
the most honest officers unfairly and with suspicion.
Participants related their suspicions of the Internal
Affairs Bureau's processes to ensure confidentiality- several

suggested that members of the Internal Affairs Bureau would not
be

averse

to "burning"

an ofCicer who

made

a

confidential

report.
At least four (4) of the groups queried as to the
integrity of the Internal Affair Bureau's Action Desk and the
true anonymity of a caller's identity expressed skepticism.
Thev believed that the r.,odern technologies of "Caller ID 11
and. voice identification could or would be useci to· determine a
caller's identity.
Most of the participants were unfam2~1ar
with the Department's corruption hot line- 212-CORRUPT (or the
new
1-800-PRIDE-PD).
Participants
suggested
that
the
Department initiate an aggressive information campaign to
publicize and promote the new 1-800-PRIDE-PD number, and to
assure
the public
as ,.,ell
as
officers
that
Caller
Identification
technology was not being
used.
Several
participants favored an on-going precinct dialogue program with
members of the Internal Affairs Bureau as a means to sensitize
officers from both groups to the objectives and goals of the
other.
Other participants suggested the strong need for the
Internal Affairs Bureau to change its image and its methods of
operation. In particular, they vocally criticized the Internal
Affairs Bureau custom of issuing 11 no hats" and 11 Hhite socks 11
complaints, characterizing this practice as 11 playing a numbers
game 11 at the expense of hard Harking honest officers.
The Internal Affairs Bureau has been associated with a
willingness
to close out serious allegations either
as
LLUnsubstantiated" or as LLOI:hcr Misconduct Noted,
through
issuance of a Command DisciQline for minor
administrative
infractions.
Officers are concerned that tl1ese notations
remain on their Central Perso~nel Index file and may be used to
unfairly deny them detail assignments or promotions.
:Some
characterized 11 Unsubstantiatedll case closures as evidence of
ineffective Internal Affairs Bureau investigators and
of
attempts to bolster performance indicators, even 1-,1hen a more
complete investigation might result in exoneration. Although

( 46 )

project
staff
explained
that
administrative
violation
complaints are no longer issued by the Internal Affairs Bureau,
many participants remained skeptical. They will believe it,
they said, 11 when they see it.,,

It

was

evident

that trust plays a pivotal

role

in

an

officers'
decision to report corruption.
Official
and
anonymous repo~-ting appears to be directly correlated to the
level of trust an individual has in the Internal Affairs Bureau
and the confidentiality of the reporting system.
Notwithstanding this essential caveat,
two (2)
frequent
and enduring features of the police occupational culture which

have

frequently been noted in connection with

corruption

are

loyalty and secrecy.
The etiology of these features are
extremely complex, and their dimension and boundaries can again
be expected to vary over time and in regard to specific
circumstances.
Moreover, the larger culture outside the police
agency provides support for loyalty norms among peers in any
group,
and the larger culture's antipathy toward informers and
11
rats 11 has also been imported into the occupational culture,
where the realities of policey work create a crucible in which
loyalty and secrecy norms are 1amplified and expanded.
Loyalty
and secrecy norms in the police occupational culture derive
from several sources, including the close physical proximity in
1.,hich Police Officers frequently work for extended periods, the
real and perceived dangers of police work,
and the inevitable
social isolation and alienation engendered by assuming the
police role in society.
These and other forces conspire to create a strong sense
of mutual interdependence and affinity among officers, and to
facilitate the creation of a powerful loyalty ethic.
In
itself, the loyalty ethic is a highly functional and beneficial
attribute which usually contributes significantly to
the
org_anization's· pursuit of legitimate goals and objectives.
Taken to the extreme, however, this loyalty to fello1-1 officers
can conflict with and in some cases overwhelm the officer's
sense of loyalty to the organization and to the rule of law.
In the extreme, this misplaced loyalty may induce some officers
to protect other deviant officers from official discovery.
When conflict occurs between loyalty to the organization and
loyalty to fellow officers,
the informal subcultural ethic may
prevail,
and some officers may close :ranks behind
the
proverbial 11 blue wall of silence 11 •

It should be emphasized that the prevalence and scope of
the 11 blue wall 11 of secrecy are frequently overstated by casual
observers of police culture 1 .particularly by those whose
critical orientation or agenda overpowers their objectivity.
These critics are usually eith~r ignora_nt of or unconcerned
with the positive and functional aspects of loyalty and its
contriblJtion to the attai11me11t of legitimate goals.
Too
frequently perhaps 1
unrestrained or draconian efforts to
destroy the occasional emergence of excessive secrecy has
unforeseen deleterious impact upon the loyalty ethic 1
and
ultimately both
the organization and the public suffers the
effects.
A more cogent strategy is for the police
executive
to carefully monitor and manage the conaJ.cJ.ons under Hhich
secrecy can flourish 1 conconitantly nurturing the positive
elements of group and organizational loyalty.
The Integrity Control Officers wl1o participated in the
Focus Group were very suprised that officers in previous Focus
Groups were reluctant to officially report corruption, even
when the offenses involved were of the order of those committed
by Michael Dowd.
They stated that they would not hesitate to
officially report such behavior if they became aware of it, and
they seemed to genuinely believe that most officers in their
commands would also report such corL·uption without hesitation.
The project staff surmises that the !CO's avowed willingness to
take acc1on in such cases is a function of their rank and
position 1
and its attendant role definitions:
the supervisory
and ICO roles encompass and demand the repoL"ting of corruption 1
and 110 expectations of complicity or silence is placed upon
them.
While both the task en•tironment of the patrol officer
and the dynamics of the SLJecific 11 patrol officer culture' 1
operate to encourage solidarity and to discourage officers from
scrutinizing too closely the behavior of their peers/
these
features are not a part of the supervisory role.
Supervisors 1
particularlY ICO's 1 are not expected by their peers or by their
subordinates to remain silent in the face of misconduct or
corruption.
Moreover 1
their functional exclusion from the
specific 11 patrol officer culture 11 tends to immunize them from
the subtle or overt sanctiqns that culture might impose, simply
stated, supervisors and !CO's are expected to report misconduct
and corruption 1 and they have little to lose by doing do.
The Lieutenants participating in this Focus Group stated
that they would have no problem reporting an officer 1.,hose
corrupt activities were of the type evident in the Michael Dowd
case, and they were unconcerned with any repercussions which
might result from reporting such an officer.
Again, the

(48)
project team
repercussions
role. Unlil<e
supervisory
complicity.

members attribute this lack of concern with
or social stigma to the Lieutenants' supervisory
those steeped in the patrol officer culture, the
role entails no expectation of
silence
or
On the contrary, their own social reference group

as ~~ell as the patrol officer culture expects them to
any corruption or misconduct coming to their attention 1

without regard to the severity or extent
corruption.

It

is

Lieutenants

important

to

emphasize

report
almost

of that misconduct or

that

the

participating

believed quite strongly that the average

officers

would have little difficulty reporting corrupt acts committed
by peers.
The Lieu tenants 1 like the Integrity
Control
Officers 1 and Sergeants~ groups which preceded t.hem 1 were quite
suprised and dismayed when the project staff informed them that
Police Officers convey a great reluctance to report corruption.
Several
important implications may be drawn
from
this
misperception among supervisory personnel.
It is alarmingly apparent that our supervisory personnel
are dreadfully out of touch with the opinions and attitudes of
those they supervise 1 and it is unlikely that integrity is the
only sphere in which such misapprehensions occur.
Given the
significance and gravity of integrity and corruption prevention
within the agency,
though, it should be quite reasonable to
expect that superior officers would have an accurate perception
of subo~dinates attitudes and beliefs in this area if they
regularly discussed integrity matters with their subordinates.
At least three (3) potential inferences can be drawn from the
disparity between patrol officers' self-reported attitud;es and
their supervisors' perceptions of those attitudes.
First, we might infer that supervisors do not regularly
engage in dialogue with their subordinates regarding integrity
and corruption, either from a lack of concern or because they
do not appreciate the gravity of the issue or its consequences.
Implicit in this proposition is the viable assumption that
patrol officers are culturally constrained not to
raise
integrity-related issues, while supervisors are complacent
about it;
the Focus Group findings tend to support the
hypothesis that neither 91-oup feels compelled to raise or
discuss the matter openly and honestly.
This supervisory
complacency may be explained as an artifact of the supervisors'
tenure in the department 1 particularly if we are inclined to
accept the view that the types and the extent of corruption

( 49)

existing today were less prevalent when older supervisors were
Police Officers.
Many of today's Lieutenants and senior
sergeants were, in fact 1 products of the era immediately
post-Knapp 1
\4hen drug-related corruption was
much
less
prominent and when tremendous attention was paid to shielding
officers from exposure to corruption.
It is tl1erefore quite
logical to expect that the cadre of officers who entered cne
Department during and after the era of Knapp reforms would have
a markedly different view of the potential extent of corruption
than those who entered fifteen (15) or twenty (20) years later.

In the alternative, we might surmise that such dialogue
does occur, but that patrol officers actively mislead their
supervisors into believing that they would report acts of
corruption or serious misconduct coming i:.o cneir ai:.lention.
This unlikely scenario assumes, without credible evidence, that
a pervasive form of conspiracy to mislead supervisors exists
among patrol officers.
Finally, we might infer that when such dialogue occurs, it
is of a .superficial and pro forma nature, and that little real
attention is paid to the substantive issues involved.
This
proposition, Hhich is supported by informal observations as
well as by an intuitive understanding of the dynamics of the
supervisor-subordinate dialogue process, is highly plausible
and may partially derive from and work in concert with the
first scenario presented above.
Despite the fact that the
Department mandates annual integrity intervieHs and presents
other passive reminders of the need for integrity, a perception
prevails among many officers of all ranks that the agency
became lax and did not pursue corruption or promote integrity
as aggr:essively in the several years prior to the Mallen
Commission as it did earlier.
RECOMHENDATION:
It
is highly recommended
that
the
Department immediately adopt aggressive measures to dispel the
prevalent attitude among senior supervisory personnel that
patrol officers as a group are not averse to reporting
corruption.
Similarly, it is recommended that the Department
aggressively QUrsue efforts to increase and enhance dialogue
concerning corruption, and that such dialogue involve members
of the service of all ranks. Such a program would have several
beneficial effects, including the dissipation of misconceptions
and misperceptions.
Moreover, an increased awareness and
realistic understanding of the corruptiol} hazards faced by

(50)

officers may provide personnel with the prophylactic capacity
to avoid them.
Antecedent discussions of corruption and
ethical behavior,
in which officers project themselves into
ethicaJ.ly problematic situations and consider the consequences
of their actions, can be expected to act as a behavioral check
when and if officers actually er1counter those situations.

Slightly more than half the Captains believed tl1at the
average officer would turn in another officer whose corruption
matched

that

of

Michael

Dowd.

Of

those,

the

Captains

overwhelmingly felt that the officers would do so only with the
assurance of anonymity.
This perception,
it should be noted,
differs
markedly from the perceptions of Sergeants
and
!..:ieutenants, who believed quite strongly that most officers
would make the requisite notifications.
The Captains stated
that officers who turned in a "Michael Dowd" could have no
e.xpectation of support from their fellow officers, and would in
fact be ostracized; this perception was more in line with the
reported beliefs of Police Officer participants.
'I·he Captains believed that the Department's system to
encourage reporting of corruption could be strengthened if a
totally anonymous system were devised and promulgated.
They
believe that the former Internal Affair Division 1 s reputation
for investigating minor misconduct (''white socks")
while
ignoring serious misconduct and corruption has negatively
impacted the Internal Affair Bureau's credibility and capacity
to gain the trust of officers, noting that this perception must
be changed before substantive long-term gains can be made.
In
their opinion, the Internal Affairs Bureau should deal solely
with cases of serious misconduct and corruption.
It is
critical to ensure that trust be established 1 and that the
identity of offi9ers who report corruption be kept absolutely
secret 1 but those who do come forward should be rewarded. They
suggeste<il. that the Internal Affairs Bureau change its image ·and
attempt to gain trust through the honest and
objective
dissemination of information 1
and that this training be
conducted by credible individuals.
They also stated that an
officer's Confidential Personnel Index (CPI) file
sl1ould
contain positive i11formation in addition to the
largely
negative data currently retained there.
'l'he Captains also
believed
quite strongly that precinct Integrity
Control
Officers and commandets should, when possible and practicable,
be made a\. . are of on-going IAB investigations within their
commands, and that IAB should utilize the knowledge and
expertise of commanders and !CO's to a fuller extent.

(51 )

Members

of

the Guardians Association

Focus

Group

were

generally
in agreement with the attitudes and
opinions
expressed
by other groups concerning the
reporting
of
corruption.
The participants stated that
the reporting of
corruption can be encouraged •.·:hen the prospe~t of retribution
fl·om co-workers and SUi?ervisors is diminished.
They deba!:..ed
the efficacy of a· re11ard system to encourage the reporting of

corruption,

but the majority of participants stated

that

the

Department is "sweeping corruption under the rug" by not
pursuing it aggressively.
Still, African-American officers are
reluctant to come forward, altl1ougl1 the participants stated
that they were not part of the "blue fL·atel·nit.y. 11

In contrast to most of the previous end predominantly male
Focus Groups,
the r..ember:s of the Police~·:orr:en' s Endo1·1ment
Association Focus Group unanimously stated that as individuals
they would have no problem ' 1 turning in 11 an officer I<Jhose
misconduct
approached that of Michael Dowd.
They
did
acKnowledge,
though,
that other women might be reluctant to
come_ forward with information 1
for fear that they would be
labelled a "rat" and lose the support of their male peers.
In
light of the barriers they face,
particularly with regard to
their perceived credibility about male officers 1 women officers
must expend significant effort in a process of "proving
themselves 1 "
and some may be constrained by the fear of
jeopardizing what credibility and status they have gained.
1-.ioreover 1
the group members noted that by virtue of their
gender,
female officers are prone to "labelling" for acts or
omissions which they have not committed. As a result, they may
be more circumspect about taking the risk of coming forward to
report corruption.

( 52 )

ISSUE # 7

The

~ervisory

Training Issues

first-line

supervisor

plays

an

integral

part

10

detecting and preventing corruption.
In recognition of the
important
role
Sergeants
play
in
the
Department 1 s
anti-corruption programs a series of questions were presented

to

the

Focus

Group

of Sergeants

in

an

effort

to

obtain

information concerning how well individuals are prepared for
the challenges of their new position.
Participants were also

queried to aecermine the knowledge and skills
perform their duties.

they

need

to

The Sergeants were very reproachful about supervisory
training in general and the Basic Management Orientation Course
{BMOC) in particular.

The Bt10C course was vieHed as a

Patrol

Guide refresher course designed to rehash the basic 11 do's 11 and
don' ts 11 of police procedure. The participants felt little
affort was made to impart leadership skills.
Many Sergeants
suggested that guest speakers should speak on issues related to
the effective management of personnel and other resources and
not give them a 11 Canned speech 11 •
Police Academy instructors, especially those conducting
Br-mc and
Centralized
Management Training Courses
were
criticized for their teaching abilities and their lack of
credibility. During a recent training session one of the Focus
Group members had occasion to question the information being
presented.
During the exchange the instructor is reported to
have justified his comments by stating that he 11 hasn' t been on
patrol in a long time 11 • Other instructors have admitted to
spending 11 very little time on l_)atrol 11 •
The perceived lack of
credibility and training skills of Police Academy instructors
has had a detrimental effect on supervisory training.
During the .discussion of this issue
many supervisors
complained about an unmanageable span of control. Participants
stated that many times they are the only supervisor on patrol,
covering the entire precinct.
Even during those times that
they are the sole Patrol Supervisor, they are routinely
dispatched to handle jobs.
Group members felt they 1,-1ere not
given the opportunity to properly supervise their officers, yet
were held to a high standard of accountability.

( 53)

It is interesting to note that group members chided
younger
colleagues
for becoming
subordinates.
Participants told of

11

their

overly
friendly
with
car pools' 1 , and 11 drinking

buddies 11 that included supervisors and the members of their
squads.
Sergeants felt their position as supervisors were
jeopardized because of the actions of their peers.

The Lieutenants'

Focus Group identified several

training

issues which the Department should address.
The Lieutenants
stated that the Basic Management Orientation Course (BMOC) and
the

Lieutenants'

Orientation Course should be more

realistic

and "hands-on,'' particularly with regard to the deployment of
personnel,
conducting roll call, and handling desk duties.
Such training,
they stated,
should not be conveyed by lecture
in a classroom selting, but rather the trainees should be
afforded the opportunity to practice these skills in
a
realistic and practical environment.

Specialized positions for Lieutenants
i.e., !CO and
Jl.dminis tra ti ve Lieutenant positions
require
specialized
training in preparation of forms, the proper floN of paperwork,
etc.
Such specialized training is not currently
being
provided,
and Lieutenants newly assigned to these positions
lack the resources to perform their duties adequately.
The
participants also decried the prevalent practice of assigning
newly promoted Lieutenants to the ICO and Administrative
Lieutenant positions,
a practice which occur because these are
the least desirable and least rewarding for Lieutenants in
patrol commands.
The PEA group also believed that supervisors
(especially
Sergeants) are afrai.d to make decisions 1 and that supervisors
too frequently distrust the officers who work for them;
in
general,
they believed that the overall quality of supervision
has declined substantially in recent years. They characterized
the Police Academy training as inadequate and impractical, and
they called for a return to a more 11 quasi-military 11 training
style.
In addition, the participants questioned the competency
and experie11ce of many Police Academy staff members.

(54 )

Issue # 8 Corruotion

T~aining

In response to an issue that was identified during the
initial rounds of Focus Groups, project staff sought to ~robe
the perception of newly hired Police Officers concerning
integrity/corruption training being implemented.
Questions
were presented to evoke discussion of how well Police Academy
corruption training adequately prepared young officers for the
pitfalls they might encounter while on patrol.
Both

believed

groups of officers assigned to Field Training

the AcBdemy training was unrealistic and

Units

repetitive.

Numerous officers were critical of a series of integrity

films

11

Erosion

being

presented

at the Academy (believed to be

the

Series 11
\:.apes).
The group members felt that the depictio·n of
an 11 honest cop 11 who obtained a discount for a meal early in the
film and shortly
thereafter degenerated into a 11 Criminal 11
engaged
in "corruption 11 and being led away in handcuffs,
was
unrealistic.
In addition,
officers felt the training program
could be shortened and cited that instructors repeated the same
information over and over again.
Moreover,
members of the
Field Training Unit Focus Groups related that the examples and
scenarios
presented
for discussion were
either
overly
simplistic or extreme.
Some of the behaviors which instructors
characterized as corrupt were,
in view of participants,
more
properly characterized as minor misconduct.
As a result,
the.
distinction
beh;een
corruption and
minor
breaches
of
administrative rules became blurred for some students 1
leading
to some confusion over their own duties as well as the role of
the Internal Affairs Bureau. One participant 1
for example,
stated that an instructor related a case in which an officer
used a Police DeparLment dumpster to dispose of personal trash,
and that this Has characterized as corruption.
In conducting the discussion it became evident that
approximately
half of the participants were instructed -by
members of the Internal Affairs Bureau Training Unit while the
other half were instructed by Police Academy staff.
A recent
change in policy regarding corruption/integr±ty training has
.been implemented.
Police Academy staff using Internal Affairs
Bureau Training Unit lesson plans and instructor guides is
currently presenting this block of training.
Academy
instructors were perceived as not taking the
course material seriously.
J:llustrations of instructors who
read from
their notes,
could not
(or would not) answer
'questions 1 an instructor whose whole presentation was to place

I 5s l
and

remove

instructor

a

series

pressed

of overhead

into

an

projector

academic

slides,

situation

who

a

gym

was

obviously nervous and unsure of himself, an instructor who
"rushed" -through the material because the Company was behind in
11
other 11 academic matters were given and confirmed by the group
membe~s.
"Let's get thrOIJgh this 11 and 11 We have to cover this''
were common phrases instructors were reported to have used
while introducing l:he topic to the Company. Academy staff were
reported to have advised recruits to 11 always have a stori' and
to "C.Y.A. 11 •
Participants also relayed they were repeatedly
ad:r:o:::ish~d
to stay away from the ''hairbags \'l'ho will only get
you into trouble.''
The advj ce reported to be given to the
Field Training Unit groups was supported by the recruit Focus
Groups who added that ;;:any times c.cademy i.nstrlJctors prefaced
their remarks Ylith "for Acaclemy purposes!' leading them to
believe there is a chasm between theory (being taught at tl1e
Police Academy) and reality (the street).
Internal Affair Bureau instructors on the other hand were
viewed more positively.
The members felt the instructors were
sincere and took the issue of corruption more seriously than
Academy instructors.
It appears the presence of the Internal
Affairs Bureau gave more importance to the lesson and more
credibility to the questions being answered.

(56)

ISSUE# 9 AJlcillary Issues
In

the course of conducting the Focus Group

sessions,

a

number of issues arose which, while not directly related to the
project's defined goals and objectives, are nevertheless worth
mentioning.
One such issue concerned the Department's policy on
wearing hats.
When a participant would raise this perennial
issue,
a majority of the group members inevitably agreed that
altogether too much emphasis was put on enforcement of this
rule,
and that this emphasis resulted in a waste of D~partment
time and resources.
They characterized \:.he Department's
posture regarding hats as draconian and petty,
noting that a
supervisor's time and effort would be ~ore effectively spent
addressing more substantive issues.
Focus Group members
recommended
that the regulation hat should be
optional
equipment, at least during the summer months, and that officers
be given some discretion in choosing Hhen and under what
circumstances to wear it.

Another concern was a widespread perception that the
Department is overly responsive to political pressures and
media influence.
They believed quite strongly that the
Department and its officers should be independent of such
pressures, and that its actiOllS and policies should be directed
toward best serving the needs of the entire citizenry rather
than the needs and whims of special interest grouQS and
political officials.
There exists a particularly strong
feeling that the agency's policies are increasingly shaped by
external political agendas,
rather than by the true needs of
communities,
and these sentiments breed tremendous resentment
and cynicism.
Repeatedly, participants from varied groups
referred to special 11 0peration All Out 11 posts as 11 Dinkins
Re-Election PostS 11 •
They saw political influence upon the
Department as pervasive, counterproductive, and contrary to the
ideals that they and the Department espouse, and several
participants equated such yielding with corruption.
Internal political influence was also a frequent topic
among the various Focus Groups. Participants are of the opinion
that merit and seniority are not as influential in determining
choice assignments as the proverbial 11 hook 11
is. The 11 who you
11
know 1 not what you know belief \-.'as prevalent during each group
discussion. !-1any officers expressed frustration at perceived
favoritism in the selection of individuals for discretionary

(57)

expressed
promotions and special assignments.
A clearly
11as
quite
Departme11t-wide opportunities
cynicism
about

apparent.
One group in particular (group 1/12,
from Brooklyn North)
believed lhat their Patrol Borough is considered a "dumping
ground 11 within the agency.
They stated that tl1ey are regarded

by officers from other Eoxouglls, as well as by the Department's
executive cadre, as a collection of misfits,
incompetents,
malingerers,
and
undesirables inhabiting
a
series
of
11
shithouses 11 •
This perception coexists with,
and perhaps has
created,
a strong .group identity marked by an undercurrent of

perverse pride in their deviant status.
Subtle e~idence also
emerged that at times these officers act out their deviant
status for the benefit of other officers, often in a bid to
demonstrate affillitt fer the g=oup identity.
Concurrently,
they speak of the fact that Brooklyn North cops are more
courageous than officers in other Boroughs, and that they deal
with a level of crime and disorder which other cops could not
tolerate.
This group reiterated their long-standing belief
that Brooklyn North Precincts receive less external supervision
than precincts in other Boroughs, because ranking officials are
afraid to come there.
As in the past,
tl1is consciousness
translates to a view that they are somewhat insulated from the
scrutiny of Internal Affairs officers, whom they denigrate as
timid and apprehensive officers who are unwilling to expose
themselves to the dangers of working in Brooklyn North.
The officers from Brooklyn North also believe that their
Patrol Borough should be considered a training ground for new
members of the service, rather than a repository of rejection.
This perception was quite strong within the group, and members
provided several potent anecdotes to describe the bases of
their assertions - at detail assignments, for example, th~y
contend that they are regularly assigned to the least desirable
posts, as far as possible from the public eye.
It is hig_hly
recc.::1mended that positive action be quickly taken to dispel
this alarming set of perceptions and self-identities.
Focus Group participants believed that the Department's
recruitment and hiring practices and policies l1ave decli11ed in
recent
years.
Many of tl1e participants articulated
a
connection between this decline in hiring standards
and
corruption,
predicting that the continued
decline
will
inevitably lead to the emergence of widespread corruption. The
fact that the Department has hired individuals arrested for
felony crimes, which were pleaded to misdemeanor convictions,

( 58)

alarmed them greatly.
They see these individuals as having a
proven criminal mindset, and they are sim!J.arly convinced that
many individuals who have become Police Officers are former
criminals who simply were not identified,
either by official
arrest or by the Department's applicant screening processes.

They

believe that the Department should l1ave the authority to
turn down applicaJlts whose character is in any way
suspeCt or who have been the subject of police inte~vention.
Several participants, it should be noted, claimed that they had
personally arrested felons who are now Police Officers, and
that as a matter of policy Applicant Processing Division had
not given sufficient consideration to their recommendation
against hiring.
flatlv

The Lieutenants concurred with virtually all of the
previous Focus Groups (with the exception of r2cruit officers)
that entry-level standards have fallen within the agency in the
past several years. Again, they raised the issue of inadequate
background investigations and the Department's policy
of
permitting applicants with misdemeanor convictions for serious
felony charges to be hired.
Overall, they see the calibre of
younger officers to be declining, and they find the officers
they supervise to be unacceptably immature.
Rookie officers
were described as 11 cL-y-babies 11 who complain incessantly about
minor issues.
The Lieutenants see an increased need for more
remedial training of rookies by supervisors. Participants also
raised the issue of their contract's five (5) year stretch-out
provision,
which they characterized as demoralizing
and
inadequate.
They strongly believe that their level
of
compensation
is
not commensurate with
the
extent
of
accountability and responsibility they hold, and for their span
of control within patrol commands.
The participants from the third round were critical of the
Police
Academy
facility.
Officers
complained
about
insufficient locker-room space and bathroom/shower facilities
that. are often out of service or malfunctioning.
These
officers were also skeptical of an Academy disciplinary system
that "does nothing" 11hen someone is the recipient of numerous
"star cords" and/or Command Di.:;ciplines.
Although none of tl1ese Ancillary issues were introduced by
the project staff, the fact that they were raised repeatedly by
officers is telling.
Perha!?s more than some of the other
issues discussed elsewhere in this report, participants were
exceptionally vocal and vehement in introducing and discussing
these. The project staff believe that these issues are closely

I

(59)

linked

to

antipathy

to

the development of cynicism,
for the Department.

question

and

and

to

feelings

They certainly permit

to denigrate the overall

of

officers

integrity

of

the

Department's policies and policy makers.
A number of ancillary issues were raised by the !CO group.
They perceive an inordinately high turnover rate among !CO's,
attributing this to the fact that the Platoon Commander's
position is much more attractive,
in terms of (esponsibility,

accountability,

and flexibility 1

than their own.

Few !CO's,

they said,
would not prefer assignment as a Platoon commander,
and they attempt to secure such assignments when vacancies
occur.
As a result, they believe that !CO's are also generally
the least tenured and least experj.enced Lieutenants within a
precinct command.
As noted, the ICO's feel that their knowledge,
skills and
abilities are under-utilized,
particularly in regard
to
conducting investigations and liaison with the Internal Affairs
Bureau and Borough Inspections Units.
They would like to see
some
sort
of career path credit
toward
~nvestigative
assignments,
and would like the same overtime and chart day
opportunities enjoyed by Platoon Commanders.
The ICO's also
claim to be under-resourced.
The clerical l·mrkload they
currently carry warrants the assignment of a supervisory
assistant and a civilian clerical staff me~ber,
as well as a
dedicated computer and unmarked car.
With such resources,
the
ICO's believe that they can devote more time to conducting
field observations and investigations, which are currently all
but precluded.
The reo• s also complained that they are overburdened with
clerical work,
to the extent that they can rarely conduct
adequate field observations of the officers in their commands.
One reo noted that he currently bears the responsibility and
the accountability for integrity in a high crime command of
over three hundred (300) officers, and that an additional sixty
(60) officers are expected to be assigned there in February
1994.
Given
the fact that the !CO's also report that
Commanding Officers often assign them additional clerical tasks
and responsibilities only marginally related to their reo
duties,
their complaints cor1cerning inadequate time
and
resources
to do their job appear to have some
merit.
Specifically,
they called for the Department to provide them
with additional staff (an assistant ICO),
computers and
computer training,
and a dedicated vehicle.
At present,
they
state that the ICO's cars are frequently borrowed by Commanders
and Executive Officers.

I

I

I
i

(60)
. Several

ancillary issues arose during the course

of

the

Guardians Association Focus Group 1 including the perception of
unfair evaluation practices which adversely impact minority
orr1cers. The participants believe that in contrast to the old
system of evaluation, the recently revised evaluation process
is less fair to minority officers. As in previous groups,
the
problem of inexperienced supervisors arose again,
as did the
perception that morale and discipline have declined.
The
participants evinced a view that it is exceedingly difficult
for minority office:..-s to get into 11 detail 11 assignments 1
and
that this is an artifact of the systematic racism and sexism
existing within the Department. The participants believe that
African-American and other minority officers are
treated
unfairly as a result of this ~acist and sexist posture, which
pervades the recruitment,
discipline,
promotion and ~ersonnel
assignment systems as well as almost every aspect of the
Department
and
its policies.
The
redressal
process,
particularly the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, does
not work for African-American officers, the p·articipants said.

(6j

)

CONCLUSION
The systematic use of ~ocus Group methodology as a
management tool for the identification of
organizational
problems and employee concerns, and for the identification of
cogent strategies to remedy these p~oblems and concerns,
provides executives with an appropriate a11d viable vehicle for
implementing change.
Focus Groups would seem to be
a
particularly effective management tool within the field of
policing,
since the dimensions and character of the police
occupational culture impact tremendously upon the achievement
of organizational goals and objectives.
Proficient police
executives are well aware of the culture's capacity to eL&ner
facilitate or inhibit change, and of the need to manage and
direct the culture as caref,Jlly as they would any other
resource.
By providing opportunities for officers to participate in
agency management through membership in Focus Groups
or
advisory panels,
police executives concurrently encourage
officers to assume 11 ownership'' of the agency and of the changes
taking place within it. Focus Groups engender cooperation in
the process of implementing change,
and they enhance the
overall level of trust and unanimity within the organization.
In this regard,
Focus Groups constitute a far more effective
modality for implementing change than mere executive fiat.
Perhaps the most essential factors in the ultimate success or
failure of those changes, however,
are the chief executive's
commitment to the process and to the underlying assumptions
that process makes about the capacities and capabilities of
employees to identify and generate solutions for tl1e critical
issues facing the agency.
Focus Groups and quality
circles
inevitably entail the sharing of po~-.·er and responsibility,
but
do not allay the executive's accountability for the changes
which occur.
Perhaps lhe most important information to emerge from this
set of Focus Groups is the fact that Police Officers seem
genuinely interested in wanting corruption to be eliminated.
They articulate very little tolerance for corruption or serious
misconduct in their. midst, and many speak openly to the pride
they still feel in being Police Officers. They seem to believe
wholeheartedly in the notion Lhat they are fundamentally
different from the public they police.
They also speak of
their embarrassment when officers such as t·1ichael Dowd are
exposed, and to their anger at him and at others who would
tarnish their image. Their anger is evidence of the culture's

( 62 I

vitality

and of the l1igh positive regard these
for themselves and for their peers.

officers

have

The Focus Group process holds great promise as one of an
array of tools available to police executives inclined to
practice participative management techniques.
The process
provides police executives with a useful and
altogether
necessary feedback mechanism, and a means with which to assess
and measure the impact of new or proposed policy changes among
the work force and within the subculture.
By consulting with
employees regarding policy development 1 management is afforded

ample opportunity to glean essential data which can inform

and

shape those policies, ultimately enhancing their effectiveness.
As has been demonstrated in this project,
Police Officers
and Del8ctives in this Departffient have a lew tolerance for
corrupt behavior on the part of their peers,
a fact which is
not
mitigated by their reluctance to officially
report
corruption
without full assurance of confidentiality
or
anonymity.
Rather,
this finding points up several areas for
policy refinement, and perhaps for major revision of existing
policies. Specifically,
the officers who participated in the
Focus Groups articulated a pressing need as well as an acute
desire for policies and procedures which will permit them to
report C•)rruption without the fear of consequence,
either from
the agency's hierarchy or from their peers. To allay their
current high level of cynicism and distrust for management in
general and the internal investigative function in particular,
they must first be convinced that the Department is ''on the
level 11 •
Police Officers,
whose h'Orking environment
and
subculture make them particularly attuned to deception and
dissembly, must be convinced that management decisions are made
primarily on the basis of fairness and equity,
and that
political and parochial issues only minimally impact those
decisions.
In a heuristic sense,
the present Focus Group project has
also identified a need for cor1tinued study and for additional
Focus Group ses~ions on these and other topics.
The value of
these additio~al sessions migl1t well be augmented through the
administration
of various survey instruments
(e.g. 1
the
Niederhoffer Cynicism Scale,
the Fishman-McCormack Scale bf
Police
Probity
and Improbity,
the BuzaHa
Police
Job
Satisfaction Questionnaire) to Focus Group members as well as
to other operational officers. Once established,
an em(?irical
baseline for the Department and for various sub-samples of the

( 63 )
agency can be carefully monitored to measure the extent and
directio,
of
attitude changes in
response
to
policy
modifications. Future Focus Groups might also be comprised of
previous participants, reunited to discuss the changes they
have seen as a result of the project.
As
police attitudes .begin and continue to
change,
participative management concepts demand that executives stay
abreast of the chanaes and their nuances.
The management of
police culture, perh~ps to greater extent than other resources,
requires consistent accurate feedback and constant attention on
the part of concerned executives who are committed to positive
change.

( 64 )

SUMM~.RY

OF RECOI1MENDATIONS FROM FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS:

ISSUE # 1
service reguiLement for
An increase in the years of
promotion so that Sergeants can gain some practical street
experience.
Elimination of the present FTU system
training scheme ~ode!ed after the NSU's.

An
chart 11

in

favor

alternative to the steady tour concept.
available on a voluntary basis.

A

11

of

a

Scooter

ISSUE # 2

Department values need to be integrated into training
heighten awareness.
A clear definition of corruption and ethical issues
to be reviewed.

to

needs

ISSUE # 3

Random
increased.

and

for

cause drug

Department policy
reviewed and clarified.

on

Training
procedures.

inform all

tape

to

drug

screening
use

by

tests

should

be

members

should

be

members

on

policies

and

ISSUE # 4

A
clear policy statement
(Board of
concerning free or discou11ted meals needs to
into training.

Ethics
Ruling)
be incorporated

ISSUE # 5

Integrity tests {targeted and random) should be increased.

( 65 )
ISSUE # 6
to
Initiation of an aggressive information campaign
and to
publicize and promote the new 1-800-PRIDE-PD number,
public
as well as
officers
that
Caller
assure
the

Identification technology is not being used.

An ory-going precinct dialogue program with members of the
Internal Affairs Bureau as a means to sensitize officers from
both groups to the objectives and goals of the other.
Internal

Tl1e

Affairs

Bureau change its

image

and

its

methods of operation.

Changing
policy

of

the

Internal Affairs Bureau real

permitting

investigators

to

close

or

perceived

out

serious
allegations either as 11 Unsubstaptiated 11 or as 11 0ther Misconduct
Noted"
through
issuance
of
Command
Disciplines
for
administrative infractions.
ISSUE # 7

Supervisory training
management skills.

should

emphasize

leadership

and

Revise first line supervisory training.
ISSUE # 8

The Internal Affairs
corruption training.
Police Academy
corruptio-n matters.

Bureau

instructors

should
need

be

involved

in

more

training

in

ISSUE # 9

The regulation hat should be optional equipment, at least
during the summer months, and that officers be given some
discretion in choosing when and under what circumstances to
wear it.
Brooklyn North participants believe that their Patrol
Borough shOuld be considered a training ground for new members
of the service, rather than a 11 dumping ground. 11 This sentiment
was quite strong within the group.
Positive action should be
quickly
taken
to dispel this set of
perceptions
and
self-identities.

'

( 6 G)

ATI'ACHMENT

11

B11

FOCUS GROUP OU'rLINB

Subject
I

Estimated time

rn_t_roduction
A
B

c D

II

Icebreaker
A
B

\~hat is a Focus Group?
Historical use of Focus Groups
(quality circles - Ad Hoc Task Force)
Random Selection Process
Purpose.of the Focus Group
10 minutes

Participant in~roduction
(first name, brief job hi.sLury)
How has the job changed over the last
few years?
15 minutes

III Department Values
A
B

c

Awareness of Value Statement
Are the Department Values Reasonable?
(Unreasonable) Why?
Is it reasonable to hold Police Officers to
a different standard?
Why? Why not?
20 minutes

IV

Department Drug Testing Procedures
A
Explanation of Random and 11 For Cause 11 tests
Reasonableness of 11 For Cause Testing''
B
c Reasonableness of 11 Random 'I'est.ing"
D
Department Pol~cy on positive findi119S
20 minutes

v

Corruption
A
B

c
D

VI

Define corruption
Nhat effect does corruption have on honest
Police Officers?
Do minor violations lead to more serious
violations? (''Slippery Slope" theory)
What can be done to weed out corruption?
20 minutes

The Blue Wall of Sile11Ce

A
Does it exist? Benefits and Negatives
B - What will the average Police Officer do when
corru~tion is observed?

.,

(s7 )
C - What can be done to encourage honest Police
D

VII

Officers to report corruption?
What happens when an honest Police Officer
reports corruption?
20 minutes

Integrity Tests
A
Targeted tests - Reasonable? Unreasonable?
B - Random Tests - Reasonable? Unreasonable?

20 minutes
VIII Supervisory Training Issues
A
Quality of training

B - Training needs

C
IX

X

Supervisory responsibilities

Integrity Training
A
Quality of training
B
Instructors
C
Training needs

20 minutes

20 minutes

Ancillary Issues
A - Topics suggested by Focus Groups
15 minutes