State of Hawaii v. Trump

Filing 198

MEMORANDUM re 65 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order [MUSLIM ADVOCATES, AMERICAN MUSLIM HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, MUPPIES, INC., THE NATIONAL ARAB AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, AND NETWORK OF ARAB-AMERICAN PROFESSIONALS' BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER], filed by American Muslim Health Professionals, Muppies, Inc., Muslim Advocates, Network of Arab-American Professionals, The National Arab American Medical Association. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Anton A. Ware, # 2 Exhibit 1 - Shutdown Press Release, # 3 Exhibit 2 - Anderson Cooper Interview, # 4 Exhibit 3 - State Rudy Guiliani, # 5 Exhibit 4 - Miller on Fox News, # 6 Exhibit 5 - WaPo Kansas Suspect, # 7 Exhibit 6 - Seattle Kent, # 8 Exhibit 7 - Fire store owner, # 9 Exhibit 8 - WaPo pipe attack, # 10 Exhibit 9 - Spate of mosque fires stretches across the country, # 11 Exhibit 10 - Politico absolute no choice but to close down mosques, # 12 Exhibit 11 - Georgetown Bridge Initiative Trump Cites Flowed Poll, # 13 Exhibit 12 - Republican Candidates Debate in North Charleston, South Carolina, # 14 Exhibit 13 - Transcript Donald Trump's national security speech, # 15 Exhibit 14 - 60 Minutes Trranscript, # 16 Exhibit 15 - Meet the Press, # 17 Exhibit 16 - Presidential Candidates Debates, # 18 Exhibit 17 - Christian Broadcasting Network, # 19 Exhibit 18 - Donald Trump on Twitter defends Muslim ban, calls work a 'horrible mess', # 20 Exhibit 19 - Pew Reseach Center 2016 Refugees, # 21 Exhibit 20 - DJT Tweet, # 22 Exhibit 21 - So called judge tweet, # 23 Exhibit 22 - See you in court tweet, # 24 Exhibit 23 - Sean Spicer press conference, # 25 Exhibit 24 - Stephen Miller key engineer, # 26 Exhibit 25 - Stephen Miller Islamofascism, # 27 Exhibit 26 - Pew Forum, # 28 Exhibit 27 - State Dept Country Report, # 29 Exhibit 28 - DHS, # 30 Exhibit 29 - DOJ Iraqi Kentucky, # 31 Exhibit 30 - Cato, # 32 Exhibit 31 - Lawfare, # 33 Exhibit 32 - Brennan Center, # 34 Exhibit 33 - Letter Former Officials on March 6 EO, # 35 Exhibit 34 - Trump delays new travel ban after well-reviewed speech - CNN Politics, # 36 Exhibit 35 - Families hoping to make the U.S., # 37 Exhibit 36 - Trump Muslim ban is tearing apart families, # 38 Exhibit 37 - Children and Refugees Who Planned Medical Care in the US Stuck After Trump Executive Order - Health News - ABC News Radio, # 39 Exhibit 38 - Trump's Travel Ban, Aimed at Terrorists, Has Blocked Doctors - The New York Times, # 40 Certificate of Service)(Kacprowski, Nickolas) Modified on docket title text on 3/14/2017 (ecs, ).

EXHIBIT 30

PolicyAnalysis
September 13, 2016 | Number 798

Terrorism and Immigration
A Risk Analysis
By Alex Nowrasteh

EXECUTI VE S UM MARY

T

errorism is a hazard to human life and material prosperity that should be addressed
in a sensible manner whereby the benefits
of actions to contain it outweigh the costs.
Foreign-born terrorists who entered the
country, either as immigrants or tourists, were responsible
for 88 percent (or 3,024) of the 3,432 murders caused by terrorists on U.S. soil from 1975 through the end of 2015. This
paper presents the first terrorism risk analysis of the visa
categories those foreign-born terrorists used to enter the
United States.
Including those murdered in the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 (9/11), the chance of an American
perishing in a terrorist attack on U.S. soil that was
committed by a foreigner over the 41-year period
studied here is 1 in 3.6 million per year. The hazard
posed by foreigners who entered on different visa
categories varies considerably. For instance, the chance
of an American being murdered in a terrorist attack

caused by a refugee is 1 in 3.64 billion per year while the
chance of being murdered in an attack committed by
an illegal immigrant is an astronomical 1 in 10.9 billion
per year. By contrast, the chance of being murdered by
a tourist on a B visa, the most common tourist visa, is
1 in 3.9 million per year. Any government response to
terrorism must take account of the wide range of hazards posed by foreign-born terrorists who entered under
various visa categories.
The federal government has an important role to play
in screening foreigners who enter the United States,
and to exclude those who pose a threat to the national
security, safety, or health of Americans. This terrorism risk analysis of individual visa categories can aid in
the efficient allocation of scarce government security
resources to those categories that are most exploitable by
terrorists. The hazards posed by foreign-born terrorists
are not large enough to warrant extreme actions like a
moratorium on all immigration or tourism.

Alex Nowrasteh is the immigration policy analyst at the Cato Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity.

2

“

From 1975
through 2015,
the chance of
an American
being
murdered by a
foreign-born
terrorist was 1
in 3,609,709 a
year.

”

INTRODUCTION
The December 2, 2015, terrorist attack that
left 14 people dead in San Bernardino, California,
was committed by American-born Syed Rizwan
Farook and his foreign-born wife, Tashfeen
Malik, who entered the United States two years
earlier on a K-1 fiancé(e) visa.1 Their attack was
dramatic and brutal, and it prompted calls for
heightened immigration restrictions, additional
security checks for K-1 immigrants, and even a
complete moratorium on all immigration.2
Substantial administrative hurdles and barriers are in place to block foreign-born terrorist
infiltration from abroad.3 Any change in immigration policy for terrorism prevention should
be subject to a cost–benefit calculation. A sensible terrorism screening policy must do more
good than harm to justify its existence. That
means the cost of the damage the policy prevents should at least equal the cost it imposes.
Government security resources should be allocated to the most efficient means of reducing
the costs of terrorism. The Strategic National
Risk Assessment (SNRA) seeks to evaluate the
risk of threats and hazards, like terrorism, to
help the government more effectively allocate
security resources to the “threats that pose the
greatest risk.”4 However, the SNRA did not include a thorough terrorism risk analysis of different visa categories.
This policy analysis identifies 154 foreignborn terrorists in the United States who killed
3,024 people in attacks from 1975 through
the end of 2015. Ten of them were illegal immigrants, 54 were lawful permanent residents
(LPR), 19 were students, 1 entered on a K-1
fiancé(e) visa, 20 were refugees, 4 were asylum
seekers, 34 were tourists on various visas, and 3
were from Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries. The visas for 9 terrorists could not be
determined. During that period, the chance
of an American being murdered by a foreignborn terrorist was 1 in 3,609,709 a year. The
chance of an American being killed in a terrorist attack committed by a refugee was 1 in
3.64 billion a year. The annual chance of being
murdered by somebody other than a foreignborn terrorist was 252.9 times greater than the

chance of dying in a terrorist attack committed by a foreign-born terrorist.
The first part of this policy analysis provides
a quantification of the risks of foreign-born terrorists entering the United States in each U.S.
visa category. It does so by identifying known
foreign-born terrorists, counting how many people they murdered in terrorist attacks, and estimating the costs of those attacks. The second
part of this policy analysis compares the costs of
terrorism with the costs of proposed policy solutions such as an immigration moratorium.

BRIEF LITERATURE SURVEY
Few researchers have tried to identify the specific visas used by terrorists, and none have used
that information to produce a risk assessment for
each U.S. visa category. John Mueller and Mark
Stewart have produced superb terrorism risk
analyses, but they did not focus specifically on
the terrorism risk from visa categories.5 Robert S.
Leiken and Steven Brooke wrote the most complete survey of visas used by foreign-born terrorists.6 However, their published work does not
allow separating threats by country, their analysis
ended in 2006, their data set is no longer available, and they did not produce a risk analysis.7
Broader links between immigration and
terrorism are the subject of additional strands
of research. Immigrants are overrepresented
among those convicted of terrorist-related offenses post-9/11.8 In the developing world,
heavy refugee flows are correlated with increased terrorism.9

METHODOLOGY
This analysis focuses on the 41-year period
from January 1, 1975, to December 31, 2015,
because it includes large waves of Cuban and
Vietnamese refugees that posed a terrorism risk
at the beginning of the time period and bookends with the San Bernardino terrorist attack.
It identifies foreign-born terrorists who were
convicted of planning or committing a terrorist
attack on U.S. soil and links them with the specific visa they were first issued as well as the num-

3
ber of people they individually murdered, if any,
in their attacks.10 This report counts terrorists
who were discovered trying to enter the United
States on a forged passport or visa as illegal immigrants. Asylum seekers usually arrive with a
different visa with the intent of applying for asylum once they arrive, so they are counted under
the asylum category. For instance, the Tsarnaev
brothers, who carried out the Boston Marathon
bombing on April 15, 2013, traveled here with a
tourist visa but their family immediately applied
for asylum, so they are included in that category.
Next, information on the individual terrorists, their visa types, and number of victims is
compared with the estimated costs per victim
and the total number of visas issued in each
category. Where conflicting numerical estimates exist, the highest plausible figures are
used with the intent to maximize the risks and
costs of terrorism in terms of human life. The
appendix lists all of the terrorists identified.
Finally, other costs of terrorism, such as
property damage, losses to businesses, and reduced economic growth, are considered. Only
three terrorist attacks committed by foreigners on U.S. soil have created significant property, business, and wider economic damage: the
1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 9/11 attacks, and the Boston Marathon bombing. The
costs of the government’s responses to terrorism are excluded. This analysis is concerned
primarily with the cost of human lives taken in
terrorist attacks.

Counting Foreign-Born Terrorists and
Their Victims
This policy analysis examines foreignborn and immigrant terrorists and so excludes
American-born terrorists except for purposes
of comparison. For attacks planned or carried
out by native-born Americans in concert with
foreigners, the Americans are excluded and the
immigrants are credited entirely for the terrorist plots and murders. That choice increases the
estimates of the harm caused by foreign-born
terrorists. For plots that included many foreignborn terrorists and victims, each terrorist is
credited with an equal number of victims. For

instance, the 1993 World Trade Center attack
was committed by six foreign-born terrorists;
six people were murdered, so each terrorist is
responsible for one murder. Airplane hijackings
that started in the United States and ended in
different countries—such as the September 10,
1976, hijacking of TWA Flight 355 by Croatian
nationalists that eventually terminated in Paris,
France—are also included. However, this analysis
excludes terrorist attacks in which the identities
of the perpetrators were unknown, as well as attacks that occurred or were intended to occur
(but were not successfully carried out) abroad.

Sources
The identities of the terrorists come from
nine main data sets and documents. The first
is Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases, edited by John Mueller.11 This voluminous work
contains biographical and other information
related to attacks and cases since September
11, 2001. Mueller’s work is indispensable because he focuses on actual terrorism cases
rather than questionable instances of people
who were investigated for terrorism but then
cleared of terrorism, convicted under other
statutes, and ultimately counted as “terrorismrelated” convictions. For instance, the widely
cited March 2010 Department of Justice (DOJ)
report, National Security Division Statistics on
Unsealed International Terrorism and TerrorismRelated Convictions,12 included only 107 convictions based on actual terrorism statutes out of
399 “terrorism-related” convictions.13 Many of
those terrorism-related convictions were for
citizenship fraud, passport fraud, or false statements to an immigration officer by immigrants
who never posed an actual terrorism threat to
the homeland.14 The convictions of Nasser
Abuali, Hussein Abuali, and Rabi Ahmed provide context for the government’s use of the
term “terrorism-related.” An informant told
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that
the trio tried to purchase a rocket-propelled
grenade launcher, but the FBI found no evidence supporting the accusation. The three
individuals were instead charged with receiving
two truckloads of stolen cereal and convicted.15

“

Nasser
Abuali,
Hussein
Abuali,
and Rabi
Ahmed were
charged with
receiving two
truckloads
of stolen
cereal and
convicted.
The
government
classified their
convictions
as ‘terrorismrelated.’

”

4

“

From 1975
through
2015, the
chance that
an American
would be
killed in a
terrorist
attack
committed by
a refugee was
1 in 3.64 billion
a year.

”

The government classified their convictions as
“terrorism-related” despite the lack of an actual
terrorist connection, terror threat, planned attack, conspiracy, or any actual tentative steps
taken toward carrying out a terror attack. That
case is an especially absurd one to count as terrorism, but it is not too different from many of
the other 289 convictions in the DOJ report.
The second source is the Fordham University Center on National Security’s compilation of
all of the trials for Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) members in the United States.16 Third
is the 2013 Congressional Research Service report American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a
Complex Threat.17 The fourth source of terrorist
identities is the RAND Database of Worldwide
Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), which covers the years 1968–2009.18 Fifth is the Global
Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism
and Responses to Terrorism at the University
of Maryland, College Park.19 The RDWTI and
GTD overlap considerably. Sources six through
nine are the New America Foundation,20 Mother
Jones,21 the Investigative Project on Terrorism,22
and the research of University of North Carolina
professor Charles Kurzman.23
Individual immigration information for the
terrorists comes from the sources mentioned
above, news stories, court documents, government reports, and publicly accessible databases.
Many of the terrorists analyzed here entered the
United States on one visa but committed their
terrorist attack after they switched to another
visa or were naturalized. This report classifies
those individuals under the first visa they had
when they entered. The only exception to that
rule is for those seeking asylum in the United
States—they are counted under the asylum visa.
That exception is important because those individuals usually make their claim at the U.S. border or after they have entered on another visa,
often with the intention of applying for asylum.
For instance, Faisal Shahzad entered initially on
a student visa and then obtained an H-1B visa before he unsuccessfully attempted to detonate a
car bomb in Times Square in 2010. He is counted
as having entered on a student visa.

THE ATTACKS
These data sets identify 154 foreign-born terrorists in the United States from 1975 to the end of
2015. Ten of the subjects were illegal immigrants,
54 were lawful permanent residents (LPR), 19
were students, 1 entered on a K-1 fiancé(e) visa,
20 were refugees, 4 were asylum seekers, 34 were
tourists on various visas, and 3 were from Visa
Waiver Program (VWP) countries. The visas for
9 terrorists could not be determined.
The number of murder victims per terrorist attack comes from government reports, the
RDWTI, the GTD, and John Mueller’s research.
From 1975 through 2015, those 154 foreign-born
terrorists murdered 3,024 people, 98.6 percent
of whom were killed on September 11, 2001. The
other 1.4 percent of murder victims were dispersed over the 41-year period, with two spikes
in 1993 and 2015. The spikes were produced by
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing that killed
6 people and the combination of two 2015 incidents—the Chattanooga shooting on July 16, 2015,
that killed 5 people and the San Bernardino attack
on December 2, 2015, that killed 14 people. (The
2013 Boston Marathon bombing killed 3 people.)
From 1975 through 2015, the annual chance
that an American would be murdered in a terrorist attack carried out by a foreign-born terrorist
was 1 in 3,609,709. Foreigners on the Visa Waiver
Program (VWP) killed zero Americans in terrorist
attacks, whereas those on other tourist visas killed
1 in 3.9 million a year. The chance that an American
would be killed in a terrorist attack committed by
a refugee was 1 in 3.64 billion a year. Of the roughly
768,000 total murders committed in the United
States from 1975 to the end of 2015, 3,024 (or 0.39
percent) were committed by foreign-born terrorists in an attack.24 Those risk statistics are summarized in Table 1. The annual chance of being murdered was 252.9 times as great as dying in an attack
committed by a foreign-born terrorist on U.S. soil.
The U.S. murder rate declined from a high
of 10.17 per 100,000 in 1980 to a low of 4.45 per
100,000 in 2015 (see Figure 1). The 1975–2015 rate
of murder committed by foreign-born terrorists
was 0.026 per 100,000 per year, spiking to 1.047
in 2001. Zero Americans were killed in a domestic attack committed by foreign-born terrorists

5
Table 1
Chance of Dying in an Attack by a Foreign-Born Terrorist, 1975–2015
Visa Category

Terrorism Deaths per
Visa Category

Chance of
Being Killed

Percent Chance of
Being Killed

All

3,024

1 in 3,609,709

0.00003

Tourist

2,834

1 in 3,851,715

0.00003

Student

158.5

1 in 68,869,156

0.000002

Fiancé(e) visa (K-1)

14

1 in 779,697,234

0.0000001

Lawful Permanent
Resident (LPR)

8

1 in 1,364,470,160

0.00000007

Asylum

4

1 in 2,728,940,320

0.00000004

Refugee

3

1 in 3,638,587,094

0.00000003

Illegal

1

1 in 10,915,761,281

0.00000001

Unknown

1.5

1 in 7,277,174,187

0.00000001

Visa Waiver Program
(VWP)

0

Zero

0.00000000

Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents;
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; U.S. Census
Bureau, “American Community Survey”; Disaster Center, “United States Crime Rates 1960–2014”; and author’s calculations.
Note: Nonwhole numbers for deaths result from dividing the number of victims among multiple terrorist perpetrators.

Figure 1
U.S. Murder Rates, Excluding Foreign-Born Terrorism

Source: Disaster Center, “United States Crime Rates 1960–2014”; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents; National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; and author’s calculations.

“

The annual
chance
of being
murdered
from 1975
through the
end of 2015
was 252.9
times as great
as dying in
an attack
committed by
a foreign-born
terrorist on
U.S. soil.

”

6

“

A total
of 3,432
Americans
were
murdered
in terrorist
attacks during
the period
from 1975
to the end
of 2015. Of
those, 408
were killed by
native-born
Americans
or unknown
terrorists
and 3,024
were killed by
foreigners.

”

in 30 of the 41 examined years. In the 14 years
after 9/11, only 3 years were marred by successful
foreign-born terrorist attacks. Figure 1 shows a
single perceptible blip for terrorism on the 9/11
attacks and a flat line otherwise.

Uniqueness of 9/11
The foreign-born terrorist murder rate by
itself has a single spike in 2001 and is virtually a
flat line for every other year (see Figure 1). The
foreign-born terrorist murder rate of 1.047 per
100,000 in 2001 is 176.3 times as great as the
next highest annual rate of 0.0059 in 2015. The
statistical mode (meaning the most common
number) of the annual murder rate by foreignborn terrorists is zero.
The 9/11 attacks killed 2,983 people (not
counting the 19 hijackers). The attacks were a
horrendous crime, but they were also a dramatic outlier. The year 2015 was the deadliest year
excluding 9/11, with 19 Americans killed by foreign-born terrorists. Fourteen of those victims
were killed in the San Bernardino attack—the
second deadliest ever committed by a foreignborn terrorist on U.S. soil. The attacks on 9/11
killed about 213 times as many people as were
killed in San Bernardino.
To put the deaths by foreign-born terrorists into perspective, a total of 3,432 Americans
were murdered in terrorist attacks during the
41-year time period. Of those, 408 were killed
by native-born Americans or unknown terrorists, and 3,024 were killed by foreigners.25
Government officials frequently remind
the public that we live in a post-9/11 world
where the risk of terrorism is so extraordinarily high that it justifies enormous security
expenditures.26 The period from 1975 to 2001
had only 17 murders committed by 16 foreignborn terrorists of a total of 64 who either tried
or were successful in their attacks. During the
same time period, 305 people were killed in
terrorist attacks committed by native-born
Americans and those with unknown nationalities. The majority of those victims (168) were
killed in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing
that was committed by Timothy McVeigh and
Terry Nichols, who were both U.S. natives.

From September 12, 2001, until December
31, 2015, 24 people were murdered on U.S. soil
by a total of 5 foreign-born terrorists, while
65 other foreign-born terrorists attempted
or committed attacks that did not result in
fatalities. During the same period, 80 people
were murdered in terrorist attacks committed
by native-born Americans and those with unknown nationalities.
The number of murders committed by terrorists who are native-born or have unknown
nationalities is higher than the number committed by foreigners in pre- and post-9/11
United States. The horrendous death toll from
the terrorist attacks of 9/11 dominates deaths
from other attacks.

Estimating the Cost per Terrorist Victim
When regulators propose a new rule or
regulation to enhance safety, they are routinely
required to estimate how much it will cost to
save a single life under their proposal.27 Human
life is very valuable but not infinitely so. Americans are willing to take risks that increase their
chance of violent death or murder, such as enlisting in the military, living in cities that have
more crime than rural areas, or driving at high
speeds, actions that would be unthinkable if
individuals placed infinite value on their own
lives. It then stands to reason that there is a value between zero and infinity that people place
on their lives. In public policy, a review of 132
federal regulatory decisions concerning public
exposure to carcinogens found that regulatory
action never occurs if the individual fatality
risk is lower than 1 in 700,000, indicating that
risks are deemed acceptable if the annual fatality risk is lower than that figure.28 A similar type
of analysis for foreign-born terrorism will help
guarantee that scarce resources are devoted to
maximizing the number of lives saved relative
to the costs incurred.
In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) produced an initial estimate that
valued each life saved from an act of terrorism at
$6.5 million, then doubled that value (for unclear
reasons) to $13 million per life saved.29 Hahn,
Lutter, and Viscusi use data from everyday risk-

7
reduction choices made by the American public
to estimate that the value of a statistical life is
$15 million.30 This policy analysis uses Hahn,
Lutter, and Viscusi’s $15 million estimate to remove any suspicion of undervaluation.
There are other costs of terrorism, such as
property damage, medical care for the wounded,
and disruptions of economic activity.31 However,
those costs are highly variable and confined to
three major terrorist attacks caused by foreigners. They are the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 9/11 attacks, and the Boston Marathon
bombing. The highest plausible cost estimates
for those events are $1 billion,32 $170 billion,33
and $25 million,34 respectively. The combined
amount of just over $171 billion excludes the
costs of the government’s response to terrorism
but captures virtually the entirety of the property and other economic damage. The cost of
lives lost was greater than the value of property
and other economic damages in every terrorist
attack examined here except for the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing and 9/11 attacks.

TERRORISM RISK FOR
EACH VISA CATEGORY
The DHS annual Yearbook of Immigration
Statistics35 provided the statistics for the numbers of lawful permanent residents, student visas, K-1 fiancé(e) visas, asylum seekers, B-tourist
visas, and entrants through the VWP. The numbers of student visas, K-1 fiancé(e) visas, and Btourist visas issued are available from 1981 onward, and the VWP numbers are available only
beginning in 1986, when the program was created. The particulars of the various visa programs
will be described in their individual sections.
The Refugee Processing Center has recorded the number of refugees going back to 1975.
The annual gross inflow of illegal immigrants is
estimated on the basis of data from DHS, Pew
Research Center, the Pew Hispanic Center, and
other sources.36 For the purposes of this report,
only the illegal immigrants who actually entered
the country illegally are included in that category.37 Immigrants who entered on legal visas and
became illegal by overstaying are counted under

the legal visa category on which they entered.
There are other vastly greater estimates of the
number of illegal immigrants who entered the
United States from 1975 to 2015; this analysis assumes the smaller estimated number of illegal
entries to maximize the danger posed by that
class of immigrants.38 This estimation methodology could exaggerate the number of terrorists
who entered the United States with an LPR
status, thus diminishing the relative danger of
other categories. At the time of writing, data
were unavailable for 2014 or 2015, so for those
years this paper uses an estimate of the previous
two years of available visa numbers.
The terrorist risk for each visa category can
be understood in different ways. The following
sections will present the number of foreignborn terrorists in each visa category, the number of murders carried out by terrorists in each
visa category, the chance of a terrorist getting a
visa, and how many deaths can be expected by
each foreign-born terrorist on a particular visa.
Multiplying the number of murders in each
visa category by the $15 million cost per victim
yields the estimate of the costs of terrorism.
Each subsection that follows presents two
estimates: one includes all victims from all foreign-born terrorist attacks from 1975 to the end
of 2015 and the other excludes 9/11 because it is
such an extreme outlier. The number of victims
from the 9/11 attacks is more than two orders of
magnitude greater than the next deadliest foreign-born terror attack on U.S. soil.39 That scale
of attack is unlikely to be repeated, whereas other attacks on a smaller and less deadly scale will
certainly occur in the future. Presenting the terrorism hazard data in two formats, one including 9/11 and the other excluding it, enables the
reader to focus on understanding the risks from
the more common smaller-scale attacks that terrorists commit on U.S. soil.

Terrorism Risk for All Visa Categories
The U.S. government issued 1.14 billion visas
under the categories exploited by 154 foreignborn terrorists who entered from 1975 to the
end of 2015.40 Of those, only 0.0000136 percent
were actually granted to terrorists. In other

“

One foreignborn terrorist
entered the
United States
for every
7.38 million
nonterrorist
foreigners
who did
so in the
tourist, lawful
permanent
resident,
Visa Waiver
Program,
illegal
immigrant,
student,
and K-1
fiancé(e) visa
categories.

”

8

“

The 9/11
terrorist
attacks were
the deadliest
in world
history.

”

words, one foreign-born terrorist entered the
United States for every 7.38 million nonterrorist foreigners who did so in those visa categories. Table 2 and Figure 2 display these numbers,
broken out in subcategories.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks were the deadliest in world history. Table 3 gives the same
statistics as Table 2, except that it excludes the
9/11 attacks. Excluding the 9/11 terrorists and
Zacarias Moussaoui, who intended to participate but could not because he was in jail at the
time, 134 foreign-born terrorists entered the
United States of a total of 1.14 billion visas issued in these categories from 1975 through
2015. That means that only 0.00001 percent of
all foreigners who entered on these visas were
terrorists. For each terrorist, excluding the
9/11 attackers, 8.48 million visas were granted
to nonterrorist foreigners.

Of the 19 9/11 hijackers, 18 were on tourist visas. The 19th hijacker was Hani Hanjour
who entered the United States on a student
visa. Zacarias Moussaoui was not a hijacker
on 9/11, but he was involved in the plot. His
French citizenship allowed him to enter the
United States on the VWP. Omitting the 9/11
terrorist attackers would make the student
and the tourist visa categories look substantially safer and slightly improve the safety of
the VWP.

Number and Cost of Terrorism Victims
for All Visa Categories
As previously noted, 3,024 people were murdered by foreign-born terrorists in attacks in
the United States from 1975 to the end of 2015.
Those terrorist attacks cost $45.36 billion in
human life or $1.11 billion per year on average

Table 2
All Terrorists, by Visa Category, 1975–2015

Annual
Number
of Terrorists
per Category

Terrorists

Percentage

Years of
Visa Data
Available

Lawful Permanent
Resident (LPR)

54

35.1

41

1.317

34,829,485

644,990

0.8

Tourist*

34

22.1

35

0.971

657,934,182

19,351,005

1.0

Refugee

20

12.9

41

0.488

3,252,493

162,625

2.1

Student*

19

12.3

35

0.543

24,176,617

1,272,454

1.8

Illegal

10

6.5

41

0.244

26,519,625

2,651,963

4.1

Unknown

9

5.8

41

0.220

NA

NA

4.6

Asylum

4

2.6

41

0.098

700,522

175,131

10.3

Visa Waiver Program
(VWP)^

3

2.0

30

0.100

388,024,058

129,341,353

10.0

Fiancé(e) visa (K-1)*

1

0.7

35

0.029

604,132

604,132

35.0

Visa Category 

Entries per
Category

Visas Issued to
Nonterrorists
per Terrorist

Average
Number
of Years
between
Attacks/
Convictions

Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents; National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; Center on National Security; Charles Kurzman, “Spreadsheet of MuslimAmerican Terrorism Cases from 9/11 through the End of 2015,” University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, http://kurzman.unc.edu/islamic-terrorism/;
Department of Homeland Security; Pew Hispanic Research Center; Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System; and author’s estimates.
Note: LPR = lawful permanent resident; VWP = Visa Waiver Program; K-1 = fiancé(e) visa; NA = Not available.
*1981 onward.
^1986 onward.

9

“

Figure 2
All Terrorists, by Visa Category

Of all 154
foreign-born
terrorists
analyzed
here, 114 did
not murder
anyone in
a terrorist
attack.

”

Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents;
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; Center on
National Security; and Charles Kurzman, “Spreadsheet of Muslim-American Terrorism Cases from 9/11 through the End of
2015,” University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, http://kurzman.unc.edu/islamic-terrorism/.
Note: LPR = lawful permanent resident; VWP = Visa Waiver Program; K-1 = fiancé(e) visa.

as displayed in Table 4.41 The terrorism cost
equals $39.93 per visa issued over that time.
Excluding the 9/11 terrorist attacks lowers the
human cost of terrorism to $615 million during
the period or $15 million per year as displayed in
Table 5. The murder-cost of terrorism committed by the foreign-born inside the United States,
excluding 9/11, is $0.54 per visa issued.
Of the 154 terrorists, 114 did not murder
anyone in a terrorist attack. Many of them were
arrested before they were able to execute their
attacks or their attacks failed to take any lives.
Including all terrorists and the 9/11 hijackers,
even the ones who did not kill anybody, each
terrorist killed about 20 people on average for
a total human cost of $294.6 million. Excluding 9/11, each terrorist killed an average of 0.31
people, for a total human cost of $4.6 million
per terrorist analyzed here.
Only 40 of the 154 foreign-born terrorists
actually killed anyone. Of those terrorists,

each one killed an average of 75.6 people and
took $1.13 billion worth of human life. Excluding 9/11, each successful terrorist killed
an average of just under two people for a human cost of $29.29 million inflicted by each
successful terrorist.
Excluding the 9/11 attackers, 21 foreign-born
terrorists succeeded in murdering 41 people
from 1975 through 2015. Sixteen of those terrorists committed their attacks prior to 9/11
and killed a total of 17 people—an average of
1.06 murders per terrorist. Only two terrorists
during this time period killed more than one
person each: Mir Aimal Kasi shot and killed
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees
Frank Darling and Lansing Bennett as they
were waiting in traffic outside of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, on January 25,
1998; and El Sayyid Nosair assassinated Meir
Kahane on November 5, 1990, and then participated in the first World Trade Center attack on

10
Table 3
Terrorists, by Visa Category, Excluding 9/11 Attacks, 1975–2015

Annual
Number
of Terrorists
per Category

Visas Issued to
Nonterrorists
per Terrorist

Average
Number
of Years
between
Attacks/
Convictions

Terrorists

Percentage

Years of
Visa Data
Available

Lawful Permanent
Resident (LPR)

54

40.30

41

1.317

34,829,485

644,990

0.8

Refugee

20

14.93

41

0.488

3,252,493

162,625

2.1

Student*

18

13.43

35

0.514

24,176,617

1,343,145

1.9

Tourist*

16

11.94

35

0.457

657,934,182

41,120,886

2.2

Illegal

10

7.46

41

0.244

26,519,625

2,651,963

4.1

Unknown

9

6.72

41

0.220

NA

NA

4.6

Asylum

4

2.99

41

0.098

700,522

175,131

10.3

Visa Waiver Program
(VWP)^

2

1.49

30

0.067

388,024,058

194,012,029

15.0

Fiancé(e) visa (K-1)*

1

0.75

35

0.029

604,132

604,132

35.0

Visa Category 

Entries per
Category

Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents; National Consortium for
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; Center on National Security; Charles Kurzman, “Spreadsheet of
Muslim-American Terrorism Cases from 9/11 through the End of 2015,” University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, http://kurzman.unc.edu/islamicterrorism/; Department of Homeland Security; Pew Hispanic Research Center; Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System; and author’s
estimates.
Note: LPR = lawful permanent resident; VWP = Visa Waiver Program; K-1 = fiancé(e) visa; NA = Not available.
*1981 onward.
^1986 onward.

February 26, 1993, which killed six people. Over
time the number of terrorists has shrunk but
their deadliness has increased.
There were five successful attacks after 9/11
that killed 24 people, with each terrorist responsible for an average of 4.8 murders. Egyptian-born
Hesham Mohamed Hedayet killed two people
on July 4, 2002, at Los Angeles International
Airport; the Tsarnaev brothers killed three people in the Boston Marathon bombing on April
15, 2013; Mohammad Abdulazeez murdered five
people on July 16, 2015; and Tashfeen Malik,
along with her U.S.-born husband, killed 14 on
December 2, 2015, in San Bernardino, California.
The pre-9/11, 9/11, and post-9/11 numbers are
summarized in Table 6.
Foreign-born terrorists on tourist visas
have killed more Americans in attacks than
those on any other type of visa, followed dis-

tantly by those who entered on student visas.
The 2,983 deaths on 9/11 account for all but 41
of those deaths. Excluding the 9/11 attacks,
the K-1 fiancé(e) visa appears to be the deadliest (due entirely to the San Bernardino attack)
followed by LPRs and tourists.
The following subsections discuss the terrorism risks and costs for each specific visa
category. Summary data for the categories are
provided in Table 7.

Illegal Immigrants
Only 10 illegal immigrants became terrorists, a minuscule 0.000038 percent of the
26.5 million who entered from 1975 through
2015 as summarized in Table 7. In other words,
2.65 million illegal immigrants entered the
United States for each one who ended up being a terrorist.

11
Table 4
Deadliness of All Terrorists, by Visa Category, 1975–2015

Visa Category

Murders Percentage

Total
1975–2015
Estimated
Entries
for Each
Visa Category

Number of
Visas Issued
per Victim
of Terrorism

Cost per Death
(dollars)

Cost per
Visa Type
(dollars)

Cost per
Visa Issued
(dollars)

Tourist

2,834

93.72

657,934,182

232,157

15,000,000

42,510,000,000

64.61

Student

158.5

5.24

24,176,617

152,534

15,000,000

2,377,500,000

98.34

Fiancé(e) visa (K-1)

14

0.46

604,132

43,152

15,000,000

210,000,000

347.61

Lawful Permanent
Resident (LPR)

8

0.26

34,829,485

4,353,686

15,000,000

120,000,000

3.45

Asylum

4

0.13

700,522

175,131

15,000,000

60,000,000

85.65

Refugee

3

0.10

3,252,493

1,084,164

15,000,000

45,000,000

13.84

Unknown

1.5

0.05

NA

15,000,000

22,500,000

Illegal

1

0.03

26,519,625

26,519,625

15,000,000

15,000,000

0.57

Visa Waiver
Program (VWP)

0

0.00

388,024,058

0

15,000,000

0

0.00

3,024

100.00

1,136,041,115

375,675

15,000,000

Total

NA

45,360,000,000

NA

39.93

Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents; National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; Center on National Security; Department of Homeland Security; Pew Hispanic
Research Center; Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System; and author’s estimates.
Note: Nonwhole numbers for deaths result from dividing the number of victims among multiple terrorist perpetrators; NA = Not available.

Only one of those illegal immigrants, Ahmed
Ajaj, actually succeeded in killing an American as
he was one of the 1993 World Trade Center conspirators. The human cost of terrorism caused
by illegal immigrants was thus $15,000,000 or
equal to $0.57 cents per illegal immigrant. As a
reminder, none of the 9/11 hijackers entered the
United States illegally.

Lawful Permanent Residents
An LPR is also commonly known as a green
card holder. An LPR can reside and work permanently in the United States until such time
as he naturalizes or commits a serious enough
crime to lose his green card and be deported.42
More terrorists have taken advantage of
the LPR category than any of the other visa
categories. From 1975 through 2015, 54 foreign-born terrorists were LPRs—an average
of 1.32 terrorists per year. Over the 41-year period, more than 35 million LPRs were allowed

in, meaning that just 0.00016 percent of LPRs
were actual terrorists. In other words, one terrorist entered for every 644,990 nonterrorist
legal permanent residents.
Those 54 LPR terrorists killed only eight
people in terrorist attacks. The human cost of
LPR terrorism was thus $120 million, equal to
$3.45 per green card issued. None of the 9/11
hijackers had green cards.

Student Visas
Student visas allow foreigners to enter the
United States temporarily to attend an educational institution such as a college, university,
seminary, private elementary school, or vocational training program.43
A total of 19 students—0.00008 percent of
the 24,176,617 student visas issued from 1981
to 2015—were terrorists.44 In other words, one
terrorist was issued a student visa for every
1,272,454 students who were not terrorists.

12
Table 5
Deadliness of All Terrorists, by Visa Category, Excluding 9/11, 1975–2015.

Visa Category

Murders Percentage

Total
1975–2015
Estimated
Entries
for Each
Visa Category

Number of
Visas Issued
per Victim
of Terrorism

Cost per Death
(dollars)

Cost per
Visa Category
(dollars)

Cost per
Visa Issued
(dollars)

Fiancé(e) visa (K-1)

14

34.15

604,132

43,152

15,000,000

210,000,000

347.61

Lawful Permanent
Resident (LPR)

8

19.51

34,829,485

4,353,686

15,000,000

120,000,000

3.45

Tourist

8

19.51

657,934,182

82,241,773

15,000,000

120,000,000

0.18

Asylum

4

9.76

700,522

175,131

15,000,000

60,000,000

85.65

Refugee

3

7.32

3,252,493

1,084,164

15,000,000

45,000,000

13.84

Student

1.5

3.66

24,176,617

16,117,745

15,000,000

22,500,000

0.93

Unknown

1.5

3.66

NA

NA

15,000,000

22,500,000

Illegal

1

2.44

26,519,625

26,519,625

15,000,000

15,000,000

0.57

Visa Waiver Program
(VWP)

0

0.00

388,024,058

0

15,000,000

0

0.00

41

100.00

1,136,041,115

27,708,320

15,000,000

615,000,000

0.54

Total

NA

Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents; National Consortium for the Study
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; Center on National Security; Department of Homeland Security; Pew Hispanic Research
Center; Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System; and author’s estimates.
Note: Nonwhole numbers for deaths result from dividing the number of victims among multiple terrorist perpetrators; NA = Not available.

Terrorists on student visas appear especially
deadly because one of them was a 9/11 hijacker.
Altogether, students caused 158.5 fatalities, or
one for every 152,534 students admitted.45 The
human cost of terrorism caused by foreigners
on student visas was thus $2.38 billion, equal to
5.23 percent of all the terrorism costs to human
life. The average terrorism cost per student visa
issued is $98.34.
Excluding 9/11, 18 terrorists entered the
United States as students, or one entry for
every 1.34 million student visas issued. Those
18 committed a total of 1.5 murders that cost
$22.5 million or $0.93 per student visa issued.

K-1 Fiancé(e) Visas
The K-1 visa permits a foreign-citizen fiancé or fiancée to travel to the United States
to marry his or her U.S.-citizen sponsor within
90 days of arrival. Once married, the foreign-

citizen can then apply to adjust his or her immigration status to that of LPR.46
Tashfeen Malik entered the United States
on a K-1 visa sponsored by her U.S.-born
husband, Syed Rizwan Farook. Together
they murdered 14 people during the San
Bernardino terrorist attack of December 2,
2015. Because it is unknown which attacker
specifically killed which victims, this report
attributes all 14 murders to Malik.
The San Bernardino attack is the only
one to involve this visa. However, because
of the relatively small number—604,132—of
these visas issued over the 41-year time frame
examined, this lone attack makes the K-1
look like a very dangerous visa, with a single
murder for every 43,152 K-1 visas issued. The
single terrorist on the K-1 visa has imposed
$210 million in costs or an average of $347.61
for every K-1 visa issued—by far the highest

13

“

Table 6
Foreign-Born Terrorists and Murders in Pre- and Post-9/11 United States
Average
Murders per
Successful
Terrorist

Number of
Successful
Terrorists

Murders in
Terrorist
Attacks

Pre-9/11

16

17

1.06

26

9/11

19

2,983

157

1

Post-9/11

5

24

4.8

14

Years Covered

Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents;
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; Center on
National Security; Department of Homeland Security; Pew Hispanic Research Center; Worldwide Refugee Admissions
Processing System; and author’s estimates.

cost per visa issued. So while it is the second
deadliest visa, there is no trend of K-1 visa
holders committing attacks.47

Refugees
A refugee is a person who is located outside
of the United States and is of special humanitarian concern; demonstrates that he or she
was persecuted or fears persecution because
of race, religion, nationality, political opinion,
or membership in a particular social group; is
not firmly settled in another country; and does
not violate other immigration bars on admission such as posing a national security or public health risk.48 Refugees apply from a third
country and then enter the United States after
they have been granted their visa. Refugees
must apply for a green card after one year of
residing in the United States.
Of the 3,252,493 refugees admitted from
1975 to the end of 2015, 20 were terrorists, which
amounted to 0.00062 percent of the total. In
other words, one terrorist entered as a refugee
for every 162,625 refugees who were not terrorists. Refugees were not very successful at killing
Americans in terrorist attacks. Of the 20, only
three were successful in their attacks, killing a
total of three people and imposing a total human cost of $45 million, or $13.84 per refugee

visa issued. The three refugee terrorists were
Cubans who committed their attacks in the
1970s and were admitted before the Refugee
Act of 1980 created the modern rigorous refugee-screening procedures currently in place.
Prior to that act, a hodgepodge of poorly managed post–World War II refugee and displaced
persons statutes, presidential grants of parole,
and ad hoc congressional legislation allowed
Hungarian, Cuban, Vietnamese, and other
refugee groups to settle in America.49 All of the
murders committed by foreign-born refugees
in terrorist attacks were committed by those
admitted prior to the 1980 act.
Two of the Cuban terrorists assassinated a
Chilean dissident and his American aide. The
third Cuban terrorist assassinated a Cuban
exile leader who supported a closer United
States relationship with Fidel Castro. The
GTD and RDWTI showed many more terrorist attacks and assassinations in the 1970s and
1980s that were likely perpetrated by Cuban
or Vietnamese refugees, but no one was ever
arrested for the crimes so they could not be
included here.
Many of the refugees arrested after 9/11 were
admitted as children, and in some cases there
is doubt over whether their attacks even qualify as terrorism.50 Other refugees have been

Of 20
terrorist
refugees
admitted to
the United
States
between 1975
and 2015, only
three were
successful in
their attacks,
killing a total
of three
people.

”

14
Table 7
Summary of Terrorism Incidents and Costs, by Visa Category

Visa Category

Total
Terrorists
per
Category

Murders
per
Category

Total
Entrants per
Category

Entrants
per
Terrorist

Entrants
per
Victim

Costs per
Death
(dollars)

Total Human
Costs
(dollars)

Costs per
Entrant in
this Category
(dollars)

Illegal immigrant

10

1

26,519,625

2,651,963

26,519,625

15,000,000

15,000,000

0.57

Lawful Permanent
Resident (LPR)

54

8

34,829,485

644,990

4,353,686

15,000,000

120,000,000

3.45

Student, including 9/11
Student, excluding
9/11

19
18

158.5
1.5

24,176,617
24,176,617

1,272,454
1,343,145

152,534
16,117,745

15,000,000
15,000,000

2,377,500,000
22,500,000

98.34
0.93

Fiancé(e) visa (K-1)

1

14

604,132

604,132

43,152

15,000,000

210,000,000

347.61

Refugee

20

3

3,252,493

162,625

1,084,164

15,000,000

45,000,000

13.84

Asylum seeker

4

4

700,522

175,131

175,131

15,000,000

60,000,000

85.65

Tourist, including 9/11
Tourist, excluding
9/11

34
16

2,834
8

657,934,182
657,934,182

19,351,005
41,120,886

232,157
82,241,773

15,000,000 42,510,000,000
15,000,000
120,000,000

64.61
0.18

Visa Waiver
Program (VWP)

3

0

388,024,058

129,341,353

0

15,000,000

0

0.00

Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents; National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; Center on National Security; Charles Kurzman, “Spreadsheet of Muslim-American Terrorism
Cases from 9/11 through the End of 2015,” University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, http://kurzman.unc.edu/islamic-terrorism/; Department of Homeland Security;
Pew Hispanic Research Center; Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System; and author’s estimates.

arrested for terrorism or the vague “terrorismrelated charges,” but they were planning terrorist attacks overseas or providing material support for foreign groups operating overseas.51
No refugees were involved in the 9/11 attacks.

Asylum Seekers
Asylum seekers are those who ask U.S. border officials for protection because they have
suffered persecution or fear that they will suffer persecution because of their race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinions.52 Unlike refugees,
asylum seekers must apply in person at the border and are often detained before being granted
asylum. Four asylum seekers, or 0.0006 percent
of the 700,522 admitted from 1975 through
2015, later turned out to be terrorists. For every
terrorist who was granted asylum, 175,131 nonterrorist asylum seekers were admitted.
Terrorists who were asylum seekers killed
four people in terrorist attacks, three of them

in the Boston Marathon bombing on April
15, 2013, carried out by the Tsarnaev brothers. The brothers entered the United States
as young children and later became terrorists. Ramzi Yousef, who helped plan the 1993
World Trade Center bombing that killed six
people, was the other asylum seeker. Because
Yousef planned and carried out those attacks
as a member of a six-person team, this report
considers him to be responsible for one of the
six murders.
Altogether, asylum seekers caused four fatalities, or one for every 175,131 admitted. The
total human cost of terrorism by asylum seekers
was $60 million, equal to an average of $85.65
per asylum seeker admission. No asylum seekers were involved with 9/11.

Tourist Visas
Tourists on the B visa are allowed to tour
the United States for business or pleasure as
well as enroll in short recreational courses of

15
study.53 These are the tourist visas available to
most residents of the world.
The tourist visa categories were the second
most abused by terrorists. A total of 34 terrorists entered the United States on tourist visas
over the 35-year period (1981–2015) for which
data are available. That is an average of 0.97
terrorists who entered on a tourist visa annually. Almost 658 million tourists entered the
United States on tourist visas, so a single terrorist was issued a visa in this category for every
19.35 million issued.
The 34 terrorists on tourist visas killed
2,834 people in attacks or one victim for every
232,157 visas issued. The total terrorism cost in
terms of human life by terrorists on tourist visas
was $42.51 billion, or $64.61 per visa.
Eighteen of the terrorists who carried out
the 9/11 attacks held tourist visas, so this visa
category is responsible for 93.7 percent of all
deaths caused by terrorists. Excluding 9/11 lowers the number of fatalities to eight and the total
death-related costs to $120 million or $0.18 per
tourist visa issued. Excluding the 9/11 hijackers,
one terrorist entered on a tourist visa for every
41.12 million nonterrorist tourists. There was
one murder victim for every 82.24 million nonterrorist tourists who entered.

was in jail on unrelated charges during the attacks. The second was the British shoe bomber
Richard Reid, who attempted to ignite his
shoe on a transatlantic flight en route to the
United States. The last was Qaisar Shaffi, who
cased New York buildings for a future attack
that was broken up by British intelligence.
Besides those three, Ahmed Ajaj and Ahmed
Ressam were apprehended at John F. Kennedy
International Airport while attempting to enter the country illegally using forged passports
from nations that were part of the VWP. Because they were captured at the border and
their documents were forgeries, they are classified as illegal immigrants.56
In addition, a few international terrorist
suspects have been apprehended while trying to enter through the VWP. These include
a member of the Provisional Irish Republican
Army, a French-Bolivian dual-national who was
implicated in a 1990 bombing of U.S. Marines
in La Paz, and a British mercenary who tried to
buy a fighter jet for the infamous Colombian
drug lord Pablo Escobar.57
According to the historical data, the VWP
was the least likely category to be used by
terrorists.

Visa Waiver Program

The visa statuses of nine terrorists are unknown. Those individuals committed their attacks or were arrested between 1975 and 1990.
Only two of the nine actually succeeded, and
they are responsible for 1.5 murders with a total human cost of $22.5 million.58

The VWP enables most citizens of the
participating countries to travel to the United
States for business or tourism for up to 90 days
without first obtaining a visa.54 The participating countries are developed nations in Europe,
East Asia, and South America that have established security procedures to exclude terrorists
and share traveler information with the U.S.
government, and whose citizens rarely overstay
illegally in the United States.55
There were three terrorists on the VWP
out of a total of 388 million entries during the
life of the program (since 1986), or a single
terrorist for every 129 million entries. That
makes the VWP the safest visa category. The
three VWP terrorists killed zero people. One
was French national Zacarias Moussaoui, who
was originally part of the 9/11 conspiracy but

Unknown

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Immigration screening for counter-terrorism purposes is important, but it will never be
perfect.59 As Steven Camarota at the Center
for Immigration Studies wrote, “To be sure,
in a nation as large as the United States, it is
impossible to prevent terrorists from entering
the country 100 percent of the time.”60 Even
though terrorists rarely achieve their ultimate
policy goals, the United States will always be
vulnerable to terrorist attacks in the sense

“

There were
only three
terrorists
on the Visa
Waiver
Program
during the
life of the
program
(since 1986),
which
amounts to a
single terrorist
for every
129 million
entries.

”

16

“

An
immigration
moratorium
would have
to prevent
504 times the
number of
murders in
any given year
as actually
occurred
annually from
1975 through
2015 for the
costs of the
moratorium
to equal the
benefits.

”

that the possibility of harm will be greater
than zero.61
Confronted with the threat of Islamic terrorism, well-known conservatives like Larry
Kudlow, David Bossie, and Ann Coulter have
called for a complete moratorium on immigration.62 They presumably want to restrict only
LPRs, student visas, fiancé(e) visas, illegal immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, but
they may also want to prevent the entry of
tourists. The following sections will separate
tourists from immigrants and migrants to estimate how many Americans must die from
terrorism to justify a moratorium on foreigners
entering the United States. Finding the breakeven point at which the benefits of reduced terrorism justify the cost incurred by stopping all
legal immigration and tourism helps form the
outer-most boundaries of a sensible policy.63 If
the benefits of the different policies proposed
below outweigh the costs, then the measure is
cost-effective. If, however, the costs of the policies proposed below are greater than the benefits, then they are not cost-effective.
This cost-benefit analysis considers the cost
of human deaths, property damage, injuries,
and economic disruption caused by terrorism.
In virtually all cases of terrorism, with the notable exception of the 9/11 attacks, property
damage is minuscule while the cost of injuries
is minor compared with the cost of the deaths.
Government reactions to terrorism, such as the
virtual shutdown of Boston in the wake of the
Marathon bombing and the grounding of all air
travel after 9/11, are not considered.64

Broad Immigration Moratorium
The economic cost of a moratorium on all
future immigration is tremendous. Professor
Benjamin Powell of Texas Tech University estimated the economic costs of a total immigration moratorium at $229 billion annually.65
This section includes two cost projections.
The first conservatively estimates the economic
costs of a moratorium to be only $35 billion annually, which is the number used by Harvard
economist George Borjas.66 That $35 billion
counts only the immigration surplus, which is

the increase in American wages caused by immigration. The figure ignores other enormous economic benefits, including the economic gains to
the immigrants themselves. The second cost projection assumes the $229 billion annual price tag
of a moratorium calculated by Benjamin Powell.
The greatest possible benefit of an immigration moratorium would be the elimination
of all terrorism by immigrants. Including the
devastation caused by the 9/11 attacks, 190
people were murdered on U.S. soil in terrorist
attacks committed by 117 illegal immigrants,
LPRs, students, fiancé(e)s, refugees, asylum
seekers, and those with unknown visa statuses
since 1975—accounting for 6.3 percent of all
fatalities caused by foreign-born terrorists
on American soil. The other 2,834 murders,
or 93.7 percent, were committed by 34 tourists who would have been unaffected by an
immigration moratorium. Those 34 tourists
account for 22.1 percent of all foreign-born
terrorists but 93.7 percent of murders caused
by foreign-born terrorist attacks. Some
99.7 percent of the murders committed by terrorists on tourist visas occurred on 9/11. A ban
on immigration will barely diminish the costs
of terrorism.
The costs of an immigration moratorium
vastly exceed the benefits, even with very
generous assumptions buttressing the promoratorium position. According to a breakeven analysis, which seeks to find when the
cost of an immigration restriction would equal
the benefit of reduced terrorism, an immigration moratorium would have to prevent 2,333
deaths annually at an estimated $15 million
per death. In reality, an average of 4.6 murders
were committed per year by immigrant (nontourist) terrorists during the 41-year period.
An immigration moratorium would have to
prevent 504 times as many such murders in any
given year as actually occurred annually from
1975 through 2015 for the costs of a moratorium to equal the benefits.
Benjamin Powell’s more realistic $229 billion annual estimate of the economic costs of an
immigration moratorium means the ban would
have to prevent 15,267 murders by terrorists each

17
year at a cost savings of $15 million per murder for
the benefits of the ban to equal the costs. That
number is about 3,294 times as great as the average annual number of terrorist deaths caused by
immigrants (excluding tourists) and more than
five times as great as all of the murders committed by all foreign-born terrorists (including tourists) from 1975 through 2015.
In short, an immigration moratorium produces huge economic costs for minuscule benefits.

Tourism Moratorium
Given the role that tourism played in the 9/11
attacks, it is tempting to think that limiting an
immigration ban to tourism might be a preferable policy. Yet the economic costs of a tourism
moratorium are even larger. The World Travel
and Tourism Council estimated that international tourists added $194.1 billion directly and
indirectly to the U.S. economy in 2014.67 A moratorium on tourism would deny the U.S. economy
an amount of economic activity equal to just
over 1 percent of U.S. gross domestic product.
The majority of all murders committed
by foreign-born terrorists, 93.7 percent, were
committed by 34 different terrorists on tourist
visas. A total of 99.7 percent of all terrorist murders committed by those on tourist visas were
committed by 18 such men on 9/11. Over the
entire 41-year period of this study, an average
of 69.1 Americans were murdered each year in
terrorist attacks committed by those on tourist visas, producing an average annual cost of
$1.037 billion—which is what would be saved if
there was a moratorium.
But the costs of a tourist moratorium vastly
exceed the benefits. Such a moratorium would
have to deter at least 12,940 murders by terrorists per year to justify the loss in economic activity. The annual number of murders committed
by tourists in terrorist attacks would have to be
187.2 times as great as they currently are to justify
a moratorium. To put in perspective the 12,940
murders that would have to be prevented each
year, that is about 4.3 times as great as all the
deaths caused by all foreign-born terrorists over
the entire 41-year period studied here. Counterterrorism cannot justify a tourist moratorium.

Including Nonhuman Costs
The destruction of private property, businesses, and economic activity caused by foreign-born
terrorism during the 1975–2015 time period is estimated to have cost $171 billion. The combined
human, property, business, and economic costs
of terrorism from 1975 through 2015 are thus estimated at $216.39 billion. Spread over 41 years, the
average annual cost of terrorism is $5.28 billion,
which is still far less than the minimum estimated
yearly benefit of $229.1 billion from immigration
and tourism ($35 billion + $194.1 billion). The average yearly costs of terrorism, including the loss
of human life, injuries, property destruction, and
economic disruptions, would have to be 43.4 times
as great as they have been to justify a moratorium
on all foreigners entering the United States. A
moratorium on foreigners entering the United
States is more costly than the benefits even when
including the property, business, and greater economic costs caused by foreign-born terrorism.

CONCLUSION
Foreign-born terrorism on U.S. soil is a lowprobability event that imposes high costs on
its victims despite relatively small risks and low
costs on Americans as a whole.68 From 1975
through 2015, the average chance of dying in an
attack by a foreign-born terrorist on U.S. soil was
1 in 3,609,709 a year. For 30 of those 41 years, no
Americans were killed on U.S. soil in terrorist
attacks caused by foreigners or immigrants. Foreign-born terrorism is a hazard to American life,
liberty, and private property, but it is manageable
given the huge economic benefits of immigration and the small costs of terrorism. The United
States government should continue to devote resources to screening immigrants and foreigners
for terrorism or other threats, but large policy
changes like an immigration or tourist moratorium would impose far greater costs than benefits.

APPENDIX
All identified foreign persons who attempted terrorism in the United States over the time
period 1975–2015 are listed in Table A1.

“

Foreign-born
terrorism is
a hazard to
American
life, liberty,
and private
property,
but it is
manageable
given the huge
economic
benefits of
immigration
and the small
costs of
terrorism.

”

18
Table A1.
Identified Foreign Persons Who Attempted or Committed Terrorism on U.S. Soil,
1975–2015
Name of Terrorist

Important Date

Fatalities*

Visa upon Entry

Hernandez, Valentin

2/21/1975

1

R

Kajevic, Stojilko

6/22/1975

0

U

Otero, Rolando

10/17/1975

0

R

Bušić, Zvonko

9/10/1976

0

L

Vlašić, Slobodan

9/10/1976

0

L

Matanić, Petar

9/10/1976

0

L

Pešut, Frane

9/10/1976

1

L

Sampol, Guillermo Novo

9/21/1976

1

R

Diaz, Alvin Ross

9/21/1976

1

R

Brekalo, Jozo

6/14/1977

0

U

Buconjic, Marijan

6/14/1977

0

U

Dizdar, Vladimir

6/14/1977

0

U

Kelava, Bozo

8/17/1978

0

R

Kodzoman, Mile

8/17/1978

0

U

Kavaja, Nikola

6/20/1979

0

L

Asadi, Hormoz

11/9/1979

0

F

Ghodoosi, Feraidonoon

11/9/1979

0

F

Noori, Mohamaad

11/9/1979

0

F

Heidary, Hady

11/9/1979

0

F

Stamboulish, Antoun

11/9/1979

0

F

Perez, Alberto

3/25/1980

0

R

Sánchez, Ramón

3/25/1980

0

R

Arocena, Eduardo

3/25/1980

0

R

Garcia, Andres

3/25/1980

0

R

Losada-Fernandez, Eduardo Fernandez

3/25/1980

0

R

Sassounian, Harout

10/6/1980

0

L

Tcharkhutian, Vicken

1/1/1982

0

L

Kozibioukian, Hratch

1/1/1982

0

L

Kozibioukian, Stanouche

1/1/1982

0

L

Chirinian, Varant Barkev

1/1/1982

0

L

Sassounian, Harry

5/5/1982

1

L

Tung, Kuei-sen

10/1/1984

1

U

Tran, Be Tu van

3/18/1986

0

R

Kikumura, Yu

4/13/1988

0

T

el-Hage, Wadih

1/31/1990

0.5

F

Francis, Glen Cusford

1/31/1990

0.5

U

1/1/1993

0

F

al-Ridi, Essam

continued

19
Table A1.
Identified Foreign Persons Who Attempted or Committed Terrorism on U.S. Soil,
1975–2015
Name of Terrorist

Important Date

Fatalities*

Visa upon Entry

Kasi, Mir Aimal

1/25/1993

2

T

Ayyad, Nidal A.

2/26/1993

1

L

Ismail, Eyad

2/26/1993

0

F

Yousef, Ramzi

2/26/1993

1

A

Abouhalima, Mohammed

2/26/1993

0

T

Abouhalima, Mahmud

2/26/1993

1

T

Salameh, Mohammad

2/26/1993

1

T

Nosair, El Sayyid

2/26/1993

2

T

Ajaj, Ahmed

3/9/1993

1

I

Haggag, Abdo Mohammed

6/1/1993

0

L

Saleh, Matarawy Mohammed Said

6/1/1993

0

L

Ali, Siddig Ibrahim Siddig

6/1/1993

0

L

Elhassan, Tarig

6/1/1993

0

L

Khalafalla, Fares

6/1/1993

0

T

Abdelgani, Amir

6/24/1993

0

T

Rahman, Omar Abdel

6/24/1993

0

T

Abdelgani, Fadil

6/24/1993

0

T

Baz, Rashid

3/1/1994

1

F

Elgabrowny, Ibrahim

3/4/1994

0

L

Saleh, Mohammed

1/19/1996

0

L

Abu Kamal, Ali Hassan

2/23/1997

0

T

7/1/1997

0

I

Khalil, Lafi

7/31/1997

0

T

al-Dahab, Khalid Abu

8/21/1998

0

F

Ressam, Ahmed

12/1/1999

0

I

Tizegha, Abdel Hakim

12/1/1999

0

I

Meskini, Abdelghani

12/1/1999

0

I

Hanjour, Hani

9/11/2001

157

F

Atta, Muhammad

9/11/2001

157

T

al-Omari, Abdul Aziz

9/11/2001

157

T

al-Shehri, Waleed

9/11/2001

157

T

al-Suqami, Satam

9/11/2001

157

T

Banihammad, Fayez

9/11/2001

157

T

al-Ghamdi, Ahmed

9/11/2001

157

T

al-Ghamdi, Hamza

9/11/2001

157

T

al-Shehhi, Marwan

9/11/2001

157

T

al-Shehri, Mohand

9/11/2001

157

T

Mezer, Gazi Ibrahim Abu

continued

20
Table A1.
Identified Foreign Persons Who Attempted or Committed Terrorism on U.S. Soil,
1975–2015
Name of Terrorist

Important Date

Fatalities*

Visa upon Entry

al-Shehri, Wail

9/11/2001

157

T

al-Hazmi, Nawaf

9/11/2001

157

T

al-Hazmi, Salem

9/11/2001

157

T

al-Mihdhar, Khalid

9/11/2001

157

T

bin Ghanim, Majid Muqid Mushan

9/11/2001

157

T

al-Ghamdi, Saeed

9/11/2001

157

T

al-Haznawi, Ahmad

9/11/2001

157

T

Jarrah, Ziad

9/11/2001

157

T

al-Nami, Ahmed

9/11/2001

157

T

Moussaoui, Zacarias

9/11/2001

0

V

12/22/2001

0

V

Mandhai, Imran

2/1/2002

0

L

Jokhan, Shueyb Mossa

5/1/2002

0

L

Hedayet, Hesham Mohamed

7/4/2002

2

T

al-Bakri, Mukhtar

9/9/2002

0

L

Kim, Steve

10/3/2002

0

L

Khan, Majid Shoukat

3/28/2003

0

A

Paracha, Uzair

3/28/2003

0

T

5/1/2003

0

F

11/28/2003

0

R

Siraj, Shahawar Matin

1/1/2004

0

I

Paracha, Saifullah

7/8/2004

0

U

Barot, Dhiren

8/1/2004

0

F

Tarmohammed, Nadeem

8/1/2004

0

F

Shaffi, Qaisar

8/1/2004

0

V

Aref, Yassin Muhiddin

8/4/2004

0

R

Hossain, Mohammed Mosharref

8/6/2004

0

L

Samana, Hammad Riaz

8/2/2005

0

L

Taheri-azar, Mohammed Reza

3/3/2006

0

L

Ahmed, Syed Haris

3/23/2006

0

L

Hayat, Umer

4/25/2006

0

L

Abraham, Patrick

6/1/2006

0

I

Duka, Shain

5/8/2007

0

I

Duka, Dritan

5/8/2007

0

I

Duka, Eljvir

5/8/2007

0

I

Shnewer, Mohamad Ibrahim

5/8/2007

0

L

Tatar, Serdar

5/8/2007

0

L

Reid, Richard

Faris, Iyman
Abdi, Nuradin M.

continued

21
Table A1.
Identified Foreign Persons Who Attempted or Committed Terrorism on U.S. Soil,
1975–2015
Name of Terrorist

Important Date

Fatalities*

Visa upon Entry

Abdullahu, Agron

5/8/2007

0

R

Defreitas, Russell

6/1/2007

0

L

Kadir, Abdul

6/2/2007

0

L

Lemorin, Lyglenson

2/7/2008

0

L

Payen, Laguerre

5/20/2009

0

L

Zazi, Najibullah

9/19/2009

0

R

Smadi, Hosam Maher Husein

9/24/2009

0

F

Abdulmutallab, Umar Farouk

12/25/2009

0

T

Ahmedzay, Zarein

1/7/2010

0

R

Medunjanin, Adis

1/7/2010

0

R

Ouazzani, Khalid

2/3/2010

0

L

Shahzad, Faisal

5/1/2010

0

F

Hasanoff, Sabirhan

6/30/2010

0

L

Hassoun, Sami Samir

9/18/2010

0

L

Ahmed, Farooque

10/27/2010

0

L

Mohamud, Mohamed Osman

11/26/2010

0

L

Younis, Awais

12/6/2010

0

L

Martinez, Antonio

12/8/2010

0

L

Aldawsari, Khalid Ali-M

2/23/2011

0

F

Mamdouh, Mohamed

5/11/2011

0

L

Ferhani, Ahmed

5/11/2011

0

R

Melaku, Yonathan

6/17/2011

0

L

Kodirov, Ulugbek

7/26/2011

0

F

Arbabsiar, Manssor

10/11/2011

0

L

Pimentel, Jose

11/20/2011

0

L

1/7/2012

0

R

2/17/2012

0

T

Nafis, Quazi Mohammad Rezwanul Ahsan

10/17/2012

0

F

Qazi, Raees Alam

11/30/2012

0

L

Qazi, Sheheryar Alam

11/30/2012

0

L

Aldosary, Abdullatif Ali

11/30/2012

0

R

Tsarnaev, Dzhokhar

4/15/2013

1.5

A

Tsarnaev, Tamerlan

4/15/2013

1.5

A

El Shukrijumah, Adnan Gulshair

12/6/2014

0

L

Juraboev, Abdurasul Hasanovich

2/1/2015

0

L

Saidakhmetov, Akhror

2/1/2015

0

L

Habibov, Abror

2/1/2015

0

U
continued

Osmakac, Sami
El Khalifi, Sidi Mohamed Amine

22
Table A1.
Identified Foreign Persons Who Attempted or Committed Terrorism on U.S. Soil,
1975–2015
Name of Terrorist

Important Date

Fatalities*

Visa upon Entry

Siddiqui, Asia

4/1/2015

0

L

Diaz, Miguel Moran

4/2/2015

0

L

Suarez, Harlem

4/3/2015

0

L

Mumani, Fareed

6/7/2015

0

L

Abdulazeez, Mohammad Youssuf

7/16/2015

5

L

Malik, Tashfeen

12/2/2015

14

K

Note: A=asylee, F=student on F or M visa, I=illegal, K=K-1 fiancé(e), L=lawful permanent resident, R=refugee, T=tourist on B-visa,
U=unknown, V=visa waiver program.
*If multiple attackers, all casualties spread evenly across all attackers.

NOTES
1. Matt Pearce, “A Look at the K-1 Visa That
Gave San Bernardino Shooter Entry into U.S.,”
Los Angeles Times, December 8, 2015, http://
www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-k1-visas20151208-story.html.
2. Alicia A. Caldwell, “U.S. Reviewing Fiancé
Visa Program after San Bernardino Shooting,”
Associated Press, December 8, 2015, http://www.
pbs.org/newshour/rundown/u-s-reviewing-fiancevisa-program-after-san-bernardino-shooting/;
Larry Kudlow, “I’ve Changed. This Is War. Seal
the Borders. Stop the Visas,” National Review,
December 11, 2015, http://www.nationalreview.
com/article/428411/larry-kudlow-seal-bordersstop-visas; David Bossie, “Conservatives Should
Think Bigger on Immigration Ban,” Breitbart,
December 11, 2015, http://www.breitbart.com/
big-government/2015/12/11/conservatives-shouldthink-bigger-on-immigration-ban/; Ann Coulter,
interview by Breitbart News Saturday, December 12,
2015, https://soundcloud.com/breitbart/breitbartnews-saturday-ann-coulter-december-12-2015.
3. See Jared Hatch, “Requiring a Nexus to National Security: Immigration, ‘Terrorist Activities,’ and Statutory Reform,” BYU Law Review 3
(2014): 697–732.

4. U.S. Department of Homeland Security
[DHS], “The Strategic National Risk Assessment
in Support of PPD 8: A Comprehensive RiskBased Approach toward a Secure and Resilient Nation” (Washington: DHS, December 8,
2011), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rmastrategic-national-risk-assessment-ppd8.pdf.
5. John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The
American Cases (Columbus: Ohio State University, March 2016), http://politicalscience.osu.edu/
faculty/jmueller/since.html.
6. Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The
Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism and Immigration: An Initial Exploration,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 4 (2006): 503–21.
7. Emails with Robert Leiken on March 14, 2016,
and Steven Brooke on March 17, 2016, confirmed
that the data set their paper was based on does not
exist anymore. Emails are available upon request.
8. U.S. Government Accountability Office
[GAO], “Criminal Alien Statistics: Information
on Incarcerations, Arrests, and Costs,” GAO-11187 (Washington: GAO, March 2011), p. 25.
9. Daniel Milton, Megan Spencer, and Michael

23
Findley, “Radicalism of the Hopeless: Refugee
Flows and Transnational Problems,” International
Interactions (August 2013): 3.
10. Illegal immigrants are included in a visa category called “illegal” to improve readability.
11. Mueller, Terrorism and Political Violence.
12. U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ], National
Security Division Statistics on Unsealed International Terrorism and Terrorism-Related Convictions
9/11/01–3/18/10 (Washington: DOJ), https://fas.
org/irp/agency/doj/doj032610-stats.pdf.

securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/analysis.
html.
21. “Profiles in Terror,” Mother Jones, http://www.
motherjones.com/fbi-terrorist.
22. The Investigative Project on Terrorism, “International Terrorism and Terrorism-Related
Convictions 9/11/01–3/18/10,” http://www.investi
gativeproject.org/documents/misc/627.pdf.
23. Charles Kurzman, “Spreadsheet of MuslimAmerican Terrorism Cases from 9/11 through the
End of 2015,” University of North Carolina–Chapel
Hill, http://kurzman.unc.edu/islamic-terrorism/.

13. GAO, “Criminal Alien Statistics,” pp. 25–26.
14. DOJ, National Security Division Statistics.
15. “Profiles in Terror: Nasser Abuali,” Mother
Jones, http://www.motherjones.com/fbi-terrorist/
nasser-abuali-stolen-cereal.
16. “By the Numbers: ISIS Cases in the United
States, March 1, 2014–January 25, 2016,” New
York, Center on National Security at Fordham
Law, January 25, 2016, http://static1.squarespace.
com/static/55dc76f7e4b013c872183fea/t/56a7a90
a2399a387c5bc9eeb/1453828362342/ISIS+Cases+Statistical+Overview+01-25-16.pdf.
17. Jerome P. Bjelopera, “American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat,” CRS Report
for Congress no. R41416 (Washington: Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2013), https://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf.

24. United States Crime Rates 1960–2014, Disaster Center website, http://www.disastercenter.
com/crime/uscrime.htm.
25. I used the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD) at the University of Maryland to estimate the total number of terrorist deaths in the
United States during this time period except for
1993 because the data are missing for that year. I
used data from the RAND Database to fill in the
missing 1993 GTD data.
26. John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Chasing
Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016), pp. 13–21.
27. John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Responsible Counterterrorism Policy,” Cato Institute
Policy Analysis no. 755, September 10, 2014, p. 4.
28. Mueller and Stewart, Chasing Ghosts, p. 137.

18. RAND National Security Division, “RAND
Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents,”
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorismincidents.html.
19. “Global Terrorism Database” (College Park:
University of Maryland), http://www.start.umd.
edu/gtd/.
20. “Homegrown Extremism 2011–2015” (Washington: New America Foundation), http://

29. Lisa A. Robinson, James K. Hammitt, Joseph
E. Aldy, Alan Krupnick, and Jennifer Baxter, “Valuing the Risk of Death from Terrorist Attacks,”
Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 7, no. 1 (2010): article 14.
30. Robert W. Hahn, Randall W. Lutter, and
W. Kip Viscusi, “Do Federal Regulations Reduce Mortality?” Washington, AEI-Brookings
Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 2000,

24
https://law.vanderbilt.edu/files/archive/011_DoFederal-Regulations-Reduce-Mortality.pdf. See
also Benjamin H. Friedman, “Managing Fear:
The Politics of Homeland Security,” Political Science Quarterly 126, no. 1 (2011): 85, footnote 31.
31. See Karen C. Tumlin, “Suspect First: How
Terrorism Policy Is Reshaping Immigration Policy,” California Law Review 92, no. 4 (July 2004):
1173–239; and John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Evaluating Counterterrorism Spending,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 28, no. 3 (Summer
2014): 237–48.
32. Phil Hirschkorn, “New York Remembers
1993 WTC Victims,” CNN New York Bureau,
February 26, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/
US/Northeast/02/26/wtc.bombing/.
33. Mueller and Stewart, Chasing Ghosts, pp. 144,
279.
34. “Insurers Have Paid $1.2M for Boston
Bombing P/C Claims So Far; Health Claims to
Top $22M,” Insurance Journal, August 30, 2013,
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/
2013/08/30/303392.htm.

Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a Layered Defense,” GAO-04-82 (Washington: GAO, May 2004), http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d0482.pdf.
38. Combining three sources for three time periods yields an astonishing 50,052,500 illegal entries: (1) the estimated gross illegal entries from
Massey and Singer, “New Estimates,” for the
years 1975 to 1989; (2) Robert Warren and Donald
Kerwin, “Beyond DAPA and DACA: Revisiting
Legislative Reform in Light of Long-Term Trends
in Unauthorized Immigration to the United
States,” Journal on Migration and Human Security
3, no. 1 (2015), for the years 1990 to 2009; and
(3) estimating from Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera
Cohn, “Trends in Unauthorized Immigration:
Undocumented Inflow Now Trails Legal Inflow”
(Washington: Pew Research Center, 2008), for
the years 2009 to 2015.
39. “San Bernardino Shooting,” CNN, http://
www.cnn.com/specials/san-bernardino-shooting.
40. Illegal immigrants are not really a visa category, but they are listed as such for simplicity’s sake.
41. No discount rate adjustment.

35. U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
“Yearbook of Immigration Statistics” (Washington: DHS, multiple years), https://www.dhs.gov/
yearbook-immigration-statistics.
36. Thomas J. Espenshade, “Unauthorized Immigration to the United States,” Annual Review
of Sociology 21 (1995): 195–216; Doug S. Massey
and Audrey Singer, “New Estimates of Undocumented Mexican Migration and the Probability of Apprehension,” Demography 32, no. 2
(May 1995): 203–13; and “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in
the United States: 1990 to 2000” (Washington:
Office of Policy and Planning, U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Service), https://www.dhs.
gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/Ill_
Report_1211.pdf.
37. U.S. General Accounting Office, “Overstay

42. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
“Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR)” (Washington: DHS), https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/
lawful-permanent-resident-lpr.
43. Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Student Visa”
(Washington: U.S. Department of State), https://
travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/study-exchange/
student.html.
44. F and M visas are for students.
45. Wadih el-Hage was on a student visa when he
and Glen Cusford Francis likely assassinated Dr.
Rashad Khalifa on January 31, 1990, in Tucson,
Arizona.
46. Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Nonimmigrant
Visa for a Fiancé(e) (K-1)” (Washington: U.S. De-

25
partment of State), https://travel.state.gov/con
tent/visas/en/immigrate/family/fiance-k-1.html.
47. Alex Nowrasteh, “Secret Policy to Ignore Social
Media? Not So Fast,” Cato at Liberty, December
15, 2015, http://www.cato.org/blog/secret-policyignore-social-media-not-so-fast.
48. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
“Refugees” (Washington: DHS), https://www.uscis.
gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/refugees.
49. Charlotte J. Moore, “Review of U.S. Refugee
Resettlement Programs and Policies,” Congressional Research Service (Washington: Government Printing Office, March 1, 1981), pp. 3–16.
50. Matthew Hendley, “Paul Gosar Thinks
Abdullatif Aldosary, Alleged Bomber, Is a ‘Known
Terrorist’; He Is Not,” Phoenix New Times, December 7, 2012, http://www.phoenixnewtimes.
com/news/paul-gosar-thinks-abdullatif-aldosaryalleged-bomber-is-a-known-terrorist-he- isnot-6647318.
51. U.S. Government Accountability Office,
“Combating Terrorism: Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation Process and U.S. Agency
Enforcement Actions,” GAO-15-629 (Washington: GAO, June 2015), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/680/671028.pdf.
52. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
“The United States Refugee Admissions Program
(USRAP) Consultation & Worldwide Processing Priorities” (Washington: DHS), https://www.
uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/refugees/
united-states-refugee-admissions-program-usrap
-consultation-worldwide-processing-priorities.

55. Ibid.
56. Steven A. Camarota, “The Open Door: How
Military Islamic Terrorists Entered and Remained
in the United States, 1993–2001,” Center for Immigration Studies, Center Paper no. 21, May 2002,
http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2002/
theopendoor.pdf.
57. Office of Inspector General, “An Evaluation
of the Security Implications of the Visa Waiver
Program,” OIG-04-26 (Washington: DHS, April
2004), pp. 11–12, https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/
Mgmt/OIG_SecurityImpVisaWaiverProgEval_
Apr04.pdf.
58. Two terrorists killed one person in an attack, so they each got credit for one-half of the
murder.
59. DHS, “The Strategic National Risk Assessment in Support of PPD 8.”
60. Camarota, “The Open Door: How Military
Islamic Terrorists Entered and Remained in the
United States, 1993–2001.”
61. Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not
Work,” International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006):
42–78.
62. Kudlow, “I’ve Changed”; Bossie, “Conservatives
Should Think Bigger”; and Ann Coulter, interview by Breitbart News Saturday.
63. See Mueller and Stewart, “Evaluating Counterterrorism Spending.”
64. Mueller and Stewart, Chasing Ghosts, p. 188.

53. Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Visitor Visa”
(Washington: U.S. Department of State), https://
travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/visit/visitor.html.

65. Benjamin Powell, “Coyote Ugly: The Deadweight Cost of Rent Seeking for Immigration
Policy,” Public Choice 150 (2012): 195–208.

54. Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Visa Waiver Program” (Washington: U.S. Department of State),
https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/visit/
visa-waiver-program.html#reference.

66. George Borjas, “Immigration and the
American Worker: A Review of the Academic
Literature” (Washington: Center for Immigration Studies, April 2013), p. 2, http://cis.org/

26
immigration-and-the-american-worker-reviewacademic-literature.
67. World Travel and Tourism Council, “Travel &
Tourism: Economic Impact 2015, United States
of America,” London, World Travel and Tourism

Council, p. 5, http://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/
reports/economic%20impact%20research/coun
tries%202015/unitedstatesofamerica2015.pdf.
68. Mueller and Stewart, “Evaluating Counterterrorism Spending,” pp. 239–40.

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