Echon et al v. Sackett et al

Filing 116

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE that 106 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Justin Echon, Maribel Echon, Esmeraldo Villanueva Echon, Jr. be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. By Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang on 9/20/2017. (Attachments: # 1 - (7) Unpublished case law) (nywlc1)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 14-cv-03420-PAB-NYW
ESMERALDO VILLANUEVA ECHON, JR.,
MARIBEL ECHON, and
JUSTIN ECHON,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WILLIAM SACKETT, and
LEONIDA SACKETT,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
______________________________________________________________________________
Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang
This civil action comes before the court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
[#106, filed May 1, 2017]. The Motion was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Amended Order Referring Case dated August 28, 2015
[#46], and the memorandum dated May 2, 2017 [#107]. For the reasons set forth herein, this
court respectfully RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment be
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Esmeraldo Villanueva Echon, Jr., Maribel Echon, and Justin Echon
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) assert the following claims against Defendants William Sackett (“Mr.
Sackett”) and Leonida Sackett (“Ms. Sackett”) 1 (collectively “Defendants” or “the Sacketts”): (1)
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”); (2) violation of the Colorado Minimum

1

Defendant Leonida Sackett is often referred to in the record evidence as “Nida.”

Wage of Workers; (3) violation of the Colorado Wage Claim Act; (4) Breach of Contract; (5)
Breach of Contract—Third Party Beneficiary Claim; and (6) Unjust Enrichment.

[#1].

Additionally, Esmeraldo Echon, Jr. (“Esmeraldo Echon”)2 and Justin Echon assert a claim against
the Sacketts for violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act. Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants, who operate several businesses and manage a farm in Rocky Ford,
Colorado, held them without pay in “debt bondage, requiring them to work on their crops and in
their market, clean and maintain their rental properties, and perform various other jobs from
2011–2014.” [#1 at ¶ 2]. The Sacketts, who are proceeding pro se, filed an Answer on March 18,
2015. [#11].
On April 23, 2015, the undersigned presided over a Scheduling Conference, [#16], and
subsequently entered a Scheduling Order. [#17]. As discussed in previous orders, discovery in
this action has been wrought with difficulties, including multiple discovery motions and
conferences that resulted in attendant delays and orders compelling discovery and awarding fees.
See, e.g., [#73, #90]. The final version of the Scheduling Order set April 22, 2016 as the deadline
to complete discovery, and May 20, 2016 as the deadline by which to file dispositive motions.
See [#55]. The Parties then embarked on discovery.
As early as August 2015, Plaintiffs alerted the court that Defendants were not responding
to any discovery requests in a substantive fashion. [#23, #27]. In response, Defendants insisted,
“I have given them all that I have, any employment record that he keeps wanting does not exist.
There was not any employment [sic] I did not employ any of them at any time.” [#31 at 2].
Defendants also asserted that they did not have employees, and had not had any employees since
approximately 2012. [Id. at 3]. On August 19, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their first Motion to Compel

2

Plaintiff Esmeraldo Echon is at times referred to in the record as “Junior.”
2

Discovery. [#32]. The court extended the deadline for Defendants to respond to no later than
September 14, 2015, and reminded Defendants that they were required to follow the same rules
of procedure that bind represented parties. See [#39]. On September 11, 2015, Defendants filed
a document entitled, “Discovery,” which appeared to be additional responses to some or all of
Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production. Compare [#32-2] with [#50]. At a hearing held October 1,
2017, this court granted the first Motion to Compel Discovery and ordered Defendants to
respond to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories and Requests for Production no later than October 22, 2015.
See [#52].

Defendants did not file an objection to this Order to the presiding judge, the

Honorable Philip A. Brimmer.
On November 30, 2015, this court held a telephonic discovery conference to discuss the
status of discovery responses. See [#59]. The court again advised Defendants of their duties to
follow applicable rules regarding discovery, and that failure to do so could result in sanctions,
including but not limited to default judgment. See [id.]. On December 4, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a
second Motion to Compel Discovery, [#60], to which Defendants filed no response. By Order
dated January 27, 2016, this court granted the second Motion to Compel Discovery in part,
ordering Plaintiffs to respond to Interrogatory Nos. 1 (as limited) - 5, 7-16 and Requests for
Production No. 2-4, 6, 8, 10, and 11, no later than February 9, 2016. See [#62]. Counsel for
Plaintiffs took the depositions of Mr. Sackett and Mrs. Sackett while the Second Motion to
Compel Discovery was pending. See [#104-21, #104-22].
Plaintiffs then filed a third Motion to Compel and for Sanctions on February 23, 2016.
[#64]. On March 7, 2016, Defendants filed a response, docketed as a letter. See [#68]. On May
2, 2016, this court compelled Defendants to respond to the outstanding Interrogatories in
narrative form. See [#73 at 7]. This court also granted sanctions in the amount of 50 percent of

3

the reasonable expenses associated with the third Motion to Compel, which resulted in an Order
awarding $1,552.50. [Id.; #90].
The Parties’ difficulties with respect to discovery culminated with Plaintiffs’ fourth
Motion to Compel Discovery, filed July 19, 2016, which sought a variety of sanctions including
default judgment against Defendants, a request that the court designate certain matters and facts as
established for the purpose of this action, and a request that the court preclude Defendants from
introducing certain matters and facts at a later time in this litigation. See [#83]. On January 23,
2017, the undersigned recommended that the Motion be granted as to the court designating certain
facts as established and precluding Defendants from introducing certain facts (to be determined in
the context of summary judgment), and denied as to the request for default judgment. See [#91].
This court also recommended that the court set a new deadline for Plaintiffs to file a motion for
summary judgment. [Id.] On February 24, 2017, Judge Brimmer accepted the recommendation
and ordered Plaintiffs to file a motion for summary judgment on or before April 10, 2017. [#92].
Judge Brimmer specified that the court would address in further detail at a later date the matters to
be established and precluded. [Id.] On March 23, 2017, Plaintiffs sought and received an
extension of the new dispositive motion deadline. See [#94, #97]. Plaintiffs filed the instant
Motion for Summary Judgment on May 1, 2017. See [#106]. Defendants filed a Response on
May 15, 2017, [#110], and Plaintiffs filed a Reply on May 24, 2017. [#111]. On June 6, 2017,
Defendants filed what appears to be a surreply. [#112].3 The Motion for Summary Judgment is

3

This court construes Defendants’ papers liberally because they are proceeding pro se. Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). Nevertheless, as this court has repeatedly
advised, Defendants’ pro se status does not exempt them from complying with procedural rules
or from satisfying substantive law as is required of represented parties. See Murray v. City of
Tahlequah, Okla., 312 F.3d 1196, 1199 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008) (observing that a party’s pro se
status does not relieve him of the obligation to comply with procedural rules) (citation omitted);
Dodson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1236 (D. Colo. 2012). Neither the
4

thus ripe for disposition, and the undersigned finds that oral argument would not materially assist
in the resolution of this matter.
LEGAL STANDARD
A party may be entitled to summary judgment prior to trial if “the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Henderson v.
Inter–Chem Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567, 569 (10th Cir. 1994). “A ‘judge’s function’ at summary
judgment is not ‘to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). Whether there is a genuine dispute as to a
material fact depends upon whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or conversely, is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49; Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2000);
Carey v. U.S. Postal Service, 812 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir. 1987). “Where the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine
issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(citing First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Com, 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment the court views all evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. See Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210,
1213 (10th Cir. 2002). Where, as here, the moving parties will bear the burden of proof on an
issue at trial, they must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Local Rules of Practice of this District contemplate that
a party may freely file a surreply. However, Plaintiffs did not move to strike the surreply and I
do not find that it materially affects the court’s analysis of the Motion for Summary Judgment.
5

than for the moving party. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party meets its
initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or
discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e). The non-movant “may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of [the] pleadings, but
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 256. Conclusory statements based merely on speculation, conjecture, or subjective belief are
not competent summary judgment evidence. Bones v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 875
(10th Cir. 2004). The nonmoving party’s evidence must be more than “mere reargument of [its]
case or a denial of an opponent’s allegation,” or it will be disregarded. See 10B Charles Alan
Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738 at 356 (3d ed.1998). However, even where
a non-moving party fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment, a court cannot
automatically grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party. See Issa v. Comp USA, 354
F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1993). Rather, the court may enter summary judgment only if
Plaintiffs carry their burden under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and they are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. See Reed v. Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190, 1194-95 (10th Cir. 2002).
The Tenth Circuit has observed that the rights of pro se litigants require “careful
protection where highly technical requirements are involved…” Jaxon v. Circle K Corp., 773
F.2d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1984)).
With this guidance, the court reads Defendants’ Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment
with a liberal construction in mind; however, the court cannot, and will not, act as Defendants’
counsel in this matter. The court will not craft arguments on behalf of Defendants, or “peruse
the record…in search of evidence” not readily accessible, Securities and Exch. Comm’n v.

6

Capital Hldgs., L.L.C., No. 03-CV-00923-REB-CBS, 2006 WL 1660541, at *1 (D. Colo. June
12, 2006); but this court will consider the totality of admissible evidence, including but not
limited to the depositions of the Sacketts and their minor child (the transcripts of which Plaintiffs
submitted along with their Motion), in evaluating whether summary judgment is appropriate.
Indeed, Rule 56 explicitly provides that the court may consider “other materials” in the record in
adjudicating a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). See Pipkins v. Taillon,
No. 12-CV-02275-REB-KLM, 2014 WL 4197945, at *4 (D. Colo. Aug. 25, 2014).
Additionally, the court will not consider unverified statements not admitted to by the
opposing party.

See Lopez-Bignotte v. Ontivero, 42 F. App’x 404, 408 (10th Cir. 2002)

(affirming grant of summary judgment where non-moving party did not file affidavits or submit
other admissible evidence to refute the affidavits filed by moving party in support of motion for
summary judgment). The Sacketts did not refer to evidence in their Response or surreply, or
attach evidence thereto. [#110, #112]. The Response itself is styled as a “declaration,” and
concludes with each Defendant’s signature and the date but is not sworn under the penalty of
perjury. See [#110]. Similarly, the surreply contains entirely unsworn testimony, some of which
appears to take issue with other sworn testimony. [#112]. The Response and surreply do not
comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, and thus do not constitute evidence that can create factual
disputes for the purpose of precluding summary judgment. See Dodson v. Board of County
Com’rs, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1244 n.4 (D. Colo. 2012). See also Hayes v. Marriott, 70 F .3d
1144, 1148 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Unsworn affidavits do not raise factual issues precluding summary
judgment”) (citation omitted); Henderson v. Inter–Chem Coal Co., 41 F.3d 567, 569 n.1 (10th
Cir. 1994) (noting that unsworn affidavits may be used in summary judgment proceedings, but
only if they comply with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and are signed under penalty of

7

perjury). In addition, as discussed below, to the extent that Defendants are now attempting to
provide information that should have previously been disclosed in response to the Interrogatories
and were not reflected in their sworn deposition testimony, they will not be permitted to do so.
MATERIAL FACTS
Framework
Plaintiffs ask that the court deem as established the facts in Plaintiffs’ Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts “that correspond to Defendants’ failure to respond to Plaintiffs’
interrogatories,” which Plaintiffs cite as Undisputed Material Facts: 1-3, 11-13, 15, 23-25, 2829, 31-39, 42, 45-46, 59. [#104 at 4]. Plaintiffs state that these facts fall into five categories:
“(1) Defendants’ employment and nonpayment of Plaintiffs, (2) Defendants’ operation of their
businesses, (3) Defendants’ business dollar volume and inclusion in the ‘Retail and Service’
industry, (4) Defendants’ limited financial support of Plaintiffs, (5) Defendants’ expectation
that Plaintiffs work off their ‘debt’ by working without pay.” [Id.] The court agreed with
Plaintiffs in a previous order that Defendants should be precluded from (1) offering evidence
that was not disclosed in discovery; (2) contradicting testimony provided during their
depositions; and (3) relying on uncorroborated statements so as to contradict Plaintiffs’ asserted
factual allegations, where only Defendants (rather than Plaintiffs) have access to such
information. See [#91 at 16, #104]. As explained in more detail below, given the record before
it, the court cannot deem all of these facts as uncontested.
First, in light of Defendants’ sworn and consistent testimony at deposition that they did
not employ Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs performed no work for them, this court cannot accept
the proposed undisputed facts that relate to the duration and type of work performed by
Plaintiffs. For instance, the proffered undisputed fact in ¶ 23 contends:

8

Defendants required Esmeraldo Echon to perform a variety of jobs for them from
September 2011 through September of 2014. He worked on their rental
properties—cleaning, making repairs, doing yard work, and painting. He also
worked in Defendants’ fields, greenhouse, market, and at their home, including
building a garage and concrete wall fence, and flooring a warehouse. He generally
worked ten hours per day for six days per week.
[#104 at 6, ¶ 23]. For the same reasons, the court cannot deem as true the statement that “Justin
Echon worked in Defendants’ fields, on construction projects, and on other miscellaneous or
domestic work for about nine hours each day for six days each week.” [Id. at ¶ 34]. Nor can
the court deem as true the statement that “Defendants required Maribel Echon to work for
Defendants, by caring for Leonida Sackett and Esmeraldo Echon’s mother, Conchita Echon.”
[Id. at ¶ 36]. Indeed, these statements appear to be contradicted by third party evidence in the
record. For instance, Isidro Fierro testified during his deposition regarding Plaintiffs that,
“[t]hey – they will – I will see them walking, but never saw them working, but they’re supposed
to work, I don’t know.” [#104-28 at 15:9-11].4 Similarly, the Sacketts’ minor child testified
during her deposition that Plaintiffs never worked in the market or in the fields, and never took
care of Mrs. Conchita Echon.

See [#104-29].

This court finds no basis for depriving

Defendants the ability to testify consistently with the position they have always asserted, i.e.,
they did not employ Plaintiffs or otherwise cause Plaintiffs to perform work for them.
However, having unequivocally denied that Plaintiffs ever performed any work of any sort for
them, Defendants cannot temper their testimony at trial by suggesting that Plaintiffs may have
undertaken “some work,” or that they paid Plaintiffs for “any work” Plaintiffs may have
performed. See [#104 at 19].5 Similarly, Mrs. Sackett testified unequivocally at her deposition

4

In citing deposition transcripts, this court refers to the page number originally assigned in the
transcript of the deposition, not the page number assigned by the court’s ECF system.
5
Given the diametrically opposite testimony regarding these facts, the factfinder will be faced
with a black and white determination: either Plaintiffs worked for Defendants for the duration
9

that she and her husband provided “enough food” to Plaintiffs and that they provided food four
times a month. See [#104-22 at 151:9-17]. Accordingly, the court cannot deem as admitted the
statement that “Defendants failed to provide sufficient food to Plaintiffs, leaving them hungry.”
[#104 at ¶ 45].
However, the court will deem admitted other facts that Plaintiffs propose are undisputed
as a result of Defendants’ failure to appropriately respond to certain Interrogatories. For
instance, this court will accept as true that Defendants paid no more than $300 per month for
utilities for Plaintiffs’ housing in Rocky Ford, in light of Defendants’ failure to respond to
Interrogatory No. 8 regarding financial support provided to Plaintiffs and Jeffrey Echon. See
[#104 at ¶ 12]. This court will also accept as true that Defendants did not pay Esmeraldo or
Maribel Echon for any work and gave them money only a few times and after they had begged.
See [id. at ¶ 25]. Likewise, the court will accept as true the fact that Defendants occasionally
paid Justin Echon a small amount for work, and never paid Maribel Echon for work. [Id. at ¶¶
33, 38]. The court will also accept facts establishing that Plaintiffs depended on Defendants for
food and lodging.

[Id. at ¶¶ 42].

And, in light of Defendants’ failure to respond to

Interrogatory No. 3, the court will accept as true that Mr. Sackett was aware that his wife did
not pay Plaintiffs for any work. [Id. at ¶ 39].
Finally, some of the facts Plaintiffs propose as undisputed as a result of Defendants’
failure to respond are too attenuated to the associated Interrogatories, because the fact offered as
undisputed is not actually responsive to the particular Interrogatory. For example, Plaintiffs ask
to establish as true that when they “asked Defendants for help finding a paying job, Defendants
refused.” For support they cite Maribel Echon’s declaration and Defendants’ failure to respond

and amount described by Plaintiffs; or Plaintiffs did not work for Defendants at all. Defendants
should not be permitted to attempt to explain away evidence of labor undertaken by Plaintiffs.
10

to Interrogatory No. 8. However, Interrogatory No. 8 asks Defendants to “list all times you
financially supported any of the Plaintiffs or Jeffrey Echon,” and cannot fairly be read to
inquire into how or if Defendants responded to Plaintiffs’ request for help finding a paying job.
Similarly, Defendants’ failure to respond to Interrogatory Nos. 6, 7, 15, and 16 does not
correlate to establishing as true the statement that “Leonida Sackett told Plaintiffs that they
needed to work off their debt for the costs Defendants had incurred for bringing Plaintiffs to the
United States [sic] She never specified the amount they owed or a timeframe for paying it off.”
[#104 at ¶ 13]. This court is even more reluctant to deem such a fact admitted in light of Mrs.
Sackett’s unequivocal denial that she ever threatened Plaintiffs. See [#104-22 at 162:13-14].
The facts as discerned by this court, both undisputed and disputed, are set forth in detail below.
Undisputed Material Facts
In applying the framework as set forth above, the court concludes that the following facts
are undisputed.

Defendants own and operate a farm and retail produce market known as

“Sackett’s Farm Market,” and own several residential rental properties in Rocky Ford, Colorado.
[#1 at ¶¶ 10, 12, #11 at ¶¶ 10, 12]. Defendants earned more than 50 percent of their annual dollar
volume of business from sales to the public transacted through their market. [#1 at ¶ 11, #11 at ¶
11, #104-21 at 22:10-14, 75:2-20, 126:13-17].

Defendants are in charge of the day to day

operation of their businesses, including supervision of the work. [#104-21 at 99:18-19, 175:21176:2, #104-22 at 54:13-15, 56:9-14, 62:6-8, 177:9-11].
Defendant Leonida Sackett is a U.S. Citizen. [#1 at ¶ 20, #11 at ¶ 20]. Esmeraldo Echon
is Mrs. Sackett’s brother, and Plaintiff Maribel Echon is married to Esmeraldo Echon. Mrs.
Sackett petitioned the U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) to obtain legal permanent
residency status for Plaintiffs. [#1 at ¶ 23, #11 at ¶ 23]. Defendants signed USCIS Form I-864

11

Affidavit of Support as the sponsors of Plaintiffs. [#104-6]. Plaintiffs were approved as U.S.
Legal Permanent Residents and traveled to the United States to live. [#104-18 at ¶¶ 5, 7, 16,
#104-19 at ¶ 7]. Esmeraldo Echon moved to Rocky Ford, Colorado from the Philippines in
September 2011. [#104-18 at ¶ 5, #104-19 at ¶ 6]. In April 2012, Maribel Echon moved to
Rocky Ford with three of their sons, Plaintiff Justin Echon, Jeffrey (who is not a party to this
action), and a minor son. [#104-18 at ¶ 6, #104-19 at ¶¶ 5, 7]. Plaintiffs lived in one of the rental
houses owned by the Sacketts until mid-September 2014. [#104-18 at ¶¶ 19, 122, #104-19 at ¶¶
13, 62]. At all times relevant to this, case the rental value of the housing Defendants provided to
Plaintiffs was no more than $750 per month. [#51 at ¶ 24].6 The Sacketts supplied Plaintiffs with
food valued at $12,500, or less. [Id. at ¶ 25]. The Sacketts provided for transportation for Justin
Echon and Plaintiffs’ minor son to and from school, valued at approximately $1,600. [Id. at ¶ 30].
To the extent a jury finds that Esmeraldo and Maribel Echon performed work for the Sacketts, the
Sacketts did not pay for their work and only gave them money a few times after the Echons had
begged, [#104-18 at ¶¶ 21, 59, 67, 78, #104-19 at ¶¶ 16-17, #104-24 at ¶ 20], and William Sackett
was aware that his wife did not pay Plaintiffs for their work. [#104-18 at ¶ 113, #104-20 at ¶ 23].
Similarly, to the extent a jury finds that Justin Echon performed work for the Sacketts, William
Sackett paid Justin Echon only occasionally, and only a small sum for his work. [#104-20 at ¶¶
20-21, 26, 35-36, #104-18 at ¶¶ 21, 23, 67, #104-15].

6

On September 22, 2015, Defendants filed an Objection to this court’s Recommendation that a
motion to vacate be converted into a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and denied. See
[#51]. This court declines to accept the Objection and assertions therein into evidence as
interrogatory responses on which the Sacketts can rely to carry their Rule 56(c)(1)(B) burden,
because the Objection is not sworn to under oath. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). However, this
court accepts Plaintiffs’ references to the Objection in support of their Statement of Undisputed
Facts, see, e.g., [#104 at ¶¶ 43, 49], and for the purpose of satisfying their Rule 56(c)(1)(A)
burden. See [id. at 29]. See also F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A) (an opposing party’s statement is not
hearsay if it is offered against an opposing party and “was made by the party in an individual or
representative capacity.”).
12

Plaintiffs spoke very little English when they arrived in the United States and still are not
fluent in English. [#104-18 at ¶ 15, #104-19 at ¶ 10]. Defendants kept Maribel and Justin
Echon’s residency and Social Security cards from Plaintiffs for over a year. [#104-18 at ¶¶ 41,
42]. In January 2013, Esmeraldo Echon suffered from complications with his kidneys. [#104-18
at ¶¶ 79-80]. Plaintiffs depended on Defendants for food and lodging. [#104-18 at ¶ 30, #104-20
at ¶ 9]. Justin Echon and his minor brother attended school in Rocky Ford. The Sacketts rarely
bought clothing or shoes for Plaintiffs, or school supplies for Esmeraldo and Maribel’s school-age
children. [#104-19 at ¶ 51, #104-25 at ¶ 11].
In the fall of 2013, Plaintiffs applied for food stamps with Otero County, Colorado. They
ultimately received food stamps for their minor son, and by summer of 2014 were receiving $189
per month. [#104-18 at ¶ 120, #104-19 at ¶ 60, #104-20 at ¶ 36, #104-24 at ¶ 24, #104-3 at 8-9].
Plaintiffs received food and clothes from service providers, a Presbyterian Church, the food bank,
and the Salvation Army. [#104-18 at ¶¶ 83-84, #104-19 at ¶ 53, #104-25 at ¶¶ 5, 9, 11, #104-23
at ¶ 4, #104-24 at ¶ 23].
In June 2014, Plaintiffs sought assistance from Colorado Legal Services to help them
leave the Sacketts. [#104-18 at ¶¶ 98, 108, #104-19 at ¶ 54]. Around this time, Esmeraldo and
Maribel Echon started working at odd jobs for Rocky Ford resident Phyllis Adkins, who would
provide transportation for them to and from her home. [#104-18 at ¶ 121, #104-19 at ¶ 61, #10425 at ¶ 13, #104-23 at ¶ 7]. Plaintiffs left Rocky Ford in September of 2014. [#104-19 at ¶ 54,
#104-25 at ¶ 16]. Since their departure, they have not received any money or support from the
Sacketts. [#104-18 at ¶ 122, #104-19 at ¶ 62, #104-20 at ¶ 37]. In October 2014, Plaintiffs earned
about $250 working at a cell-phone company. [#104-18 at ¶ 123, #104-19 at ¶ 62, #104-20 at ¶

13

38].7

After the job with the cell phone company, Plaintiffs were not able to find stable

employment until January 2015. [#104-18 at ¶ 124, #104-19 at ¶ 63]. Since January 2015,
Esmeraldo and Maribel Echon have been employed full time. [#104-18 at ¶ 124, #104-19 at ¶
64].
Disputed Material Facts
The Sacketts did not provide a statement of undisputed material facts, or challenge the
statement of undisputed material facts presented by Plaintiffs. Nonetheless, the record contains
evidence, provided by Plaintiffs, that gives rise to genuine and material disputes of fact. That
evidence is as follows.8 William Sackett testified at his deposition that he manages the farm and
supervises those who work on his farm. [#104-21 at 99:18-19, 111:21-22]. He testified that none
of Leonida Sackett’s family members worked on the Sacketts’ farm:
Q: Do any of Leonida’s family members work on the farm?
A: No.
Q: Have they ever?
A: No.
Q: No one’s ever worked on the farm?
A: No.
Q: Not one day?
A: Not one day.
Q: So none of the plaintiffs in this case—
A: They never worked. They never was employed. They was never asked to be
employed. They was never, ever any time card filled out, any I-9 form filled out.
No Social Security cards taken, no numbers, nothing. They absolutely did no farm
work or any employment of any kind on the farm…or on any other thing that the
Sackett family owns.

7

It is unclear which Plaintiff held this job, as the declarations of all three Plaintiffs include the
same statement.
8

In finding that these facts are contested, this court notes that in certain instances statements in
Plaintiffs’ declarations find support in other documents in the record. This court stresses,
however, that it in no way passes on the veracity of the testimony of any of the Parties or
witnesses. Rather, this court is mindful that its role at this juncture is not to weigh evidence or
judge credibility. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000);
Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1165–66 (10th Cir. 2008).
14

[#104-21 at 102:2-22]. In response to follow-up questions, Mr. Sackett testified that Plaintiffs
undertook no “custom work,” and while they “may have did something on the – not on the farm,
something on the property I own,” they were “never employed or never asked to do anything, not
of an employment nature.” [Id. at 103:2-9]. He also testified that Plaintiffs were “never, ever
asked to do any work or ever employed to do any work,” and that they “never did no work they
was not paid for [and] [t]hey never did any work that they was paid for because they never did no
work that was employed.” [Id. at 105:12-25]. Plaintiffs’ counsel asked Mr. Sackett, “did
[Plaintiffs] perform any activity related to work, whether it was paid or unpaid, whether it was
related to employment or not?,” to which Mr. Sackett responded, “I’m going to tell you, no.” [Id.
at 107:13-17]. Plaintiffs’ counsel also asked Mr. Sackett about whether he ever saw Plaintiffs
performing work of any kind on the Sacketts’ property:
Q: You never saw them volunteer?
A: No, sir.
Q: You never saw them work on your farm?
A: No, sir.
Q: You never saw them work in the market?
A: No, sir. They never worked in the market.
[Id. at 110:3-9]. Mr. Sackett testified that his minor daughter, by contrast, works on the farm: “Q:
What type of work does she do…A: Oh, heck, just whatever there is to do; feed the horse…I
mean, what can’t she do. She can…the gal can do anything that I ask her to do. I ask her to drive
a tractor, plant and plow and disk and -- she can do it.” [#104-21 at 99:29-100:5]. Mr. Sackett
testified that his daughter has been working on the farm since she was approximately eight years
old and that she is not paid. [Id. at 100:18-24 (“Well, she’s 18. So she’s been working with me
for probably 10 years. And she don’t get paid.”)]. In response to questions regarding how many
hours a day Mr. Sackett’s daughter works, he testified:
A: I don’t know. There’s all different hours, you know. She’s family, you know,
15

you don’t – how many hours does a family work? What difference does it make?
You know – you know, you’re asking questions again that don’t amount to
nothing.
Q: Well, I still want to know an answer. It can be your best guess. How many
hours does she work?
A: One hour a day.
…
Q: During the busiest season, she works one hour a day?
A: Oh, maybe she might work – she might work 8 or 10 then. She don’t get paid
even then.
[Id. at 100:25-101:17].
During her deposition, Leonida Sackett testified that Esmeraldo Echon did not work
around the Sacketts’ property. He did not clean the yard, help with maintenance, care for
Conchita Echon (Mrs. Sackett and Esmeraldo Echon’s mother), work at the Sacketts’ market, or
work on the Sacketts’ farm. [#104-22 at 157:12-158-25, 159:10-23]. Leonida Sackett testified
that Maribel Echon did nothing to contribute around the Sacketts’ property, and that she generally
stayed home and took care of her children. [Id. at 159:24-160:4]. Mrs. Sackett testified that
Maribel Echon did not care for Conchita Echon, “[n]ot one thing.” [Id. at 161:16-22, 180:15-17].
Mrs. Sackett also testified that she was not abusive to Esmeraldo or Maribel Echon, and rather,
Maribel was verbally abusive to her. See, e.g., [id. at 168:9-23, 218:11-21]. She also testified that
Plaintiffs were dependent on her for food and health care, but that they had access at all times to a
vehicle and Esmeraldo could drive. [Id. at 220:17-221:17, 223:3]. Mrs. Sackett testified that
Plaintiffs did not feel that they owed her a debt, did not feel obligated to help around the property,
and did not worry that she would withhold food or care. [Id. at 223:4-21]. She further testified
she never threatened to have Esmeraldo or Maribel deported. [Id. at 214:17-215:4]. Rather, she
encouraged them to learn English, attend school, and find employment. [Id. at 219:17-220:1,
224:4, 224:24-225:5-8].
Mrs. Sackett also testified that she remembered when Plaintiffs moved from Rocky Ford
16

to Manzanola, Colorado, and testified, in response to questioning about what she thought about
Plaintiffs working in Manzanola, that she “love[d] it…when they went to work.” [#104-22 at
227:5-11]. She testified that Esmeraldo and Maribel wanted her to care for the children while
they lived and worked in Manzanola, [id. at 227:12-228:25], and that she warned Esmeraldo and
Maribel Echon when they left Rocky Ford that “they might get in trouble for leaving [their] kids
at home.” [Id. at 232:6-233:18]. Mrs. Sackett testified that Esmeraldo and Maribel chose to
return to Rocky Ford because they could not afford to pay for their apartment in Manzanola. [Id.
at 230:1-5]. She testified that she gave Esmeraldo Echon $3,500 during the first year he lived in
Rocky Ford to satisfy a mortgage on land in the Philippines; she otherwise did not give him or the
other Plaintiffs money during their stay. [Id. at 266:10-17].
In light of the Sacketts’ testimony, the court finds that the following testimony given by
Plaintiffs, and identified in the Motion for Summary Judgment as undisputed, is in fact disputed.
Esmeraldo Echon attests that Defendants required him to perform a variety of jobs for them from
September 2011 through September of 2014. He worked on their rental properties—cleaning,
making repairs, doing yard work, and painting.

He also worked in Defendants’ fields,

greenhouse, market, and at their home, including building a garage and concrete wall fence, and
flooring a warehouse. He generally worked ten hours per day, six days per week. [#104-18 at ¶¶
51-53, 56-58, 64-65, 68-69, 71-74, 82, 90, 92, 93, 95, 97, 109, #104-24 at ¶¶ 6-16]. He attests
that Leonida Sackett primarily directed him in the work he performed, but that William Sackett
ordered work done as well on several occasions, and William Sackett was aware of all the work
Esmeraldo Echon performed for them. [#104-18 at ¶ 111]. Except for a one week period in 2012,
Leonida Sackett did not allow Esmeraldo Echon to work anywhere else. [#104-18 at ¶¶ 29, 36].
In the fall and winter of 2012, the Sacketts “lent” Esmeraldo and Jeffrey Echon to their friends in

17

Rocky Ford for two or three months to construct a warehouse. Esmeraldo and Jeffrey Echon
worked eight hours each day for six days each week during this time. [#104-18 at ¶¶ 72-76].
Esmeraldo Echon is “sure” that the friends paid the Sacketts for the labor, but he and his son did
not receive payment. [Id. at ¶¶ 77-78]. Leonida Sackett told Plaintiffs not to talk about their
living and working conditions. She told Esmeraldo Echon to lie and say he and his family were
just helping out, and she attempted to prevent him from talking to anyone. [#104-18 at ¶¶ 48-50].
Justin Echon attests that he attended high school between August 2012 and May 2013 and
August 2013 and May 2014, but worked at least one day a week for the Sacketts, and also every
day during summers and school holidays. [#104-20 at ¶¶ 11-14, 16-19, 24, 27-28]. He attests that
William Sackett assigned work to him. [#104-20 at ¶ 22]. Justin Echon attests that he worked in
Defendants’ fields, on construction projects, and on other miscellaneous or domestic work jobs
for about nine hours each day for six days each week. [#104-20 at ¶¶ 11, 13, 17, 25]. And he
attests that during the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 school years, he worked one day every week,
usually Saturdays, for nine hours and usually in the fields. [Id. at ¶¶ 16- 18, 24, 27, 29].
Maribel Echon attests that the Sacketts required her to work on their farm, and at their
market, rental properties, and home for about six hours per day, three days per week. [#104-19 at
¶¶ 33-34, #104-24 at ¶¶ 17-19]. Between April 2012 and September 2014, the Sacketts required
Maribel Echon to work for them by caring for Conchita Echon. [#104-19 at ¶¶ 19, 21, #104-24 at
¶¶ 17-19, #104-4 at 3-8]. She attests that Defendants never paid her for any of her work, [#10418 at ¶¶ 21, 23, 67, #104-19 at ¶¶ 17, 27, 38, 52].
Plaintiffs attest that Leonida Sackett told them they needed to work off their debt for the
costs Defendants had incurred for bringing Plaintiffs to the United States. Leonida Sackett never
specified the amount Plaintiffs owed or a timeframe for paying off the debt. [#104-18 at ¶¶ 25-

18

27, 31-33, 40, #104-19 at ¶ 35]. Plaintiffs did not want to work without pay and told Leonida
Sackett they wanted to find paying jobs. [#104-18 at ¶¶ 28, 34, 35, #104-19 at ¶ 35]. When
Plaintiffs asked Defendants for help finding a paying job, Defendants refused. [#104-18 at ¶¶ 3436]. Defendants coerced Plaintiffs into working for them for no pay by threatening to deport
Plaintiffs and through verbal abuse. [#104-18 at ¶¶ 20-22, 37-39, 44, #104-19 at ¶¶ 14, 15, 18,
#104-20 at ¶ 10, #104-24 at ¶ 27]. Leonida Sackett threatened to deport Plaintiffs on multiple
occasions, [#104-18 at ¶ 44, #104-19 at ¶ 37, #104-20 at ¶ 10], and Plaintiffs believed Leonida
Sackett could have their family deported because she sponsored their applications for legal
permanent residency. [#104-18 at ¶ 45, #104-19 at ¶¶ 35-37, #104-20 at ¶ 10, #104-23 at ¶ 11].
Finally, Plaintiffs attest that the Sacketts failed to provide them with sufficient food. [#104-18 at
¶¶ 60-63, #104-25 at ¶ 9, #104-23 at ¶¶ 4, 7, #104-24 at ¶¶ 22-23].
Plaintiffs attest that in April 2013, a workforce organization in Rocky Ford tried to help
them leave their situation with the Sacketts and move to Manzanola, Colorado. Leonida Sackett
would not allow Esmeraldo and Maribel Echon’s younger sons to leave, and Plaintiffs “had no
means to bring them to Manzanola to live with [them],” or to find work. Plaintiffs returned to
Rocky Ford after approximately one month.

[#104-18 at ¶¶ 86-89, #104-19 at ¶¶ 41-42].

Plaintiffs lived in fear of Defendants, and felt they had no choice but to work for Defendants.
[#104-18 at ¶¶ 31, 47, #104-19 at ¶ 36, #104-20 at ¶¶ 9-10]. Plaintiffs felt trapped and hoped
someone would help them escape from their situation with Defendants. [#104-18 at ¶ 85].
Plaintiffs suffered emotionally and suffered from loss of sleep and depression as a result of
Defendants’ verbal abuse and threats. [#104-18 at ¶ 114, #104-19 at ¶ 55, #104-20 at ¶¶ 31-32].

19

ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs allege that over the course of three years, the Sacketts systematically coerced
and threatened them into working without pay. The Sacketts dispute the allegation generally, and
contend that they paid for Plaintiffs to leave the Philippines, and provided for Plaintiffs in Rocky
Ford, strictly as acts of beneficence.
I.

Statutory Claims9
A. Claim One: Liability Under Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1589, asserted by Esmeraldo Echon and Justin Echon
1. Applicable Law
The forced labor provision of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000

(“TVPA”), as

amended

by

the

William

Wilberforce Trafficking

Victims

Protection

Reauthorization Act of 2008 (“TVPRA”), governs forced labor, and identifies as a criminal
defendant one who:
[K]nowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person by any one of, or
by any combination of, the following means-(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical
restraint to that person or another person;
(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another
person;
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or
(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to
believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or
another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint.
18 U.S.C. § 1589(a). In addition, liability lies for anyone who “knowingly benefits, financially or
by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in the
providing or obtaining of labor or services by any of the means described in subsection (a),

9

Plaintiffs represent in the Motion for Summary Judgment that they “intend to dismiss Claim 2,”
which asserts a violation of the FLSA. [#104 at 1 n.1]. See also [#1].
20

knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the venture has engaged in the providing or
obtaining of labor or services by any of such means.” Id. at § 1589(b). The TVPRA contains a
civil remedy provision that establishes a private cause of action against one who violates the
statute:
An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action
against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving
anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should
have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate
district court of the United States and may recover damages and reasonable
attorneys fees.
Id. at 1595(a). See also Mojsilovic v. Oklahoma ex rel. Board of Regents for University of
Oklahoma, 841 F.3d 1129, 1130 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting the TVPRA “provides a civil remedy for
victims of forced labor”).

Section 1589 defines “abused or threatened abuse of law or legal

process,” as:
the use or threatened use of a law or legal process, whether administrative, civil, or
criminal, in any manner or for any purpose for which the law was not designed, in
order to exert pressure on another person to cause that person to take some action
or refrain from taking some action.
18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(1). The term “serious harm” is defined as:
any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or
reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding
circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the
same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or services in order
to avoid incurring that harm.
Id. at § 1589(c)(2).
Esmeraldo and Justin Echon argue that the Sacketts are liable under this claim for serious
harm or threats of serious harm, abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process, or for a
scheme, plan, or pattern that was intended to cause Plaintiffs to believe they would suffer serious
harm if they did not perform the labor. See [#104 at 13-14]. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(2)-(4).

21

2. Evidence
Esmeraldo Echon.

Esmeraldo Echon attests as follows. “As soon as I arrived in

Colorado, Nida informed me that I owed her a large amount of money. She said this was for the
support she had given me in the Philippines and for the cost of obtaining my legal immigration
status.” “Nida told me that I was only in the United States because she sponsored me and that I
needed to repay her for that debt. Before this, she never said that I had to pay her for sponsoring
me, or for buying me a plane ticket to the US.” “Nida told me that I had to work this debt off by
providing her and Bill with free labor.” [#104-18 at ¶¶ 25-27]. When Esmeraldo Echon’s wife
and three sons “arrived in the U.S. in 2012, Nida informed them that they owed her a large debt
and they needed to work it off by providing free labor to her and Bill.” [Id. at ¶ 40]. “Shortly
after Maribel and our sons arrived in the US, their residency documents and Social Security cards
arrived at the Sacketts’ home,” and the Sacketts “kept these important documents for over a year
without giving them to, me, Maribel or my sons.” [Id. at ¶¶ 41-42]. Esmeraldo Echon and his
family’s native language is Ilocano and their second language is Tagalog. He is learning English,
but is not fluent. [Id. at ¶ 15].
Esmeraldo Echon also attests:
[f]or about three years, from 2011-2014, the Sacketts forced me to work in their
fields, at their farm market, to clean and fix their rental properties, and perform
various other jobs. During the nearly three years that we worked for Nida and Bill,
we (my wife Maribel, and my sons Jeffrey and Justin) were almost never paid for
the work we performed. Sometimes Justin received a small amount at the end of
the week, but, it was far less than minimum wage. During this time, Nida and Bill
forced us to work under sometimes-harsh conditions, often without enough food.
[Id. at ¶¶ 20-21].
I felt that I had no choice but to work for Nida and Bill, just as they insisted. Nida
never told me the exact amount of money that I owed her. Nida also never gave
me any timeframe in which my debt would be paid off. Nida just told me that I
owed her a large amount of money and that I would have to work a long time for
22

free to pay it off.
[Id. at ¶¶ 31-33].
Additionally, “Nida and Bill told us we had to work for them; they said if we did not, they
would have us deported from the United States or kicked out of their house. Nida also verbally
abused us and threatened us. She would get mad and threaten us. She would swear at me, and
argue with us.” [Id. at ¶ 23]. “Nida would regularly threaten me with deportation if I did not do
what she told me to do”; “Nida exploited my feelings of obligation toward her for bringing me
and my family here”; “Nida would repeat those feelings of obligation to coerce me to continue
working for her and Bill without pay”; and “Nida regularly threatened to deport us if we did not
do the work she wanted us to do or if we were not working to her liking.” [Id. at ¶¶ 37-39, 44].
“I did not know any differently; I thought that Nida could have me and my family deported since
she was the sponsor for our legal permanent residency in the US.” [Id. at ¶ 45]. “[T]here were
times that I would come home from working, and I would see Maribel and my sons crying
because Nida had been to the house, and had been mean to them. She verbally abused them. She
said terrible things to them.” [Id. at ¶ 106]. “Since the Sacketts began verbally abusing and
threatening me, I have suffered emotionally, including losing sleep and being depression [sic].”
[Id. at ¶ 114]. “I did not want to work for them without pay. I wanted to find a job where I could
earn a wage so that I could help build a life for myself and my family in the United States.” [Id.
at ¶ 28]. “On many occasions, I told Nida that I wanted to find a paying job. When I would say
this, Nida would tell me that I still owed her a lot of money and I needed to keep working it off.”
[Id. at ¶¶ 34-35]. “I felt that I had no choice but to work for Nida and Bill, just as they insisted.”
[Id. at ¶ 31]. “I was forced to depend on Nida and Bill for food, lodging, transportation, and
communication with others.” [Id. at ¶ 30]. Finally:

23

Many times, Nida stressed to me, my wife, and our older sons that we should not
talk to anyone about our work or our living conditions. In fact, many times when I
was working at the market, Nida told me to tell anyone who asked that I was not
working; I was just to tell them that I was just helping out my sister. Several
times, Nida tried to prevent me from talking to anyone except her and Bill.
[Id. at ¶¶ 48-50].
In April 2013, a workforce organization in Rocky Ford tried to help Plaintiffs to leave
their situation with the Sacketts and move to Manzanola, Colorado. Leonida Sackett would not
allow Esmeraldo and Maribel Echon’s younger sons to leave, and Plaintiffs “had no means to
bring them to Manzanola to live with [them],” or to find work. Plaintiffs returned to Rocky Ford
after approximately one month. [#104-18 at ¶¶ 86-89] see also [#104-19 at ¶¶ 41-42].
Maribel Echon. Maribel Echon attests as follows. “For a little more than two years, from
about April 2012 to June 2014, Nida and Bill forced me and my two older sons to work in their
fields, at their farm market, to clean and maintain their rental properties, and perform various
other jobs. My husband had to do this work also, and he was in the US for about a year before the
rest of us arrived.” [#104-19 at ¶¶ 14-15]. “Nida and Bill told my family and me that we had to
work for them. They said if we didn’t, they would have us deported from the United States, or
they would kick us out of their house. Leonida also verbally abused and threatened us. She called
us mean names, ordered us around, and swore at us on many occasions.” [Id. at ¶ 18]. “Nida
would often threaten me that she was going to call the police or the immigration authorities if I
did something not to her liking.” [Id. at ¶ 37]. “Since Nida began verbally abusing and
threatening me, I have suffered emotionally, including but not limited to loss of sleep and feelings
of depression and hopelessness.” [Id. at ¶ 55]. “I did not want to perform any of these tasks
without pay; however, Nida would force me to do this work by verbally insulting me and telling
me that I was obligated to do so because of all the assistance she had provided to me, my husband,

24

and my sons in the Philippines and in Colorado.” [Id. at ¶ 35]. And, “[w]henever we asked for
help in finding a paying job, such as help with transportation, Nida or Bill refused to provide any
help and continued to force us to work for them without pay.” [Id. at ¶ 40]. “I felt that I had no
other option than to follow Nida’s orders.” [Id. at ¶ 36]. Maribel Echon is learning English but is
not fluent. [Id. at ¶ 10].
Justin Echon. Justin Echon attests as follows. He believed that he, his parents, and his
brothers “would suffer serious harm if I did not do the work my aunt and uncle told me to do. My
Aunt and Uncle told us they would deport us if we did not do the work they told us to do; I did not
know better, and believed that they could deport us, so I felt I had no choice but to work for my
aunt and uncle.” [#104-20 at ¶ 10]. “It was upsetting to see my mother and father be treated the
way they were by my Aunt Nida and Uncle Bill. I did not like how my aunt and uncle cursed at
my parents. I also did not like how they never gave us much food, or let my Mother and Father
work anywhere else.” [Id. at ¶ 31]. “I could see that my parents were completely dependent on
my aunt and uncle for support and I believed that I had no other choice but to do the work my
Aunt Nida made me do.” [Id. at ¶ 9]. “Since Nida began verbally abusing and threatening me, I
suffered emotionally including loss of sleep and feelings of depression and hopelessness.” [Id. at
¶ 32].
Nonparties. A friend of Plaintiffs, Albert Hall, provided a declaration in support of
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. [#104-24]. Some of Mr. Hall’s statements are
admissible, and will be considered by the court. For instance, Mr. Hall attests:
Junior and Maribel did work for Defendants Bill and Leonida Sackett on a regular
basis, for many days and many hours during the period I knew them.. … I
witnessed them working a various locations on the Sacketts’ property on many
occasions when I picked them up from work, brought them food, or just stopped
by to see them.

25

[Id. at ¶ 6]. Mr. Hall further attests that “I saw Junior working for Defendants on many occasions.
I saw him at the Sacketts’ produce stand several times, during the late spring and summer months,
when the produce stand was open.” [Id. at ¶ 7]. The court considers these statements to be
admissible evidence. However, other statements offered by Mr. Hall are not admissible, such as:
Junior and Maribel told me that if he took a day off from working the fields,
Leonida would say that he needed to work more. She would say that Junior’s
family was costing the Sacketts money and that she was letting them have a house.
She also threatened to send them back to the Philippines since she was their
sponsor.
[#104-24 at ¶ 27]. See F.R.E. 801(c). These statements are inadmissible hearsay that cannot be
considered at summary judgment. See Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 452
F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[S]ummary judgment courts should disregard inadmissible
hearsay statements contained in affidavits, as those statements could not be presented at trial in
any form.”)
Another friend of Plaintiffs and resident of Otero County, Colorado, Phyllis Adkins,
attests that, from her experience and observations, “the Echons are a very nice family and hard
workers. There was a time when many church members were involved at just helping them
survive. They were in a very difficult situation. They were scared to death that Leonida was
going to send them back to the Philippines.” [#104-23 at ¶ 11]. She also attests:
Leonida would not allow them to run the air conditioner that was installed in the
house, and sometimes threatened to turn off the gas if they didn’t work for her. On
one occasion, Maribel Echon asked me if it was normal to have an electric bill for
$2,000, because that is what Leonida had told them it cost.
[Id. at ¶ 10]. These statements are admissible.
Finally, Frances Miller, a resident of Otero County and secretary of the Community
Presbyterian Church in Rocky Ford, attests that she met Emeraldo and Maribel Echon in 2014
when they approached the food bank at her church. [#104-25 at ¶ 5]. Ms. Miller attests that
26

“Maribel also told me that they were only given one roll of toilet paper for the entire family to
use, and very little soap.” [Id. at ¶ 10]. This statement is inadmissible hearsay and is not
considered by the court. Additionally, the court will not admit Ms. Miller’s statements that
“Junior and Maribel came to the food pantry at the Church because they said they needed some
food. Maribel said that Nida was not giving them enough food,” [id. at ¶ 7]; “Maribel told me
that Nida only gave them a bag of rice and one chicken each month and it just was not enough to
feed all of them who were living together, [id. at ¶ 8]; and “Junior told me that he had built a
fence at Nida’s house, and that he was not paid for the work he did, [id. at ¶ 14]. These
attestations constitute out of court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and
Plaintiffs do not suggest that an exception applies. However, the court will admit Ms. Miller’s
statement that she and “other Church members…got together a big supply of paper products like
toilet paper, paper towels, soap and laundry detergent and gave it all to the Echon family.” [Id.
at ¶ 10].
3. Application
There is limited case law from the Tenth Circuit discussing the types of acts and conduct
that qualify as means of serious harm or abuse of law or legal process for purposes of TVPRA
liability. Therefore, the court considers cases from other jurisdictions that have encountered the
question.
Typically…forced labor situations involve circumstances such as squalid or
otherwise intolerable living conditions, extreme isolation (from family and the
outside world), threats of inflicting harm upon the victim or others (including
threats of legal process such as arrest or deportation), and exploitation of the
victim’s lack of education and familiarity with the English language, all of which
are used to prevent [vulnerable] victims from leaving and to keep them bound to
their captors.
Muchira v. Al-Rawaf, 850 F.3d 605, 618-19 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Callahan,

27

801 F.3d 606, 619 (6th Cir. 2015) and collecting cases) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).

Courts have found that “serious harm” includes “threats of any consequences,

whether physical or non-physical, that are sufficient under all of the surrounding circumstances
to compel or coerce a reasonable person in the same situation to provide or to continue providing
labor or services.” Shukla v. Sharma, No. 07-CV-2972, 2012 WL 481796, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.
14, 2012) (quoting United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 151 (1st Cir. 2004), vacated on
sentencing grounds, 545 U.S. 1101, 125 S.Ct. 2543, 162 L.Ed.2d 271 (2005)). The Shukla court
relied on law from the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits to determine that a worker’s
“employment and living conditions” may provide support for finding that a defendant’s threats
“plausibly...compelled the victim[ ] to serve.” Id. (quoting United States v. Farrell, 563 F.3d
364, 373 (8th Cir. 2009) and citing United States v. Veerapol, 312 F.3d 1128, 1130–21 (9th Cir.
2002) (considering working conditions, including “excessive working hours,” in analyzing
involuntary servitude claim); United States v. Sabhnani, 539 F. Supp. 2d 617, 620 (2d Cir. 2010)
(affirming forced labor convictions where victims, who did not speak English and did not know
how to drive or use a telephone, were, among other things, brought into the United States
illegally, physically abused, forced to sleep on the floor, dressed in rags, provided inadequate
food, and threatened with arrest). See also United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 713 (7th
Cir. 2008) (affirming forced labor conviction of defendants who kept Filipino woman for
nineteen years, requiring her to work sixteen-hour days, seven days a week, rarely permitting her
to walk outside, and allowing her to speak with her family on only a few occasions).
Additionally, multiple jurisdictions have found that the threat of deportation may itself
constitute a threat sufficient to satisfy the second and/or third element of forced labor. Aguirre v.
Best Care Agency, 961 F. Supp. 2d 427, 444 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (stating that “[t]he threat of

28

deportation alone may support a claim for forced labor” under § 1589); Nuñag-Tanedo v. E.
Baton Rouge, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that the threat of
deportation constitutes “abuse of legal process” within the meaning of section 1589 since the
objective is to intimidate or coerce the victim into forced labor); Mojsilovic v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Board of Regents for the University of Oklahoma, No. CIV–14–886–R, 2015 WL 1542236, at *3
(W.D. Okla. Apr. 7, 2015) (collecting cases). See also United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931,
948 (1988) (“[T]hreatening...an immigrant with deportation could constitute the threat of legal
coercion that induces involuntary servitude, even though such a threat made to an adult citizen of
normal intelligence would be too implausible to produce involuntary servitude.”).
The second element regarding serious harm may also be satisfied by evidence that the
worker/victim was subjected to repeated abuse or threats of violence. See Guobadia v. Irowa,
103 F. Supp. 3d 325, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding genuine issues of material fact precluded
summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff’s forced labor claims, citing plaintiff’s
testimony that “she was subjected to repeated physical, verbal, and emotional abuse,” by
defendants, that an individual defendant’s “physical blows resulted in visible bruises to the
Plaintiff's face,” and the same defendant “dragged the Plaintiff on a staircase.”).
“When considering whether an employer’s conduct was sufficiently serious to coerce the
victim to provide labor or services against her will, we must also ‘consider the particular
vulnerabilities of a person in the victim’s position.’” Muchira, 850 F.3d at 618 (quoting United
States v. Rivera, 799 F.3d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 2015)). See also Guobadia, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 336
(noting that under the totality of the circumstances, “the fact that the Plaintiff may have been
able to come and go as she pleased from the home does not mean the Defendants were not
engaging her in unlawful forced labor”) (quoting Elat v. Ngoubene, 993 F. Supp. 2d 497 (D. Md.

29

2014) (observing that “[a]lthough the record is replete with evidence that Plaintiff left the
Ngoubene home on various occasions and returned, this evidence must be considered under the
totality of the circumstances,” and finding “there is a sufficient dispute of material fact to permit
a jury to determine whether Plaintiff understood that she had any other option”). Courts look to
whether a defendant’s “misconduct has created a situation where ceasing labor would cause a
plaintiff serious harm,” recognizing that what constitutes serious harm for that plaintiff must be
determined by considering the totality of the circumstances presented. Nuñag-Tanedo, 790 F.
Supp. 2d at 1145. Serious harm encompasses “not only physical violence, but also more subtle
psychological methods of coercion.” Bradley, 390 F.3d at 150.
employer-employee

relationships

will

constitute

forced

However, “not all bad

labor.”

Aguilera

v.

Aegis

Communications Group, LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 975, 978 (W.D. Mo. 2014). See also Muchira,
850 F.3d at 619-20 (affirming award of summary judgment to defendants, observing that
plaintiff admitted that she came to the United States willingly, defendants never physically
abused her or threatened her or her loved ones with physical harm, defendants never physically
restrained or impeded her from leaving her employment situation, and defendants never
threatened her with arrest, deportation, adverse immigration consequences, or other legal
consequences if she left their employment); Bradley, 390 F.3d at 155 (noting distinction between
“merely abusive employers” and employers who “deliberately sought to compel forced labor”);
United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 629 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that “we should not—
without a clear expression of Congressional intent—transform a statute passed to implement the
Thirteenth Amendment against slavery or involuntary servitude into one that generally makes it
a crime for a person in loco parentis to require household chores, or makes child abuse a federal
crime.”).

30

Finally, the “scope of the statute is narrowed by the requirement of scienter.” U.S. v.
Dann, 652 F.3d 1160, 1170 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Calimlim, 538 F.3d at 711-12). “The linchpin
of the serious harm analysis under § 1589 is not just that serious harm was threatened but that the
employer intended the victim to believe that such harm would befall her.” Id. See also Muchira,
850 F.3d at 618.
In response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Sacketts primarily delineate what
services and goods, including shelter, sustenance and care, they provided Plaintiffs, and attribute
the care and provisions to their benevolence. The Sacketts’ assertions might be relevant to
Plaintiffs’ claims for unjust enrichment or breach of contract, pled in the alternative, but they are
not relevant to liability under the TVPRA. Only one sentence in the Response is relevant to the
TVPRA claim: “I nor the Sackett Family did not employ any Echon family or ask them to work
or give any job or any task of any kind to the Echon family [sic].” [#110 at 3]. While the
Sacketts do not proffer admissible evidence to corroborate their assertions, the record includes
their deposition testimony in its entirety, see [#104-21, #104-22], and the court may consider any
materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
I pause to acknowledge the seriousness of the allegations, as well as the status of the
Sacketts as pro se litigants. The ordeal Plaintiffs describe and attribute to the Sacketts might not
include the severity of treatment, physical abuse, and duration of punishment presented in
Calimlim and Sabhnani; however, “the TVPA not only protects victims from the most heinous
human trafficking crimes, but also various additional types of fraud and extortion leading to
forced labor.” Nuñag-Tanedo, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1145 (citing Calimlim, 538 F.3d at 711-14).
See also Panwar v. Access Therapies, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 2d 948, 958 (S.D. Ind. 2013) (denying
motion to dismiss as to TVPA claim based on plaintiff’s allegations of “non-physical forms of

31

coercion and threats of serious financial harm”). The court must consider whether the threat,
seen from the vantage point of a reasonable person in the place of the victim, is sufficiently
serious to compel the person to remain. Id. (citation omitted). See also Dann, 652 F.3d at 1171
(“someone is guilty of forced labor if he intends to cause a person in his employ to believe that if
she does not continue to work, she will suffer the type of serious harm—physical or nonphysical,
including psychological, financial, reputation harm—that would compel someone in her
circumstances to continue working to avoid that harm.”).

Additionally, the victim’s

acquiescence must be “objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” Muchira, 850 F.3d at
618 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiffs attest that the Sacketts repeatedly threatened to kick them out of the home and/or
have them deported if Plaintiffs did not work and similarly do as the Sacketts instructed. There
is no indication in Plaintiffs’ testimony that they had reason to believe the Sacketts could not
effectuate the threats, or that they would not be subject to deportation; indeed the Echons attest
they believed Leonida could have them deported because she and her husband had sponsored
them. Additionally, Plaintiffs testify that Leonida Sackett told them they owed her and her
husband a large debt that could be paid only through free labor, but she did not state the amount
of the debt or explain the temporal terms for repaying the debt. See Dann, 652 F.3d at 1171
(“For an immigrant without access to a bank account and not a dollar to her name, a juror could
conclude that the failure to pay her—and thus the lack of money to leave or live—was
sufficiently serious to compel [the immigrant] to continue working.”). Esmeraldo and Maribel
testify that they received no money and they routinely lacked sufficient food; they did not speak
English well, and they were entirely dependent on the Sacketts for lodging, utilities, and
transportation; and the Sacketts held Maribel and the Echon sons’ residency papers for over a

32

year. Plaintiffs attest that, despite their requests, the Sacketts refused to allow them to find
paying jobs, and in many instances forbade them from speaking with anyone in the community.
However, the Sacketts’ testimony under oath, summarized in the previous section, directly
contradicts almost all of Plaintiffs’ allegations. And while this court is cognizant that defendants
generally cannot avoid summary judgment simply by offering uncorroborated, self-serving and
conclusory statements, the court may and should consider Defendants’ statements made under
oath during a deposition and based on their own personal, firsthand knowledge. See Cox v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 11-CV-01479-PAB-BNB, 2013 WL 140624, at *4 (D. Colo. Jan.
11, 2013), aff'd, 545 F. App’x 766 (10th Cir. 2013).
Accordingly, this court finds that the claim and the competing evidence present precisely
the sort of factual dispute that should be resolved by a jury, and that Plaintiffs Esmeraldo Echon
and Justin Echon have failed to carry their burden. Thus this court respectfully recommends that
the Motion for Summary Judgment as to this claim be DENIED.
B. Claim Three: Violation of the Colorado Minimum Wage of Workers
As Plaintiffs state in their Motion for Summary Judgment, they may recover under this
claim if they were: (1) employees (2) receiving less than the legal minimum wage (3) applicable
to such employee. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-6-118. See also Kennett v. Bayada Home Health Care,
Inc., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1232, 1238 (D. Colo. 2015) (noting that the Colorado “Minimum Wages of
Workers Act” charges the Director of the Colorado Division of Labor with the determination of
“adequate” minimum wages for workers in covered industries). An “employee” is “any person
performing labor or services for the benefit of an employer in which the employer may
command when, where, and how much labor or services shall be performed.” 7 Colo. Code
Regs. § 1103-1:2. See also Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1129 (D. Colo.

33

2015). For the reasons discussed above with respect to the TVPRA claim, I find that a genuine
issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiffs are employees and I RECOMMEND that the
Motion for Summary Judgment as to this claim be DENIED.10
C. Claim Four: Violation of the Colorado Wage Claim Act (“CWCA”)
The Colorado Wage Claim Act governs the timely payment of wages and provides for
judicial relief when wages are not paid. In particular, the CWCA allows an employee “to sue his
or her former employer for earned wages and other compensation the employer has refused to
pay.” Lester v. Career Bldg. Acad., 338 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Colo. App. 2014). See also Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 8-4-109. The CWCA defines “employer” as “every person, firm, partnership,
association, corporation…employing any person in Colorado,” and “employee” as “any
person…performing labor or services for the benefit of an employer in which the employer may
command when, where, and how much labor or services shall be performed.” Colo. Rev. Stat. §
8-4-101(5)-(6). For the reasons discussed above with respect to the TVPRA claim, I find that a
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiffs are employees and I RECOMMEND
that the Motion for Summary Judgment as to this claim be DENIED.
II.

Common Law Claims (Pled in the Alternative)
A. Claims Five and Six: Breach of Contract, or, in the alternative, Breach of
Contract, Third Party Beneficiary
These two claims arise out of the Affidavit of Support (USCIS Form I-864) that the

Sacketts signed for Plaintiffs, and by which the Sacketts identified themselves as sponsor and

10

The Colorado Minimum Wage Order applies to four industries: (1) Retail and Service; (2)
Commercial Support Service; (3) Food and Beverage; and (4) Health and Medical. 7 Colo.
Code Regs. 1103–1:1. See also Menocal, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 1129. Plaintiffs assert their work
qualifies as work performed within the Retail and Service industry, which covers businesses that
sell to the consuming public, and that generate 50% or more of its annual dollar volume of
business from such sales. [#104 at 16 (citing 7 Colo. Code Regs. 1103–1:2(a))].
34

joint sponsor of Plaintiffs. See [#104 at 27-28]. U.S. Citizens applying for lawful permanent
resident status for immediate relatives must provide an Affidavit of Support for each applicant,
agreeing “to provide support to maintain the sponsored alien at an annual income that is not less
than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line during the period in which the affidavit is
enforceable.”

8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(b)(1) (“The person who filed a

relative…petition, the approval of which forms the basis of the intending immigrant’s eligibility
to apply for an immigrant visa or adjustment of status as an immediate relative or a family-based
immigrant, must execute an affidavit of support on behalf of the intending immigrant.”). Once
the sponsored immigrant enters the United States and obtains legal permanent residency, the
Affidavit of Support “is legally enforceable against the sponsor by the sponsored alien, the
Federal Government, any State…or by any other entity that provides any means-tested public
benefit.”

See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1183a(a)(1)(B), (e)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(d) (“The sponsored

immigrant, or any Federal, State, or local governmental agency or private entity that provides
any means-tested public benefit to the sponsored immigrant after the sponsored immigrant
acquires permanent resident status, may seek enforcement of the sponsor’s obligations through
an appropriate civil action.”). See also Wenfang v. Mund, 748 F. Supp. 2d 958, 962 (W.D. Wisc.
2010), affirmed in part and reversed in part by Lie v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2012);
Younis v. Farooqi, 597 F. Supp. 2d 552, 554 (D. Md. 2009); Shumye v. Felleke, 555 F. Supp. 2d
1020, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Schwartz v. Schwartz, Case No. CIV-04-770-M, 2005 WL
1242171, at *1-2 (W.D. Okla. May 10, 2005).
The sponsor’s obligation to support the sponsored immigrant at the requisite income level
continues until one of the following conditions is met: the sponsor dies; the sponsored immigrant
dies; the sponsored immigrant becomes a U.S. citizen; the sponsored immigrant permanently

35

leaves the United States; or the sponsored immigrant receives credit for forty qualifying hours of
work. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1183a(a)(2), (3); 8 CFR 213a.2(e)(2)(i). A sponsor’s failure to support
the sponsored immigrant consistent with the obligations set forth in the Affidavit of Support
creates a cause of action for breach of contract by which the sponsored immigrant may sue for
damages “that would put plaintiff[s] in as good a position as [they] would have been had the
contract been performed.” Shumye, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1024. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(c). To
determine the question of breach, and damages if necessary, courts compare the plaintiff’s
annual income for the particular years at issue against the 125 percent poverty threshold for each
year. Shumye, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1024-25. The sponsor and joint sponsor, if applicable, may
also be liable for legal fees and other costs of collection. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1183a(c).11
It is undisputed that the Sacketts signed and submitted Affidavits of Support on behalf of
Plaintiffs in their bid for citizenship. See [#104-6]; see also [#1 at ¶¶ 23, 24, #11 at ¶¶ 23, 24].
Defendants signed these forms on September 24, 2010 and October 1, 2010, [#104-6], and
Plaintiffs thereafter received their Legal Permanent Resident status and came to the United States

11

Plaintiffs reference a split in authority as to whether the sponsored immigrant is a party or a
third-party beneficiary to the contract created by the Affidavit of Support. [#104 at 27
(comparing Younis, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 554; Shumye, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1023; Schwartz, 2005 WL
1242171, at *1, with Erler v. Erler, 824 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2016), Wenfang, 748 F. Supp.
2d at 962)]. This court is inclined to agree with the Ninth Circuit that “[o]nce executed, the
affidavit becomes a contract between the sponsor and the U.S. Government for the benefit of the
sponsored immigrant…,” Erler, 824 F.3d at 1175, and thus a third-party beneficiary theory of
liability is more appropriate. Indeed, the Sacketts, not the Echons, signed the Affidavits of
Support. See [#104-6 at 10, 11]. See also C-470 Joint Venture v. Trizec Colorado, Inc., 176 F.3d
1289, 1293 (10th Cir. 1999) (“A third party beneficiary is created if the parties to the agreement
intended to benefit a non-party”) (citing E.B. Roberts Constr. Co. v. Concrete Contractors,
Inc., 704 P.2d 859, 865 (Colo. 1985) (en banc)); Coleman v. Mountain Mesa Uranium Corp., 240
F.2d 12, 16 (10th Cir. 1956) (“If ... [plaintiff] was a third party beneficiary [,] he could sue for the
enforcement of his rights under the contract, although he was not a party thereto or was not
mentioned therein.”). However, this court need not reach the question as to whether Plaintiffs are
parties to or third party beneficiaries of the contract; the court is satisfied that the Sacketts, having
signed the Affidavits of Support, are liable for providing the requisite support, regardless of the
precise theory of recovery.
36

with the sponsorship of Defendants. Additionally, it is undisputed that during the time at issue in
this lawsuit, the Sacketts supported Plaintiffs as follows: monthly rent in no more than the amount
of $750, [#104-22 at 76:10-11]; food valued at no more than $12,500, [#104 at 29 (citing #51 at ¶
25)]; transportation for Justin Echon and Plaintiffs’ minor son to and from school, valued at no
more than $1,600, [id. (citing #51 at ¶ 30)]; and monthly payment for utilities valued at no more
than $300, [#104 at 5, ¶ 12]. Additionally, Plaintiffs account for the $1,400 that Esmeraldo
Echon earned with the construction job in South Dakota in 2012, [#104-18 at ¶¶ 116, 117], and
the value of the food stamps they received from Otero County in 2013 ($1,888) and 2014
($4,412). See [#104-3]. Mrs. Sackett testified that in 2011, she gave Esmeraldo Echon $3,500.
[#104-22 at 265:21-22].

But the Sacketts have not introduced evidence of any additional

monetary support given in furtherance of their contractual obligations as sponsors during the years
of 2012 through 2014, and indeed, Mrs. Sackett confirmed in her testimony that Defendants
provided no additional monetary support after 2011. [Id. at 265:18-25, 266]. To the extent Mrs.
Sackett testified that she could not recall giving Plaintiffs any other money, see [id. at 266:16-25],
this court notes that Defendants failed to respond to Interrogatory No. 8, which asked Defendants
to “list all times you financially supported any of the Plaintiffs or Jeffrey Echon .. [including] the
nature of the support as well as the amount expended or given.” Defendants additionally failed to
produce written evidence of any other support provided during the years 2012 through 2014.
Accordingly, this court finds that Defendants should be precluded from offering such evidence
now or at trial.
One hundred percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines (“FPG”) for a household of four

37

was $23,050 in 2012, $23,550 in 2013, and $23,850 in 2014.12 Accordingly, 125 percent of the
FPG for Plaintiffs’ household during those years was $28,812.50, $29,437.50, and $29,812.50,
respectively. Plaintiffs assert their annual household income was no greater than $14,896 for
2012, $22,132 for 2013, and $19,595 for 2014. [#104 at 29]. Plaintiffs contend, and this court
agrees, that the evidence demonstrates the Sacketts failed to provide for them at the mandated
125 percent of the FPG during 2012, 2013, and 2014. The difference between Plaintiffs’
household income and 125 percent of the FPG is $13,916.50 for 2012, $7,305.50 for 2013, and
$10,217.50 for 2014, for a total of $31,439.50. Based on the record before it, this court finds
that Plaintiffs have carried their burden as to Claim Six and RECOMMENDS that summary
judgment be granted in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants as to this claim. 13
B. Claim Seven: Unjust Enrichment
Finally, Plaintiffs contend they each worked for the Sacketts and that the Sacketts
“benefitted from the many hours of work Plaintiffs performed for them without payment.”
[#104 at 25]. To recover for unjust enrichment, Plaintiffs must show that “(1) a benefit was
conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) the benefit was appreciated by the defendant; and
(3) the benefit was accepted by the defendant under such circumstances that it would be
inequitable for it to be retained without payment of its value.” Does v. Rodriguez, No. 06–cv–

12

Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, “2012 Poverty Guidelines for the 48
Contiguous States and the District of Columbia,” 77 FR 4034-02, 2012 WL 219087 (Jan. 26,
2012); Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, “2013 Poverty Guidelines for the 48
Contiguous States and the District of Columbia,” 78 FR 5182-01, 2013 WL 246458 (Jan. 24,
2013); Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, “2014 Poverty Guidelines for the 48
Contiguous States and the District of Columbia,” 79 FR 3593-01, 2014 WL 218286 (Jan. 22,
2014).
13
Plaintiffs assert that “[a]t least four others lived in the same house as [them],” and Leonida
Sackett “charged some of these family members $700 per month for rent.” [#104 at 29 n.15].
Plaintiffs specify that they adopt “these amounts for purposes of establishing liability (not for
damages).” [Id.] Accordingly, this court’s finding extends to liability only, and recommends
that the issue of damages be reserved for the jury.
38

00805–LTB, 2007 WL 684117, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2007) (quoting Humphrey v.
O'Connor, 940 P.2d 1015, 1021 (Colo. App. 1996). “The scope of this remedy is broad ... with
its application guided by the underlying principle of avoiding the unjust enrichment of one party
at the expense of another.” Id. Given the genuine issues of material fact identified above, I find
that the undisputed evidence does not support an award of summary judgment in favor of
Plaintiffs on the issue of whether Defendants were unjustly enriched by Plaintiffs’ labor.
Accordingly, this court RECOMMENDS that summary judgment as to Claim 7 be DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Based on the reasons set forth herein, this court respectfully RECOMMENDS that:
(1)

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment [#106] be GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART;
(2)

The court GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART Plaintiffs’ request that

certain proposed facts be accepted as true;
(3)

The court GRANT the Motion as to Claims Five and Six, pled in the alternative,

with respect to liability;
(4)

The court DENY the Motion as to Claims One, Three, Four, and Seven; and

(5)

The court DISMISS Claim Two (arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act). 14

14

Within fourteen days after service of a copy of the Recommendation, any party may serve and
file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and recommendations with
the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); In re Griego, 64 F.3d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1995). A general objection that
does not put the District Court on notice of the basis for the objection will not preserve the
objection for de novo review. “[A] party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the
district court or for appellate review.” United States v. One Parcel of Real Property Known As
2121 East 30th Street, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). Failure to make
timely objections may bar de novo review by the District Judge of the Magistrate Judge’s
proposed findings and recommendations and will result in a waiver of the right to appeal from a
39

(6)

The Parties and counsel are reminded that the Final Pretrial Conference in this

matter is set for September 29, 2017 at 10:00 A.M. in Courtroom C-204, Second Floor, Byron
G. Rogers United States Courthouse, 1929 Stout Street, Denver, Colorado. The proposed Pretrial
Order is due seven (7) days prior to the Final Pretrial Conference. Please remember that anyone
seeking entry into the Byron G. Rogers United States Courthouse will be required to show valid
photo identification. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 83.2(b).

DATED: September 20, 2017

BY THE COURT:

s/ Nina Y. Wang
Nina Y. Wang
United States Magistrate Judge

judgment of the district court based on the proposed findings and recommendations of the
magistrate judge. See Vega v. Suthers, 195 F.3d 573, 579-80 (10th Cir. 1999) (District Court’s
decision to review a Magistrate Judge’s recommendation de novo despite the lack of an objection
does not preclude application of the “firm waiver rule”); International Surplus Lines Insurance
Co. v. Wyoming Coal Refining Systems, Inc., 52 F.3d 901, 904 (10th Cir. 1995) (by failing to
object to certain portions of the Magistrate Judge’s order, cross-claimant had waived its right to
appeal those portions of the ruling); Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 1342, 1352 (10th Cir. 1992)
(by their failure to file objections, plaintiffs waived their right to appeal the Magistrate Judge’s
ruling). But see, Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 2005) (firm waiver
rule does not apply when the interests of justice require review).
40