Schoolcraft v. The City Of New York et al

Filing 500

DECLARATION of Alan H. Scheiner in Support re: 498 MOTION in Limine To Preclude Plaintiff From Offering Certain Evidence at Trial.. Document filed by Christopher Broschart(Tax Id. 915354 in his official capacity), Christopher Broschart(Tax Id. 915354 Individually), Kurt Duncan(Shield No. 2483, Individually), Kurt Duncan(Shield No. 2483 in his official capacity), William Gough(Tax Id. 919124, Individually), William Gough(Tax Id. 919124, in his Official Capacity), Elise Hanlon(in her official capacity as a lieutenant with the New York City Fire Department), Elise Hanlon(individually), Shantel James(Shield No. 3004 in his official capacity), Shantel James(Shield No. 3004 Individually), Theodore Lauterborn(Tax Id. 897840 in his official capacity), Theodore Lauterborn(Tax Id. 897840, Individually), Michael Marino, Michael Marino, Gerald Nelson(Assistant Chief Patrol Borough Brooklyn North, Tax Id. 912370 in his official capacity), Gerald Nelson(Assistant Chief Patrol Borough Brooklyn North, Tax Id. 912370, Individually), Frederick Sawyer(Shield No. 2576 in his official capacity), Frederick Sawyer(Shield No. 2576, Individually), The City Of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G (Under Seal), # 8 Exhibit PTX 4, 6, 13, 16, 18, 22, 25, 26, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 40, 42, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 59, 60, 62, 64, 65, 66, 72, 84, 93, 95, 306, 308, 309, 314, 316, 400, 401, 402, 403, 406, 407, 408, 409, 420, 421, 426, 427 (Under Seal), # 9 Exhibit PTX 79, # 10 Exhibit PTX 81 (Part 1 of 2), # 11 Exhibit PTX 81 (Part 2 of 2), # 12 Exhibit PTX 404, # 13 Exhibit PTX 410, # 14 Exhibit PTX 411)(Thadani, Kavin)

PTX 79

The City of New York
Commission to Investigate Allegations
of Police Corruption and the

Anti-C:orruption Procedures of the
Police Department

OMMISSION
EPORT
Milton fv1ollen
Chair
. \.
...
'

~

<Wo•

'

.'

· Joseph P. Armao

Herold Baer, Jr.
tferbert Evan$
Roderick C. lankier

Harold R. Tylsr, Jr.

Chief Counsel
. · Leslie U. Cornfeld

·:Deputy Chief Counsel

July 7, 1994

ANA~TOMY

OF FAILURE: A PATH FOR SUCCESS

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Commission~s work reflects the combined efforts of a great many people. Our
findings, conclusions, a:o.d recommendations are the result of intensive investigations,
countless interviews, pailnstaking collection and analysis of evidence, and many hours of
wliting and editing. So :many people have so generously given us their time and expertise,
it is impossible to recogzlize them all. Nevertheless, we must single out certain individuals
and agencies for their special contribution to our work.
The people who ~conducted the daily work of the Commission were, of course, the
Comiilission's very able full-time staff, headed by our chief counsel, Joseph P. Armao,
deputy chief counsel, u:slie U. Cornfeld, and chief investigator, Brian M. Carroll. They
provided outstanding skill and dedication in. ·leading our investigative efforts, systems
an.alysis, and the public hearings. We wish particularly to thank Mr. Armao and Ms.
Comfc:ld for applying th~~ir considerable talents over countless hours to the creation of this
R~~port. We are grateful to the distinguished law firms of Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent,
Sheinfeld & Sorkin, and Paul, Weiss, Rifldnd, Wharton & Garrison for their support of Mr.
Armao and Ms. Cornfeld in performing this important public service.
Our investigators and analysts, whose tireless efforts, under the supervision of Mr.
Carroll, generated many of the witnesses and much of the evidence underlying our findings
and conclusions, were deputy chief investigators Frank O'Hara and Robert Machado, who
were a constant source of insight and inspiration; investigators and analysts Frances
Alexax:tder, Marilyn Coleman, Marcia DeLeon, Alfred Fernandez, Brian T. Kelly, Samuel
Ni.eves, Jody Pugach, Charmaine Raphael, Dorice J. Shea, and Gregory Thomas.

In addition, four c1f the Commission's investigators were loaned to us by federal and
state agencies. The Commission is deeply indebted to Ronald Goldstock, the Director of
the: New York State Organized Crime Task Force, for loaning us the expert services of our
deputy chief investigator Frank O'Hara. The Commission is also similarly indebted to the
Regional Inspector of the: Inspection Service of the Internal Revenue Service, William Gill
and his predecessor J os.eph Reinbold, for loaning us two of the Service's best agents,
Thomas Hopkins and Frank Luce. We also wish to thank especially the New York Office
of the Drug EnforcemeiLt Administration and its former and current Special Agents in
Charge, Robert A Bryden and Carlo Boccia, for providing us the valuable services of
Intelligence Analyst Jose Guzman.
Commission attomeys, whose many functions included supervising investigations,
witnesses, and preparing the hearings, were David A Burns, Edward
Cunningham, and Charles Guria. Special Counsels Jonny J. Frank and William Goodstein
provided us and our staff with constant advice and guidance that were critical to the success
of our projects. We are iitdeed grateful to former United States Attorney Andrew Maloney
intj:rvic~v.ing

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cmd to United States Attorneys Mary Jo White and Zachary Carter for continuing Mr.
Frank's assignment to us. The Commission also received able assistance from two part-time
volw1teer attorneys, Charles King of the firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson.
and Thomas Obermaier of the firm of Skadden. Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flam. In
particular, we thank Jdfrey Zimmerman, who served the Commission diligently for over
three: months as an assistant counsel, and to the law firm of Patterson, Belknap, Webb &
Tyler for providing Mr. Zimmerman's valuable services to us pn7 bono.
We are also indebted to Professor Mark H. Moore and Mr. David M. Kennedy of
the Ha.rvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government who acted as consultants
to the Commission. TI1eir wisdom, experience, and judgment guided many aspects of our
work.
The members of the Commission's support staff, Anne Sherlock, Nancy Levine, and
Lourdes Sinisterra, supported the Commission in all phases of our endeavors. We thank
them (and their famililes) for the many nights and weekends dedicated to helping us
accomplish our tasks. In particular, we thank our public information director, Tom Kelly,
for his dedication, profc~ssionalism, and expertise in coordinating the Commission's public
information.
Many law enforcement officials and agencies gave us extraordinary assistance and
coope:ration. In particular, we would like to extend our warm thanks to the Honorable Mary
J o White and the staff of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of
New York; the Honorable Robert M. Morgenthau and the staff of the District Attorney of
New York County; the Honorable Charles J. Hynes and the staff of the District Attorney
of Kings County; the Honorable Richard A Brown and the staff of the District Attorney of
Queens County; the Honorable Robert Johnson and the staff of the District Attorney of
Bronx County; and the Honorable William Murphy and the staff of the District Attorney
of Richmond County; the Honorables Andrew Maloney and za,:hary Carter and the staff
of the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York; and the
Honorable James Catterson, the District Attorney of Suffolk County. We also wish to
extend special thanks to Thomas A Coughlin ill, the Commissioner of the New York State
Department of Correctional Services, and his Inspector General, Brian E Malone, who were
a constant source of important assistance.. In addition. we thank Mr. Joseph Yarrish, the
Rt:~gional Inspector Genc:ral of the United States Department of Agriculture, Supervisory
Special Agent Richard Gallo, and Special Agent Michael PagHughi for their important
assistance.

Vle are especially grateful to United States Attorney White and Assistant United
States Attorneys Michael Horowitz, Sarah C1lapman, and Michelle Hirschmann for their
guidan,ce and direction in our investigation of the 30th Precinct. Similarly, we express our
gratitude to District Attorney Hynes and Assistant District Attorneys Dennis Hawkins and
Wa.nda Lucibello for thc:ir assistance and guidance in the course of our 73rd Precinct

11

investigation. as well as United States Attorney Carter and Assistant United States Attorney
Charh~s Gerber.
Others to whom the Commission is indebted for valuable cooperation. assistance, and
advice: are former Police: Commissioners Patrick V. Murphy, Raymond W. Kelly, Robert J.

McGuii'e, and Richard (::ondon, and former officers of the Depanment Joseph Trimboli,
John Guido, Aaron Rosenthal, and Daniel Heggarty; James Fox, William Doran, Mark
Oodd, John O'Connor, and Roger Viadero of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Judge
John Keenan and Judge Whitman Knapp of the Southern District of New York; Michael
F. Armstrong, former Chief Counsel, Knapp Commission; Richard Girgenti, Commissioner
of the State Division of Criminal Justice Services, Gerald W. Lynch, president of John Jay
Q)llege of Criminal Justice; Professor Lawrence W. Sherman; Paul Schechtman, Chief of
the Crirninal Division, United States Attorney's Office; Helene Gurian, chief counsel to the
State In.vestigation Commission; Thomas A. Reppetto, president of the Citizens' Crime
Commission; former U~eutenant David Durk; Edward T. Mechmann. former Assistant
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York; Laurence A Levy of the
Office of the Corporation Counsel, and Grace de Fries and Mark McCreery of the Office
of the Mayor.
The Commission worked in cooperation with and received much help from officials
of the New York City Police Department In particular, we thank Police Commissioner
William J. Bratton. First Deputy Commissioner David Scott, Deputy Commissioner John E.
Maple, Deputy Commissioner Walter Mack, Deputy Commissioner Elsie Scott, Chief of
Personn1~l Michael Juliail, Deputy Chief William Casey, Deputy Chief Joseph Ragusa, and
Inspector Charles Campisi. We should particularly note the outstanding cooperation given
th<: Commission by form,er Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly, Police Commissioner
Bratton, Deputy Commissioner Mack and Deputy Chief Casey in the course of the 30th
Prc:cinct investigation.
Special thanks are due to the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation and the New York
Community Trust for their generosity in providing critical funds to support the Commission's
work. We also wish to thank The Acorn Group, Ltd. for their excellent and generous
services in preparing our public hearing exhibits and assisting in reproducing them in this
Report.
We should particuJarly note the outstanding cooperation of the former Mayor of the
City of New York, the Honorable David N. Dinkins, for his unwavc:ring support and for the
frec:dorn he afforded the Commission to fulfill its mandate. We further express our deep
appreciation to the Honorable Rudolph W~ Giuliani, the Mayor of the City of New York,
for the support and valuable insights be provided to us since the date of his election to the
completion of our endeavors.

w

Last, but never },east, we thank the many police officers and citizens of New York
City and elsewhere who wrote or telepho.ne:d to express their support and encouragement
for our often difficult ·work. In particular, many thanks go to the many committed and
courageous members of the Police Department who came forward to provide this
O::unnili:sion with invaluable information, direction, and insight to guide our inquiries. Much
of the Commission's work could not have been accomplished without these individuals, who
choose~ 11ot to be named. It was their commitment that confirmed for us early in our tenure
hcrw fortunate this City is to be served by the fine men and Ylomen who comprise the
overwhelming majority of the finest Police Department in the world.

IV

Commission To Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption
And The Anti·..Corruption Procedures of the Police Department
Commissioners
Milton Mallen, Chair
Roderick C. Lankier
Harold Tyler

Harold Baer, Jr.
Herbert Evans
Commission Staff

Leslie U. Cornfeld
Deputy Chief Counsel

Jost=ph P. Armao
Chief Counsel

Brian Carroll
Director of Investigations
Frank O'Hara
Robert A Machado
Deputy Chief Investigators
Investi2ators and Analysts
David A Burns
Edward Cunningham
Charles M. Guria
Jeffrey Zimmerman

Frances Alexander

Marilyn Coleman
Marcia Deleon
Fernandez
Jose Guzman
Thomas Hopkins
Brian T. Kelly
Frank Luce
Samuel Nieves
Jody Pugach
Charmaine Raphael
Dorice J. Shea
Gregory A Thomas
~ed

DirectoJ of Media RelatiQm

Tom Kelly
Support Staff

Nancy Levine
Anne Sherlock
Lourdes Sinisterra
Special Counsel
Jo:nny J. Frank

William Goodstein
Volunteer Attorneys

Charles King

Thomas M. Obermaier
v

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE - .AN OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY OF
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER 1WO - THE STATE OF MODERN POLICE

C·ORR'VPI10N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
I. TilE COMMISSION'S INVESTIGATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

II.. TilE NEW NATURE OF CORRUPTION: AN OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . .

15

Corruption and :Drugs . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
'The New Character of Police Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"Crew'" Corruptl[on: The New Organization of Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Methods to Create Corruption Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Methods To Escape Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
:Profile of Today's Corrupt Cop: The Erosion Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Mixed Motives Behind Corruption: A New Framework
for Analyzing Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15
16
17
19
19
20
21

ill. lPA1TERNS OF CORRUPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

SECTION 1: COPS COMMITI1NG THEFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

lbefts From Street Dealers: "Shake Downs" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
~[befts From Radio Runs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
'Ibeft From Unlawful Searches and Seizures:
"Raids," "Doi.D.g Doors," "Booming Doors" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thefts From La\Jiful Searches and Seizures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1[befts From Car Stops and Drug Couriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Off-Duty Robberies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22
25
28
29
30

SECTION 2: COPS PROTECfiNG AND ASSISTING
NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

SECTION 3: COPS AS DRUG DEALERS AND USERS DISTRIBUilNG AND USING DRUGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

SECTION 4: PERJURY AND FALSIFYING DOCUMENTS . . . . . . . . . .

36

VI

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SECTION 5: F'OUCE VIOLENCE AND BRUTAUTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
The Link Between Brutality and Acts of Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
The Link Between Brutality And Police Culture . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . .

47

CHAPTER THREE - POLICE CUIXURE AND CORRUPTION . . . . . . . 51 'The Code of Silc~nce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"Us vs. Them• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Erosion Of Values And Pride . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Police Cynicism . • . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . • . . • • . . • . . .

................
. . . . . . . . . . .. . .
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53
58
60

................
Moral Character and Fitness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
l~li ce u·
o
mons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.

63
65

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66
68

CHAPTER FOUR - l"HE COLLAPSE OF THE DEPARTMENT'S
CORRUPTION CONTROLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
I. THE CREATION AND CORRUPTION OF TiiE DEPARTMENT'S

IN1'EGRITY SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73

Spreading Accoun.tability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The New Anti-Co:rruption Apparatus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74
76

II. 'TilE COLLAPSE OF COMMAND ACCOUNTABllJTY . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

ill. INEFFECTIVE FIElD SUPERVISION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

Willful Blindness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Performance Evaluations . . . . . . . . .
Resource and Management Failures .
Integrity Control Officers . . . . . . . . .

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80
81
82
84

IV. 11ffi DETERIORATION OF TilE INVESTIGATIVE STRUCTIJRE:
11JE COllAPSE OF lAD AND TIIE FIAUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

The Internal Affair.s Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Field Internal Affairs Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85
89

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V. FRAGMENTING, MINIMIZING AND CONCEALING

POUCE CORRUPTION CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

Minimizing Corruption Through Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

The Michad Dowd/15th Precinct Investigation . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The N'znth ,Precinct Case . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Concealing Corruption Through Filing and Oassification Systems . . . . . . . .
The Tzckler File . . . . • . . . . . • • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other Cases Not Sent to Prosecutors or Not Officially Recorded . . . . . . . .
Favoritism Towaxd High-Ranking Officers . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scalabrino Case . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

Simonetti

C~ase

92
95
95
98
99
99
. • • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

VI. 1HE DEPARTMENT'S FLAWED INVESTIGATIVE AND
INTEWGENCE-GATIIERING EFFORTS ........................ 101
The Failure to Employ Pro-Active Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Failed Undercover Programs: Field Associates and Undercover Operatives . 102
'The IAD .. Action Desk• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . 103

Vll. 'IHE DEPARTMENT ABANDONED ITS RESPONSffilliTY TO
CHANGE TiiE CUL1URE OF CORRUPTION .................... 107

CHAP1rER FIVE -- RECO:MMENDATIONS FOR REFORM OF mE
DEPARTMENT'S CORRUPTION CONTROL POLICIES AND
PliO(~I~DURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
I. lPOUCE CULTIJRE AND MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
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<-oiillllltment to , tegrtty ..................................... .
Recruitment and Screening .................................... .
Recruit And In-Service Performance Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
..
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In t egrlty Traunng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Police Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... .
Police Unions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
!)rug Testing .............................................. .
New York City Residency Requirement ........................... .

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112
112
118
119
123

125
127

128

TI. COMMAND ACCOUNTABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
.Enforcement of Command Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Supervision . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

ill. ll'ITERNAL INVESTIGATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Internal Affairs Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Recruitment of Qualified Investigators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Intelligence-Gathering Operations . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Investigative Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Organizational Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c:ommand liaisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Civil Rights Investigations . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

136
138
139
140
141
142
142

IV. SANCflONS AND DETERRENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

DlSCipline • . • . • . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
1

Disability Pension Abuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

V. COMMUNITI 01£J1'REACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Community Policing and Community Outreach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

CILWrER SIX- HEJ:J>ING TilE POLICE TO POLICE
THEMSELVES: THE NEED FOR INDEPENDENT, EXTERNAL
OVJ~RSIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
I. DEFICIENCIES OF TIIE OFFlCE OF 1HE STATE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
IJ. DEFICIENCIES OF TilE INSPECTOR GENERAL MODEL .......... 151

III. THE COMMISSIONS PROPOSED INDEPENDENT
OVERSIGHT MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Monitoring
Monitoring
Mo.nitoring
Conclusion

Performance of Anti-Corruption Systems .
Cultural Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corruption Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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156
157
157

APPENDIX
E:dtibit One
Executive Order No. 42 issued by The Honorable David N. Dinkins,
Mayor of 1he City of New Yor·k, on July 24, 1992,
Appointing the Commission to Investigate
Allegations of Police Corruption and the
Anti-Comtption Procedures of the New York
City Police Department
Exhibit '1\lu
Opening StatemeJlt by The Honorable Milton Mallen,
Commission Public Hearings, September 27, 1993
Exhibi1t

~lbree

Mid-Hearings Sta1:ement by The Honorable Milton Molleil,
Commissio:n Public Hearings, October 4, 1993
Exhibil Four
Exhibits presented at the Commission Public Hearings,
September 27, 1993 through October 7, 1993
Exhibit Fhe

Letter dated December 27, 1993 to Mayor David N. Dinkins
from The Honorable Milton Mallen
Exhjbit Six

Commission's Interim Report and Principal Recommendations,
dated December 27, 1993
Exhibit Seven

New York City Police Department, Map of Patrol Precincts

X

Exhibit Eight

'The Failure to Apprehend Michael Dowd: The Dowd Case Revisited
•
•
••
••
1'

•
•
•
•
•
•

The Failure to Apprehend Michael Dowd
Sergeant Trimboli and the Brooklyn North FIAU
Trimboli and the 75th Precinct
The R&T Grocery Store Robbery
Corruptio11 in the 75th Precinct
The Trimboli Investigation
The Pro-Active Plan
The 79th Precinct Investigation
The Yurkiw Investigation
Final Devc~lopments
Comments

xi

CHAPTER ONE
AN OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY OF THE CO:MMISSION'S FINDINGS
This Com.missio:!l has spent the past twenty-two months investigating the nature,
extent :md causes of pc11ice corruption today and the New York City Police Department's
competence and commitment to prevent and detect it When the Commission was created
in July 1992 by Executilve Order of Mayor David N. Dinkins we were given a three-fold
mandate: to investigate the nature and extent of corruption in the Department; to evaluate
tbe Department's procedures for preventing and detecting corruption; and to recommend
changes and improvements in those procedures. What follows is the Commission's Report
on the: state of corruptioD. we observed, the Department's ability and willingness to deal with
it in r~ecent years, and our recommendations for lasting change.
Part of what we found was uplifting, part was disheartening. But our fundamental
conclusion is that this (:ity has cause for faith in the future of our police department.
Unlilm the situation a ge:neration ago, this Commission can confidently report that the vast
majoriity of New York City police officers are honest and hard-working, and serve this City
with skiU and dedication each day. It also appears that the work of this Commission and
the attitude of the Department's current leadership has resulted in a determined
commitment to fighting police corruption. This is a critical achievement for the Department
and the people of our City. Without such a commitment, no efforts to combat corruption
will succ:eed. This Report is intended to h.elp the Department maintain and carry out that
coliliD.l[trnent - both today and in generations to come.
Despite our overall cause for optimism, we found that police corruption is a serious
problem confronting our City. Our findings raise significant concerns about the nature ~f
corruption today, the conditions that fuel it, the Department's willingness to confront and
fight it and, perhaps most troubling, the potential for these pmblems to grow without
sustained vigilance and oversight
\Vhat we found is that the problem of police corruption extends far beyond the
cmrup1t c:op. It is a multi-faceted problem that has flourished in parts of our City not only
bec:aus1e of opportunity and greed, but because of a police cultur·e that exalts loyalty over
int1:grity; because of the silence of honest officers who fear the consequences of "ratting"
on another cop no matter how grave the crime; because of willfully blind supervisors who
fear the~ consequences of a corruption scandal more than corruption itself; because of the
demise of the principle of accountability that makes all commanders responsible for fighting
corruption in their commands; because of a hostility and alienation between the police and
community in certain predncts which breeds an "Us versus Them" mentality; and because

for years the New York City Police Department abandoned its responsibility to insure the
integrity of its members.
AU these factors contributed to the state of corruption we uncovered. While the
systemic and institutionalized bribery schemes that plagued the Department a generation
ago no longer exist, a new and often more invidious form of corruption has infected parts
of this City, especially il:t high-crime precincts with an active narcotics trade. Its most
prevalent form is not police taking money to accommodate criminals by closing their eyes
to illegal activities such as bookmaking, as was the case twenty years ago, but police acting
as (..Timinals, especially in connection with the drug trade. Corruption occurred not only
because of fortuitous opportunities and the frailties of human nature, but often because of
created opportunities and premeditated, organized group effort.
Former police officer Michael Dowd, for example, did not just take bribes from drug
traffickers to turn his he4!ld; he became a drug dealer himself and actually assisted and
protected major drug operations. Former police officer Kevin Hembury did not only steal
drugs, guns and money in the course of a series of unlawful searches; he was part of a gang
of cops that raided drug locations almost daily for the sole purpose of lining their pockets
with cash. Former police: officer Bernard Cawley - nicknamed "the Mechanic" by his
sergeant because he so openly and frequently "tuned people up," or beat them - not only
used informants to identify drug locations for robberies, but beat people indiscriminately in
crime-infested housing projects his precinct. And it is alleged that former police officer
Alfonso Compres, one of the fourteen officers arrested thus far in the Commission's yearlong 30th Precinct investigation, did not just steal from drug dealers on the streets; he
demanded regular payments to allow them to operate freely his precinct and robbed those
who did not pay - he even used his service revolver to shoot a dealer while stealing a
package of cocaine while in uniform. To cover up their corruption, officers created even
more: they falsified of:fici::Ll reports and perjured themselves to conceal their misdeeds.
Thus,, whil·e more limited in extent, police corruption has become more serious and
threatening than ever before.

m

m

In the face of this problem, the Department allowed its systems for fighting
corruption virtually to collapse. It had become more concerned about the bad publicity that
corruption disclosures generate than the devastating consequences of corruption itself. As
a result, its c:orruption controls minimized, ignored and at times concealed corruption rather
than rooting it out. Such an institutional reluctance to uncover corruption is not surprising.
No institution wants its reputation tainted - especially a Department that needs the public's
confidence and partnership to be effective. A weak and poorly resourced anti-corruption
apparatus minimizes the lil<:elihood of such taint, embarrassment and potential harm to
careers. Thus there was a strong institutional incentive to allow corruption efforts to fray
and lose priority - which is exactly what this Commission uncovered. This reluctance
manifested itself in every component of the Department's corruption controls from

2

command accountability and supervision, to investigations, police culture, training and
recntitment.
For at least the past decade, the system designed to protect the Department from
(:Omlption minimized the likelihood of uncovering it. In a Department with a budget of
over oz1e billion dollars,, the basic equipment and resources needed to investigate corruption
succ(~ifully were routinely denied to corruption investigators; internal investigations were
prematurely closed and fragmented and targeted petty misconduct more than serious
corruption; intelligence-gathering was minimal; integrity training was antiquated and often
DIOn·c~xistent; Internal Affairs undercover officers were often placed in precincts where
corruption was least ·prevalent; reliable information from field associates was ignored;
supezvisors and commanders were not held accountable for corruption in their commands;
and corruption investigators often lacked investigative experience and almost half had never
taken the Department~i "mandatory" basic investigative training course. Most Internal
Affairs investigators and supervisors embraced a work ethic more dedicated to closing
corruption cases than to investigating them. Most volunteered for Internal Affairs to get on
a qukk promotion track rather than to get corrupt cops off the job. Indeed, a survey of
Intemall Affairs investigators we conducted through an Internal Affairs "insider" revealed
that ove:r 50 percent of Internal Affairs investigators' time was spent on non-investigatory
matters.. And no one said a word about this state of affairs until this Commission
commenced its investiga.tions.
This was no accident. Weak corruption controls reduced the chances of uncovering
serious corruption and protected police commanders' careers. Since no entity outside the
Dt:partDJent was resporudble for reviewing the Department's success in policing itself, years
of self-protection continued unabated until this Commission commenced its independent
inquiries.
This abandonment of effective anti-corruption efforts did more than avoid public
exposure: of corruption, it fueled it. It sent a message throughout the Department that
integrity was not a high priority and that Department bosses did not really want to know
about ~corruption. In short, it gave everyone in the Department an excuse for doing what
was easiest: shutting their eyes to corruption around them.

And that is preci!;ely what happened. The principle of command accountability,
which holds commanders responsible for fighting corruption, completely collapsed.
Supervisors and commanding officers were lazgely complacent about maintaining integrity.
Few Wtere concerned WJith corruption on their watch - unless it exploded into an
embarrassing corruption scandal. One officer in a high-crime precinct related how his
commanding officer went so far as to annoWlce at roll call that he knew his officers were
coDlmitting acts of corrupdon, and gave them this bit of advice: if you get caught, keep your
molllth shut. Obviously, aiiy officer who hears that message will conclude that his bosses are
content to let corruption ~continue - despite the Department's rhetoric to the contrary.

3

- - --- -· ·- -·-----r·--·

Patrol officers, too, shut their eyes to corruption. Officers from various commands
told this Commission that they would never report even serious corruption because they
feared the consequence: of being labeled a .. rat" and lacked confidence in the Department's
commitment to uncover corruption and maintain confidentiality. Indeed, so powerful is this
code of silence that in dozens of Commission interviews and in recent group discussions held
by th1: Department, police officers admitted that they would not openly report an officer as
corrupt as Michael Dowd - though almost all of them would silently hope that he would be .
arrested and removed from the Department.
Even corruption investigators understood that avoiding scandal was often more
important than uncovering corruption. As one Internal Affairs detective testified at a
ptivat1e hearing:
They [lAD's commanders] didn't. want us to be effective....
They didn''t want us to uncover any serious misconduct or largescale or any kind of misconduct that would bring bad press to
the Department or would cause embarrassment • • • [serious J
cases were not aggressively pursued. There was no aggressive
posture taken when it could have a potential to develop into
something that would cause embarrassment to the Department.
This attitude began at tbe top. At the Commission's public hearings, Daniel F. Sullivan,
the vet1::ran chief of the Department's Inspectional Services Bureau - and the Department's
top uniformed commande:r of its corruption controls - testified about the Department's view
of com1ption investigations:
The Department [was] paranoid over bad press.... There was
a message that went out to the field that maybe we shouldn't be
so aggressive in fighting [police] corruption because the
Department just does not want bad press. (Tr. 25) 1
This attitude is no secret in the crime-ridden, narcotics-infested communities where
police corruption is most prevalent. Numerous residents and leaders of these communities
told us that they often do not know whom to suspect more: the cops or the criminals. Few
civilians would ever turn to the Department to report corruption - because they believe the
Department will invariably support even corrupt cops more than tl1e public. They believe
that no one with the same uniform really care.s what cops do on the drug-ridden streets of
North Brooklyn, Upper Manhattan, or the streets of any ghetto of this City. Regardless of
the truth of this perceptio:n, it is the perception that often matters. And this perception
poisons relations between tbe community and the police, compromising the credibility of the

--------·------------

1
Tirroughout this Report, references to "Tr." indicate pages in the transcript of the
Commission's public hearin.gs, held from September 27, 1993 through October 7, 1993.

4

vnst maJority of honest and dedicated cops who need the community1 cooperation to carry
out their difficult jobs effectively.
The Department also failed - or refused - to recognize that police corruption is a
multi-dimensional problem that cannot be overcome by focusing solely on the corrupt cop
a11d inadequate investigations. In so doing, the Department failed to insure that corruption
controls operated on a variety of fronts and in the daily operations of the Department,
including: recruitment, screening, integrity training, supervision, deterrence, accountability
allld polilce culture. Because of that failure, the Department abandoned some of its best
tools for conquering corruption: the honest cop and the community.
Enlisting the SUPJ)Qrt of the honest cop who comprises the bulk of the Department
is criti,c:al to effective intt~grity controls. First, most corrupt officers start off as honest and
idc:alistic. The focus must be on keeping them honest We found that over time the
consta:at and repeated eJposure to certain conditions and temptations - especially those in
high-crime and drug-ridden precincts - erodes the values and principles of many officers.
This makes them more susceptible to corruption and to a culture that accepts and protects
it. Second, it is honest cops who, by their silence, allow corruption to continue. Reforms
must £oc:us on making llonest officers feel responsible for keeping their fellow officers
honest,, cLild ridding themselves of corrupt ones. Despite this, until recently no effort was
ma.de to encourage the honest cop to become part of the solution to corruption. To the
contrazy, honest cops, lilce the community, were often discouraged from doing so. Scores
of offi1cers told us that they believed the Department did not want them to report
corruption, that such information was often ignored, and that their careers would be ruined
if they did so. The evidence shows that this belief was not unfounded.
Convincing honest cops to help fight corruption will not be easy. The culture of
group loyalty and protection is powerful - as it should be. It bolsters morale and is vital
to !illCC1::ssful policing. But too often an officer's loyalty to fellow officers - even corrupt
one:s - exceeds his loyalty to the Departmeilt and the law. The challenge is to redirect
tho:se mhierwise admirable~ values away from cops who have tarnished the badge, and toward
all thos~e who honor it daily. We are convinced such a transformation is possible.
There is a strong b~LSis for our optimism. First, history shows that a Department-wide
toleranc:e for corruption can be turned into corruption intolerance with proper leadership
and commitment. After the Knapp Commission's revelations of widespread police
conuptiou, former Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy made integrity a centerpiece of
his adm.ln.istration and held police commanders and supervisors personally accountable for
combatting corruption. It worked. Successful integrity controls swiftly eliminated much of
the ~com~ption that had plagued the Department and a new code of ethics arose among the
troops. T1Jat commitment eventually eroded because no mechanism was ever implemented
to sustain it. But the point is that former Commissioner Murphy demonstrated that a

s

corruption-infested Department with a corruption-tolerant culture changed because of

aggressive leadership and unwavering commitment
.An even more important basis for our sense of optimism is the essential values of the
h1mdt'eds of honest officers of all ranks we interviewed over the past months. While they
may yet be reluctant to tum in fellow officers who dishonor their badges, they silently hope
tllat suC'.h officers are 11emoved from the job. They despise corrupt cops and want the
Department to root them out of their patrol cars and from their precincts. Their attitude
gives rise to much hope. It shows us that the battle to change police culture is already half
won. It shows us that the wall of silence is far from impenetrable and that the beginnings
of widespread intoleranc:e for corruption already exist.
We believe the Dc:partment has the leadership and commitment needed to transform
Department once again. We are confident.that the current :Police Commissioner has
th~~ skills and insights to accomplish his mission of driving corruption from the ranks of his
Department We have seen what appears to be a new era in the fight against police
cmruption. The Department, in partnership with this Commission, has begun to implement
many of the reforms set forth in this Report. Much time, effort and resources have been
devoted to strengtheniitg corruption controls, signamng the Department's genuine
commitment to fighting police corruption.
th(~

·The challenge we face is to maintain that commitment long after this Commissioner
departs and the glare of public scrutiny subsides. We believe the Department cannot
maintain that commitme11t alone. If history proves anything, it is that when the glare of
scrutiny shines on the Department, it can and will successfully police itself. But history also
proves that left to its own. devices the Department will backslide, and its commitment to
integrity will erode. It is no coincidence that the only two times in the past twenty years
that fighting corruption has been a priority in the Department was when an independent
com~;ion publicly reviewed and disclosed the Department's failures to keep its own house
in order. Tbis is because, :in the words of former Police Commissio.ner Raymond Kelly and
former Chief of Inspectional Services Daniel Sullivan, outside oversight "keeps the
Department's feet to the fire." Indeed, law enforcement officials unanimously told us that
the Department's heighten<~d commitment and vigilance began only after the creation of this
independent oversight Commission. Only a truly independent body, working with the
Department but beyond its contra~ can sustain this commitment -- and make the fear of
failed corruption controls more powerful than the fear of corruption's disclosure.
Titere is another bertefit to outside oversight It will provide assurance to the public,
when justified, that the Department is using its best efforts in the fight against corruption.
Often, the public incorrectly views the Department's success in uncovering corruption as
evidence of widespread n:w:1agement and integrity failures. As happened in the wake of the
recent 30th Precinct case, an independent monitor can tell the public when the arrests of
police: officers is evidence not of the Department's failure to fight corruption but of its

6

!iUCCI~s:sful commitment to rooting it out It can help turn what has been traditionally a
matter of shame for tht:= Department, into a cause for pride. It can help reduce the pain of
c:om1ption disclosures - and thus the Department's reluctance to uncover it.

For these reasons, we recommend the establishment of a permanent independent
overs:ight body so that the vigilance and determination to fight the police corruption we see
in our City today does not again evaporate when public attention and political concerns turn
dsewhere.
But independent: oversight alone will not do the trick. The primary responsibility for
combatting police conuption should and must remain with the Department We are
confident that the Deparnnent possesses the skills and the ability to fight corruption
effectively. There are, however, numerous internal reforms and a new orientation to the
approa•ch of fighting corruption that must be adopted. We have recommended a wide-range
of internal reforms and a new approach to combatting corruption that focuses on
strengthening corruption detection and prevention, as well as on the conditions that nurture
corruption and its tolerance. These include:
••
•
•
•
"
•
••
•
•
•
•
•

improving screening and recruitment;
improving recruit education and in-service integrity training;
strengtheiling first-line supervision;
reinventing the enforcement of command accountability;
attacking corruption and brutality tolerance;
challenging other aspects of police culture and conditions that breed
corruptioiL and brutality;
enhancing sanctions and disincentives for corruption and brutality;
strengthening intelligence-gathering efforts;
preventing: and detecting drug abuse;
soliciting police union support for anti-corruption efforts;
minimizing the corruption hazards of community policing; and
legislative reforms.

External independent oversight will belp insure that these reform efforts succeed.
Ulltimately, however, it is the Department's own officers, supervisors and commanders who
will d.::t,ermine whether the battle is won or lost - whether a culture that tolerates
corruption can be trans~Jrmed into one that drives it out There:fore, it is imperative that
both these elements are present to devise efff:ctive reforms: successful internal Department
co.ntrols coupled with an independent outside entity to insure their lasting success.

•

•

*

To reach the coz:tclusions and recommendations in this Report, the Commission
sought information from a wide variety of sources. We reviewed thousands of Department

7

docu.Dlents and case files; interviewed a number of corrupt officers who agreed to cooperate

wllth tbe. Commission; conducted hundreds of private hearings and interviews of former and
cu:rreDlt police officers of all ranks; audited, investigated and conducted performance tests
of the principal components of the Department's anti-corruption systems; conducted
unannounced on-site systems inspections; conducted an anonymous survey of Internal Affairs
investigations with the assistance of an Internal Affairs '"insider"; analyzed hundreds of
imtesti.gative and person11el files; interviewed private citizens, criminal defense attorneys,
alleged 'Victims of corruption and criminal informants; conducted an extensive literature
review 011 police corruption and prevention; and held a series of roundtable discussions and
other meetings with a variety of police management and corruption experts including local,
state and federal law enforcement officials, prosecutors, former and current police chiefs and
commissioners, inspectors general, academics and police union officials.
We also undertoo;lc a number of special projects and conducted a series of private
hearings on various critical aspects of corruption control, including Internal Affairs'
opc:ratimts and performatlce, recruitment and screening, training, supervision and command
accoun1tability, integrity c:ontrol officers, police perjury and falsifications, as well as an
empirical study of the coJmection between brutality and corruption.
The Commission cllso initiated a number of its own field investigations in various
precincts .in the City, some:times in conjunction with local and federal prosecutors, targeting
areas where our analysis suggested police corruption existed. We were aided in all of our
efforts by former and cunent members of the Department of all ranks who came forward
to offer their assistance and insights about the state of corruption and corruption controls
in the Department.
From September 27, through October 7, 1993, the Commission held two weeks of
public b1:arings to present much of the information we had uncovered in the three primary
areas of our mandate.

•

•

•

H was these investigations, audits and analyses that led to the conclusions presented
in this Report. We believe that our findings and recommendations will strengthen the
Department's ability and de:sire to fight corruption, not only today but in the future. We are
not so naive as to believe that corruption can ever be completely eliminated among police
officc:rs, or in any other profession. Aey occupation comprising large numbers will have
some corn1ption. More than any other profession, however, the police face seductive
opporturulties to turn corrupt. Today, many neighborhoods of New York City are awash with
drugs, mon,ey and guns, and our police are on the front lines. Potential for the misuse of
power and strong temptations challenge many of our police officers to abandon their oaths
every day.. Given such circumstances, in a police department whose numbers will soon

8

CHAPI'ER THREE

POUCE CULTURE AND CORRUPTION
"We must create an atmosphere in which the dishonest officer
fears the honest one, and not the other way around."
- Detecthe Frank Serpico,
Testifying before the
Knapp Commission, December 1971
More than twenty years after Frank Serpico's testimony, this Commission found that
the dishonest officers in the New York City Police Department still do not fear their honest
colleagues. And for good reason. The vast majority of honest officers still protect the
rrlinmity of corrupt officers through a code of silence few dare to break. The Knapp
Commission predicted that the impact of their revelations would significantly weaken the
characteristics of police culture that foster corruption. In particular, they hoped that their
success in persuading a number of corrupt police officers to testify publicly about corruption
would forever undermine the code of silence, the unwritten rule that an officer never
incriminates a fellow oflicer. Unfortunately, their hope never became reality.
Police culture - the attitudes and values that shape officers' behavior - is a critical
component of the proble:m of police corruption today. This Commission, therefore, was not
satisfic!d simply to exan:line the types of police corruption we found to exist. The more
difficult question we asked is why such corruption exists, what are the root causes and
prevailing conditions that nurture and protect it, and how they can be effectively addressed.
Only by examining the variety of influences and attitudes that contribute to corruption, can
we assess and formulate strategies to stop it
The code of silence and other attitudes of police officers that existed at the time of
the Knapp Commission continue to nurture police corruption and impede efforts at
corruption control. Scores of officers of every rank told the Commission that the code of
silc!nce pervades the Department and influences the vast majority of honest and corrupt
officers alike. Although police officers who look the other way while colleagues steal
property, sell drugs, or abuse citizens' civil rights may not be directly involved in corruption,
the:y nonetheless support and perpetuate it by abandoning their professional obligations.
These aspects of police culture facilitate corruption primarily in two ways. First, they
en<:ourage corruption by setting a standard that nothing is more important than the
unswerving loyalty of officers to one another - not even stopping the most serious forms of
corruption. This emboldens corrupt cops and those susceptible to corruption. Second, these
attitud(:S thwart efforts to control corruption. They lead officers to protect or cover up for

51

others' crimes - even. crimes of which they heartily disapprove. They lead to officers
flooding Department radio channels with warnings when Internal Affairs investigators
appear at precincts, ar1d refusing to provide information about serious corruption in their
commands. Changing these aspects of police culture must be a central task if corruption
controls are ever to succeed.
The realities of police work bolster these corruptive features of police culture. As
a. society, we expect more of police officers than any other public servants. We call upon
them daily to accomplish a variety of competing responsibilities. We expect them to be
daring crime fighters as well as patient mediators. We call upon them to stop crime in our
neighborhoods, to resolve our domestic disputes, and to act as obedient members of a
paramilitary organization. Most of all, we expect them to confront physical danger and risk
their .lives to protect our lives and property. After a time, particularly in high-crime areas,
they begin to identify the criminals they must confront every day with the community they
must serve. They begin to close ranks against what they perceive as a hostile environment
Consequently, many officers lose sight of the majority of law-abiding citizens who live in
their precincts. When this happens, corruption becomes easier to commit and to tolerate.
Citizens often return this hostility. With crime, drugs, and guns rampant in parts of
our City, the public incorrectly faults the police. When incidents of police corruption are
disclosed, the community incorrectly assumes that this is the norm. When police officers
interfere with citizens' activities, the public often resents it Police officers feel this
resentment. What the Knapp Commission observed in its time is just as applicable today:
Nobody, whether a burglar or a Sunday motorist, likes to have
his activiti(:S interfered with. As a result most citizens, at one
time or ar1other, regard the police with varying degrees of
hostility. The policeman feels, and naturally often returns, the
hostility.8
Faced with this res1:ntment, the dangers of their work, aiid their dependence on other
officers for their mutual .safety, police officers naturally baiid together. Often to such a
degree that officers becCime isolated from the outside world. They socialize with and
depend upon fellow officers not only on the job, but off. An intense group loyalty, fostered
by s.hared experiences aiid the need to rely on each other in times of crisis, emerges as a
predominant ethic of poli1::e culture.

City of New York, Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and
the City's Anti-Corruption Procedures, Commission Report (New York: December 26, 1972),
p. 6.
8

52

This loyalty ethic itself is not corruptive. Loyalty and trust are vital attributes that
promote effective and safe policing. We cannot ask police officers to abandon their loyalty
to each other while simultaneously demanding that they confront danger for us.
But group loyalty often flourishes at the expense of an officers sworn duty. It makes
allegiance to fellow officers - even corrupt ones - more important than allegiance to the
Department and the community. When this happens, loyalty itself becomes corrupt and
erects the strongest barriers to corruption control: the code of silence and the "Us vs.
'Them" mentality.

The Code or Silence
The pervasivenc~ss of the code of silence is itself alarming. But what we found
particularly troubling is that it often appears to be strongest where corruption is most
frequent. This is because the loyalty ethic is particularly powerful in crime-ridden precincts
where officers most deJ,end upon each other for their safety each day - and where fear and
alienation from the co:mmunity are most rampant. Thus, the code of silence influences
bone.st officers in the v~ery precincts where their assistance is needed most.
The pervasiveness of the code of silence is bolstered by the grave consequences for
violating it: Officers who report misconduct are ostracized and harassed; become targets
of complaints and even physical threats; and are made to fear that they will be left alone
on the streets in a time of crisis. This draconian enforcement of the code of silence fuels
corruption because it makes corrupt cops feel protected and invulnerable. As former police
officer Bernard Cawley testified at the public hearings:
Question:

Were you ever afraid that one of your fellow
officers might turn you in?

Answer:

Never.

Question:

Why not?

Answer:

Because it was the Blue Wall of Silence. Cops
don't tell on cops. And if they did tell on them,
just say if a cop decided to tell on me, his
career's ruined. He3 going to be labeled as a rat.
So if he's got fifteen more years to go on the job,
he's going to be miserable because it follows you
wherever you go. And he could be in a precinct,
be's going to have nobody to work with. And

53

chances are if it comes down to it, they're going

to let him get hurt. (Tr. 138)
In his public hearing testimony, another corrupt officer, Kevin Hembury, concurred:
If you're labeled a rat, especially early in your career, you're
going to .have a difficult time for the remainder of your career
in the New York City Police Department. You do not want to
be labeled a rat. You will be the recipient of bad practical
jokes, even things more serious than practical jokes. Then, to
leave or :request to leave the environment that you were in,
wouldn't be the end of this labeling that you had. Phone calls
would be made to wherever your final destination was in the
Department. Your name traveled with you. It was something
you couldll't shake. (Tr. 87)

Dozens of honest officers similarly told the Commission about their fears of breaking
the code of silence. Lieutenant Robert McKenna, a highly decorated Lieutenant with
twenty years experience Jln the Department, testified about this view at our public hearings:
Question:

What is the consequence of breaking this silence?

McKenna:

The cops are ostracized at times. They're held
away. They're pushed off to one side. They're
kept <N~ay from the rest of the group. I could
almost say it'd be like the effects of a divorce.
You're separated from your family. You're alone
over here. Your family, the cops, are over there.
(Tr. 80)

The Commission interviewed a number of officers who suffered the penalties of being
labe:led a rat. Their names will be withheld for obvious reasons. A captain we interviewed
spent thirteen years as a police supervisor, a Field Internal Affairs Unit investigator, and a
duty captain, or "shoefly, .. in Brooklyn. He was a stern disciplinarian who often disciplined
his subordinates for misconduct and reported allegations of corruption to Internal Affairs.
During the course of his career, he was assigned to thirty-eight different commands
throughout the City. In almost every case, on the very day he arrived to report for duty at
his new command, he fmmd evidence that his reputation bad preceded him. At one
command. his locker was burned; at another, his car tires were slashed; at another, he
received threats of physical harm.
In another case, a detective who served in Internal Affairs was transferred to a
precinct detective squad. In his first week, his new colleagues made sure he knew that he

54

would be alone on the street. They placed dead rats on .bis car windshield, stole or
destmyed his personal property, and told him directly that he could not count on them in
tinH!S of danger. The ~constant harassment. eventually led the detective to seek psychological
counseling and restricted duty.
The inculcation of police culture begins early in police officers' careers, as early as
the Police Academy. F'olice Officer "Otto," an officer assigned to a high-crime precinct who
agre:ed to testify publiicly before the Commission only in disguise because of the code of
silence, told us that he learned about the code of silence while he was still a recruit at the
Police Academy:
Question:

How do police officers learn about this wall or
code of silence?

Otto:

It starts in the Police Academy, and it just
develops from there. . . . It starts with the
instructors telling you never to be a rat, never
give up your fellow officer. It starts with other
recruits telling you they'll never give you up, and
it just goes on down the line as you go through
N.S.U. [Neighborhood Stabilization. Units] and
into a precinct. (Tr. 14)

And, while still recruits, police officers learn the harsh le:ssons of violating the code
of silence. One former recruit told us that while in training at the Academy, she made a
complaint to Internal .Affairs about the lewd remarks an Academy instructor constantly
made to her and other women recruits. Despite assurances of confidentiality, Internal
AffaiJ·s informed Academy supervisors of her complaint. Within days, she was ostracized
by her fellow recruits (eYen those who bad been her friends) and Academy personnel. Her
isolation was made so complete that she was forced to finish her Academy training on her
own. When she graduated, the Department assigned her to Internal Affairs because it was
unlikely she would be accepted anywhere else in the Department. Her dream to become
a cop became a nightmare because she made a single complaint about a fellow cop. Within
a year, she resigned from the Department.
Tbe fear of violating the code of silence can even lead an officer to accept the blame
and punishment for the C:lcts of a fellow officer. Hembury testified to an incident when, still
a rookie,. be and a partne:r stopped a motorcycle for a number of traffic violations. Because
the~ driver became irate, Hembu.ry's partner thought be would teach him a lesson by
removing a spark plug c:oil to disable the engine. Eventually charges for damaging the
motorcycle were wrongly brought against Hembury, not his partner. But the code of silence
compeUed Hembury to accept the punishment - a loss of fifteen vacation days - for

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som~~thing he did not do. Hembury knew that the punishment for breaking his silence
would be far worse than the punishment for police misconduct:

Hembury:

... And the spark plug I bad nothing to do with.
But yet these charges were brought against me.
I took the hit (punishment], lost my fifteen days,
and that was the end of it.

Question:

So you took a fifteen day hit all because you just
could not be labeled a rat and tell the truth
about who was really responsible for damaging
the motorcycle?

Hembury:

That's correct. (Tr. 89)

There is a tragic: irony to the code of silence which provides both the greatest
challenge - and hope -· in combatting corruption. Although most honest cops will not
report serious corruptio:a. they despise corrupt cops and silently hope that they will be
removed from the ranks. Recently, the Internal Affairs Bureau's Corruption Prevention and
Analysis Unit shared with the Commission the results of a series of enlightening discussions
conducted with groups of police officers about their perception of police values and
corruption. Remarkably, although patrol officers openly expressed disgust over corruption
and hoped corrupt officers would be fired, they nonetheless are highly reluctant to report
corruption, even if it involves drugs and weapons. The Internal Affairs report states:
Extremely serious allegations induding drugs and weapons were
not viewed differently by most of the participants. Members
were consistent in their reluctance to officially report these
transgressions. Officers were of the opinion that the discovery
and the official reporting of criminal allegations aud serious
misconduct would not elevate them in the eyes of their peers.
These officers believed they would be perceived as 'rats,' not
to be trusted!. The consensus was that if an individual reported
serious matters they would likely report minor infractions as
well. The fear of being labeled a ·rat' and subsequently
divorced from police culture has a seemingly powerful, negative
impact on n~porting corruption. This reveals a whole new
dimension to the code of silence: it does not always reflect
solely toleraDlce for corruption or a misplaced group loyalty. In
many instances it is motivated purely by self-interest and selfprotection: a. fear of the consequence of breaking the norms of
loyalty and silence.

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Thus the most devastating consequence of the code of silence is that it prevents the
vast :majority of honest officers from doing what they inwardly want to do: help keep their
Department corruption free. It is not surprising that the honest cop wants corrupt cops off
the job. The consequences of corruption for honest cops are grave: it taints their
reputations, destroys their morale, and, most important, jeopardizes their very safety.
What is surprising is that despite these devastating consequences, honest cops refuse
to help eliminate corrupt cops from their Department, even though they are the principal
victims of police corruption. Again, Police Officer Otto, like scores of his colleagues, made
this point clear:
Question:

What is the impact of corruption on honest cops?

Otto:

It hurts them. It disheartens them.
them not want 1to work.

Question:

Do you believe that it endangers their safety on
the street?

Otto:

Well, put it this way. I wouldn't want to run
across a drug dealer who's been ripped off one
time too many.

It makes

Despite corruption~ threat to their safety and their genuine desire to work in a corruptionfree Department, officc:rs view reporting 11:orruption as an offense more heinous and
dangerous than the com1ption itself.
Honest officers who know about or suspect corruption among their colleagues,
therefor~:. face an exasperating dilemma. They perceive that they must either turn a blind
ey(~ to the corruption the:y deplore, or risk the dreadful consequences of reporting it. The
Commission's inquiries re:veal that the overwhelming majority of officers choose to live with
the: corruption.
And they have not been reluctant to admit this to the Commission. Indeed, the facts
bear out what officers have been telling us for the past twenty-two months: despite years
of open a.nd frequent corruption by officers like Michael Dowd, Bernard Cawley and others,
virtually none of their colleagues or supervisors reponed this corruption to Internal Affairs.
J[f the Department ever hopes to make lasting improvements in corruption control,
it must do something it bas failed to do in recent history: acknowledge that the code of
silence exists and take Stf:ps to overcome it It must rescue its members from the grip of
their se~lf-created predicament. From first-line supervisors to Internal Affairs, it must
provide constant support and recognition to officers who, by reporting corruption, choose

57

to do what is right rather than what their culture expects of theiiL The Police Commissioner

must make it clear that those who expose corruption will be rewarded, and those who help
conceal it punished.
Finally, the Department must provide the same confidentiality protections to officers
who report other officc:rs, as it does to civilians who provide information about criminals.
There~ is a widespread perception among officers that this is not the case. Many officers told
us that they would not rt~port corruption because the Department does not provide the same
basic protections to officers as it does to civilians assisting the Department. This
communicates a powerfi.ll message: that the Department is not really interested in enlisting
the police in the fight against corruption.. Until this changes, no reforms will ever change
the attitudes that underlie the code of silence.

"Us vs. Them"
The code of the "blue fraternity" extends beyond the "blue" and into the
communities they police. The loyalty ethic and insularity that breed the code of silence that
protects officers from other officers also erects protective barriers between the police and
th(~ public. Far too many officers see the public as a source of trouble rather than as the
people they are sworn to serve. Particularly in precincts overtaken with crime, officers
sometimes view the public as the "enemy." Officer Otto explained:
Question:

Otto:

Is there an attitude prevalent among police
officers that . . . protects them against other
people who might report corruption on their
part?
Yes. It's an 'Us vs. Them' mentality. See, we're

all blue, and that we're in this together and we
have to protect each other no matter what.
Question:

And I suppose what you're saying is the police
officers are the 'us,' and who is the 'tbem'?

Otto:

Everybody else.

While the "Us vs. Them" mentality is most powerful in crime-ridden precincts, often
with large minority populations, it is not confined to these precincts. We found that this
attitude <::xists, in varying degrees, in many precincts in the City - and begins to develop
early in aJI officer's career. The Commission's inquiries show that, like the code of silence,
the "Us vs. Them" mentality starts when impressionable recruits and rookies are led to
believe by Yeteran officers that the ordinary citizen fails to appreciate the police and that

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