State of Texas et al v. United States of America et al

Filing 64

REPLY in Support of 5 Opposed MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, filed by Phil Bryant, Paul R. LePage, Patrick L. McCrory, C.L. "Butch" Otter, Bill Schuette, State of Louisiana, State of Alabama, State of Arizona, State of Arkansas, State of Florida, State of Georgia, State of Idaho, State of Indiana, State of Kansas, State of Montana, State of Nebraska, State of North Dakota, State of Ohio, State of Oklahoma, State of South Carolina, State of South Dakota, State of Texas, State of Utah, State of West Virginia, State of Wisconsin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex 1, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 2, # 3 Exhibit Ex. 3, # 4 Exhibit Ex. 4, # 5 Exhibit Ex. 5, # 6 Exhibit Ex. 6, # 7 Exhibit Ex. 7, # 8 Exhibit Ex. 8, # 9 Exhibit Ex. 9.a, # 10 Exhibit Ex. 9.b, # 11 Exhibit Ex. 10.a, # 12 Exhibit Ex. 10.b, # 13 Exhibit Ex. 10.c, # 14 Exhibit Ex. 10.d, # 15 Exhibit Ex. 10.e, # 16 Exhibit Ex. 10.f, # 17 Exhibit Ex. 10.g, # 18 Exhibit Ex. 10.h, # 19 Exhibit Ex. 10.i, # 20 Exhibit Ex. 10.j, # 21 Exhibit Ex. 10.k, # 22 Exhibit Ex. 10.l, # 23 Exhibit Ex. 10.m, # 24 Exhibit Ex. 10.n, # 25 Exhibit Ex. 10.0, # 26 Exhibit Ex. 10.p, # 27 Exhibit Ex. 10.q, # 28 Exhibit Ex. 10.r, # 29 Exhibit Ex. 10.s, # 30 Exhibit Ex. 11, # 31 Exhibit Ex. 12, # 32 Exhibit Ex. 13, # 33 Exhibit Ex. 14, # 34 Exhibit Ex. 15, # 35 Exhibit Ex. 16, # 36 Exhibit Ex. 17, # 37 Exhibit Ex. 18, # 38 Exhibit Ex. 19, # 39 Exhibit Ex. 20, # 40 Exhibit Ex. 21, # 41 Exhibit Ex. 22, # 42 Exhibit Ex. 23, # 43 Exhibit Ex. 24, # 44 Exhibit Ex. 25, # 45 Exhibit Ex. 26, # 46 Exhibit Ex. 27, # 47 Exhibit Ex. 28, # 48 Exhibit Ex. 29, # 49 Exhibit Ex. 30, # 50 Exhibit Ex. 31, # 51 Exhibit Ex. 32, # 52 Exhibit Ex. 33, # 53 Exhibit Ex. 34, # 54 Exhibit Ex. 35)(Oldham, Andrew)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
)
)
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
vs.
)
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
)
)
Defendants. )
)
STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,

Case No. 1:14-cv-254

PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities ...................................................................................................... iv
Table of Exhibits .......................................................................................................... xv
Summary of Argument .................................................................................................. 1
Argument ....................................................................................................................... 3
I.

Plaintiffs Are Likely To Prevail On The Merits ...................................... 3
A.

Defendants Violated The Take Care Clause ................................ 3
1.

Plaintiffs’ Take Care Claim Is Cognizable Under
Youngstown ......................................................................... 3
a.
b.

Defendants cannot relitigate Youngstown .............. 4

c.

Defendants cannot ignore Youngstown ................... 7

d.
2.

Plaintiffs have a cause of action .............................. 3

OLC agreed that Youngstown applies ..................... 7

Plaintiffs’ Take Care Claim Is Likely To Succeed
Under Youngstown.............................................................. 9
a.

Congress prohibited Defendants from
granting deferred action to 40% of the
Nation’s undocumented immigrants ....................... 9
i.

Parents of U.S. citizens ............................... 10

ii.

Parents of LPRs ........................................... 13

b.

Congress prohibited Defendants from
granting work permits to 40% of the Nation’s
undocumented immigrants .................................... 14

c.

Historical practice prohibits the DHS
Directive ................................................................. 18

d.

Congressional rejection of Defendants’
legislation prohibits the DHS Directive ................ 23

3.

The DHS Directive Is Lawmaking, Not
Discretionary Decisionmaking ......................................... 25
a.
b.

Rubber-stamping
is
not
“case-by-case
discretion” ............................................................... 28

c.
B.

Plaintiffs challenge Defendants’ actions —
not their inactions .................................................. 25

Theoretical revocability of deferred action
cannot save the DHS Directive .............................. 32

Defendants Violated The APA .................................................... 34
1.

The DHS Directive Is Reviewable Under The APA ........ 35
a.

The Directive is a substantive rule ....................... 36

b.

Defendants are wrong to call the Directive a
non-substantive “guidance” or “policy”
document ................................................................ 37

2.
3.
C.

Defendants’ Say-So Cannot Defeat Judicial Review ....... 38
Plaintiffs’ APA Claims Are Likely To Succeed On
The Merits ......................................................................... 40

Plaintiffs Have Standing ............................................................. 42
1.

The DHS Directive Will Impose Economic Injuries
On Plaintiffs’ Driver’s License Programs ........................ 43
a.
b.

2.

The States will lose money .................................... 43
The States’ injuries are not “self-inflicted” ........... 45

Plaintiffs’ Standing Follows A Fortiori From
Massachusetts v. EPA ....................................................... 49
a.

States get “special solicitude” as plaintiffs ........... 50

b.

Plaintiffs’ injuries are concrete, traceable,
and redressable ...................................................... 51

c.

The size of Plaintiffs’ injuries is irrelevant ........... 55

d.

Defendants’ counterarguments fail ....................... 56
ii

3.

Plaintiffs Have Parens Patriae Standing ......................... 58
a.
b.

4.

States can sue to protect citizens against
economic discrimination ........................................ 58
States can sue DHS ................................................ 61

One Plaintiff With Standing Is Sufficient To Create
A “Case” Or “Controversy”................................................ 62

II.

Plaintiffs Will Incur Irreparable Injuries.............................................. 64

III.

The Balance of Equities Tips in PLaintiffs’ Favor ................................ 65

IV.

The Public Interest Necessitates a Preliminary Injunction ................. 66

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 67
Certificate of Service

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
ABA v. FTC,
430 F.3d 457 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................ 16, 17
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136 (1967) ............................................................................................ 34, 35
Adams v. Richardson,
356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C. 1973) ................................................................................. 32
Adams v. Richardson,
480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ................................................................................ 32
ALCOA v. Bonneville Power Admin.,
903 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1989) .................................................................................... 58
Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999) .................................................................................................. 50
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez,
458 U.S. 592 (1982) ...................................................................... 2, 47, 59, 60, 61, 62
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith,
496 U.S. 167 (1990) .................................................................................................. 48
Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States,
987 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1993) .................................................................................. 57
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,
208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000) .......................................................................... 37, 40
Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer,
757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014) ............................................................................ 45, 46
Arizona v. United States,
132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) .............................................................................................. 51
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth.,
297 U.S. 288 (1936) .................................................................................................. 41
Austin v. New Hampshire,
420 U.S. 656 (1975) .................................................................................................. 58
iv

Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962) ............................................................................................ 44, 45
Barlow v. Collins,
397 U.S. 159 (1970) .................................................................................................. 43
Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678 (1946) .................................................................................................... 4
Bowen v. Massachusetts,
487 U.S. 879 (1988) .................................................................................................. 39
Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714 (1986) .................................................................................................. 62
Catawba County v. EPA,
571 F.3d 20 (D.C. Cir. 2009) .................................................................................... 56
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting,
131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) .............................................................................................. 61
Chamber of Commerce v. DOL,
174 F.3d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1999) .................................................................................. 37
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) .............................................................................................. 33
City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund,
511 U.S. 328 (1994) .................................................................................................. 16
Clinton v. City of New York,
524 U.S. 417 (1998) .................................................................................................. 62
Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) .................................................................................. 57
Corley v. United States,
556 U.S. 303 (2009) .................................................................................................. 15
Croplife v. EPA,
329 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2003) .................................................................................. 39
Ctr. for Auto Safety, Inc. v. NHTSA,
342 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2004) .............................................................................. 58

v

De Canas v. Bica,
424 U.S. 351 (1976) .................................................................................................. 61
Diamond v. Charles,
476 U.S. 54 (1986) .................................................................................................... 47
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000) .................................................................................................. 16
FEC v. Akins,
524 U.S. 11 (1998) .................................................................................................... 56
Feinerman v. Bernardi,
558 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2008) ............................................................................ 64
Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. HHS,
648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) ................................................................................ 63
Franklin v. Massachusetts,
505 U.S. 788 (1992) .................................................................................................... 4
Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,
561 U.S. 477 (2010) .................................................................................................... 4
Freeman v. Gonzales,
444 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2006) .................................................................................. 21
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167 (2000) ............................................................................................ 42, 60
Georgia v. Pa. R. Co.,
324 U.S. 439 (1945) ............................................................................................ 51, 59
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230 (1907) .................................................................................................. 51
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966) .................................................................................................. 45
Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821 (1985) ................................................................................ 25, 26, 28, 32
Hudson v. United States,
522 U.S. 93 (1997) .................................................................................................... 60

vi

Illinois v. City of Chicago,
137 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1998) .................................................................................... 49
In re U.S.,
503 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2007) .................................................................................... 32
Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc’y,
478 U.S. 221 (1986) ............................................................................................ 34, 35
Lockhart v. Napolitano,
573 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 2009) .................................................................................... 21
Los Angeles Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius,
638 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2011) .................................................................................... 57
Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick,
813 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1987) .................................................................................. 40
Maryland v. Louisiana,
451 U.S. 725 (1981) .................................................................................................. 59
Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497 (2007) ...................................2, 42, 43, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 58, 61, 62
Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447 (1923) .................................................................................................. 61
McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961) .................................................................................................. 45
Mississippi v. Johnson,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866) ....................................................................................... 4
N.W. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder,
557 U.S. 193 (2009) .................................................................................................. 41
Nalco Co. v. EPA,
786 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.D.C. 2011) .......................................................................... 64
National Association of Home Builders v. Army Corps of Engineers,
417 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2005) .................................................................... 26, 27, 28
NFIB v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) .............................................................................................. 47

vii

Nixon v. GSA,
433 U.S. 425 (1977) .................................................................................................. 65
NLRB v. Noel Canning,
134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) .............................................................................................. 67
NRDC v. EPA,
643 F.3d 311 (D.C. Cir. 2011) .................................................................................. 38
NRDC v. FDA,
710 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2013)........................................................................................ 49
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935) .................................................................................................... 4
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553 (1923) .................................................................................................. 59
Perales v. Casillas,
903 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1990) ........................................................................ 9, 10, 28
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson,
223 U.S. 605 (1912) .................................................................................................... 4
Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott,
131 S. Ct. 1 (2010) .................................................................................................... 64
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson,
22 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 1994) ...................................................................................... 39
Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982) .................................................................................................. 53
Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala,
56 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1995) .......................................................... 2, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969) .................................................................................................. 24
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee,
525 U.S. 471 (1999) ............................................................................................ 28, 29
Robinson v. Napolitano,
554 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2009)...................................................................................... 21

viii

Rodriguez v. United States,
480 U.S. 522 (1987) .................................................................................................. 10
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.,
547 U.S. 47 (2006) .................................................................................................... 62
Russello v. United States,
464 U.S. 16 (1983) .................................................................................................... 13
Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio,
134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014) .............................................................................................. 13
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro,
349 U.S. 48 (1955) .................................................................................................... 35
Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972) .................................................................................................. 47
Simmat v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons,
413 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2005) .................................................................................. 4
St. Pierre v. Dyer,
208 F.3d 394 (2d Cir. 2000)................................................................................ 48, 49
Stomper v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 241,
27 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 1994) ...................................................................................... 10
Texas Democratic Party v. Benkiser,
459 F.3d 582 (5th Cir. 2006) .................................................................................... 43
Texas v. United States,
497 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2007) .............................................................................. 47, 48
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,
545 U.S. 748 (2005) .................................................................................................. 26
United States v. Juarez-Escobar,
25 F. Supp. 3d 774 (W.D. Pa. 2014)......................................................................... 28
United States v. Lee,
106 U.S. 196 (1882) .................................................................................................... 4
United States v. Rutherford,
442 U.S. 544 (1979) .................................................................................................. 24

ix

United States v. SCRAP,
412 U.S. 669 (1973) ............................................................................................ 42, 44
University of Texas v. Camenisch,
451 U.S. 390 (1981) .................................................................................................. 63
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977) .................................................................................................. 63
Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found.,
454 U.S. 151 (1981) ............................................................................................ 62, 63
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc.,
531 U.S. 457 (2001) ............................................................................................ 16, 41
Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555 (2009) .................................................................................................. 51
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952) ....................... 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, 18, 19, 23, 24, 25, 66, 67
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton,
132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012) .............................................................................................. 57
Federal Constitutional Provisions
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3............................................................................. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 34
U.S. CONST. art. III ........................................................................ 42, 47, 48, 56, 62, 64
Federal Statutory Provisions
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142 (2009)............................................................... 21
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)............................................................. 17
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996)....................................................... 12, 62
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000)............................................................. 22

x

Violence Against Women Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 ........................................................................ 22
5 U.S.C. § 553 ......................................................................................................... 34, 41
5 U.S.C. § 702 ............................................................................................................... 34
5 U.S.C. § 704 ................................................................................................... 34, 35, 56
5 U.S.C. § 706 ......................................................................................................... 34, 41
8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) .............................................................................................. 41, 42
8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(1) .................................................................................................... 13
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) ........................................................................................... 11
8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1) .................................................................................................... 13
8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) .................................................................................................... 13
8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3) .................................................................................................... 13
8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(4) .................................................................................................... 13
8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii) ......................................................................................... 22
8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iv).......................................................................................... 22
8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(vii) ........................................................................................ 22
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) ........................................................................................... 11
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) ...................................................................................... 11
8 U.S.C. § 1201(a) ........................................................................................................ 11
8 U.S.C. § 1225 ....................................................................................................... 11, 12
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) .................................................................................................... 13
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) ............................................................................................... 12
8 U.S.C. § 1226 ............................................................................................................. 12

xi

8 U.S.C. § 1226a ........................................................................................................... 12
8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(1) .................................................................................................. 12
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(3) .................................................................................................... 15
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) ......................................................................................................... 12
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) ............................................................................................. 11
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e)(1) .................................................................................................. 11
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(7) .................................................................................................... 15
8 U.S.C. § 1255 ............................................................................................................. 11
8 U.S.C. § 1324a ........................................................................................................... 14
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) ............................................................................................. 14
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) ...................................................................................... 14, 15, 42
8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) ........................................................................................................ 14
8 U.S.C. § 1439(a) ........................................................................................................ 14
26 U.S.C. § 4980H(b) ................................................................................................... 60
26 U.S.C. § 4980H(b)(1) ............................................................................................... 60
26 U.S.C. § 7121 ........................................................................................................... 18
26 U.S.C. § 7122 ........................................................................................................... 18
28 U.S.C. § 516 ............................................................................................................... 8
28 U.S.C. § 519 ............................................................................................................... 8
28 U.S.C. § 1331 ......................................................................................................... 3, 4
49 U.S.C. § 30301 ......................................................................................................... 44

xii

Federal Regulatory Provisions
Final Notice, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,818 (Mar. 9, 2000) ....................................................... 26
6 C.F.R. § 37.13(b)(1) ................................................................................................... 44
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(6) .................................................................................................... 20
8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14).................................................................................. 17, 18, 46
45 C.F.R. § 152.2(8)...................................................................................................... 60
State Statutory Provisions
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212 ................................................................................... 60
ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-511 ....................................................................................... 61
ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-1105 ..................................................................................... 44
MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-11-3(7)(e).................................................................................. 60
S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-8-50(D)(2) ............................................................................. 60, 61
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-103(d) ................................................................................... 61
TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 521.142(a).................................................................................. 43
TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 521.1425(d)................................................................................ 43
TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 521.181 ...................................................................................... 43
TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 521.421(a).................................................................................. 43
TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 521.421(a-3) .............................................................................. 43
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-1B-7 ........................................................................................ 61

xiii

Other Authorities
Applicability of the Davis-Bacon Act to the Veterans Administration’s Lease of
Medical Facilities, 12 Op. O.L.C. 89 (1988) .............................................................. 8
ARKANSAS MEDICAID, MEDICAL SERVICES POLICY MANUAL ........................................ 53
Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part I: Congressional
Acquiescence to Deferred Action, 103 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE __
(forthcoming 2015) ................................................................................................... 20
CBS Los Angeles, Long Lines Expected at DMV Friday as Undocumented
Immigrants Apply for Licenses (Jan. 1, 2015)......................................................... 64
Glenn Kessler,
Fact Checker: Obama’s Claim that George H.W. Bush Gave Relief to
‘40 Percent’ of Undocumented Immigrants, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2014) .............. 19
Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the
Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) ........................................................ 6
IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK (13th ed. 2012) ............................. 13
Kristi Lundstrom, The Unintended Effects of the Three- and Ten-Year Unlawful
Presence Bars, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 389 (2013) .......................................... 11
6 C. GORDON, S. MAILMAN & S. YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE (1998).................................................................................... 29
Michael D. Shear, For Obama, Executive Order on Immigration Would be a
Turnabout, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2014) ................................................................... 65
Kenji Yoshino, On Empathy in Judgment (Measure for Measure),
57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 683 (2009) ............................................................................... 67

xiv

TABLE OF EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT

DOCUMENT NAME

APP.
PAGE NO.

1

Declaration of Richard Allgeyer, Ph.D.

0001-0046

2

Stuart Anderson, Memorandum for Johnny N.
Williams, Re: Deferred Action for Aliens with Bona
Fide Applications for T Nonimmigrant Status (May 8,
2002)

0047-0049

3

Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, No. 13-16248
(9th Cir.), Amicus Br. of United States in Opp’n to
Reh’g En Banc

0050-0074

4

Declaration of Kevin D. Bailey

0075-0078

5

Declaration of David G. Baker

0079-0086

6

Jeanne Batalova et al., DACA at the Two-Year Mark,
Migration Policy Institute (Aug. 2014)

0087-0121

7

Declaration of Michael Berndt

0122-0125

8

DACA Emails, Part I

0126-0141

9

DACA Emails, Part II

0142-0273

10

DACA Standard Operating Procedures

0274-0735

11

Declaration of Lisa Dawn-Fisher

0736-0741

12

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Report, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (Apr. 10, 2013)

0742-0744

13

Declaration of James Dunks

0745-0748

14

Declaration of Karl Eschbach, Ph.D.

0749-0790

15

Declaration of Patrick A. Fernan

0791-0802

16

Declaration of Jeffrey M. Gill

0803-0805

17

Bob Goodlatte & Charles E. Grassley, Letter to Jeh
Johnson (Aug. 29, 2014)

0806-0811

xv

EXHIBIT

DOCUMENT NAME

APP.
PAGE NO.

18

David Hancock, Few Immigrants Use Family Aid
Program, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 1, 1990)

0812-0814

19

H.R. 5759, Preventing Executive Overreach on
Immigration Act of 2014

0815-0821

20

Declaration of Michael C. MacCracken,
Massachusetts v. EPA (D.C. Cir. No. 03-1361)

0822-0838

21

Donald Neufeld, Memorandum for Field Leadership,
Re: Guidance Regarding Surviving Spouses of
Deceased U.S. Citizens and Their Children (Sept. 4,
2009)

0839-0847

22

Declaration of Walt Neverman

0848-0851

23

Declaration of Kenneth Palinkas

0852-0856

24

Declaration of Joe Peters

0857-0878

25

Declaration of Sheri Pollock

0879-0882

26

President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President
in Immigration Town Hall — Nashville, Tennessee
(Dec. 9, 2014)

0883-0893

27

Hearing Transcript, President Obama’s Executive
Overreach on Immigration, House Judiciary
Committee (Dec. 2, 2014)

0894-0972

28

Press Release, USCIS, USCIS Announces Interim
Relief for Foreign Students Adversely Impacted by
Hurricane Katrina (Nov. 25, 2005)

0973-0975

29

Leon Rodriguez, Letter to Charles E. Grassley (Oct. 9,
2014)

0976-0995

30

Declaration of Donald M. Snemis

0996-1003

31

Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements
Program Documents

1004-1022

xvi

EXHIBIT

DOCUMENT NAME

APP.
PAGE NO.

32

Paul W. Virtue, Memorandum for Regional Directors
et al., Re: Supplemental Guidance on Battered Alien
Self-Petitioning Process and Related Issues (May 6,
1997)

1023-1030

33

Declaration of Finis Welch, Ph.D.

1031-1053

34

William R. Yates, Memorandum for the Director,
Vermont Service Center, Re: Centralization of
Interim Relief for U Nonimmigrant Status Applicants
(Oct. 8, 2003)

1054-1061

35

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952) (No. 51-744), Brief for Petitioners

1062-1191

xvii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.A.

The Defendants claim they can dispense with federal law and

unilaterally resolve one of the Nation’s most intractable issues with a five-page
DHS Directive. And they claim that their efforts are challengeable by no plaintiff,
reviewable by no court, and subject to no public input under the Administrative
Procedure Act. See Opp. 29 (“Plaintiffs’ redress . . . is through the political process,
not the courts.”). Harry Truman was the last President to violate the Take Care
Clause in such stark terms, and the Supreme Court enjoined the attempt in the
Steel Seizure Cases. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952). This Court should respond likewise.
Defendants cannot distinguish the Steel Seizure Cases by claiming that the
DHS Directive is an unreviewable act of “discretionary non-enforcement.” This is a
lawsuit about what Defendants did — not what they declined to do.

They

unilaterally created a new entitlement program, legislated the eligibility criteria for
it, and then (in the words of the USCIS union president) they “rubber-stamped” the
eligible applications. Palinkas Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8 (App. 0854-55). Moreover, Defendants
will issue millions of federal identification cards (called Employment Authorization
Cards, or “EACs”), which will entitle their holders to myriad legal benefits under
federal and state law. Whatever else might be said about Defendants’ unilateral
actions, they cannot be minimized as mere “inaction.”
I.B.

Plaintiffs also are likely to succeed on their APA claims. The APA’s

notice-and-comment and judicial-review provisions apply whenever an agency
creates an entitlement program with administrative eligibility criteria that bind

agency officials and confer benefits on members of the public. See Prof’ls & Patients
for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 596 (5th Cir. 1995).

The DHS

Directive easily meets that standard because it obligates agency officials to “rubberstamp” eligible applications, see Palinkas Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8 (App. 0854-55), and it confers
legal rights in the form of EACs on members of the public. It is irrelevant that DHS
calls the document a mere “policy” statement because federal courts must look
behind the agency’s label to the substance and practical effect of the agency’s
actions. See Prof’ls & Patients, 56 F.3d at 596 n.27.
I.C.

The Plaintiffs have standing to raise their Take Care and APA claims.

Unless enjoined by this Court, (1) the DHS Directive will impose millions of dollars
in costs on state licensing programs; (2) the States will be forced to spend hundreds
of millions of dollars on health, education, and law-enforcement programs; and
(3) the Directive will distort labor markets in the Plaintiff States by making EACholders cheaper to hire.

Those injuries are far more concrete than the States’

interests in EPA’s non-regulation of certain greenhouse gases, so the States’
standing here is clearer than in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). And
the Supreme Court repeatedly has held that the States have parens patriae
standing to vindicate their sovereign interests in federal court.

E.g., Alfred L.

Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
II-IV. The Plaintiff States will suffer irreparable injuries without a
preliminary injunction because they will be forced to spend millions of dollars to
remediate the Directive’s consequences. And as the President has conceded, it will

2

be difficult or impossible to unravel the Directive once it takes effect. Against those
injuries, the Defendants do not assert any immediate need to issue 4 million
deferred action approvals and EACs. Moreover, the Youngstown Court held that no
emergency — not even the exigencies of the Korean War — can allow the Executive
to violate the Take Care Clause. Finally, the public interest favors preserving the
status quo until the federal courts can make a considered judgment regarding the
lawfulness of the Directive.

Otherwise the Executive will escape judicial

enforcement of the Constitution’s separation of powers simply by racing to violate it.
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO PREVAIL ON THE MERITS
A.

Defendants Violated The Take Care Clause

Plaintiffs’ claim under the Take Care Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, is likely
to succeed for three reasons. First, Plaintiffs have a cause of action to raise that
claim, just as the steel mills did in Youngstown. Second, under the legal framework
established in Youngstown, the DHS Directive is unconstitutional because it
contravenes Congress’s plain statutory commands regarding undocumented
immigrants’ presence in the United States and their authorizations to work. Third,
Defendants cannot avoid judicial review by invoking “prosecutorial discretion” or
“enforcement priorities” because this is a case about executive action, not inaction.
1.

Plaintiffs’ Take Care Claim Is Cognizable Under Youngstown
a.

Plaintiffs have a cause of action

It is a rudimentary proposition of federal law that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the
Constitution itself provide a cause of action to raise constitutional claims for
3

injunctive relief against federal officers. See, e.g., Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223
U.S. 605 (1912); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220-21 (1882). Section 1331
gives this Court “jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution . . . of
the United States,” and that is all the Plaintiffs need to seek “injunctions to protect
rights safeguarded by the Constitution.” Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946); see
also Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 491 n.2 (2010) (plaintiffs have
cause of action “without regard to the particular constitutional provisions at issue
here”); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992) (even when no statutory
cause of action runs against the President, “the President’s actions may still be
reviewed for constitutionality”); Simmat v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 413 F.3d 1225,
1232 (10th Cir. 2005) (McConnell, J.) (“Section 1331 thus provides jurisdiction for
the exercise of the traditional powers of equity in actions arising under federal law.
No more specific statutory basis is required.”).1 Defendants therefore cannot deny
that there is a “judicially cognizable basis to challenge executive action under the
Take Care Clause.” Opp. 30.
b.

Defendants cannot relitigate Youngstown

The legal standard governing Plaintiffs’ Take Care claim comes from the
Steel Seizure Cases, which are the canonical authority governing unilateral
exercises of executive power. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952). There, President Truman directed his Secretary of Commerce to seize
1 Even constitutional claims generally do not run against the President himself. See Mississippi
v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 501 (1866) (In general, “this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to
enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.”). Rather, they run against the
executive officers who implement the President’s unlawful instructions. See, e.g., Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).

4

the Nation’s steel mills, and the mill owners brought constitutional claims against
the Commerce Secretary. The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that Truman
unconstitutionally tried “to dispense with the laws” in violation of the Take Care
Clause — just as James II did before him.

Brief for Petitioners at 35-38,

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (No. 51-744) (App.
1112-15) (explaining that Article II and the Take Care Clause find their roots in
James II’s invocation of the dispensing power).
In response, the Department of Justice defended Truman’s unilateral
dispensation in terms virtually identical to those it uses here.

Consider this

colloquy between Truman’s DOJ lawyer and U.S. District Judge David Pine:
The Court: So you contend the Executive has unlimited power in time
of an emergency?
Mr. Baldridge: He has the power to take such action as is necessary to
meet the emergency.
The Court: If the emergency is great, it is unlimited, is it?
Mr. Baldridge: I suppose if you carry it to its logical conclusion, that is
true. But I do want to point out that there are two limitations on the
Executive power. One is the ballot box and the other is impeachment.
The Court: Then, as I understand it, you claim that in time of
emergency the Executive has this great power.
Mr. Baldridge: That is correct.
The Court: And that the Executive determines the emergencies and the
Courts cannot even review whether it is an emergency.
Mr. Baldridge: That is correct.
***
The Court: So, when the sovereign people adopted the Constitution, it
enumerated the powers set up in the Constitution but limited the
powers of the Congress and limited the powers of the judiciary, but it
did not limit the powers of the Executive. Is that what you say?
Mr. Baldridge: That is the way we read Article II of the Constitution.
***
It is our position that the President is accountable only to the country,
and that the decisions of the President are conclusive.

5

Id. at 27-28 (App. 1104-05) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Judge
Pine responded exactly how we are asking this Court to respond: he rejected the
Executive Branch’s limitless-power argument and issued a preliminary injunction.
The Supreme Court affirmed and made clear that the President is not a law
unto himself: “In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see
that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587.

And in one of the most influential concurring

opinions in Supreme Court history, Justice Jackson enunciated a three-part
framework for analyzing presidential pleas for deference to executive power:
1.
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate.
***
2.
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may
have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.
***
3.
When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for
then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain
exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the
Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power
at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution,
for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional
system.
Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted); see also Neal K. Katyal &
Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111
YALE L.J. 1259, 1274 (2002) (“Justice Jackson’s concurrence outlined the three nowcanonical categories that guide modern analysis of separation of powers.”).
6

c.

Defendants cannot ignore Youngstown

Defendants’ treatment of the “now-canonical” Youngstown case is deeply
conflicted. On the one hand, DOJ embraces the same unbridled theory of executive
power that it previously (and unsuccessfully) leveled in defense of Truman’s seizure
of the steel mills. Compare Opp. 29 (arguing only check on Defendants’ actions “is
through the political process, not the courts”), with Youngstown Br. 28 (App. 1105)
(arguing only check on executive power “is the ballot box and . . . impeachment”).
On the other hand, DOJ relegates its entire discussion of Youngstown to a single
sentence in the middle of a 349-word footnote on page 30 of its brief. See Opp. 30
n.25.
And even that solitary sentence does not make sense.
distinguish the precedent, Defendants argue:

Purporting to

“In Youngstown[,] the President

conceded that he was acting outside of authority provided to him by statute.” Ibid.
If Defendants mean to suggest that the touchstone for a Take Care violation is a
presidential concession of lawlessness, we have 20 of them. The current President
likewise conceded that his actions in this case exceeded the authority provided to
him by statute. See FAC ¶¶ 19, 44, 48 (collecting quotations). While Defendants
fail to acknowledge those concessions even once in their voluminous filing, they can
no more avoid those concessions than they can avoid the Supreme Court’s emphatic
rejection of their unreviewable-discretion theory of executive power.
d.

OLC agreed that Youngstown applies

The Defendants’ nonchalance toward Youngstown is all the more remarkable
because DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) previously told the American public
7

that the decision is far from irrelevant. See OLC Memo (FAC Ex. B).2 Rather than
relegating Youngstown to one sentence in a 349-word footnote, OLC said the
decision is critically important and puts meaningful limits on DHS’s deferred action
programs:

“Immigration officials’ discretion in enforcing the laws is not . . .

unlimited.” Id. at 5 (citing Youngstown).
In the first “zone” of the Youngstown framework, when DHS operates with
the “express or implied authorization of Congress, [its] authority is at its
maximum.” 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). At the other end of the
spectrum is the third “zone”: when the Executive “takes measures incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.” Id. at
637 (Jackson, J., concurring). That is why OLC said it is “critical” to the DHS
Directive’s constitutionality that it enjoyed the express or implied acquiescence of
Congress — i.e., the Directive fell in “zone 1” of the Youngstown framework. In fact,
even OLC rejected part of DHS’s policy proposal because OLC concluded it fell
outside of “zone 1.”

See OLC Memo 32-33 (concluding DHS cannot lawful give

deferred action to parents of DACA beneficiaries because Congress had not
authorized it).

As explained below, OLC was wrong because the entire DHS

Directive falls in “zone 3” — i.e., Congress has taken numerous affirmative steps to
foreclose the relief unilaterally afforded by the Defendants. But in all events, it is

2 OLC provides authoritative legal advice to the President and all executive agencies. By virtue
of delegations from the Attorney General, OLC also has asserted control over the litigation positions
of Executive Branch agencies, including obviously other lawyers at DOJ. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519;
Applicability of the Davis-Bacon Act to the Veterans Administration’s Lease of Medical Facilities, 12
Op. O.L.C. 89, 93-94, 98 (1988).

8

remarkable that Defendants are not willing to admit what even OLC did: namely,
that Youngstown applies.
2.

Plaintiffs’ Take Care Claim Is Likely To Succeed Under
Youngstown

The DHS Directive falls under “zone 3” of the Youngstown framework. That
is so for four reasons: (a) several provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (“INA”), prohibit Defendants from unilaterally
authorizing the presence of 40% of the Nation’s undocumented immigrants;
(b) several provisions of the INA also prohibit Defendants from unilaterally giving
work permits to 40% of the Nation’s undocumented immigrants; (c) deferred action
programs previously blessed by Congress are inapposite because they bridged
individuals from one lawful status to another; and (d) Defendants cannot propose
immigration legislation, lose in Congress, and then exert their will to accomplish
their preferred legislative result through unilateral executive action.

Plaintiffs

therefore are likely to succeed on the merits of their Take Care claim.
a.

Congress prohibited Defendants from granting deferred
action to 40% of the Nation’s undocumented immigrants

Congress has not expressly authorized or implicitly acquiesced to granting
deferred action to 4 million undocumented immigrants.

Defendants’ contrary

argument is that the INA evinces a broad congressional preference for “family
unity,” which the Executive Branch is free to promote at all costs. See Opp. 43.
That is wrong for two reasons. First, the courts have rejected the assertion that the
INA is motivated by a single-minded “Congressional interest in family unification[;]
an even more central purpose might be to protect American jobs.”
9

Perales v.

Casillas, 903 F.2d 1043, 1051 (5th Cir. 1990). Second, regardless whether the INA
has one purpose or many, the DHS Directive violates the entirety of Congress’s
effort by throwing away the statute’s carefully tailored provisions and adopting
instead a blunt, across-the-board policy that renders superfluous entire portions of
the INA for 40% of the Nation’s undocumented population.
“Deciding what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the
achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice — and
it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that
whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.” Rodriguez v.
United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987) (per curiam); see also Stomper v.
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 241, 27 F.3d 316, 320 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Easterbrook, J.) (“A court must determine not only the direction in which a law
points but also how far to go in that direction.”). And here, Congress made very
clear how far it wanted to go in authorizing the presence of parents of U.S. citizens
and legal permanent residents (“LPRs”).

Limiting family reunification was as

important to Congress as providing for it. The Defendants cannot simply disregard
those limits, make up their own, and then claim that Congress “acquiesced” in their
unilateral lawmaking.
i.

Parents of U.S. citizens

First take the undocumented parents of U.S. citizens. Under the INA, the
undocumented parent is not lawfully present until he or she: (A) remains in the
country and evades detection until the citizen-child turns 21, (B) voluntarily leaves

10

the country, (C) waits 10 more years, and then (D) obtains an IR-5 immediaterelative visa from a U.S. consulate abroad.

See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i),

1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), 1201(a), 1255. Moreover, if the undocumented parent does not
evade detection for 21 years, he or she is statutorily inadmissible to the United
States.

See id. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

The only way to avoid that statutory

inadmissibility and remain in the country lawfully is to satisfy yet another list of
rigid statutory criteria, including among other things, “that [the inadmissible
parent’s] removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to
the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States.”

Id.

§ 1229b(b)(1)(D). And even then, Congress has capped the number of cancellations
of removal at 4,000 per year nationwide. See id. § 1229b(e)(1).
It takes a rather skewed eye to see this scheme as an unbounded thrust
toward “family unity.”

Indeed, some have criticized the foregoing provisions as

imposing draconian hurdles to the unification of undocumented parents and their
citizen children. See Kristi Lundstrom, The Unintended Effects of the Three- and
Ten-Year Unlawful Presence Bars, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 389 (2013).
Regardless whether those hurdles are good or bad policy, it is irrefutable that
Congress imposed them and the Defendants ignored them. Undocumented parents
of U.S. citizens no longer have to comply with Congress’s requirements in Sections
1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and 1229b(b)(1)(D); instead, they can lawfully stay
in the United States and avoid removal proceedings simply by satisfying DHS’s

11

requirements in the Directive.3

That is the exact opposite of congressional

acquiescence; it is zone-3-style executive aggrandizement.

See Youngstown, 343

U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Defendants cannot justify that aggrandizement by misreading the statute.
For

example,

8

U.S.C.

§

1225(b)(2)(A)

creates

a

mandatory

duty

to

remove undocumented immigrants. See PI Mot. 3-4, 23. It is impossible to deny
that Section 1225 speaks in “mandatory” terms while conceding that Sections 1226
and 1226a do speak in “mandatory” terms, Opp. 43; all three use the same “shall”
commands. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2)(A) (“[T]he alien shall be detained”); 1226(c)
(“The Attorney General shall take into custody” criminals); 1226a(a)(1) (“The
Attorney General shall take into custody” terrorists).
Nor can Defendants claim that Section 1225 is irrelevant because it applies
only to individuals who are “seeking admission,” rather than people who are already
here unlawfully. Opp. 35. Congress specifically amended the INA to define all
people who are here unlawfully as people “seeking admission,” whether they
present themselves to border authorities or have been living quietly in the country
for decades. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 301, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (“IIRIRA”). As a leading treatise
explains: “[P]ersons who enter [unlawfully] are treated as applicants for admission

3 It is true that undocumented parents of U.S. citizens still must comply with Congress’s
statutory requirements for an adjustment of status (e.g., from “deferred action” to “LPR”). See Opp.
36-37. But that’s irrelevant. The statutory provisions cited above reflect the narrow circumstances
under which Congress authorizes the presence of parents of U.S. citizens, and those are the
requirements that the Defendants unconstitutionally disregarded in the DHS Directive. It is
irrelevant that DHS did not also disregard the statutory requirements for adjustments of status.

12

under INA § 253(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).” IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW
SOURCEBOOK 59 (13th ed. 2012).
ii.

Parents of LPRs

The undocumented parents of LPRs are an even easier case.

Unlike the

parents of U.S. citizens, the parents of LPRs never have enjoyed “family unity”
preferences under the immigration laws. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a)(1), 1153(a)(1)-(4).
And because Congress chose not to authorize the presence of parents of LPRs and
citizens on identical terms, it would frustrate Congress’s purposes for DHS to
nonetheless treat them equally. See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191,
2212-13 (2014) (noting the equation of statutorily preferred and non-preferred
immigrants “would . . . scramble the priority order Congress prescribed”); Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“Where Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act,
it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted)).
The Defendants offer only one justification for authorizing the presence of
parents of citizens and LPRs on identical terms. They claim that it’s theoretically
possible that LPR-children can become citizens after they turn 21, “at which point
they too can petition to obtain visas for their parents.” OLC Memo 27. But of
course, anything is possible. It is possible that every undocumented immigrant in
the United States can become a naturalized citizen by marriage or through military

13

service. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1430(a), 1439(a). If the mere possibility of citizenship is
sufficient, as Defendants suggest, then DHS unilaterally could legalize the presence
of all 11 million undocumented immigrants in the United States (rather than just
40% of them).
In short, Congress carefully considered the circumstances under which the
parents of citizens and LPRs lawfully can stay in the country.

Congress then

enacted an intricate and finely tuned statutory scheme — replete with eligibility
criteria and numerical caps. Defendants cannot discard that scheme, replace it, and
then claim Congress’s blessing of the effort.
b.

Congress prohibited Defendants from granting work
permits to 40% of the Nation’s undocumented immigrants

Congress likewise has not expressly authorized or implicitly acquiesced to
giving employment authorization cards (“EACs”) to 40% of the undocumented
immigrants in the United States. Therefore, Defendants’ work-permit program also
falls within Youngstown’s “zone 3.”
Defendants’ only counterargument relies on 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3). See Opp.
8, 12, 48; OLC Memo 21-22. But far from legalizing work authorization for anyone,
Section 1324a makes it unlawful “to hire . . . an unauthorized alien.”

8 U.S.C.

§ 1324a(a)(1)(A). In a subsection entitled “Definition of unauthorized alien,” Section
1324a then defines which undocumented immigrants count as “unauthorized
alien[s]” who cannot be hired. The definitional provision says, in full:
As used in this section, the term ‘unauthorized alien’ means, with
respect to the employment of an alien at a particular time, that the
alien is not at that time either (A) an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by this
14

chapter or by the Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland
Security].
Id. § 1324a(h)(3). In Defendants’ view, when Congress said “unauthorized alien[s]”
are those not “authorized to be so employed . . . by the Attorney General,” ibid., it
implicitly gave the Executive Branch unreviewable discretion to issue work permits
for every single undocumented immigrant in the United States (or 40% of them).
In addition to its inherent implausibility, this assertion of executive authority
is misplaced for three reasons. First, Section 1324a(h)(3) is a definitional provision,
not a substantive one. It merely defines which undocumented immigrants count as
“unauthorized” for work; it does not give the DHS Secretary any power to authorize
work by anyone. The DHS Secretary’s power to authorize work instead comes from
other provisions of the INA. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a)(3) (certain LPRs), 1231(a)(7)
(certain individuals who cannot be removed). And of course, those other provisions
of the INA say nothing about granting work authorizations to all (or 40%) of the
undocumented immigrants in the United States.
Second, reading Section 1324a(h)(3) to authorize the DHS Secretary to grant
work authorizations to whomever he pleases would render surplusage the other
provisions of the INA — like Sections 1226(a)(3) and 1231(a)(7) — that grant
authority limited to particular individuals in particular statutorily prescribed
circumstances. See, e.g., Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (“[A]
statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no
part will be inoperative or superfluous.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Moreover, provisions like Sections 1226(a)(3) and 1231(a)(7) prove that Congress

15

knew how to authorize the DHS Secretary to grant work authorizations in
particular circumstances for particular individuals; it would be absurd to suggest
that the Secretary can nonetheless do whatever he wants with unreviewable
discretion. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338-39 (1994)
(“[I]t is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely” when it
“includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another,”
and as a consequence, an agency cannot find administrative power where Congress
omitted it).
Third, it is inconceivable that Congress would use a casual phrase in a
definitional provision to give the Secretary the power to extend work authorization
to all immigrants regardless of legal status.

It is a well-settled principle of

statutory interpretation that Congress does not bury capacious delegations of power
in small and inconspicuous places. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc.,
531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress, we have held, does not alter the fundamental
details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions — it does not,
one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”); FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000) (“Congress could not have intended to
delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an agency in so
cryptic a fashion.”).
For example, in ABA v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the FTC claimed
authority to regulate all attorneys engaged in the practice of law. The Commission
rested its claim on the capacious definition of “financial institution” included in the

16

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338 (1999), which, the FTC contended, gave it sweeping authority to regulate any
firm that conducts “financial activities” — including law firms.

The FTC was

untroubled by the fact that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act contained mountains of
detailed provisions, none of which mentioned law firms and none of which had any
conceivable application to law firms. The D.C. Circuit rejected the FTC’s arguments
out of hand:
To find [the FTC’s] interpretation deference-worthy, we would have to
conclude that Congress not only had hidden a rather large elephant in
a rather obscure mousehole, but had buried the ambiguity in which the
pachyderm lurks beneath an incredibly deep mound of specificity, none
of which bears the footprints of the beast or any indication that
Congress even suspected its presence. We therefore seriously doubt
that Congress intended to empower the Commission to undertake that
regulation . . . .
Id. at 469.
Here, the elephant is larger, the mousehole more obscure, and the mound of
specificity more imposing. The INA — as amended by scores of statutes over more
than 50 years — makes the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act look banal. And the INA has
spawned tens of thousands of pages of regulatory text, promulgated by eleven
presidential administrations and covering every conceivable immigration topic.
Nowhere in any of those sources of federal immigration law is there even the
faintest hint that Congress intended for the President to give out 4 million EACs
with unilateral and unreviewable discretion.
Defendants argue that none of this matters because DHS’s power to issue
EACs comes “from pre-existing legal authority.”

17

Opp. 37 (citing 8 C.F.R.

§ 274a.12(c)(14)).

That regulation purports to allow DHS to grant work

authorizations to “[a]n alien who has been granted deferred action,” 8 C.F.R.
§ 274a.12(c)(14) — but so what? For all of the reasons given above, DHS can point
to no statutory authorization for that regulation. And even if it could, that would
prove nothing. For example, the Internal Revenue Code gives the IRS preexisting
legal authority to settle tax disputes for $0, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 7121-7122; that does
not allow the IRS to create a unilateral federal program that erases 40% of
American taxpayers’ liabilities. See PI Mot. 32. And in all events, if the workauthorization regulation could be interpreted to allow DHS to grant EACs to 40% of
America’s undocumented population, it too is unconstitutional for all of the reasons
given above.
c.

Historical practice prohibits the DHS Directive

Defendants cannot

escape

Youngstown’s “zone

3”

by searching

for

“congressional acquiescence” in previous deferred action programs by previous
presidents. As the Defendants concede, the DHS Directive is constitutional under
Youngstown only insofar as it is rooted in congressional precedent. See Opp. 8-9
(citing OLC Memo 14).

But those other programs are nothing like the DHS

Directive in kind or scale.
For example, OLC conceded that it could find no evidence of any deferred
action program in the history of the country that came close to affording legal
benefits to 4 million people. See OLC Memo 31. But it took some comfort in the
1990 “Family Fairness” program, which “made a comparable fraction of
undocumented aliens — approximately four in ten — potentially eligible for
18

discretionary extended voluntary departure relief.” Ibid. Because Congress later
codified a similar (though different) program in the Immigration Act of 1990, OLC
concluded that the “Family Fairness” program constituted a tacit congressional
approval of an altogether different program implemented a quarter-century later
under different circumstances. Ibid. Defendants likewise rely on that precedent
here. See Opp. 8, 42.
It is difficult to overstate the fallaciousness of that logic. The fact that a
previous Congress approved a previous program 25 years ago on different terms and
with a different scope and scale says nothing about whether this DHS Directive
falls within Youngstown’s first or third zone.

As it turns out, however, the

fallaciousness of the Defendants’ position is the least of their worries because their
factual claims about the Family Fairness program are false. Far from legalizing the
presence of 40% of the undocumented population, the 1990 Family Fairness
program authorized approximately 1%. See David Hancock, Few Immigrants Use
Family Aid Program, MIAMI HERALD, at B1 (Oct. 1, 1990) (App. 0813) (noting that,
according to official INS statistics, only 46,821 of the Nation’s 3.5 million
undocumented immigrants applied for discretionary relief under the Family
Fairness program); see also Glenn Kessler, Fact Checker: Obama’s Claim that
George H.W. Bush Gave Relief to ‘40 Percent’ of Undocumented Immigrants, WASH.
POST (Nov. 24, 2014), http://wapo.st/11Ouk5k (giving “Three Pinocchios” to
Defendants’ contrary claim).

19

Nor can the Defendants find congressional acquiescence in four other
deferred action programs that were even smaller than Family Fairness: (1) foreign
students affected by Hurricane Katrina; (2) widows of U.S. Citizens; (3) T and U
visa applicants; and (4) deferred action for VAWA self-petitioners. See Opp. 8-9.
Each of those programs involved classes of immigrants who Congress — not the
Executive — already had decided could remain lawfully in the United States.
Deferred action was used as a stop-gap measure while the immigrants transitioned
to a lawful status that had been provided by Congress. In granting deferred action
status to those immigrants, the Executive Branch was implementing Congress’s
will — not exercising its own by brute force.

See Josh Blackman, The

Constitutionality of DAPA Part I: Congressional Acquiescence to Deferred Action,
103 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE __ (forthcoming 2015), available at
ssrn.com/abstract=2545544.
Let’s walk through each of the Defendants’ examples. The first arose when
Tulane University and many others along the Gulf Coast cancelled their fall
semesters after Hurricane Katrina.

This left 2,000 foreign students in limbo

because the terms of their student visas required them to pursue a “[f]ull course of
study.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(6). Congress already had welcomed all 2,000 of those
students into the country.

Rather than deport them on account of a natural

disaster, USCIS granted them deferred action for a few months, until they could
enroll at another university (and thus maintain their student-visa status).

See

Press Release, USCIS, USCIS Announces Interim Relief for Foreign Students

20

Adversely Impacted by Hurricane Katrina (Nov. 25, 2005) (App. 0974-75). Deferred
action was a bridge from one lawful immigration status to another.
The program for widows of U.S. citizens was similar. It gave a few months of
deferred action to non-citizen spouses who were married for less than two years
when their citizen spouse died. At the time, because of delays in processing visa
applications and because of USCIS’s interpretation of a then-existing statute, noncitizen widows and widowers became removable upon the death of their spouses
because they were no longer “immediate relatives” under the INA. See Robinson v.
Napolitano,

554

F.3d

358,

367

(3d

Cir.

2009)

(agreeing

with

USCIS’s

interpretation); but see Lockhart v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 251, 255-62 (6th Cir. 2009)
(rejecting USCIS’s interpretation); Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1034-43
(9th Cir. 2006) (same). Rather than deport widows and widowers, USCIS granted
them deferred action for several months until the agency could process their
applications. Donald Neufeld, Memorandum for Field Leadership, Re: Guidance
Regarding Surviving Spouses of Deceased U.S. Citizens and Their Children at 1
(Sept. 4, 2009) (App. 0840). Once again, a few months of deferred action served as a
bridge from one legal status to another. And a few months after the deferred action
program was announced, Congress amended the statute to solve the problem. See
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83,
§ 568(c), 123 Stat. 2142, 2186 (2009).
The final two instances of deferred action cited by Defendants are T and U
visa applicants (victims of human trafficking) and self-petitioners under the

21

Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”), Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1796,
1902.

Both programs involved noncitizens whose prospect for obtaining lawful

status was imminent, and who needed only a few months’ forbearance so USCIS
could process the paperwork. For example, VAWA authorized noncitizens who had
been abused by U.S. citizen or LPR spouses or parents to self-petition for lawful
immigration status, without having to rely on their abusive family members to
petition on their behalf. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv), (vii). Consistent with
congressional will, USCIS granted deferred action to these noncitizens whenever
their visa applications had been approved but the visa itself was not immediately
available — usually because the approval came near the end of the year, when the
statutory cap on VAWA visas had been reached. See Paul W. Virtue, Memorandum
for Regional Directors et al., Re: Supplemental Guidance on Battered Alien SelfPetitioning Process and Related Issues at 3 (May 6, 1997) (App. 1026). Rather than
deport these noncitizens, who Congress had invited to apply for lawful status,
USCIS offered them deferred action until a visa became available. Ibid.
For similar reasons, USCIS has granted deferred action to victims of human
trafficking who applied for T and U visas. Through the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act (“VTVPA”), Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000),
Congress directed USCIS to give lawful status to victims of human trafficking and
other crimes. See ibid. (imposing annual limit of 5,000 T visas and 10,000 U visas).
Consistent with Congress’s instructions, USCIS told immigration officers to grant
deferred action or stays of removal to any VTVPA applicant who made a “prima

22

facie” or “bona fide” showing of eligibility.

Stuart Anderson, Memorandum for

Johnny N. Williams, Re: Deferred Action for Aliens with Bona Fide Applications for
T Nonimmigrant Status at 1 (May 8, 2002) (App. 0048); William R. Yates,
Memorandum for the Director, Vermont Service Center, Re: Centralization of
Interim Relief for U Nonimmigrant Status Applicants at 5 (Oct. 8, 2003) (App.
1059). Like all other instances of deferred action, this program was created for the
benefit of immigrants with existing lawful status in the U.S. or at very least the
immediate prospect of such status. And, like in all the other cases, the program
was intended as a temporary bridge to another form of lawful status for which the
aliens had already established eligibility.
The DHS Directive, of course, looks nothing like these past programs because
it involves immigrants who are here unlawfully, who have no prospect of lawful
status, and who Congress has never even invited to apply for lawful status.4 And
although it should go without saying, Congress’s approval of deferred action for
2,000 lawfully present Katrina victims does nothing to approve deferred action for 4
million immigrants who were not legally present to begin with.
d.

Congressional rejection of
prohibits the DHS Directive

Defendants’

legislation

Finally, if there were any doubt whether the DHS Directive falls within
Youngstown’s “zone 3,” it is resolved by the fact that the Defendants promulgated

4 The Defendants think this is a benefit of their unilateral action because it somehow makes their
conduct less lawless. See Opp. 12, 34, 36-37 (emphasizing that the DHS Directive does not bridge
anyone’s immigration status). But by conceding that the DHS Directive does not provide a bridge to
lawful status, Defendants also have conceded that the Directive is fundamentally different from the
deferred action programs that preceded it.

23

the Directive because Congress refused to do it for them. It is true that unenacted
legislation sometimes is an unreliable indicator of congressional intent. See Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 n.11 (1969). But it is equally true that,
“once an agency’s statutory construction has been fully brought to the attention of
the public and the Congress, and the latter has not sought to alter that
interpretation although it has amended the statute in other respects, then
presumably the legislative intent has been correctly discerned.” United States v.
Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 n.10 (1979); accord Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 381.
In this case, that intent could not be clearer. The President of the United
States emphatically and repeatedly brought his interpretation of the INA to the
attention of the public and Congress in 2012 when he said he could not help the
“DREAMers” without the DREAM Act. See FAC ¶ 19 (collecting citations). And he
emphatically and repeatedly brought his interpretation of the INA to the attention
of the public and Congress in 2014 when he said he could not accomplish
comprehensive immigration reform without a new law from Congress. See id. ¶ 44
(collecting citations).

Then, after the President unilaterally “took an action to

change[ ] the law,” id. ¶ 48, the House swiftly rebuked the DHS Directive as
unlawful, see H.R. 5759, Preventing Executive Overreach on Immigration Act of
2014 (App. 0816-21). Thus, this case is the paradigmatic example of Youngstown’s
third zone.

And just as Judge Pine rejected President Truman’s plea for

unreviewable discretion there, this Court should do so with the Defendants’
identical plea here.

24

3.

The DHS Directive
Decisionmaking

Is

Lawmaking,

Not

Discretionary

Having failed to insulate the DHS Directive from judicial review under
Youngstown, the Defendants offer a fallback plea for immunity from judicial review.
In particular, they argue at length that the Directive is an act of unreviewable
“discretionary non-enforcement” under Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). See
Opp. 31-44. That’s a red herring. No one is challenging what the Defendants failed
to do. Cf. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832 (prosecutorial discretion involves “[a]n agency’s
decision not to take enforcement action” in a particular case). Rather, Plaintiffs are
challenging what Defendants did. Specifically, Defendants created a new federal
program for granting legal benefits to 4 million or more undocumented immigrants.
And Defendants’ own employees and documents prove that the new federal program
will operate according to strict, across-the-board eligibility criteria — not case-bycase discretionary decisionmaking.

That’s the stuff of lawmaking, and it is

judicially reviewable as such.
a.

Plaintiffs challenge Defendants’ actions — not their
inactions

DOJ can find no case in the history of the Nation that allows the Executive to
use “prosecutorial discretion” as the pretense for unilaterally creating a new
entitlement program that doles out government benefits to millions of people.
Given DOJ’s concerted efforts to conflate “discretion” (which it can sometimes wield)
and “entitlements” (which it cannot unilaterally create), we will be very precise
about what those terms mean and what they don’t.

25

First, the Supreme Court has held that private plaintiffs generally do not
have a right to demand that the government enforce a particular statute against a
particular person. For example, in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748
(2005), the Supreme Court held that a particular woman did not have a Due Process
right to demand that police enforce a particular restraining order against her
violent husband.

The Court concluded that because of “insufficient resources,”

“sheer physical impossibility,” or “practical necessity,” the police have discretion not
to enforce criminal laws against particular violators.

Id. at 760-62 (internal

quotation marks omitted). The Court reached a similar conclusion in Chaney, in
which it held that particular death-row prisoners did not have rights under the APA
to demand that the FDA enforce certain misbranding and mislabeling provisions
against the manufacturers of lethal-injection drugs. See 470 U.S. at 823-24. The
Court again emphasized that agencies can set enforcement priorities and allocate
available resources to high-priority cases and away from particular low-priority
ones. Id. at 831-32.
Second, and by contrast, an agency cannot hide behind discretion when it
creates legal benefits for members of the public.

Take for example National

Association of Home Builders v. Army Corps of Engineers, 417 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir.
2005). In that case, “[t]he Corps d[id] not have the resources to develop a method to
quantify potential cumulative and indirect impacts that may result from activities
authorized by [certain water permits].” Final Notice, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,818, 12,827
(Mar. 9, 2000). Given those resource constraints, and as a matter of its priority-

26

setting discretion, the Corps created certain “streamline[d]” permits for low-level
polluters. The court held that those permits were legal benefits — i.e., they were
entitlements to discharge waste into the water — and as such, they were judicially
reviewable.

It was irrelevant that the Corps issued them as a matter of

enforcement discretion, and it was irrelevant that the Corps necessarily decided not
to enforce the Clean Water Act against some polluters. See 417 F.3d at 1281 (“Here
the appellants challenge not the Corps’ failure to act . . . ; instead, they attack the
[permits] the Corps did issue.”).
So here.

Our claim is that the DHS Directive creates a massive new

permitting scheme, which gives 4 million people permits to reside and work lawfully
in the United States.

It is of course true that “discretionary non-enforcement”

allows DHS to save resources by declining to prosecute particular individuals; but
it’s equally of course true that “non-enforcement” does not allow DHS to spend
hundreds of millions of dollars to hire thousands of new employees and to open new
service centers to process millions of deferred action applications under new DHScreated eligibility requirements and to dole out millions of EACs. Indeed, internal
emails obtained from USCIS show that it affirmatively reorganized its operations
and allocated additional resources to prioritize DACA applicants. See, e.g., DACA
Emails (App. 0129) (describing changes USCIS had to make “to accommodate the
additional work coming in from DACA-related shifts of resources”); DACA Emails
(App. 0180-82) (similar).

That’s not resource conservation.

And whatever else

might be said about the new program DHS has created, it cannot be said that

27

Defendants’ efforts qualify as the kind of “agency inaction” held unreviewable in
Chaney. See 470 U.S. at 846 (Marshall, J., concurring).
That is why Defendants are wrong to rely on Reno v. American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (“AAADC ”), and Perales. Both cases
noted that the Executive Branch has discretion not to enforce a particular
immigration statute in particular cases. See AAADC, 525 U.S. at 484-85; Perales,
903 F.2d at 1047-48. For example, Perales held that an undocumented immigrant
cannot challenge DHS’s refusal to give out work permits: “An agency’s inaction in
such a situation is necessarily exempt from judicial review because there are no
meaningful standards against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”
903 F.2d at 1047 (citing Chaney). But this case is the exact opposite. When the
government does act — for example, when it erects a new entitlement program,
replete with eligibility criteria and identification cards for permit-holders — there is
ample “law to apply.” See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 417 F.3d at 1281; United
States v. Juarez-Escobar, 25 F. Supp. 3d 774, 786-88 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (applying that
law and striking down the Directive as unconstitutional).
b.
Nor

can

Rubber-stamping is not “case-by-case discretion”

Defendants

rubber-stamp

99.5%-94.4%

of

deferred

action

applications and call it “a discretionary, case-by-case” process. Opp. 41. As OLC
previously conceded, it “[i]s critical” to the legality of deferred action programs that
they rely on genuine “case-by-case” discretion, “rather than granting deferred action
automatically to all applicants who satisfied the threshold eligibility criteria.” OLC
Memo 18 n.8 (emphasis added). OLC’s concession was a wise one; as the Supreme
28

Court has held, the sine qua non of prosecutorial discretion is genuine case-by-case
decisionmaking, rather than across-the-board policymaking. See, e.g., AAADC, 525
U.S. at 484 & n.8 (deferred action decisions must be made on “case-by-case basis”).5
But as explained below, it is now undisputed that the Defendants have given DACA
to every person who satisfied their threshold eligibility criteria.

And it is also

undisputed that the Defendants plan to take the same rubber-stamp approach
under the DHS Directive. See Opp. 12, 40 (conceding deferred action applications
under the Directive will be processed the same way DHS processed DACA
applications).

That undisputed proof of rubber-stamping renders the Directive

unlawful.
As we previously explained, USCIS statistics show that the Defendants
rubber-stamped 99.5% of DACA applications. See FAC ¶ 25; Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals Report, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (Apr. 10,
2013) (App. 0743); Palinkas Decl. ¶ 8 (App. 0855). Defendants proudly respond
that, no, they only approved 94.4% of DACA applications.

See Opp. 41.

Even

assuming that 94.4% is the correct number of DACA approvals, Defendants cannot
claim that the remaining 5.6% “were denied for failure to meet eligibility criteria or
5 Defendants’ reliance on AAADC is puzzling because they claim it gives them “broad authority”
to grant deferred action on a limitless scale and for unreviewable reasons. Opp. 3-5. AAADC does
nothing of the sort; the case hinged on whether the INA deprived federal courts of jurisdiction over
claims that undocumented immigrants were unfairly prosecuted, not whether decisions to defer
action — i.e., to not prosecute — are justiciable. Moreover, the entirety of the Supreme Court’s
discussion of deferred action is based on a background description from an immigration treatise, see
525 U.S. at 484-85 (citing 6 C. GORDON, S. MAILMAN & S. YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 72.03[2][h] (1998) (“IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE”)), and that treatise says that
deferred action decisions must be based on extraordinary factors, identified by careful case-by-case
analysis, and individually approved by high-ranking USCIS personnel. See IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 72.03[2][h], at 72-75 (2011) (noting, e.g., case-by-case decisions must be “made by the
district director in a personally signed recommendation to the regional commissioner”).

29

for other discretionary reasons.”

Ibid. (emphasis added).

As far as the record

reveals, every denied application was denied for failure to meet eligibility criteria;
none were denied “for other discretionary reasons.”
It’s not for lack of opportunity that Defendants can identify zero examples of
DACA applications denied “for other discretionary reasons.” Members of Congress
have been pressing the Defendants for that evidence for months (if not years). And
far from providing it, Defendants admitted it does not exist: DHS “admitted to the
[House] Judiciary Committee that, if an alien applies and meets the DACA
eligibility criteria, they will receive deferred action. In reality, immigration officials
do not have discretion to deny DACA applications if applicants fulfill the criteria.”
Hrg. Tr. at 31, President Obama’s Executive Overreach on Immigration, House
Judiciary Comm., Dec. 2, 2014 (App. 0925) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte). Over four
months ago, Congress asked the DHS Secretary to identify any discretionary
reasons that his Department used to deny DACA applications. See Letter from Bob
Goodlatte & Charles E. Grassley to Jeh Johnson at 2 (Aug. 29, 2014) (App. 0808)
(“Judiciary Committees’ Letter”). DHS could point to none. See Letter from Leon
Rodriguez to Charles E. Grassley, Enclosure 1 at 1 (Oct. 9, 2014) (App. 0978)
(“Rodriguez Letter”) (noting 42,906 DACA applications were denied and listing as
reasons only (1) failure to use the correct form, (2) failure to sign the form,
(3) failure to pay the required fee, and (4) filing the form at the wrong time).6

The Migration Policy Institute conducted an exhaustive analysis of DACA data, and it did not
identify a single exercise of individualized “discretion” (as opposed to rote application of DHS’s
eligibility criteria). See Jeanne Batalova et al., DACA at the Two-Year Mark, Migration Policy
Institute (Aug. 2014) (App. 0088-0121).
6

30

The absence of even a single case that was denied for “discretionary reasons”
is unsurprising given the way the Defendants set up the DACA program (and the
way they’ve promised to follow suit under the 2014 Directive). As explained by the
USCIS union president, “USCIS management has taken several steps to ensure
that DACA applications receive rubber-stamped approvals rather than thorough
investigations.” Palinkas Decl. ¶ 6 (App. 0854). The Defendants have “prevented
immigration officers from conducting case-by-case investigations of DACA
applications” by routing those applications to service centers and preventing
investigators from interviewing applicants. Id. ¶ 8 (App. 0855). That “guarantee[s]
that applications will be rubber-stamped for approval, a practice that virtually
guarantees widespread fraud and places public safety at risk.” Ibid.
Internal USCIS documents offer further proof that the Defendants have
divested their field agents of the ability to investigate DACA applications. DHS has
publicly “assur[ed] potential DACA applicants that USCIS has no plans to actually
verify the validity of any evidentiary documents submitted in support of an
application.” Judiciary Committees’ Letter at 1 (App. 0807). USCIS has directed its
staff to “NOT deny a DACA request” unless DHS’s internal records contain
sufficient evidence to support a denial under the Directive’s eligibility criteria —
e.g., because the applicant flunks the criminal-background check. DACA Standard
Operating Procedures (App. 0318). Finally, USCIS has explained why it strictly
applies the eligibility criteria and does not give its officers enforcement discretion.
An internal powerpoint presentation says that the DHS Secretary already has

31

exercised the requisite “discretion” in setting the DACA eligibility criteria, and all
that is left for USCIS officers to do is to use a series of “templates” to ensure that
the Secretary’s Directive is “applied consistently.”

DACA Standard Operating

Procedures (App. 0444).
But when it comes to abandoning duly enacted statutes, consistency is a vice
not a virtue. For example, in Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(per curiam) (en banc), the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”)
gave Title VI funds to 74 of 113 noncompliant school districts (an unlawful-funding
rate of 65%).

See 356 F. Supp. 92, 95 (D.D.C. 1973).

HEW justified its

administrative action by invoking prosecutorial discretion — in particular, it argued
that the court should not interfere because the agency was “still seeking voluntary
compliance through negotiation and conciliation.” Ibid.; cf. In re U.S., 503 F.3d 638,
642 (7th Cir. 2007) (Easterbrook, C.J.) (negotiation is an integral part of
prosecutorial discretion).

The D.C. Circuit nonetheless held that the federal

government’s 65% unlawful-action rate was tantamount to “a general policy which
is in effect an abdication of its statutory duty.” Adams, 480 F.3d at 1162; see also
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (clarifying that its holding does not apply on Adams’
facts). Even using Defendants’ most-conservative estimates, this case is easier than
Adams.
c.

Theoretical revocability of deferred action cannot save the
DHS Directive

Against all of this, Defendants argue that the Directive is shrouded from
review by any court at any time because deferred action documents are not worth

32

the paper they’re printed on. See Opp. 34-35. Their idea seems to be the Directive
is an act of “enforcement discretion” because deferred action does not confer “any
legal status”; it “can be revoked at any time”; Defendants can change their minds
for any reason or no reason; and therefore, deferred action does not actually prevent
anyone from being deported ever. Ibid. Those are troubling assertions because the
President and Defendant Rodriguez have urged undocumented immigrants across
the United States to “come out of the shadows” and promised them that they “will
not be deported” if they do so. FAC ¶¶ 50, 55. Either that promise was false, or
DOJ’s representations to this Court should be dismissed as “nothing more than a
convenient litigating position.” Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S.
Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Data provided to Congress suggest it’s the latter. Defendants confirmed that
they revoke DACA the same way they deny it: extremely rarely and never for
“discretionary” reasons. In particular, out of 591,555 DACA approvals, Defendants
have revoked only 113 (a rate of 0.0191%). See Rodriguez Letter, Enclosure 1 at 1-2
(App. 0978-79). And every one of them was revoked because (1) USCIS made an
error and subsequently “determined the requestor did not satisfy all DACA
guidelines at the time of filing,” or (2) the DACA recipient subsequently violated an
eligibility criterion (by, for example joining a gang or committing aggravated
assault). Ibid. None was for “discretionary” reasons. Moreover, even if Defendants
could prove that one person lost his or her deferred action document and EAC with
the snap of executive fingers, those documents still would constitute legal benefits

33

until they are revoked. Whichever way you slice it, the Directive carries legal effect
— and the Take Care Clause forecloses the Defendants from creating those legal
effects unilaterally.
B.

Defendants Violated The APA

Even if Plaintiffs’ Take Care claim fails, a preliminary injunction still should
issue because Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their two, independent
claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq. (“APA”).
Ever since Congress enacted the statute in 1946, the APA has presumptively
applied to all federal agency actions, and it is the federal agency’s burden to prove
by “clear and convincing evidence of legislative intention” that Congress wanted to
override that presumption. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc’y, 478
U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986); accord Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41
(1967) (collecting cases). Where the agency fails to carry that burden, the APA
requires the agency to publish its proposed action (“notice”), allow members of the
public to offer feedback (“comment”), and then publish a final decision (“rule”) that
considers public input and reaches a reasoned, non-arbitrary decision. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 553. Persons aggrieved by the agency’s decision then can challenge it in federal
court. See id. §§ 702, 704, 706.
Here, Plaintiffs’ APA claims are likely to succeed for three reasons. First, the
APA applies to the DHS Directive. Second, Defendants cannot unilaterally label
the Directive a “policy” statement and escape judicial review; the contrary result
would contravene Japan Whaling and a half-century of precedent under the APA.
Third, Defendants tacitly concede that they will lose if the Court reaches the merits
34

because they undisputedly failed to comply with the APA’s notice-and-comment
requirements; the Directive is also arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.
1.

The DHS Directive Is Reviewable Under The APA

The APA applies to any “final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. The Supreme Court has held that the
APA is a “seminal act” that “manifests a congressional intention that it cover a
broad spectrum of administrative actions.” Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140. The
Court further “has echoed that theme by noting that the Administrative Procedure
Act’s ‘generous review provisions’ must be given a ‘hospitable’ interpretation,” id. at
140-41 (quoting Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955)), under which the
APA applies unless the agency proves that Congress intended otherwise, see Japan
Whaling.
Following those instructions, the lower federal courts have developed a
number of doctrines that demarcate those “agency actions” that must comply with
the APA from those few that need not. The only doctrine at issue here is the one
that makes “substantive rules” subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment and
judicial-review provisions. See Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56
F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 1995) (describing the doctrine). A “substantive rule” is one
that “impose[s] any rights and obligations,” or “binds” the hands of agency officials
and does not leave them “free to exercise discretion.”
marks omitted).

Ibid. (internal quotation

Contrariwise, a “non-substantive rule” (also called a “policy

statement” or “guidance” document) merely “announces the agency’s tentative
intentions for the future.” Id. at 596 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The key
35

inquiry” in distinguishing between substantive and non-substantive rules “is the
extent to which the challenged policy leaves the agency free to exercise its discretion
to follow or not to follow that general policy in an individual case, or on the other
hand, whether . . . upon application one need only determine whether a given case is
within the rule’s criteria.” Ibid.
a.

The Directive is a substantive rule

The DHS Directive easily qualifies as a “substantive rule” because there is
nothing tentative about it. To the contrary, it uses a series of shalls and musts to
bind immigration officers and force them to apply the Directive’s eligibility criteria.
And if applicants fail to satisfy one of the eligibility requirements, the officers have
no discretion to grant a reprieve: the officer instead must follow pre-written steps
and check a “standard” denial box in a template.

DACA Standard Operating

Procedures (App. 0382-83). The reasons for denial which are listed on the template
include only failures to meet various eligibility requirements and failures to
cooperate in the processing of the application; the template gives officers no
“discretionary” box to check. DACA Standard Operating Procedures (App. 0595);
see also Part I.A.3, supra (DHS Directive leaves no room for case-by-case
“discretion”).
That is by design. Defendants constructed their deferred action regime so
that “upon application” an immigration officer “need only determine whether a
given case is within the rule’s criteria.” Prof’ls & Patients, 56 F.3d at 596. As the
USCIS union president has explained, Defendants have “prevented immigration
officers from conducting case-by-case investigations of DACA applications,” and
36

have “guarantee[d] that applications will be rubber-stamped for approval, a practice
that virtually guarantees widespread fraud and places public safety at risk.”
Palinkas Decl. ¶ 8 (App. 0855). DHS forbids immigration officers to exercise any
case-by-case discretion because they fear that the bureaucracy might fail to treat
like cases alike. See DACA Standard Operating Procedures (App. 0444) (officials
should use “templates” in “checkbox format” to ensure DHS Directive is “applied
consistently”). And as a consequence, it is undisputed that the Directive has yielded
a 99.5-94.4% approval rate — which is more than sufficient to show that it is a
“substantive,” “binding” rule. Chamber of Commerce v. DOL, 174 F.3d 206, 208, 212
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (70%-90% rate sufficient).
Such predictability is a laudable goal for a sweeping entitlement program,
but it does not make for a “non-binding” “policy statement.” See Prof’ls & Patients,
56 F.3d at 596-97; Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1021-22 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (holding agency can evade APA only where it can prove that a “guidance”
document or “policy statement” is “not binding in practical sense”). Because the
Directive commands and dictates, it is a “substantive rule” and therefore must
comport with the APA.
b.

Defendants are wrong to call the Directive a nonsubstantive “guidance” or “policy” document

Defendants’ counterargument is that the APA is inapplicable because the
Directive serves only to “advise the public” and does not “impose any rights and
obligations.”

Opp. 45.

These statements rest uncomfortably alongside the

Defendants’ later claims that enjoining the DHS Directive will “impact[ ] the lives of

37

many people,” will “disrupt,” “interfere,” and “impede” the work of DHS, and will
“halt[ ] policies” that promote “national security” and “humanitarian concerns.” Id.
at 54.

The statements also rest uncomfortably alongside the Defendants’

acknowledgments that “DHS officials have been instructed to implement . . . [the
DHS Directive] within 180 days,” and that “[a] preliminary injunction would
prevent DHS from timely implementation of [the Directive].” Compare id. at 45,
with id. at 54. Defendants are wrong to suggest that those substantive effects could
stem from enjoining a precatory, non-substantive policy statement. Because policy
statements are by definition legally meaningless, an agency can implement and
follow them “just as if the policy statement had never been issued.”

Prof’ls &

Patients, 56 F.3d at 596 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, Defendants cannot deny the substantive effect of a Directive that
confers benefits on members of the public. See, e.g., id. at 602; NRDC v. EPA, 643
F.3d 311, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (APA applies when agency purports to “confer
benefits” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, both lawful presence and work
permits constitute benefits that DHS conferred through the Directive. That alone is
sufficient to trigger the APA.
2.

Defendants’ Say-So Cannot Defeat Judicial Review

Next the Defendants urge the Court to ignore substance and embrace form.
See Opp. 45 (arguing that the Court should give weight to the Defendants’ own
“characterization of the rule” as “a general statement of policy”). But courts in the
Fifth Circuit and beyond do not allow agencies to evade judicial review through
mislabeling.

See, e.g., Prof’ls & Patients, 56 F.3d at 596 (“The label that the
38

particular agency puts upon its given exercise of administrative power is not, for
our purposes, conclusive; rather, it is what the agency does in fact.”); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 616, 619 (5th Cir. 1994), modified on other
grounds, No. 93-1377, 1994 WL 484506 (Sept. 7, 1994) (rejecting an agency’s
attempt “to avoid the notice and comment requirements of the APA by
mischaracterizing a legislative rule as a mere ‘yardstick’ and ‘policy guideline’ ”);
Croplife v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that an EPA “press
release” announced a legislative rule and therefore that the EPA could not escape
notice-and-comment and judicial review); see id. (“[A]n agency pronouncement will
be considered binding as a practical matter if it either appears on its face to be
binding, or is applied by the agency in a way that indicates it is binding.”).
It is not surprising that courts care less about what agencies say than what
they do. Congress passed the APA to bring agency decisions under the supervision
of the federal courts. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903 (1988) (APA’s
“central purpose” is to “provid[e] a broad spectrum of judicial review of agency
action”). It would defy that purpose to allow the agency to use its own intention (or
characterization of the rule) as an excuse for evading judicial review. Courts should
be especially watchful for agency self-aggrandizement where, as here, the
underlying

dispute

pits

congressional

prerogatives

against

an

allegedly

overreaching Executive.
It is irrelevant that the Ninth Circuit held that much more modest deferred
action “instructions” from the 1980s were non-substantive. Opp. 46. The Ninth

39

Circuit merely held that those old instructions did not create a “binding norm” and
instead left agency officials free to make “discretionary” and “individualized
determinations,” Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 1987);
that says nothing about whether this Directive is similarly non-substantive.
Indeed, Defendants themselves concede that the DHS Directive is unprecedented,
see OLC Memo 30, and even OLC does not contend that the deferred action
“instructions” from the 1980s justify the radical expansion of deferred action in the
DHS Directive. Nor could it. See Prof ’ls & Patients, 56 F.3d at 596 n.27 (“[T]he fact
that we previously found another FDA compliance policy guide to be a policy
statement is not dispositive whether CPG 7132.16 is a policy statement.”).
Nor can Defendants evade judicial review by bolting on a “no-rights”
paragraph at the end of the DHS Directive. The Directive contains paragraph after
paragraph of non-discretionary commands and bright-line eligibility criteria that
bind the hands of DHS officials in service centers across the country. Then, at the
very end, it says: “This memorandum confers no substantive right . . . .” FAC Ex. A
at 5. EPA included a similar boilerplate paragraph at the end of its “guidance”
document in Appalachian Power, and the Court of Appeals held that the APA
applied anyway: “[T]he entire Guidance, from beginning to end — except the last
paragraph — reads like a ukase. It commands, it requires, it orders, it dictates.”
208 F.3d at 1023. So too here.
3.

Plaintiffs’ APA Claims Are Likely To Succeed On The Merits

If the Directive is a substantive rule (rather than a policy statement), it is
uncontested that the Defendants will lose because they issued it in violation of the
40

APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. Beyond that violation
of the APA’s procedural requirements, the Directive also is arbitrary, capricious,
and contrary to law because it violates Congress’s clear statutory commands. See
id. § 706; Part I.A.2, supra.
Defendants’ only defense of the Directive on the merits is that it somehow
comports with vacuous statutory provisions — such as the DHS Secretary’s
authority to “perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his
authority” under the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3). First, the as-he-deems-necessary
clause gives Secretary Johnson power to “carry[ ] out his authority” under the INA;
it does not give him power to violate the INA or render entire portions of it
superfluous. See Part I.A.2, supra (Defendants violated clear statutory commands
by legalizing the presence of and giving work permits to 4 million people).
And second, it would raise serious constitutional concerns to read Section
1103(a)(3) as giving the DHS Secretary authority to ignore the entire statute when
“he deems [it] necessary.” Courts go to great lengths when reading federal statutes
to avoid constitutional difficulties. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297
U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); N.W. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009). And the Constitution forbids Congress to delegate its
lawmaking authority to the Executive Branch absent an “intelligible principle.”
Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474-76. Defendants’ interpretation of Section 1103(a)(3)
tests those constitutional limits because it fails to articulate any intelligible
principle for Congress’s delegation of limitless lawmaking power to DHS. Those

41

constitutional concerns are even graver under Defendants’ interpretation of 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3), which they invoke as the statutory basis to grant 4 million
EACs.

As explained above, Section 1324a(h)(3) is a definitional provision and

delegates nothing — much less does it unconstitutionally purport to delegate
limitless lawmaking power. See Part I.A.2.b, supra. The canon of constitutional
avoidance therefore requires reading both Section 1103(a)(3) and Section
1324a(h)(3) narrowly and to disallow DHS’s limitless discretion.
C.

Plaintiffs Have Standing

For all of its complexities, the point of the standing doctrine is simple: to
ensure that at least one plaintiff before this Court has “[t]he requisite personal
interest” to create a “Case” or “Controversy” under Article III. Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). The
Plaintiffs here have several personal interests: (1) the DHS Directive will impose
millions of dollars of costs on state licensing programs; (2) the Directive will force
the States to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on health, education, and lawenforcement programs; and (3) the Directive will distort labor and employment
markets in the Plaintiff States. Those interests are dramatically more concrete,
personal, and judicially cognizable than an interest in “breath[ing] the air,” a
generalized concern over “global warming,” or a desire to go fishing — all of which
were sufficient to support standing. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 678
(1973) (breathing air); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007) (global
warming); Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181-82 (fishing). The Defendants must
defeat all of these to win dismissal; they can defeat none.
42

1.

The DHS Directive Will Impose Economic Injuries On Plaintiffs’
Driver’s License Programs
a.

The States will lose money

As the Defendants appear to concede, Plaintiff States can establish standing
by showing that “[t]he costs of processing additional [driver’s] licenses” are not
“recouped through fees levied on the individual recipients.” Opp. 22 n.20. That
concession was a wise one because “economic injury is a quintessential injury upon
which to base standing.” Texas Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 586
(5th Cir. 2006) (citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1970)). And the
economic injuries associated with state driver’s license programs certainly are
“concrete and particularized,” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517; they are concrete in
that they can be measured in dollars and cents, and they are particularized in that
no one other than the States will incur them.
In Texas, for example, an individual “who is not a citizen of the United States
must present to the [Department of Public Safety (“DPS”)] documentation issued by
the appropriate United States agency that authorizes the applicant to be in the
United States before the applicant may be issued a driver’s license.” TEX. TRANSP.
CODE § 521.142(a). Section 521.1425(d), in turn, provides that DPS “may not deny a
driver’s license to an applicant who provides documentation described by Section
521.142(a) based on the duration of the person’s authorized stay in the United
States, as indicated by the documentation presented under Section 521.142(a).”
And if the applicant pays the required fee, DPS “shall issue” a driver’s license. Id.
§ 521.181. The fee is $24. Id. § 521.421(a), (a-3).

43

That fee does not come close to covering the State’s costs for issuing driver’s
licenses under the DHS Directive. Texas’s undocumented population numbers at
least 1.6 million. See Eschbach Decl. ¶ 33 (App. 0767). If only one-third of them
apply for driver’s licenses under the DHS Directive, it will cost the State $198.73
per license, at a net loss of $174.73 per license. See Peters Decl. ¶ 8 (App. 0860-61).
Even if only 2% of the undocumented population applies, it will cost the State
$154.89 per license, at a net loss of $130.89 per license. See ibid. Those costs are
understated because they do not include the costs of license renewals.

Ibid.

Moreover, federal law requires every State to verify every deferred action document
before issuing a license, and DHS forces the State to pay for 100% of every
verification7 — but those charges also are not included in the per-license figures
quoted above. Id. ¶ 9 (App. 0861-62). Texas is not unique. See, e.g., Fernan Decl.
(App. 0792-0802); Snemis Decl. (App. 0997-1003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-1105
(requiring the issuance of driver’s licenses to deferred action beneficiaries).8 Those
injuries are way more than the “identifiable trifle [that] is sufficient for standing.”
SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689 n.14; see also ibid. (“We have allowed important interests
to be vindicated by plaintiffs with no more at stake in the outcome of an action than
a fraction of a vote, a $5 fine and costs, and a $1.50 poll tax.” (citing Baker v. Carr,

See 6 C.F.R. § 37.13(b)(1) (States must verify using DHS’s “Systematic Alien Verification for
Entitlements,” “SAVE,” system); 49 U.S.C. § 30301 note (State must enter a “memorandum of
understanding” (“MOU”) with DHS to use the SAVE system); Systematic Alien Verification for
Entitlements Program Documents ¶ IV.B.3 (App. 0869-70) (Texas’s MOU, which requires the State
to pay 100% of the cost for every SAVE query); App. 1018 (Arizona’s MOU).
7

8 And the States’ costs are not limited to driver’s licenses. The DHS Directive will impose costs
on the States’ other licensing programs, too. See, e.g., Berndt Decl. (App. 0123-25); Neverman Decl.
(App. 0849-51).

44

369 U.S. 186 (1962), McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), and Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966))).
b.

The States’ injuries are not “self-inflicted”

Defendants cannot dismiss those injuries as “self-inflicted.”

Before this

Court, Defendants repeatedly insist that federal law does “not requir[e] [S]tates to
issue driver’s licenses to” deferred action beneficiaries. Opp. 10 n.12; see also id. at
21 (“[F]ederal law establishes a presumption that certain categories of aliens,
including the recipients of deferred action, are ‘not eligible for any State or local
public benefits.’ ”); id. at 22 (States have a choice to issue driver’s licenses to
deferred action beneficiaries, so the costs of doing so are “self-inflicted injuries”).
But just a few short months ago, the United States argued the opposite to the Ninth
Circuit.

See Amicus Br. of United States in Opp’n to Reh’g En Banc at 8-17,

Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, No. 13-16248 (9th Cir.) (filed Sept. 30, 2014)
(App. 0063-72).
Arizona Dream Act arose when Governor Brewer amended the State’s policies
to deny driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries; the State then further amended its
policies to deny licenses to all deferred action beneficiaries (not just DACA
recipients). See id. at 6. But the Ninth Circuit enjoined the State from making the
changes, both because the changes were preempted by federal law and because the
changes violated the U.S. Constitution. See Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer,
757 F.3d 1053, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit concluded that DHS wanted
DACA beneficiaries to work; that “the ability to drive may be a virtual necessity for
people who want to work in Arizona”; and that therefore, “conflict preemption”
45

principles would require Arizona to give driver’s licenses to all deferred action
beneficiaries — including DACA beneficiaries and presumably those under the DHS
Directive.

Ibid.9

The United States successfully defended that conclusion and

argued that federal law preempted the State’s effort to change its licensing policy —
even where the State was willing as Arizona was to deny licenses to all deferred
action beneficiaries (DACA and non-DACA alike). See Arizona Dream Act Amicus
Br. 12 (App. 0067).
It is troubling that the United States now urges this Court to find that these
injuries are “self-inflicted” because the Plaintiffs could change state law, refuse to
issue driver’s licenses under the DHS Directive, and thus frustrate DHS’s efforts to
allow 4 million undocumented immigrants to drive to work. See Opp. 21-22. That
is unquestionably untrue for Plaintiffs Arizona, Idaho, and Montana — all of which
are in the Ninth Circuit and are therefore bound by DOJ’s victory in Arizona Dream
Act.
Moreover, all of the Plaintiff States are harmed by the Defendants’ new-andimproved view of the law. As Defendants now describe it, the States are free to
deny driver’s licenses to deferred action beneficiaries — as long as the States deny
them to all deferred action beneficiaries. See Opp. 22 n.19 (“[A] State may not
selectively deny driver’s licenses to some recipients of deferred action.”); compare
9 The Ninth Circuit did not need to reach the preemption claim at the preliminary injunction
phase because it found that Arizona’s revised driver’s license policy violated the Equal Protection
Clause. But the Court of Appeals held that “[i]f Plaintiffs can ultimately show adequate proof of the
link between driver’s licenses and the ability to work in Arizona, we agree that [Arizona’s] policy
would be conflict-preempted.” 757 F.3d at 1062. The court rested that conclusion on its
interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14), see id., which is the same provision that the Defendants
have invoked to provide work permits under the DHS Directive, see supra p.18.

46

Arizona Dream Act Amicus Br. 14 (App. 0069). That is, the Defendants now say the
Plaintiffs face an all-or-nothing choice:

extend driver’s licenses to all deferred

action recipients (and bear the costs described above) or eliminate driver’s licenses
for all deferred action recipients (including the victims of torture, Hurricane
Katrina, child trafficking, and 9/11). But that sort of coercive all-or-nothing choice
is itself an Article III injury. Cf. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602-07 (2012)
(opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (holding all-or-nothing choice under the Affordable Care
Act’s Medicaid expansion was unconstitutionally coercive).
Moreover, even if the Plaintiff States could change their laws to avoid giving
licenses to DHS Directive beneficiaries, the obligation to change state law would
constitute an Article III harm that is traceable to the Directive. As the Supreme
Court has held, “ ‘the power to create and enforce a legal code, both civil and
criminal’ is one of the quintessential functions of a State,” and as a result, “the
State has [a] ‘direct stake’ . . . in defending the standards embodied in that code.”
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982), and Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 740 (1972)).

It follows that the State is injured when it is forced to

exercise its sovereign prerogative and change its legal code upon pain of paying a
financial penalty.
The Fifth Circuit has reached that conclusion on even harder facts. In Texas
v. United States, the Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas sued the State for refusing
to enter a Class III gaming compact with the tribe. 497 F.3d 491, 495 (5th Cir.

47

2007). Texas invoked its sovereign immunity; that sovereign act triggered dismissal
of the tribe’s lawsuit, but it also triggered a dispute-resolution process under
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior. Ibid. Texas then filed its
own lawsuit to have the Secretary’s regulations declared unlawful, and the Fifth
Circuit held the State was injured merely by being forced to go through an
administrative process it alleged was unlawful. Id. at 496-98. Moreover, the Fifth
Circuit rejected the Secretary’s claim that “Texas brought the injury on itself by
invoking a sovereign immunity defense” because Texas could not be forced to choose
between forfeiting that defense and submitting to an unlawful regulatory process.
Id. at 498. This is an easier case because forcing the States to change their laws is
an even greater affront to their sovereignty than merely inviting them to participate
in a dispute-resolution process. And Plaintiffs’ injuries are even less self-inflicted
because when they passed their driver’s licenses statutes, the States never could
have guessed that a President would one day commandeer dozens of driver’s
licenses programs and demand that the States pay for millions of licenses under
unlawful pretenses.

Cf. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 181

(1990) (States have legally cognizable reliance interests in preexisting federal law).
The States incur Article III injury when they rely on federal law and the federal
government unconstitutionally changes it.
Finally, Defendants’ entire conception of “self-inflicted” injuries is suspect.
An injury is self-inflicted so as to defeat standing “only if . . . the injury is so
completely due to the plaintiff ’s own fault as to break the causal chain.” St. Pierre

48

v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 402 (2d Cir. 2000). Thus, in NRDC v. FDA, 710 F.3d 71 (2d
Cir. 2013), the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff had standing to challenge
FDA’s failure to regulate a hand-soap chemical even if its members could have
avoided the soap through other means (e.g., by buying chemical-free soap or by
asking their employers to remove the chemical-containing soap). Id. at 84-85. The
court emphasized that the plaintiff could establish standing simply by showing that
the agency’s failure to regulate the chemical was a “contributing factor” to the
injury. Id. at 85. And there can be no doubt that the Defendants’ conduct here is a
“contributing factor” to the States’ injuries; without the Directive, the States will
not be forced to pay for millions of driver’s licenses or to change their laws. That
but-for causation is more than sufficient to show standing. See ibid.10
2.

Plaintiffs’ Standing Follows A Fortiori From Massachusetts v.
EPA

Independently, the States have standing under Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497 (2007). In that case, the Supreme Court held that Massachusetts had
Article III standing to sue a federal agency for failing to regulate greenhouse gases
based on a string of inferences. In particular, Massachusetts alleged that: (i) EPA’s
failure to regulate carbon dioxide and other molecules contributed in some small
way to the “greenhouse effect” in the Earth’s atmosphere; (ii) the increase in the
“greenhouse effect,” however minor, might eventually cause some unknowable rise
10 Illinois v. City of Chicago, 137 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1998), is not to the contrary. In that “odd
duck” case, the State of Illinois “attack[ed] the validity of its own statute,” insofar as it delegated to
the City of Chicago the power to enter certain interstate compacts relating to airports. Id. at 476. Of
course, if Illinois delegated its powers to a subordinate political subdivision (Chicago), the State had
only itself to blame for the consequences. This case is the polar opposite: the Plaintiff States cannot
control what the federal government does to them (or their driver’s license programs).

49

in sea levels; and (iii) the potential rise in sea levels could erode some indeterminate
number of centimeters of Massachusetts’ shoreline. This is an a fortiori case.
a.

States get “special solicitude” as plaintiffs

First, the Massachusetts Court emphasized that States are owed “special
solicitude in our standing analysis.” 549 U.S. at 520; see also id. at 518 (noting “the
special position and interest of Massachusetts”); ibid. (“It is of considerable
relevance that the party seeking review here is a sovereign State and not . . . a
private individual.”). Even “before the creation of the modern administrative state,
[the Supreme Court has] recognized that States are not normal litigants for the
purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction.” Ibid. That is because federal courts or
federal jurisdiction would not exist but for the States’ willingness to join together
and cede some of their sovereignty to the Union. Id. at 519; see also, e.g., Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 726-27 (1999).

For example, when it joined the Union,

Massachusetts gave up its pre-founding sovereign rights to “invade Rhode Island to
force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions,” to “negotiate an emissions treaty
with China or India,” and to exercise “its police powers to reduce in-state motorvehicle emissions” without fear of federal preemption. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at
519.

But what it got in return was special rights to vindicate its sovereign

prerogatives in federal court. Id. at 519-20. As Justice Holmes put it:
When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of outside
nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to
whatever might be done. They did not renounce the possibility of
making reasonable demands on the ground of their still remaining
quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to force is a suit in
[federal] court.

50

Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Georgia v. Pa. R. Co., 324
U.S. 439, 450 (1945) (“Trade barriers, recriminations, intense commercial rivalries
had plagued the colonies. The traditional methods available to a sovereign for the
settlement of such disputes were diplomacy and war.

Suit in this Court was

provided as an alternative.” (footnote omitted)).
Just so here. Border States cannot force their neighbors to reduce illegal
immigration; States cannot negotiate and sign immigration treaties with foreign
Nations; and much of the States’ power over immigration issues has been
preempted.11 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). But that does
not mean that the States lack sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests in the integrity
of their borders, their property, and their treasuries. To the contrary, the whole
premise of the federal system is that the States retain their sovereign and quasisovereign interests — they just agree to vindicate those interests through the
federal courts rather than through self-help. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520.
b.

Plaintiffs’ injuries are concrete, traceable, and redressable

The Plaintiffs’ injuries here are at least as concrete as those in
Massachusetts. In Massachusetts, the State submitted the declaration of a scientist
who testified that “[t]he atmospheric concentration” of greenhouse gases like carbon
dioxide “have been increasing since about 1750 as a result of human activities.”

11 The very premise of the Supremacy Clause, of course, is that state law must give way to
conflicting, and validly-enacted, federal laws, the creation of which the States participated in
through their representatives in Congress. But when the “law” at issue is unilateral executive action
of the sort at issue here, the Executive is purporting to effect preemption while circumventing
Congress and the representative process it embodies. This too injures the States. See Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583-88 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).

51

Declaration of Michael C. MacCracken ¶ 5(a), Massachusetts v. EPA (D.C. Cir. No.
03-1361) (filed June 14, 2004) (App. 0826-27). MacCracken explained that human
activities over the last 250 years made “major contributions to the rise in global sea
level by 10-20 cm (4 to 8 inches) observed over the past century.” Id. ¶ 5(c) (App.
0827).

And “in the absence of policy change, atmospheric concentrations of

greenhouse gases will continue to rise steadily throughout this century,” which in
turn would cause global sea levels to rise 4-35 inches by 2100. Id. ¶ 5(b), 5(d) (App.
0827-28). MacCracken conceded that greenhouse gases have myriad sources in the
U.S. and globally, and that the entire U.S. transportation sector was responsible for
only 7% of global fossil fuel emissions. Id. ¶ 31 (App. 0837). He did not explain how
any global-warming costs or harms could be attributed to those 7% of global
emissions, much less did he explain how any global-warming costs or harms could
be traced to the much narrower dispute before the EPA (namely, whether new cars
sold in the U.S. should have to comply with regulations that reduce but do not
eliminate carbon emissions). Rather, he concluded that, “[i]f the U.S. takes steps to
reduce motor vehicle emissions, other countries are very likely to take similar
actions,” and when combined with “progress in limiting other emissions,” the
collective global response “would discernibly and significantly reduce and delay
projected adverse consequences of global warming.”

Id. ¶ 32 (App. 0837).

The

Supreme Court held that MacCracken’s declaration was sufficient to establish the
State’s standing to challenge EPA’s inaction. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 52123.

52

This case is much easier because inferences are not required to show that
illegal immigration imposes billions of dollars in costs on the Plaintiff States. For
example, in the last two years for which data are available, the State of Texas spent
approximately $1.313 billion in uncompensated medical care for undocumented
immigrants.
approximately

See Allgeyer Decl. ¶ 11 (App. 0006).
$303

million

to

provide

Emergency

Moreover, Texas spent
Medicaid

services

to

undocumented immigrants over the last four years for which data are available. Id.
¶ 8 (App. 0004-05).

Texas spent approximately $106 million to provide CHIP

Perinatal Coverage to undocumented immigrants over the last three years for which
data are available. Id. ¶ 10 (App. 0005). Texas spent approximately $5.2 million to
provide Family Violence Program services to undocumented immigrants over the
last four years for which data are available. Id. ¶ 9 (App. 0005). And it costs the
State of Texas approximately $9,473 per year to educate each undocumented child
in its school system. See Dawn-Fisher Decl. ¶ 9 (App. 0739); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982) (States are constitutionally required to educate undocumented children).
Those costs will increase if additional undocumented immigrants come to Texas.
See Allgeyer Decl. ¶ 12 (App. 0006); Dawn-Fisher Decl. ¶ 12 (App. 0740). Again,
Texas is not unique. See, e.g., Bailey Decl. ¶ 5 (App. 0078); ARKANSAS MEDICAID,
MEDICAL SERVICES POLICY MANUAL § B-250 (regarding coverage of prenatal care for
undocumented immigrants); id. § B-500 (concerning coverage of emergency care for
undocumented immigrants).

53

And the causal connection between the DHS Directive and increases in
undocumented immigration is dramatically tighter than the link between EPA’s
refusal to regulate carbon emissions from new cars sold in the U.S. and the loss of
Massachusetts’ coastline.

MacCracken could only speculate that an EPA rule

governing new cars in the U.S. might prompt other nations to take similar actions
that, when combined with “progress in limiting other emissions,” might slow the
pace of global warming in some unspecified way and to some unspecified extent.
MacCracken Decl. ¶ 32 (App. 0837). Whereas here, one of the Defendants conceded
that Defendants’ immigration policies are causing increases in illegal immigration.
FAC ¶¶ 37, 43, 62. Moreover, first-hand reports reveal that individuals illegally
crossing the border think that the Defendants will give them “ ‘permisos,’ or passes
that grant them permission to remain in the United States indefinitely.” Dunks
Decl. ¶ 6 (App. 0747-48).

Undocumented immigrants have reported to Texas

officials that they came to the United States illegally “because they have seen flyers
in their home countries promoting the federal government’s favorable immigration
policies.” Ibid. And since the Defendants implemented DACA, it has cost the State
of Texas $26.9 million in law-enforcement resources to deal with what the President
himself has characterized as a “humanitarian crisis” on Texas’s border. FAC ¶ 31;
Baker Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8 (App. 0081-82). “These expenditures reflect costs associated
with employee overtime, travel, aviation, and other expenses that [Texas] would not
have incurred but for this emergency operation.”

Baker Decl. ¶ 8 (App. 0082).

Finally, if there was any doubt about the cause-and-effect relationship between

54

Defendants’ policies and undocumented immigration, that doubt is eliminated by
Plaintiffs’ expert demographer, who affirmed that the DHS Directive will
“discernibly and significantly” increase undocumented immigration. Eschbach Decl.
¶ 5(a) (App. 0752-53).
c.

The size of Plaintiffs’ injuries is irrelevant

The Massachusetts Court held it was irrelevant that the State had no idea
whether or how action by EPA would affect climate change on a global scale. 549
U.S. at 524.

The Court held that any step — however “small,” “tentative,” or

efficacious — is sufficient. Ibid. Correlatively, the Court held it was irrelevant to
Massachusetts’ injuries whether any benefits from U.S. regulation would be more
than offset by increased pollution in “developing countries such as China and
India.” Id. at 525-26. All that mattered, the Court held, is that the reduction of
even one emitted carbon-dioxide molecule “would slow the pace of global emissions
increases, no matter what happens elsewhere.” Id. at 526.
Again, this case is much easier. It is undisputable — and Defendant Vitiello
already has conceded in principle — that illegal immigration increases when
Defendants announce to the world that 40% of the undocumented population can
stay and work in the United States. See FAC ¶¶ 37, 43, 62; Dunks Decl. ¶ 6 (App.
0747-48); Eschbach Decl. ¶ 5(a) (App. 0752-53). Moreover, it is undisputable that
the DHS Directive incentivizes undocumented immigrants to stay in the United
States when they otherwise would choose not to. See Eschbach Decl. ¶¶ 5(a), 17
(App. 0752-53, 0759). Either way, invalidating the DHS Directive would slow the

55

pace of growth in undocumented immigration by at least one person. And that’s all
that Article III requires. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 526.
d.

Defendants’ counterarguments fail

Against all of this, Defendants offer four unpersuasive counterarguments.
First, they claim that Massachusetts is irrelevant because Congress
authorized that State to sue under the Clean Air Act, whereas “Congress has not
authorized the type of challenge brought by Plaintiffs.” Opp. 26. That is wrong; the
Administrative Procedure Act provides a right of review precisely because no other
statute does. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject
to judicial review.” (emphasis added)). And it is hornbook administrative law that
the same standards apply under both statutes. See Catawba County v. EPA, 571
F.3d 20, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“[W]e apply the same standard of review
under the Clean Air Act as we do under the Administrative Procedure Act.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Second, Defendants claim that the problems associated with undocumented
immigration are a “generalized grievance” of “wide public significance.” Opp. 27-30.
But the exact same thing could have been said — in fact, was said — about global
warming. And the Supreme Court rejected it as irrelevant: “That these climatechange risks are ‘widely shared’ does not minimize Massachusetts’ interest in the
outcome of this litigation.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522; see also FEC v. Akins,
524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (“[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the

56

Court has found ‘injury in fact.’ ”). For all of the reasons given above, the States’
injuries here are at least as concrete as Massachusetts’ were there.
Third, Defendants are wrong to suggest that the “prudential standing”
doctrine somehow bars the federal courts from adjudicating issues of “ ‘ broad public
significance.’ ” Opp. 28 (quoting Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, 987
F.2d 1174, 1176 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc)). To the contrary, the Supreme Court has
held that “the Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases properly before it, even
those it “ ‘would gladly avoid.’ ” Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct.
1421, 1427 (2012) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)).
The only exception is a “narrow” one called the political question doctrine. Ibid.
And notably, Defendants do not claim that this case fits within that exception.
Moreover, Defendants cannot explain how this case somehow involves issues of
“broad[er] public significance” than worldwide carbon emissions (Massachusetts),
the President’s power to seize the steel mills in the middle of the Korean War
(Youngstown), or for that matter, the standing of 27 States to challenge the
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act (NFIB).
Finally, Defendants speculate that the costs imposed on the States by the
DHS Directive “may be offset” by an increase in sales or income tax revenues. See
Opp. 22 n.20. For three reasons, such speculation cannot defeat standing. First,
the expenditure of money is an injury, no matter when or whether that expenditure
is offset. See, e.g., Los Angeles Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 644, 657
(9th Cir. 2011) (“[S]o long as Haven Hospice can point to some concrete harm

57

logically produced by [the regulation], it has standing to challenge the hospice cap
regulation even though in a prior, current, or subsequent fiscal year it may also
have enjoyed some offsetting benefits from the operation of the current
regulation.”); ALCOA v. Bonneville Power Admin., 903 F.2d 585, 590 (9th Cir. 1989)
(“There is harm in paying rates that may be excessive, no matter what the
California utilities may have saved.”).

Indeed, there can be little doubt that

economic productivity associated with greenhouse-gas emissions offset some or all of
Massachusetts’ injuries, but that did not figure into the Court’s analysis at all. Cf.
549 U.S. at 524 (holding irrelevant whether benefits from EPA rule would be
“offset” by carbon emissions in China). Second, the Defendants cannot meet hard
numbers with hunches about what “may be.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, Inc. v. NHTSA,
342 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2004) (“Speculation . . . is insufficient to defeat
standing.”).

Lastly, even if the Defendants could prove that the Plaintiffs will

eventually recoup their costs, the Plaintiffs still would have standing because
deprivation of the time value of money is an injury of its own. See Austin v. New
Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 659 n.4 (1975) (holding that plaintiffs had standing, even
though their income tax payments to New Hampshire were eventually refunded by
their home States because the plaintiffs had to wait for the refund).
3.

Plaintiffs Have Parens Patriae Standing
a.

States can sue to protect citizens against economic
discrimination

All of the Plaintiff States have a third, independent, and well-established
basis for standing: the parens patriae doctrine. “Parens patriae means literally

58

‘parent of the country,’ ” and it is a common-law doctrine that provides standing for
States to vindicate their “quasi-sovereign” interests in federal court.

Alfred L.

Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600. One of the quasi-sovereign interests that gives a State
federal-court standing is the protection of its citizens’ “economic well-being.” Id. at
605; see Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 738-39 (1981) (Maryland has parens
patriae standing to ensure that its citizens have access to natural gas on nondiscriminatory terms); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923)
(Pennsylvania has parens patriae standing to ensure its access to natural gas
produced in West Virginia because it is important to economic well-being of
Pennsylvania’s citizens); Georgia v. Pa. R. Co., 324 U.S. at 450-51 (Georgia has
parens patriae standing to challenge antitrust conspiracy operating against
Georgia’s shippers).
For example, in Alfred L. Snapp, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico brought
suit in federal district court against a group of apple orchards for discriminating
against Puerto Rican workers and instead hiring Jamaican workers.

The

Commonwealth argued that the INA prohibited such discrimination against U.S.
workers.

The Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth had parens patriae

standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief: “Just as we have long recognized
that a State’s interests in the health and well-being of its residents extend beyond
mere physical interests to economic and commercial interests, we recognize a
similar state interest in securing residents from the harmful effects of
discrimination” by employers. 458 U.S. at 609.

59

Likewise here, the DHS Directive discriminates against U.S. citizens by
making it more expensive for employers to hire them vis-à-vis the deferred action
beneficiaries. In particular, deferred action beneficiaries are ineligible to purchase
subsidized health insurance on the Affordable Care Act exchanges. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 152.2(8). That means employers subject to the so-called “employer mandate” in 26
U.S.C. § 4980H(b) can hire EAC beneficiaries, not afford them “minimum essential
coverage,” and not pay a penalty. See id. § 4980H(b)(1). Contrariwise, if the same
employer hired an unemployed citizen in the Plaintiff States, it would be subject to
the employer mandate and would pay penalties for failing to offer required
coverage. Thus, the DHS Directive effectively gives such employers a waiver from
the Affordable Care Act as long as they hire EAC-holders. That waiver will make
employers substantially more likely to hire EAC-holders instead of citizens in the
Plaintiff States. See Welch Decl. ¶¶ 25-26 (App. 1039); Friends of the Earth, 528
U.S. at 185 (“ ‘[A]ll civil penalties have some deterrent effect.’ ” (quoting Hudson v.
United States, 522 U.S. 93, 102 (1997))).

And economic discrimination against

Plaintiffs’ citizens in the employment context is precisely the economic harm that
the Supreme Court held sufficient to create parens patriae standing in Alfred L.
Snapp. See 458 U.S. at 609.
The Plaintiff States’ quasi-sovereign interests — and hence their bases for
parens patriae standing — do not stop there. Several Plaintiffs have state laws that
prohibit employers in their States from hiring undocumented immigrants. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212; MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-11-3(7)(e); S.C. CODE ANN.

60

§ 41-8-50(D)(2); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-103(d) (2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-1B-7.
And the Supreme Court has twice held that those statutes are valid exercises of the
States’ “broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment
relationship to protect workers within the State.” De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,
356 (1976); see also Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011)
(reaffirming that result).

Because the Defendants’ actions would change those

employment relationships and the scope of the States’ police powers, the States
have parens patriae standing. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519 (States have
parens patriae standing where they could “exercise [their] police powers” but for
federal law).12
b.

States can sue DHS

It is no answer to claim that “ ‘[a] State does not have standing as parens
patriae to bring an action against the Federal Government.’ ”

Opp. 24 (quoting

Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 610 n.16 (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,
485-86 (1923))). As the Supreme Court subsequently held, neither Alfred L. Snapp
nor Mellon precludes States from suing federal agencies, full-stop.

See

Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17. Rather, those cases merely prevent a State
from suing “to protect her citizens from the operation of federal statutes.” Ibid.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, nothing in this suit seeks to protect
the Plaintiffs’ citizens from the operation of federal statutes. To the contrary, as in
12 Moreover, the Directive will cause other distortions in the States’ labor markets by making
new workers eligible for unemployment insurance, which is paid exclusively by employers in the
Plaintiff States. See, e.g., Gill Decl. (App. 0804-05); Pollock Decl. (App. 0880-82); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 11-10-511 (requiring the payment of unemployment benefits to aliens who are lawfully present for
the purpose of performing services or otherwise residing in the United States under color of law).

61

Alfred L. Snapp and Massachusetts, the Plaintiff States are suing to force the
Defendants to comply with federal statutes like the INA, IIRIRA, and the APA.
4.

One Plaintiff With Standing Is Sufficient To Create A “Case” Or
“Controversy”

Officials from 25 different States have joined this lawsuit to challenge the
unlawfulness of the President’s unilateralism, and all of the Plaintiffs have
standing for at least one of the reasons given above. It is well-settled, however, that
this Court need only find that one plaintiff has standing; that is all Article III
requires to create a “Case” or “Controversy.” As the Supreme Court has held:
Once it is determined that a particular plaintiff is harmed by the
defendant, and that the harm will likely be redressed by a favorable
decision, that plaintiff has standing — regardless of whether there are
others who would also have standing to sue. Thus, we are satisfied
that both of these actions are Article III “Cases” that we have a duty to
decide.
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 434-36 (1998). The Supreme Court has
reaffirmed that proposition time and time again. See, e.g., Massachusetts, 549 U.S.
at 518 (“Only one of the petitioners needs to have standing to permit us to consider
the petition for review.”); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights,
Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006) (The Court need “not determine whether the other
plaintiffs have standing because the presence of one party with standing is
sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.”); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) (“It is clear that members of the Union, one of
whom is an appellee here, will sustain injury by not receiving a scheduled increase
in benefits. . . . We therefore need not consider the standing issue as to the Union or
Members of Congress.”); Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160
62

(1981) (“Because we find California has standing, we do not consider the standing of
the other plaintiffs.”); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 264 & n.9 (1977) (“Because of the presence of this plaintiff, we need not
consider whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to
maintain suit.”).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, DOJ raised the same all-plaintiffs-musthave-standing argument in the Affordable Care Act litigation — which was the last
time a nationwide, multi-State coalition lawsuit challenged the lawfulness of the
federal government’s actions. The Eleventh Circuit rejected DOJ’s argument as
contrary to the “abundantly clear” law. Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. HHS, 648 F.3d
1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The law is abundantly clear that so long as at least
one plaintiff has standing to raise each claim — as is the case here — we need not
address whether the remaining plaintiffs have standing.”), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). And DOJ did not revive the argument before the
Supreme Court — presumably because it is foreclosed by decades of precedent.13
*

*

*

In short, for all of the reasons given above, at least one Plaintiff State will
suffer a concrete and particularized injury from the DHS Directive, and a favorable

13 The foregoing constitutes just a sample of the Plaintiff States’ injuries from the Directive, but
that sample is plainly sufficient to justify a preliminary injunction: “The purpose of a preliminary
injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be
held. Given this limited purpose, and given the haste that is often necessary if those positions are to
be preserved, a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less
formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits. A party thus is not required
to prove his case in full at a preliminary-injunction hearing.” University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451
U.S. 390, 395 (1981). Either through jurisdictional discovery or a trial on the merits, Plaintiffs could
(and if necessary would) offer still more evidence of injuries from still more Plaintiff States.

63

decision enjoining that Directive will redress that injury in whole or in part. That is
all that Article III requires. And on the merits, the Defendants have no answers to
the statutory provisions prohibiting the Directive or the unbroken line of judicial
precedent requiring the Directive to comport with the APA. Plaintiffs therefore are
likely to succeed on the merits.
II.

PLAINTIFFS WILL INCUR IRREPARABLE INJURIES
Once DHS begins implementing its Directive, the States will suffer

irreparable injury for at least three reasons.

First, unless the Court issues a

preliminary injunction, the States must prepare to issue hundreds of thousands of
new driver’s licenses to deferred action beneficiaries, which will cost millions of
dollars. See Part I.C.1, supra; see also CBS Los Angeles, Long Lines Expected at
DMV Friday as Undocumented Immigrants Apply for Licenses (Jan. 1, 2015),
available at http://cbsloc.al/141FFAj (“The Department of Motor Vehicles expects
big crowds on Friday, the first day undocumented immigrants in California can
officially apply for a driver’s license. The DMV has hired more than 1,000 workers
and opened four new centers to handle the rush.”).
Second, the States will have to pay millions of dollars to remediate the
problems created by the Directive — including healthcare, law-enforcement, and
education. See Part I.C.2, supra. It will be difficult or impossible to recover those
costs from the federal government. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott, 131 S.
Ct. 1, 4 (2010) (Scalia, J., in chambers); Nalco Co. v. EPA, 786 F. Supp. 2d 177, 188
(D.D.C. 2011); Feinerman v. Bernardi, 558 F. Supp. 2d 36, 51 (D.D.C. 2008).

64

Third, as the President himself confessed, it will be difficult or impossible to
unwind the DHS Directive after it goes into effect. See President Barack Obama,
Remarks by the President in Immigration Town Hall — Nashville, Tennessee (Dec.
9, 2014) (App. 0887) (“It’s true that theoretically a future administration could do
something that I think would be very damaging. It’s not likely, politically, that
they’d reverse everything that we’ve done.”).
III.

THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES TIPS IN PLAINTIFFS’ FAVOR
Defendants cannot claim any countervailing injury from delaying the

implementation of their new entitlement program by a few months.

First, the

status quo has existed “for years.” Michael D. Shear, For Obama, Executive Order
on Immigration Would be a Turnabout, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2014), available at
http://nyti.ms/1uGy9oI (“For years, he has waved aside the demands of Latino
activists and Democratic allies who begged him to act on his own, and he insisted
publicly that a decision to shield millions of immigrants from deportation without
an act of Congress would amount to nothing less than the dictates of a king, not a
president.”).
Second, the United States and its amici offer a heartfelt defense of the
President’s motives for unilateral lawmaking, and the Plaintiff States share their
humanitarian concerns. But “[s]urely if ever there were a case for ‘balancing’ and
giving weight to the asserted ‘national interest’ to sustain governmental action, it
was in the Steel Seizure Cases.”
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

Nixon v. GSA, 433 U.S. 425, 560 (1977)

During the Korean War, a well-meaning President

Truman seized steel mills because “a work stoppage would immediately jeopardize
65

and imperil our national defense . . . and would add to the continuing danger of our
soldiers, sailors, and airmen engaged in combat in the field.” Youngstown, 343 U.S.
at 590-91. But the Supreme Court upheld the district court’s preliminary injunction
against the President’s actions, charging the federal judiciary with policing even
benevolent abuses of executive power:
It is not a pleasant judicial duty to find that the President has
exceeded his powers and still less so when his purposes were dictated
by concern for the Nation’s wellbeing . . . . But it would stultify one’s
faith in our people to entertain even a momentary fear that the
patriotism and the wisdom of the President and the Congress, as well
as the long view of the immediate parties in interest, will not find
ready accommodation for differences on matters which, however close
to their concern and however intrinsically important, are
overshadowed by the awesome issues which confront the world.
Id. at 614 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(“There can be no doubt that the emergency which caused the President to seize
these steel plants was one that bore heavily on the country. But the emergency did
not create power; it merely marked an occasion when power should be exercised.”).
So even with the Nation at war and with soldiers’ lives on the line, the President is
not allowed to defend executive overreach by arguing that gains outweigh harms, or
that ends justify means.
IV.

THE PUBLIC
INJUNCTION

INTEREST

NECESSITATES

A

PRELIMINARY

The United States tacitly concedes that the question presented in this case is
whether the President can rewrite entire sections of the U.S. Code through
unilateral executive action and without any judicial review whatsoever.

Under

Defendants’ view of the world, future presidents can affirmatively authorize

66

taxpayers not to pay their taxes, companies not to comply with environmental laws,
and employers not to comply with workplace-safety statutes. See PI Mot. 32. That
is a dangerous path to go down because in some ways “an unenforced law is worse
than no law at all.”

Kenji Yoshino, On Empathy in Judgment (Measure for

Measure), 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 683, 685 (2009).
Once the Executive Branch starts down that path, it uses each previous step
to justify the next one. Compare OLC Memo 15-19 (using past instances of deferred
action to justify DHS Directive), with NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2592
(2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing DOJ’s “adverse-possession
theory of executive authority”). Only the courts can prevent the Executive’s selfaggrandizement:
It is said that other Presidents without congressional authority have
taken possession of private business enterprises in order to settle labor
disputes. But even if this be true, Congress has not thereby lost its
exclusive constitutional authority to make laws necessary and proper
to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution . . . . The Founders
of this Nation entrusted the law making power to the Congress alone
in both good and bad times.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588-89 (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
If the courts want to reconsider the lines drawn in Youngstown, they are
free to do so. But that reconsideration should be conducted carefully and before the
Executive Branch redraws the lines on its own.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.

67

LUTHER STRANGE
Attorney General of Alabama

KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas

MARK BRNOVICH
Attorney General of Arizona

CHARLES E. ROY
First Assistant Attorney General

DUSTIN MCDANIEL
Attorney General of Arkansas

JAMES D. BLACKLOCK

PAMELA JO BONDI
Attorney General of Florida
SAMUEL S. OLENS
Attorney General of Georgia
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General of Idaho
JOSEPH C. CHAPELLE
PETER J. RUSTHOVEN
Counsel for the State of Indiana
DEREK SCHMIDT
Attorney General of Kansas
JAMES D. “BUDDY” CALDWELL
Attorney General of Louisiana

/s/ Andrew S. Oldham
ANDREW S. OLDHAM
Deputy Solicitor General
Attorney-in-Charge
State Bar No. 24081616
J. CAMPBELL BARKER
Deputy Solicitor General
ARTHUR C. D’ANDREA
Assistant Solicitor General
ANGELA V. COLMENERO
ADAM N. BITTER
Assistant Attorneys General
Office of the Attorney General of Texas
P.O. Box 78711
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
512-936-1700

TIMOTHY C. FOX
Attorney General of Montana
JON C. BRUNING
Attorney General of Nebraska
WAYNE STENEHJEM
Attorney General of North Dakota
MICHAEL DEWINE
Attorney General of Ohio
ERIC E. MURPHY
Co-counsel for the State of Ohio
(additional counsel on following page)

68

E. SCOTT PRUITT
Attorney General of Oklahoma
ALAN WILSON
Attorney General of South Carolina
MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General of South Dakota
SEAN D. REYES
Attorney General of Utah
PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General of West Virginia
BRAD D. SCHIMEL
Attorney General of Wisconsin
BILL SCHUETTE
Attorney General for the People of
Michigan
DREW SNYDER
Counsel for the Governor of Mississippi
PAUL R. LEPAGE
Governor of Maine

ROBERT C. STEPHENS
Counsel for the Governor of North
Carolina
TOM C. PERRY
CALLY YOUNGER
Counsel for the Governor of Idaho

69

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I served a copy of this pleading on the following counsel for the
Defendants via this Court’s CM/ECF system:
Adam Kirschner
Kyle R. Freeny
Trial Attorneys
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
20 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Room 7126
Washington, D.C. 20001
Daniel David Hu
U.S. Attorney’s Office
1000 Louisiana, Suite 2300
Houston, Texas 77002

/s/ Andrew S. Oldham
ANDREW S. OLDHAM